G.R. No.

L-69809 October 16, 1986

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1
of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed by the
petitioner.

In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living
room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which
they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the
proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).

That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit
'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).

When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through
a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard
complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.

(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of
the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel
Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty.
Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;

(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High School;

(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;

(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical High School;

(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel Montebon at the
Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty.
Laconico to be filed later;

(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;

(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;

(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).

1
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico
answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March
10, 1983, pp. 2-12).

Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then
Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money.
(tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested
by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the
withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico
guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment
with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate court.

On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by
Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the
complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone
conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.

In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises the following issues;
(a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in
nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act
No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d)
whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner.

Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceeding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

We rule for the petitioner.

We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The issue is not
the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or
not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should

2
both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged
attempt at extortion.

There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico
was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and another as distinguished
from words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the
authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously,
complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00
consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu
City Fiscal's Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance
of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener
to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against
the listener's.

Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads
which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called
"crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime
might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his
own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never
intended for such mischievous results.

The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other
device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the user
to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their
bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations
between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a
proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?

The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly
known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices
contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being
considered in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the
most popularly known communication device.

Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate.
Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of devices
"commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however
otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from
the provisions of the Act.

The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the
context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is
a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not
forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one
place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication corning
from the other party or end.

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a
wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken
words.

3
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a
telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there
for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature,
the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of
Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).

In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:

Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a contract may be, they shall
not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the
parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a
contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them
taken jointly.

xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be
then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be construed as to comprehend all other
obligations of the decedent. The rule that 'particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be
restricted to the former' is based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed
specially to the particularization, and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they
stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v.
Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court
(Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated
therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use
of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not
have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a
kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably
has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a
telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S.
107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):

Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to ring in more than
one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have
an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has
been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception,
has not occurred.

In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating
the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction between
that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same purpose.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case
of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or
4
arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. In the case of People
v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule:

American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the law of the rights of
individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion
of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3)
26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited
in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but
to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on
Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).

In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the
primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional
Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a
prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of
recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly objectionable. It is made
possible by special amendment which Your Honor may introduce.

Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with the amendment than without
it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment would only consist of government testimony as against
the testimony of the defendant. With this amendment, they would have the right, and the government officials and
the person in fact would have the right to tape record their conversation.

Senator Tañada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.

Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record and, therefore, the court would be
limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the police officers or the defendant?" In these cases, as experienced
lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace offices.

(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an agent outside listening in, he could
falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if you allow him to record or make a recording in any
form of what is happening, then the chances of falsifying the evidence is not very much.

Senator Tañada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false testimony. If we could
devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation of false testimony, it would be wonderful. But what this bill
intends to prohibit is the use of tape record and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which
later on will be used in court.

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).

It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as
government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence
for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated
5
devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among
such devices or arrangements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16,
1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No.
4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993

JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.

Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.

Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration on the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond. 1

The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing that:

In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:

Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall
be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.

The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions
rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for
overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not
only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:

Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of
P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding company acceptable to the Administration and duly
accredited by the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from
violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and contracts of employment.
The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Code and its implementing rules and
regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of the
Department and all liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include the condition that
the notice to the principal is notice to the surety and that any judgment against the principal in connection with

6
matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds shall be
co-terminus with the validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied)

In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in
compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of
recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."

Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that the rules cited
by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from decisions of
the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:

Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in
Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a
cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which
shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of
the date when the appellant received the appealed decision and/or award and proof of service on the other party of
such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the
period for perfecting an appeal.

Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)

The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of P200,000 as
required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a
decision of the POEA to the NLRC?

It was.

The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the
escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal
from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary
award in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.

It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the payment
of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees
whose contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by
the recruiter of the conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247
(reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur.

As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be used only
as a last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers that may
be adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be enough to cover such claims and, even if it could
initially, may eventually be exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.

As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to the dismissed
employee, the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if
this award were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow money, making
them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other obligations the recruiter may incur.

7
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000, which is
the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.

It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner observes, but there is
a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement because of
the special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign employers, against whom there is
usually no direct or effective recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds
and the escrow money are intended to insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign
principal to whom our overseas workers are to be sent.

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be
taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as
a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the
appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds
and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any
such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a
construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.

Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4,
Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to
post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an
appeal from a decision of the POEA.

Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to the mandate of the
Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee,
this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of labor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

8
G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991

RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-in-insolvency VICENTE J. CUNA, petitioner,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Angeles City, Branch No. LVI, EMILIO C. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS and TERESITA
GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF ANGELES CITY, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY, SANYO MARKETING
CORPORATION, S & T ENTERPRISES INC., REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES INC., and DELTA MOTOR
CORPORATION, respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.

Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:p

This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court * in A.C-G.R.
SP No. 04160 entitled "Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the petition
for certiorari and mandamus; and its Resolution of July 1, 1986 denying the motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate Court, are as follows:

On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary insolvency of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein, the case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1548 of the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga and Angeles City.

On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking cognizance of the said petition and stating inter
alia that:

. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the delivery of any property owing and belonging to said
respondents-debtors from other persons, or, to any other persons for the use and benefit of the same respondents-
debtors and/or the transfer of any property by and for the said respondents-debtors to another, upon petitioners'
putting up a bond by way of certified and reputable sureties. (Annex 1, Comment).

Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City of the aforesaid order (Annex 2, Ibid)
and on March 26, 1981, also communicated with counsel for the petitioner herein regarding same order, apprising
the latter that "the personal and real property which have been levied upon and/or attached should be preserved till
the final determination of the petition aforementioned." (Annex 3, Ibid).

