ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

INTRODUCTION
All western democracies are now acutely aware of the consequences of a well-organized
attack on high-profile government facilities and other related targets. Many of these buildings are
historical, ornate, listed and constructed using traditional techniques. Many of the modern
retrofitted reinforcement techniques used to protect these structures against terrorist
attacks are unsightly, intrusive or inappropriate. However, security specialists are well
aware that while there might be little that can be done to defend a building against an aircraft
attack; much can be done to defeat the more traditional car bomb and bullet. The design and
construction of public buildings to provide life safety in the face of explosions is receiving
renewed attention from structural engineers.

The four basic physical protection strategies for buildings to resist explosive threats are

1) Establishing a secure perimeter;

2) Mitigating debris hazards resulting from the damaged facade
3) Preventing progressive collapse; and
4) Isolating internal threats from occupied spaces. Other considerations, such as the
tethering of non-structural components and the protection of emergency services, are also key
design objectives that require special attention.

Generally, the size of the explosive threat will determine the effectiveness of each of
these protective strategies and the extent of resources needed to protect the occupants. Therefore,
determining the appropriate design threat is fundamental to the design process and requires
careful consideration.

The primary object of protecting office buildings against terrorist attack is to save lives.
Structurally this is accomplished by preventing catastrophic collapse Of the building, to reduce
the number of occupants that becomes trapped under the structural debris post-attack. Some
secondary benefits of preventing collapse include: facilitating rescue and evacuation efforts and
providing shelter to occupants during an explosion, thereby protecting them from the flying
debris and air-blast pressure of an explosion.

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EXPECTED TERRORIST BLASTS ON STRUCTURES:

 External car bomb

 Internal car bomb
 Aircraft attack

GOALS OF BLAST RESISTANT DESIGN:

Reduce the severity of injury
 Facilitate rescue
 Expedite repair
Accelerate the speed of return to full operations

MAJOR CAUSES OF LIFE LOSS AFTER THE BLAST:

 FLYING DEBRIS

Debris is rubble, wreckage, ruins, litter and discarded garbage/refuse/trash, scattered remains of
something destroyed, discarded, or as in geology, large rock fragments left by a melting glacier
etc. Depending on context, debris can refer to a number of different things.

Flying debris - It is flying waste produced after impact and explosion blast effect on the
structure.

Causes of life loss due to flying debris:-

 falling of debris
 Due to explosion, the structure falls down in pieces, if there are persons standing under the
structure can cause injuries or sometimes loss of life.
 Suffocation
 Debris contains small particles of concrete which flows in air which can cause suffocation to
the persons inside the affected structure.
 Pollution
 If the debris flows outside the structure causes air pollution.

 BROKEN GLASS
Glass is the non-structural member and the weakest part of the structure. It is used for
appearance purpose. So, when impact load or any explosion effect occurs on structure it fails
first due to shock wave and sound wave.

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Causes of life loss

Due to failing of glass it will spread in forms of fragments any direction outside the structure or
and inner side of structure and will create injury to the human being which tends towards the life
loss

 Blocked glass
 Smoke and fire Power loss
 Communications breakdown

 CATASTROPHIC COLLAPSE:
Due to the joints and corners, as they are the weakest part of structure fail first. Therefore
the structural member like beam, columns etc. are failed because joint between them will fail and
they collapse suddenly.

Due to suddenly collapse of structural member the whole structure will be collapse,
which term known as “catastrophic collapse” of the structure.

Causes:

 Due to catastrophic collapse there is more chance of mainly human life loss as well as
severity of injuries. So it will more affect to human life.
 They also cause the power loss in structure due cutting of wires, cable etc.
 Due to power loss, communication will be breakdown so communication will fail and
require more time for rescue operation.
 Catastrophic collapse mainly cause economic loss, as suddenly collapse of structure all
proper in as well as near the structure will be destroyed.

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature survey on anti explosiove structure is necessary which involves the previous study and
knowledge about the anti explosiove structure and various papers related to the project are
gained which can be referred.

 Technical Paper on “Terrorist Attack Resisting Structure” by Prof. Jignesh Vanjara (1)
:-Terrorist attack resistant structure has very wide aspects in civil engineering There is lots of
advancement in this subject. This study is motivated from making buildings in a blast
resistant way, pioneering to put the necessary regulations into practice for preventing human
and structural loss due to the blast and other human-sourced hazards and creating a common
sense about the explosions that they are possible threats in daily life. In this context,
architectural and structural design of buildings should be specially considered.

This paper gives a systematic approach to assessing the causes and outcomes of terrorist
attacks. The literature also provides a systematic framework to investigate terrorist attacks and
their impacts on building structures. Common damage types from explosions to general
civil structures are provided including the World Trade Center attack on 9/11 and the
Murrah Building bombing. These examples provide perspectives on what can occur in a
terrorist attack. Then the basic principles of an explosion are explored, which is the
foundation to design analytical and experimental studies. After that, the impact of an
explosion on a structure and how that is determined is discussed. Analysis techniques for a
damaged structure are also explored in depth, as well as experimental methods used to
validate and prove those techniques

 Technical Paper on “Blast Loading and Blast Effects on Structures” by T. Ngo P.

Mendis, A. Gupta & J. Ramsay (2) :- An Overview” This paper conclude that for high-
risks facilities such as public and commercial tall buildings, design considerations against
extreme events (bomb blast, high velocity impact) is very important. It is recommended that
guidelines on abnormal load cases and provisions on progressive collapse prevention should
be included in the current Building Regulations and Design Standards. Requirements on
ductility levels also help improve the building performance under severe load conditions.

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

 “Architectural and Structural Design for Blast Resistant Buildings” by Zeynep KFatih
Sutcu, Necdet Torunbalci (3) :- This paper says that the increase in the number of terrorist
attacks especially in the last few years has shown that the effect of blast loads on buildings
is a serious matter that should be taken into consideration in the design process. Although
these kinds of attacks are exceptional cases, man-made disasters; blast loads are in fact
dynamic loads that need to be carefully calculated just like earthquake and wind loads.
The objective of this study is to shed light on blast resistant building design theories, the
enhancement of building security against the effects of explosives in both architectural
and structural design process and the design techniques that should be carried out.
Firstly, explosives and explosion types have been explained briefly. In addition, the general
aspects of explosion process have been presented to clarify the effects of explosives on
buildings. To have a better understanding of explosives and characteristics of explosions will
enable us to make blast-resistant building design much more efficiently. Essential
techniques for increasing the capacity of a building to provide protection against explosive
effects are discussed both with an architectural and structural approach.

 Osman Shallan, Atef Eraky, Tharwat Sakr, Shimaa Emad “Response of Building
Structures to Blast Effects” (4) :- This paper investigates, through numerical simulations,
the effects of blast loads on three buildings with different aspect ratios. Finite element
models of these buildings were developed using the finite element program AUTODYN.
Blast loads located at two different locations and spaced from the building with different
standoff distances were applied. The simulations have revealed that the effect of blast load
decrease with increasing the standoff distance from the building and with variation the aspect
ratios of the buildings there is no variation in the displacement of the column in the face of
the blast load but with increasing the aspect ratio the effect of blast load decrease in other
element in the building. And author conclude that blast load decrease with increasing the
standoff distance from the building and with variation the aspect ratios of the buildings there
is no variation in the displacement of the column in the face of the blast load but with
increasing the aspect ratio the effect of blast load decrease in other element in the building.

 Vasilis KARLOS, George SOLOMOS European Laboratory for Structural Assessment.

“Calculation of Blast Loads for Application to Structural Components” (5) :- This paper
studies on the behaviour of engineering structures under blast or impact loading. The use of
explosives by terrorist groups around the world that target civilian buildings and other
structures is becoming a growing problem in modern societies. Explosive devices have
become smaller in size and more powerful than some years ago, leading to increased
mobility of the explosive material and larger range effects. Usually the casualties from such a
detonation are not only related to instant fatalities as a consequence of the direct release of
energy, but mainly to structural failures that might occur and could result in extensive life
loss.
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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

 Structural Design for External Terrorist Bomb Attacks by Jon A. Schmidt (6) :-
This paper summarises the methods available to define an external terrorist bomb threat and
estimate structural design loads and element responses using simple dynamic system models
and principle. With the increase of the threat of terrorist attacks using explosives over the last
decade has created an awareness of building owners and designers. The US government has
funded extensive research of blast analysis and protective design methods and has produced a
number of guidelines for its own facilities. The private sector is increasingly considering similar
measures, especially for so-called “Icon Buildings” that are perceived to be prime targets, as
well as a nearby structure that are vulnerable to collateral damage. This article summarises the
methods available to define an external terrorist bomb threat and estimate structural design
loads and element responses using simple dynamic system models and principles.

 “Blast Loading Effects on Steel Columns” by Ashish Kumar Tiwary, Aditya

Kumar Tiwary, Anil Kumar, Jaypee University (7) :-
This paper says that a bomb explosion within or adjacent to a building causes
catastrophic damage to the building’s exterior as well as interior structural elements
including walls, windows. Loss of lives and injuries to occupants can result from many causes
such as direct blast effects, structural collapse, debris impact, fire, smoke, etc. The indirect
effects can combine to inhibit or prevent timely evacuation, thereby causing additional
casualties. In such cases, one or more columns of the building are damaged which results in the
failure of beam slab systems and thereby causing a progressive collapse of the part or the whole
structure. Thus the columns which are prone to blast must be investigated for high strain loading
effects. So the paper presents the modal analysis of steel column taken from a large building
frame subjected to blast loading. The implicit modal analysis was done to assess the robustness
of numerical model prepared in explicit dynamic ANSYS.

 Impacts and Analysis for Buildings under Terrorist Attacks” by Edward Eskew &
Shinae Jang (8) :- This paper gives a systematic approach to assessing the causes and
outcomes of terrorist attacks. The literature also provides a systematic framework to
investigate terrorist attacks and their impacts on building structures. Common damage
types from explosions to general civil structures are provided including the World
Trade Center attack on 9/11 and the Murrah Building bombing. These examples provide
perspectives on what can occur in a terrorist attack. Then the basic principles of an
explosion are explored, which is the foundation to design analytical and experimental
studies. After that, the impact of an explosion on a structure and how that is determined is
discussed. Analysis techniques for a damaged structure are also explored in depth, as
well as experimental methods used to validate and prove those techniques.

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

CHAPTER 3

WHAT IS AN EXPLOSION?

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

WHAT IS AN EXPLOSION?
An explosive can be solid, liquid or a mixture of substances. When a suitable stimulus,
(e.g. electric, flame, spark, percussion) is applied to the explosive substance it is capable of
developing a sudden high pressure by the rapid formation or liberation of stable gases at high
temperatures.

WHAT EXACTLY IS AN EXPLOSION?

An explosion is a kind of chain reaction that happens when a material very quickly
changes from being in solid, liquid or gas form, into hot, expanding gas. When the energy from
this chemical reaction is released, a quick increase in pressure happens. For an explosion to
occur, three things have to be present, namely oxygen, flammable material and temperature (the
fire triangle). When something explodes, however, the actual burning process usually produces
oxygen to burn. (If you mix sugar with a material with lots of oxygen in it (an oxidant), you can
make it explode)

WORLD TRADE CENTRE COLLAPSE

The collapse of the World Trade Centre (WTC) towers on September 11, 2001, was as
sudden as it was dramatic; the complete destruction of such massive buildings shocked nearly
everyone. Immediately afterward and even today, there is widespread speculation that the
buildings were structurally deficient, that the steel columns melted, or that the fire
suppression equipment failed to operate.

World Trade Centre Disaster — Tuesday, September 11, 2001

On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, at 8:45am New York local time, One World
Trade Centre, the north tower, was hit by a hijacked 767 commercial jet airplane, loaded with
a jet fuel of 90,000 litres. A similar hijacked jet hit two World Trade Centre, the south
tower, 18 minutes later at 9:03am. The south tower, WTC 2, which had been hit, second, was
the first to suffer a complete structural collapse at 10:05am, 62 minutes after being hit itself,
80 minutes after the first impact. The north tower, WIC I. then also collapsed at 10:29am,
104 minutes after being hit. WTC 7, a substantial 47 story office building in its own right,
built in 1987, was damaged by the collapsing towers, caught fire, and later in the afternoon
also totally collapsed.

CASUALTIES: About 2800 people died in the disaster. At the time the recovery and site
clearing process officially concluded on May 30, 2002, 1796 people got injured. 1.8
million tons of debris was removed from the disaster site. The aircraft impact undoubtedly
destroyed several columns in the WTC perimeter wall, the number of columns lost on the
initial impact was not large and the loads were shifted to remaining columns in this highly
redundant structure. Of equal or even greater significance during this initial impact was the
explosion when 90,000 L of jet fuel. Comprising nearly 1/3 of the aircraft's weight, ignited.
The ensuing fire was clearly the principal cause of the collapse.

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TYPE OF EXPLOSIVES

A. Gelignites
An explosives that is based on nitroglycerine (NG), are manufactured in gelatinous or
semi gelatinous form.

For underground coal mine, a “permitted” or “permissible “type of explosives, so as to be

safe from coal dust or methane gas explosion. This is achieved by adding sodium chloride (15%
to 40%).

Because of their relatively high cost and stricter safety requirements, the use of gelignite
in the mining industry is decreasing.

B. Ammonium nitrate – Fuel Oil (ANFO)

Neither ammonium nitrate nor fuel oil is classified as explosive, but when mixed in
correct proportion, the result is an effective blasting agent.

3NH2NO3 + CH2 3N2 + 7H2O + CO2 (3900 kJ/kg) (Ideal – 94.3% AN: 5.7% FO)

ANFO cannot be detonated by a detonator. It needs a primer i.e. a high explosive with a
detonator.

