Pub - Islam and Society Sharia Law Jihad Women in Islam PDF

The Challenge of Muslim Immigration to Europe
Christine Schirrmacher
Islam and Society

The Challenge of Islam: Are we Equipped?
Is Multi(Culti) at an End?
Islam – Religion of Peace?
How Muslims view Christians
What is a Fatwa?
Islam and Society

Islamic “Mission” (Da’wa)
Apostasy and Sharia
The Significance of Islamic Tradition
Women in Islam
“Islam” is not just “Islam” Sharia Law - Jihad -
Suicide, Martyrdom and Jihad
Honor Killings and Ideas of Honor
Women in Islam
Christine Schirrmacher, born 1962 (MA in Islamic Stu- Essays
dies 1988, Dr. phil. Islamic Studies 1991) has studied
Arabic, Persian and Turkish and is presently Professor
of Islamic Studies at the Department “Religious Studies
and Missiology“ of the “Evangelisch-Theologische Fa-
culteit” (Protestant University) in Leuven/Belgium. She
is director of the “Institut für Islamfragen“ (Institute of
VKW The WEA Global Issues Series 4

Islamic Studies) of the German Evangelical Alliance as
well as an official speaker and advisor on Islam for the
World Evangelical Alliance (WEA). She lectures on Islam
and security issues to authorities, is author of several
books on Islam, sharia and family issues in Islam, has
visited many countries of the Muslim world and is engaged in current dialogue
initiatives, like the conference “Loving God and Neighbour in Word and Deed:
Implications for Muslims and Christians” of the Yale Centre for Faith and Culture,
Yale University, New Haven/Connecticut, in July 2008.
sponsored by:
ISBN 978-3-938116-64-7
Verlag für Kultur und Wissenschaft

VKW
(Culture and Science Publ.)

Dr. Thomas Schirrmacher
Islam and Politics

The WEA Global Issues Series
Editors:
Geoff Tunnicliffe,
International Director, World Evangelical Alliance
Thomas Schirrmacher,
Director, International Institute for Religious Liberty and
Speaker for Human Rights of the World Evangelical Alliance
Volumes:
1. Thomas K. Johnson – Human Rights

2. Christine Schirrmacher – The Islamic View of Major Christian Teachings
3. Thomas Schirrmacher – May a Christian Go to Court?
4. Christine Schirrmacher – Islam and Society
5. Thomas Schirrmacher – The Persecution of Christians Concerns Us All
“The WEA Global Issues Series is designed to provide thoughtful

and practical insights from an Evangelical Christian perspective into
some of the greatest challenges we face in the world.
I trust you will find this volume enriching and helpful in your Kingdom service.”
Dr. Geoff Tunnicliffe, International Director, World Evangelical Alliance
Islam and Society
Sharia Law – Jihad – Women in Islam
Essays
The WEA Global Issues Series

Volume 4

Culture and Science Publ.
Bonn 2008
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Contents
1 The Challenge of Muslim Immigration to Europe.................................... 7

2 The Challenge of Islam: Are we Equipped?........................................... 19
3 Is Multi(Culti) at an End?....................................................................... 27
4 Islam – Religion of Peace? ..................................................................... 45
5 How Muslims view Christians – What does the Koran Teach? ............. 55
6 What is a Fatwa? .................................................................................... 67
7 Islamic “Mission” (Da’wa)..................................................................... 69
8 Apostasy and Sharia ............................................................................... 77
9 The Significance of Islamic Tradition .................................................... 85
10 Women in Islam ................................................................................... 89
11 “Islam” is not just “Islam“: Sunni and Shiite Islam compared ........... 107
12 Suicide, Martyrdom and Jihad............................................................ 111
13 Honor Killings and Ideas of Honor .................................................... 119
About the Author..................................................................................... 127
1 The Challenge of Muslim Immigration to Europe1
The Present Situation – History and Background

Globalization is a subject of great significance for Europe, too. The
world has moved closer together. This is true also for the Islamic world
and Europe. New chances for the shaping of a shared future in the twenty-
first century, as well as challenges, result from this situation.
North Africa is closely linked with France by virtue of its colonial past,
as are Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India with Great Britain. Nearly two mil-
lion Muslims live in Britain; in France about six million; in Germany 3.2
million. The immigration of Muslims to Germany began roughly 45 years
ago when, in the post-War period, the recruitment of workers from south-
ern (and southeastern) Europe and, later, also from Anatolia (Turkey) ap-
peared to be the solution for an expanding labor market.
The first ten thousand Muslims came to Germany beginning about 1960.
They were primarily male workers without families; women and children
followed later. Through revolutions and wars (above all, the Iranian Revo-
lution of 1979, the war in the Balkans, and the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to
1988), through the influx of refugees and asylum-seekers, and by virtue of
a higher birth-rate compared with the Western population, the number of
Muslim immigrants in Europe increased to roughly sixteen to twenty mil-
lion persons.
Even in the last twenty years, when this development was foreseeable,
European countries found it difficult to consider themselves as countries
“open to immigration”. There was repeated failure to discuss cultural, so-
cial, and political as well as religious commonalities and differences, to
consider the mistakes that were made, and to work out rules for life to-
gether in the future. The German society, for example, assumed all too
1
Conference paper presented at Europe International House Pécs/Hungary, November
22, 2005 at the conference “Continents – Globalisation – Security”, November 22-
23, 2005
8 Islam and Politics
naturally that these people would prefer the Western, secular way of life to
their own tradition, would give up their religious-cultural roots over time,
and would “assimilate” themselves. Today, it is clearly evident that in
many parts of Europe a contrary development – a return to tradition and a
retreat into a world of one’s own – long since has begun.
Most of the Muslims who live in Europe today will remain; their number
will continue to increase. The political or economic situation in their home
countries frequently offers them no perspective for a return; their children
and grandchildren have grown up in Europe and they, too, will not return.
In view of this situation, several challenges result:
1. Social Aspects
Never before have so many people from the Islamic cultural sphere lived
permanently in Europe. But, are they also at home in Europe?
Many young people of the second and third generation speak too little
German (or French, Spanish, or Dutch) to be successful in a vocation.
What future do these young people face? Not a few of them retreat into
their own world, their own language, the mosque, and the Turkish or Arab
neighborhood.
Forced marriages and murders of honor occur precisely within the paral-
lel society in which its members take justice into their own hands. At long
last, the duty of speaking the language of the host country finally is being
discussed openly in Europe. Without the command of the language, there
is no integration; without integration, there is no vocational success and no
shared future.
Neither the immigrants nor their host countries originally reckoned with
a permanent life together. Both sides at first thought their coexistence
would last only a few years. Especially the majority society concerned
itself too little and not intensively enough with the cultural and religious
peculiarities of the immigrants. The “other culture” was either admired
uncritically or ignored and rejected. The knowledge about Islam among
many people in Europe is still too undeveloped. Many Muslims, at first,
wanted to become “Europeans”, but then turned away in disappointment.
Many make contact with a mosque that preaches distance and withdrawal,
and extols the nationalism from the home country and Islam as an identity
as an alternative in a “godless” Western society. Then, it is perhaps only a
small step to a turn toward political Islam (Islamism) or even to extremism.
1 The Challenge of Muslim Immigration to Europe 9
A New Situation for Both Sides
The situation is new not only for Europeans, but also for the Muslim
communities. They must undertake a new definition of their theological
and political-social position here in the “diaspora” in a non-Muslim West-
ern society. Many questions arise: Is it possible in non-Islamic countries to
do without the amplification of the call to prayer by loudspeaker – in Mus-
lim countries an everyday occurrence? May meat slaughtered by non-
Muslims (and, of course, not ritually slaughtered by them) be eaten by
Muslims – a situation that hardly ever will occur in Islamic countries? How
are the Islamically-based social conventions (no contact between young
men and girls) to be adhered to in a liberal, pluralistic society in which
only a few people still stand up for religious values? Is one’s own son al-
lowed to marry a German, non-Muslim woman who possibly judges the
family of her husband to be “unbelievers”? All of these are questions that
never arose in the Islamic land of origin, and are questions to which the
Muslim community must find answers, answers which can turn out to be
quite different even within the Muslim community.
But even beyond the conduct of daily life, many questions arise in re-
gard to religion: How can the Islamic faith be passed on to the younger
generation that lives in the midst of a pluralistic secularized society that
often is not very much characterized by visible ethical and religious val-
ues? Many families begin to practice their religion for the first time in the
diaspora, in the desire to preserve their cultural roots. Others observe the
regulations more strictly than they do in their lands of origin. Especially in
Turkish Islam in Germany, a conservative religion is thus “conserved” that
hardly exists in this form in present-day Turkey.
And how does the Western majority society act? Does it understand the
tall minaret, which perhaps towers above all the other buildings in the
neighborhood, as a cultural enrichment or as a threat? Or perhaps in earlier
years as an enrichment, but today as a threat? Does it believe the peaceful
declarations from the neighborhood mosque association, or does it consider
the mosque to be the meeting place for “sleepers” and terrorists? Are the
people who pray there those who practice their religion, or those who form
political cells? Is the headscarf worn as a personal confession of faith, or as
a political symbol? Do European societies at all desire a coexistence with
the immigrants? And, does the majority of immigrants today still desire
integration? How far do the tolerance and freedom of democratic societies
reach, and where does indifference or rejection begin?
2. The Political Challenge

Today, everyone is aware of what is meant under the subject of the “po-
litical challenge”: Many people in Europe in the last thirty years considered
the occupation with this political dimension in Islamic countries to be sub-
ject matter appropriate for some Near East experts. It was assumed for a
long time that extremist efforts limited themselves to internal conflicts in
countries like Algeria, Palestine, or Iran. Today, this view has changed
fundamentally, and quite rightly so.
Whoever focuses one’s attention only on countries such as Afghanistan
as areas of refuge for extremist networks will no longer grasp the present-
day situation in all of its implications. European metropolis also have be-
come the scenes of terrorist attacks, among them Amsterdam, Madrid, or
London, which for quite a long while has been considered to be the hub of
international political Islam. With logistical and financial support from the
Near and Middle East, Europe has become the area of refuge and action for
extremist groups. Mosques and Islamic centers have become scenes of
significant incidents. International Islamistic terrorism, long underesti-
mated in regard to its significance and its claim to power, has not stopped
before the gates of Europe, but rather today – as dreadful as this conclusion
is – has become an element of European reality. It is no longer the only
goal of present-day extremist groups to pursue the conflict in and in the
vicinity of Israel in the Middle East, or to struggle against the regimes in
their own Islamic countries they deem to be “open to compromise” or “un-
Islamic”. Horror and terror are carried into the Western world, too, in the
name of Islam, and Muslims as well as non-Muslims are killed because
they are representatives of the “godless West” or because they are “col-
laborators” with it.
Islamism as a Political Power

Of course, political Islam does not consist only of violence and terror.
Violent extremism is only one wing of political Islam and, in terms of
numbers, on the whole a small spectrum. That area of Islamism that pur-
sues its goals by legal means, with a strategy, with financial resources
stemming in part from foreign donors, with well-schooled personnel, but
not with less determination, is also to be counted as a form of political
Islam. Politically motivated Islam exerts its influence over mosque associa-
tions and umbrella organizations, and this in two ways. First, it declares
itself as organized Islam to be the spokesperson of “the” Muslims in Ger-
many, and employs titles such as “Zentralrat der Muslime”, although this
“central council” is likely to represent less than one percent of the Muslims
in Germany. Altogether, from five to, at most, ten percent of all Muslims
in the country belong to one of these organizations, that is, a minority.
Nevertheless, politically organized Islam formulates statements proclaimed
to the public. Since the Muslim community has no membership status or
hierarchy comparable to those in the churches, organized Islam thus ap-
points itself to be the partner in dialogue with the church and to be the con-
tact organization for the state, although a majority of at least 90 percent of
all the Muslims in Germany do not desire to be represented by one of these
organizations.
Representatives of Islamism seek influence in universities and in poli-
tics, demand equality with the Christian churches and increased rights, or
even demand adjustments in legislation (the law for the protection of ani-
mals had to be altered to allow special permission for the ritual slaughter of
animals not previously numbed). Other points of contention carried before
the highest courts in the last few years also include the question of the
headscarf for women teachers with civil servant status, or the call to prayer
broadcast by loudspeaker.
The pre-eminent goal is the recognition of Islam as a religion possessing
equal rights in Europe, and the acquaintance and pervasion of Western
society with Islamic values. The second step is the establishment of Sharia,
the Islamic order, first of all over the Muslim community. But, in addition,
politically organized Islam also has an effect within the Muslim commu-
nity through its desire to urge Muslims in Europe to adopt a stricter obser-
vance of Islam. If female teachers from organized Islam give instruction in
religion in the public schools while wearing the headscarf, and if they thus
display their traditional role that legally discriminates against women, then
the pressure upon female students in this environment to wear the head-
scarf more frequently obviously becomes greater. Thus is a traditional,
non-enlightened Islam fostered and carried into the parents’ house.
Consideration of the background of political Islam, thus, is today neither
“far-fetched” nor an off-beat intellectual field of activity, but rather is of
the greatest significance for European society. Neither scare tactics nor
minimalizing of the risk nor generalizing are appropriate here. A sober
stocktaking is required.
Differentiation Creates Sobriety