On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion for issuance of insolvency order and resolution of
the case, alleging among other things, that in November, 1982, they filed an urgent motion to issue insolvency
order; on December 2, 1982, they presented a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of Angeles City from disposing the
personal and real properties of the insolvent debtors, Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18,
1983, they (sic) appealed in the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news item to the effect that Radiola-Toshiba
Phil. Inc. has already shut down its factory, sometime in March 1983, through their representative, they caused to
be investigated the real properties in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan and they were
surprised to find out that some of the aforesaid properties were already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.;
and that in view of such development, it is their submission that without an insolvency order and a resolution of the
9
case which was ripe for resolution as early as March 3, 1982, the rights and interest of petitioners-creditors would
be injured and jeopardized. (Annex "C").

On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion vis-a-vis the prayer that the insolvency order
(which has not been rendered yet by the court) be annotated on the transfer certificates of title already issued in its
name (Annex "D").

On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency of respondents-debtors Carlos Gatmaytan and
Teresita Gatmaytan.

On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the same second urgent motion and motion to direct
respondent sheriff to issue a final certificate of sale for the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its
favor (Annex "E").

On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that ownership of certain real properties of the
insolvents had passed to it by virtue of foreclosure proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, which properties were not redeemed within the
period of redemption, respondent court issued an order disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of Mr. Emilio C. Patino, as assignee of all the registered
claimants in this case, and, in consequence thereof, the said assignee is hereby directed to post a bond in the
amount of P30,000.00 and to take his oath thereafter so as to be able to perform his duties and discharge his
functions, as such.

The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors with the attendance, of course, of the assignee, on March
9, 1984, at 8:30., as by that time the proposals, which the respective representatives of the parties-claimants desire
to clear with their principals, shall have already been reported.

The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the insolvents which are now in the actual or constructive custody
and management of the receiver previously appointed by the Court on petitioners' and claimants' proposals be
placed under this actual or constructive custody and management, such as he is able to do so, as the Court hereby
dissolves the receivership previously authorized, it having become a superfluity. (Annex "F").

On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 35946, issued an
order directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or whoever is acting in his behalf, to issue within seven (7) days
from notice thereof a final deed of sale over the two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles
Nos. 18905 and 40430 in favor of petitioner. (Annex "G").

In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money covering the proceeds of television sets and
other appliances, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, issued a writ of
preliminary attachment on February 15, 1980 upon application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a bond of
P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., levy on attachment was done in favor of petitioner on the real
properties registered in the names of spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT Nos. 18905
and 40430 of the Registry of Deeds of Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles. (Annex "A" and "B").

On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, ordering private respondents and their co-
defendant Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay petitioner, jointly and severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus
interest thereon of 14% per annum from October 12, 1979 until fully paid; P20,000.00, for and attorney's fees; and
the costs of suit (Annex "5", Comment). After the said decision in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became
final and executory, a writ of execution for the satisfaction thereof issued on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981,
respondent sheriff of Angeles City sold at auction sale the attached properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and
40430, to petitioner as the highest bidder, and the certificate of sale was accordingly issued in its favor.
10
On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said properties; but
respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of petitioner.

On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition, stating among other things, that subject motion
is improper and premature because it treats of matters foreign to the insolvency proceedings; and premature, for
the reason that the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought to the jurisdiction
of the insolvency court for the determination of the assets of the insolvents available for distribution to the approved
credits/liabilities of the insolvents. Petitioners-creditors theorized that the insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction to
grant the motion referring to matters involved in a case pending before a coordinate court in another jurisdiction
(Annex "l").

Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court came out with its assailed extended order with the
following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the aforequoted order issued in pursuance of a similar motion of
the movant, the Court denies, as it is hereby denied the motion of Radiola-Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs
the latter to participate in the supposed meeting of all the creditors/claimants presided by the duly elected assignee.
(Annex "J").

On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. (RTPI, for short) filed a petition
forcertiorari and mandamus with respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March 31, 1986, denied petitioner's aforesaid
petition. On April 19, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated July 1, 1986.

Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues —

1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF

JURISDICTION ONLY; and

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE THE LIEN OF PETITIONER ARISING
FROM A LEVY OF ATTACHMENT NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the
insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.

On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended), provides:

Sec. 32 — As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the clerk of the court shall, by an
instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all the real and personal
property, estate, and effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, and such
assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, and shall relate back to the
acts upon the adjudication was founded, and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such property, estate, and
effects in the assignee, although the same is then attached on mesne process, as the property of the debtor. Such
assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from
execution. It shall dissolve any attachment levied within one month next preceding the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any action commenced within thirty days
immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered by
default or consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
11
Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are undisputed that the levy on attachment
against the subject properties of the Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case
No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980 while the insolvency proceeding in the then Court of First Instance of Angeles
City, Special Proceeding No. 1548, was commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more than four (4) months after the
issuance of the said attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner contends that its lien on the subject properties
overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.

Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law, which reads:

Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in
insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit
was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs and
disbursements of the suit, and of the keeping of the property, and the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.

and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the proceedings in the insolvent case, argue that
the subsequent Certificate of Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject properties, was
issued in bad faith, in violation of the law and is not equitable for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and pursuant
to the above quoted Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer of the subject properties in its name.

Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of the above-quoted Section 32, of the Insolvency Law
is very clear — that attachments dissolved are those levied within one (1) month next preceding the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated and set aside are judgments entered in any
action, including judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor, where the action was filed within thirty (30)
days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut off period —
one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the
insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand, relied upon by private respondents, provides for the right of
the plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is
dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was commenced is
proved against the estate of the debtor. Therefore, there is no conflict between the two provisions.

