City Of Manila vs. Chinese Community Of Manila, 40 Phil.

349 (1919)
CASE DIGEST

FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery
for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such
public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are
within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were
available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss
and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that
would have to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of
land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent
domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation.
Thus, the same filed an appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the
expropriation.

HELD:The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal
corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature.
But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under
the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire
to.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Vda. De Castellvi (G.R. No. L-20620) - Digest

Facts:

In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement
over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate
the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth
almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an
ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation
proceedings for the land in question.

Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation
should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property that year .

The requisites for taking are:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;

2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;

3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;

4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and

5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.

Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, “momentary” when applied to
possession or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean “a limited period” -- not
indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from
year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The
fact that the Republic, through AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter
the fact that the entry into the lant was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from
year to year by consent of the owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the
republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time
the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy
the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this
“intention” cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract.

The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the property and
its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment
of the property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic,
as shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease
contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was
terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the
Republic was bound to pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time
when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi’s property should not be determined
on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when
it held that the “taking” of the property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint
in this case.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to
be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

Republic vs Gingoyon
481 SCRA 457 [GR No. 166429 December 19, 2005]

Facts: The Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA 3) was conceived, designed and
constructed to serve as the country’s show window to the world. Regrettably, it has spawned controversies.
Regrettably too, despite the apparent completion of the terminal complex way back it has not yet been operated.
This has caused immeasurable economic damage to the country, not to mention its deplorable discredit in the
international community. In the first case that reached this Court, Agan v. PIATCO,the contracts which the
Government had with the contractor were voided for being contrary to law and public policy. The second case now
before the Court involves the matter of just compensation due the contractor for the terminal complex it built. We
decide the case on the basis of fairness, the same norm that pervades both the Court’s 2004 Resolution in the first
case and the latest expropriation law. The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Court’s
decision in Agan v. PIATCO,promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This decision nullified the “Concession
Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger
Terminal III” entered into between the Philippine Government (Government) and the Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments and supplements thereto. The agreement had authorized
PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the
said terminal during the concession period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo
Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did not possess the requisite financial capacity when it was awarded the
NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement was contrary to public policy. At the time of the promulgation of the 2003
Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the
ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as well
as whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities. PIATCO and
several respondents-intervenors filed their respective motions for the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision. These
motions were denied by the Court in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004 (2004 Resolution). However, the Court
this time squarely addressed the issue of the rights of PIATCO to refund, compensation or reimbursement for its
expenses in the construction of the NAIA 3 facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3
facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the
airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation
regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. It also appears that arbitral proceedings were commenced before the International
Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration and the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes, although the Government has raised jurisdictional questions before those two bodies. Then, on
21 December 2004, the Government11 filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court
(RTC), together with an Application for Special Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special raffle. The
Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take
immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited
the amount of P3,002,125,000.0012 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the
NAIA 3 terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes. The case was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC,
presided by respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day that the Complaint was
filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to
“take or enter upon the possession” of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of City of Manila v. Serrano, the RTC
noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession upon the filing of a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance, and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property subject to expropriation. The RTC found these requisites present, particularly noting that “[t]he
case record shows that [the Government has] deposited the assessed value of the [NAIA 3 facilities] in the Land
Bank of the Philippines, an authorized depositary, as shown by the certification attached to their complaint.” Also on
the same day, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession. According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take
possession over the NAIA 3 facilities immediately after the Writ of Possession was issued. However, on 4 January
2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of
Possession. In the 4 January 2005 Order, now assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted that its earlier issuance
of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was
observed that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as “An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition
of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes” and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many respects.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8794 should be applied in the instant expropriation case and not Rule 67.

Held: Yes. At the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even
assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should
then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court’s requirement in
the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the Government may
take over the property.

It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of
“immediate payment” in cases involving national government infrastructure projects.

As acknowledged in the 2003 Decision, the development of NAIA 3 was made pursuant to a build-operate-and-
transfer arrangement pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957, as amended,which pertains to infrastructure or
development projects normally financed by the public sector but which are now wholly or partly implemented by the
private sector. Under the build-operate-and-transfer scheme, it is the project proponent which undertakes the
construction, including the financing, of a given infrastructure facility.

There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities which it had financed and constructed.
The 2004 Resolution squarely recognized that right when it mandated the payment of just compensation to PIATCO
prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3. The fact that the Government resorted to eminent domain
proceedings in the first place is a concession on its part of PIATCO’s ownership. Indeed, if no such right is
recognized, then there should be no impediment for the Government to seize control of NAIA 3 through ordinary
ejectment proceedings.
Since the rights of PIATCO over the NAIA 3 facilities are established, the nature of these facilities should now be
determined.

