Caltex Philippines vs. IAC

11/8/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 176
VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 741

Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
*
G.R. No. 74730. August 25, 1989.
CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and HERBERT
MANZANA, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Pleadings; Issues; Appeal; The well-

entrenched rule that only issues raised in the lower court and those
which are raised by their parties in their pleadings will be
entertained on appeal, may be relaxed in the interest of justice.—
We rule that the respondent court did not commit any error in
taking cognizance of the aforestated issues, although not raised
before the trial court. The presence of strong consideration of
substantial justice has led this Court to relax the well-entrenched
rule that, except questions on jurisdiction, no question will be
entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below
and it is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings
(Cordero v. Cabral, G.R. No. L-36789, July 25 1983, 123 SCRA
532). The compassionate spirit behind this rule will equally apply
to the other allegation of CALTEX that Manzana’s indebtedness
of P361,218.66 was secured up to the extent of P120,000.00 only
although it appears that this issue is raised for the first time in
this present petition. Thus, the liberal application of the rule will
favor both parties.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
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742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016e44f7ceb1209c3847003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
Contracts; Interpretation Of; Specific provisions of a contract

shall prevail over general ones.—The Deed of First Mortgage
seems to contain provisions that contradict one another. However,
considering all the provisions together, the first condition cited by
CALTEX is actually a specific provision while the fourth
paragraph and the fourth condition cited by Manzana are general
provisions. x x x We therefore hold that Manzana’s indebtedness
of P361,218.66 was secured up to the extent of P120,000.00 only.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Remand of the case to the lower
court for reception of evidence is not necessary if the Supreme
Court can resolve the case on the basis of the records before it.—
Remand of the case to the lower courts for reception of evidence is
not necessary if the Supreme Court can resolve the dispute on the
records before it. The common denominator in cases holding that
remand of a case is not necessary is the fact that the trial court
had received all the evidence intended to be presented by both
parties (Hechanova v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48787,
November 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 550).
Obligations and Contracts; Mortgage; Remedies of a Mortgage
Creditor; In case of default in payment on the part of the
mortgagor, the mortgagee has a choice of one of two remedies i.e.
foreclosure of the mortgage or an ordinary suit for collection, but
he cannot have both.—Thus, where a debt is secured by a
mortgage and there is a default in payment on the part of the
mortgagor, the mortgagee has a choice of one (1) of two (2)
remedies, but he cannot have both. The mortgagee may: 1)
foreclose the mortgage; or 2) file an ordinary action to collect the
debt. When the mortgagee chooses the foreclosure of the mortgage
as a remedy, he enforces his lien by the sale on foreclosure of the
mortgaged property. The proceeds of the sale will be applied to
the satisfaction of the debt. With this remedy, he has a prior lien
on the property. In case of a deficiency, the mortgagee has the
right to claim for the deficiency resulting from the price obtained
in the sale of the real property at public auction and the
outstanding obligation at the time of the foreclosure proceedings
(Soriano v. Enriquez, 24 Phil. 584; Banco de Islas Filipinas v.
Concepcion Hijos, 53 Phil. 86; Banco Nacional v. Barreto, 53 Phil.
101). On the other hand, if the mortgagee resorts to an action to
collect the debt, he thereby waives his mortgage lien. He will have
no more priority over the mortgaged property. If the judgment in
the action to collect is favorable to him, and it becomes final and
executory, he can enforce said judgment by execution. He can
even levy execution on the same mortgaged property, but he will
not have priority over the latter and there may be other creditors
who
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VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 743
have better lien on the properties of the mortgagor.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Mere filing of a collection suit for
recovery of a debt constitutes a waiver of the other remedy of
foreclosure.—The mere act of filing a collection suit for the
recovery of a debt secured by a mortgage constitutes waiver of the
other remedy of foreclosure. The rationale behind this was
adequately explained in the Bachrach case, supra: “x x x, a rule
that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action
against the debtor and simultaneously or successively another
action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in
multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice (Soriano vs. Enriquez,
24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio vs. San
Agustin, 25 Phil. 404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the
vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of the
residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the
property lies.” In the present case, however, We shall not follow
this rule to the letter but declare that it is the collection suit
which was waived and/or abandoned. This ruling is more in
harmony with the principles underlying our judicial system. It is
of no moment that the collection suit was filed ahead, what is
determinative is the fact that the foreclosure proceedings ended
even before the decision in the collection suit was rendered. As a
matter of fact, CALTEX informed the trial court that it had
already consolidated its ownership over the property, in its reply
to the opposition of Manzana to the motion for execution pending
appeal filed by it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Deficiency Judgment;
Prescription; A suit for recovery of the deficiency after foreclosure
is in the nature of a mortgage action, and the same prescribes in
10 years.—A suit for the recovery of the deficiency after the
foreclosure of a mortgage is in the nature of a mortgage action
because its purpose is precisely to enforce the mortgage contract;
it is upon a written contract and upon an obligation of Manzana
to pay the deficiency which is created by law (see Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Tomeldan, et al., G.R. No. 51269,
November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 171). Therefore, since more than
ten (10) years have elapsed from the time the right of action
accrued, CALTEX can no longer recover the deficiency from
Manzana.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Procedure; Causes of Action;
A mortgage creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor
for non-payment of a note secured by a mortgage, hence, he cannot
split up his cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the