But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a
construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut
maqis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute — its
every word. Hence, where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such
reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious
with each other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, p. 182).

Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the petitioner be considered as a fraudulent
transfer or preference by the insolvent debtors, which constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency Law. In the
case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines (100 Phil. 187, [1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70
contemplate only acts and transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside of the 30-day period cannot possibly be considered as coming
within the orbit of their operation.

Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never placed under the jurisdiction of
respondent insolvency court so as to be made available for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in
the insolvency proceedings.

Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the attachment and execution of Civil Case
No. 35946 of the CFI of Rizal constitutes a freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the former which were
not within its jurisdiction; undeniably, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, correctable
by certiorari.

12
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and SET
ASIDE. The attachment and execution sale in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given due course
and petitioner's ownership of subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered consolidated.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102377 July 5, 1996

ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA SAJONAS, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO A. PILARES, SHERIFF ROBERTO GARCIA OF QUEZON CITY and
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:p

A word or group of words conveys intentions. When used truncatedly, its meaning disappears and breeds conflict.
Thus, it is written -- "By thy words shalt thou be justified, and by thy words shalt thou be condemned." (Matthew,
12:37)

Construing the new words of a statute separately is the raison d'etre of this appeal.

Essentially, the case before us is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on Execution from a
certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription was caused to be made by the private
respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of
the spouses Ernesto B. Uychocde and Lucita Jarin, and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the same registry, issued in the name of the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and
Conchita H. Sajonas, who purchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this
case.

The facts are not disputed, and are hereby reproduced as follows:

On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of residential land
located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas on installment basis as
evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated September 22, 1983. The property was registered in the names of the
Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. On August 27, 1984, the
Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the
subject property, which was inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes
executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984.
The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after, or on August 28, 1985.

Meanwhile, it appears that Domingo Pilares (defendant-appellant) filed Civil Case No. Q-28850 for collection of sum
of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25, 1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the parties
in the said case under which Ernesto Uychocde acknowledged his monetary obligation to Domingo Pilares
amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay the same in. two years from June 25, 1980. When Uychocde failed to
comply with his undertaking in the compromise agreement, defendant-appellant Pilares move d for the issuance of
a writ of execution to enforce the decision based on the compromise agreement, which the court granted in its order
dated August 3, 1982. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on August 12, 1982 by the CFI of Quezon City
where the civil case was pending. Pursuant to the order of execution dated August 3, 1982, a notice of levy on
execution was issued on February 12, 1985, On February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon

13
City presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was
annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.

When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4, 1984 was registered on August 28, 1985, TCT No. N-79073
was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was issued in the name of the Sajonas couple. The notice of
levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried over to the new title. On October 21, 1985, the
Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the sheriff of Quezon city, hence the auction sale of the subject
property did not push through as scheduled.

On January 10, 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution upon
defendant-appellant Pilares, through a letter to their lawyer, Atty. Melchor Flores. Despite said demand, defendant-
appellant Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation. In view thereof, plaintiffs-appellees filed this
complaint dated January 11, 1986 on February 5, 1986. 1

The Sajonases filed their complaint 2 in the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 71, against Domingo Pilares, the
judgment creditor of the Uychocdes. The relevant portion of the complaint alleges:

7. That at the time the notice of levy was annotated by the defendant, the Uychocde spouses, debtors of the
defendant, have already transferred, conveyed and assigned all their title, rights and interests to the plaintiffs and
there was no more title, rights or interests therein which the defendant could levy upon;

8. That the annotation of the levy on execution which was carried over to the title of said plaintiffs is illegal and
invalid and was made in utter bad faith, in view of the existence of the Adverse Claim annotated by the plaintiffs on
the corresponding title of the Uychocde spouses;

9. That a demand was made by the plaintiffs upon the defendant Domingo A. Pilares, to cause the cancellation of
the said notice of levy but the latter, without justifiable reason and with the sole purpose of harassing and
embarrassing the plaintiffs ignored and refused plaintiffs' demand;

10. That in view of the neglect, failure and refusal of the defendant to cause the cancellation of the notice of levy on
execution, the plaintiffs were compelled to litigate and engage the services of the undersigned counsel, to protect
their rights and interests, for which they agreed to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000 and appearance
fees of P500 per day in court. 3

Pilares filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim 4 on March 8, 1986, raising special and affirmative defenses, the
relevant portions of which are as follows:

10. Plaintiff has no cause of action against herein defendants;

11. Assuming without however admitting that they filed an adverse claim against the property covered by TCT No.
79073 registered under the name of spouses Ernesto Uychocde on August 27, 1984, the same ceases to have any
legal force and effect (30) days thereafter pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. 1529;

12 The Notice of Levy annotated at the back of TCT No. 79073 being effected pursuant to the Writ of Execution
dated August 31, 1982, duly issued by the CFI (now RTC) of Quezon proceeding from a decision rendered in Civil
Case No. 28859 in favor of herein defendant against Ernesto Uychocde, is undoubtedly proper and appropriate
because the property is registered in the name of the judgment debtor and is not among those exempted from
execution;

13. Assuming without admitting that the property subject matter of this case was in fact sold by the registered owner
in favor of the herein plaintiffs, the sale is the null and void (sic) and without any legal force and effect because it
was done in fraud of a judgment creditor, the defendant Pilares. 5
14
Pilares likewise sought moral and exemplary damages in a counterclaim against the Sajonas spouses. The parties
appeared at pre-trial proceedings on January 21, 1987, 6 after which, trial on the merits ensued.

The trial court rendered its decision on February 15, 1989. 7 It found in favor of the Sajonas couple, and ordered the
cancellation of the Notice of Levy from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417.