If the background and motives of political Islamic groups, on the one
hand, are recognized and analyzed soberly, then this will contribute to the
sophisticated perception of the Muslim community and, in the end, to the
avoidance of false judgments. If apolitical Muslim groups distance them-
selves emphatically from violence, terror, and Islamism – indeed, it is even
more valuable if they find arguments in the Koran and the writings of Mus-
lim theologians that reject the justification of a violent Islam – then this
will serve to make more clearly discernible the differences existing be-
tween it and the peaceful majority in the Muslim community in Europe.
Neither a resistance directed against Muslim neighbors and fellow citizens
arising out of fear, nor a minimalizing of the political activities of the
known groups, will contribute to peaceful coexistence and the constructive
shaping of a shared future.
Making an Accounting is Required

Critical questions also must be allowed if the urgently necessary objec-
tive discussion is to take place, critical questions of the majority as well as
of the minority society. Subjects of such questions could be the mistakes of
the past, the failed integration, but also subjects such as forced marriages
and so called murders of honor. Both have existed in Germany for more
than forty years, but until recently were of little interest to the majority
society. The fact that today there is rather an increase in murders of honor,
and that there is still a large number of forced marriages of young Turkish
girls in Germany, at the same time poses the question about the defense of
European values, such as how women are to be protected, and how Euro-
pean notions of the equality of men and women are to be established in an
environment that, through the importation of antiquated traditions, funda-
mentally questions these values. Only a sober discussion of present prob-
lems will bring us a step forward.
3. The Question of Religion

In a time in which, in the West, the general mood is that religion has
hardly any public significance any more and, in the consciousness of
many, is so characterized by the Enlightenment and secularization that it
has only little to do with the European order of values, Islam appears as an
exceedingly energetic, worldwide networked, and above all self-confident
religion with an apologetically presented claim upon absolute truth.
In Islam, of course, we encounter not only a religion, but also a social
system that is clearly bound with religion and tradition. At the same time,
religion is in a much greater measure an element of daily life, of public
life, and of the family than is the case in general in Europe. The tradition
woven closely together with Islam contains detailed rules in regard to
clothing and food, feasts and holidays, the conduct of men and women,
marriage and divorce, the relationship of Muslims to non-Muslims, and
war and peace. Because tradition and faith are bound closely to each other,
and the tradition is grounded in religion, the tradition retains a determina-
tive power in daily life. For this reason alone, it is not easy to separate the
political sphere from the religious one in a question such as the signifi-
cance of the headscarf or the function of the mosque. With religion and
tradition (which does not always have to be specifically Islamic), social
and political aspects are bound together. Thus, the headscarf is for many
Muslim women simply more than only a personal confession of faith, but
rather also stands for recognition of the legal stipulations in Sharia con-
cerning marriage and the family, and of the legally disadvantaged position
of the woman. Thus, the significance of the headscarf altogether goes far
beyond a personal confession.
By virtue of the fact that Islam raises the subject of religion anew, West-
ern society, too, will have to ask itself what values it wishes to defend. Do
the values of European society rest upon the foundation of a Jewish-
Christian legacy? If so, must this Jewish-Christian legacy be preserved in
order to be able to preserve Europe’s central values? Or, can both be de-
coupled from each other? The in part heated debate, within the framework
of a possible entry of Turkey into the European Union, about whether
Europe is a “Christian club” or not definitely has shown that this question
in the last analysis always maintains an unspoken presence in the course of
the confrontation with Islam. European countries first must answer this
question for themselves before they will be able to give an acceptable an-
swer to Turkey.
Discernible is also the fact that Islam has gained in attractive power
rather than lost. One today can no longer speak of the much-invoked
“wearing down” of religion in the second and third generation. There is
certainly the sphere of “secularized” Islam – Muslims who pursue the same
forms of leisure time entertainment, as do European or German youth – but
considered as a whole, Islam has remained a lively religion among the
immigrants. Not, perhaps, in the sense that every individual Islamic reli-
gious regulation is observed to the last detail in every family, but indeed in
such a manner that Islam offers support and identity. It is, in part, the case
that precisely young people – after their parents have lived a relatively
enlightened form of Islam – again turn to a stricter observance of Islamic
regulations.
Concrete Fields of Discussion
A sign of a detailed treatment of the subject of “Islam” would be a dis-
cussion about concepts and content that, in another religious-cultural con-
text, could have a different meaning.
A.) The Question of Human Rights
There is, for example, the discussion about human rights. Muslim or-
ganizations have emphasized repeatedly that Islam not only respects hu-
man rights, but even has formulated more extensive catalogues of human
rights than the West and is really the “author” of all human rights. At the
same time, however, a second look at the contents of the human rights
declarations in the Western and Islamic contexts reveals clearly that all the
Islamic declarations place the Sharia as a preamble before any kind of hu-
man right. In practical application, this means that an apostate can no
longer demand any human rights at all, since he, according to the stipula-
tions of Sharia, has committed a crime worthy of death and, thus, can no
longer claim any religious freedom or other human rights. In the opinion of
the vast majority of Muslim theologians, the right to religious freedom and
human rights ends with the defection from Islam – even if the death sen-
tence only rarely is carried out by courts, but in most cases is done so by
the offender’s family or the society.
Here lies the real focus in the discussion between the Western and the Is-
lamic understanding of human rights, and not in the superficial discussion
of whether Islam recognizes human rights at all. If, however, there are
reports from all Islamic countries about violations of human rights and
limitations upon religious freedom – especially for converts – then these
become understandable only in the context of the official Islamic definition
of human and minority rights. Only on the basis of a detailed knowledge of
the religion, culture, and legal system of Islam will it be possible to con-
duct this discussion at all in wider settings and in the public realm.
B.) Suicide Attacks
Another example: The terror attacks from 2001 and the following years
were condemned repeatedly from the Muslim side with the argument that
the Koran emphasizes that the one who kills a human being has “killed the
whole world” (Sura 5: 32). Numerous Muslims emphasized that the attacks
are in no way to be justified with the aid of Islam.
It is correct that the Koran (Sura 4: 29), as well as also Islamic tradition,
disapproves of murder, just as well as it does suicide. Murder is one of the
serious crimes listed in the Koran. The tradition explicitly condemns sui-
cide: Whoever commits suicide out of the fear of poverty or out of despair
will not enter Paradise.
Of course, those who carry out attacks in Palestine and other places do
not consider themselves as those who commit suicide, but rather first of all
as martyrs, that is, as human beings who fight and die for the cause of Is-
lam, for the cause of God. An attack that is carried out with the high prob-
ability of the attacker’s own death is hardly ever interpreted as suicide, but
rather as Jihad, as commitment to the cause of God, as the final weapon
against the wrongful oppression of the community of Muslims. The Koran
promises martyrs entry into Paradise (Sura 4: 74), without examination of
their faith: “I will let no action that one of you commits go unrewarded,
whether it is done by a man or a woman… And those who, for my sake …
have suffered hardship, and who have fought and been killed, I will forgive
them their bad deeds, and, as a reward from God, I will let them enter
gardens in whose valleys streams flow. With God, one is rewarded well”
(3: 195). The martyr, however, can expect Paradise (Sura 47: 4-6). “And if
you are killed or die for God’s sake, then forgiveness and compassion from
God are better than what you manage to do” (3: 157).
C.) The Question of Tolerance
Another example is the question of tolerance and of the concept of toler-
ance. A frequently expressed reproach made by Muslim apologists is that
Islam accepts Christianity, but the Christians do not accept Islam. It is not
infrequently pointed out in this connection that Muslim conquerors – in
contrast to the Christian churches and crusaders – did not force the Chris-
tians to choose between conversion to Islam or death. In addition, so the
argument, Muslims accepted Jesus Christ quite fundamentally as a re-
spected prophet and the Old and New Testaments as revelations, while
Christians refused their recognition of Mohammed as well as of the Koran,
also.
Here, too, a discussion about the concept of “tolerance” easily moves in
the wrong direction without a detailed knowledge of Islam: What is under-
stood under the term “tolerance” within Islam? In any case, not the recog-
nition of another religion on an equal basis. The Koran already makes clear
that Mohammed, to be sure, campaigned for the recognition of the new
religion by Christians (and Jews) and urged Christians and Jews to become
members of it, but, in his later years, after the Christians of his time refused
to follow him, he considered the Christian faith more and more to be blas-
phemy and the Christian revelation to be falsified. Christians in areas con-
quered by Islam, indeed, were permitted as a rule to retain their faith. But,
they became subjugated persons (Arabic: dhimmis – protected minorities),
who paid taxes for their “unbelief” and had to endure many legal disadvan-
tages, even persecution and death.
The Koran, indeed, certifies the Old and New Testaments as God’s reve-
lation, and Jesus is a respected prophet in the Koran. But, he is respected
only as a “herald of Islam”, as a precursor to Mohammed who is only a
human being and who brought salvation to no one. Jesus, so the Islamic
position, was falsely revered by the Christians as God’s Son, and thereby
they distorted his “originally Islamic” message completely. The Christian
revelation as a “falsified text”, is given only very little respect in Islam, and
the person of Jesus as it is represented in the Old and New Testaments, just
as little.
Worrying is the fact that many Muslim organizations in Europe today
urge that nothing “negative” be permitted to be published any more about
Islam, since this would mean discrimination. In other words, everything
not written from the Muslim point of view is to be prevented from being
published (a development that is far more advanced, for example, in Great
Britain thanks to the efforts of Islamic lobbyists). The point of departure
for these considerations is the dhimma status assigned in the Muslim view
to the Christians, that is, the status of the protected minority that is placed
under Islam and is subjugated to Islamic law. Here, how “awake” Western
society is will be very essential as it follows this development, as well as to
what extent it is ready to defend the freedoms of the press and speech es-
tablished only after great effort.
D.) The Question of Women
A further example is the frequently cited situation of women. Here, too,
a detailed knowledge of Islam would lead to a better initial situation in the
discussion and, finally, to more honesty in regard to the really controversial
points. Muslim apologists emphasize that the woman in Islam enjoys equal
status before God with men and, indeed, that Islam endows the woman
with true dignity, freedom, protection, and respect. In the Western view, a
woman with headscarf and cloak is an “oppressed creature”. What is right?
The Koran, indeed, speaks of the fact that man and woman were created
equal before God, without giving an indication that the woman might be a
creature of “less value”. At the same time, the Koran speaks – and the Is-
lamic tradition even more clearly – of the different duties assigned to the
man and the woman, from which different rights are derived and, indeed,
with which the legal discrimination of the woman is sanctioned. She is
legally discriminated against in the law of inheritance (she inherits only
half of what the man inherits), in witness rights (her testimony is worth
only half as much as the testimony of a man), and in marital law (a divorce
is made more difficult for her; in some countries it is almost impossible; in
most countries, polygamy is allowed for the husband). A foundation of
Islamic marital law that is recognized everywhere is the wife’s duty to be
obedient and the man’s right of discipline in regard to her that forbids her
to make her own self-determined decisions against his objections (to leave
the house, to maintain contacts to persons of whom he disapproves, and
similar restrictions). If she does not render him this obedience, then, ac-
cording to the opinion of the majority of theologians, he is permitted to
resort to means of discipline in accord with Sura 4:34.
It is, thus, much more this marital law (polygamy, duty to obey, disci-
pline, law of inheritance) – that, in the Islamic world, is interpreted in the
vast majority of cases in a conservative sense (Turkey forms a certain ex-
ception to this rule) – that stands much more in opposition to European
conceptions of law than does a piece of clothing. But, these controversial
“women’s questions” have appeared to the present only too seldom in pub-
lic discussion.
Summary
It is not necessarily the case that the same content lies at the root of the
same concepts. This cultural-religious content results rather from the spe-
cific cultural-religious-political context in which it originated. Concepts
such as “tolerance” and “equality” – robbed of their occidental roots – can-
not simply be transferred without problem to other cultures and religions
and then, as a matter of course, also offer the same content.
The present debate about the foundations of this society, and about the
confrontation with a quite different value system and religion, has in a
sense forced itself upon us with all its might. This frightens us deeply and,
yet, at the same time opens paths to a sound discussion, as long, then, as
Western society is able to resist falling into panic and raising the barri-
cades, but rather is able to take stock soberly of the conditions in its coun-
tries and among the immigrants, and to seek constructive solutions. Per-
haps the debate about “integration” also is so agitated because the cultural-
social or religious peculiarities of Europe, which should be defended here,
have been defined clearly only in rare cases. Does Islam perhaps make
Western society’s lack of goals and values particularly clear?
The majority of Muslims that lives and thinks apolitically in Europe and
is worried about the rights that Islamic groups bit by bit successfully de-
mand, expects an answer from the state, whose task it is – on the basis of a
detailed knowledge of Islam – to arrive at a reasonable demarcation over
against political forces. There can not be any double legal standard – nei-
ther in regard to the position of women nor in regard to the recognition of
polygamy, for example – for only an agreement upon a shared legal and
value system will be able to guarantee the preservation of our state in the
long run. It is rewarding to argue and to struggle for these shared values
and to defend anew Europe’s foundations for society, church, and state.
2 The Challenge of Islam: Are we Equipped?2
It would almost seem as though many people in Germany have only

