2014-15

Hurt and Grievous Hurt

Submitted By:
Kashif Zafar
B.A.,LL.B.(Hons.)
3rd Semester
Section A
 Acknowledgement

Firstly, I would like to express my profound sense of

gratitude towards the almighty for providing me with the
authentic circumstances which were mandatory for the completion
of my project.

Secondly, I am highly indebted to at

Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi for
providing me with constant encouragement and guidance
throughout the preparation of this project.

My cardinal thanks are also for my parents, friends and all

teachers of law department in our college who have always been
the source of my inspiration and motivation without which I
would have never been able to unabridged my project.

Kashif Zafar

Submitted by: Kashif Zafar

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 Contents
1. Introduction to Criminal Law
2. Hurt
3. Grievous hurt
o Rational behind the Section
o Scope
4. Difference between hurt and grievous hurt
o Difference between punishments for hurt and
grievous hurt
o Difference between grievous hurt and culpable
homicide
5. Grievous hurt and compelling wife to prostitution
6. Acid Attack
7. Latest Development
8. Case Analysis
9. Conclusion
10. Bibliography

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 Criminal Law: Introduction
Criminal law is the body of law that relates to crime. It regulates social conduct and
proscribes whatever is threatening, harmful, or otherwise endangering to the
property, health, safety, and moral welfare of people. It includes the punishment of
people who violate these laws. Criminal law varies according to jurisdiction, and
differs from civil law, where emphasis is more on dispute resolution and victim
compensation than on punishment.

Criminal law is distinctive for the uniquely serious potential consequences

or sanctions for failure to abide by its rules. Every crime is composed of criminal
elements. Capital punishment may be imposed in some jurisdictions for the most
serious crimes. Physical or corporal punishment may be imposed such
as whipping or caning, although these punishments are prohibited in much of the
world. Individuals may be incarcerated in prison or jail in a variety of conditions
depending on the jurisdiction. Confinement may be solitary. Length of incarceration
may vary from a day to life. Government supervision may be imposed,
including house arrest, and convicts may be required to conform to particularized
guidelines as part of a parole or probation regimen. Fines also may be imposed,
seizing money or property from a person convicted of a crime.
Five objectives are widely accepted for enforcement of the criminal law
by punishments: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation and restoration
. Jurisdictions differ on the value to be placed on each.

 Retribution – Criminals ought to suffer in some way. This is the most widely seen
goal. Criminals have taken improper advantage, or inflicted unfair detriment, upon
others and consequently, the criminal law will put criminals at some unpleasant
disadvantage to "balance the scales." People submit to the law to receive the right
not to be murdered and if people contravene these laws, they surrender the rights
granted to them by the law. Thus, one who murders may be executed himself. A
related theory includes the idea of "righting the balance."

 Deterrence – Individual deterrence is aimed toward the specific offender. The aim is
to impose a sufficient penalty to discourage the offender from criminal
behavior. General deterrence aims at society at large. By imposing a penalty on

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 those who commit offenses, other individuals are discouraged from committing
those offenses.
 Incapacitation – Designed simply to keep criminals away from society so that the
public is protected from their misconduct. This is often achieved
through prison sentences today. The death penalty or banishment has served the
same purpose.
 Rehabilitation – Aims at transforming an offender into a valuable member of
society. Its primary goal is to prevent further offense by convincing the offender that
their conduct was wrong.
 Restoration – This is a victim-oriented theory of punishment. The goal is to repair,
through state authority, any injury inflicted upon the victim by the offender. For
example, one who embezzles will be required to repay the amount improperly
acquired. Restoration is commonly combined with other main goals of criminal
justice and is closely related to concepts in the civil law, i.e., returning the victim to
his or her original position before the injury.

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 Hurt
In normal sense, hurt means to cause bodily injury and/or pain to another person. IPC
defines Hurt as follows -

Section 319 - Whoever causes bodily pain, disease, or infirmity to any person is
said to cause hurt.

Based on this, the essential ingredients of Hurt are -

1. Bodily Pain:- Bodily pain, except such slight harm for which nobody would
complain, is hurt. For example, pricking a person with pointed object like a needle
or punching somebody in the face, or pulling a woman's hair. The duration of the
pain is immaterial. Infirmity means when any organ is not able to function
normally. It can be temporary or permanent. It also includes state of mind such as
hysteria or terror.
2. Disease:- A person communicating a particular disease to another would be guilty
of hurt. However, there appears to be conflicting judicial decisions w.r.t. cases of
communication of sexual diseases by one to another.
In R. v. Clarence1, the husband was convicted by the lower court for
communicating a disease to his wife. By a majority of nine to four the Court for
Crown Cases quashed the conviction and held that it is neither an infliction of
grievous bodily harm, nor an assault for a men to infect his wife with gonorrhea by
having sexual intercourse with her, even though was aware of his condition and
she was ignorant of it, and even though she wouldn’t have had intercourse with
him had she known of his condition.
In Raka v. Emperor2, the Bombay High Court held a prostitute who had sexual
intercourse with the complainant and thereby communicated syphilis, liable under
section 269, I.P.C., for spreading of infection and not causing hurt, because the
interval between the act and disease was too remote to attract sections 319 and 321
I.P.C.

1
(1888) 22 QBD 23 (42-43) (HL).
2
1887 ILR 11 Bom 59.