The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties just like the soil to which they are adhered. Any sub-
classifications of real property and divergent treatment based thereupon for purposes of expropriation must be based
on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal protection clause of the Constitution is violated. There may be
perhaps a molecular distinction between soil and the inorganic improvements adhered thereto, yet there are no
purposive distinctions that would justify a variant treatment for purposes of expropriation. Both the land itself and
the improvements thereupon are susceptible to private ownership independent of each other, capable of pecuniary
estimation, and if taken from the owner, considered as a deprivation of property. The owner of improvements seized
through expropriation suffers the same degree of loss as the owner of land seized through similar means. Equal
protection demands that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. For purposes of expropriation, parcels of land are similarly situated as the buildings or
improvements constructed thereon, and a disparate treatment between those two classes of real property infringes
the equal protection clause.

Even as the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8974 call for that law’s application in this case, the threshold test must still
be met whether its implementation would conform to the dictates of the Court in the 2004 Resolution. Unlike in the
case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the
payment of just compensation before any takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the Government. The 2004
Resolution does not particularize the extent such payment must be effected before the takeover, but it
unquestionably requires at least some degree of payment to the private property owner before a writ of possession
may issue. The utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974 guarantees compliance with this bare minimum requirement, as it
assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the proffered value of the property to be seized.
Such payment of the proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the
Government, is precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974, one which facially complies with the prescription
laid down in the 2004 Resolution.

Clearly then, we see no error on the part of the RTC when it ruled that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the instant
expropriation proceedings.

CASE DIGEST: MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON. FERDINAND J.
MARCOS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cebu City, THE
CITY OF CEBU, represented by its Mayor, HON. TOMAS R. OSMEA, and EUSTAQUIO B. CESA,
respondents. (G.R. No. 120082; September 11, 1996)

FACTS:

Under its charter, the MCIAA shall be exempt from realty taxes imposed by the National Government or
any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. In 1994, the Local Government Unit
(LGU) of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to MCIAA.

MCIAA objected to the same as baseless and unjustified, claiming its exemption under its charter. Also,
it cites the LGC stating that LGUs taxing power does not extend to taxes, fees or charges of any kind on
the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units.
Cebu City countered, however, citing Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC which withdraw tax exemptions
of GOCCs and realty tax exemptions previously granted to ore presently enjoyed by all persons, whether
natural or juridical, including GOCCs.

MCIAA paid tax under protest. It insisted that the taxing powers of LGUs do not extend to the levy of
taxes or fees of any kind on an instrumentality of the national government. It also insisted that while it is
indeed a GOCC, it nonetheless stands on the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the
national government by the very nature of its powers and functions.

ISSUES:

[1] Is MCIAA a taxable person?

[2] Is MCIAA exempt from realty taxation?

HELD:

[1] Yes, although it previously enjoyed exemption from realty tax under its charter (which has already
been withdrawn by the LGC), this exemption extended only to said tax, not to other taxes. Hence,
MCIAA is still a taxable person.

[2] No, MCIAA is not exempt from realty tax by the City of Cebu. First, its tax exemption under its charter
has already been withdrawn. Second, while it is true that LGUs cannot levy tax on property of the
Republic of the Philippines or the National Government (outside Metro Manila), the beneficial use of
property should not be given to a taxable person

Here, MCIAA is already the owner of the parcels of land in question. Hence, even the exemption under
the LGC cannot apply.

PROTON PILIPINAS CORPORATION et al. v. BANQUE NATIONALE DE

PARIS

460 SCRA 260 (2005), THIRD DIVISION

Petitioner Proton Pilipinas Corporation (Proton) availed credit facilities of
respondent Banque Nationale De Paris (BNP). In order to assure payment, co-
petitioners Automotive Corporation, Asea One Corporation and Autocorp Group
executed a corporate guarantee.

Proton failed to comply with his obligation to BNP. Thereafter, BNP demanded the
payment of Proton‘s obligation to its co-petitioners pursuant to corporate guarantee.
But the same remained unheeded. BNP then filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) against Proton et al. The clerk of court assessed the docket fee. Proton
et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the court cannot exercise jurisdiction
over the case because BNP did not properly pay the docket fees. The RTC denied the
motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the motion of Proton et al.
Hence this present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court does not acquire jurisdiction when there is an improper
payment of docket fees

HELD:

The Court rules that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. It also stated that where the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefore shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.