started taking notice of Islam since the terrorist attacks of September 11
shook the world. “Terrorism” and “The West” were, in the minds of many
people, two separate worlds. Terrorism only happened in far – away coun-
tries, like Africa, Algeria, or the Middle – East. Since the aircraft attacks of
“Nine-eleven”, and successive terrorist attacks, often prevented in Europe
by the security services, but succeeding in other parts of the world, this
perception is changing. The awareness of the existence of Muslim extrem-
ism, and it’s potential threat, has increased.
Are we, however, better informed now concerning Islam itself? Islamic
extremism represents an alarming and spectacular threat, but is only a very
small spectrum contained within Islam. It is not enough to be preoccupied
with Islamic extremism, even though it certainly deserves urgent attention.
It behooves us to acquire an over-view of Islam in it’s entirety, and not
simply an imaginary, self – constructed picture. Islam’s own assumptions,
it’s theological variety, it’s various goals, the specific goals of the Islamic
community here in Germany, and the network of international relation-
ships.
Are we adequately informed about Islam?

First and foremost we must be correctly and thoroughly informed. This
statement sounds so self – evident that one would think it requires no fur-
ther comment. It does appear, however, that this fundamental requirement
for mutual understanding has been neglected for too long. Muslims have
not only been living in Europe since the eleventh of September 2001, and
did not appear here in Germany unexpectedly and overnight. As far back
as 1961, that is, more than forty years ago, the first work-permits were
issued for Turkish workers, recruited by the then government. The recruit-
2
Shortened version of: Christine Schirrmacher. “Herausforderung Islam – Sind wir
darauf vorbereitet?” in: Evangelische Verantwortung (EAK der CDU/CSU)
11/2003: 7-12
ing of Turkish workers was halted in 1973, but the number of Muslims has
increased to approximately 3.2 million – through the coming together of
families, through a proportionally higher birth-rate than the rest of the
population, as well as refugees and people applying for asylum. Amongst
the Turkish population of about 2 million that form the Islamic landscape
in Germany, there belong a large group of Kurds, and other minority Turk-
ish groupings. About 150 000 people have not yet been able to return to
Bosnia, several hundred thousand people have come from various Arabian
countries, such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, as well as in excess of 100
000 Iranians, who fled from Iran after the outbreak of the Iranian revolu-
tion in the 1980’s, and the Iran/Iraq war of 1980 – 1988.
From a theological perspective, the main group in Germany are the Sun-
nites, (also worldwide) with about 2.6 million adherents, followed by the
Shiites, with around 600 000 followers. To this latter group belong also the
Alevites, with about 400 000 followers, mostly from Turkey and Syria, as
well as about 50 000 members of the Ahmadiyya movement, dismissed as
a sect by other Muslims, but viewing themselves as strict and faithful Mus-
lims, and very active in the building of mosques in Germany. Around 600
000 Muslims have German citizenship, including about 10 – 12 000 Ger-
man converts.
Well, so much for statistics. Have we appreciated the variety contained
within the Islamic community within our society? What is to be discovered
behind such bland labels as “Sunnite”, “Shiite”, or “Alevite”?
All of these theological groupings, which sometimes coincide with eth-
nic origins, possess their own views of state and democracy, of life in a
secular, postmodern society, and are, to varying degrees, bound by obliga-
tions to observe Sharia, the complete Islamic law, containing not only
regulations concerning crime, punishment and civil law, but also directions
concerning moral and religious observance.
Developments and tendencies amongst Muslims in Ger-

many
The first generation of “Gastarbeitern” (Guest – workers) in Germany
had the self-declared goal of working in Germany for a few years, and,
having gathered up a modest pile of wealth, returning back home to Tur-
key. These plans changed, however, partly because of negative economic
developments in Turkey, and also because the second and third generation
of children were growing up here in Germany. In the 1980’s, at the very
2 The Challenge of Islam: Are we Equipped? 21
latest, one could see that most of these people now intended to stay. The
assumption was, where this development had even been taken notice of,
that these people would simply adapt themselves to western secular soci-
ety, relinquish their religious-ethnic customs, and in time be “assimilated”
within the rest of society. Nowadays it has become evident that this has not
happened, and that rather, a reverse dynamic has come about.
Two examples:
1. Children brought up in Germany, but with poor German – language
skills
It still happens that immigrant children – especially from Turkey and
Arabian countries – commence primary school,3and are unable to speak
German, having grown up so far in an exclusively Turkish or Arabian en-
vironment. This often is exacerbated by the tendency for Turkish Muslims
living in Germany to marry relatives from Turkey. (Marrying a cousin is
seen as particularly advantageous) Muslim immigrants in Germany often
hold to strict Islamic rules of etiquette, concerning the strict separation of
the sexes, the women being largely confined to the home, while husbands
and fathers deal with all matters requiring contact with the outside world,
sometimes even the weekly shopping. This means that married women
living in Germany seldom attend German language courses, or establish
any kind of contact with German society. Additionally, many immigrants
choose to live in city-districts with high proportions of Muslim residents,
leading to the formation of “Little Istanbuls”, where all social and business
affairs can be catered for by Turkish people, from hairdresser to baker,
shopkeeper etc… as well, of course, the local mosque. It becomes possible
to live on a daily basis with no contact at all with German society, and such
contact as there is is often experienced as unpleasant and unfriendly. The
resulting weakness in German-language skills often displayed in second
and third generation Muslims has already led to the not-uncommon situa-
tion that secondary or special school leavers have little or no academic
qualifications, and in considerably higher proportions than their German
peers. One has to ask oneself what these young people have for a perspec-
tive, or future, with such a difficult employment situation in Germany.
The discussion concerning a compulsory pre-school year for immigrant
children to gain language skills is a step in the right direction, and long
overdue. In Germany, the debate concerning “Leitkultur” (The “Leading
Culture”) sparked off no small controversy, (typically German, one is
3
Primary school children in Germany generally commence schooling when they are
six years old.
tempted to comment) but it has long been clear in other countries with a
high immigrant population that integration, success in job and career, and a
healthy identification with the new homeland, with it’s laws and customs,
begins with a thorough founding in the language, and is not possible with-
out it.
2. Withdrawal into Mosque and family
It is clear that Islam, as a religion, has become more, rather than less at-
tractive. The frequently propagated idea that religion would become “wa-
tered down” in the second and third generation is no longer mentioned.
There are, of course, “secularized” Muslims, who go in for the same kinds
of leisure activities as their German peers, but all in all, Islam has remained
very much alive as a religion among immigrants, perhaps not every small
point of Islamic law being minutely observed in every family, but suffi-
ciently so for Islam to offer a foundation and identity. Religion and custom
are currently more strictly observed here, than in the country where the
immigrants come from, and young people who form the second and third
immigrant generation, whose parents live a fairly relaxed and “enlight-
ened” form of Islam, are returning to a lifestyle of much stricter religious
observance (examples being headscarves and fasting). In many surveys,
Muslim youths often emphasize that the majority of them feel not only
unaccepted, but clearly marginalized and discriminated against. Research
amongst young people, such as the well-known “Shell Youth Study” dem-
onstrate that Muslims and Non-Muslims in Germany keep themselves very
much to themselves, and cross-cultural friendships are still more the excep-
tion than the rule. Thus, broad German society and culture remains opaque
to Islamic sub-culture, and many Muslims remain ignorant concerning
German society. They no longer live in Turkey, but have not really “ar-
rived” in Germany, in terms of language, emotional identification, and
active participation in German society. When difficulties and academic
failure at school combine with experiences of rejection, and increased at-
tachment to the local Mosque (which often will preach distance and with-
drawal from German society, propagating Turkish nationalism and Islam
as an identity) then it seems often that openness for broad German society
and chances of successful integration are lost forever.
Only a more thorough knowledge of Islam, and the current develop-
ments among Muslims in Germany, including the special cultural facets of
Islam, such as family values, will put us into the position where we can
possibly have any kind of firm basis for thinking of ways to influence this
development. This is also the only way we can avoid the situation where
we only start to notice certain negative developments when the threat to
German society has already formed, (for example, recent events concern-
ing the “King Fahd Academy”4 or the long drawn out legal proceedings
concerning the “Caliph from Cologne”5) It will not be sufficient merely to
become familiar with the mind – set of a few violent extremists, but to get
to know the thinking, faith and life of the Muslim minority as a whole. As
long as this lack of knowledge concerning Muslim cultural values (such as
the concept of “Honor and Shame” or the role of women) persists, then we
will continue to have situations such as desperate women schoolteachers,
who cannot understand why one of her male pupils refuses to acknowledge
her authority in any way, and why his elder brother has him considerably
more under control than she does, or why one of the girls in her class,
whom she considered fairly modern and open-minded, suddenly, and with-
out any warning, is bundled off to Turkey, for an arranged marriage,
shortly after having participated in a school field – trip.
Western societies will only be able to define religious and social free-
doms and boundaries for themselves, as well as for religious minorities –
some of whom also have a political agenda – through a deeper and more
thorough understanding of Islam.
Barriers to Religious Freedom?