debt, and
744
thereafter, another complaint for foreclosure.—CALTEX has only

one cause of action against Manzana, that is, non-payment of the
debt although two choices of remedies are available to it. As held
in the Bachrach case, supra: “For non-payment of a note secured
by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the
debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the
credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor
in his action may make two demands, the payment of debt and
the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from the
same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason,
they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the
mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary
to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation.
Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a single
breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule
above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a
complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another
complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing
of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By
allowing the creditor to file two separate complaint
simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and
another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be
authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so
much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression
to the debtor.”
PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the

then Intermediate Appellate Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution

of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) dated January 31, 1986 vacating its prior decision
dated June 29, 1984 and ordering that the records of the
case be remanded to the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Manila, and its resolution dated

May 19, 1986 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent Herbert Manzana purchased on
credit petroleum products from petitioner Caltex
Philippines, Inc. (CALTEX, for short). As of August 31,
1969, his indebtedness to
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VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 745

CALTEX has amounted to P361,218.66. On October 4,

1969, Manzana executed a Deed a First Mortgage in favor
of CALTEX over a parcel of land covered by OCT No. 0-274
of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Camarines Norte
to secure his debts to the latter. On various occasions,
CALTEX sent to Manzana statements of account and later
demanded payment of his entire debts. Because of
Manzana’s failure and refusal to pay, CALTEX filed a
complaint on August 17, 1970 before the trial court for the
recovery of the whole amount of P361,218.66.
Meanwhile, on September 15, 1970, CALTEX foreclosed
extrajudicially the mortgaged property. On October 30,
1970, the mortgaged property was sold at auction to
CALTEX, being the only bidder, for P20,000.00 as shown
by the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale. The foreclosure was
allegedly known by Manzana only on October 4, 1980 when
such fact was manifested by CALTEX in its reply to the
opposition of Manzana to the motion for execution pending
appeal.
On July 23, 1980, the trial court rendered judgment
ordering Manzana to pay CALTEX the amount of
P353,218.66 after deducting P8,000.00 paid by Traders
Insurance and Surety Company on its surety bond, with
interest thereon at 12% per annum from August 17, 1970,
plus 20% thereof as attorney’s fees (p. 115, Rollo).
Manzana appealed the trial court’s decision to the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court raising the
following issues (p. 37, Rollo):
“1. THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE CANNOT AVAIL

BOTH OF A PERSONAL ACTION (THIS CASE)
AND AN EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE AT
THE SAME TIME AGAINST THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT; AND,
2. THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE CANNOT AVAIL

OF A DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT AFTER HE HAD
EXTRAJUDICIALLY FORECLOSED ON THE
PROPERTY OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.”
It was the opinion of the respondent court that “a reading

of the issues raised by the defendant-appellant shows that
the question that needs resolution is whether or not
plaintiff-appellee can still avail of the complaint for the
recovery of the balance
746

of indebtedness after having already foreclosed the

property securing the same” (p. 37, Rollo).
On June 29, 1984, the respondent court rendered a
decision (pp. 36-39, Rollo) affirming in toto the appealed
decision after “finding no reversible error” therein. On July
19, 1984, Manzana filed a motion for reconsideration of
said decision. In its comment to the motion for
reconsideration, CALTEX prayed that “the judgment
sought to be reconsidered be modified by deducting the
amount of P20,000.00 (foreclosure amount) from
P353,218.66 thereby leaving a balance of P333,218.66
representing the deficiency that plaintiff-appellee is
entitled to recover from defendant-appellant plus interest,
attorney’s fees and costs of suit” (p. 41, Rollo).
Acting on the motion for reconsideration, the respondent
court issued a resolution dated January 31, 1986, the
dispositive portion of which reads (p. 59, Rollo):
“WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice the decision of this

