Sanidad vs. Comelec G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 Petitioners: Pablo C. Sanidad, Pablito V. Sanidad Respondents: Honorable Commission On Elections and Honorable National Treasurer Facts

SANIDAD vs.
COMELEC
G.R. No. L-44640
October 12, 1976
Petitioners: PABLO C. SANIDAD, PABLITO V. SANIDAD

Respondents: HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER
FACTS:
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a
national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his
present powers.
20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential
Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential
Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies)
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree
1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the same date of 22 September 1976,
the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's
continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such
body abolished and replaced through a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative
body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October
1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad,
father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to
declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission
on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October
1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution.
As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L44684,
was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that
the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is
expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M.
Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation
of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum Plebiscite of October 16.
ISSUE:
1. Whether question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 is
justiciable or political.
2. Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.
HELD:
1st issue: The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress-acting as a constituent assembly-violates
the Constitution is essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.
As defined therein, with extensive quotations from Tanada vs. Cuenco (103 Phil. 1051)
... the term 'political question' connotes, in legal parlance, what it means is that a question of policy in
matters concerning the government of a State, as a body politic. In other words, in the language of Corpus
Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislature or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.'
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on
whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations have been
respected, is justiciable or non-political, the bottom line of the problem being one of legality or validity
of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations -
particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would be set at nothing." (Javellana vs.
Executive Secretary, supra).
In the case presented, the basic issue is the constitutional validity of the presidential acts of proposing
amendments to the Constitution and of calling a referendum-plebiscite for the ratification of the
proposals made. Evidently, the question does not concern itself with the wisdom of the exercise of the
authority claimed or of the specific amendments proposed. Instead the inquiry vel non is focused solely
on the existence of the said power in the President - a question purely of legality determinable thru
interpretation and construction of the letter and spirit of the Constitution by the Court as the final
arbiter in the delineation of constitutional boundaries and the allocation of constitutional powers.
For the Court to shun cognizance of the challenge herein presented, especially in these parlous years,
would be to abdicate its constitutional powers, shirk its constitutional responsibility, and deny the
people their ultimate recourse for judicial determination.
2nd issue: No. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the
Constitution
Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments states:
(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon
a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention.
(2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention
or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate
in an election
Section 2 thereof provides that
Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment
or revision."
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions
is conferred with that amending power.
Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the
interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this
Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article XVI hereof."
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of
normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the
(1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National
Assembly.
However, the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an

election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition,
amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly
upon special call by the interim Prime Minister.
The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with
that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The
Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and
order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory
Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the
discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly.
In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was
submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In sensu striciore,
when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body
is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process.
Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the
Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National
Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While
ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional
conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction
is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The
distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any
proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies
only to the ordinary cases of legislation, not amendments.

Sanidad vs. Comelec G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 Petitioners: Pablo C. Sanidad, Pablito V. Sanidad Respondents: Honorable Commission On Elections and Honorable National Treasurer Facts

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Sanidad vs. Comelec G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 Petitioners: Pablo C. Sanidad, Pablito V. Sanidad Respondents: Honorable Commission On Elections and Honorable National Treasurer Facts

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Sanidad vs. Comelec G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 Petitioners: Pablo C. Sanidad, Pablito V. Sanidad Respondents: Honorable Commission On Elections and Honorable National Treasurer Facts

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SANIDAD vs.

Petitioners: PABLO C. SANIDAD, PABLITO V. SANIDAD

As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments states:

However, the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an

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