II.

ESCHEATS

Castorio Alvarico vs. Amelita L. Sola

G.R. No. 138953

June 6, 2002

Can a private person institute a reversion proceeding?

NO. Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property in bad faith, only the State
can institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act.28 Thus:

Sec. 101.—All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall
be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.

In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of
canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land
covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead
may do so. Since Amelita Sola's title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between
the grantor and the grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelita's title. It
follows that he cannot "recover" the property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the rightful owner
thereof.

III. GUARDIANS AND GUARDANSHIP

Caniza vs CA

G.R. No. 110427

Can a guardian institute an jectment proceeding in behalf of his ward?

Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and the estate of
her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of Guardianship dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as the "guardian
over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CAIZA with full authority to take possession of the
property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts
necessary for the management of her properties ** " By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her
aunt's person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her
person in preference to relatives and friends.[33] It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise
control over, Caiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to
possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it
the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as
may be needful for this purpose.

Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to attend to "the
comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:

"SEC. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward. A guardian must manage the
estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits thereof, so far as maybe necessary, to
the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such income and profits
be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real estate, upon being authorized by order to
do so, and apply to such of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance."
Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's defenses in the ejectment action, that as the law now
stands, even when, in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted
competence to resolve. "the issue of ownership ** only to determine the issue of possession."[37]

Whether or not the ejectment case filed by the guardian in behalf of his ward is trminated upon the dath of
the ward?

No.

As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved
to dismiss the petition, arguing that Caiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista
lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the present appeal.
The motion is without merit.

While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the
death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece
of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C.
Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court[39] of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as parties
in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.:[40]

"SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period
of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time,
the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a
time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of
the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Caiza's demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit
instituted by her through her guardian. That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs
have taken her place and now represent her interests in the appeal at bar.

Neri vs Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy

GR No 194366

Whether or not surviving spouse of the decedent, as natural guardian of the minor heirs may dispose the
share of such minor heirs in the properties inherited.

NO. The sale of the subject properties made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of
the respondents is valid but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied that these heirs
have acquired their respective shares in the properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her death and that, as
owners thereof, they can very well sell their undivided share in the estate.

However, with respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale,
their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws
prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to
dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.

Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the execution of the
settlement and sale, provide:
 ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.

ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to the duties and obligations
of guardians under the Rules of Court.

Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:

SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under parental authority is worth
two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment,
shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos,
the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the child’s property, with the duties and
obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof.
For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable persons.

Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural
purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child,
exceeds the limits of administration.13 Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental
authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law
only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance
with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.14

Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial
authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority

Oropesa vs Oropesa

GR No. 184528

Whether or not testimony of a medical expert is required to prove the incompetency of the purported ward in
a petition for guardianship.

HELD:

A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence. In an analogous
guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue, it was held that "where the
sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary and that the observations of the trial judge coupled with
evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice."

The trial court in its order denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration stated its own observation of
respondent’s physical and mental state, i.e., “that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.

Abad vs Biason

G.R. No. 191993

Yes. With Biason’s demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It
is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either
the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of Biason’s
appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its
disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any substantial relief.

TRUSTEES

Advent Capital and Finance Corp vs Alcantara

G.R. No. 183050

Whether or not trust fees stipulated to be automatically deducted from the trust account per trust agreement
may be ordered by the rehabilitation court to be delivered to the trustee when the trust account is already in
the possession of a third person.

No. The real owner of the trust property is the trustor beneficiary. In this case, the trustors-beneficiaries are the
Alcantaras. Thus, Advent Capital could not dispose of the Alcantaras’ portfolio on its own. The income and principal
of the portfolio could only be withdrawn upon the Alcantaras’ written instruction or order to Advent Capital.

Ultimately, the issue is what court has jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the conflicting claims of the parties over the
dividends that Belson held in trust for their owners. Certainly, not the rehabilitation court which has not been given the
power to resolve ownership disputes between Advent Capital and third parties. Neither Belson nor the Alcantaras are
its debtors or creditors with interest in the rehabilitation.