Court promulgated June 29, 1984 is vacated and the records are
ordered remanded for purposes of determining the deficiency due
the plaintiff-appellee and for the trial court to render another and
proper judgment based on the evidence adduced by all the parties.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
“SO ORDERED.”
The respondent court was convinced that the following

consideration justified a reconsideration of its prior
decision (pp. 55-56, Rollo): “x x x, the action (before the trial
court) cannot be said to be one for recovery of deficiency
judgment because x x x (it) seeks recovery of the whole
amount of indebtedness totalling P361,210.66” (should be

P361,218.66).
The motion for reconsideration filed by CALTEX was
denied. Hence, the present petition.
The issues may be limited to the following:
1) Whether or not the respondent court committed an

error in giving due course to the question whether
CALTEX can avail at the same time of a personal
action in court for collection of a sum of money and
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the deed of first
mortgage, which
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VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 747

was only raised for the first time on appeal;

2) Whether or not the mere filing of a collection suit
for the recovery of the debt secured by real estate
mortgage constitutes waiver of the other remedy of
foreclosure;
3) Whether or not the filing of the complaint for
recovery of the amount of indebtedness and the
subsequent extrajudicial foreclosure of the deed of
first mortgage constitutes splitting of a single cause
of action.
FIRST ISSUE
CALTEX alleges that the only issue submitted for

resolution before the trial court is whether or not Manzana
was indebted and liable to it in the sum of P361,218.66.
The issue whether or not CALTEX can avail at the same
time of a personal action in court for collection of a sum of
money and the extrajudicial foreclosure of the Deed of First
Mortgage, and the issue whether or not CALTEX can avail
of a deficiency judgment were never raised in the pleadings
of the parties nor at any stage of the proceedings before the
trial court. These were only raised by Manzana for the first
time on appeal before the respondent court.
We rule that the respondent court did not commit any
error in taking cognizance of the aforestated issues,
although not raised before the trial court. The presence of
strong consideration of substantial justice has led this
Court to relax the well-entrenched rule that, except

questions on jurisdiction, no question will be entertained
on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below and
it is within the issues made by the parties in their
pleadings (Cordero v. Cabral, G.R. No. L-36789, July 25,
1983, 123 SCRA 532). The compassionate spirit behind this
rule will equally apply to the other allegation of CALTEX
that Manzana’s indebtedness of P361,218.66 was secured
up to the extent of P120,000.00 only although it appears
that this issue is raised for the first time in this present
petition. Thus, the liberal application of the rule will favor
both parties.
On the basis of the first condition enumerated in the
Deed of First Mortgage, CALTEX submits that Manzana’s
indebtedness of P361,218.66 was secured up to the extent
of P120,000.00 only, to wit (p. 50, Rollo):
748

“This Mortgage is subject to the following terms and conditions:

“1) The aforementioned indebtedness of THREE HUNDRED
SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTEEN &
66/100 (P361,218.66) of the MORTGAGOR shall be paid upon
demand by the MORTGAGEE; it being expressly understood that
the limit or maximum amount secured by this mortgage is ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P120,000.00) only.”
On the other hand, on the basis of the fourth paragraph of

the deed and the fourth condition therein, Manzana
contends that the whole outstanding obligation of
P361,218.66 was secured by the mortgage, to wit (pp. 49-
50, Rollo):
“NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the said

overdue, payable and demandable indebtedness of the
MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE in the sum of THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
EIGHTEEN PESOS & 66/100 (P361,218.66), Philippine Currency,
the foregoing premises and other x x x and valuable
considerations, and to secure the faithful performance by the
MORTGAGOR of all the terms and conditions hereinafter set
forth, particularly the payment of the obligations hereby secured,
the MORTGAGOR does hereby convey BY WAY OF FIRST
MORTGAGE x x x.
“x x x.
“4) This mortgage shall remain in force to cover the