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 On the other hand, an accused who had veneral disease induced a girl of 13 years
of age, who was ignorant of his condition, to have sexual intercourse with him and
infected her with the disease, was held guilty of indecent assault.
3. Infirmity:- infirmity means a temporary mental impairment, hysteria or terror. In
Jashanmal Jhamatmal v. Brahmanand Sarupanand3, the accused landlord in
order to frighten the complainant’s wife uttered a piercing sound like ‘Haoo’ and,
extending his arms towards the lady pointed a pistol at her, with a view to causing
the couple to vacate the premises. Due to shock, the complainant’s wife collapsed
and become seriously ill for some considerable time. Held, the act was sufficient to
cause a state of temporary mental impairment or hysteria resulting in infirmity of
the mind of the lady to attract section 319, I.P.C.

Act neither intended to cause death nor grievous hurt may be hurt even though
it results in death- When there is no intention of causing death or bodily injury as is
likely to cause death, and there is no knowledge that inflicting such injury would
cause death, the accused would be guilty of hurt if the injury is not serious. In a case
in 1883, the accused struck a man one blow on the head with a bamboo yoke and the
injured man died, primarily due to excessive opium administered by his friends to
alleviate pain. He was held guilty under this section.

In Bysagoo Noshyo4, A, on a grave and sudden provocation given by B, gave B a

kick on the abdomen. B had an enlarged spleen which was punctured by the blow,
and B died in consequence. Since a had no intention to cause death, nor any
knowledge that injury was likely to cause death, he was held liable for causing simple
hurt under sections 319 and 321 of I.P.C.

In re Marana Goundan5, A demanded ten rupees from B which latter owed him. B
promised to pay later. A thereupon kicked B twice in his abdomen. B collapsed and
died. A was held guilty of voluntarily causing hurt.

In Beshor Bewa6 , the accused lady, gave a kick on the back and two slaps on the
face of her 10 year old daughter which resulted in her death. She was held guilty of
causing hurt only.

3
A.I.R. 1944 Sind. 19.
4
(1867) 8 WR (Cr) 29.
5
A.I.R. 1971 Goa, Daman and Diu 18.

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The authors of the code have observed that in many cases offences that fall under hurt
will also fall under assault. However, there can be certain situations, where they may
not. For example, if A leaves food mixed with poison on B's desk and later on B eats
the food causing hurt, it cannot be a case of assault.

If the accused did not know about any special condition of the deceased and causes
death because of hurt, he will be held guilty of only hurt. Thus, in Marana Goundan's
case AIR 1941, when the accused kicked a person and the person died because of a
diseased spleen, he was held guilty of only hurt.

A physical contact is not necessary. Thus, a when an accused gave food mixed with
dhatura and caused poisoning, he was held guilty of Hurt.

6
(1872) 18 WR (Cr.) 29.

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 Grievous Hurt
Cases of severe hurt are classified under grievous hurt. The authors of the code
observed that it would be very difficult to draw a line between hurt and grievous hurt
but it was important to draw a line even if it is not perfect so as to punish the cases
which are clearly more than hurt.

Section 320- Grievous Hurt- The following kinds of hurt are designated as
“grievous”

First- Emasculation.

Secondly- Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.

Thirdly- Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear.

Fourthly- Privation of any member or joint.

Fifthly- Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or

joint.

Sixthly- Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.

Seventhly- Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.

Eighthly- Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the victim to be in
severe bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits for a period of 20
days.

The section is explained in the following lines.

Firstly- ‘Emasculation’- the term ‘emasculation’ means the depriving a person of

masculine vigor, castration. Injury to the scrotum would render a man impotent. A
person emasculating himself cannot be convicted under this section. A person causing
hurt to himself does not come within the purview of this section.

Secondly- Losing eye sight-where as many as twenty four persons lost their eye-sight
permanently in consequence of arrack distributed by the accused after mixing methyl

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alcohol in it, the hurt has to be regarded as grievous hurt because of what has been
stated in the clause 2.

Thirdly- It deprives a man of his sense of hearing. Injury to the tympanum or auditory
nerve or by thrusting something into the ear which causes deafness.

Fourthly- The term ‘member’ means an organ or a limb being part of man capable of
performing a distinct function. It includes, nose, mouth, hands, feet, phalanges etc.

Fifthly- The use of limbs and joints of body are essential to the discharge of the
normal functions of the body. Their deprivation causes lifelong crippling and makes
the person defenseless and miserable.

Sixthly- The word ‘disfigure’ means to cause some external injuries which detracts
from his personal appearance but does not weaken him. In Gangaram v. State of
Rajasthan7 the bridge of the nose was cut, as the injury was inflicted by a sharp –
edged weapon, it was held that the act amounted to permanent disfiguration within the
meaning of this clause and hence the injury was grievous.

Seventhly- It is not necessary that a bone should be cut through and, the cut should be
up to the medulla. If there is a break by cutting or splintering of the bone or there is a
rupture or fissure in it, it would amount to a fracture but the doctor must document the
dimensions of fracture and duration/age correlation with age of injury. Dislocation
means displacement. Mere looseness of teeth will not amount to dislocation. It has to
be proved that the tooth was originally not loose and that there was fracture or
dislocation by the injury. In Horilal8, the Supreme Court held that ordinary fracture
means breaking of a bone. A mere abrasion or cut that does not go across the bone
cannot be called a fracture of the bone9

Eighthly- Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the victim to be in severe
bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits for a period of 20 days. A wound
may cause intense pain, prolonged disease or long lasting body injury but does not fall
under any of the seven clauses. A body injury/beating may not mutilate the sufferer or
fracture his bones but may be so harsh and painful may cause even death. The eighth

7
1984 Cr LJ 180 NOC (Raj)
8
Horilal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1970 SC 1969
9
Parma, A.I.R. 1956, Raj 39.