C.Watergels
This group of explosives is sometimes referred to as slurries. Watergels were developed
to overcome the deficiencies of ANFO in wet conditions. They consist of a mixture of:

I. gel base, with

ii. Ammonium nitrate, and sometimes. Aluminium powder

D. Emulsions
Fine droplets of oxidizer salts such as ammonium, sodium or calcium nitrates are finely
dispersed into the continuous phase of fuel oil. This water-in-oil emulsion is then stabilized
against liquid separation by an emulsifying agent such as sodium oleate or sodium mono-oleate.
Dispersed gas can be put into the emulsion matrix for density control within a range of 0.70 to
1.35 g/cm3. This is achieved with micro balloons or by chemical gassing of the composition.
Other salts such as perchlorates are added to improve sensitivity and shelf life. The emulsions
explosive have excellent water resistance. Heavy ANFO – mixtures of ANFO and high density
no explosives emulsion phase.

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

CHAPTER 4

TYPES OF LOAD ACTING ON THE

STRUCTURE DUE TO EXPLOSION

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

MEASURING FORCES
A force is a push or pull that tends to cause an object to change its movement or shape.

Fig.1.Different Forces Acting On Structure.

The actual effect of a force on a structure depends on:

Magnitude, Direction, and Location

• The magnitude, or size, of the force (the bigger the force’s magnitude, the stronger it is and the
more effect it will have on a structure)

• The direction of the force

• The location where the force is applied

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EXTERNAL FORCES ACTING ON STRUCTURES

External forces on structures are stresses that act on a structure from outside the structure.
Gravity is one such force, acting on all things all the time. Impact forces (things that collide with
the structure) are another type of live load. External forces produce internal forces, or stresses,
within the materials from which the structure is made. These internal stresses can change the
shape or size of a structure and is called deformation. This deformation can lead to repair of the
damage to the structure, or failure of the structure.

Load

The load is an external force on a structure.

Static Load:

A static (dead) load is a permanent force, acting on a structure. This includes the weight
of the structure itself and the non-moving parts it supports.

Dynamic Load:

A dynamic (live) load is changing, or non-permanent force acting on a structure. This

includes the force of the wind and the weight of things that are in, or on a structure.

Impact load:

An impact load is a load which is suddenly acting on the structure due to sudden collision
of structural members or other external collision on structures.

BLAST FORCE

Maximum Values for Reference Explosion – The maximum values of the positive side on
overpressure pso, reflected over pressure pso and dynamic pressure qo, as caused by the
explosion of one tonne explosive at various distances from the point of explosion.

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CHAPTER 5

EFFECTS OF EXPLOSION
ON STRUCTURE

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF BLAST AND EFFECTS ON

STRUCTURES
The Source-

The conventional chemical charge is considered spherical. The shock front at the ground
surface from a contact burst is approximately vertical. The effective yield of a contact burst is
almost double of an equal explosion high in the air. This condition is assumed to give most
serious effects.

Shock Wave-

As a result of explosion, a shock wave is generated in the air which moves outward in all
directions from the point of burst with high speed causing time-dependent pressure and suction
effects at all points in its way. The shock wave consists of an initial positive pressure phase
followed by a negative (suction) phase at any point as shown in Fig. The shock wave is
accompanied by blast wind causing dynamic pressures due to drag effects on any obstruction
coming in its way. Due to diffraction of the wave at an obstructing surface reflected pressure is
caused instantaneously which clears in a time depending on the extent of obstructing surface.

Fig.2 Shock Wave Produced by Blast

Pressures and Duration-

At any surface encountered by the shock wave, the pressure rises almost instantaneously
to the peak value of side-on overpressure and the dynamic pressure or their reflected pressure.
The peak values depend upon the size of explosion, the distance of the surface from the source,
and other factors like ambient pressure and temperature in air.

The incident blast wave characteristics are described by the peak initial overpressure p so, the
overpressure ps versus time t curve; the maximum dynamic pressure q0, the dynamic pressure q
versus time t curve and the duration of positive phase t 0.

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

The peak positive intensity quickly drops down to zero; the total duration of the positive phase
being a few milliseconds. The maximum negative overpressure is much smaller than the peak
positive overpressure, its limiting value being one atmosphere. But the negative phase duration is
2 to 5 times as long as that of the positive phase.

Explosive Effects:
An explosion is a chemical reaction, which causes an extremely rapid release of energy.
This energy is released in several forms including sound, heat and a shock wave, which
propagates outward from the explosive source at very high velocities. Of these it is the shock
wave, which consists of highly compressed particles of air that is the primary cause of the
structural damage.
The major threat is caused by terrorist bombings. The threat for a conventional bomb is
defined by two equally important elements, the bomb size, or charge weight, and the standoff
distance - the minimum guaranteed distance between the blast source and the target. Mother
requirement is to keep the bomb as far away as possible, by maximizing the standoff distance.
No matter what size the bomb, the damage will be less severe the further the target is from the
source.
Structural hardening should actually be the last resort in protecting a structure: detection
and prevention must remain the first line of defence.

How Explosion Causes Damage to a Building:

The shock wave exerts extremely high pressures on all surfaces that it encounters in its
path. The face of a building immediately in front of the face of an explosion is worst hit by the
shock wave not only it is closest to the explosion because the wave is reflected from this
surface, which amplifies the pressures and damages the structure. This effect is same as a
wave crashing against a sea wall.

The wall stops the wave and dissipates its energy. In this process, the wave jumps up
on the wall. Similarly, the pressures jump very high on the side of the building, which is
impeding the path of the propagating wave, forcing it to reverse its direction or to be reflected.
The other sides of the building are subject to the reflected shock wave as the wave continues to
propagate, engulfing the building in the process and exerting pressures on all surfaces it
encounters. The other visible cause of injury is falling debris.

One of the less visible causes of human injuries is blast pressure, which can rupture the
ear drum, collapse the lung, or even crush the skull as a result of the blast wave's getting into the
workspace. These injuries can be reduced if the level of blast pressures entering the space is
curtailed. The amount of blast that enters the space is directly proportional to the amount
of openings on the facade of a structure.

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

How a Building Responds to an Explosion:

The windows are typically the weakest portion the building and are the first to break in
an explosion. Breaking of glass could mean hundreds of pounds of glass flying through the air
at the time of the explosion. Though glass is not a structural element to the extent that it is not
responsible for keeping the building standing glass shrapnel is responsible for many of the
injuries in explosions and is therefore an explosive by-product to be reckoned with.

Once the blast wave has entered the interior of the building it will act both upward and
downward on the floor slabs of the building. Since the floor slabs have not been designed for
upward load they are particularly vulnerable to collapsing in this loading direction. The
columns too may be placed in to tension, which may cause significant devastation of the
structure.

If the force of the explosion is capable of failing a floor slab or column on the
lower floors, then a partial or complete collapse of the structure may be initiated as the floors
above come tumbling down.

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

CHAPTER 6

ANTI EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

VERY HIGH STRENGTH CONCRETE (VHSC):

The variability of concrete’s strength and mass make it a useful material in structural
protection. The mass of a concrete member can be varied by altering its component materials and
geometry. For applications where ample mass is needed, a large section of normal-density
concrete or a smaller section of high- density concrete can be used. For applications where mass
or size is detrimental, yet strength is necessary, concrete structures can be designed with thin
sections of higher-strength concrete. Engineers are constantly looking for new materials to
provide answers to complex problems. As construction and material costs escalate, demand has
increased for stronger materials that occupy less space. Research has been examining high-
performance concrete materials for use in protective structures.

Developments in very-high-strength concrete (VHSC), a material made using

conventional constituents combined in critical proportions, have further expanded these
capabilities.

VHSC is made from the same general constituents as conventional concrete

(cementations material, water, aggregate, and additional compounds for removing air and water
from the mix {admixtures}). Yet, the careful selection of constituents and their proportions, as
well as proper mixing, results in significantly improved tensile and compressive strength,
toughness

Advantages of Very High Strength Concrete (VHSC):

• Improved homogeneity through particle size and material selection.

• Increased density by optimization of particle size and mixing technology.

• Improved strength by maximizing reactive materials and minimizing water content.

• Increased microstructure by application of pressure before setting and post-set heat treatment.

• Increased tensile strength, toughness, and ductility by incorporation of steel fibres or steel
micro-fibres.

These new VHSCs are useful for force protection and infra- structures in need of blast
and penetration resistance. Their performance, especially in spall resistance and increased
deflection without failure, mesh well with design requirements calling for reduced flying debris
in buildings and prevention of progressive collapse. Development of this new class of very- high
- strength concretes, based on use of small-particle component materials and particle-packing
theories, has led to materials with improved penetration resistance. Although the direct-tensile
strength s remain low at approximately 10 MPa, the compressive strength s of these concretes are
very high, near 200 MPa. Additionally, the flexural toughness of the concrete is greater than 250
times that of conventional, non-fibre reinforced concrete .

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

Penetration-resistance experiments conducted on the VHSC indicated approximately 50%

less penetration than into CSPC concrete, and 30% less penetration than into HSPC and HSFR
concrete. Inclusion of fibres into these concretes does not significantly improve the penetration
resistance of a given strength of concrete, but does provide for greater resistance to visible
damage surrounding the penetration crater.

FIBRE-REINFORCED CONCRETE:
The Portland Cement Association (PCA) has been investigating adding fibre to
reinforced concrete since the late 1950’s, and several studies have investigated the behaviour of
fibre reinforced concrete (FRC) under impact loading. Moreover, fibre is currently used in
applications that require enhanced crack control and/or better performance in flexure and shear
(ACI Committee 544, 1996). Several fibre types are available depending on the application and
desired behaviour. This report addresses selective studies to provide evidence supporting the use
of fibres in reinforced concrete for blast resistant design.

Fibre Types:
Many different fibre types are available: steel, micro-synthetic, macro-synthetic, glass,
cellulose, natural, and poly-vinyl alcohol (PVA) fibres. These types have varying properties and
applications. Fibres to control plastic shrinkage cracking are micro-synthetic fibres, which are
made of synthetic materials such as polypropylene, nylon, polyethylene, and polyester. Macro-
synthetic fibres have properties similar to steel fibres and can be used in their place
(Applications, 2007). The first glass fibres produced were attacked by the alkali in the cement
and destroyed; therefore, they are manufactured today with zirconia, and their most common
application is in “exterior architectural cladding panels” (ACI Committee 544, 1996). Steel fibres
are used to enhance the “toughness and post-crack load carrying capacity,” and their lengths vary
from 38.1 13mm (1.5”) to 76.2 mm (3”). “Typically loose or bundled, these fibres are generally
made from carbon or stainless steel and are shaped into varying geometries such as crimped,
hooked end or with other mechanical deformations for anchorage in the concrete” (Applications ,
2007). Steel fibres are the material investigated for their mechanical properties in this study.

A variety of steel fibre shapes are available: straight, crimped, hooked single, hooked
collated, and twisted (Tadepalli, Mo, Hsu, & Vogel, 2009). Before the mid-1970’s, the only fibre
shape tested was straight. Currently, straight fibres are seldom used in the field, due to their
inferior mechanical bond to concrete compared to that of deformed fibres. The most effective
shape for energy absorption capacity is hooked fibres according to studies on effects of steel
fibre reinforcement on the mechanical properties of reinforced concrete (Tadepalli, Mo, Hsu, &
Vogel, 2009).

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STEEL FIBRE CONCRETE (SFC):

As the name suggest it immense (gives) tensile and ductile strength to concrete. The real
contribution of steel fibre is to increase the toughness of concrete under any type of loading i.e.
blast loading also resistance to shock wave & vibration therefore it can be used in blast resisting
structure .

It has ultimate strength of 1100 MPa and above.

Why it should be used in blast resisting structure?

Because

 It has resistance to impact blast and shock waves.

 Shrinkage control of concrete
 High flexural, shear tensile strength.
 Resistance to spalling of concrete & Abrasion
 High thermal impact resistance.
 Resistance to seismic hazards.

ADVANTAGES OF STEEL FIBRE CONCRETE:

 Crack control: - It can control the crack because of which concrete will not fail suddenly.
 Joint stability: - It gives greater strength to joint will not fail.
 Fatigue &Impact resistance
 Ductility
 Shear load transfer

APPLICATIONS OF STEEL FIBRE CONCRETE: -

 It is mainly used in blast/ Impact resistance structure.
 Defence structures

STEEL FIBRE REACTIVE POWDER CONCRETE (SFRPC):

Due to a rapid development in precision guided and penetrating weapons existing
protective engineering face a great challenge and severe threat. Generally, there are two methods
used to improve the performance of protective engineering structures against attacks. One is to
seek advanced structural systems to mitigate and/or disperse the energy of the impact
(penetration or explosion), and the other is to apply new high-performance materials to enhance
the anti-strike capability of the structure. In recent decades, steel-fibre high-strength concrete has
become a popular material in structural engineering suitable for possible exposure to accidental
explosions and other harsh environments1. Reactive powder concrete (RPC) is a kind of
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advanced cement-based material, originally developed in the early 1990s. RPC possesses ultra-
high static/dynamic strength, high fracture capacity, low shrinkage, and excellent durability
under severe conditions. The addition of steel fibre further improves the dynamic properties of
the concrete. However, the high cost and complex fabrication technique required to make
SFRPC severely limits its commercial development and application in civil engineering.
However, in the construction of important protective engineering structures for military purpose,
anti-strike capability has priority over cost. Thus, SFRPC is a commendable choice to use as a
substitute for ordinary concrete in the construction of such protective structures. As the
application and demand for SFRPC increased, several experimental studies were conducted to
investigate

The test results showed that SFRPC demonstrates high-quality toughness and high
residual strength even after cracks have appeared. SFRPC possesses most of the properties
required for protective engineering applications. However, there are only a few reports published
in the literature devoted to investigating the anti-penetration or anti-explosion performance of
SFRPC structures. To investigate the anti- strike capability of SFRPC, a group of tests on
SFRPC under penetration and contact explosion conditions have been carried out.

Armor-Blast and Ultra-Blast, two of our blast mitigation coatings, can significantly reduce
casualties and property damage from hostile explosive attacks compared to non-coated surfaces.
This poly-urea coating was specifically developed to survive massive pressure, such as
explosion, when applied to concrete or metal structures. The ballistic protection coatings are
suitable for armored vehicles and high profile buildings and offers proven blast mitigation
benefits.

Before Blast During blast

After Blast

Fig.3.Blast Mitigating Coating Effect On Stucture.