aforementioned outstanding indebtedness of the MORTGAGOR to
the MORTGAGEE in the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-
ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTEEN PESOS & 66/
100 (P361,218.66).”
Article 1374 of the Civil Code, regarding interpretation of

contracts, provides:
“ART. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be

interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense
which may result from all of them taken jointly.”
The Deed of First Mortgage seems to contain provisions

that contradict one another. However, considering all the
provisions together, the first condition cited by CALTEX is
actually a
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VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 749

specific provision while the fourth paragraph and the

fourth condition cited by Manzana are general provisions.
This interpretation is bolstered by the third WHEREAS
clause and the penultimate paragraph of the deed, to wit
(pp. 49-50, Rollo):
“WHEREAS, the MORTGAGOR has offered to execute, sign and

deliver a First Mortgage over his property x x x, only as partial
security for the aforementioned overdue, payable and demandable
indebtedness of the MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE, which
offer of the MORTGAGOR is accepted by the MORTGAGEE.
(italics supplied)
“x x x.
“The MORTGAGOR binds himself to complete the securities
required by the MORTGAGEE and shall permit any authorized
representative of the MORTGAGEE to inspect the mortgaged
property and all the properties offered to be mortgaged to
complete the required security.” (italics supplied)
We therefore hold that Manzana’s indebtedness of

P361,218.66 was secured up to the extent of P120,000.00
only.
The records show that CALTEX extended to Manzana a
continuing credit line, with the result that each transaction
constituted a separate obligation. We affirm the trial
court’s ruling with respect to the liability of Manzana to
CALTEX in the amount of P233,218.66 (P353,218.66 less

P120,000.00) with interest thereon at 12% per annum from
August 17, 1970, plus 20% thereof as attorney’s fees. The
evidence on record, both testimonial and documentary,
clearly support such amount of indebtedness. The trial
court said (pp. 114-115, Rollo):
“Plaintiff’s claim that as at (sic) termination of agreement on July

27, 1970, Manzana had an outstanding account totalling
P361,218.66, appears to be confirmed by the following:
“(1) On September 8, 1970, defendant Manzana, by a letter,
acknowledged his indebtedness, but asked for time to pay the
unpaid balance (Exh. “1” and “M”).
“(2) To secure his obligation of P361,218.66, said defendant
executed, on October 4, 1969, a Deed of First Mortgage on a piece
of land covered by O.C.T. No. 0-274 of the Registry of Deeds for
Camarines Norte (Exh. “N”).
“Rarely can a confirmation of an account be more definitive
than the foregoing.
750

“Defendant Manzana’s defenses, set up in his answer, do not

appear to have merit. In the first place, the supposed lack of
liquidation is belied by the periodical statements of account
showing the corresponding running balance thru the years 1968
to 1969 (Exhs. “N” to “O-7” inclusive), effectively constituting a
form of liquidation. Secondly, the very terms used repeatedly in
the Dealer Agreement—neither pleaded nor in any manner
assailed as ambiguous—are peculiar to purchase and sale
transactions and to the relationship of the parties thereto as
debtor and creditor. There is no reasonable way under the
provisions thereof that Manzana can be deemed to be either an
agent or a mere collector with plaintiff bearing the risk of non-
payment.”
Furthermore, this case has been pending since August 17,

1970 and to order its remand to the trial court will
necessarily entail additional expenses and unduly delay its
disposition and the administration of justice to the parties.
Remand of the case to the lower court for reception of
evidence is not necessary if the Supreme Court can resolve
the dispute on the records before it. The common
denominator in cases holding that remand of a case is not
necessary is the fact that the trial court had received all
the evidence intended to be presented by both parties

(Hechanova v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48787,
November 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 550).
THE SUCCEEDING DISCUSSION WILL CONCERN
THE SECURED INDEBTEDNESS OF P120,000.00.
CALTEX, in effect, has made a mockery of our judicial
system when it initially filed a collection suit then, during
the pendency thereof foreclosed extrajudicially the
mortgaged property which secured the indebtedness and
still pursued the collection suit to the end. In this light, the
actuations of CALTEX are deserving of severe criticism, to
say the least. Of importance is the doctrine laid down by
this court in the leading case of Bachrach Motor, Inc. v.
Icarañgal, et al., 68 Phil. 287, which was applied by the
respondent Court in resolving the case, where We ruled
that:
“x x x, in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage

creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a
personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage.
In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not
both. By
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VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 751

such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired,

for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election
to bring a personal action will leave open to him all the properties
of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the
mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal action
and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an
unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue
for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the
defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to
him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his
remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any
advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy
are purely accidental and are all under his right of election. x x x.”
Thus, where a debt is secured by a mortgage and there is a

default in payment on the part of the mortgagor, the
mortgagee has a choice of one (1) of two (2) remedies, but
he cannot have both. The mortgagee may:
1) foreclosure the mortgage; or

