Tuazon v. Tuazon
Tuazon v. Tuazon
Tuazon v. Tuazon
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated
August 1, 2018 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 200115 (Adelaida Tuazon and the Heirs of Geronimo Tuazon,
namely: Mary Ann J. Tuazon, Ferdinand J. Tuazon, Madona J. Tuazon and
Edwin Tuazon v. Lydia Tuazon and Anunciacion Tuazon). — This is a petition for
review on certiorari 1 seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals' (CA) August 19, 2011
Decision 2 and January 10, 2012 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 91498. The CA reversed
the June 25, 2007 Decision 4 of Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
(RTC) in Civil Case No. 476-0-03 and dismissed the complaint for accion reivindicatoria
filed by Spouses Adelaida and Geronimo Tuazon (petitioners). 5
The dispute arose from the complaint captioned as an accion reivindicatoria led
by petitioners on October 14, 2003 with the RTC. 6 They alleged in the complaint that:
(1) they were the prior and actual lawful possessors and bonafide claimants of a parcel
of land identi ed as Lot No. 165, Ts-308 situated at No. 83-18th Street, East Bajac-
Bajac, Olongapo City from 1968 up to the present; (2) they also averred that Lydia
Tuazon (Lydia) and Anunciacion 7 Tuazon (respondents) unlawfully occupied and
withheld physical possession of a portion of Lot No. 165 containing an area of more or
less 73 square meters (property); (3) despite repeated demands to vacate the
premises, of which the last demand was made on December 1998, respondents
refused to do so, forcing petitioners to refer the matter to the barangay for resolution;
and (4) the parties failed to amicably settle the matter which led to the issuance of a
"certification to file" on February 18, 1999. 8 cHECAS
The RTC, in its two-paged Decision, granted the complaint. It ruled that
petitioners have established their possessory rights over the property:
After a careful reading of the documentary evidence submitted by the
plaintiffs consisting of decisions issued by courts of law involving the subject
property, this Court has come to the conclusion that indeed, the possessory
rights of the plaintiffs to the lot in question have been su ciently established.
This is clear from the Decision dated October 1, 1979 rendered by the former CFI
Zambales and Olongapo City, Branch 3; and the Decision in Civil Case No. 226-
0-84 rendered by the RTC Branch 74, Olongapo City that was subsequently
a rmed by the appellate court in CA G.R. CV No. 18985 issued on January 26,
1994. Such being so, plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the subject
lot through an accion reinvindicatoria. Anent the argument of the defendants
that the dispositive portions of the cited decisions by the plaintiff do not contain
any adjudication of rights in favor of the plaintiff, the Court nds such
contention misplaced considering that what is controlling is the body of the
decisions that spelled out in no uncertain terms the rights of the plaintiffs over
the lot in question. 1 6 (Italics in the original.)
The CA, however, granted respondents' appeal and dismissed the complaint. 1 7 It
observed that while the complaint was captioned as an accion reivindicatoria, the cause
of action, based on the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced, is
actually one for accion publiciana or for recovery of possession. 1 8 It also found that:
(1) petitioners are not the owners but merely holders of possessory rights; (2) more
than one year has elapsed from the date of the last demand; and (3) while petitioners
have established their possessory rights over the property, their cause of action has
prescribed considering that more than 10 years have lapsed from the formal demand
to vacate on November 29, 1982. 1 9
In this petition, petitioners argue that their cause of action is one for accion
reivindicatoria grounded on a bonafide claim of ownership based on just title and
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vested interest acquired over time. This, they claim, renders the application of the 10-
year prescriptive period under Article 555 of the Civil Code inapplicable as recovery of
ownership of real property, being a real action, prescribes in 30 years under Article
1141 of the Civil Code. In any case, petitioners maintain that the period for extinctive
prescription was interrupted by the series of litigations between the parties. 2 0 IDSEAH
However, we also agree with the CA that the action has prescribed and that
petitioners have already lost their real right of possession at the time of the ling of the
complaint on October 14, 2003.
