Tuazon v. Tuazon

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 200115. August 1, 2018.]

ADELAIDA TUAZON AND THE HEIRS OF GERONIMO TUAZON,


NAMELY: MARY ANN J. TUAZON, FERDINAND J. TUAZON, MADONA
J. TUAZON AND EDWIN TUAZON , petitioners, vs. LYDIA TUAZON AND
ANUNCIACION TUAZON , respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated
August 1, 2018 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 200115 (Adelaida Tuazon and the Heirs of Geronimo Tuazon,
namely: Mary Ann J. Tuazon, Ferdinand J. Tuazon, Madona J. Tuazon and
Edwin Tuazon v. Lydia Tuazon and Anunciacion Tuazon). — This is a petition for
review on certiorari 1 seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals' (CA) August 19, 2011
Decision 2 and January 10, 2012 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 91498. The CA reversed
the June 25, 2007 Decision 4 of Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City
(RTC) in Civil Case No. 476-0-03 and dismissed the complaint for accion reivindicatoria
filed by Spouses Adelaida and Geronimo Tuazon (petitioners). 5
The dispute arose from the complaint captioned as an accion reivindicatoria led
by petitioners on October 14, 2003 with the RTC. 6 They alleged in the complaint that:
(1) they were the prior and actual lawful possessors and bonafide claimants of a parcel
of land identi ed as Lot No. 165, Ts-308 situated at No. 83-18th Street, East Bajac-
Bajac, Olongapo City from 1968 up to the present; (2) they also averred that Lydia
Tuazon (Lydia) and Anunciacion 7 Tuazon (respondents) unlawfully occupied and
withheld physical possession of a portion of Lot No. 165 containing an area of more or
less 73 square meters (property); (3) despite repeated demands to vacate the
premises, of which the last demand was made on December 1998, respondents
refused to do so, forcing petitioners to refer the matter to the barangay for resolution;
and (4) the parties failed to amicably settle the matter which led to the issuance of a
"certification to file" on February 18, 1999. 8 cHECAS

Respondents denied the allegations. By way of a rmative defense, they alleged


that Lydia and her three sisters, now deceased, owned the subject parcel of land in
common, having purchased it using their own funds sometime in 1965. 9
After pre-trial, petitioners waived their right to present testimonial evidence.
Instead, they formally offered their documentary evidence which were all admitted by
the RTC, subject to their probative value. 1 0 These consisted of several decisions on
cases between the parties since 1974:
(1) Civil Case No. 1558-0 — an action for conveyance of property with
damages led by respondents against petitioners on October 1, 1974.
This was dismissed by the trial court on October 1, 1979, which declared
petitioners as the sole purchasers of the possessory right over the
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property; 1 1
(2) Civil Case No. 2296 — an action for unlawful detainer and damages led
by petitioners against respondents on May 17, 1983. The trial court
dismissed the case on May 21, 1986 due to the pendency of Civil Case No.
226-0-84 where the issue of possession is to be determined; 1 2
(3) Civil Case No. 226-0-84 — an action for speci c performance with
damages case led by respondents against petitioners on August 2, 1984
for the enforcement of a compromise agreement between the parties. The
trial court dismissed the case on February 8, 1988, on the ground that Civil
Case No. 1558-0 constituted res judicata on the issue; 1 3
(4) Civil Case No. 4229 — an action for unlawful detainer case led by
petitioners against respondents on March 8, 1999. The trial court
dismissed the case on April 10, 2000 for failure to establish a cause of
action. The case was led beyond the one year period reckoned from
November 29, 1982, "when plaintiffs have formally informed defendants of
their demand to vacate." 1 4
Respondents then moved for leave of court to le a demurrer to evidence or
motion to dismiss but the same was denied. Thereafter, respondents manifested that
they were no longer presenting evidence. Thus, the parties submitted their respective
memoranda. 1 5 AHDacC