2) file an ordinary action to collect the debt.
When the mortgagee chooses the foreclosure of the

mortgage as a remedy, he enforces his lien by the sale on
foreclosure of the mortgaged property. The proceeds of the
sale will be applied to the satisfaction of the debt. With this
remedy, he has a prior lien on the property. In case of a
deficiency, the mortgagee has the right to claim for the
deficiency resulting from the price obtained in the sale of
the real property at public auction and the outstanding
obligation at the time of the foreclosure proceedings
(Soriano v. Enriquez, 24 Phil. 584; Banco de Islas Filipinas
v. Concepcion Hijos, 53 Phil. 86; Banco Nacional v. Barreto,
53 Phil. 101).
On the other hand, if the mortgagee resorts to an action
to collect the debt, he thereby waives his mortgage lien. He
will have no more priority over the mortgaged property. If
the judgment in the action to collect is favorable to him,
and it becomes final and executory, he can enforce said
judgment by execution. He can even levy execution on the
same mortgaged property, but he will not have priority
over the latter and there
752

may be other creditors who have better lien on the

properties of the mortgagor.
CALTEX submits that the principles enunciated in the
Bachrach case are not applicable nor determinative of the
case at bar for the reason that the factual circumstances
obtained in the said case are totally different from the
instant case. In the Bachrach case, the plaintiff instituted
an action to foreclose the mortgage after the money
judgment in its favor remained unsatisfied whereas in the
present case, CALTEX initially filed a complaint for
collection of the debt and during the pendency thereof
foreclosed extrajudicially the mortgage.
We disagree. Although the facts in the Bachrach case
and in the present case are not identical, there is similarity
in the fact that the plaintiffs in these two cases availed of
both remedies although they are entitled to a choice of only
one.
SECOND ISSUE
CALTEX alleges next that the mere act of filing a collection

suit for the recovery of a debt secured by real estate
mortgage is not tantamount to an implied waiver of the
mortgage lien. Under Philippine jurisdiction, there is no
statute which prohibits or precludes a mortgagee from
subsequently foreclosing the real estate mortgage shortly
after the collection suit has been filed. The real estate
mortgage itself does not contain any explicit provision that
the filing of a collection suit would mean waiver of the
remedy of foreclosure.
We hold otherwise. The mere act of filing a collection
suit for the recovery of a debt secured by a mortgage
constitutes waiver of the other remedy of foreclosure. The
rationale behind this was adequately explained in the
Bachrach case, supra:
“x x x, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal

action against the debtor and simultaneously or successively
another action against the mortgaged property, would result not
only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice (Soriano vs.
Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio
vs. San Agustin, 25 Phil. 404), but also in subjecting the
defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his
residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the
place where the property lies.”
753
VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 753

In the present case, however, We shall not follow this rule

to the letter but declare that it is the collection suit which
was waived and/or abandoned. This ruling is more in
harmony with the principles underlying our judicial
system. It is of no moment that the collection suit was filed
ahead, what is determinative is the fact that the
foreclosure proceedings ended even before the decision in
the collection suit was rendered. As a matter of fact,
CALTEX informed the trial court that it had already
consolidated its ownership over the property, in its reply to
the opposition of Manzana to the motion for execution
pending appeal filed by it.
A corollary issue that We might as well resolve now
(although not raised as an issue in the present petition, but
applying the rule in Gayos, et al. v. Gayos, et al., G.R. No.
L-27812, September 26, 1975, 67 SCRA 146, that it is a
cherished rule of procedure that a court should always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding

leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigation) is whether or not CALTEX can still sue for a
deficiency judgment—P100,000.00 (secured debt of
P120,000.00 less the foreclosure amount of P20,000.00).
The collection suit filed before the trial court cannot be
considered as a deficiency judgment because a deficiency
judgment has been defined as one for the balance of the
indebtedness after applying the proceeds of the sale of the
mortgaged property to such indebtedness and is necessarily
filed after the foreclosure proceedings. It is significant to
note that the judgment rendered by the trial court was for
the full amount of the indebtedness and the case was filed
prior to the foreclosure proceedings.
In general, a deficiency judgment is in the nature of an
ordinary money judgment, may constitute a cause of action
and is barred by the statute of limitations applicable to
ordinary judgment (59 C.J.S. 1497). The ten (10) year
period provided in Articles 1142 and 1144 of the Civil Code
applies to a suit for deficiency judgment, to wit:
“Art. 1142. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years. (1964a)”

“Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues:
754

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment. (n)”
A suit for the recovery of the deficiency after the

foreclosure of a mortgage is in the nature of a mortgage
action because its purpose is precisely to enforce the
mortgage contract; it is upon a written contract and upon
an obligation of Manzana to pay the deficiency which is
created by law (see Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Tomeldan, et al., G.R. No. 51269, November 17, 1980, 101
SCRA 171). Therefore, since more than ten (10) years have
elapsed from the time the right of action accrued, CALTEX
can no longer recover the deficiency from Manzana.
THIRD ISSUE
CALTEX has only one cause of action against Manzana,

that is, non-payment of the debt although two choices of
remedies are available to it. As held in the Bachrach case,
supra:
“For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has

a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of
action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the
security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two
demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his
mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-
payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single
cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute
separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and
both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there
exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that
obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated,
cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for
payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for
foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first
complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the
creditor to file two separate complaint simultaneously or
successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his
mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for
a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with
so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.”
755
VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 755

St. Anne Medical Center vs. Parel
ACCORDINGLY, the resolution of the respondent

Intermediate Appellate Court dated January 31, 1986 is
SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that private respondent Herbert
Manzana’s liability to petitioner Caltex Philippines, Inc. is
only up to the extent of P233,218.66 with interest thereon
at 12% per annum from August 17, 1970, plus 20% thereof
as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ.,

concur.
Resolution set aside. Decision of the trial court affirmed

with modification.
Notes.—Agreements have the force of law between the

parties. (Herrera vs. Petrophil Corporation, 146 SCRA 385.)
Contracts are to be interpreted according to their literal
meaning and should not be interpreted beyond their
obvious intendment. (Herrera vs. Petrophil Corp., 146
SCRA 385.)
——o0o——
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11/8/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 176

VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 741

CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE

Civil Procedure; Pleadings; Issues; Appeal; The well-

742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Contracts; Interpretation Of; Specific provisions of a contract

VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 743

Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

have better lien on the properties of the mortgagor.

split up his cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the

744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

thereafter, another complaint for foreclosure.—CALTEX has only

PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution

Regional Trial Court) of Manila, and its resolution dated

VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 745

CALTEX has amounted to P361,218.66. On October 4,

“1. THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE CANNOT AVAIL

2. THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE CANNOT AVAIL

It was the opinion of the respondent court that “a reading

746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

of indebtedness after having already foreclosed the

“WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice the decision of this

The respondent court was convinced that the following

amount of indebtedness totalling P361,210.66” (should be

1) Whether or not the respondent court committed an

VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 747

was only raised for the first time on appeal;

CALTEX alleges that the only issue submitted for

Court to relax the well-entrenched rule that, except

748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“This Mortgage is subject to the following terms and conditions:

On the other hand, on the basis of the fourth paragraph of

“NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the said

“4) This mortgage shall remain in force to cover the

Article 1374 of the Civil Code, regarding interpretation of

“ART. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be

The Deed of First Mortgage seems to contain provisions

VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 749

specific provision while the fourth paragraph and the

“WHEREAS, the MORTGAGOR has offered to execute, sign and

We therefore hold that Manzana’s indebtedness of

CALTEX in the amount of P233,218.66 (P353,218.66 less

“Plaintiff’s claim that as at (sic) termination of agreement on July

750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“Defendant Manzana’s defenses, set up in his answer, do not

Furthermore, this case has been pending since August 17,

the evidence intended to be presented by both parties

“x x x, in the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage

VOL. 176, AUGUST 25, 1989 751

such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired,

Thus, where a debt is secured by a mortgage and there is a

1) foreclosure the mortgage; or

When the mortgagee chooses the foreclosure of the

752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED