Kilayko v Tengco | G.R. No.

45425 March 27, 1992

Lizares v Tengco | G.R. No. 45965 March 27, 1992

Testator: Maria Lizares y Alunan; Eustaquia Lizares (intestate)

Beneficiary and relationship: niece, Eustaquia Lizares under Maria’s will; Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares as joint
administrators for the estate of Eustaquia who died intestate

Contesting Party and relationship: Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al (sisters of testator)

FACTS:

November 20, 1962 - the late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a "Testamento" (in Spanish). She died without any issue
leaving said "testamento" with her niece, Eustaquia Lizares. Eustaquia filed a petition for the settlement of the testate
estate of Maria Lizares y Alunan, before the CFI. The court declared the will probated and appointed Eustaquia as the
executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares.

Eustaquia filed a project of partition which was granted by the probate court. Simultaneously, said court declared the
heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in the project of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and
usufructuaries of the estate; adjudicated to them the properties respectively assigned to each and every one of them, and
ordered the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and Bacolod City to effect the corresponding transfer of the real
properties to said heirs as well as the transfer of shares, stocks, and dividends in different corporations, to the heirs and
legatees, and the closure of the testate proceedings of Maria Lizares.

Eustaquia filed a motion to reopen the testate proceedings in order that some properties of Maria Lizares which had been
omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her. The Court reopened the testate proceedings and adjudicated to Eustaquia
certain stocks, a revolving fund certificate, plantation credits and sugar quota allocations, and real or personal properties
of Maria Lizares which were not given by her to any other person in her last will and testament.

The heirs of Maria Lizares executed an agreement of partition and subdivision, terminating their co-ownership over
certain lots. A year later Eustaquia Lizares died single without any descendant. Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares were appointed
joint administrators of Eustaquia's intestate estate.

On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the will of Maria Lizares, which were
allegedly in the nature of a simple substitution, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., filed a motion to reopen once again the
testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed that the order granting the partition be reconsidered and
amended by declaring them as heirs; that the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, after such amendment, be ordered
to register at the back of their respective certificates of title, the order of probate and a "declaration" that movants are the
heirs of said properties, and issue new certificates of title in their names.

Intestate heirs of the deceased Eustaquia Lizares opposed the aforesaid motion. They alleged that the court had no more
jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares as the order of closure had long become final.

The Court denied the motion to reopen the testate proceedings and held that as the settlement of an estate is a
proceeding in rem, the judgment therein is binding against the whole world. The movants knew that the court had
jurisdiction over them, they did not take part in the proceedings nor did they appeal. Hence, they filed a complaint for
recovery of ownership and possession of real property against the administrators of the estate of Eustaquia Lizares,
Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares and filed a notice of lis pendens with the RD of Negros Occidental.

The joint administrators of the estate of the late Eustaquia Lizares filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. Respondent judge issued an order granting the motion for cancellation of notice
of lis pendens. The court simultaneously held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss the complaint.

Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the order granting the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens, the latter of which was denied by the lower court.

Upon receipt of a copy of said order, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review on certiorari, contending that the grounds of lis pendens, namely, that the properties are in custodia legis and the
lending institutions would not grant crop loans to the estate, are not the legal grounds provided for under the Rules of
Court for the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens.
Petitioners contend that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the civil case involving the interpretation of the will of
Maria Lizares, its implementation and/or the adjudication of her properties. They assert that the matter had been settled
and become final and unappealable long ago and therefore, the cause of action in the latter case was barred by the
principle of res judicata. They aver that the claim of Celsa, Encarnacion and Remedios, sisters of Maria Lizares, over the
properties left by their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had inherited by will from Maria Lizares, was groundless
because paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria's will on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. base their claim, conceived of a
fideicommissary substitution of heirs. Petitioners contend that said provisions of the will are not valid because under
Article 863 of the Civil code, they constitute an invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs.

The joint administrators filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction.

Both cases were consolidated.