The RTC, in its two-paged Decision, granted the complaint. It ruled that
petitioners have established their possessory rights over the property:
After a careful reading of the documentary evidence submitted by the
plaintiffs consisting of decisions issued by courts of law involving the subject
property, this Court has come to the conclusion that indeed, the possessory
rights of the plaintiffs to the lot in question have been su ciently established.
This is clear from the Decision dated October 1, 1979 rendered by the former CFI
Zambales and Olongapo City, Branch 3; and the Decision in Civil Case No. 226-
0-84 rendered by the RTC Branch 74, Olongapo City that was subsequently
a rmed by the appellate court in CA G.R. CV No. 18985 issued on January 26,
1994. Such being so, plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the subject
lot through an accion reinvindicatoria. Anent the argument of the defendants
that the dispositive portions of the cited decisions by the plaintiff do not contain
any adjudication of rights in favor of the plaintiff, the Court nds such
contention misplaced considering that what is controlling is the body of the
decisions that spelled out in no uncertain terms the rights of the plaintiffs over
the lot in question. 1 6 (Italics in the original.)
The CA, however, granted respondents' appeal and dismissed the complaint. 1 7 It
observed that while the complaint was captioned as an accion reivindicatoria, the cause
of action, based on the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced, is
actually one for accion publiciana or for recovery of possession. 1 8 It also found that:
(1) petitioners are not the owners but merely holders of possessory rights; (2) more
than one year has elapsed from the date of the last demand; and (3) while petitioners
have established their possessory rights over the property, their cause of action has
prescribed considering that more than 10 years have lapsed from the formal demand
to vacate on November 29, 1982. 1 9
In this petition, petitioners argue that their cause of action is one for accion
reivindicatoria grounded on a bonafide claim of ownership based on just title and
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vested interest acquired over time. This, they claim, renders the application of the 10-
year prescriptive period under Article 555 of the Civil Code inapplicable as recovery of
ownership of real property, being a real action, prescribes in 30 years under Article
1141 of the Civil Code. In any case, petitioners maintain that the period for extinctive
prescription was interrupted by the series of litigations between the parties. 2 0 IDSEAH

The issue here is whether petitioners' cause of action has prescribed.


We deny the petition.
At the outset, we nd that the CA correctly considered the action as one for
accion publiciana, a plenary action to determine and recover, the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. It is also used to refer to an ejectment suit
where the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more than one year and can no
longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. 2 1 An accion reivindicatoria
on the other hand, is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the
real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the
said ownership. 2 2
The property appears to be disposable land of the public domain whose
ownership belongs to the State. Petitioners do not dispute the public character of the
property, having alleged that they have a pending Miscellaneous Sales Application with
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 2 3 Under Section 4 of
the Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, the authority
to dispose public lands is primarily lodged with the Director of Lands (now Land
Management Bureau), subject to review by the DENR Secretary. Given the public
character of the property, it is the DENR which has primary jurisdiction to resolve any
conflicting claims of title over it. 2 4
Nonetheless, we have time and again ruled that "the power and authority given to
the Director of Lands to alienate and dispose of public lands does not divest the regular
courts of their jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or
applicants against others to protect their respective possessions and occupations." 2 5
Civil courts still have the ultimate power to resolve con icts of possession. 2 6
Consequently, the RTC may still determine who among the parties has the better right
of possession.
Here, the complaint su ciently alleged ultimate facts constitutive of an accion
publiciana. Petitioners alleged that they are holders of possessory rights over the
property, and that more than one year had lapsed from the date of last demand. While
they also claim ownership over the property, this allegation is a mere surplusage which
may be disregarded in light of the public character of the property. 2 7 Hence, the only
issue to be determined here is the possessory right over the property.
We agree with the RTC and CA that petitioners have established their right of
possession by virtue of Civil Case No. 1558-0. Petitioners were declared therein as the
sole purchasers of the possessory right over the property under a deed of transfer of
possessory right executed in 1968. This became nal and executory on September 11,
1981. 2 8 aCIHcD

