20 CONSTI1 - Ruffy V Chief of Staff Digest - Crisostomo (Executive)

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 | DIGESTS | 1D

Case No. <20>: <Ruffy v Chief of Staff>


No. L-533. August 20, 1946.

TOPIC: <Military Powers>

FACTS:
The petitioners in this case prays that the records of the proceedings before the General
Court Martial be reviewed by the Court. The petition filed by the petitioners prays also the
prohibition from further proceedings in the trial of petitioners before the General Court Martial
on grounds that petitioners were not subject to military law at the time the offense for which
they had been placed on trial was committed.
Petitioners in this case retreated to the mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy
during the landing of the Japanese forces in the Philippines. They organized and led a guerrilla
outfit known as Bolo Combat Team or Bolo Area.
On July 26, 1941, the President of the United States issued a military order, as
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, call and order into the
service of the armed forces of the United States for the period of the existing emergency,
and place under the command of the general officer, United States Army, to be designated
by the Secretary of War, from time to time, all of the organized military forces of the
Government of the Commonwealth.
As per Special Orders and upon instructions to Colonel Jurado on November 2, 1943,
petitioners were appointed as officers of the Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the
6th Military District under the operational control of the United States Army. The Bolo Area
received supplies and funds for the salaries of its officers and men from the Southwest Pacific
Command.
After a change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected by Colonel Jurado,
relieving Major Ruffy of his assignment as Commanding Officer, Lieut. Col. Jurado was slain
allegedly by the petitioners. After the commission of such crime, the petitioners, were formally
withdrawn from the 6th Military District. It was the murder which gave rise to petitioners' trial,
the legality of which is now being contested.
Petitioners' contention is that by the enemy occupation of the Philippines, the National
Defense Act and all laws and regulations creating and governing the existence of the Philippine
Army including the Articles of War, were suspended and in abeyance during such belligerent
occupation.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were subject to the military law decided before the General
Court Martial

PETITIONER (NAME): RESPONDENT (NAME):


RAMON RUFFY as Commanding Officer of THE CHIEF OF
the Bolo Area, VICTORIANO DINGLASAN as STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL.,
Finance Officer, JOSE L. GARCIA as Acting respondents.
Commanding Officer, ANDRES FORTUS as
Corporal and PRUDENTE M. FRANCISCO
and DOMINADOR ADEVA as members of
the Bolo Area
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 | DIGESTS | 1D

SC RULINGS:
Yes, petitioners were subject to the military law.
The Court ruled that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are considered
superseded or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the
civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not bind the enemies in
arms.
The petitioners come within the general application of the clause in sub-paragraph (a)
of Article of War which defines person subject to military law, to wit: “all other persons lawfully
called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they
are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same. By their acceptance of
appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military
District, they became members of the Philippine Army amenable to the Articles of War.
The attitude of the enemy toward underground movements did not affect the military
status of guerrillas who had been called into the service of the Philippine Army. If the invaders
refused to look upon guerrillas, without distinctions, as legitimate troops, that did not stop the
guerrillas who had been inducted into the service of the Philippine Army from being component
parts thereof, bound to obey military orders and subject to military discipline.
Petitioners failed to perceive the nature of courts martial and the sources of the authority
for their creation. Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the
authorities "for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be attached to the
constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief, independently of
legislation."
The Supreme Court of the United States referring to the provisions of the Constitution
authorizing Congress to provide for the government of the army, excepting military offenses
from the civil jurisdiction, and making the President Commander in Chief, observes that
(1) Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval
offences in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations, and that the power to do
so is given without any connection between it and (2) the Article of the Constitution defining
the judicial power of the United States; indeed that the two powers are entirely independent
of each other.
Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-
martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as
Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and
enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives. The only legitimate object of military tribunals is to aid the Crown to
maintain the discipline and government of the Army. (Winthrop's Military Law and
Precedents, 2d Edition)
Petition dismissed.

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