A discerning knowledge of Middle-East culture will enable us to form a
well-grounded and sober assessment of our own Western culture. This
assessment will make it possible to differentiate between the demands
made by religious groups which can be readily accepted, and fall into the
category of “Religious Freedom”, and those demands which call into ques-
tion the basis for western society – values only relatively recently won,
after hard struggles, and seen as great triumphs. (for example, sexual
equality) This brings to light a distinguishing feature of Islam, namely, that
it sees itself not just as a religion, but as a forming-influence in society,
and, according to the views of Islamic authorities, a would – be political
system. Islamists will therefore ever be attempting to re-order existing or-
ders in society, to make Islamic law (Sharia) become more and more bind-
4
Reference to recent controversy concerning an Islamic school in Bonn, Germany,
which allegedly taught it’s pupils Islamistic viewpoints, including advocating vio-
lence under certain circumstances to propagate Islam.
5
Reference to legal proceedings on the part of the German government to ban an
extreme Islamic organization, whose leader has earned the nickname “Caliph from
Cologne” The organization is now banned and the aforementioned Caliph is sent
back to his home country.
ing. This is also the perspective from which to view the various court –
orders which have had to be reached, concerning ritual animal-slaughter,
the wearing of headscarves, or calls to prayer over loudspeakers. Also to be
sorted into this context, is the striving to build ever larger Mosque com-
plexes, with minaret’s built as high as possible, some meters higher, in
some cities, than the planning permission allowed, but until now always
having been allowed to remain standing. Not a few people in this country
are concerned that Islam is working toward their own conversion. Of
course, a non-Muslim converting to Islam would be seen as a cause for
rejoicing, but is by no means the main strategic direction from the Islamic
camp.
Through a deeper understanding of Islam it would be possible to have a
more realistic assessment of our own situation, and would enable us to see
from what perspective Islam views our society – including the Church. The
rather superficial discussions concerning the “Abrahamic Religions” could,
with better grounded knowledge concerning the other religion, reach the
point where one was able to speak about really sensitive themes, such as
the perception of who God is, and what he is like, spiritual revelation, the
way the Koran came to be written, why Islam claims to have existed before
Christianity, and why Adam is seen as a proclaimer of Islam.
Muslims expect answers

Islam has become an enormous challenge for the state, society and the
Church. Muslims, Muslim leaders and organizations expect well thought
through answers from German society. They do not expect to be marginal-
ized on a human level, nor discriminated against from our society. Our
society has not experienced a “Muslim invasion”, but Muslims live among
us as people who were invited by German society to come and live and
work here. Muslims also expect theological answers, so that they can see in
Christianity a group that can be taken seriously, and engaged with in seri-
ous dialogue. Answers cannot be reached without a much deeper knowl-
edge of Islam, and by simply assuming that both religions have the same
content, or by refusing to face the differences which surface from the re-
spective text traditions, Muslims themselves certainly do not believe that
Islam and Christianity are the same, or stand for the same things. Clear
Christian standpoints and values, lived-out by Christians in Church and
society, would be taken for granted by Muslims, would require no justifi-
cation, and would, furthermore, receive admiration and respect. Muslims
respect this kind of clarity amongst themselves, and theological vagueness,
trying at all costs to maintain a false kind of “chumminess” is recognized
for what it is by many Muslims, and despised. The majority of apolitical
Muslims who live in Germany are very concerned about the rights which
Islamic groups are gaining, step by step. It is the job of the state – from the
position of a deeper knowledge of Islam – to find sensible ways of drawing
clear boundaries for political groups and influences. There must not be
double standards, for example, in the question of the woman’s place in
society, or acceptance of polygamy, for a state can only survive perma-
nently, if there is common acceptance of the same laws and values. It is
well worth the effort of standing up for these common values, in a fair and
friendly manner, and to defend the basis of Society, Church and State.
3 Is Multi(Culti) at an End?6
“Multi-culti” – a catchword we all know. A concept that today is looked

at rather critically but, in past decades, was to a large extent a guideline for
the shared life of Christians and Muslims in Europe, even if by far not eve-
ryone was aware of this premise. Multi-culti – a result of an historical de-
velopment into which we have stumbled rather than consciously planned
and controlled. A development that, in addition, resulted from the false
intellectual premises that accompanied the contemplation of the migration
of Muslim workers to Germany, as well as from indifference and igno-
rance.
Stumbling into History

The history of Islam in Germany begins in the year 1961 – if we disre-
gard the recruitment of twenty Turkish soldiers as “Lange Kerls” for the
army of Friedrich Wilhelm I in 1731. In 1961, the Federal Republic of
Germany concluded the first recruitment contracts with workers from Tur-
key. The majority of those who were fathers of families originated from
Anatolia. More important than educational and vocational qualifications
was the test of physical health – including an examination of the teeth –
that had to be passed before entry into Germany was granted. Many came
as unskilled workers and participated in furthering the tremendous eco-
nomic growth in post-war Germany, for which, in a period of full employ-
ment, no further reserves of labor could be mobilized within European
borders. Many men came without their families, as “guest workers”, with
the declared goal of returning to their home country after a few years and
after achieving some affluence.
But, the economic and, in part, the political situation in Turkey did not
appear to be very promising and when, in 1973, the Federal Republic or-
dered an end to the recruitment, but continued to facilitate the immigration
of the workers’ families, the return of the immigrants to their home coun-
6
Lecture Delivered in the Ceremonial Hall of the “Red City Hall”, Berlin, February
15, 2006
tries did not take place. On the contrary, many wives and children followed
their husbands and fathers and joined them in Germany. Thus, a second
generation of Muslim immigrants grew up in Germany. By virtue of a birth
rate higher in comparison with that in the German population, streams of
refugees from different Islamic countries (above all, Balkan countries, Iran,
and some Arab countries), and asylum-seekers and economic refugees, the
number of Muslims in Germany grew to today’s total of ca. 3.2 million
people.
Thus, the history of Islam in Germany does not begin on September 11,
2001, but rather nearly 45 years ago – a fact of which not everyone really
is aware. In these years, a number of clearly enunciated guidelines for
shared life became established, but there were all the more unspoken ones,
too.
False Premises have been Brought along

Contributing to the present problematic situation is the fact that the first
phase of shared life beginning in 1961 was accompanied by many false
intellectual premises, such as, for example, the assumption in the first two
decades that the Muslim “guest workers” soon would return to their home
countries. This assumption proved to be completely false, but this fact was
acknowledged only very hesitantly. Later, in the 1980s, it was quietly as-
sumed that the integration of those who remained would come to pass
more or less by itself – again a false assumption. Indeed, even as late as the
1990s, responsible politicians supported the thesis, sometimes quite ag-
gressively, that the immigrants from a Muslim culture would have “assimi-
lated” themselves to such an extent (according to an original quotation
from an interview partner from that time) that their Turkish or Arab back-
ground would no longer matter, and that their origin very soon would no
longer be recognizable. This, too, was a false assumption, as is all too ob-
vious today.
The second or, at least, the third generation would speak the German
language fluently and as a matter of course; special language instruction
would not be necessary – once again, a false assumption. And, finally, it
was more or less presumed officially that Islam as a religion, and the cul-
tural values founded upon it, would no longer play an appreciable role in
the integration of the immigrants and in the shared life of Christians and
Muslims, and indeed that the religion of Islam soon would be just as
“enlightened” and would lead just as peripheral an existence as Christianity
in western societies. – Even to question these intellectual premises was
3 Is Multi(Culti) at an End? 29
considered in the best case as politically incorrect, and in the worst case as
xenophobic.
Indifference and Ignorance were Cultivated

Added to this uncontrolled development and the false intellectual prem-
ises were indifference and ignorance, and this on the political as well as the
personal level. An occupation with the developing problems that arose
through the permanent residence of the immigrants, the further influx of
more immigrants, and the fact that the Muslim communities were left to
themselves, for a long time did not take place. If, however, the subject was
taken up, then in most cases this was done only hesitantly and half-
heartedly. In these first twenty or thirty years, it was not recognized that
the second and third generations of working immigrants might need special
support programs, but also, on the other side, it was not seen that, in many
locations, mosque-centered cultures and political networks had arisen that
in many respects vehemently placed the foundations of western society in
question. But, since no one saw either religious-legal or cultural-social
differences in comparison with the majority society, any special need for
action, of course, was not conceded.
It was for this reason, too, that the task of integration was delegated al-
most without a murmur to the schools, where it was intended that this inte-
gration of the working immigrants was to take place without any fuss.
Teachers – in most cases without additional budgeted time and without any
teaching aids and necessary training – were supposed to compensate, in a
certain sense incidentally, for the deficits of Muslim children in integra-
tion, culture, and language, and to raise these children to the level of
knowledge possessed by the rest of their classmates. While in many loca-
tions this may have been managed in the case of individual children by the
virtue of a great deal of dedication, this model had to fail when no longer
one or two, but rather fifteen or twenty or twenty-five children without
German language skills came together in an average school class. For
much too long a time it was expected that these extra efforts in German
instruction “on the side” would become superfluous, when the grandchil-
dren of the first immigrants finally would speak German well “by them-
selves”. Only today has it been recognized completely that this never will
be the case without additional support programs.
But also, apart from grand politics, on a quite personal level, there was
hardly any different attitude to be recorded. Muslim immigrants, even in
the third generation, remained “strangers” in this country, “foreigners” or
“the Turks” who frequently were addressed with the question: “But you
speak German really well. When are you going to go back home?” and
who then with irritation could ask in return: “Back to where? I was born in
Germany and have a German passport.” In addition to the lack of any will-
ingness for encounter among the people of such different worlds on both
sides, there were false notions, or none at all, about Islamic religion, tradi-
tion, educational values, and culture.
Today, the problems that have grown out of this situation are only all too
obvious. Much is sufficiently known:
The language problem has not taken care of itself. On the contrary, Mus-
lim migrant children of the third generation to a large extent speak German
more poorly than do their parents and grandparents.
The integration of the immigrants, as well, has not taken place by itself.
Even those migrants naturalized in Germany have remained in many re-
spects “foreigners” in the consciousness of the majority population to the
present day. They never have been welcomed, never accepted as neighbors
and friends. They see themselves as despised and pushed to the margins of
society. Transplanted to Germany through a decision made by their parents
or grandparents, they to the present day have not yet arrived emotionally in
Germany. Many of them today do not desire to undertake any more efforts
in this direction.
Instead of integration making any progress among them, a large portion
of the Muslim migrant community has concentrated itself increasingly in
its own urban neighborhoods and has retreated to the mosques and its own
linguistic and cultural sphere.
Non-Integration has been Reaped

The consequences of an integration that, seen as a whole, has not taken
place emerge openly today in many places:
Among Women…
Thus, for example, gender problems concerning girls and women, as
well as in regard to young men, have become more critical. For young
women not only in so far as the number of headscarves among female
Muslim migrants clearly has increased, but also by virtue of the fact that
they are worn at a far earlier age, indeed often even earlier than in the Is-
lamic countries of origin, where the headscarf worn before puberty is un-
usual. Social workers and teachers in Berlin especially – but also in other
urban centers – increasingly observe that girls from six to eight years of
age already are beginning to wear the veil, to be taken out of physical edu-
cation classes, to be withdrawn from class trips, to be denied permission to
ride bicycles, and also to be hindered in their movements in public.
Also, the number of those who, under pressure from Muslim political
groups, feel themselves forced to wear the headscarf is increasing. Girls
without a head covering are, in some cases, scorned, regulated, and threat-
ened, or openly cursed as “whores” by other Muslims in their neighbor-
hoods. Islamic dress regulations and, along with them, the moral doctrine
connected with them are gaining ground – right in the middle of Germany.
Forced marriages also are no exception among those of the third gen-
eration. “Imported brides” are brought to Germany in part from rural areas
of Turkey, in order to procure from among family relations a “clean” and
compliant young woman for a son. Conservative husbands often grant es-
pecially these third-generation women fewer personal freedoms and rights
than those enjoyed by their mothers and grandmothers, who not infre-
quently were gainfully employed. Their children, again, will be torn be-
tween two very different worlds, since they are reared by their mothers
from rural Turkey according to Turkish educational ideals and exclusively
in the Turkish language and, on their very first day at school, again will not
speak a word of German.
And the subject of honor killings also is, sadly, a matter of present rele-
vance. Unfortunately, we are not speaking here about a long outmoded
custom from a thousand years ago, but rather about a practice carried out in
the midst of the major cities of Germany. The last victim, Hatun Sürücü,
was shot in broad daylight in February, 2005, in Berlin by her brothers
because she “lived like a German” and was “a slut” that “didn’t deserve
any better” (original quote from several youths from the Turkish commu-
nity). The number of honor murders in the third generation appears rather
to be increasing, and this today when Muslim women who have grown up
between two worlds dare, for example, to oppose the marriage plans of
their families.
The injured honor of the world Muslim community, which the Koran
characterizes as “the best community that ever came into being among
human beings” (Sura 3, 110), is also at the core of many conflicts between
the Islamic and western worlds, in part also in the conflicts in regard to the
cartoons first published in September, 2005, in the Danish newspaper Jyl-
lands Posten. But, honor also plays a role in the torture scandal at the
prison of Abu Ghraib in Iraq, for humiliation and the loss of face before
the entire world weigh more heavily than everything else. And Osama bin
Laden enjoys the sympathy of so many Muslims of the most varied origin
and point of view because, in the eyes of many, he has restored the tram-
pled upon honor of the Islamic world by rebelling against the continued
oppression and the shame inflicted upon the Muslim world and by defying
the western superpower of the USA.
… and Men
But, young men also have fallen by the wayside as a result of the inte-
gration that has not begun in earnest: Many studies describe them, above
all, as the real losers of immigration. Many too many of them feel them-
selves accepted neither in Germany nor in the land of their parents and
grandparents. Often coddled and neglected at the same time in their own
families, they are affected by educational failure especially frequently at
school. This is also because most of them receive little support and encour-
agement from the home – especially the PISA studies have made clear how
decisive the “educational climate” in the family really is for a child’s suc-
cess in learning and at school. Much too often, migrant children leave high
school without a diploma (in many Berlin neighborhoods, as many as 70%)
or, because they too frequently must repeat individual classes, even must
transfer to a special school. The family as shelter and refuge stands over
against the lack of success in school and profession: the family cares for
them, provides them with excuses, and frequently defends them when they
are on trial in court, and thereby is often of no help to them in the process
of confronting openly the realities of life and their future in Germany, a
land in which educational and professional training – not family members
and relationships – are among the basic prerequisites for advancement and
promotion.
Without a school diploma, no professional training: It is no wonder that
it is precisely young men who are affected by a high rate of unemploy-
ment. According to statistics, 65% of migrant families live under or barely
above the poverty level. Thus, the social progression of the unskilled
workers of the first generation of recruits up to the third generation has not
yet taken place. Of course, it has been clear for a long time even in regard
to the German society, that low income, a weak educational background,
and the permanent receipt of public assistance will be passed on with high
probability to the next generation. Also within the migrant community at
the present time, there seem to be no signs of social progress, a situation
that naturally is not improved by the present situation on the labor market.
Whoever whiles away the time without hope of a job; whoever is denied
recognition and a place in society, perhaps will think he can make a quick
fortune with drugs or as a pimp, will join a gang, or engage in street fights
with others. Unfortunately, making a show of physical strength and exer-
cising violence with the use of weapons or fists is a much more frequent
part of daily life in migrant families than in comparison with the hereditary
German population; sometimes there are fistfights even in the Koran
schools. Violence and power are marks of the patriarchal society, and are
the evidence here for self-assurance and the power of self-assertion.
The most recent studies show also that, in regard to violence against
one’s own mother and sister, the number of those who have taken part in
such violence is, among migrant children, many times higher than in fami-
lies without a migrant background. In the process, of course, a certain view
of women also is imparted to the young people involved, and the daily
contempt and disdain for the woman as an independent personality is inter-
nalized. Violence, thus, is experienced as a legitimate method of conflict
resolution.
More and more frequently, young men feel themselves rejected, disad-
vantaged, and discriminated against as Muslims and Turks and react, for
their part, with a fundamental rejection of this society, which they ever
more vehemently judge as racist. The number of those who consider the
Koran and democracy as incompatible with each other is increasing, as
well as is the influence of Islamist groups who reach young people through
the mosques and the leisure-time activities offered there. When, in this
situation, Turkish nationalism, Islam as the religion superior to all others,
and the image of the West as godless and corrupt are imparted to them as
young people, then more and more frequently a process of radicalization
begins that makes all the efforts on behalf of these young people in
schools, social projects, or public youth work appear almost hopeless.
These young people have grown up in a purely Turkish or Arabic family
and living environment. No one ever has imparted to them the standards
and values of this society, let alone the philosophical foundations of this
culture and its history. This development must give cause for a great deal
of concern since, after all, the number of ca. 800,000 young people with a
Muslim background is much too high to permit us to continue to neglect
the present symptoms as peripheral phenomena.
Today: The Pursuit of Research into Causes

The situation already described must give lasting pause for serious
thought. It will not resolve itself, and the problems will not be solvable
without the massive efforts of us all. It is good that a more open discussion
of the present situation finally has begun, for only a sound, objective dis-
cussion that is as free as possible from any intellectual blinders will be able
to bring objective solutions to light.
The discussion, though, about present difficulties – as important as it is
as a first step – alone will not be enough. We will have to bore a level
deeper and also speak about the underlying causes for the present problem-
atic situation: about the foundations of western culture and civilization, as
well as about the Near Eastern culture and social order, but also about the
foundations of the Islamic religion, not without taking into consideration in
the process the fact that religion, tradition, and culture cannot always be
separated clearly from each other.
Only well-grounded research into causes will open up paths for con-
structive integration: Whoever cannot define the supporting, absolutely
essential foundations of one’s own culture and community of values inevi-
tably must remain uncertain about what he can demand from immigrant
society, and about the point where he can begin to enjoy cultural diversity
as an enrichment of his own horizons.
The present problematic situation, thus, almost forces the discussion of
values upon western society; indeed, it reveals the West’s previous avoid-
ance of such a discussion. Only when western society honestly engages in
this long overdue discussion of values will it be able to cope with the pre-
sent crisis and derive lasting profit from it. Otherwise, all that will be ac-
complished will be superficial touch-up jobs. For this reason, the present
crisis is at the same time a chance for defining our position and our goals.
Discerning Islam in its Totality

In regard to Islam in Germany, this means, for example, the necessity of
seeing Islam in its entire range as a religion and seeing it in the way that
Islam understands itself: as a vital religion pointing the way to the future,
but not only as a religion, but also as a social order that, for many Muslim
authorities, also possesses a political dimension.
Whoever desires to understand present-day Islam in Germany must deal
with its history and theology, and with the founder of Islam, the Prophet
Muhammad, at once the military leader, lawgiver, and community leader.
Whoever desires to understand Muhammad’s significance for today’s Mus-
lims will discover in history and theology that, as the last historical prophet
sent by God, he already during his lifetime was considered an unassailable
standard in all worldly as well as spiritual affairs, and that the Koran, as a
literally divinely-inspired message, has not been subjected to any historical
criticism to the present day.
Whoever desires to grasp the Palestinian conflict in its historical and
theological dimensions, and whoever wishes to put into proper perspective
the anti-Semitic statements of contemporary Muslim theologians and
spokesmen, must know how negatively the Koran judges the Jewish com-
munity of that time – on the basis of Muhammad’s struggles with Jewish
groups. Also, that the Koran, to be sure, respects the Christian religion at
the beginning of the period of Muhammad’s proclamation, but that, toward
the end of his life, it more and more vehemently condemns it as distorted.
A process must take place that considers, on the basis of these statements
from the Koran, what significance is to be attached to these verses as cited
in contemporary mosque sermons, and to what actions Moslems are sum-
moned there. And whoever wants to place into proper perspective the vio-
lent worldwide reactions, extending even to destruction of property and the
murder of innocent bystanders, to the at first insignificant cartoons in a
Danish newspaper depicting Muhammad, must know – along with the fact
that these worldwide disturbances were fomented deliberately using misin-
formation – that Muhammad answered the mockery of his own person by
the Jewish community in Medina with punitive military campaigns and
retaliation beginning in 624 AD – at least, according to Islamic tradition.
Then, when we speak about Islam in Germany, we must recognize that,
to the present, too little attention has been paid to the fact that we have to
do not only with a Muslim community living in Germany, but also indi-
rectly with political parties, ideologies, theologians, and movements from
the Islamic home countries that, in part, exercise great influence on the
Muslim community in Germany through the mosques, Islamic centers, and
the media. The literature from Muslim legal scholars (muftis) and theologi-
ans is available in German in numerous mosques, their sermons are sold on
cassette, or their opinions on legal matters are accessible via Internet or
email. Whoever exercises influence on the Islamic community in Arabic
countries will exercise this influence in a certain sense on European Mus-
lims, too, for local groups here reflect the theological, national, and ideo-
logical diversity in those countries and the connections are, in part, quite
intensive. Thus, if we want to understand the Muslim community in Ger-
many, then we must look at the same time at the Muslim countries of ori-
gin.
In order to make progress in integration, we thus must direct our atten-
tion to Islam and its historical, theological, cultural, and political signifi-
cance. If we ignore one aspect, then our analysis will be based on an in-
complete set of assumptions. In the present situation, the social values
founded upon Islam are of especial significance, but in the end they have
their roots in Islamic law, tradition, and theology.
Naming the Foundations of European Culture and Civili-

zation
Precisely because Islam urgently poses the question about the cultural,
political, and religious values of this society, it is high time to think about
sound answers. About the answers, namely, that we have avoided up to
now, partially out of indolence, ignorance, or an attitude of refusal, but
answers that inevitably must be given in order to convert the present situa-
tion into something positive. For this to succeed, we first of all need to
engage in “stocktaking”, that is, stocktaking in regard to the values under-
lying indigenous culture as well as migrant culture.
Whoever thinks about the roots of European culture and history thereby
has not declared him- or herself in favor of a super-culture, or for the crea-
tion of a monoculture. To think about one’s own roots, rather, is a sign of
genuine tolerance and open-mindedness: Whoever does not achieve clarity
about one’s own self will not be able to encounter others, too, in openness
and freedom. A cosmopolitan outlook is called for – and this all the more
in an age of globalization – but a cosmopolitan outlook that is conscious of
its own history and tradition. Cultural strength can come only from a con-
sciousness of one’s own values and their history and tradition. The alterna-
tive would be the surrender of one’s own self through a disoriented and
limitless admiration – and the ensuing absorption into immigrant culture –
or the complete rejection of all that may have the effect of being “foreign”
here. Both, however, are in no way practicable paths into the future.
Recognizing the Basic Elements of the Jewish-Christian

Legacy
Whoever considers European cultural history will recognize that it is
based quite essentially upon its Jewish-Christian legacy, as well as upon
the Enlightenment. What concrete profit is to be drawn from this, at first,
seemingly abstract idea?
The more fundamentally this question is approached, the clearer will the
real intersections with immigrant culture be recognized.
Separation of Powers and Equality before the Law

There is, first of all, the separation of powers, an essential precondition
for the western concept of the rule of law. It is in no way the chance prod-
uct of a modernizing society in transition from the Middle Ages to the
modern age, and also not the necessary consequence of Enlightenment
liberation from the “shackles of the Church”. It is much more the case that
the separation of the executive power from the legislative already is laid
out in the Old Testament as a component part of the Jewish-Christian heri-
tage and is confirmed and strengthened in the New Testament. Closely
connected with it is the separation of church and state, the worldly and
religious spheres, which, of course, was not always practiced in Christian
church history. The classic formulation of this is found in Jesus’ call to
give the Emperor and God what belongs to each (Matthew 22:21).
The most important consequence of the fact that the separation of legis-
lative and executive powers, the powers of the priest, the proclaimer of
God’s laws, and of the king, already existed in Israel in Old Testament
times was perhaps that the king did not enact the law, but much rather that
he was subject to it. If he broke the law – and the Old Testament contains
numerous reports about power-mad, corrupt, lawless, and godless kings –
he was reminded of God’s law by a prophet and brought to account for his
failings. Perhaps the most famous example of this is the story of King
David, who believed he could abuse his power and commit adultery and
murder because he was the most powerful man in Israel. The prophet Na-
than, however, confronted him mercilessly with his guilt, for which he had
to pay with the death of his first son (2. Samuel 11-12). Derived from this
again and again in the Old and New Testaments is the teaching: “God is no
respecter of persons” (2. Chron. 19:7, and many other passages).
… in Western Societies
One can dismiss this story as insignificant – yet, it portrays one of the
foundations of our concept of the state and our sense of the law. Only
when the representative of state power stands under, and not above, the law
can there be a possibility of appeal for the citizen against the state. Only in
this case does a healthy sense of self-responsibility in the face of an excess
of authority or abuse of power grow. Only the person who can call upon
the state to act against itself, and can remind the administrators of the law
to comply with it, who can demand an accounting from the state or even
file suit against it, is a free citizen who possesses his or her own personal
dignity as an individual, and is not just a subject. Only then, when there is
a counterweight to state power – the possibility of appeal to the highest
instance – can justice and an administration of justice bound to the law
arise. Hand in hand with this goes the prohibition – which also was formu-
lated already in the Old Testament (Exodus 23:8) – on accepting bribes,
that is, putting the law up for sale – the epitome of the door to injustice.
When a person in public life arrogates things to him- or herself that
would not be possible for a common citizen – such as tax evasion to the
sum of millions, or the unlawful use of personal advantage – the inhabitant
of the western hemisphere rebels. But, why should this be? Are not those
who work hard and bear great responsibility also permitted to enjoy more
extensive rights? The fact that this, as ever, is not the prevailing conviction
and general public opinion, but rather that a just punishment of such law-
breakers, even those in the highest positions, is expected, is to be sought
above all in the fundamental Christian values of our society – the equality
of all before the law irrespective of reputation and position.
and in Islamic Countries

Without wanting to claim in black and white terms that the law in west-
ern states is implemented in perfect accord with these principles, one nev-
ertheless will have to see that the contrast with conditions elsewhere is
exceedingly distinct when one looks at the foundations of other cultures. Is
it mere coincidence that none of the core Arabic-Islamic countries today
can be termed a constitutional state?
On the basis of our original consideration that the separation of powers
makes the rule of law possible, we can observe first of all that, in the origi-
nal Islamic congregation, such a separation of powers was renounced
straightforwardly in the person of Muhammad, as well as in regard to his
successors, the caliphs. Muhammad, as the religious leader of his congre-
gation and conveyor of the divine message, was at the same time a law-
giver in worldly affairs, as well as the leader of the army and a field gen-
eral. It is the worldwide goal of Islamist movements to restore this original
Islamic unity of state and religious congregation, and to unite the Islamic
community under the leadership of a caliph.
What about Muhammad’s position in regard to the Islamic law that he
himself proclaimed to his congregation? Even Muslim theologians do not
deny that, in different situations, Muhammad placed himself above instead
of under the law, or claimed for his own person revelations applying only
to himself and, in this way, justified special rights for himself (for example,
in regard to the large number of his wives, the violation of peace treaties,
or the marriage with his daughter-in-law, Zainab, which in principle was
forbidden for anyone else).
Is it mere coincidence that no Islamic country today recognizes a citi-
zen’s right of appeal against the state in the real sense of the term? Is it
mere coincidence that, to be sure, concessions in reaction to obvious injus-
tices are made here and there (as, for example, in the form of the “recon-
ciliation commission” like that appointed by King Mohammed VI in 2004
to investigate the human rights situation in Morocco), but that the common
citizen hardly can sue for justice or take legal action against a state that in
most cases is experienced as overpowering? Is it mere coincidence that
arbitrary arrest, unlimited incarceration without trial and attorney-assisted
defense, and, indeed, that overwhelming state power in the form of torture
and arbitrariness in many places are nothing unusual? Is it mere coinci-
dence that the question of who gets to feel the despotism of the state and
the power wielded by the powerful depends rather upon a person’s social
position, his family and social connections to the powerful people in the
country, as well as upon his financial possibilities when it is a legal ques-
tion of right or wrong? And, is it mere coincidence that all of this is the
case particularly in those countries that plead for the complete introduction
of Sharia as the divine law that creates justice? Is it a coincidence that in so
many Islamic countries the outcome of a trial is so often unpredictable and
that every outcome – for example, an acquittal as well as a death sentence
in the case of defection from Islam – appears to be possible up to the day
of judgment? Or, that the law in many places appears to be so easy to per-
vert, and that in many societies it is indispensable, for self-preservation, to
avoid government authorities in the search for justice – for example, pre-
cisely in the case when a woman desires to file a charge of rape – and not
to ask for help and support from those authorities where even greater injus-
tice can befall the petitioner? Or, that the common man on the street does
not experience a policeman primarily as a representative of law and justice,
but rather not seldom as someone who first of all delivers him into the
hands of injustice?
Monopoly in the Use of Force, and Retribution

To the guarantee of security and the creation of justice in a society also
belongs the assertion by the state of a monopoly on the use of force and the
renunciation of every kind of private retribution, against which the New
Testament already warns (Romans 13). Private retribution, when others
repay injustice as they see fit instead of the state and which is bound by its
own laws, causes an escalation of injustice, inevitably makes innocent fam-
ily members liable, and leads to the dissolution of constitutional structures.
There has been family liability and retribution suffered on behalf of oth-
ers in many societies, not least of all during the Third Reich. It is always a
sign of despotism, the more so since it lies in the nature of the matter to
overrule the theoretical necessity of a clearly demonstrable injustice and its
punishment according to the principle of equality, and to give way to anar-
chy.
The Koran, too, recognizes the unlimited private retribution practiced in
pre-Islamic times, which it limits but does not abolish. It expressly permits
retribution for bodily injury and manslaughter through the same such in-
jury or execution of the guilty person or a representative. The representa-
tive principle, thus, is not renounced fundamentally. This, too, is an aspect
of the current “cartoon dispute”, in which, first, Danish products and firms,
too, were included under the retribution for slandering Muhammad, and
then people of different nationalities, but primarily those of Christian con-
fession, were threatened and killed and the embassies of several countries
sent up in flames – they all belonged to the collective group of western
societies that were held in wholesale responsibility.
Dignity and Freedom of all People

From where can the dignity and freedom of a human being be derived?
According to the Christian view, this is possible above all on the basis of
the human being’s creation in the image of God, according to which the
human being is seen as a distinct, uniquely gifted creature called into life
by God. Since the dignity of the human being comes, in the last analysis,
from God himself, it is in the Christian view inviolable. This applies to the
dignity of every human being, whether it be a Christian or a non-Christian,
a man or a woman, a citizen or a guest, indeed whether a criminal or one
true to the law. The idea of the indivisible dignity of each individual is
closely linked with the idea of equality before God and the law, but also
just as much with respect and genuine tolerance, which can arise only
where this legal and natural equality of all human beings is a part of basic
consensus.
… in the Christian View

The Christian, who “shall cultivate and preserve” the earth (Genesis 1),
experiences this equality and dignity, but also the freedom given by God.
He is obligated to keep God’s commandments, but he does this as a free
creator of his world in obligation to his conscience. Creativity, inventive-
ness, enterprise, and free scholarship – the foundations of all economic and
intellectual growth and progress – but also the freedom of speech, the
press, and religion are the concrete expressions of this fundamental orienta-
tion in Christianity on the dignity and freedom of a human being. Only
Christianity has rejected slavery fundamentally. Important representatives
of their faith fought against it despite energetic resistance from the highest
authorities, and declared it to be incompatible with human dignity.
Critical thought, reflection upon one’s own being, upon life on this earth
and in the hereafter, indeed, even the reproach and the accusation directed
against God are not taboos already in the Old Testament– one need think
only of Job or the psalms of lament, which mercilessly expose the eternal
God to criticism by limited human beings. This God is, on the one hand,
inscrutable, but, on the other, exhorts human beings to reflect and inquire.
For this reason, the Christian faith constantly raises questions, is discussed
anew, and is re-examined on the basis of social realities. It inquires,
weighs, compares, and questions the meaning of history and personal exis-
tence, but also lets itself be questioned in the process – and this, too, al-
ready in the Old and New Testaments – without being damaged fundamen-
tally or having to fear for its honor.
Criticism and fundamental questioning of itself, creativity and freedom,
did not have to be wrung from the Christian faith, but rather were compati-
ble with its central concern from the very beginning, so that, finally, the
ideas of the Enlightenment could be taken up, too – even if the social real-
ity often did not reflect this ideal.
and in Islamic Theology

A comparison with the realities of Islamic theology and the social facts
of life shows that these values, too, are not universal matters of fact. In a
theology that, to be sure, considers the human being to be a creation of
God, but does not grant him the special dignity inhering in a creature made
in the image of God, it is then only a logical consequence that the human
being primarily is not a free and questioning creature, but rather is a sub-
jected one, a “Muslim” (Islam= submission, devotion). For this reason, the
one subjected enjoys basically more rights in the Islamic state than the Jew
or the Christian, neither of whom subjects himself to God in the religion of
Islam, is thus a non-Muslim, and for this reason is subjected as a second-
class citizen in the Islamic state through special taxes or discrimination. In
the same way, the man enjoys more rights in Islamic inheritance, witness,
and marital law than a woman, for there can be no equality among those
who are fundamentally unequal – a fundamental principle of Islamic law.
For this reason, the human being is not bound by his conscience, but
rather by the law with its numerous individual regulations regarding foods
and ablutions, clothing and the direction in which prayers are to be made,
the prescribed formulation of prayers, the prayer times determined to the
very minute, and the ritual of pilgrimage. Submission instead of critical
questioning, an educational system oriented on the whole much too much
on repetition instead of free research, the limitation of personal freedoms
such as the freedom of the press or of speech, or the withheld right to
found political parties, are a part of daily life in Islamic countries. Art,
culture, literature, and religious freedom may have had better opportunities
for development to a degree in the past, but however are very limited in
Islamic countries today. Sharia recognizes only the right to turn to Islam,
but for 1400 years it has threatened the defection from Islam with a death
sentence.
There are further aspects that could be examined comparatively, for ex-
ample the features of the Christian work ethic, which declares every form
of work to be valuable because it is service done at the same time both for
God and for the neighbor. The educational mission and the care of the sick
and the dying, the poor and the handicapped irrespective of their “value”,
their confession, their sex, or their origins are, in their foundations, specifi-
cally Christian values and in no case universal matters of fact.
No Fear of the Discussion of Values

There finally must be a well-grounded discussion about these values,
which have their roots in religion, legal thought, and tradition and which
underlie a society. It is absolutely not the case that everything that sounds
similar is also the “same” in content. Only when the foundations of our
society – as well as the foundations of the immigrant society – and their
consequences for life together are frankly analyzed and illuminated – for
example, in regard to the role of men and women, tolerance, and legal
thought – will the values essential for our society emerge. These then also
must be demanded of immigrants in order to be able to shape a construc-
tive life together.
However, if this society persists in its uncertainty about its own values
and identity, then it will be able to offer only little resistance in opposition
to such a challenging culture and tradition that possesses its own firmly
established framework of values. In the long run, it will be able only to
admire that culture in a disoriented fashion, or must dissociate itself from it
for the sake of survival. Both, however, are no alternatives for a common
future, which, without any doubt, we must shape together.
A discussion of values and the rules for life together derived from such a
discussion, thus, cannot be a sign of arrogance or of a “forced germaniza-
tion”, but on the contrary a sign of good will on behalf of a genuine shared
existence. Whoever carelessly casts his or her own history and identity
overboard, already has given up him- or herself and will live tomorrow in a
crumbling order of values, in which parallel value and legal systems estab-
lish themselves.
Christian values supplemented by the Enlightenment and humanism of-
fer a stable framework for a life together that has meaning and exhibits
equality. This is because these values make possible the respect of every
person, tolerance on the basis of equality, the rights of women and minori-
ties, rights of freedom and religion, and the common shaping of the future
in equality and under a common canon of values “without respect of per-
sons”.
Islam has become an irrevocable component of German and European
society. Let us finally establish common rules. For, a successful life to-
gether, because of the divergent notions of values, will not arise by itself.
On the contrary, because of the long period of neglect of the problems,
greater efforts are necessary today. Politics needs to propose additional
programs in the instruction of language and values, for children as well as
also for those resident here for thirty years. New solutions are needed for
finding work and training for those who have failed and left school early.
Additional educational programs and perhaps even a new housing policy
are needed to prevent the formation of additional ghettoes and the devel-
opment there of independent notions of the law. But, every citizen also has
a responsibility in his or her own environment when encounter with others
and engagement in politics and society, support und demands, programs
and the drawing of boundaries are at issue.
This society at the moment stands at a crossroads: Will it summon the
energy to reassure itself once again of its culture and civilization, to find
sound arguments for it, and to defend it successfully in the confrontation
with other philosophies of life? The future of us all already has begun – let
us find the courage to shape it together.
4 Islam – Religion of Peace?7
Is Islam really a religion of peace, as for instance the “Islamic Charter”

of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD) put it in 2002?
Does the very term Islam have or contain the meaning peace? Is Islam
etymologically related to the Arabic word salaam (peace, cf. Hebrew sha-
lom)? Does Islam live up to its claim to bring peace to mankind?
A person who accepts Islam “is at peace with themselves and with their
environment”8, or more fully “Islam is the religion and lifestyle of peace-
makers. The goal of Islam is peace in all areas … Human beings are to
make their peace with God and to be at peace with themselves and God’s
creation. Islam means a life of rest and peace in which the eternal grace of
God is manifest.”9
Does the word Islam mean peace?