To begin with, petitioners' claim that the prescriptive period for the action should
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be 30 years is misplaced. Article 1141 of the Civil Code explicitly states that real
actions over immovables prescribe after 30 years, without prejudice to what is
established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. Since
the action before us is one of accion publiciana, which seeks recovery of the real right
of possession, Article 1141 must be read in relation to established rules on
prescription governing the real right of possession. Article 555 (4) of the Civil Code
provides that, "the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years." It
is for this reason that we have time and again ruled that the remedy of accion
publiciana is no longer available after the lapse of 10 years from dispossession. 2 9
There is also no merit in petitioners' assertion that the prescriptive period should
be counted from the time of last demand in December 1998. This claim is based on the
erroneous belief that respondents' possession was converted into tolerance after Civil
Case No. 1558-0 became nal and executory, as what petitioners advanced in the
unlawful detainer cases they led against respondents. However, for the proper claim
of possession of tolerance, it is elementary that tolerance must be present at the
inception of the possession. 3 0 As aptly noted by the trial court in Civil Case No. 4229
(the second unlawful detainer case), "[petitioners] cannot be allowed to advance their
claim of tolerance on a [piecemeal] basis, taking into account that as early as May 17,
1983, when the earlier unlawful detainer case (Civil Case No. 2296) was led, they [have
already] been claiming tolerance." 3 1 To allow them to do so would result in the actions
of ejectment and accion publiciana never being barred by prescription at the whim of
petitioners.
On the contrary, we nd that the prescriptive period of 10 years is to be counted
from the time petitioners were dispossessed of the property in as early as 1968. Albeit
the exact date of when respondents occupied the property is not shown, records
disclose that at the time petitioners acquired their possessory rights by virtue of the
deed of transfer of possessory rights in 1968, respondents were already adversely
occupying the property since 1967. 3 2 This adverse occupation is further evidenced by
their initiation of Civil Case No. 1558-0 against petitioners on October 1, 1974. That this
adverse occupation continued despite nality of the Decision in that case is further
supported by petitioners' initiation of the unlawful detainer cases in 1983 and 1999,
which were both dismissed by the lower courts, as well as the present case. In which
case, from the time of respondents' adverse occupation since 1967, or even on
October 1, 1974, petitioners' real right of possession has been lost after the lapse of 10
years from either date.
We do not subscribe to the view that the series of litigation between the parties
tolled the prescriptive period. Article 1155 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the
"prescription of actions is interrupted when they are led before the court" and this
necessarily contemplates the same cause of action subject of the prescriptive period.
The cases led prior to this case referred to causes of action different from accion
publiciana. It is settled that ejectment cases involve a different cause of action from an
accion publiciana. 3 3 Also, while Civil Case No. 1558-0 is captioned as conveyance of
property, the cause of action of respondents in that case is actually the enforcement of
an implied trust. 3 4
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED . The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 19, 2011 and the Resolution dated January 10, 2012 are
AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED." Leonardo-De Castro, J. , designated as Acting Chairperson of
the First Division per Special Order No. 2559 dated May 11, 2018; Gesmundo, J. ,
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designated as Acting Member of the First Division per Special Order No. 2560 dated
May 11, 2018.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 7-31.
2. Id. at 43-53. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante with Associate Justices
Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Antonio L. Villamor, concurring.
3. Id. at 55-56.
4. Id. at 102-103. Penned by Judge Ramon S. Caguioa.
5. Id. at 52. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Decision
dated June 25, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74, in Civil
Case No. 476-0-03 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint before the RTC
of Olongapo City is DISMISSED.
22. Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815, 824-825.
23. Rollo, p. 10.
24. Bagunu v. Aggabao, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011, 655 SCRA 413, 423-425, 428-429.
25. Modesto v. Urbina, G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010, 633 SCRA 383, 393, citing Solis v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72486, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 267, 272.
26. Id.
27. See Espejo v. Malate, G.R. No. L-48612, January 27, 1983, 120 SCRA 269, 276-278.
28. Rollo, pp. 48-49.
29. Cutanda v. Heirs of Roberto Cutanda, G.R. No. 109215, July 11, 2000, 335 SCRA 418, 426-
427.
30. Flores-Cruz v. Goli-Cruz, G.R. No. 172217, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 545, 551.
31. Rollo, p. 95.
32. Id. at 94.
33. Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 500, 509.
34. Rollo, p. 82.