The court a quo stated, thus:

After going over the evidence presented by the parties, the court finds that although the title of the subject matter of
the Notice of Levy on Execution was still in the name of the Spouses Uychocde when the same was annotated on
the said title, an earlier Affidavit of Adverse of claim was annotated on the same title by the plaintiffs who earlier
bought said property from the Uychocdes.

It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction (Guidote vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442) that actual notice of an adverse claim
is equivalent to registration and the subsequent registration of the Notice of Levy could not have any legal effect in
any respect on account of prior inscription of the adverse claim annotated on the title of the Uychocdes.

xxx xxx xxx

On the issue of whether or not plaintiffs are buyers in good faith of the property of the spouses Uychocde even
notwithstanding the claim of the defendant that said sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors,
the Court finds that the evidence in this instance is bare of any indication that said plaintiffs as purchasers had
notice beforehand of the claim of the defendant over said property or that the same is involved in a litigation
between said spouses and the defendant. Good faith is the opposite of fraud and bad faith, and the existence of
any bad faith must be established by competent proof. 8 (Cai vs. Henson, 51 Phil 606)

xxx xxx xxx

In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Pilares, as
follows:

1. Ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Levy on Execution annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-
109417.

2. Ordering said defendant to pay the amount of P5,000 as attorney's fees.

3. Dismissing the Counterclaim interposed by said defendant.

Said defendant is likewise ordered to pay the costs.

Dissatisfied, Pilares appealed to the Court of Appeals", assigning errors on the part of the lower court. The appellate
court reversed the lower court's decision, and upheld the annotation of the levy on execution on the certificate of
title, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated February 15, 1989 is reversed and set aside and this
complaint is dismissed.

Costs against the plaintiffs-appellees. 10

The Sajonas couple are now before us, on a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 11 praying inter alia to set aside the
Court of Appeals' decision, and to reinstate that of the Regional Trial Court

15
Private respondent filed his Comment 12 on March 5, 1992, after which, the parties were ordered to file their respective
Memoranda. Private respondent complied thereto on April 27, 1994 13, while petitioners were able to submit their
Memorandum on September 29, 1992. 14

Petitioner assigns the following as errors of the appellate court, to wit:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULE ON THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR ADVERSE CLAIM
UNDER SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IS ABSOLUTE INASMUCH AS IT FAILED TO READ OR CONSTRUE
THE PROVISION IN ITS ENTIRETY AND TO RECONCILE THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY WITHIN THE
PROVISION IN ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO IT AS A WHOLE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IN SUCH WISE ON THE
GROUND THAT IT VIOLATES PETITIONERS' SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

Primarily, we are being asked to ascertain who among the parties in suit has a better right over the property in
question. The petitioners derive their claim from the right of ownership arising from a perfected contract of absolute
sale between them and the registered owners of the property, such right being attested to by the notice of adverse
claim 15 annotated on TCT No. N-79073 as early as August 27, 1984. Private respondent on the other hand, claims the
right to levy on the property, and have it sold on execution to satisfy his judgment credit, arising from Civil Case No. Q-
28850 16 against the Uychocdes, from whose title, petitioners derived their own.

Concededly, annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece
of real property where the registration of such interest or right not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration
Act or Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves a warning to third parties dealing
with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or a better right than that of the registered
owner thereof. Such notice is registered by filing a sworn statement with the Register of Deeds of the province
where the property is located, setting forth the basis of the claimed right together with other dates pertinent
thereto. 17

The registration of an adverse claim is expressly recognized under Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529. *

Noting the changes made in the terminology of the provisions of the law, private respondent interpreted this to
mean that a Notice of Adverse Claim remains effective only for a period of 30 days from its annotation, and does
not automatically lose its force afterwards. Private respondent further maintains that the notice of adverse claim was
annotated on August 27, 1984, hence, it will be effective only up to September 26, 1984, after which it will no longer
have any binding force and effect pursuant to Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, the sale in favor of the petitioners
by the Uychocdes was made in order to defraud their creditor (Pilares), as the same was executed subsequent to
their having defaulted in the payment of their obligation based on a compromise
agreement. 18

The respondent appellate court upheld private respondents' theory when it ruled:

The above staled conclusion of the lower court is based on the premise that the adverse claim filed by plaintiffs-
appellees is still effective despite the lapse of 30 days from the date of registration. However, under the provisions
of Section 70 of P.D. 1529, an adverse claim shall be effective only for a period of 30 days from the date of its
registration. The provision of this Decree is clear and specific.

xxx xxx xxx

16
It should be noted that the adverse claim provision in Section 110 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) does not
provide for a period of effectivity of the annotation of an adverse claim. P.D. No. 1529, however, now specifically
provides for only 30 days. If the intention of the law was for the adverse claim to remain effective until cancelled by
petition of the interested party, then the aforecited provision in P.D. No. 1529 stating the period of effectivity would
not have been inserted in the law.

Since the adverse claim was annotated On August 27, 1984, it was effective only until September 26, 1984. Hence,
when the defendant sheriff annotated the notice of levy on execution on February 12, 1985, said adverse claim was
already ineffective. It cannot be said that actual or prior knowledge of the existence of the adverse claim on the
Uychocdes' title is equivalent to registration inasmuch as the adverse claim was already ineffective when the notice
of levy on execution was annotated. Thus, the act of defendant sheriff in annotating the notice of levy on execution
was proper and justified.

The appellate court relied on the rule of statutory construction that Section 70 is specific and unambiguous and
hence, needs no interpretation nor construction. 19 Perforce, the appellate court stated, the provision was clear enough
to warrant immediate enforcement, and no interpretation was needed to give it force and effect. A fortiori, an adverse
claim shall be effective only for a period of thirty (30) days from the date of its registration, after which it shall be without
force and effect. Continuing, the court further stated;

. . . clearly, the issue now has been reduced to one of preference -- which should be preferred between the notice of
levy on execution and the deed of absolute sate. The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on September 4, 1984,
but was registered only on August 28, 1985, while the notice of levy on execution was annotated six (6) months
prior to the registration of the sale on February 12, 1985.

In the case of Landig vs. U.S. Commercial Co., 89 Phil. 638 Commere it was held that where a sale is recorded
later than an attachment, although the former is of an earlier date, the sale must give way to the attachment on the
ground that the act of registration is the operative act to affect the land. A similar ruling was restated in Campillo
vs. Court of Appeals (129 SCRA 513).

xxx xxx xxx

The reason for these rulings may be found in Section 51 of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, which provides as follows:

Sec. 1. Conveyance and other dealings by the registered owner. -- An owner of registered land may convey,
mortgage, lease, charge, otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of
deeds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease or
other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority
to the Register Deeds to make of registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land in so far as third persons are
concerned and in all cases under the Decree, the registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds
for the province or city where the land lies. (Emphasis supplied by the lower court.)

Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon
the land. A person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of
the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the
register or certificate of title. 20

Although we have relied on the foregoing rule, in many cases coming before us, the same, however, does not fit in
the case at bar. While it is the act of registration which is the operative act which conveys or affects the land insofar
17
as third persons are concerned, it is likewise true, that the subsequent sale of property covered by a Certificate of
Title cannot prevail over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of title previous to the
sale. 21 While it is true that under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree, deeds of conveyance of property
registered under the system, or any interest therein only take effect as a conveyance to bind the land upon its registration,
and that a purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates in quest for any
hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto, nonetheless, this rule is not absolute. Thus,
one who buys from the registered owner need not have to look behind the certificate of title, he is, nevertheless, bound by
the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon. One who buys without checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and
losses consequent to such failure. 22

In PNB vs. Court of Appeals, we held that "the subsequent sale of the property to the De Castro spouses cannot
prevail over the adverse claim of Perez, which was inscribed on the bank' s certificate of title on October 6, 1958.
That should have put said spouses on notice, and they can claim no better legal right over and above that of Perez.
The TCT issued in the spouses' names on July, 1959 also carried the said annotation of adverse claim.
Consequently, they are not entitled to any interest on the price they paid for the property. 23

Then again, in Gardner vs. Court of Appeals, we said that "the statement of respondent court in its resolution of
reversal that 'until the validity of an adverse claim is determined judicially, it cannot be considered a flaw in the
vendor's title' contradicts the very object of adverse claims. As stated earlier, the annotation of an adverse claim is a
measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property, and serves as a notice and
warning to third parties dealing with said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or has a better
right than the registered owner thereof. A subsequent sale cannot prevail over the adverse claim which was
previously annotated in the certificate of title over the property. 24

The question may be posed, was the adverse claim inscribed in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 still in
force when private respondent caused the notice of levy on execution to be registered and annotated in the said
title, considering that more than thirty days had already lapsed since it was annotated?

This is a decisive factor in the resolution of this instant case.

If the adverse claim was still in effect, then respondents are charged with knowledge of pre-existing interest over
the subject property, and thus, petitioners are entitled to the cancellation of the notice of levy attached to the
certificate of title.

For a definitive answer to this query, we refer to the law itself. Section 110 of Act 496 or the Land Registration Act
reads:

Sec. 110. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered lands adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Act for registering the
same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired,
and a reference to the volume and page of the certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the
land in which the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and designate a
place at which all notices may be served upon him. The statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse
claim, and the court, upon a petition of any party in interest, shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the
validity of such adverse claim and shall enter such decree therein as justice and equity may require. If the claim is
adjudged to be invalid, the registration shall be cancelled. If in any case, the court after notice and hearing shall find
that a claim thus registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax the adverse claimant double or treble the costs in
its discretion."

18
The validity of the above-mentioned rules on adverse claims has to be reexamined in the light of the changes
introduced by P.D. 1529, which provides:

Sec . 70 Adverse Claim -- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner,
arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this decree for
registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under
whom acquired, a reference to the number of certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered
owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.

The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and a place at which
all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the
certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After
the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor
by the party in-interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same
ground shall be registered by the same claimant.

Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where
the land is situated for the cancellation the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the
question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the
adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court,
after notice and hearing shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an
amount not less than one thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of
thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that
effect. (Emphasis ours).

In construing the law aforesaid, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect and a construction that
could render a provision inoperative should be avoided, and inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a harmonious whole. 25 For taken in solitude, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite
different from the one actually intended and evident when a word or phrase is considered with those with which it is
associated." 26 In ascertaining the period of effectivity of an inscription of adverse claim, we must read the law in its
entirety. Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:

The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration."

At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But
the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence
following, which reads:

After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition
therefor by the party in interest.

If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days,
then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no
adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not
have required the party in interest to do a useless act.