Advent Capital must file a separate action for collection to recover the trust fees that it allegedly earned and, with the
trial court’s authorization if warranted, put the money in escrow for payment to whoever it rightly belongs. Having
failed to collect the trust fees at the end of each calendar quarter as stated in the contract, all it had against the
Alcantaras was a claim for payment which is a proper subject for an ordinary action for collection. It cannot enforce its
money claim by simply filing a motion in the rehabilitation case for delivery of money belonging to the Alcantaras but
in the possession of a third party.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs Peres

G.R. No. 166884

Whether the subject transactions may properly be considered as trust receipts so as to render the herein
respondents liable for estafa.

Based on these premises, we cannot consider the agreements between the parties in this case to be trust receipt
transactions because (1) from the start, the parties were aware that ACDC could not possibly be obligated to
reconvey to LBP the materials or the end product for which they were used; and (2) from the moment the materials
were used for the government projects, they became public, not LBPs, property.

Since these transactions are not trust receipts, an action for estafa should not be brought against the respondents,
who are liable only for a loan

In all trust receipt transactions, both obligations on the part of the trustee exist in the alternative the return of the
proceeds of the sale or the return or recovery of the goods, whether raw or processed. When both parties enter into
an agreement knowing that the return of the goods subject of the trust receipt is not possible even without any fault
on the part of the trustee, it is not a trust receipt transaction penalized under Section 13 of P.D. 115; the only
obligation actually agreed upon by the parties would be the return of the proceeds of the sale transaction. This
transaction becomes a mere loan, where the borrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase
of the goods.
ADOPTION

CANG VS CA

G.R. No. 194366

Is the written consent of the natural parent always required for the validity of the adoption?

No. While the law requires that the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree
of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the
child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even,
without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts
sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this
Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.

What constitute abandonement?

In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement
alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was
physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love,
care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and
telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.

Vda de Jacob vs CA

Whether or not the fact of adoption may be proved merely by a decree of adoption wherein the signature of
the issuing judge is in question.

The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil
failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.

The alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did
not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the
accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated
in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct
gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other
acts that he performed thereafter.

In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the
Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,
issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together,
these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.
 Republic vs Hon. Hernandez

G.R. No. 11720

Whether or not a petition for change of name of the adopted may be filed jointly with the petition for
adoption. Whether the LAST name of the adoptee may be changed in the same petition for adoption.

Yes.

Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of adoption:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the
right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the
adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority
over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.

Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is the
natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the
court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

Whether a petition to change the FIRST name of the prospective adoptee and a petition for adoption may
correctly be joined.

No. The given or proper name of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The
creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered
Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the
purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a
prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.

The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest
the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same,[17] and shall continue to be so used until the court orders
otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial change in
ones official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure
authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the
object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree recording such
change)[18]

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein, If a change
in ones name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 103695

Can the RTC has acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, considering that the subject
petition for adoption includes prayer to change the first name of the prospective adoptee, but the notice by
publication did not state the true name of the minor child..

YES. The first issue is whether on the facts stated, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private respondents petition
for adoption. Petitioners contention is that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption
because the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor child. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Cruz
v. Republic. There the petition for adoption and the notice published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name of
the child -(Rosanna E. Cruz) instead of her name in the record of birth (Rosanna E. Bucoy). it was held that this was
a substantial defect in the petition and the published order of hearing. Indeed there was a question of identity involved
in that case. Rosanna E. Cruz could very well be a different person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common experience
would indicate.

The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted. In
this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters ch for the letter d, so that what appears as
Midael as given name would read Michael. Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one.
Changing the name of the child from Midael C. Mazon to Michael C Mazon cannot possibly cause any confusion,
because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig). The
purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the adoption can
make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case.

TFor this reason we hold that the RTC correctly granted the petition for adoption of the minor Midael C. Mazon and
the Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, correctly did so.