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clause provides for such hurts. Under this, three different clauses of hurt are included.
These are:

 Any hurt which endangers life.

 Any hurt which causes the victim to be in severe bodily pain for a period of 20
days.
 Any hurt which prevents the victim from following his ordinary pursuits for a

period of 20 days.

In Muhammad Rafi’s10 case, the accused, a mocha (cobbler) aged about 20 years who
inflicted an injury on the neck of the deceased with a penknife from behind, was
convicted by the Session’s Court under section 304(2) IPC for culpable homicide to
murder. The tragedy took place as a result of a quarrel between the two boys over a
loan of sum of fifteen paisa. The deceased was taken to the hospital and died fifteen
days later as a result of septic poisoning from the wound.

Allowing the appeal partially, the Lahore High Court held the accused liable under
section 322, IPC for causing death by grievous hurt as against culpable homicide not
amounting to murder as the circumstances did not justify a time a wound on the neck
is dangerous to life within the meaning of clause 8 of section 320, IPC.

In Mohindar Singh v. Emperor11, the accused on 22nd August, 1922 inflicted a

wound on Sarwan singh’s leg with a gandasa (a sharp – edged weapon) and gave him
blows with the back of the gandasa. Tetanus set in on 31st August, 1922 which caused
his death. Held, a wound in the leg was not in itself sufficiently dangerous to bring the
case within the meaning of grievous hurt when death due to tetanus which supervened
and resulted in the death of deceased.

Rational behind the section- The authors of the code observe: “we have found it
very difficult to draw a line between those bodily hurts which are serious and those
which are slight. To draw such a line between with perfect accuracy is absolutely
impossible; but it is far better that such a line should be drawn, though rudely, than
that offences some of which approach in enormity to murder, while others are little

10
AIR 1930 Lah. 305
11
AIR 1925 Lah. 297.

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more than frolics which a good natures man would hardly recent, should be classed
together.

Some hurts which are not, like those kinds of hurt which are mentioned in
condition 1 to 7, distinguished by a broad and obvious line from slight hurts, may
nevertheless be most serious. A wound, for example, which neither emasculates the
sufferer, nor blinds him, nor destroys his hearing, nor deprives him of a member or a
joint, nor breaks his bones, nor dislocate them, may yet cause intense pain, prolonged
disease, lasting injury to constitution. It is evidently desirable that law should make a
distinction between such a wound, mad scratch which he headed by just sticking
plaster. A beating, again, which does not maim the sufferer or break his bones may be
so cruel as to bring him to point of death. Such a beating, it is clear, ought not to be
confounded with a bruise, which requires only to be bathed with vinegar, and of which
the traces disappear in a day.”

Scope- Like in Section 319, this section is also in the nature of definite clause. Section
319 defines hurt, whereas section 320 defines ‘grievous hurt’.

To make out the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, there must be some
specific hurt, voluntarily inflicted, and coming within the eight kinds enumerated in
this section. When a person forcibly thrust lathi into the rectum of another person and
causes serious injuries, he was held guilty of causing grievous hurt. Injuries inflicted
with the help of burning firewood cannot be considered as grievous hurt as they do not
come within the specific items of the injuries mentioned in the definition of grievous
hurt; nor do they endanger life.

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 Difference between hurt and grievous hurt
Section 321- Voluntarily causing hurt –

Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person,
or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and
does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said "voluntarily to cause hurt".

Section 322- Voluntarily causing grievous hurt –

Whoever voluntarily causes hurt, if the hurt which he intends to cause or knows
himself to be likely to cause is grievous hurt, and if the hurt which he causes is
grievous hurt, is said "voluntarily to cause grievous hurt".

Explanation-A person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt except when he
both causes grievous hurt and intends or knows himself to be likely to cause grievous
hurt. But he is said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt, if intending or knowing himself
to be likely to cause grievous hurt of one kind, he actually causes grievous hurt of
another kind.

Illustration- A, intending or knowing himself to be likely permanently to disfigure Z’s

face, gives Z a below which does not permanently disfigure Z’s face, but which cause
Z to suffer severe bodily pain for the space of twenty days. A has voluntarily caused
grievous hurt.

The provisions of this section are very precise and incapable of misconstruction. A
magistrate dealing with charges of voluntarily causing grievous hurt must consider
and decide not only whether grievous hurt has been caused but if it has been caused
voluntarily or himself knew to be likely to cause grievous hurt. If he intended or knew
himself to be likely to cause only simple hurt, he cannot be convicted under section
325. Section 321 and the explanation to section 322 make it clear that either the
ingredient of intention or that of knowledge, must be essentially present in order to
constitute the offence of hurt. Such a knowledge cab be inferred from the part of body
chosen for inflicting violence and the severity of that violence as shown by the injuries

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on the body of the victim. The means by which the injury was cause is not the true
criterion. The answer really depends on the nature of the injury caused and the manner
in which the blows were administered, whether by fists and slaps or by a weapon.

Difference between punishments for “hurt” and

“grievous hurt”
Section 323- Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt –

“Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes
hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees,
or with both.”