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

BENEFITS OF BLAST MITIGATION COATINGS

 Blast mitigation and impact resistance for military vehicles, equipment, bunkers and facilities
 Unique surface protection for public buildings and high visibility venues such as sporting
events and concerts
 Added safety for armored transport vehicles, limousines, and other transportation targets
susceptible to explosive attacks
 Secure environment for political, government, and executive residences
 Increased impact resistance for pipes, bridges, chemical tanks, and other potential hazards

BLAST MITIGATION OPTIONS

Armor-Blast and Ultra-Blast are developed from a two-component 100% solid polyurea. They
can be sprayed at a wide range of temperatures from 18°F to 150°F. Temperature exposure
ranges from -40°F to 350°F with high tear-tensile strength and chemical and water resistance. In
addition to CMU structures, they can be sprayed on other substrates such as metal, concrete and
foam blast mats. These seamless, waterproof coatings have no VOC’s or solvents.

ARMORBLAST 1:1 PURE POLYUREA

Superior elongation properties, tensile and tear strength; material simultaneously mitigates the
concussive force of a blast and holds together the materials of a coated substrate; adapts very
well to multiple substrates
Sprayed on armored vehicles, concrete block and other structures
Used around a core of impact absorbing polyurethane foam to provide personnel protection for
military transport or other blast-susceptible environments such as industrial transport or
manufacturing

 ULTRABLAST 1:1 PURE POLYUREA

 Top-of-the-line blast mitigation coating, incredibly high tensile and tear strength with
excellent elongation to mitigate a concussive force or shockwave

 HIGHLINE 510 1:1 PURE POLYUREA MULTI-PURPOSE OPTION

 Excellent corrosion resistance; superior skid resistance; slightly slower set time for a
smoother texture application
 Lower sensitivity to moisture for spraying in environments that don’t allow other elastomeric
coatings options
 Used as coatings for mining, secondary containment, marine applications, water features,
wastewater and sanitation systems, blast mitigation.

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

CHAPTER 7

TREATMENTS TO VARIOUS

PARTS OF A STRUCTURE

25
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

TREATMENTS PROVIDED TO VARIOUS PARTS OF A

STRUCTURE TO IMPROVE BLAST RESISTING MECHANISM:
Every building has some inherent ability to resist explosive effects. Depending on the
construction materials and the structural design approach used this resistance may vary greatly.
A masonry or brick load bearing building for instance has very little inherent blast
resistance where as a poured-in-place reinforced concrete building will have much more inherent
strength.

Reinforced concrete is a particularly good material for resisting explosion effects not only
because of its heavy weight but when properly designed a reinforced concrete building will
respond to the explosion by absorbing the energy of the explosion through
deformation. This type of response is termed to be "ductile" response: This will prevent a sudden
catastrophic failure., The objective here is to allow the building to be flexible enough to
deform without collapsing:, For reinforced concrete design to behave well under explosive
loading, it is essential that the joints connecting the members are properly tied into each
other with reinforcing bars to ensure that failure does not occur at these critical locations and the
full strength of the members is developed,

Dynamic Analysis of Building Systems

The performance of building systems in response to explosive loading is highly dynamic,
highly inelastic, and highly interactive. By controlling the flexibility and resulting deformations,
structural or facade components may be designed to dissipate considerable amounts of blast
energy. The phasing of the different responses and the energy that is dissipated through inelastic
deformation must be carefully represented in order to accurately determine the behaviour. The
'sequential single-degree-of freedom (SDOF) model' approach, commonly used to analyse
individual components, is likely to produce overly conservative designs, while an accurate
representation of the structural system truly requires a complex 'multi-degree-of-freedom
(MDOF) model.' These MDOF models may be developed using appropriate inelastic Finite
Element software for which an explicit formulation of the equations of motion may be solved.
The details of the finite element models, including the interaction between the glass and the
support mullions, will determine the accuracy of the analysis. Only this approach will provide
the most authentic representation of the system's ability to resist the dynamic blast loading AND
provide the most economical design.

Performance Standards
Analytical tools that evaluate the likely performance of curtain-wall façades in response
to blast loads are used to demonstrate compliance with established blast criteria or performance
specifications. Many of these performance specifications contain the criterion that the building
system must be a balanced design. The objective of this criterion is to realize the capacity of all
the materials, maximize the potential energy dissipated due to deformation, and manage the
26
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

failure mechanisms. This is accomplished by assuring a controlled sequence of failure.

Depending on the specified performance conditions, the application of this criterion could have
significant impact on the sizing of the members and the design of the connections between the
different components. The behaviour of structural materials, such as steel and aluminium, in
response to explosive loading was the subject of intense investigation by the governments of the
United Kingdom, Israel, and the United States of America. Some of these materials behave very
differently when subjected to high strain rate loading than they do under static conditions.
Furthermore, the inelastic deformation of these members depends on their section properties,
shape functions, and extent of deformation. For compound sections composed of different pieces
and materials, transformed section properties may be used to characterize an equivalent material
and a combined or composite section property may be used to represent its structural resistance.
Care must be taken to calculate composite section properties when strain compatibility between
components can be justified and combined section properties when deformation compatibility
between components is enforced.

Physical Protection Strategies and Features:-

Perimeter Protection
While it may be possible to predict effects of a certain charge weight at a specified
standoff distance, the actual charge weight of the explosive used by a terrorist, the efficiency of
the chemical reaction and the source location cannot be reliably predicted. Given the
uncertainties, the most effective means of protecting a structure is to keep the explosive as far
away as possible by maximizing the keep-out or standoff distance. However, this approach is
only necessary if an analysis identifies the building to be at risk of attack as opposed to suffering
collateral damage due to an attack on a nearby target.

To guarantee the maximum keep-out distance between unscreened vehicles and the
structure, anti-ram bollards or large planters must be placed at the curb around the perimeter of
the building. The site conditions will determine the maximum speeds attainable, and thus the
kinetic energy that must be resisted. Both the bollard and its foundation must be designed to
resist the maximum load. Conversely, if design restrictions limit the capacity of the bollard or its
foundation, then site restrictions will be required to limit the maximum speed attainable.
Furthermore, public parking abutting the building must be secured or eliminated, and street
parking should not be permitted adjacent to the building. Removing one lane of traffic and
turning it into an extended sidewalk or plaza can gain additional standoff distance. However, the
practical benefit of increasing the standoff depends on the charge weight. If the charge weight is
small, this measure will significantly reduce the forces to a more manageable level. If the threat
is a large charge weight, the blast forces may overwhelm the structure despite the addition of
nine or ten feet to the standoff distance and the measure may not significantly improve
survivability of the occupants or the structure.
27
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

Façade Protection
The building's exterior is its first real defence against the effects of a bomb. How the
façade responds to this loading will significantly affect the behaviour of the structure. Hardening
of the façade is typically the single most costly and controversial component of blast protection,
and may produce a dramatic change to the exterior appearance of the structure such as smaller
window sizes and more rugged attachments. Moreover, given the large surface areas of most
buildings, modest levels of protection may not be cost-effective. Therefore, it may be best to
concentrate on improving the post-damaged behaviour of the façade.

Except for very thick lights, most glazing materials and components designed to respond
to the blast loads will most likely be damaged by the blast overpressures. To improve the post-
damage behaviour of the glazing system, one could specify laminated glass for new construction
or apply anti-shatter film to existing glazing. While these features do little to improve the
strength of the glass, they attempt to hold the shards of glass together and better protect the
occupants from hazardous debris (see also WBDG Glazing Hazard Mitigation. Laminated glass
possesses the best post-damage behaviour, may be used with a wide variety of glazing materials
and thickness, and provides the highest degree of safety to occupants. The effectiveness of Mylar
films, on the other hand, depends on the method of application and the thickness of the film.
Common film systems range from a simple edge-to-edge (daylight) application, to a wet glazed
adhesion, to a mechanical attachment to the existing window frame. The mechanical attachments
are most effective when they are anchored to the underlying structure. Regardless of the method,
there are architectural issues and life cycle costs associated with the use of anti-shatter films.

Equally important to the design of the glass is the design of the window frames. For the
window to properly fail, the glass must be held in place long enough to fail. Short of that, the
glazing will dislodge from the housing intact and cause serious damage or injury. The capacity of
the frame system to resist blast loading should therefore exceed the corresponding capacity of the
glazing, often referred to as the "glass fail first criteria." Factors of two to three, over the nominal
capacity of the glass to resist breakage, may be required to design the frames. The bite, including
the possible use of structural silicone sealant, must be adequate to assure the failed glass is
retained within the frame. Depending on the façade, the mullions may be designed to span from
floor to floor or tie into wall panels and must be capable of withstanding the reactions of a
window loaded to failure. Finally, the walls to which the windows are attached must be designed
to accept the reaction forces as well.

Designing glazing systems capable of resisting a specified overpressure requires a

cascade of costly upgrades to the façade, including really thick laminated glass, and relatively
heavy frames and mullions. There are also major construction challenges such as reinforcement
and steel embedment that get in the way of new cast-in-place reinforced concrete wall
construction, and the substantial anchorage required to accommodate the large reaction forces.

28
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

Moreover, attaching these window systems to existing walls may even be a physical
impossibility. Because the improved capacity is likely to fall far short of the pressures associated
with a realistic terrorist threat, it is recommended that for new construction with low threat
criteria and limited budgets for blast protection, the engineer select the weakest laminated
glazing that satisfies wind and serviceability requirements. In this way, the improved post failure
behaviour provides the occupants a measure of protection at a reasonable cost.

Curtain Wall Protection

Fig.4 Curtain Wall –Sample blast curtain wall engineered to take advantage of a flexible
system. Some protective features may include: insulated glazing unit with laminated inner
light; glazing adhered to mullion with structural silicone sealant; and curtain-wall frame
with steel backup encased in aluminium.

A curtain wall is a non-bearing exterior enclosure that is supported by a building's

structural steel or concrete frame and holds either glass, metal, stone, or precast concrete panels.
Lightweight and composed of relatively slender extruded aluminium members, curtain-wall
façades are considerably more flexible than conventional, hardened punched window systems. In
a blast environment, the mullion support would absorb a portion of the blast energy and improve
the performance of the glazing, allowing the glazing to sustain greater blast environments
(although the mullions themselves should be designed to resist the forces collected by the glass).

It is important to take into account the inherent flexibility of curtain-wall systems when
sizing members for blast loads and evaluating the glazing for hazard. This enables the engineer
to both ascertain the true blast worthiness of the curtain wall as well as to properly calculate the
reduced load transfer into supporting structural elements.

The design of curtain-wall systems to withstand the effects of explosive loading depends
on the performance of the various elements that comprise the system. Curtain-wall response
software, based on more sophisticated finite element methods than simplified Single-Degree-of-
Freedom glass fragment hazard analytical approaches, was developed for the Department of
29
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

Defence,, Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) to accurately represent the capacity of the
glazing and the supporting frame members. While the glazing may be the most brittle
component, the performancee of the system, and the reduction of hazard to the occupants depend
on the interaction between the capacities of the various elements.

In addition to hardening the individual members that comprise the curtain

curtain--wall system, the
attachments to the floor slabsbs or spandrel beams require special attention. These connections
must be adjustable to compensate for the fabrication tolerances and accommodate the differential
inter-story
story drifts and thermal deformations as well as be designed to transfer gravity loads, wind
loads, and blast loads.

Energy-Absorbing
Absorbing Catch Systems
An alternative approach to blast protection takes the concept of a flexible curtain-wall
curtain
system one step further by making full use of the flexibility and capacity of all the window
materials to absorb and dissipate large amounts of blast energy while preventing debris from
entering the occupied space. Energy
Energy-absorbing
absorbing catch systems (a.k.a. Cable Protected Window
Systems (CPWS)) work in such a way that as the glass is damaged it bears against a cable
c catch
system, which in turn deforms the window frames. Extensive explosive testing, as well as
sophisticated computer simulations, has demonstrated the effectiveness of these systems.

Fig.55 Energy-Absorbing Catch Systems

FLOOR SLABS:

I. In exterior bays/lower floors, drop panels are required to shorten the effective slab length
and improve the punching shear resistance
2. Shear reinforcement embedded in the slab will improve the shear resistance and
improve the ability of the slab to ttransfer moments to the columns.
3. The slab-column
column interface should contain closedclosed-hoop
hoop stirrup reinforcement properly
anchored around flexural bars within a prescribed distance.
30
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

4. More lateral ties must be provided through the column. This reinforcement serves to prevent
brittle failure at the connection and provides an alternate mechanism for developing
shear transfer once the concrete has punched through.

5. Continuously tied reinforcement, spanning both directions, must be detailed properly

Floor Slab Reinforcements

A reinforced-concrete, flat-plate structural slab is an economical system that provides for
maximum use of vertical space, particularly for buildings in areas with height restriction.
However, when subjected to a blast load, punching shear and softening of the moment-resisting
capacity of the slabs will reduce the lateral-load-resisting capacity of the system. Once the
moment-resisting capacity of the slabs at the columns is lost, the ability of the slab to transfer
forces to the shear walls is diminished and the structure is severely weakened. In addition to the
failure of the floor slab, the loss of contact between the slab and the columns may increase the
unsupported column lengths, which may lead to the buckling of those columns. Furthermore, the
lateral load resisting system—which consists of the shear walls, the columns, and the slab
diaphragms that transfer the lateral loads—may be weakened to such an extent that the whole
building may become laterally unstable.

Fig.6. Floor slabs

Conventional flat-plate design may be upgraded by paying more attention to the design
and detailing of exterior bays and lower floors, which are the most susceptible to an exterior
vehicle explosive threat, and the design of the spandrel beams, which tie the structure together
and enhance the response of the slab edge. Drop panels and column capitols may be used to
shorten the effective slab length and improve the punching shear resistance. If vertical clearance
is a problem, shear-heads embedded in the slab will improve the shear resistance and improve
the ability of the slab to transfer moments to the columns. Furthermore, the blast pressures that
enter the structure through shattered windows and failed curtain walls will load the underside and
subsequently the top surfaces of the floor slabs along the height of the building. Both the delay in
the sequence of loading and the difference in magnitude of loading will determine the net
31
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

pressures acting on the slabs. Consequently, there will be a brief time in which each floor will
receive a net upward loading. This upward load requires that the slab be reinforced to resist loads
opposing the effects of gravity.

Fig.7. Column Heads

The ductility demands and shear capacity required to resist multiple-load reversals often
force the engineer to provide beams to span over critical sections of the slab. The inclusion of
beams will greatly enhance the ability of the framing system to transfer lateral loads to the shear
walls. The slab-column interface should contain closed-hoop stirrup reinforcement properly
anchored around flexural bars within a prescribed distance from the column face. Bottom
reinforcement must be provided continuous through the column. This reinforcement serves to
prevent brittle failure at the connection and provides an alternate mechanism for developing
shear transfer once the concrete has punched through. The development of membrane action in
the slab, once the concrete has failed at the column interface, provides a safety net for the post-
damaged structure. Continuously tied reinforcement, spanning both directions, must be detailed
properly to ensure that the tensile forces can be developed at the lapped splices. Anchorage of
the reinforcement at the edge of the slab or at a structural discontinuity is required to guarantee
the development of the tensile forces.

In all, the slab should be designed to prevent a punching shear failure that may in turn
develop into a progressive collapse. Although research has shown that punching shear failures at
interior columns are more likely to result in a progressive collapse than a failure at an exterior
column, the external bay around the perimeter of the structure must be hardened at all
intersecting columns for the external car bomb threat

COLUMNS:
1. The potential for direct lateral loading on the face of the columns, resulting from the blast
pressure and impact of explosive debris, requires that the lower-floor columns be designed with
adequate ductility and strength
32
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

2. The perimeter columns supporting the lower floors must also be designed to resist this
extreme blast effect
3. Encasing these lower-floor columns in a steel jacket will provide confinement, increase shear
capacity, and improve the columns' ductility and strength. An alternative, which provides
similar benefits, is to embed a steel column within the perimeter concrete columns or wall
section.
4. For smaller charge weights, spiral reinforcement provides a measure of core
confinement that greatly improves the capacity and the behaviour of the reinforced
concrete columns under extreme load.

Column Reinforcements
For blast consideration, the distance from the explosion determines, to a great extent, the
characteristics of the loading on a structure. For example, buildings located at a substantial
distance from a protected perimeter—approximately 100 ft. or more—will be exposed to
relatively low pressures fairly uniformly distributed over the façade; buildings located at shorter
distances from the curb—most typical in urban environments—will be exposed to more
localized, higher intensity blast pressures. Due to direct blast pressures, the columns of a typical
building, which are designed primarily to resist gravity loads with no special detailing for
ductility demands, may experience severe bending deformations in addition to the axial loads
that the columns support. To enhance protection, the columns must be designed to be sufficiently
ductile to sustain the combined effects of axial load and lateral displacement.

Fig.8. Direct pressure

In conditions that cause uplift—the net upward load on the slab—the column's tension
will experience a brief tensile force. Conventional reinforced concrete columns not designed to
resist the combined effects of bending may be prone to damage under these conditions. The
lower-floor columns must therefore be designed with adequate ductility and strength to resist the
effects of direct lateral loading from the blast pressure and impact of explosive debris.
Reinforced concrete columns may be designed to resist the effects of an explosion by providing
adequate longitudinal reinforcement, staggering the bar splices, and providing closely spaced ties
at plastic hinge locations. Steel columns may be sized to withstand the lateral loads and column
33
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

splices may be detailed to develop the plastic moments of the section. Existing concrete columns
may be encased in a steel jacket or wrapped with a composite fibre to confine the concrete core
and increase the shear capacity. On the other hand, existing steel columns may be encased in
concrete to add mass and prevent a premature buckling of the thin flanges. For more information
on retrofitting existing buildings, see WBDG Retrofitting Existing Buildings to Resist Explosive
Threats.

Fig.9. Uplift

Fig. 10. Weakened connection

Preventing Progressive Collapse

In addition to façade debris hazards, building occupants may be vulnerable to heavier
debris resulting from structural damage. Progressive collapse occurs when an initiating localized
failure causes adjoining members to be overloaded and fail, resulting in an extent of damage that
is disproportionate to the originating region of localized failure. A protective design may avoid
structural systems that either facilitate or are vulnerable to a progression of collapse resulting
from the loss of a primary vertical load-bearing member.

34
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

New facilities may be designed to accept the loss of an exterior column for one or
possibly two floors above grade without precipitating further collapse. In these cases, the design
requirements are intended to be threat-independent to protect against an explosion of
indeterminate size that might damage a single column, which results in adequate redundant load
paths in the structure should damage occur due to an unspecified abnormal loading. The upgrade
of existing structures to prevent localized damage from developing into a progressive collapse
may not be easily accomplished through the alternate path method. This is because the loss of
support at a column line would increase the spans of all beams directly above the zone of
damage and require different patterns of reinforcement and different types of connection details
than those typically detailed for conventional structural design. For more information on
retrofitting existing buildings, see WBDG Retrofitting Existing Buildings to Resist Explosive
Threats.

Alternatively, columns may be sized, reinforced, or protected to prevent critical damage

as a result of the design threat charge weight that may be located in close proximity to them. The
vulnerable concrete columns may be jacketed with steel plate or wrapped with composite
materials and the vulnerable steel columns may be encased in concrete to protect the cross
sections and add mass. For the upgrade of existing structures, these approaches are better for
preventing progressive collapse than supplementing the capacity of the connecting beams and
girders, or upgrading them using the alternate path method. However, the effectiveness of these
approaches is predicated on the operational and technical security procedures that will limit the
magnitude of the explosive threat. This includes the establishment of effective perimeter
protection, adequate screening of vehicles entering an underground parking facility or loading
dock, and inspection of parcels that may be hand carried into the building. For more information
on retrofitting existing buildings, see WBDG Retrofitting Existing Buildings to Resist Explosive
Threats.

Fig.11.Catenary

35
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

Transfer Girder Reinforcements

Transfer girders and the columns supporting transfer girders are particularly vulnerable to
blast loading. Transfer girders typically concentrate the load-bearing system into a fewer number
of structural elements, which contradicts the concept of redundancy desired in a blast
environment. Typically, the transfer girder spans a large opening, such as a loading dock, or
provides the means to shift the location of column lines at a particular floor. Damage to the
girder may leave several lines of columns, which terminate at the girder from above, totally
unsupported. Similarly, the loss of a support column from below will create a much larger span
that bears critical loads. Transfer girders, therefore, create critical sections the loss of which may
result in a progressive collapse. So if a transfer girder is required and vulnerable to an explosive
loading, then the girder should be designed to be continuous over several supports. There should
be substantial structure framing into the transfer girder to create a two-way redundancy, thereby
an alternate load path in the event of a failure. The column connections, which support the
transfer girders, should be designed as Type 2 connections to provide sustained strength despite
inelastic deformations.

Fig. 12. Transfer girders

Overall Lateral Resistance

The conventional lateral loads—wind and seismic zone 1 forces—to which most
buildings are designed are minimal. These minimal lateral load requirements may be resisted by
a combination of shear walls, braced frames, and moment-resisting frame action. At each floor
level, the slab diaphragms transfer the lateral loads to the lateral-load resisting system. Each
component of the lateral-load resisting system must be checked to determine its adequacy to
resist blast loads. Depending on the results of a blast analysis, the individual elements of the
lateral-load resisting system may require modification.

Buildings with an irregular floor plan will induce large torsional effects on the lateral-
load resisting system. Typically, symmetrical buildings behave better when subjected to blast or

36
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

seismic loading. If the shear core is centrally loaded a large demand is placed on the diaphragm
action of the floor slab to transmit the lateral loads from the perimeter of the floor into the central
shear walls. This effect can be more critical for blast load than for seismic load. Seismic base
motions are typically applied over the entire foundation; blast loads resulting from a close-in
explosion tend to impose higher intensity loads over a more concentrated region. Although the
total base shears may be nominally the same, the lateral-resisting behaviour is not. The usual
rigid diaphragm action might not be suitable in such a localized blast situation and a full three-
dimensional analysis of the building might be required.

Fig. 13. Diaphragm action

The ability of structures to resist a highly impulsive blast loading depends in great
measure on the structural detailing of the slabs, joists, and columns that provides for the ductility
of the load-resisting system. The structure has to be able to deform in-elastically under extreme
overload (i.e., dissipate large amounts of energy) prior to failure. Provisions have been
established for the design of structures to resist seismic forces that ensure both the ductility of the
members and the capacity of the connections to undergo large rotations without failing.

In addition to providing ductile behaviour, there needs to be a well-distributed lateral-

load resisting mechanism in the horizontal floor plan. The use of several shear walls distributed
throughout the building will improve the overall seismic as well as the blast behaviour of the
building. If adding more shear walls is not architecturally feasible, a combined lateral-load
resisting mechanism can also be used. A central shear wall and a perimeter moment-resisting
frame will provide for a balanced solution. The perimeter moment-resisting frame will require
strengthening the spandrel beams and the connections to the outside columns. This will also
result in better protection of the outside columns. For more information on seismic design, see
WBDG Seismic Design Principles.

37
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

SHEAR WALLS
The ability of structures to resist a highly impulsive blast loading depends on the ductility
of the load-resisting system. This means that the structure has to be able to deform in elastically
under extreme overload, thereby dissipating large amounts of energy, and prior tofailure. In
addition to providing ductile behaviour for the structure, the following provisions would
improve the blast protection capability of
I. Use a well-distributed lateral-load resisting mechanism in the horizontal floor plan.
This can be accomplished by using several shear walls around the plan of the building this
will improve the overall seismic as well as the blast behaviour of the building.
II. The irregular L-shape of the floor plan will induce large torsion effects on the lateral-
load resisting system typically, symmetrical buildings behave better when subjected to blast or
seismic loading.

STAND OFF:
1.The keep out distance, within which explosives-laden vehicles may not penetrate, must be
maximized and guaranteed. As we all know, the greater the standoff distance, the lesser is
the damage.
2. The public parking lot at the corner of the building must be secured to guarantee the
prescribed keep out distance from the face of the structure. Securing this parking lot means
that all vehicles must be cleared, i.e., employee owned or visually inspected, such as delivery
trucks.
3. Eliminate underground parking or restrict parking to occupants and not permit trucks or vans
to enter basements.
4. Street parking should not be permitted on the near side of the street, adjacent to the building
5An additional measure to reduce the chances of an attack would be to prevent parking on the
opposite side of the street. While this does not improve the keep out distance, it could
eliminate the "parked" bomb, thereby limiting bombings to "Park and run"

MAXIMIZE STANDOFF DISTANCE.

The primary design strategy is to keep terrorists as far away from inhabited buildings as
possible. The easiest and least costly opportunity for achieving the appropriate levels of
protection against terrorist threats is to incorporate sufficient standoff distance into project
designs. While sufficient standoff distance is not always available to provide the standoff
distances required for conventional construction, maximizing the available standoff distance
always results in the most cost-effective solution except where land is at a premium. Maximizing
standoff distance also ensures that there are opportunities in the future to upgrade buildings to
meet increased threats or to accommodate higher levels of protection.

38
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

INTERNAL PARTITION REINFORCEMENTS

The walls surrounding loading docks, mailrooms, and lobbies—where explosive threats,
like a hand delivered package bomb, may be introduced prior to inspection and screening—must
be hardened to confine the explosive shock wave and permit the resulting gas pressures to vent
into the atmosphere. Specific modifications to the features of these unprotected spaces can
prevent an internal explosion from causing extensive damage and injury inside the building. This
hardening can be achieved by designing the slabs and erecting cast-in-place reinforced-concrete
walls, with the thickness and reinforcement determined relative to the appropriate threat. The
isolation of occupied spaces from these vulnerable locations and any other unsecured spaces,
such as basements and underground parking garages, requires both adequate levels of
reinforcement as well as connection details capable of resisting the collected blast pressures.
These structural designs must be integrated with the remainder of the structural frame to make
sure they do not destabilize other portions of the gravity load-bearing system.

Alternative Construction Materials to Resist Explosive Threats

A variety of materials, not traditionally used in building construction, may provide

alternatives to conventional blast hardening solutions. Among these alternatives there are shock
attenuating chemically bonded ceramics (SA/CBC), and composite systems comprised of carbon,
aramid and polyethylene fibres and resin. These materials are well-developed systems currently
in use for the prevention of sympathetic detonation of explosives in munitions storage depots
(SA/CBC materials) as well as in the seismic retrofit of reinforced concrete columns in highway
bridges in California (carbon fibre wrapping). In the latter application, carbon fibre wrappings
were found to have advantages over conventional steel jacketing of columns due to problems
with weld seams and corrosion. Spray-on elasto-polymers have been demonstrated to protect
unreinforced masonry walls by providing a ductile membrane that enables these brittle elements
to sustain large deformations without fragmenting and throwing hazardous debris.

In retrofit scenarios where conventional structural treatments may be too heavy or too
labour intensive, composite materials may be attractive alternatives because of their lightweight
and high tensile strength. However, full scale and component testing are required to collect data
on the performance of these materials in blast scenarios as well as in different structural
configurations. Ultimately, a set of analysis procedures and structural engineering guidelines are
needed in order for engineers to specify such materials in both the retrofit of structures and in
new construction.

INTERNAL EXPLOSION THREATS

The blast environment could be introduced into the interior of the structure in four
vulnerable locations .The entrance lobby, the basement mechanical rooms, the loading dock, and
the primary mailrooms. Specific modifications to the features of these vulnerable spaces can
prevent an internal explosion from causing extensive damage and injury inside the building.
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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

1. Walls and slabs adjacent to the lobby, loading dock, and mail rooms must be hardened to
protect against the hand delivered package bomb, nominally a 10-20 kg explosive. Redesigning
the slabs and erecting cast-in-place reinforced-concrete walls, with the thickness and
reinforcement determined relative to the appropriate threat, can achieve this hardening.
2. The basement must be similarly isolated from all adjacent occupied office space,
including the floor above, from the threat of a small package bomb.