ISSUES:

1. WON the lower court had no jurisdiction over the civil case involving the interpretation of the will of Maria Lizares, its
implementation and/or the adjudication of her properties

2. WON testamentary provisions contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the will of Maria Lizares, were in the nature of a
simple substitution

HELD:

The petition in G.R. No. L-45965 (joint administrators Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares) is impressed with merit.

In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law
enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the
whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a
will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.

Pertinent to the issue interposed by the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45965 is Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court which
reads:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance
to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on application of
the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the
estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may
demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession.
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such
time as the court directs.

Some decisions of the Court pertinent to the issue that the probate court has the jurisdiction to settle the claims of an
heir and the consequent adjudication of the properties, are worth mentioning. The court has previously held that any
challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir,
legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same
special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate
shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution
and adjudication of the property to the interested parties.

The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate, has the power to determine the proportion or
parts to which each distributee is entitled. A project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the heredity
estate which the court may accept or reject. It is the court that makes that distribution of the estate and determines the
persons entitled thereto.

In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares, the executrix,
Eustaquia Lizares submitted a project of partition in which the parcels of land, subject matters of the complaint for
reconveyance, were included as property of the estate and assigned exclusively to Eustaquia as a devisee of Maria Lizares.
In accordance with said project of partition which was approved by the probate court, the heirs executed an Agreement of
Partition and Subdivision, whereby they agreed to terminate their co-ownership over certain lots. These facts taken
altogether show that the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact
reaped the fruits thereof.

Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the guise of a complaint for
reconveyance. Thus, where a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that the inclusion
was affected through improper means or without petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said
title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition according
to the tenor of the partition. The question of private respondents title over the lots in question has been concluded by the
partition and became a closed matter.

The admission made by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. in their complaint, that Eustaquia had been in possession of the
questioned lots up to the time of her death indicates that the distribution pursuant to the decree of partition has already
been carried out. Moreover, when Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. moved for the reopening of the testate estate proceedings
of Maria Lizares, the judicial decree of partition and order of closure of such proceedings was already final and executory.
They cannot now be permitted to question the adjudication of the properties left by will of Maria Lizares, by filing an
independent action for the reconveyance of the very same properties subject of such partition.A final decree of distribution
of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it
should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in
rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution
and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant. The fundamental
principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue
more than once, that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. All the requisites for the existence of res
judicata are present. Thus, the order approving the distribution of the estate of Maria Lizares to the heirs instituted in
said will has become final and unappealable; the probate court that rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the parties; the judgment or orders had been rendered on the merits; the special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Maria Lizares was a proceeding in rem that was directed against the whole world including
Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., so that it can be said that there is a similarity of parties; there is identity of subject matter
involved in both actions, namely, the properties left by Maria Lizares; there is identity of causes of action because in the
first action there was a declaration of the probate court in its order that although the testatrix intended a fideicommissary
substitution in paragraphs 10 and 11 of her will, the substitution can have no effect because the requisites for it to be
valid, had not been satisfied.

Granting that res judicata has not barred the institution of the case brought by Kilayko, their contention that they are
conditional substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria Lizares is not meritorious. While the allegation of
the joint administrators that paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will and testament conceives of a
fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is also baseless as said paragraphs do not impose upon
Eustaquia a clear obligation to preserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may said paragraphs
be considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution.

It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and provides that if such heir should die a second
heir also designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should then be construed
as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art. 859 of the Civil Code but it shall be effective only if the first heir
dies before the testator. In this case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there
can be no substitution of heirs for, upon Maria Lizares' death, the properties involved unconditionally devolved upon
Eustaquia. Under the circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of Eustaquia by operation
of the law of intestacy.

With respect to the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the properties involved, there is no merit in the contention
of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., that the lower court acted contrary to law and/or gravely abused its discretion in
cancelling the notice of lis pendens. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice may be ordered by the court having
jurisdiction over it at any given time. In this case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of said notice on the principal
reason that the administrators of the properties involved are subject to the supervision of the court and the said
properties are under custodia legis. Therefore, such notice was not necessary to protect the rights of Celsa L. Vda. de
Kilayko, et al.