When the injury is not serious and there was no intention to cause death or
grievous hurt, nor did the accused have knowledge that it was likely to cause grievous
hurt or death, he is guilty of causing hurt and not death, even though death is caused.
Where the accused was one of the persons who assaulted the deceased with a stick but
there was no proof that the fatal blow or grievous injury was caused by him, it was
held, that the accused could only be convicted under section 323.12

Where evidence gave no clue as to on which part of the body of deceased the
accused has struck and prosecution also could not establish that the death of deceased
was caused by striking on some vital body, the accused could only be convicted under
section 323.

Chart showing the amount of penalty prescribed under the code in case of hurt
and grievous hurt: depending on the nature and gravity of the injury

Circumstance Penalties Hurt Grievous Hurt

leading to injury
Injury caused by (a) Up to 3 years and/ or fine Up to 10 years, and fine
dangerous weapon likely (I.P.C. Sec. 324) (I.P.C. sec. 326)
to cause death, or (b) fire,

12
Babu Bika Jadhav 1996 Cri LJ 3952 (Bom)

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 or (c) any heated
substance, or (d)poison,
or (e) any corrosive
substance, or (f) any
explosive substance, or
(g) by means of animal
Injury inflicted for Up to 10 years and fine Up to 10 year and fine
purpose of extorting (I.P.C. sec. 327) (I.P.C. sec 329)
property or valuable
security, or to constrain
someone to do anything
illegal, or to facilitate the
commission of an offence
Injury caused by Up to 10 years and fine -
administering poison or (I.P.C. sec 328)
any stupefying,
intoxicating or
unwholesome drug with
intent to commit or
facilitate the commission
of an offence.
Injury inflicted for Up to 7 years and fine Up to 10 years and fine
purpose of (a) extorting a (I.P.C. sec 330) (I.P.C. sec 331)
confession (b) to compel
restoration of any
property
Injury to a public servant Up to 3 years and/or fine Up to 10 years and fine
in the discharge of his (I.P.C. sec 332) (I.P.C. sec333)
duty
Injury inflicted due to Up to 1 month and/or fine Up to 4 years and/or fine
grave and sudden to Rs. 2000 (I.P.C sec335)
provocation up to Rs500
(I.P.C. sec 334)
Injury inflicted by acting Up to 6 months and/or Up to 2 years and/or fine
so rashly or negligently as fine up to Rs. 500 (I.P.C. up to Rs. 1000. (I.P.C.
to endanger human life or sec 337) sec338)
the personal safety of
others.
Act doing so rashly and Up to 3 months or fine up Up to 2 years and or fine

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 negligently, as to to Rs. 200 or both (I.P.C. up to Rs. 1000
endanger human life or sec. 336)
personal safety of others

Section 324- Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means-

Whoever, except in the case provided by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by
means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument
which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or
any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or
by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive
substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to
receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years,
or with fine, or with both.

Section 325- Punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt – Whoever, except
in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.

The prosecution may prove:

That the accused caused of any kind described in section 320.

That the accused intended, or knew that he was likely, to cause grievous hurt of any
kind described;
That the accused did so voluntarily.

Where there is no evidence to indicate as to which of the accused persons actually

caused grievous hurt none of them could be convicted under section 325. It may be
presumed that each of them intended to cause grievous hurt but such a presumption
alone is not sufficient to establish the offence of causing grievous hurt unless it is
further shown that the accused actually caused grievous hurt.13

The prosecution does not have to prove hurt under s.319 in order to prove grievous
hurt under s.320 as they have to prove homicide under s.299 and then move on to

13
Dipa AIR 1947 All 408.

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s.300 in order to prove murder. Section 320 has very clearly laid down hurt which are
to be classified as grievous hurt and the eighthly clause is the only one in which some
interpretation and misuse is possible. The only catch in this section is the intention
part. Although intention can be inferred from the way in which the injury was caused,
but it takes a little more for the prosecution to prove grievous hurt because the defense
would always like to bring the injury from s.320 to s.319 because the punishment and
fine imposed is much less. An illustration in this respect can be that if a person slaps
another person and he falls down, hitting his head on the ground which results in his
death. This is only a case of simple hurt as the person had only slapped and in
ordinary course of things it would not lead to death. Now let us consider another case,
a boxer ‘punches’ a person in his stomach twice. The person falls down, head hits the
ground and he dies. In this case it is very clearly evident from the circumstances that
the intention was to cause to grievous hurt as he was a ‘boxer’ and he ‘punched’
twice. It can safely inferred that the boxer ‘knew’ if not ‘intended’ that if he ‘punches’
a person twice in his stomach, it will cause grievous hurt if not death.

Although there is a huge fundamental difference between the offence of hurt and
grievous hurt, but in practice, they are not that minutely followed in practical
application. Going by the language of the section 319, there is no clear cut definition
of hurt whereas on the contrary section 320 has defined which categories of hurt fall
under grievous hurt.

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 Difference between Grievous Hurt and Culpable
Homicide
The line separating Grievous Hurt and Culpable Homicide is very thin. In Grievous
Hurt, the life is endangered due to injury while in culpable homicide, death is likely to
be caused. Thus, acts neither intended nor likely to cause death may amount to
grievous hurt even though death is caused.

In case of Formina Sbastio Azardeo v. State of Goa Daman and Diu14, the deceased
was making publicity about the illicit intimacy between N and W. On the fateful day,
N, W, and her husband A caught hold of D and tied him up to a pole and beat him as a
result of which he died. They were not armed with any dangerous weapon and had no
intention to kill him. N and W were held guilty of only causing grievous hurt.

Grievous hurt and compelling wife to prostitution

The Parsi Act in Section 32(e) of the Parsi Act has clubbed the three different grounds
of divorce, viz., (i) Grievous Hurt, (ii) V.D. - Venereal Diseases and (iii) Compelling
the wife to submit herself to Prostitution. No doubt all these three grounds operate in
three different lines and bear no relation with one another.

The Act could have and should have spelt out these three grounds and should have
added them separately in the list of grounds of divorce nevertheless, the Act has
chosen to put them together, for no obvious reason or for no reasons explained in the

14
1992 CLJ SC.

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Act. Be it as it is. The grounds of divorce are, in any case boon to the married women
and therefore, welcome in any combination.

The grounds, VD, Compelling Wife to Prostitution and Grievous Hurt, are not based
on void or voidable marriage but proceed from the valid marriage or the marriage
which does not suffer from any legal infirmity under the Law of Contract.

Compelling Wife to Prostitution

Compelling wife to prostitution is a ground of divorce under Section 32(e) of the Act.
Indeed, this ground is more akin to immoral behaviour of the husband, such as
sodomy, bestiality, etc. It is not unusual in this strange world that, in some rare of
rarest cases, men do behave in this inexplicable manner. The women are, therefore,
given a 'right' to seek divorce on the strange behaviour of man of forcing his wife to
prostitution.

Venereal Disease
The other ground; Venereal Disease (VD) is also a ground for divorce. This ground is
discussed in the commentary on Divorce Act in this Book and hence, not repeated
here.

Grievous Hurt
The 'Grievous Hurt' is also the ground for divorce under the Act, however, nowhere, it
states what it means. Whereas, the term cruelty, as understood, as of now, means
physical injury, however, the Parsi Act, separately and independently enumerates this
ground in the list of ground of divorce. The term 'Grievous Hurt' is peculiar to
Criminal Law. The Indian Penal Code in Section 320 lies down thus:

For matrimonial purpose, the eighth clause would be more in use than the other
clauses. It only means that life is in immediate danger and doctors describe it danger
to life. Although the medical evidence may be more reliable but is not legally
necessary. The apex Court has held that cutting or splintering of the bone or a rupture
or Fissure in it, would amount to "fracture" within the meaning of Clause 7 of Section
320 of IPC.

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The Parsi Act prescribes the period of limitation of two years. The period of limitation
begins under the Act:

1. After infliction of the grievous hurt.

2. After the knowledge of suffering of the venereal disease of the other spouse.

Acid Attack15
It is most shocking and distressing to see that in-spite of incidents of acid attacks
mounting very high in our country, adequate punishment is not meted out to the
offenders and in most cases they escape unpunished or with very minor punishment.
This is just not done. Section 326 of IPC which covers grievous hurt caused by
throwing of corrosive substance etc. is just not adequate to deal with cases of acid
throwing. It contains glaring infirmities and time is ripe now to remove such
infirmities and make it more stringent.

226th report of Law Commission titled “The Inclusion of Acid Attacks as Specific
Offences in the IPC and a law for Compensation for Victims of Crime” very
categorically points out that Section 326 of IPC is just insufficient/inadequate to deal
with it.

Firstly, the definition of grievous hurt is not broad enough to cover the various kinds
of injuries which are inflicted during acid attacks. Secondly, the section does not
cover the act of administering acid. Thirdly, the section gives a wide discretion to the
courts as far as punishment is concerned. The cases on acid attacks in India show that
normally inadequate punishment is awarded in these cases.

Fourthly, the section in the IPC does not punish the intentional act of throwing of acid
if no injuries occur. Lastly, the section also does not specify who the fine should be
awarded to. All these glaring anomalies and infirmities must be addressed properly so
that no offender is able to escape unpunished by taking undue advantage of them.

I also very strongly feel that 226th report of Law Commission very rightly
recommends that a new section 326A be added to the IPC. The proposed Section

15
Acid Attack: Talibanic Act Must be Punished in Same Way
GoIndoCal, Sanjeev Sirohi , Jan. 2, 2012, 6:40pm IST.

Submitted by: Kashif Zafar

19
326A will read as follows: “Whoever burns or maims or disfigures or disables any
part or parts of the body of a person or causes grievous hurt by throwing acid on or
administering acid to that person, with the intention of causing or with the knowledge
that he is likely to cause such injury or hurt shall be punishable with imprisonment of
either description which shall not be less than 10 years but which may extend to life
and with fine which may extend to Rs 10 Lakhs.

Provided that any fine levied under this section shall be given to the person on whom
acid has been thrown or administered. Also, it is a cognizable , non–bailable and non–
compoundable and triable by court of session.

Further, Section 326 A (ii) provides that, “Whoever throws acid on or administers acid
to, any person with the intention of causing burns or maiming or disfiguring or
disabling or causing grievous hurt to that person shall be liable to imprisonment of
either description for a term not less than 5 years but which may extend to 10 years
and with fine which may extend to Rs 5 Lakh.