It is true that Islam and salaam derive from the same Arabic triliterate
root s-l-m, but this need not imply semantic overlap or proximity, since
any number of Arabic words may derive from the same root without neces-
sarily having the same or similar meaning.
In any case Muslims lay less emphasis on etymology and stress rather
the theological axiom that where Islam is dominant it brings peace.
The common Muslim greeting, echoing sura 6.54, is “as-salaam
‘alaykum”, “peace be with you”, answered by “wa-‘alaykum as-salaam”,
“and to you too peace.”
Conservative opinion recommends limiting this greeting to Muslims on
the grounds that only Islam and thus Muslims can bring world peace. Non-
7
First published in: Islam und Christlicher Glaube/Islam and Christianity. Journal of
the Islam Institute of the German Evangelical Alliance. 7/2007, 2: 14-21
8
That’s the definition of the “Muslimische Studenten der TU-Ilmenau” (Muslim stu-
dents of the technical university of Ilmenau): http://www.stud.-tu-ilmenau.de
(18.09.2007)
9
“Die Stimme des Islam” http://www.moslem.at/islam/frieden.html (18.09.2007)
Muslims cannot be real peacemakers. The consensus among Oriental
scholars is, however, that Jews and Christians used this greeting in its
Aramaic (salaam) or Hebrew (shalom) form before the birth of Islam.10
Scholars who do not render Islam as peace interpret the term as “en-
trance into the state of salvation”11 and Muslim as “a person entering12 the
state of salvation.”13 J. Ch. Bürgel considers Islam to be a combination of
two strands, “attainment of salvation through submission”14, i.e. without
the submission demanded by Islam, no salvation. In addition to submission
and surrender Helmer Ringgren sees “unquestioning obedience” and “ut-
ter heart dedication to God” as possible renderings of Islam.15
There can be no doubt that etymologically Islam in Arabic means “devo-
tion”, “submission”. It was submission to the one almighty God that Mu-
hammad demanded from his Arab contemporaries when around 610 AD he
began to preach monotheism and the Last Judgment. The derivate term
Muslim designates a person who has accepted Islam and means literally
“submitting oneself”, one who submits or dedicates themselves to God.
Was early Islam peaceful?

The fact is that even in its primitive form Islam neither brought peace ei-
ther for Muslims or non-Muslims nor did it represent a state of peace. As
military commander of his followers Muhammad fended off armed attacks
and himself conducted aggressive campaigns, particularly after his move to
Medina in 622 AD.
10
C. van Arendonk; [C. Gimaret]. Salam. In: Encyclopaedia of Islam, Bd. VIII, Lei-
den: E. J. Brill, 1995, p. 916
11
Johann Christoph Bürgel. Allmacht und Mächtigkeit. Religion und Welt im Islam. C.
H. Beck: Munich, 1991, p. 23
12
“Here, salvation does not mean redemption from sins through the self-sacrifice of
the Son of God but entering the universe put in order by God and his almighty
power. It means to be a partner of the almighty power of God”. Bürgel. Allmacht.
op. cit., p. 24
13
More disputed is the connection between the term ‘Islam’ and salaam/salvation,
covenant of peace or Islam as a synonym for dedicating one’s own life to Allah.
Helmer Ringgren. “Islam, ‘aslama and muslim.” in: Horae soederblomianae 2.
Uppsala 1949. pp. S. 2-5
14
Bürgel. Allmacht. op. cit., p. 24
15
Helmer Ringgren. “Islam, ‘aslama and muslim.” in: Horae soederblomianae 2. Upp-
sala 1949. pp. 1-34
4 Islam – Religion of Peace? 47
In Mecca Muhammad originally sought recognition and disciples among
the Arab tribes and recognized Jews and Christians as possessing divine
revelation, even if he did not share their convictions. “Say: you unbeliev-
ers! I do not worship what you worship, and you not worship what I wor-
ship. I do not worship what you used to worship. You have your religion, I
have mine” (sura 109). Muhammad did not threaten retribution but ap-
pealed for followers and let Muslims and non-Muslims exist side by side.
God would be the ultimate judge. “What I do is my concern, and what you
do is yours. You are innocent of what I do, and I am innocent of what you
do.” (10:41)
In the context of contemporary dialogue the words of sura 2:256 is fre-
quently cited: “There is no compulsion in religion” but this affirmation is
subject to differing interpretations. Some think it means those who have
already their religion (i.e. Muslims) cannot be compelled to perform
certain religious practices, others see it as referring to heart religion which
cannot be subject to compulsion. After all, Jews and Christians living in
areas conquered by Islam have not as a rule been compelled to submit to
Islam but tolerated in their own religious practice.
In Medina Muhammad’s role increasingly shifted from that of a preacher
warning of impending judgment and calling people to turn to the One true
God, to that of legislator for the young Muslim community as well as army
commander and warlord.16 There was also a shift in Muhammad’s relation-
ship to Jews and Christians to increasing remoteness and enmity, which for
the three large indigenous Jewish tribes in Medina, Banu Nadir, Banu
Qainuqa’ and Banu Quraiza in the years 624-627 climaxed in repression,
expulsion and extermination.
Having consolidated his power, Muhammad made a final attempt in later
years to return to his birthplace Mecca and in 632 was ultimately able to
make a “farewell” pilgrimage to the Ka’aba just months before his death,
thus once and for all incorporating into Islam the pre-Islamic sacrificial and
pilgrimage rites. A previous revelation declared banning Muslims from the
proper place of worship, the Ka’aba, to be “more heinous” than breaking
an armistice, and “persecution”, “impediment” or enticing others away
from Islam “graver than killing” (2:217). This rather fuzzy definition of
“enticement” or “impediment” furnishes Islamic extremists with sufficient
grounds from the Qur’an and the life of Muhammad to declare Muslims
16
Compare also the description of the role shifting of Muhammad with Earle H.
Waugh. Peace. in: Encyclopaedia of the Qur’an. E. J. Brill: Leiden, 2004, Vol. 4,
p. 35
who are impeded in their practice of Islam to be objects of aggression. If
planning permission is refused for a mosque or limits set on the height of
the building, does that not count as repression and impeding the faithful
from practicing Islam? This would justify resistance, since such enticement
is “graver than killing.”
Whatever else it may be, it is definitely injustice on the part of non-
Muslims, since only the unhindered practice of Islam guarantees justice
and peace on earth. Hindrances put in the way of Islam ultimately impede
the implementation and spread of God’s rule on earth. “Muslims are
charged with defending the human right of freedom to publicly express
their faith in God at all costs, if need be by force.”17 It is not difficult to
imagine how such a struggle for the untrammeled liberty of (Islamic) belief
is susceptible to abuse. The emphasis that a Muslim “must be active in
protecting those who invoke God’s help in resisting tyranny”18 is a call for
solidarity with all who could in any way be regarded as an oppressed mi-
nority of fellow-Muslims. “What about you, who do not struggle in Allah’s
way for the helpless man, women and children who say ‘Lord lead us out
of this city who inhabitants are oppressors and grant us a protector and
helper sent by you!’” (4:75)
The Qur’an and later Muslim apologetic writings justify the attacks on
Jews and Arabs who resisted Muhammad and his proclamation of Islam by
arguing the Jews had derided Muhammad and he was acting in self-
defense. The Islamic community has an absolute right of self-defense
(22:39-40) and to fight those who fail to abide by treaties and who deride
Muslims. “If they break their covenantal oath and disdain your faith, you
are to fight the leaders of the infidels … to make them desist.” (9:12) Mu-
hammad led crusades to attack Arab tribes who refused to side with him.
The Qur’an condemns them as enemies of Muhammad and God. “Arm
yourselves with as many troops and horses you can to intimidate your
enemies and God’s.” (8:60)
In the first centuries after Muhammad, during the reign of the first four
Caliphs from 632-661, the spread of Islam throughout the Arabian penin-
sula, across North Africa was not always by bloody conquest but led in
every case to the subjugation of Jews and Christians as “wards” in an Is-
lamic area and consequently a curb on their religious liberties. The original
Christian majority’s resistance to Islamic conquest was also weakened by
internal ecclesiastical rivalry, bribery, the threat of higher taxes for non-
17
“Was sagt der Islam zu Krieg und Frieden”, http://www.enfal.de/krieg.htm
18
“Was sagt der Islam zu Krieg und Frieden”, http://www.enfal.de/krieg.htm, p. 3
Muslims and illusions about the new rulers’ tolerance, all of which played
into the hands of those furthering the progressive islamization of what had
been overwhelmingly Christian areas.19
The Way to Peace

A number of verses in the Qur’an affirm that a person who has accepted
Islam goes “the way of peace.” “God leads those who aim to please him
the way of peace (or salvation) and brings them with his permission from
darkness to light and leads them in a straight way.” (5:16) Whoever goes
God’s way and follows his right direction knows peace (20:47).
In the Qur’an peace is intimately associated with entering Paradise. The
angels pronounce peace to those who have obtained God’s favor in the
Last Judgment (16:32). Whoever enters Paradise will receive an accolade
of greeting and peace (25:75) and hear the greeting of peace (10:10). Peace
reigns in Paradise (19.62) for it is the “the place where peace dwells”
(10:25).
For the individual, peace is found now and in the hereafter through the
acceptance of Islam. Were everyone to accept Islam and live according to
God’s Sharia law, society would also know peace. On this view conflict
arises from the existence of non-Muslims and “peace will only come when
the frontiers of Islam have reached the end of the earth.”20
The Qur’an also commends efforts to make peace on an interpersonal
level, although primarily disputes between Muslims, whether spouses
(4:35) or simply “brothers” (49:10). In disputes with “infidels” the Muslim
party should come to terms if the other party is also “inclined to peace.”
(8:61; 4:90) Combat against infidels should be broken off if the godless
submit to Islam. “Fight in Allah’s way against those who fight against you,
but do not transgress. Allah does not love transgressors. Kill them, wher-
ever you encounter them, expel them from where they expelled you, for to
persecute is worse than to kill. Do not attack them in a protected place of
19
Martin Tamcke mentions some concrete examples: “Der Patriarch und seine arabi-
schen Christen. Die nestorianischen Katholikoi-Partriarchen in ihren Anweisungen
für Kirchenglieder auf der Arabischen Halbinsel in frühomajadischer Zeit.” in:
Detlev Kreikenbom u.a. (Hg.). Arabische Christen – Christen in Arabien. Nord-
ostafrikanisch / Westasiatische Studien 6, Peter Lang: Frankfurt, 2007, pp. 105-
119
20
A. Th. Khoury. “Frieden.” in: A. Th. Khoury; Ludwig Hagemann; Peter Heine.
Islam-Lexikon, Vol. 1, p. 259
prayer until they (first) attack you, but if they fight you, then kill them.
Such is the desert of infidels. However if they desist, Allah is merciful and
forgiving.” (2:190-192).
In the verse “Fight against them until there is no persecution (or unbe-
lief, apostasy or turning others from the faith) left and (all) religion is Al-
lah’s” (2:192), the Qur’an demands the struggle continue until Islam is the
only surviving religion, since Muslim eschatology presupposes that in the
last days, when the apocalyptic beast appears (27:82), the dead will be
summoned to judgment (21:96), Jesus will reappear on earth to combat the
Antichrist, Islam alone will predominate and a universal reign of peace will
dawn, once the adherents of other religions have either converted to Islam
or been killed – ultimate peace through the creation of a homogenous Is-
lamic society. So peace has to do with subjugation, Muslims’ submission
to God, the subjugation of non-Muslims to Muslims, until finally freedom
(the submission of all mankind) comes at the end of time.
The Meaning of Peace

To assess the assertion that Islam means peace one must first, as in the
parallel case of human rights for men and women, define what is meant by
peace. Islam does not lead to peace in the sense that Muslims and non-
Muslims enjoy equal rights in Islamic societies or that religious communi-
ties meet on equal terms without discrimination. It does bring “peace” in
the sense of an order which defines the legal discrimination and subjuga-
tion of non-Muslims in accordance with Islamic law.
For the “tolerated” Jewish and Christian minorities in Islamic areas
“peace” means being classed as “wards” with inferior social, political and
often also economic status in the dominant Muslim community. Even if in
the course of later history individuals sometimes rose to influential posi-
tions, they retained inferior legal status were subject to incessant pressure
to convert and occasionally suffered threats or persecution.21 Islam’s
proclaimed “tolerance” for non-Muslims means that Christians and Jews
did not as a rule have to abandon their faith, while the payment of a poll-
tax discharged them from the obligatory participation in jihad. So “peace”
in this instance does not imply a relationship of equality but a hierarchy of
21
Some of the classical discriminating sharia laws imposed n Jews and Christians in
the “house of Islam” are mentioned by Yohanan Friedmann. Tolerance and Coer-
cion in Islam. Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition. Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge, 2003, p. 37
the privileged and the underprivileged as second-class citizens existing side
by side in an Islamic area.
The religion of “the people of the book” is no more than tolerated be-
cause Islam is superior to all other religions on account of its “immunity
against (later) abrogation”22 as the only genuine faith, since “Islam is
truly God’s religion” (3:19)
At the same time the Muslim community has priority over all non-
Muslims (3:110) for the “the task of the political community of Muslims …
is to bear and maintain God’s rights and safeguard the human rights
emancipated according to the standard of divine right.”23 Sura 9:29 orders
Muslims to combat the people of the book who “do not belong to the true
religion” “until they meekly pay tribute.” Here too peace in the sense of an
end to conflict comes through subjugation and the recognition of Islamic
rule.
In the 11th century AD the Sunni legal expert al-Mawardi advocated a
hypothesis that still finds supporters today, especially among Islamists. He
divided the world into the “house of Islam” (Arabic daar al-islaam) where
Islam and Islamic law are in force, and the “house of war” (Arabic daar
al-harb) where Islam does not yet rule. This classification is found neither
in the Qur’an nor the tradition but is a definition of Muslim theology. Ac-
cording to this hypothesis the “house of Islam” is involved in a continuing
struggle against the “house of war” and this just war of conquest, jihad,
will continue until the “house of war” becomes the “house of Islam.”
Such a perspective leaves no room for co-existence between the only true
faith (Islam) and unbelief (Arabic kufr) or polytheism (Arabic shirk).
For other groups only a peaceful proclamation of Islam is legitimate,
since the true faith cannot be foisted on people by political means or by
force. Islamic mystics see the essence of Islam in ascetic piety, meditation
and contemplation and reject armed struggle and political programs. This
goes for the Ahmadiyya movement too, persecuted on the Indian sub-
continent, which lays strong emphasis on Da’wa, the “invitation” or “call
to Islam” but holds itself aloof from any form of violence.
22
As defined by Yohanan Friedmann. Tolerance, op. cit. p. 26
23
A. Th. Khoury. “Frieden.” in: A. Th. Khoury; Ludwig Hagemann; Peter Heine.
Islam-Lexikon, Vol. 1, p. S. 261
Islam – political or apolitical?