DRY RETROFIT SYSTEMS:

EXTERNAL:

Not only does the building's skin protect the occupants from the weather, but it also
limits the amount of blast that can actually enter the workspace. The facade is built of two
elements-the structural skin or wall section and the window or glazing by constructing the
exterior wall of a more durable material such as reinforced cast-in-place concrete instead of
block walls or brick walls, at least for the lower floors, the building will be able to resist or
curtail certain blast loads, resulting in significantly less bodily injury and building
damage. In addition a concrete wall will aid in preventing progressive collapse, as the
wall will assist in carrying the load of a damaged column.

'INTERNAL:

Steel liners or Achidctex curtains can be used depending on the threat level and the
degree of protection desired. Steel liners that are connected to the roof and floor slabs and
covered with gypsum board can withstand impulse loads of about 220 psi the Achidetex curtain
is connected to the slabs and glued to the internal face of the walls, similar to wallpaper. Such
curtains can withstand impulse loads of about 150 psi. Both systems can be combined with
'built in" windows and doors, for the same level of protection. The primary purpose of
windows and curtain walls is to protect people from flying glass.
The cabling system recently developed to fulfils this purpose. It "catches - the glass and
debris in the window itself Windows and curtain walls, combined with the cabling
system, can meet high loads.

Protect Occupants:

The most important function of structural protection is to safeguard the people who work
and live in the building. Every building owner has a duty of care; there is a need to make the
place safe from terrorist attack this can take several forms depending on a whole spectrum
of parameters. Smaller buildings with robust exterior walls can be strengthened to resist attack.
For large buildings, it may be more economical to establish "safe havens" within the structure
instead of strengthening the whole of a vulnerable facade. Properly trained security
personnel, appropriate surveillance systems and well-rehearsed emergency procedures
will all help to protect occupants in the event of a crisis.

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

Seismic Protection vs. Blast Protection

It is often stated that blast damage would be reduced if 'seismic-like' construction

standards were adhered to. However, this should not be taken to say that a structure designed to
resist the effects of strong ground motions would perform well in response to an explosive
loading. It is true that seismic building design details enhance the ductility of structures and
thereby increase their capacity to sustain plastic hinges and withstand large rotations.
Furthermore, for reinforced concrete structures, closely spaced stirrups improve the confinement
of the core and increase the shear capacity of the section. Yet, it is important to understand that
the nature of the blast loading and the structure's response to it is very different from a seismic
event.

The desirable features of earthquake-resistant design - that is, the provision for ductility
in member response and connection details, and redundancy in the ability to redistribute extreme
loads to lesser-loaded elements - are equally desirable in blast design. In both cases, it is the
obligation of the engineer to guarantee that the full capacity of the section be realized and that no
premature failure, resulting from inadequate confinement of a reinforced concrete section or the
local buckling of steel sections, prevents the structure from transferring the loads to the
foundation. Chapter 21 of the American Concrete Institute 318 was developed to improve the
behaviour of reinforced concrete structures subjected to large inelastic deformations. It is
recommended that those provisions be adhered to in designing the blast load resisting structural
components. However, the required extent of confinement and ductility, and the location of the
stress concentrations which form as a result of blast loading will not be the same as for structures
subjected to a seismic event. Furthermore, lateral loads resulting from strong ground motions are
proportional to the mass, which is distributed throughout the building. Conversely, blast design
relies, to some extent, on the inertial resistance of massive structural elements. Finally, seismic
resistance is distributed globally throughout the structure whereas blast hardening must provide
protection against localized explosive loads. Therefore, it should not be assumed that a structure
adhering to the governing building codes' recommended provisions for seismic design or
designed to withstand a strong ground motion is sufficient to resist the prescribed blast loading
or prevent subsequent progressive collapse. For more information on seismic design, see
WBDG.

Non-structural Components

Non-structural building components, such as piping, ducts, lighting fixtures and conduits,
must be sufficiently tied back to structural elements to prevent failure of the services and falling
debris hazards. To mitigate the effects of in-structure shock, due primarily to the infilling of blast
over-pressures through damaged windows, these non-structural systems should be located below
the raised floors or tied to the ceiling slabs with Seismic Zone IV restraints.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION ACCORDING IS: 4991-1968

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

General Principles-

As in the case of normal loads, members subjected to blast pressures resist the applied
force by means of internal stresses developed in them. However, the effective load due to blast,
for which resistance should be developed in the member, depends upon, the dynamic properties
of the member itself. Longer the natural time period of the member smaller is the effective load
for design. The duration of positive phase of blast is generally small as compared with the
natural period of the structural elements, hence may be treated as an impulse problem.

Considering the probability of occurrence of blast loading to be small, structures may be

permitted to deform in the plastic range for economical design. Permitting plastic deformations
increases the energy absorption and has the further advantage that the effective time period of the
structural element is elongated, thereby reducing the effective load for its design.

Most severe blast loading on any face of a structure is produced when the structure is
oriented with the face normal to the direction of propagation of the shock front. However, for
lack of known orientation of future explosion, every face of the structure shall be considered as a
front face. When the blast field surrounds the structure, the difference of pressures on front and
rear faces tends to tilt and overturn the structure as a whole.

Elastic Rebound-

After attaining the maximum response, the structure is found to oscillate and may have an
elastic rebound equal and opposite to the maximum deflection. Therefore, members shall be
designed to have the same strength for the reversal of the effective design load.

DYNAMIC STRENGTH OF MATERIALS, DESIGN STRESSES

General-

Plastic deformation of the structural elements should be permitted except where the
functioning of the structure would be adversely affected by their permanent displacements.
Under rapid rates of straining as associated with blast loading, materials develop higher
strengths than in statically loaded members. Under such conditions the dynamic strength may be
taken greater than the minimum specified static strength

10.3 Design Stress for Reinforced Concrete

The dynamic strength of material may be assumed as follows:

a. Reinforcing Steel—Dynamic yield stress 25 percent higher than, the minimum specified
static yield stress.
b. Concrete—the dynamic cube compression strength may be assumed to be 25 percent
higher than the minimum static cube strength at 28 days.
c. For dynamic shear in reinforced concrete members, no increase over the static shear
strength shall be permitted. For dynamic bond stress in reinforced concrete members, an increase
of 25 percent may be permitted over the static strength.
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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

CHAPTER 8

RECOMMENDED VALUES OF
BLAST PRESSURES FOR DESIGN
(ACCORDING TO IS 4991-1968)

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

RECOMMENDED VALUES OF BLAST PRESSURES FOR

DESIGN (According to IS 4991-1968)
The design parameter that is the yield of explosion and its distance from the structure will
depend upon the importance of the structure and conditions prevailing in a particular time and
should be considered by the designer in each specific case.

BUILDING DESIGN FOR A CHARGE OF 100 kg

Building Type Distance,

Category m

A Residential buildings 40

B Community buildings, such as schools, offices, cinemas, etc, and 30

industrial buildings with continuous human occupancy

C Buildings provided for accommodating essential service which 20

would be of post bombing importance, such as hospitals, emergency
relief stores, power stations, water works, communication centres,
etc.
Table - 1. Building Design For A Charge Of 100 Kg.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PLANNING BLAST

RESISTANT BUILDINGS

1. SIZE OF ROOMS

Small size of rooms generally confines the blast damage to a limited area of the structure,
because of the screening action of the partition walls.

2. CORRIDORS

Long narrow corridors should be avoided as they tend to increase the extent of damage
along the length of the corridors because of ‘multiple reflections’.

3. PROJECTIONS

All slender projections like, parapets and balconies specially those made of brittle
materials should be avoided as far as possible.

4. CHIMNEYS

Masonry chimneys on factory buildings and boiler houses are a potential hazard and
should be avoided.
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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

5. ROOFING AND CLADDING MATERIALS

Brittle roofing materials, such as tiles arid corrugated asbestos sheets are especially prone
to blast damage. When corrugated galvanized iron sheets are used for roofing and/or cladding,
particular attention should be paid to the fixtures fastening the corrugated galvanized iron sheets
to the framework.

6. USE OF TIMBER AND OTHER INFLAMMABLE MATERIALS

These are especially prone to catch fire in a strafing or incendiary attack and should be
best avoided in strategic structures where such attacks might be expected.

7. ELECTRIC WIRING

Conduit wiring is preferable to open wiring, as in case of large movement of the Walls
the conduit will give an added protection to the wiring inside and prevent them from getting cut
thus preventing fire hazards due to short circuits.

8. GLASS PANES

The most widespread damage due to blast is the breaking of glass panes. The splinters
from shattered glass window are dangerous to personnel safety. It is preferable to use non-
splintering type glass panes wherever their use cannot be avoided.

9. DOORS

Doors should be designed or the front face load.

10. WALL THICKNESSES AGAINST FLYING SPLINTERS

For protection against splinters from bombs with equivalent bare charges exploding at a
distance of 15 m, the wall thicknesses given in Table will be adequate.

MINIMUM WALL THICKNESSES AGAINST FLYING SPLINTERS

Material of Wall Wall Thickness, cm
For Bomb with Equivalent Bare For Bomb with Equivalent Bare
Charge of 50 kg Charge of 100 kg
(1) (2) (3)
Reinforced concrete 30 38
Plain concrete or 34 45
brickwork

Table - 2

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

Standoff distance

A distance maintained between a building or portion thereof and the potential location for
an explosive detonation.

Progressive collapse

The spread of an initial local failure from building element to building element,
eventually resulting in the collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionately large part of it

Maximize Standoff Distance.

The primary design strategy is to keep terrorists as far away from inhabited buildings as
possible. The easiest and least costly opportunity for achieving the appropriate levels of
protection against terrorist threats is to incorporate sufficient standoff distance into project
designs. While sufficient standoff distance is not always available to provide the standoff
distances required for conventional construction, maximizing the available standoff distance
always results in the most cost-effective solution except where land is at a premium. Maximizing
standoff distance also ensures that there are opportunities in the future to upgrade buildings to
meet increased threats or to accommodate higher levels of protection.

Minimize Hazardous Flying Debris.

In past explosive events where there was no building collapse, a high number of injuries
resulted from flying glass fragments and debris from walls, ceilings, and fixtures (non-structural
features). Flying debris can be minimized through building design and avoidance of certain
building materials and construction techniques. The glass used in most windows breaks at very
low blast pressures, resulting in hazardous, dagger-like fragments. Minimizing those hazards
through reduction in window numbers and sizes and through enhanced window construction has
a major effect on limiting mass casualties. Window and door designs must treat glazing, frames,
connections, and the structural components to which they are attached as integrated systems.
Hazardous fragments may also include secondary debris such as those from barriers and site
furnishings.

Provide Effective Building Layout.

Effective design of building layout and orientation can significantly reduce opportunities
for terrorists to target building occupants or injure large numbers of people.

Limit Airborne Contamination.

Effective design of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems can
significantly reduce the potential for chemical, biological, and radiological agents being
distributed throughout buildings.
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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

Provide Mass Notification.

Providing a timely means to notify building occupants of threats and what should be done
in response to those threats reduces the risk of mass casualties. Effective designs will include
means for both local and remote origination of information.

Standoff to Entry Control Facilities/Access Control Points.

Standoff distances from buildings to entry control facilities/access control points are
based on the distances to identification check areas instead of final denial barriers (if present)
because these standards are predicated on the stationary vehicle bomb tactic. With that
assumption, measuring to the identification check area is sufficient because that is the furthest
point at which unauthorized vehicles can approach.

SITE PLANNING

Operational, logistic, and security requirements must be integrated into the overall design
of buildings, equipment, landscaping, parking, roads, and other associated features. Standards
associated with site planning are established to address vehicle borne and hand placed explosive
threats. The most cost-effective solution for mitigating explosive effects on buildings is to keep
explosives as far as possible from them. Standoff distance must be coupled with appropriate
building hardening to provide the necessary level of protection.

The following standards detail standoff distances, referred to as “conventional

construction standoff distances,” that when achieved will allow for buildings to be built with
minimal additional construction costs for blast protection.

Standard 7.Structural Isolation.Building Additions.

This will minimize the possibility that collapse of one part of a building will affect the
stability of the remainder of the building. Alternatively, verify through analysis that collapse of
either the addition or the existing building will not result in collapse of the remainder of the
building.

Progressive Collapse Resistance.

Progressive collapse is considered to be a significant risk for buildings of three or more

stories. Basements and penthouses will be considered stories if there is any space that is designed
for human occupancy and that is equipped with means of egress as well as
Light and ventilation facilities that meet the local building code requirements. Design the
superstructures to sustain local damage with the structural systems remaining stable without
being damaged to extents disproportionate to the original local damage.

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

Exterior Masonry Walls.

The following requirements apply to exterior walls of new and existing buildings
required to comply with these standards:

New Buildings.

Unreinforced masonry walls are prohibited for the exterior walls of new buildings
required to comply with these standards. All exterior masonry walls must have vertical and
horizontal reinforcement distributed throughout the wall section. The vertical reinforcement ratio
will be at least 0.05%, spaced no more than 4 feet (1200 mm) on centre with reinforcement
within 1.3 feet (410 mm) of the ends of walls. The horizontal reinforcement ratio must be at least
0.025%, consisting of either joint reinforcement spaced no more than 1.3 feet (410 mm) on
centre, or bond beam reinforcement spaced no more than 4 feet (1200 mm) on centre, with
reinforcement within 1.3 feet (410 mm) of the top and bottom of the wall. For new buildings,
wood or metal studs that meet the analysis assumptions of Table 2-3 may be considered to meet
the provisions of this standard when used in conjunction with an otherwise unreinforced masonry
wall.

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

CHAPTER 9

ARCHITECTURAL & STRUCTURAL

ASPECTS OF DESIGN

49
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN.

Even where the conventional construction standoff distances are achieved, many aspects
of building layout and other architectural design issues must be incorporated into designs to
improve overall protection of personnel inside buildings.

Windows and Skylights.