A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately, but in its relation to the statute's totality. Each statute
must, in fact, be construed as to harmonize it with the pre-existing body of laws. Unless clearly repugnant,
provisions of statutes must be reconciled. The printed pages of the published Act, its history, origin, and its
purposes may be examined by the courts in their construction. 27 An eminent authority on the subject matter states the
rule candidly:

19
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts sections, and is animated by one general purpose and intent.
Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part section so as to
produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to confine its intention to the one section construed. It is always an
unsafe way of construing a statute or contract to divide it by a process of etymological dissection, into separate
words, and then apply to each, thus separated from the context, some particular meaning to be attached to any
word or phrase usually to be ascertained from the as context. 28

Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the portions of the law
such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition would serve to qualify the provision on
the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still
necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon
the property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its
cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless ceremony. 29

It should be noted that the law employs the phrase "may be cancelled", which obviously indicates, as inherent in its
decision making power, that the court may or not order the cancellation of an adverse claim, nothwitstanding such
provision limiting the effectivity of an adverse claim for thirty days from the date of registration. The court cannot be
bound by such period as it would be inconsistent with the very authority vested in it. A fortiori, the limitation on the
period of effectivity is immaterial in determining the validity or invalidity of an adverse claim which is the principal
issue to be decided in the court hearing. It will therefore depend upon the evidence at a proper hearing for the court
to determine whether it will order the cancellation of the adverse claim or not. 30

To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification limited to thirty days
defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of an inscription of adverse claim, as the
annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece of real
property where the registration of such interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or
Act 496 (now P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with
said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the registered owner thereof. 31

The reason why the law provides for a hearing where the validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is to
afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to be heard, providing a venue where the propriety of his claimed
interest can be established or revoked, all for the purpose of determining at last the existence of any encumbrance
on the title arising from such adverse claim. This is in line with the provision immediately following:

Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim shall be registered by the same claimant.

Should the adverse claimant fail to sustain his interest in the property, the adverse claimant will be precluded from
registering a second adverse claim based on the same ground.

It was held that "validity or efficaciousness of the claim may only be determined by the Court upon petition by an
interested party, in which event, the Court shall. order the immediate hearing thereof and make the proper
adjudication a justice and equity may warrant. And it is only when such claim is found unmeritorious that the
registration of the adverse claim may be cancelled, thereby protecting the interest of the adverse claimant and
giving notice and warning to third parties". 32

In sum, the disputed inscription of an adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 was still in effect
on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on execution thereto.
Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon the execution was
encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy
cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners. This can
be deduced from the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, to wit:

20
Sec. 16. Effect of levy on execution as to third persons -- The levy on execution shall create a lien in favor of the
judgment creditor over the right, title and interest of the judgment debtor in such property at the time of the
levy, subject to liens or encumbrances then existing. (Emphasis supplied)

To hold otherwise would be to deprive petitioners of their property, who waited a long time to complete payments on
their property, convinced that their interest was amply protected by the inscribed adverse claim.

As lucidly observed by the trial court in the challenged decision:

True, the foregoing section provides that an adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date
of registration. Does this mean however, that the plaintiffs thereby lost their right over the property in question?
Stated in another, did the lapse of the thirty day period automatically nullify the contract to sell between the plaintiffs
and the Uychocdes thereby depriving the former of their vested right over the property?

It is respectfully submitted that it did not. 33

As to whether or not the petitioners are buyers in good faith of the subject property, the same should be made to
rest on the findings of the trial court. As pointedly observed by the appellate court, "there is no question that
plaintiffs-appellees were not aware of the pending case filed by Pilares against Uychocde at the time of the sale of
the property by the latter in their favor. This was clearly elicited from the testimony of Conchita Sajonas, wife of
plaintiff, during cross-examination on April 21, 1988". 34

ATTY. REYES.

Q Madam Witness, when Engr. Uychocde and his wife offered to you and your husband the property subject matter
of this case, they showed you the owner's transfer certificate, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q That was shown to you the very first time that this lot was offered to you for sale?

A Yes.

Q After you were shown a copy of the title and after you were informed that they are desirous in selling the same,
did you and your husband decide to buy the same?

A No, we did not decide right after seeing the title. Of course, we visited. . .

Q No, you just answer my question. You did not immediately decide?

A Yes.

Q When did you finally decide to buy the same?

A After seeing the site and after verifying from the Register of Deeds in Marikina that it is free from encumbrances,
that was the time we decided.

Q How soon after you were offered this lot did you verify the exact location and the genuineness of the title, as soon
after this was offered to you?

A I think it' s one week after they were offered. 35

21
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys property of another without notice that some other person
has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or
before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. 36 Good faith consists in an honest
intention to abstain from taking an unconscientious advantage of another, 37 Thus, the claim of the private respondent
that the sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors has no basis in fact, there being no evidence that
the petitioners had any knowledge or notice of the debt of the Uychocdes in favor of the private respondent, nor of any
claim by the latter over the Uychocdes' properties or that the same was involved in any litigation between said spouses
and the private respondent. While it may be stated that good faith is presumed, conversely, bad faith must be established
by competent proof by the party alleging the same. Sans such proof, the petitioners are deemed to be purchasers in good
faith, and their interest in the subject property must not be disturbed.

At any rate, the Land Registration Act (Property Registration Decree) guarantees to every purchaser of registered
land in good faith that they can take and hold the same free from any and all prior claims, liens an encumbrances
except those set forth on the Certificate of Title and those expressly mentioned in the ACT as having been reserved
against it. Otherwise, the efficacy of the conclusiveness of the Certificate of Title which the Torrens system seeks to
insure would be futile and nugatory. 38

ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 17, 1991 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court dated February 15, 1989 finding for the
cancellation of the notice of levy on execution from Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 is hereby
REINSTATED.

The inscription of the notice of levy On execution on TCT No. N-109417 is hereby CANCELLED.

Costs against private respondent. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-6379 September 29, 1954

In the matter of the petition of WILFRED UYTENGSU to be admitted a citizen of the Philippine. WILFRED
UYTENGSU, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Manuel A. Zosa for appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Isidro C. Borromeo for appellant.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an appeal taken by the Solicitor General from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, granting the
application of Wilfred Uytengsu, for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines.