The classification of offence is same as mentioned in Section 326 (i). Apart from all
this, it was also proposed that in cases of acid attacks a presumption be incorporated in
the Indian Evidence Act as Section 114B. Section 114B dealing with presumption as
to acid attack reads: “If a person has thrown acid on, or administered acid to, another
person the court shall presume that such an act has been done with the intention of
causing, or with the knowledge that such an act is likely to cause such hurt or injury as
is mentioned in Section 326A of the IPC.”

Acid when thrown on face can severely damage the eyes, ears, mouth and nose apart
from lips and eyelids. Also, when the acid splashes or drips over any organ of the
body, it burns everything which comes in its ambit. Breathing problems or failure in
extreme cases is another potential hazards which the victims of acid attacks have to
grapple with.

It can cause permanent or temporary disfigurements with either chin becoming welded
to the chest or mouth no longer opening or eyelids no longer closing which itself
speaks volumes of the serious gravity of the crime and must never go unpunished or
even lightly punished because it spoils the entire life of the person on whom it is
thrown and who prior to the attack was leading a normal life. No provocation, no

Submitted by: Kashif Zafar

20
matter how strong it may be, can ever even remotely be allowed to be justified under
any circumstances, come what may!

The victims die daily and suffer from not only psychological symptoms like
weakness, insomnia, depression, fear of another similar attack but also face
discrimination as no one wants to employ them nor their own relatives are happy to be
at their constant services. Of course, exceptions are there but they are few and far
between.

There goes a well known old adage: “Prevention is better than cure.’’ This
resoundingly applies to acid attacks also which even the Law Commission realized
and therefore in its 226th report recommended that the distribution and sale of acid be
strictly regulated and the sale of acid across shop counters be banned which most
unfortunately has not been the case till now.

Infact, it is a child’s play to obtain acid from across the counter in medical and other
stores and therefore it has become a relatively cheap and effective way of committing
acts of violence against women.

This is exactly what is most concerning and it would not be proper to downplay it
because acid attack incidents on especially innocent, hapless women or girls have
witnessed an astronomical increase in the last few years.

Latest Development
Insertion of new section 326A- throwing or using of acid in any form on the body of
another person- notwithstanding contained in s.324 or 326 of the code, whoever does
any act of throwing acid or using acid in any form on the other person with the
intention of or with the knowledge that he is likely to cause such person permanent or
partial damage or deformity disfiguration or disability to any part of the body of such
person shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
shall not be less than 10 years but which may extend to life and shall also be liable to
fine which shall be minimum of Rs. 2 lakhs and may extend to Rs. 5 lakhs.

Submitted by: Kashif Zafar

21
The offence shall be cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable.

Justification: Although the offences relating to acid throwing is covered under s.320
and 326 of the IPC but keeping in view the extreme heinous nature of the act and the
fact that under s. 326 the offence can be punished with imprisonment for life or with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years, it is
proposed in the bill that atleast the minimum punishment be not less than 10 years and
extend to life imprisonment.

Submitted by: Kashif Zafar

22
 Case Analysis with latest judgements

Sushil Raikwar v. The State Of M.P. on 18 October, 201216

Facts
The complainant Nathuram was working on his handcart shop of snacks. His son Raju
@ Kamlesh was selling Samosas. At about 9:00 PM in the night the appellant went to
the shop of the complainant and took some Samosas. Thereafter Raju @ Kamlesh
asked for money, then the quarrel started. The appellant gave a slap to Raju @
Kamlesh. The complainant tried to stop their quarrel and when he intervened in that
quarrel, the appellant took hot oil from the utensil kept on the handcart and poured
upon the complainant due to which the complainant sustained burn injuries on his
right chest, right abdomen, right hand and right leg. The customers of the complainant
saw the incident.

Arguments on behalf of Respondent

The learned counsel for the State has submitted that the appellant was to be convicted
for the offence under Section 308 of IPC, because the victim sustained 25-30% burns
and he could die. Similarly, the sentence directed by the trial Court appears to be
correct.

Arguments on behalf of Appellant

The appellant-accused abjured his guilt. He did not take any specific plea, but he has
stated that due to his quarrel with Raju, a push was given to the handcart of the
complainant and it was disbalanced, and therefore the utensil having hot oil turned on
the complainant. He did not assault the complainant in such a manner.

The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there was no willful act of the
appellant, but a push was caused suddenly to the handcart, and therefore the
complainant sustained some superficial burns. The injuries caused to the victim were

16
Criminal Appeal No. 2259 OF 1996.

Submitted by: Kashif Zafar

23
not fatal in nature, therefore no offence under Section 308 of IPC was made out. In the
alternate, it is submitted that the appellant remained in the custody for 22 days. He
was a youth of 22 years at the time of the incident, who has faced the trial and appeal
for the last 16 years and now he has settled in the life, and therefore he may not be
sent to the jail again.

The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there was no willful act of the
appellant, but a push was caused suddenly to the handcart, and therefore the
complainant sustained some superficial burns. The injuries caused to the victim were
not fatal in nature, therefore no offence under Section 308 of IPC was made out. In the
alternate, it is submitted that the appellant remained in the custody for 22 days. He
was a youth of 22 years at the time of the incident, who has faced the trial and appeal
for the last 16 years and now he has settled in the life, and therefore he may not be
sent to the jail again.

Prayers
1. Whether the appeal of the appellant can be accepted?
2. And whether the sentence directed by the trial Court against the appellant can be
reduced?

Judgement
The presence of the appellant is proved. There is no doubt in his identification. If the
handcart was pushed and hot oil fell upon the victim due to disbalance, then the oil
should have fell on the lower part of the body of the victim Nathuram, but some drops
of the oil might have reached to the upper part of his body, but the entire oil could not
reach to the upper part of the body. Therefore the defence taken by the appellant
cannot be accepted.

The trial Court has convicted the appellant for commission of offence under Section
308 of IPC. If the evidence of Nathuram and Raju is considered along with the
medical evidence, then it would be clear that the quarrel took place in a spur of
moment. It was not pre- planned incident caused by the appellant. He could not hold
the hot utensil in his hands for a longer period, and therefore he could pour the hot oil
upon the complainant in a very small period of time, and therefore it cannot be said
that he was intended to kill the victim. Similarly, the victim Nathuram did not sustain

Submitted by: Kashif Zafar

24
any fatal injury. He sustained only simple injuries. The injuries sustained by the
complainant do not fall within the ingredients of Section 320 of IPC, and therefore it
was not grievous. Hence the case of the appellant does not fall in any ingredients of
Section 300 of IPC. It is a case of causing simple hurt by hot oil, and therefore the
crime committed by the appellant falls within the purview of Section 324 of IPC only.

The quarrel took place for payment of Rs.2/-, and therefore it cannot be said that
either the complainant or his son gave any sudden or grave provocation to the
appellant when he was throwing hot oil. He ought to have been known that by such an
act, the complainant may sustain such burn injuries, and therefore the act done by the
appellant appears to be so voluntary, hence he has caused some injuries to the victim
by throwing hot oil upon him, and therefore he is guilty of offence under Section 324
of IPC.

The instant appeal filed by the appellant is partly allowed. The conviction as
well as the sentence directed by the trial Court for the offence under Section
308 of IPC is hereby set aside. He is acquitted from the charge of offence
under Section 308 of IPC, but convicted for commission of offence under
Section 324 of IPC and sentenced to the period which he has already
undergone in the custody by enhancing the fine amount from Rs.1,000/- to
Rs.7,000/.

Bade Lal Parshad & Ors vs $ State & Ors on 17 October, 2012
Facts
A complaint was lodged by the complainant Bade Lal Parshad, on 22nd March, 2006
against the accused persons herein, alleging that on 21nd March, 2006, wife of the
accused Parbhu Nath had thrown garbage in front of the house of the complainant and
when it was objected to by his wife son of the accused Parbhu Nath abused her. In
order to put an end to the fight, the complainant went to the house of one of his
neighbours and in the meantime his daughter came and said that some persons were
beating his son. It was further alleged that on reaching his house Pintu and Chottu
caught hold of the complainant and exhorted their co-accused to beat him and then
other accused, having iron rods started beating him as a result of which he sustained

Submitted by: Kashif Zafar

25
many injuries on his head, right elbow and his upper lips and accused Prema Devi,
wife of the accused Parbhu Nath, injured the son of the complainant by hitting him on
his head with a brick.

Judgement
According to Session Court, accused persons cannot be charged for an offence
punishable under Section 308/34 IPC. The only offence under Section 324/34 IPC is
made out against the accused persons.

However, the apex court allowed the petition. The impugned order is set aside and
framing of charge under Section 308/34 IPC in place of 324/34 IPC against all the
accused persons is ordered.

Jagdamba Prasad & Ors. vs The State Of M.P.17 on

5 September, 2012
Facts

On 18.8.1994 at about 7-7.30 p.m in the evening, the victim Khadiya was going from
his field to his house at Village Thigri. In front of the house of Jagadamba Khare, the
appellants abused the victim Khadiya with obscene words and words based upon his
caste. They have told to the victim Khadiya that why he was not living like a Chamar.
Thereafter, victim Khadiya was taken in the house of Jagadamba Khare and the
appellants had assaulted him. Hakka, brother of the victim Khadiya, went to the
Outpost Mohendra of P.S. Simaria, and gave a written report with the statement that
Khadiya is still in the house of Jagadamba. At Outpost Mohendra a case was
registered and thereafter, it was transferred to the Police Station Simaria. The victim
Khadiya was sent to the hospital for his medico legal examination. Dr. P.K. Jain
examined Khadiya and gave a report. He found six injuries to the victim Khadiya
situated on left scapula, left forearm, left ear, right hand, right feet and right hip. He
was referred for the X-Ray examination. Dr. Singh took the X- Ray of the victim

17
Criminal Appeal No.280 of 1997.

Submitted by: Kashif Zafar

26
Khadiya and gave a report. He found a fracture of the right tibia bone to the victim
Khadiya.

The appellants abjured their guilt. They have stated that they were falsely implicated
due to the enmity. They never assaulted the victim on the basis of the caste or
otherwise.

After considering the evidence adduced by both the parties the learned Special Judge
acquitted the appellants from the charges of offence punishable under Section
3(1)(xiv) of the Special Act and convicted them for offence punishable under Section
3(1)(x) of the Special Act.

The appellants have preferred this appeal against the judgment dated 6.1.1997 passed
by the Special Judge under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act in ST whereby
the appellants were convicted for offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and sentenced for six months rigorous
imprisonment with fine of Rs.500/-. In default of payment of fine one month's
rigorous imprisonment was also directed.

Arguments on behalf of Appellants

The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that according to the
prosecution's story no offence was committed at the public place. It was not told by
the witness Khadiya that the appellants told him to live like a Chamar. On the contrary
he has accepted that there was enmity with the appellants since last five years and
therefore, the victim Khadiya was not ready to do the work of the appellants and
therefore, no offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the Special Act is made out
against the appellants.

Arguments on behalf of Petitioners

The learned Panel Lawyer has submitted that the conviction and sentence directed by
the trial Court appears to be correct whereas the trial Court has not framed the charges
under Section 325 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. Khadiya sustained a grievous
hurt due to the assault caused by the appellants and therefore, the appellants are
culprits for the offence punishable under Section 325 read with Section 34 of I.P.C.

Submitted by: Kashif Zafar

27
Payers
1. Whether the appellants could be convicted for offence punishable under Section
3(1)(x) of the Special Act ?
2. Whether the case may be remanded for trial of the appellants for the charge of
offence under Section 325 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C ?
3. Whether the sentence directed against the appellant can be reduced ?

Judgement
It is apparent that the appellants cannot be convicted for offence punishable under
Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) act and therefore, the trial
Court has erred in convicting them for such an offence. Consequently, the appeal
filed by the appellants is hereby allowed. Conviction as well as the sentence
directed against the appellants for offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the
SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is hereby set aside. The appellants are
acquitted from the charges of offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of the
SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. They would be entitled to get the fine
amount back, if they have deposited the same.

Tufani Bhuiyan And Ors. vs State Of Jharkhand18

on 3 January, 2006
Facts
PW 2 Mewalal Bhuiyan is the son of Kishun Bhuiyan who is the deceased. PW 3,
Sitwa Devi is the mother of PW 2 and wife of Kishun Bhuiyan. The appellants are
related with the deceased and were residing in the same premises. The case of the
prosecution is that the deceased was a witch and he is responsible for the death of the
wife of Charan Bhuiyan. It is said that; witchcraft was the motive for which the
unfortunate incident took place at about 7 p.m. on 30.7.1986. PW 2, Mewalal was
grazing his cattle and at that time the appellants and two others who died before trial,

18
2006 CriLJ 1878, 2006 (1) JCR 279 Jhr.

Submitted by: Kashif Zafar

28
went to the place of occurrence. They asked PW 2 about the where about of Kishun
Bhuiyan, the deceased in the case, PW 2 refused to reply and so he was beaten. PW 2,
thereafter, proceeded towards the village Gidhoor and on the way, saw his uncle
Rameshwar Bhuiyan and his mother Sitwa Devi. PW 2 requested his father not to go
to the place where he was earlier grazing the cattle as the appellants were searching
for him. The deceased ignoring the request of PW 2 went towards the place where PW
2 was grazing cattle and seeing him the appellants 1 to 3 assaulted him with lathi and
spear. PW 3 intervened but he was also beaten by Pokhan, the other accused who is
since dead. Thereafter the appellants went away from that place. Kishun Bhuiyan died
due to the injury sustained by him.

Arguments on behalf of Appellants

Learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellants, submits that the prosecution
having miserably failed to establish the cause of death of the deceased Kishun
Bhuiyan, the trial Court was not justified in convicting the appellants under Section
302, IPC. Learned counsel further, submits that the prosecution did not examine any
of the doctors to hold that PWs 2 and 3 suffered injuries and therefore, the accused are
entitled for acquittal.

Judgement
The prosecution did not even produce the document i.e. post-mortem examination
report, nor did it examine the doctor. Therefore, there is no evidence on record to
show that Kishun Bhuiyan died on account of homicidal violence. In the absence of
any medical evidence, we are unable to hold that the prosecution has proved its case
under Sections 323 and 324, IPC, There is nothing on record to prove that Kishun
Bhuiyan died on account of homicidal violence and that PWs 2 and 3 suffered injury.
Judges, therefore, hold that, the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the
charge of murder as well as the charges under Sections 323 and 324, IPC. Judges have
no option but to acquit the appellants and accordingly, the appellants were acquitted
of the charges levelled against them. This appeal was accordingly allowed.

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29
 Conclusion
Section 321 and explanation of section 322 make it clear that either the ingredients
of intention or that of knowledge must be essentially present in order to constitute the
offence of hurt. In Dalapati Mahji’s19 case, during the quarrel the accused dragged the
victim by holding his hand, whereby the victim fell down and sustained leg injuries. It
appeared as if the victim was drunk and the accused dragged him with no intention to
aasault. It could be inferred that the accused did not intend to cause grievous hurt, but
grievous hurt ensued unexpectedly. Therefore, conviction under section 325 was liable
to be set aside.

So punishments of HURT is just like Newton’s third law of

motion which states that “every action have an equal and
opposite reaction” mean if today you are injuring somebody
with guilty mind tomorrow he can file case against you and
get relief of what you had given to him.

19
1982 Cri LJ 134.

Submitted by: Kashif Zafar

30
 Bibliography

 Basu’s INDIAN PENAL CODE, 10th ed., Ashok Law House, New
Delhi.
 Dr. Hari Singh Gour, PENAL LAW OF INDIA, 11th ed., Vol. 3, Law
Publishers India Pvt. Ltd.
 K.D. Gaur, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 6th ed., Lexis
Nexis Butterworths.
 K.I. Vibhute, P.S.A. Pillai’s CRIMINAL LAW, 10th ed., Lexis Nexis
Butterworths.
 Faculty of Law, University of Delhi, CRIMINAL LAW-I, July 2011.

Submitted by: Kashif Zafar

31