In the case at bar, BNP merely relied on the assessment made by the clerk
of court which turned out to be incorrect. Under the circumstances, the clerk
of court has the responsibility of reassessing what respondent must pay within the
prescriptive period, failing which the complaint merits dismissal.

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, GR No.

134577, 1998-11-18
Facts:
no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.
History would also show that the
"majority" in either house of Congress has referred to the political party to which the most
number of lawmakers belonged, while the "minority" normally referred to a party with a
lesser number of members... with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as
pointed out by... petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of
which has to be identified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of
the general elections.
Issues:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
Ruling:
that the issue was justiciable, "even if the question were... political in nature," since it
involved "the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission on
Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution."... the
interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws,
the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules... of the Senate has been
clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Principles:
the function of the Court is merely to check -- not to supplant --- the Executive,... or to
ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not
to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act."
Within its own sphere -- but only within such sphere each department is supreme and
independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon... the
powers or field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but also to inquire into or
pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions...
the limitations respected is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of...
legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications,
conditions or limitations -- particularly those prescribed by the Constitution -- would be set at
naught.
courts have a 'duty, rather than a power,' to determine whether another branch of the
government has 'kept within constitutional limits.'"
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of... jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
will strike it down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2)
grave abuse of discretion.

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS

AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,

vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,

REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO,
JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,

SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

Facts:

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules
approved by the 11th Congress.

On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on
Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).

On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The
complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in
form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.

The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment”
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against
the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year.”

Issues:

Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Rulings:

This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the
Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left
to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.

Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota
or crux of the controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.

Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its
power to make rules.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to
alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment
proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
GARCIA V. COMELEC

Sept. 30, 1994

FACTS:

On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part of the
Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.

The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission; so, they
resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They solicited the
required number of signatures to repeal the said resolution.

However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative and/or referendum.

On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative because its subject is “merely a
resolution and not an ordinance.”

ISSUE:

w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative?

Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set aside?

HELD:

The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set aside.

RULING:

The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation because of the event
in February 1986. The new Constitution became “less trusting of public officials.”
Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art. 17
which provides “amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voter therein.”

The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an initiative and referendum.

On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a System of Initiative
and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.”

YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides “ the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and
the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose

and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local
legislative body.

Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely:

1. Initiative on the Constitution – petition to amend the Constitution

2. Initiative on statutes – petition proposing to enact a national legislation

3. Initiative on local legislation – petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution or ordinance

Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local initiatives, which is “the power of local initiative
shall not be exercised more than once a year.”
 166 SCRA 533 (1988)

o GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power

o EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation
o Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
FACTS:

Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan.
The widow filed a complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the
POEA, based on Memorandum Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated
death benefits and burial expenses for the family of an overseas worker. Eastern
Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular. Nevertheless, the
POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:

o W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers

HELD:

SC held that there was valid delegation of powers.

In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines

contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even
with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.

Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the
problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions.
These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be
experts in the particular fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of
subordinate legislation.”

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in
statute by “filling in” the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative
regulation.

Estrada v. Desierto
JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO (D)
G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001

FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or
more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused
political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator
Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.
Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their oath as
judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the 2nd envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the
ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. By midnight, thousands had
assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner
and the 11 senators.
January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A
10-km line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino
Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's
solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation.
January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. Petitioner agreed to
the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of
National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed
services went to the EDSA Shrine. General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your
Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we
are withdrawing our support to this government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director General
Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.
January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President
of the Philippines. Petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.
January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged
the powers the duties of the Presidency.
February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting
any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after
the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted."
February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for
judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to
have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution."

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.
Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting
President.
HELD:
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are
beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to
form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation
before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-
taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the
totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and
duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President xxx.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise
that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner's claim of inability.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That
claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

CASE DIGES T: ES TRADA VS .

A RROYO ; EST RADA VS . D ESI ERTO
9:55 PM

G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo

G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto

March 2, 2001

FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged
that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known
as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused
controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an
impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-
tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an
impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada,
pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the
group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar
associations joined in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing
that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in
this election.

OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to
avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition
for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term
as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office,
and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President,
only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not
petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.

HELD:

The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The
Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct
demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government
entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the
1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The
question of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to
judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of
events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements
extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the
press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president
despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake
of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.

As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that
petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent
of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the
petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged
criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the
framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his
tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during
which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another).
\