The main facts are not disputed. Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental
on October 6, 1927. He began his primary education at the Saint Theresa's College in said municipality
Subsequently, he attended the Little Flower of Jesus Academy, then the San Carlos College and, still later the
Siliman University — all in the same locality — where he completed the secondary course. Early in 1946, he
studied, for one semester, in the Mapua Institute of Technology, in Manila. Soon after, he went to the United States,
where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California, and was
graduated, in 1950, with the degree of Bachelor of Science. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines
for four (4) months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present application for naturalization was filed.
Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took a post-graduate course, in chemical engineering, in another
educational institution, in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to the

22
Philippines until October 13, 1951. Hence, the hearing of the case, originally scheduled to take place on July 12,
1951, had to be postponed on motion of counsel for the petitioner.

The only question for the determination in this appeal is whether or not the application for naturalization may be
granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did
not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. The Court of First Instance of Cebu
decided this question in the affirmative and accordingly rendered judgment for the petitioner. The Solicitor General,
who maintains the negative, has appealed from said judgment.

Section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 reads as follows:

Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a petition in triplicate,
accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name and surname, his present and former
place of residence; his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single or married and if the father of
children, the name, age birthplace and residence of the wife and of each of the children; the approximate date of his
arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which
he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not
disqualified for naturalization under the provision of this Act; that he has complied with the requirements of section
five of this Act, and that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to
the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship ..." (Emphasis supplied.)

In conformity with this provision, petitioner stated in paragraph 13 of his application:

. . . I will reside continuously in the Philippine from the date of the filing of my petition up to the time of my admission
to Philippine citizenship. (Record on Appeal, page 3.)

Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word "residence", as used in the aforesaid provision of the
Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost by physical absence, until
another domicile is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be domiciled in, and hence a resident of
the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States, at that time, being merely to study therein.

It should be noted that to become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization, one must reside therein for not less
than 10 years, except in some special cases, in which 5 years of residence is sufficient (sections 2 and 3,
Commonwealth Act No. 473). Pursuant to the provision above quoted, he must, also, file an application stating
therein, among other things, that he "has the qualifications required" by law. Inasmuch as these qualifications
include the residence requirement already referred to, it follows that the applicant must prove that he is a residence
of the Philippines at the time, not only of the filing of the application, but, also, of its hearing. If the residence thus
required is the actual or constructive permanent home, otherwise known as legal residence or domicile, then the
applicant must be domiciled in the Philippines on both dates. Consequently, when section 7 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473 imposes upon the applicant the duty to state in his sworn application "that he will reside continuously in the
Philippines" in the intervening period, it can not refer merely to the need of an uninterrupted domicile or legal
residence, irrespective of actual residence, for said legal residence or domicile is obligatory under the law, even in
the absence of the requirement contained in said clause, and, it is well settled that, whenever possible, a legal
provision must not be so construed as to be a useless surplusage, and, accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of
adding nothing to the law or having no effect whatsoever thereon. This consequences may be avoided only by
construing the clause in question as demanding actual residence in the Philippines from the filing of the petition for
naturalization to its determination by the court.

Indeed, although the words "residence" and "domicile" are often used interchangeably, each has, in strict legal
parlance, a meaning distinct and different from that of the other.

xxx xxx xxx

23
. . . There is a decided preponderance of authority to the effect that residence and domicile are notsynonymous in
connection with citizenship, jurisdiction, limitations, school privileges, probate and succession.

. . . the greater or less degree of permanency contemplated or intended furnishes a clue to the sometimes shadowy
distinction between residence and domicile. To be a resident one must be physically present in that place for a
longer or shorter period of time. "The essential distinction between residence and domicile is this: the first involves
the intent to leave when the purpose for which he has taken up his abode ceases; the other has no such intent, the
abiding is animo manendi. One may seek a place for purposes of pleasure, of business, or of health. If his intent be
to remain it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is accomplished, it is his
residence. Perhaps the most satisfactory definition is that one is a resident of a place from which his departure is in
indefinite as to time, definite as to purpose; and for this purpose he has made the place his temporary home.

For many legal purposes there is a clear distinction between "residence" and "domicile". A person may hold an
office or may have business or employment or other affair which requires him to reside at a particular place. His
intention is to remain there while the office or business or employment or other concern continues; but he has no
purpose to remain beyond the time the interest exists which determines his place of abode. Domicile is
characterized by the animus manendi. . . . .

Residence and domicile are not to be held synonymous. Residence is an act. Domicile is an act coupled with an
intent. A man may have a residence in one state or country and his domicile in another, and he may be a
nonresident of the date of his domicile in the sense that his place of actual residence is not there. Hence the great
weight of authorities. — rightly so, as we think — that a debtor, although his legal domicile is in the state, may
reside or remain out of it for so long a time and under such circumstances as to acquire so to speak, an actual
nonresidence within the meaning of the attachment statute.

Domicile is a much broader term than residence. A man may have his domicile in one state and actually reside in
another, or in a foreign country. If he has once had a residence in a particular place and removed to another, but
with the intention of returning after a certain time, however long that may be, his domicile is at the former residence
and his residence at the place of his temporary habitation. Residence and habitation are generally regarded as
synonymous. A resident and an inhabitant mean the same thing. A person resident is defined to be one "dwelling
and having his abode in any place," "an inhabitant," "one that resides in a place." The question of domicile is not
involved in determining whether a person is a resident of a state or country. The compatability of domicile in one
state with actual residence in another has been asserted and acted upon in the law of attachment by the Courts of
New York, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, Mississippi and Wisconsin.

Residence indicates permanency of occupation, distinct from lodging or boarding, or temporary occupation . It does
not include as much as domicile, which requires intention combined with residence." ... "one may seek a place for
purposes of pleasure, of business, or of health. If his intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent be to
leave as soon as his purpose is accomplished, it is his residence."