To minimize hazards from flying debris from windows and skylights, apply the following
provisions for glazing, framing, connections, and supporting structural elements for all new and
existing buildings required to comply with these standards. These provisions apply to window
systems at all standoff distances, even those that meet or exceed the wall conventional
construction standoff distances. These provisions only address minimum standards (very low and
low levels of protection.) For higher levels of protection, refer to PDC Technical Report 10-02.
The specific requirements below will result in window and skylight systems that provide for
effective hazard mitigation. These provisions allow for design by dynamic analysis, testing, or
the ASTM F 2248 design approach as described in the paragraphs below. Use strength design
with load factors of 1.0 and strength reduction factors of 1.0 for all methods of analysis
referenced herein.

In addition to guidance in Table B-1 for applicable explosive weights, where a building is
within a controlled perimeter, the applicable explosive weights for design of windows will be
determined based on the standoff from the controlled perimeter. If the facility is more than 200
feet (60 meters) away from the controlled perimeter, only Explosive Weight II needs to be
considered in the design of the windows. If the facility is within 200 feet (60 meters) of the
controlled perimeter both Explosive Weights I and II shall be considered in the design of the
windows at their respective standoff distances to parking and roadways, to controlled perimeters,
and to the outer edges of unobstructed spaces..
Monolithic glass or monolithic acrylic used as a single pane or as the inner pane of a multi-pane
system is not allowed for the purposes of complying with this standard. This standard does not
apply to translucent fiberglass panels, other lightweight translucent plastics, spandrel glass when
backed by a structural wall or spandrel beam, and glass unit masonry. Those components shall
comply with Standard 1. Engineered glass block window systems and spandrel glass that is open
to occupied space shall be designed in accordance with this standard. For glazing in doors, refer
to Standard 12.

Dynamic Analysis.

Any of the glazing, framing members, connections, and supporting structural elements
may be designed using dynamic analysis to prove the window or skylight systems will provide
performance equivalent to or better than the hazard rating associated with the applicable level of
protection as indicated in Table 2-1. Dynamic analysis guidance is presented in PDC TR 10-02.
The design loading for dynamic analyses will be the appropriate pressures and impulses from the
applicable explosive weights at the actual standoff distances at which the windows are sited. The
design loading will be applied over the areas tributary to the element being analyzed. The
allowable response limits of structural elements for all of the levels of protection are provided in
50
ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

PDC-TR 06-08. Response limits for steel and aluminium window frame members are provided
in PDC-TR-10-02. Window frames constructed from materials other than aluminium or steel
must be tested in accordance with paragraph B-3.1.2 or proven by analysis to demonstrate
performance equivalent to or better than the hazard rating associated with the applicable level of
protection

ASTM F 2248 Design Approach for Laminated Glass Glazing Systems.

Windows and skylights fabricated using laminated glass may be designed using ASTM F
2248 and ASTM E 1300 in accordance with the requirements below. The application of ASTM F
2248 and ASTM E 1300 results in higher levels of protection than those required in these
standards as reflected in Table 2-1. In order to reduce the conservatism associated with using the
ASTM methodology the window systems may be designed using dynamic analysis or they may
be tested in accordance with the previous paragraphs.

Glazing.

Provide laminated glass with a minimum interlayer thickness of 0.030-inch (0.75-mm)

and a load resistance determined from ASTM E 1300 greater or equal to the 3-second duration
equivalent design load determined from ASTM F 2248.
Note that ASTM F 2248 can be used for a limited range of charge weights and standoffs,
including those covered by this standard. For charge weights and standoffs outside of the range
of ASTM F 2248 and for glazing alternatives to laminated glass that provide equivalent levels of
protection, refer to PDC Technical Report 10-02.

Frames.

Provide window and skylight frames, mullions and sashes of aluminium or steel designed
in accordance with ASTM F 2248. Window frames constructed from materials other than
aluminium or steel must be tested in accordance with paragraph B-3.1.2 or proven by analysis to
demonstrate performance equivalent to or better than the hazard rating associated with the
applicable level of protection as indicated in Table 2-1.
In the case of a punched or ribbon window, the supported edge length will be taken as equal to
the longest span of a single pane of glass, regardless of any intermediate support connections.
For storefront and curtain wall systems, primary mullions that span between points of structural
support shall be considered supporting frame members and may be designed dynamically in
accordance with paragraph B-3.1.1 or statically. If designed by the static method the moment and
shear capacities of framing members shall be designed to resist two (2) times the glazing
resistance applied to the framing members only from the tributary area of the window, and
deflection shall be limited to 1/60 of the members’ span lengths between points of structural
support. Intermediate mullions shall be checked for deflection with the supported edge length
taken as equal to the longest span of a single glass panel and the deflection will be calculated
based on simple support conditions for that length.

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

Glazing Frame Bite.

Glazing frame bite requirements for structurally or non-structurally glazed windows or

skylights shall be in accordance with ASTM F 2248. Apply structural silicone bead or
Glazing tape to both sides of the glass panel for single pane glazing but only to the inboard side
for insulating glass units.

Connection Design.

Connections of window and skylight frames to surrounding walls or roofs, of hardware

and associated connections, of glazing stop connections, and of other elements in shear shall be
designed for the connection design load determined in accordance with ASTM F 2248 and will
account for the geometry of the particular frame and the connection configuration being used
when calculating bending, shear, bearing, and pull out loads for the connections.

Static Design of Supporting Structural Elements.

Supporting structural elements (i.e. those structural elements that frame the rough
opening) for window and skylight systems of any glazing material can be designed statically to
account for the increase in tributary areas to the adjacent supporting elements due to windows or
skylights. Building elements that have only glazing framed into them, such as curtain walls and
storefronts, shall be designed as frame members in accordance with paragraph

Wall and Roof Elements.

For window and skylight systems in buildings situated at or beyond the wall conventional
construction standoff distance for the wall material to which it is attached, the surrounding wall
and roof elements and their connections to the rest of the structure shall be designed as described
below. For window and skylight systems in buildings situated at less than the wall conventional
construction standoff distance the surrounding wall and roof elements will be designed
dynamically in accordance with paragraph B-3.1.1.
The supporting structural elements adjacent to windows shall be designed to account for their
increased tributary areas that represent the tributary areas of windows or skylights and the
appropriate tributary areas of the walls or roof above and below them whose loads must be
laterally supported by those elements. Those increases in tributary areas will be accounted for by
applying a tributary area increase factor (C) to the moment and shear capacities of the walls. The
tributary area increase factor is the ratio of the tributary area that accounts for the windows or
skylights and the walls or roofs above and below them to the tributary area upon which typical
conventional wall sections or elements are designed. See PDC Technical Report 10-02 for an
illustration. The tributary area increase factor is shown in Equation 1 and shall not be taken as
less than 1.

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

Fig. 14.Schematic layout of site for protection against bombs

Structural form and internal layout

Structural form is a parameter that greatly affects the blast loads on the building. Arches
and domes are the types of structural forms that reduce the blast effects on the building compared
with a cubicle form. The plan-shape of a building also has a significant influence on the
magnitude of the blast load it is likely to experience. Complex shapes that cause multiple
reflections of the blast wave should be discouraged. Projecting roofs or floors, and buildings that
are U-shaped on plan are undesirable for this reason. It should be noted that single story
buildings are more blast resistant compared with multi-story buildings if applicable.

Partially or fully embed buildings are quite blast resistant. These kinds of structures take
the advantage of the shock absorbing property of the soil covered by. The soil provides
protection in case of a nuclear explosion as well.
The internal layout of the building is another parameter that should be undertaken with the aim
of isolating the value from the threat and should be arranged so that the highest exterior threat is
separated by the greatest distance from the highest value asset. Foyer areas should be protected
with reinforced concrete walls; double-dooring should be used and the doors should be arranged
eccentrically within a corridor to prevent the blast pressure entering the internals of the building.
Entrance to the building should be controlled and be separated from other parts of the building
by robust construction for greater physical protection. An underpass beneath or car parking
below or within the building should be avoided unless access to it can be effectively controlled.
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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

A possible fire that occurs within a structure after an explosion may increase the damage
catastrophically. Therefore the internal members of the building should be designed to resist the
fire.

3.3 Bomb shelter areas

The bomb shelter areas are specially designated within the building where vulnerability
from the effects of the explosion is at a minimum and where personnel can retire in the event of a
bomb threat warning. These areas must afford reasonable protection against explosions; ideally
be large enough to accommodate the personnel involved and be located so as to facilitate
continual access. For modern-framed buildings, shelter areas should be located away from
windows, external doors, external walls and the top floors if the roof is weak. Areas surrounded
by full-height concrete walls should be selected and underground car parks, gas storage tanks,
areas light weight partition walls, e.g. internal corridors, toilet areas, or conference should be
avoided while locating the shelter areas. Basements can sometimes be useful shelter areas, but it
is important to ensure that the building does not collapse on top of them.
The functional aspects of a bomb shelter area should accommodate all the occupants of the
building; provide adequate communication with outside; provide sufficient ventilation and
sanitation; limit the blast pressure to less than the ear drum rupture pressure and provide
alternative means of escape.

Installations

Gas, water, steam installations, electrical connections, elevators and water storage
systems should be planned to resist any explosion affects. Installation connections are critical
points to be considered and should be avoided to use in high-risk deformation areas. Areas with
high damage receiving potential e.g. external walls, ceilings, roof slabs, car parking spaces and
lobbies also should be avoided to locate the electrical and other installations. The main control
units and installation feeding points should be protected from direct attacks. A reserve
installation system should be provided for a potential explosion and should be located remote
from the main installation system.

3.5 Glazing and cladding

Glass from broken and shattered windows could be responsible for a large number of
injuries caused by an explosion in a city centre. The choice of a safer glazing material is critical
and it has been found out that laminated glass is the most effective in this context. On the other
hand, applying transparent polyester anti-shatter film to the inner surface of the glazing is as well
an effective method.

For the cladding, several aspects of design should be considered to minimize the
vulnerability of people within the building and damage to the building itself. The amount of
glazing in the facade should be minimized. This will limit the amount of internal damage from
the glazing and the amount of blast that can enter. It should also be ensured that the cladding is

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

fixed to the structure securely with easily accessible fixings. This will allow rapid inspection
after an explosion so that any failure or movement can be detected.

STRUCTURAL ASPECT OF BLAST RESISTANT BUILDING DESIGN

The front face of a building experiences peak overpressures due to reflection of an

external blast wave. Once the initial blast wave has passed the reflected surface of the building,
the peak overpressure decays to zero. As the sides and the top faces of the building are exposed
to overpressures (which has no reflections and are lower than the reflected overpressures on the
front face), a relieving effect of blast overpressure is experienced on the front face. The rear of
the structure experiences no pressure until the blast wave has travelled the length of the structure
and a compression wave has begun to move towards the centre of the rear face. Therefore the
pressure built up is not instantaneous. On the other hand, there will be a time lag in the
development of pressures and loads on the front and back faces. This time lag causes
translational forces to act on the building in the direction of the blast wave.

Blast loadings are extra ordinary load cases however, during structural design, this effect
should be taken into account with other loads by an adequate ratio. Similar to the static loaded
case design, blast resistant dynamic design also uses the limit state design techniques which are
collapse limit design and functionality limit design. In collapse limit design the target is to
provide enough ductility to the building so that the explosion energy is distributed to the
structure without overall collapse. For collapse limit design the behaviour of structural member
connections is crucial. In the case of an explosion, significant translational movement and
moment occur and the loads involved should be transferred from the beams to columns. The
structure doesn’t collapse after the explosion however it cannot function anymore.

Functionality limit design however, requires the building to continue functionality after a
possible explosion occurred. Only non-structural members like windows or cladding may need
maintenance after an explosion so that they should be designed ductile enough.

When the positive phase of the shock wave is shorter than the natural vibration period of
the structure, the explosion effect vanishes before the structure responds. This kind of blast
loading is defined as “impulsive loading”. If the positive phase is longer than the natural
vibration period of the structure, the load can be assumed constant when the structure has
maximum deformation. This maximum deformation is a function of the blast loading and the
structural rigidity. This kind of blast loading is defined as “quasi-static loading”. Finally, if the
positive phase duration is similar to the natural vibration period of the structure, the behaviour of
the structure becomes quite complicated. This case can be defined as “dynamic loading”.
Frame buildings designed to resist gravity, wind loads and earthquake loads in the normal way
have frequently been found to be deficient in two respects. When subjected to blast loading; the
failure of beam-to-column connections and the inability of the structure to tolerate load reversal.
Beam-to-column connections can be subjected to very high forces as the result of an explosion.
These forces will have a horizontal component arising from the walls of the building and
a vertical component from the differential loading on the upper and lower surfaces of floors.
Providing additional robustness to these connections can be a significant enhancement.
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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

In the connections, normal details for static loading have been found to be inadequate for
blast loading. Especially for the steelwork beam-to-column connections, it is essential for the
connection to bear inelastic deformations so that the moment frames could still operate after an
instantaneous explosion. Figure 8 shows the side-plate connection detail in question [7]. The
main features to note in the reinforced concrete connection are the use of extra links and the
location of the starter bars in the connection [3] (Figure 8). These enhancements are intended to
reduce the risk of collapse or the connection be damaged, possibly as a result of a load reversal
on the beam.

Fig. 15. Fig. 16.

Figure.15 Enhanced Beam-To-Column Connection Details For Steelwork.

Figure.16 Reinforced Concrete.

It is vital that in critical areas, full moment-resisting connections are made in order to
ensure the load carrying capacity of structural members after an explosion. Beams acting
primarily in bending may also carry significant axial load caused by the blast loading.
On the contrary, columns are predominantly loaded with axial forces under normal
loading conditions, however under blast loading they may be subjected to bending. Such forces
can lead to loss of load-carrying capacity of a section. In the case of an explosion, columns of a
reinforced concrete structure are the most important members that should be protected. Two
types of wrapping can be applied to provide this. Wrapping with steel belts or wrapping with
carbon fibre-reinforced polymers (CFRP).

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Cast-insitu reinforced concrete floor slabs are the preferred option for blast resistant
buildings, but it may be necessary to consider the use of precast floors in some circumstances.
Precast floor units are not recommended for use at first floor where the risk from an internal
explosion is greatest. Lightweight roofs and more particularly, glass roofs should be avoided and
a reinforced concrete or precast concrete slab is to be preferred.

Fig. 17 .Blast Wave Effect

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Behaviour of Blasts

shock-wave. The shock wave consists of highly compressed air that wave-reflects off the
ground surface to produce a hemispherical propagation of the wave that travels outward from the
source at supersonic velocities”

“This load response to a blast is significantly different from the load response to a
seismic event, for which the natural frequency of the structure, rather than the mass, is the
primary factor in the response”
Notably, it would not be economical to design every building for a high level of
protection, where “no visible permanent damage” is experienced (McCann & Smith, 2007).
Therefore, the primary goal is to save lives, not the building, and so the following is a
prioritized list of goals:
1) preventing the building from collapse
2) reducing flying debris
3) Facilitating evacuation and rescue/recovery efforts.

First, preventing building collapse means the columns and floor slabs must be given
particular consideration in design, since their failure could initiate a progressive collapse. Floor
slabs are particularly vulnerable to vehicle-delivered explosions because of their large surface
area for the explosive pressures to act on and their relatively small thickness. The consequence of
losing the floor slab is the increased unbraced length of the column, which could cause the
column to buckle. As illustrated in Figure 2.2-1, the structure’s floor and column elements are
the most susceptible to the blast loading, due to the sequence of the blast wave.

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CHAPTER 10

CASE STUDY : WORLD TRADE CENTER

COLLAPSE

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Introduction
The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 at New York’s World Trade Centre towers
(WTC) was the first attack on a mega-city in the 21st century. The collapse of the towers
revealed the vulnerability of a mega-city to terrorist attacks at multiple scales, from the level of
structural components to the collapse of the towers, from the scale of individual heroic rescue
operations to the scale of mass evacuation and emergency operations, from the interruption of
local transportation systems to the freeze of air traffic nationwide. Everyone who lived through
the day at Ground Zero can continue the list: This was not a day for business as usual!

As the WTC towers sunk to Ground Zero and below, the logic of a world collapsed: a
building designed to rocket into the sky, imploded into the ground. Ever since that day, structural
engineers all over the world seek for explanations as to how and why the towers collapsed, and
how to prevent such failures in the future. Of course, in theory, it is possible to engineer a
structure to withstand a devastating attack whether accidental or intentional. For instance, eight
years before, on February 26, 1993, a bomb detonating in the parking area of the WTC did not
challenge the stability of the structure, unlike the event of September 11. Roughly two hours
after the impact of two planes into the towers, the icons of strength and prosperity of New York
that had been standing there for almost three decades, disappeared almost instantly from the
Manhattan skyline, transforming the 110-story towers into a big pile of debris a few stories high.
Ever since, the question is raised whether our skyscrapers are safe considering the events which
proved the limits of predictability, anticipation and prevention. To answer this question, from a
structural engineering point of view, we first need to reconstruct, as much as possible, the
sequence of events that led to the collapse of the towers.

How did the towers collapse?

Initial assessment of the collapse On September 11, the first Boeing 767-200 aircraft hit
the North Tower at 8:46am, near the centre of the North face at about the 96th floor. The South
Tower was hit at 9:03am by another Boeing 767-200 aircraft near the southeast corner of the
building at about the 80th floor. In both cases, the planes appeared to have sliced into the
buildings and exploded immediately after penetration. Smoke clouds discharged heavily from the
impact face as well as the side faces of the buildings. In both cases, destruction looked local, and
appeared at first not to have challenged the structural stability. People tried to escape from the
impact area, while some were unfortunately trapped in the floors above the impact zones due to
damaged egress routes and/or raging fuel fire. The South Tower collapsed suddenly at 9:59am,
56 minutes after the impact. Tilting occurred in the upper portion, which was immediately
followed by a total collapse top down in about 10-12 seconds. The North Tower collapsed at
10:28am in a very similar fashion, 102 minutes after the impact. Shows the collapsed building
with the perimeter steel columns several stories high still linked together at the lower levels. In
the collapse of the two WTC towers, a three-step failure mechanism may have been involved at
different scales:
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Step 1 – Impact of the airplane:

The buildings had been designed for the horizontal impact of a large commercial aircraft.
Indeed, the towers withstood the initial impact of the plane. This is understandable when one
considers that the mass of the buildings was about 2500 times the mass of the aircraft, and that,
as has been reported, the buildings were designed for a steady wind load of roughly 30 times the
weight of the plane. The impact of the plane was instantaneously followed by the ignition of
perhaps 40 m3 of jet fuel. While a fully fuelled Boeing 767-200 can carry up to 90 m3 of fuel,
the flights initiated from Boston may have carried perhaps half of this amount, comprising about
one-third of the airplane’s weight. The impact and the ensuing fireball definitely causedsevere
local damage to the building and, in fact, destroyed some perimeter and core columns across
multiple floors. It has been argued that the damage to several floors should have overloaded the
remaining intact columns in the damaged floors affecting their resistance to buckling. Yet, their
resistance was sufficient to carry the loads of the upper floors almost one hour in the South
Tower and almost double that much in the North Tower.

Step 2 – The failure of an elevated floor system:

The fireball following the impact may have destroyed some of the thermal insulation of
the structural steel members. The burning of the jet fuel may have easily caused temperatures in
the range of 600°C-800°C in the steel. Under these conditions of prolonged heating, structural
steel looses rigidity and strength. This may have caused further progressive local element
failures, in addition to those failed from the initial impact, leading to a greater reduction of
resistance of the connected two to three floor structural system. The load to which the column
bracing system was subjected to the weight transferred from the upper floors. At a certain stage,
after some 50 minutes in the South Tower and some 100 minutes in the North Tower, the
buckling resistance of the columns was reached and collapse of the columns became inevitable.
Preceding this progressive failure within the damaged column-bracing system, the floor decking
system may have failed first in a brittle way, releasing explosively the energy stored in the
system. It has also been argued that the failure may have initiated by shearing of a critical floor
from the floor-external/internal column connections. In reality, combinations of floor failure with
that of column buckling may have occurred simultaneously. In fact, failure of a floor system
would result in an instant loss of lateral column bracing, leading in turn to loss of column
stability. The tower with the higher load on top (the South Tower) collapsed first; but both
towers exhibited nearly identical failure mechanism.

Step 3 – Dynamic crash of the structure:

The failure of the floor system led to a free fall of a mass of approximately 30 stories and
14 stories onto the 80 and 96, respectively, floor structure below. The enormous kinetic energy
released by this 2-3-floor downfall was too large to be absorbed by the structure underneath. The
impact effect generated from this upper part onto the lower part was surely much higher than the

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buckling resistance of the columns below, which to this point may have been essentially
undamaged and were not affected by fire. The impact caused explosive buckling, floor after
floor, of the WTC towers with the debris of the upper floors wedging with the lower part of the
structures. As the floors failed, the collapse of the building accelerated downwards with the
accumulation of the falling mass and the dynamic amplification of its impact on to the lower
structure. Similar to a car crash in a wall, the towers crashed into the ground with a velocity close
to that of a free fall. While the first and the third step to failure are focus of two other
contributions in this book, the initiation of the collapse of the WTC is still not clear. More
precisely, the two key observations that deserve more attention are the time elapsed between
airplane impact and collapse, and (2) the abrupt failure of the structure with little warning. The
first suggests that there was a time dependent mechanism involved, at the material and/or
structural level. The second indicates a structural stability problem, which is always associated
with an abrupt failure, in contrast to a ductile failure. Understanding the combination of these
two phenomena appears to be the key to explaining the collapse of the towers. This requires,
first, a look into the structural system and construction materials employed in the structure.

Structural system
The twin towers were built as a steel tubular structural system that differed radically
from other structures of that time. The exterior walls were built of closely spaced steel columns
to perform as load bearing walls and the interior columns were located only in the core area
containing the elevators. The outer walls carried the vertical loads and also provided resistance to
lateral effects such as wind, earthquake, and impact. Figure 8 shows a view of the exterior wall.
The towers were square in plan with sides of 63.7m (209ft). The structural height of each tower
was 415m (1362ft). The height to the top floor was 411m (1348ft). The towers were built as
framed tube cantilever structures with 0.45m wide built-up box columns tied with 1.3m deep
spandrel beams in the perimeter. The beams and columns were pre- fabricated into panels and
assembled on site in a staggered fashion by bolting and welding. The perimeter member
assembly made of 59 columns over the 63.7m-wide façade ensured the load bearing capacity of
the outer skin for gravity load, lateral load, and torsional effects. The columns were spaced 1m
apart and spandrels 3.6m apart. The 24m × 42m core was composed of 44 box columns. The core
comprises steel beams and columns with reinforced concrete infill panels designed to share part
of the gravity loads. The core was designed to resist vertical loads and was not assumed to
transfer any lateral loads. The perimeter columns were tied to the core only by the truss-slab
system and the horizontal forces were assumed to be resisted by the perimeter columns and their
connecting spandrel beams. A typical floor plan is shown in Figure 10. The isometric view
shown in Figure 11 helps conceptualizing the structural system. The slab system consisted of
primary vertical bar trusses spaced 2m apart spanning 20m from the core to the perimeter
(connected to every other column). These primary trusses were braced by orthogonal secondary
trusses. Figure 12 shows the original drawing of the floor system details. A conceptual view of
the floor system is shown in Figure 13. All trusses were built up by four angle sections to form a
top cord, two to form a bottom cord, and bent round bars to form the diagonals of a classic
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warren truss. The bars were sandwiched between and welded to the angles. The bent bars
protruded above the upper angle sections and into the 10 cm thick concrete floor to act as a shear
key. Trusses were connected at their ends by bolts.

The connection of each truss to the external columns was made by means of a truss seat
(Figure 14), which was connected to the box columns. The truss seat was a built up section onto
which the two angles of the top chord were bolted with two bolts. Connection of the truss to the
core was made by bolting the bottom chord angle to a channel section, which was connected to
the interior columns. The bolted connections were of friction (or slip- critical) type, 16mm –
19mm (indicating diameter of the bolt) A325 bolts possessing a tensile strength of about 110ksi
were used. Corrugated steel decks were then secured on the orthogonal trusses, and 10cm
lightweight concrete topped the decks to complete the slab. The corrugated steel decking acted as
permanent formwork and as a composite with the concrete to support the floor loads. It is noted
that at a later stage, viscoelastic dampers were attached to the ends of each floor truss connecting
the lower truss chords to the perimeter box columns in order to reduce wind induced vibrations.

Structural and fireproofing materials the major structural material employed in the towers
were A36 structural steel, although higher strength steel was used in the lower elevations of the
structure. Except for some selected floors, for which normal strength concrete was employed, the
composite slabs were made of a 21MPa (3ksi) lightweight concrete. Fire resistance of the
perimeter columns was provided by a layer of sprayed concrete around the three sides of each
column. The concrete layer had a thickness of about 5cm and included ceramic fibres in the mix.
The interior face of each column was fire protected with approximately 5cm thick layer of
vermiculate plaster (Figure 16). The exterior sides of each perimeter column were covered by
aluminium to which the window frames were fixed. It has been reported that passive fire
protection was provided to the underside of the floor systems by a fire rated suspended ceiling.
Specifics of fireproofing implemented on these buildings including which structural members
were treated and to what level of fire resistance are still being investigated.

Why did the towers collapse?

Weakest link theory
A fundamental principle of engineering design theory is that a structure is only as stable
as the weakest link in a chain of elements. This weakest link may exist at a material or structural
level, and affects the entire structural system stability if no provisions for redundancies have
been implemented in the system. In the collapse of the twin towers there is no doubt that there
were many interacting factors involved that lead to the catastrophic failure. However, it can be
argued that perhaps a weakest link may have played a critical role in the initiation of the failure
process. A key element in the failure process of the tower buildings was the time elapsed
between the impact and the collapse, which indicates a detrimental role of a physical
phenomenon that depends on time. The obvious one is related to the heat effects that started with
the fireball and continued until failure. In the days following September 11, it was argued that
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the fire was the ultimate cause of the collapse of the towers, since it is known that steel looses
strength and stiffness at high temperatures. But one can learn more by trying to reconstruct the
different levels at which high temperature played an important role in the initiation of failure and
the collapse mechanism.

Fire
There has been speculation with respect to the magnitude of temperature that may have
resulted from burning of the jet fuel possibly leading to the melting of the steel in the WTC fire.
It has been noted (Eagar and Musso, 2001) that although heat and temperature are related they
should not be confused. Temperature is an intensive property, meaning that it does not vary with
the quantity of the material, while the heat is an extensive property, which varies with the
material volume. The two quantities are related through the heat capacity and the density. On the
other hand, the dispersal of the jet fuel over several floors of the WTC did not necessarily imply
an unusually hot fire. While burning hydrocarbons (jet fuel) using pure oxygen may reach
approximately 3000°C, the same material burning in air produces about one third of that; that is,
1000°C. Thus the temperature experienced by the steel as a result of the fire may have been in
the range of 750°C to 800°C, which is not sufficient to melt the steel. Typical value of steel
melting temperature is in the range of 1400°C-1500°C. However, this level of temperature has
significant effect on the structural behaviour.

Behaviour of steel under high temperature:

Generally, unprotected steel in a high temperature environment does not perform well as
a structural material due to the fact that steel has a high thermal conductivity and the members
made of steel usually have thin cross sections. Typical fire proofing materials for steel structures
are sprays (mineral fibre, vermiculite plaster), boards (fibre-silicate or fibre-calcium- silicate,
gypsum plaster), and compressed fibre boards, (mineral wool, fibre-silicate). Typical thicknesses
of insulating materials generally vary from 15mm to 50mm.

Could the collapse of the buildings have been prevented?