Reyes vs Mauricio

G.R. No. 175080

Can filiation or adoption be attacked collaterally?

NO. It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.20 Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his
book "Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence," noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted
from the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:

o The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed
in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs
must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void." This
principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to
"the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the
periods fixed in the present articles.

In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation
can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack.

The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v.
Sotero, this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a
decedent’s estate. Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the
testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311.

Whether an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name.

Yes. Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name. There no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article
176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle name a child may use.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely
provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire
the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted
to use the surname of the adopters;

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the
rights accorded to a legitimate child.[15] It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. One of the effects of adoption is that the
adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189[21] of
the Family Code and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law
to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother, as discussed above. It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law
 Petition for Adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim

G.R. Nos. 168992-93

Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

No. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has
not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for
children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her
children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of
the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of
the adoptees parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country
has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least
three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the
adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows
the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:

(1) former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity;
or
(2) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(3) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the
fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial
accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental
authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.[12]

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be
adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are
certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as:
 (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines;
(2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption;
(3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered;
(4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and
(5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

Castro vs Gregorio

GR No 188801

Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case?

The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the
proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.

When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested party, as in this case,
then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged documents or
perjured testimony during the trial.

Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had
Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he
failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of
Jose’s acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.

Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is required?

RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife
but also the consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)

As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however, provides for several
exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of
wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the
consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite
their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the
adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older (ART. III, Sec. 9,
RA 8552).

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of
summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights
are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural
technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly
acquired jurisdiction.
 Bartolome vs SSS

G.R. No. 192531

Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the restoration of the
parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.

Yes. The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar.
Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no
collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed
away?

The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the provisions of law on
rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee’s biological parents
shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the
retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of
parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is
not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of their child
who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form
part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the
policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the
adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain
obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of
their minor offspring’s adoptive parent.

Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

Yes. The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive
the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s
minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation
Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.

HABEAS CORPUS

Ilusorio vs Bildner

G.R. No. 139789

Can wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss?

The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-
ordinary writ of habeas corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a
person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of
one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.

To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s
liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age
or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

Serapio vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 148468

Whether or not petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus may be availed of on the ground of delay in the
hearing of a petition for bail not as a matter of right.

No. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so. In exceptional circumstances,
habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest
or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action due to its ability to cut through barriers of form and
procedural mazes. Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid
under the law, had later become invalid, and even though the persons praying for its issuance were not completely
deprived of their liberty.

The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule that
habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies, because petitioner is under
detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the
Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact
voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had
been issued.

Lacson vs Perez

G.R. No. 147780

Whether or not petition for habeas corpus may be availed of against an imminent danger from warrantless
arrest.

No. Petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor- Santiago Petition), and 147799
(Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to
the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is not
without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.

Such an individual may ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may
adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he
should remain under custody and correspondingly be charged in court. Further, a person subject of a warrantless
arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be held liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should
the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All
this is without prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil
Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the
prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time The application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
is not proper since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint a matter which remains speculative up
to this very day.
 Sangca vs City Prosecutor of Cebu

G.R. No. 175864

Whether or not petition for habeas corpus may be availed of in case of warrantless arrests where there is
pending motion to withdraw information before the trial court.

Yes. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential
object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint
is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical
liberty.

Mangila vs Pangilinan

G.R. No. 160739

Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus may be availed of on the ground that an accused in a criminal
case when remedies such as motion to quash or motion to recall warrant of arrest is no longer available.

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot
take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of
error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is
addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The
writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of
trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances
are extant.

Hence, it cannot be issued where what is being questioned is the propriety of the issuance of the warrant of arrest
and other remedies to inquire into such issue is no longer available. The function of habeas corpus, where the party
who has appealed to its aid is in custody under process, does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the
court by which it was issued and the validity of the process upon its face. It is not a writ of error.