However, we also agree with the CA that the action has prescribed and that
petitioners have already lost their real right of possession at the time of the ling of the
complaint on October 14, 2003.
To begin with, petitioners' claim that the prescriptive period for the action should
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be 30 years is misplaced. Article 1141 of the Civil Code explicitly states that real
actions over immovables prescribe after 30 years, without prejudice to what is
established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. Since
the action before us is one of accion publiciana, which seeks recovery of the real right
of possession, Article 1141 must be read in relation to established rules on
prescription governing the real right of possession. Article 555 (4) of the Civil Code
provides that, "the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years." It
is for this reason that we have time and again ruled that the remedy of accion
publiciana is no longer available after the lapse of 10 years from dispossession. 2 9
There is also no merit in petitioners' assertion that the prescriptive period should
be counted from the time of last demand in December 1998. This claim is based on the
erroneous belief that respondents' possession was converted into tolerance after Civil
Case No. 1558-0 became nal and executory, as what petitioners advanced in the
unlawful detainer cases they led against respondents. However, for the proper claim
of possession of tolerance, it is elementary that tolerance must be present at the
inception of the possession. 3 0 As aptly noted by the trial court in Civil Case No. 4229
(the second unlawful detainer case), "[petitioners] cannot be allowed to advance their
claim of tolerance on a [piecemeal] basis, taking into account that as early as May 17,
1983, when the earlier unlawful detainer case (Civil Case No. 2296) was led, they [have
already] been claiming tolerance." 3 1 To allow them to do so would result in the actions
of ejectment and accion publiciana never being barred by prescription at the whim of
petitioners.
On the contrary, we nd that the prescriptive period of 10 years is to be counted
from the time petitioners were dispossessed of the property in as early as 1968. Albeit
the exact date of when respondents occupied the property is not shown, records
disclose that at the time petitioners acquired their possessory rights by virtue of the
deed of transfer of possessory rights in 1968, respondents were already adversely
occupying the property since 1967. 3 2 This adverse occupation is further evidenced by
their initiation of Civil Case No. 1558-0 against petitioners on October 1, 1974. That this
adverse occupation continued despite nality of the Decision in that case is further
supported by petitioners' initiation of the unlawful detainer cases in 1983 and 1999,
which were both dismissed by the lower courts, as well as the present case. In which
case, from the time of respondents' adverse occupation since 1967, or even on
October 1, 1974, petitioners' real right of possession has been lost after the lapse of 10
years from either date.
We do not subscribe to the view that the series of litigation between the parties
tolled the prescriptive period. Article 1155 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the
"prescription of actions is interrupted when they are led before the court" and this
necessarily contemplates the same cause of action subject of the prescriptive period.
The cases led prior to this case referred to causes of action different from accion
publiciana. It is settled that ejectment cases involve a different cause of action from an
accion publiciana. 3 3 Also, while Civil Case No. 1558-0 is captioned as conveyance of
property, the cause of action of respondents in that case is actually the enforcement of
an implied trust. 3 4
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED . The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 19, 2011 and the Resolution dated January 10, 2012 are
AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED." Leonardo-De Castro, J. , designated as Acting Chairperson of
the First Division per Special Order No. 2559 dated May 11, 2018; Gesmundo, J. ,
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designated as Acting Member of the First Division per Special Order No. 2560 dated
May 11, 2018.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENA


Acting Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 7-31.

2. Id. at 43-53. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante with Associate Justices
Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Antonio L. Villamor, concurring.

3. Id. at 55-56.
4. Id. at 102-103. Penned by Judge Ramon S. Caguioa.
5. Id. at 52. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:

   WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Decision
dated June 25, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74, in Civil
Case No. 476-0-03 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint before the RTC
of Olongapo City is DISMISSED.

   SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original.)


6. Id. at 14; see records, pp. 1-4.
7. Also referred to as Anunsacion in some parts of the records.

8. Rollo, pp. 43-44, 92.


9. Id. at 44.

10. Id. at 44-45.


11. Id. at 63-71.

12. Id. at 72-73, 78.


13. Id. at 74-80.
14. Id. at 90-96.

15. Id. at 45.


16. Id. at 103.

17. Supra note 2.


18. Rollo, p. 46.

19. Id. at 49-52.


20. Id. at 19-21.

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21. Padilla v. Velasco, G.R. No. 169956, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 219, 226.

22. Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815, 824-825.
23. Rollo, p. 10.
24. Bagunu v. Aggabao, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011, 655 SCRA 413, 423-425, 428-429.

25. Modesto v. Urbina, G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010, 633 SCRA 383, 393, citing Solis v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72486, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 267, 272.
26. Id.

27. See Espejo v. Malate, G.R. No. L-48612, January 27, 1983, 120 SCRA 269, 276-278.
28. Rollo, pp. 48-49.
29. Cutanda v. Heirs of Roberto Cutanda, G.R. No. 109215, July 11, 2000, 335 SCRA 418, 426-
427.
30. Flores-Cruz v. Goli-Cruz, G.R. No. 172217, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 545, 551.
31. Rollo, p. 95.
32. Id. at 94.

33. Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 500, 509.
34. Rollo, p. 82.

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