The derivation of the two words "residence" and "domicile" fairly illustrates the distinction in their meaning. A home
(domus) is something more than a temporary place of remaining (residendi) however long such stay may continue.

"While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the same thing, residence combined with
intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode, fixed permanently for a time [!] for business or
other purposes, constitutes a residence, though there may be an intent, existing all the while, to return to the true
domicile."

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate the place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another." "Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one

24
domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of
residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means necessarily as, since no length of residence
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile. (Kennan on Residence and Domicile, pp. 26, 31-35)

Such distinction was, in effect, applied by this Court in the case of Domingo Dy, alias William Dy Chinco vs.
Republic of the Philippines (92 Phil., 278). The applicant in that case was born in Naga, Camarines Sur, on May 19,
1915. "At the age of seven or eight, or in the year 1923, he went to China, with his mother to study, and while he
used to go back and forth from China to the Philippines during school vacations, he did not come back to live
permanently here until the year 1937." He applied for naturalization in 1949. The question arose whether, having
been domiciled in the Philippines for over 30 years, he could be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines, without a
previous declaration of intention, in view of section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 535), exempting from such requirement "those who have resided in the Philippines
continuously for a period of thirty years or more, before filing their application." This Court decided the question in
the negative, upon that ground that "actual and substantial residence within the Philippines, not legal residence", or
"domicile," alone, is essential to the enjoyment of the benefits of said exemption.

If said actual and substantial residence — not merely legal residence — is necessary to dispense with the filing of a
declaration of intention, it is even more necessary during the period intervening from the filing of the petition for
naturalization to the date of the hearing thereof. In this connection, it should be remembered that, upon the filing of
said petition, the clerk of court is ordained by law to publish it with a notice of the date of the hearing, which
pursuant to section 7 of Act No. 2927, shall not be less than 60 days from the date of the last publication. This
period was extended to two (2) months, by section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and then to six (6) months, by
Republic Act No. 530. The purpose of said period, particularly the extensions thereof — of making a declaration of
intention at least one (1) year prior to the filing of the application — is not difficult to determine. It is nothing but to
give the government sufficient time to check the truth of the statements made in said declaration of intention, if any,
and in the application for naturalization, especially the allegations therein relative to the possession of the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law. Although data pertinent to said qualifications and
disqualifications could generally be obtained from persons familiar with the applicant, it is to be expected that the
information thus secured would consist, mainly, of conclusions and opinions of said individuals. Indeed, what else
can they be expected to say on whether the applicant has a good moral character; or whether he believes in the
principles underlying our Constitution; or whether his conduct has been proper and irreproachable; or whether he is
suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases, or has not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or
has not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos?
Obviously, the Government would be in a better position to draw its own conclusions on these matters if its officers
could personally observe the behavior of the applicant and confer with him if necessary.

In the case at bar, the Government has not had any chance whatsoever to thus keep a watchful eye on petitioner
herein. Immediately after the filing of his application — and notwithstanding the explicit promise therein made by
him, under oath, to the effect that he would reside continuously in the Philippines "from the date of the filing of his
petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship" — he returned to the United States, where he
stayed, continuously, until October 13, 1951. For this reason, when this case was called for hearing, for the first
time, on July 12, 1951, his counsel had to move for continuance. The adverse effect of such absence upon the
opportunity needed by the Government to observe petitioner herein was enhanced by the fact that, having been
born in the Philippines, where he finished his primary and secondary education, petitioner did not have to file, and
did not file, a declaration of intention prior to the filing of his petition for naturalization. Thus, the Government had no
previous notice of his intention to apply for naturalization until the filing of his petition and could not make the
requisite investigation prior thereto.

Moreover, considering that petitioner had stayed in the United States, practically without interruption, from early in
1947 to late in 1951, or for almost five (5) years, over three years and a half of which preceded the filing of the
application, it may be said that he resided — as distinguished from domiciled — in the United States at that time
and for over a year subsequently thereto. In fact, under our laws, residence for six (6) months suffices to entitle a
person to exercise the right of suffrage in a given municipality (section 98), Republic Act No. 180); residence for one
25
(1) year, to run for a seat in the House of Representatives (sec. 7, Art. VI, of the Constitution); and residence for two
(2) years, to run for the Senate (sec. 4, Art. VI, of the Constitution). In some states of the United States, a residence
of several weeks or months is enough to establish a domicile for purposes of divorce. Although in these cases the
word "residence" has been construed, generally, to mean "domicile" — that it to say, actual residence, coupled with
the intention to stay permanently, at least at the time of the acquisition of said domicile — it would seem apparent
from the foregoing that the length of petitioner's habitation in the United States amply justifies the conclusion that he
was residing abroad when his application for naturalization was filed and for fifteen (15) months thereafter, and that
this is precisely the situation sought to be forestalled by the law in enjoining the applicant to "reside continuously in
the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship,"
unless this legal mandate — which did not exist under Act No. 2927, and was advisedly inserted, therefore, by
section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 — were to be regarded as pure verbiage, devoid, not only, of any force or
effect, but, also, of any intent or purpose, as it would, to our mind, turn out to be, were we to adopt petitioner's
pretense.1âwphïl.nêt

In short, we are of the opinion that petitioner herein has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, and with the aforementioned promise made by him in his application, and, accordingly,
is not entitled, in the present proceedings, to a judgment in his favor. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed, and the case dismissed, with costs against the petitioner, but without prejudice to the filing of
another application, if he so desires, in conformity with law. It is so ordered.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Reyes, J.B.L., J., concur.

26