The world trade towers were ingeniously designed for the physical and social reality prior
to September 11, 2001. In fact, it appears to us that the structure as a general system was built
with high level of redundancy against failure. The towers did not significantly tilt throughout the
failure which no doubt avoided an even greater catastrophe and destruction far beyond lower
Manhattan. They withstood both the initial impact of the aircraft and the resulting fire balls. The
preceding analysis indicated that the collapse mechanism of the towers involved failure of the
floor system from heat affected joints with the ensuing domino effect of progressive collapse,
one could cite the perceived weaknesses at several levels: a) the end joints of the floor systems,
which involved rather simple bolt connections, b) the fire proofing of the joints of the floor
trusses, c) the transfer of internal forces among the elements, (lateral and vertical members)
within the external tube system. The tower structures were built with a breakthrough innovation,
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given the physical and social realities at the time of their construction, in creating a highly
redundant and efficient system for external effects. It is ironical that 30 years later the very same
structures had to collapse by imploding onto themselves through primarily a local mechanism
within the strong external envelope.

Could the use of concrete have prevented the collapse? The answer to this question
required, first, an analysis of different levels at which collapse was initiated. Concrete is non-
combustible, and has a low thermal conductivity compared to steel; but this alone does not
explain the better fire performance of concrete compared to that of steel. In fact, on a purely
material level, thermal damage and softening of normal concrete is quite similar for concrete and
steel, although the involved chemo-physical mechanisms are quite different. In contrast to steel,
the thermal damage of concrete is due to several sources: a differential thermal expansion
behaviour between the cement paste matrix and the aggregate inclusion, thermal instability of
some mineral components of hydrated cement at some 400°C, transformation of aggregates at
some 800°C, and so on. The thermal softening of concrete results in addition from a dehydration
of concrete, leading to a loss of strength of the material respectively. Figure 24 shows the
combination of these two effects as design curves. A comparison of these four figures shows that
there is indeed little difference between concrete and steel on a material level.

However, several other mechanisms enter when one considers the behaviour on a section
member level. First, we should note that concrete material in the context of structures is
generally used in conjunction with reinforcing bars. The concrete cover, that is the distance
between the fire exposed surface and the steel reinforcement, needs to be designed so to protect
the steel reinforcement over sufficient time. Furthermore, the mechanism of failure of concrete
members under high temperature is different than that of steel, as it involves spalling of thin
layers of concrete from the face of the concrete. The first aspect relates to the heat propagation
properties of concrete, the second to stress and pressure build-up in structural members. Table 1
compares the physical values of heat propagation of steel and concrete. Use of these values in eq.
(1) shows that for a given fireproofing (same value of l) and same structural dimension H, the
fire protection time t of concrete is at least 5 times the one of steel. Furthermore, the
characteristic size H of concrete members is generally much larger than the one of steel.
Therefore, a combination of these two effects explains why fireproofing is generally not required
for concrete. Indeed, because of its low heat conductivity, concrete in different forms is
commonly employed as fireproofing material. For instance, shotcrete (that is a sprayed concrete)
has been employed in the WTC for fireproofing the façade columns. On the other hand,
concrete members subjected to high temperatures exhibit a very particular behaviour, known as
spalling, that is the successive disintegration of surface layers of a concrete member similar to
the peeling of an onion. Figure 25 displays spalling of the concrete cover of a reinforced concrete
column subjected to heating. Spalling is an interesting phenomenon that is known to be related
to the types of constituent materials, thermal stress concentrations, and is dependent of the
behaviour of the cement paste. The two physical mechanisms that affect the thermal stability of
concrete members with regard to spalling are:
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The compressive stress build-up due to restrained thermal expansion, which is readily
understood as a combination of the low heat diffusivity of concrete and its thermal expansion
behaviour. Like most materials, concrete subjected to heating undergoes a thermal expansion.
Since a structural member cannot expand in a non- uniform fashion without disintegrating, the
expansion in the surface layer is restrained, which induces high compressive stresses in the
surface layer, on the order of the compressive strength of concrete per 100 Kelvin of temperature
rise [Ulm et al., 1999a]. The stresses in the surface layer, therefore, reach quickly the
compressive strength of concrete, which in turn is subjected to thermal softening. Concrete,
under such compressive stresses, typically fails in planes parallel to the surface. The vapour
pressure build-up due to vaporization of free water or moisture in concrete at high temperature.
Concrete is made of cement, water and aggregates, and the material hardens by chemical
reactions between cement and water. After hardening, part of the initial water remains in the
pores of the material and is subjected, under normal conditions, to a very slow drying process,
roughly 300 years for 1m of concrete. Hence, there is always some water left in concrete. At
100°C the liquid water becomes vapour, expanding in the pore space previously occupied by
water. While the water–vapour phase change is an endothermic reaction, reducing a small part of
the heat during vaporization, the vapour cannot expand within concrete or to the outside.
Therefore, the vapour pressure increases, exerting an increasing pressure on the solid part of the
concrete. This pressure reduces the confinement of the solid generated by the thermal
compressive stresses, and increases the susceptibility of concrete to spalling, particularly in
concrete with high moisture content. A combination of these two phenomena leads to the
spalling of the concrete surface layers with a rate of roughly 3 mm/min: The compressive
stresses in the surface layer generated by restrained thermal expansion are released by explosive
spalling of the surface layer, which disintegrates from the remaining section triggered by the
vapour pressure. However, in contrast to steel, concrete sections in general are large, and
therefore deterioration in layers from the fire exposed faces of a cross-section does not lead to a
rapid catastrophic failure of the entire section. The remaining section remains intact, providing a
built-in redundancy for the structural load bearing capacity. This built-in redundancy ensured, for
instance, the stability of tunnel liners in recent long-term tunnel fires in several transport tunnels
in Europe, such as the 1996 fire in the Channel tunnel, the 35 km tunnel connecting England
with France [Ulm et al., 1999b]. Clearly, as far as material and structure is concerned, concrete
is less sensitive to fire than steel, and therefore performs well in fires. But, perhaps what is more
important is that concrete, in contrast to steel, comes today in an almost infinite variety of mixes,
that can be fine-tuned to generate a new material with a high degree of built-in redundancy. For
instance, addition of polypropylene fibres to concrete mix is known to improve material
behaviour under fire by reducing spalling. This is because the fibres melt under high
temperatures, leading to the increased porosity through which water vapour can escape. Figure
25 shows the stunning effect of such fibres on the thermal stability of a reinforced concrete
member. Still, we should note that this built-in redundancy on a material level affecting the
structural performance of a member, becomes only efficient as part of a global structural system
with built-in redundancies at multiple scales. Indeed, the use of reinforced concrete for the

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column cores in the WTC would have surely improved the thermal stability of the columns.
However, prevention of the failure of the slab system would still require implementation of
redundant end joint connections with respect to structural and fire proofing and perhaps, also
provision of a reinforced concrete core tube system well integrated with the lateral load transfer
mechanism within the building structure. Thus, a materials-to-structural sequence of failure
highlights the necessity of redundancy at different scales, from the material level to the structural
level, and beyond.

New technology of redundancy:

We believe that a built-in redundancy in design and operation of mega-cities and society
at large could significantly reduce vulnerability. Redundancy of a system may be defined as a
provision of multiple added failure mechanisms that prevent the total system from collapse upon
failure of single or several of its components. Therefore, implementation of redundancy in a
system will improve its reliability. Redundancy in a system can be defined as that of the active
type or the standby type. In the active redundancy all components of the system are
simultaneously contributing to the system stability at all times. On the other hand, in the standby
redundancy, some of the elements of the redundancy may be generally inactive and become
active when some of the active redundancy components fail. Generally, redundant structural
systems are examples of the active redundancy type. In the structural context, redundancy may
be provided at the material as well as at the system level.

Fibre-reinforced material systems: a multi scale redundant system A material possesses

redundancy if it responds to the same action using more than one mechanism. Below we will
illustrate this concept via the fire resistant mechanism of fibre reinforced cementatious
composites, a high performance material that has gained increasing popularity in tall building as
well as other infrastructure construction. Recent advances in concrete science and engineering
provide the basis for a fine tuned material design of concrete materials, which overcome the
traditionally weaknesses of concrete-type materials, that is brittleness and low compressive
strength compared to steel (steel typically has a strength that is 10 times higher than that of
standard concrete). This brought about a totally new generation of High Performance
Cementatious Composites (HP2C), which are based upon the optimization of both the packing
density of the cementitious matrix, and the length-diameter spectrum of the reinforcing fibres. In
comparison with ordinary concrete, HP2C materials have enhanced microstructural material
properties and an enhanced material ductility obtained by incorporating small-sized steel or
organic fibres. A typical HP2C mix-composition gives a mean 28 days cylinder compressive
strength of 190 MPa, and a ductile tensile strength of 10-15 MPa. The high compressive
strength-to-low mass density of this material makes it an ideal material for skyscrapers, in which
weight is always a limiting factor. In fact compared to steel, HP2C is 30 to 50% more efficient in
terms of strength-to-weight. Furthermore, the ductile tensile strength of HP2C is sufficiently
large that one can employ this material without steel reinforcement. As to the fire performance,
this is a first advantage of this material in comparison with standard concrete materials. But the
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real built-in redundancy with regard to fire resistance is that the polypropylene fibres in the
material, which contribute in service to the ductile tensile behaviour, melt under high
temperatures, offering to the vapour an additional connected expansion space to escape. This
second function of the fibres, which is only activated in the extreme case of a fire, reduces the
susceptibility to spalling of the structural member, thus providing a superior structural
performance of the structure under high temperature. Furthermore, this new generation of high
performance materials may well serve, in the future, for the retrofitting of existing structures.
The low heat diffusivity combined with the high strength and low weight (compared to steel) of
this new class of materials make it an ideal material for structural fireproofing in skyscrapers,
which can fulfil more than one function:

(1) Increase of thermal inertia (like standard fire proofing materials),

(2) Increased mechanical resistance to blast loading,

(3) Structural load bearing capacity when the steel member thermally softens. The multi-
functionality of this new class of materials can provide, if employed properly for retrofitting of
steel members at a material to structural level, a built-in redundancy similar to a second or third
airbag built into a car, which would inflate if the first ever failed. This built-in redundancy is a
general principle of a sound engineering design, and encompasses materials and structures.

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CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSION

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ANTI EXPLOSIVE STRUCTURE

CONCLUSION

The explosion in or near the structure can cause catastrophic damage to the structure,
formation of fragments, destruction of life-support systems (air conditioning, sprinklers). Injuries
and deaths can be caused by exposure to explosion wave front, collapse of the structure, impact
of parts, fire and smoke. Secondary effects of the explosion can hinder or even prevent the
evacuation of people from the structure causing additional injuries and deaths.

The aim in blast resistant building design is to prevent the overall collapse of the
building and fatal damages. Despite the fact that, the magnitude of the explosion and the loads
caused by it cannot be anticipated perfectly, the most possible scenarios will let to find the
necessary engineering and architectural solutions for it.

In the design process it is vital to determine the potential danger and the extent of
this danger. Most importantly human safety should be provided. Moreover, to achieve functional
continuity after an explosion, architectural and structural factors should be taken into account in
the design process, and an optimum building plan should be put together.

This study is motivated from making buildings in a blast resistant way, pioneering
to put the necessary regulations into practice for preventing human and structural loss due to the
blast and other human-sourced hazards and creating a common sense about the explosions that
they are possible threats in daily life. In this context, architectural and structural design of
buildings should be specially considered.

During the architectural design, the behaviour under extreme compression loading of the
structural form, structural elements e.g. walls, flooring and secondary structural elements like
cladding and glazing should be considered carefully. In conventional design, all structural
elements are designed to resist the structural loads. But it should be remembered that, blast loads
are unpredictable, instantaneous and extreme. Therefore, it is obvious that a building will receive
less damage with a selected safety level and a blast resistant architectural design. On the other
hand, these kinds of buildings will less attract the terrorist attacks.

Structural design after an environmental and architectural blast resistant design, as well
stands for a great importance to prevent the overall collapse of a building. With correct selection
of the structural system, well designed beam-column connections, structural elements designed
adequately, moment frames that transfer sufficient load and high quality material; it’s possible to
build a blast resistant building. Every single member should be designed to bear the possible
blast loading. For the existing structures, retrofitting of the structural elements might be essential.
Although these precautions will increase the cost of construction, to protect special buildings
with terrorist attack risk like embassies, federal buildings or trade centres is unquestionable.

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CHAPTER 12

REFERENCES

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REFERENCES

1. Technical Paper On “Terrorist Attack Resisting Structure” By Prof.Jigneshvanjara

https://www.engineeringcivil.com/design-aspects-for-terrorist-resistant-buildings.html

2. T. Ngo, P. Mendis, A. Gupta & J. Ramsay “Blast Loading And Blast Effects On Structures –
An Overview” Ejse Special Issue: Loading On Structures (2007)
3. Zeynep Koccaz, Fatih Sutcu, Necdet Torunbalci, Architectural And Structural Design For
Blast Resistant Buildings
4. Osman Shallan, Atef Eraky, Tharwat Sakr, Shimaa Emad “Response Of Building Structures
To Blast Effects”(2014)
5. Vasilis Karlos, George Solomos European Laboratory For Structural Assessment.
“Calculation Of Blast Loads For Application To Structural Components”(2013)
6. Structural Design For External Terrorist Bomb Attacks By Jon A. Schmidt P.E.2003
7. Blast Loading Effects On Steel Columns By Ashish Kumar Tiwary, Aditya Kumar Tiwary,
Anil Kumar, Jaypee University, 2015
8. Impacts And Analysis For Buildings Under Terrorist Attacks By Edward Eskew & Shinae
Jang, 2012
9. IS 4991-1968 Criteria For Blast Resistant Design Of Structures For Explosions Above
Ground

10. Anti-Terrorism: Criteria, Tools & Technology- (PDF 1 MB, 17 pgs.) by Joseph L. Smith,
Applied Research Tools - by S.C.SHARMA
11. Explosive Materials – ex.wikipedia.org/wiki/explosive-materials
12. Forces Acting On Structure – www.edqest.cu/pdf/sia74-2notes.pdf
13. Blast Loading And Blast Effect On Structure- www.ipad.ir/file/resume/297855.pdf
14. Explosive Effects –www.Fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1455.../Fema426-ch4.pdf
15. World Trade Centre Attack –
www.shape-shifters.com/docs/lest%20we%20forgect.ppt

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