Various answers are given to the question what constitutes “real” Islam.
Can it be reduced to the early period in Mecca? Can Islam stripped off
political ambitions command a majority today? If so, will it be possible to
find religious leaders who can separate the practice of religion from the
example of Muhammad’s political action in Medina as long as they hold
fast to the idea of the unquestionable authority of the Qur’an as divine
revelation and Muhammad’s binding instructions preserved in the tradi-
tion? The question seems to be still open.
It remains open because up till now there has been no critical research
into the Qur’an in the Islamic world and therefore no discussion recognized
by theological authorities of the separation of the practice of religion from
the political inheritance of the past. There is a continuous trickle of indi-
vidual dissidents, writers, intellectuals, theologians, forced into exile in the
West for having called down the wrath of the authorities or of segments of
the population for their criticism of the Qur’an or society. The latest and
most prominent example is Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, now teaching in Leyden
in the Netherlands. Literary figures (not Qur’an exegetes!) such as Nagib
Machfuz or Farag Fouda have been targets of assassination attempts be-
cause their writings were seen as critical of society and by implication de-
rogatory to Islam.
Historical-critical research into the history of Islam and the text of the
Qur’an officially presented from the pulpits of universities and mosques
hardly exists in the Arab world. Advocacy of a “Meccan” Islam which
rejects Muhammad’s political activity in Medina may serve well enough as
a personal creed, but to make such a statement in public would be a deli-
cate matter fraught with social and political consequences, since many
conservative theologians in the university and the mosque would regard it
as verging on heresy.
Muhammad’s example
Every believer’s duty to live according to Muhammad’s “sunna”, his ex-
ample handed down by tradition and unquestioned in Islamic theology,
does not make it any easier to see how his political and military activity
while in Medina can be phased out while still retaining the untrammeled
authority of the Qur’an. The “Hadith”, traditional accounts of the life of
Muhammad forming a kind of background explanation of difficult pas-
sages in the Qur’an, is much more voluminous than the Qur’an itself and
provides details of how Muhammad and his family, his associates and his
successors, the four Caliphs, lived. Tradition relates what clothes Muham-
mad wore, his personal preferences (he loved cats, for example) and aver-
sions (men who dressed in silk and gold).
This tradition is important for the present topic of peace because legal
decisions referred to in it, such as those relating to the criminal code or
marital and family law, are on principle regarded as divine revelation and
thus as binding as the Qur’an text itself.
This creates an inflexible linkage between the Qur’an’s directive (33:21)
that Muhammad’s example is a “beautiful model” to imitate and to be
followed in legal matters, and the present time. From the perspective of
non-Muslims it turns the secular history of the past into binding prescrip-
tions for behavior in the present. This makes it seem problematic to play
down the second half of Muhammad’s life in Medina as invalid and out of
date, since the tradition relates reports of and instructions for the struggle
against the enemies of Islam and “infidels”. The critical question is how
such verses are to be applied today and what conclusions the Muslim
community can or should draw from them. The extremists’ answer to this
question obviously differs considerably from that given by apolitical mem-
bers of the Muslim community.
Conclusion
In Muhammad’s lifetime Islamic rule was already a symbiosis between
the spiritual and the secular. Islam is not simply a religion but also a way
of life and a social framework for individuals, families and the state, since
the Qur’an claims that inheritance, family and criminal law are all part of
the Sharia, the eternally valid law of God. It is therefore entirely consistent
for politically active Islamic groups to apply the universally accepted duty
of imitating Muhammad’s life in the political arena and even to the strug-
gle for the defense and spread of Islam.
Muhammad needs to be seen in the perspective of his own time of tribal
conflicts and vendettas in 6th and 7th century Arabia. Seen against this
background his methods were neither disproportionate nor particularly
cruel. The question is whether they were divinely revealed or appropriate
for making peace? Muhammad fought for what he saw as his rights with
the sword, he enacted retribution on political adversaries, wrought venge-
ance on his enemies, strove to extend his rule and claimed for himself as
Prophet and leader extraordinary rights denied to other members of his
community. He bequeathed to them the vision that Islam would one day
cover the earth. The Qur’an does speak of peace, but of peace between
Muslims and the peace that comes through universal submission to the
Sharia.
By contrast, peace and universal reconciliation are a central concern in
the Bible. Jesus, the Prince of Peace (Isaiah 9:5) was not content to de-
scribe how peace should work in theory but uniquely created peace and
reconciliation by his own life and death, peace between God and man, but
also peace among men. Because God is a God of peace (Romans 15:33),
peace is a central topic of the Bible. Jesus became a human being in order
to make peace between God and man (Colossians 1:20). It is hardly sur-
prising his followers are called to be messengers of peace (Isaiah 52:7),
peacemakers (Matthew 5:9; Romans 14:19) and at peace with all men
(Romans 12:18). One can only live up to this high vocation by accepting
the peace God offers, being at peace with God and oneself, and learning to
be a peacemaker in one’s own environment.
5 How Muslims view Christians –
What does the Koran Teach?24
Muslims (sometimes even Nonmuslims) complain about Christians – or

Western society – insisting on portraying Islam as “the enemy”. They be-
lieve that Christians especially precondemn Muslims whereas Muslims
“tolerate” Christians and accept them “without prejudice”. But is that really
the whole picture? What does the Qur’an and Muslim Tradition (hadith)
teach when it comes to Christians, the Christian faith and the Bible? What
will an “average” Muslim think coming into contact with a Christian?
Would he think more positively about Christians or be hesitant and dis-
tance himself from them?
The Islamic view of Christians: Qur’an and Hadith

Since Islam was not proclaimed by Muhammad until the 7th century AD
the Bible can contain no explicit judgment about Islam. Any opinion that
Christians have about Islam arises out of their general understanding of
Scripture which leads to an enormous variety of opinions and positions
about Islam both inside and outside the Christians churches.
When Christians are accused of not being enough open for interreligious
dialogue with Muslims and of not even expecting to find part of God’s
revelation and truth in Islam, people often do not keep in mind that con-
vinced Muslims would never accept such an approach to dialogue either.
Contrary to the Christian who has to find his own position concerning Is-
lam, the Muslim picture of Christianity and the Christian faith is already
relatively fixed. It is fixed because of the Qur’anic statements which as a
revelation after Christ makes many statements about Christians and the
Christian faith which have been later all in all underlined and confirmed by
Muslim tradition (hadith). Since there has never been an “Islamic enlight-
24
the Islam Institute of the German Evangelical Alliance. 0/2000, 1: 8-12 and
1/2001, 1: 12-17
enment” in the European sense of the word and no official historical-
critical Qur’an exegesis or Qur’an analysis, there is only limited maneuver-
ing space for exegesis and alternative interpretation of Qur’an texts and
traditions as normative texts.
Christians as seen by the Qur’an

In the Qur’an we find a complex picture of Christians and the Christian
faith:
We know that Muhammad must have got some knowledge of Christian-
ity in the 7th century AD on the Arabian Peninsula as well as during his
trade tours to Syria (and perhaps other surrounding countries). As far as we
know Muhammad only met single Christians – eremites, monks – but there
seems to have been no church of the New Testament type on the Arabian
Peninsula in his time. As far as the few written sources tell us, there was no
complete Arabic Bible translation in existence at Muhammad’s lifetime.
The Christian faith on the Arabian Peninsula was practiced mostly in
church languages like Syrian which ordinary Arabic speaking people could
not understand. As a consequence, most churches must have been as far as
sources tell us – unbalanced in their doctrines, since at least some mono-
physitistic Christian churches in Syria and Abessinia venerated Mary as
being the “mother of God”, adhered to a Nestorian form of Christianity or
practiced a monophysitistic form of faith.
The piety of the Christians

At the beginning of his proclamation of Islam, Muhammad very much
hoped to be accepted as a prophet of God by Christians as well as by Jews.
He considered both religions more highly developed than that of the Arabs,
the “heathens”, and he accepted Jews and Christians as “people of the
book” (arab. ahl al-kitab). He likewise hoped that they would accept him as
a prophet sent to the Arabs with a revelation from God. Not only did he
accept Jews and Christians as “people of the book”, but he first also pro-
claimed a similar form of fasting like the Jews practiced it, and he pro-
claimed Jerusalem as the direction for ritual prayer. Later, he abolished
both of these practices by other revelations.
Additionally to that, Muhammad first praised the piety of the Christians,
their love, their humbleness, their faith, as we read in Sura 5:82: “And
you will find the nearest of them in affection to those who believe (to be)
5 How Muslims view Christians – What does the Koran Teach? 57
those who say: ‘We are Christians. That is because there are among them
priests and monks, and because they are not proud’” (5:82).
Probably at about the same time the Qur’an tells us that the Christians do
have knowledge of God, that they believe in God and the Last Day and
that they do not have any reason to be afraid of the Last Judgment (2:62).
Also sura 3:110 confirms: “Some of them are believers”, although the
same sura in the next sentence restricts: “but most of them are evil-livers”
(blasphemers). At the same time this verse also considers the Muslims to
be of higher rank than any other group: “You are the best community that
has been raised up for mankind. You enjoin right conduct and forbid inde-
cency; and you believe in Allah” (3:110).
Especially this statement about the “best community” (arab. kuntum
haira ummatin), i.e. the community of the Muslims, is still quite important
for the convinced Muslim’s own identity in relationship to Nonmuslims.
The Qur’an further states that the Christians tried to convert Muhammad
to Christianity (2:135), to which he responded by calling them become his
followers as he claimed to be the ‘interpreter’ of their scriptures (5:15) who
corrects what they have falsified. Both the Jews as well as the Christians
refused (2:111).
The Christians’ disapproval of Muhammad

As Muhammad continued to preach in Medina after 622 AD, the Mus-
lim-Christian relationship came to a standstill because of the two sides’
mutual disapproval of the other’s theological position. The prophet’s dis-
like of the Christians grew, while he actively opposed the three great Jew-
ish tribes politically and expulsed them from and killed them in Medina.
He was convinced that he was not bringing a new revelation but only pro-
claiming the only message that had ever been sent down from eternity in a
pure form, the same message preached by all prophets ever since Adam.
Since Christians rejected Muhammad’s claim to be a prophet from God,
and since their message deviated from his, he accused them of falsifying
Scripture and opposed those Christian dogmas which deviated from his
revelations, which he believed to correspond to the original message.
One of the most important reproaches to the Christians involves the
Trinity (2:116; 5:73), which Muhammad however misunderstood as a
“trinity” of the father, Jesus Christ, the son, and Mary, his mother. Accord-
ing to the Muslims, this Christian doctrine is the greatest sin possible, the
unforgivable offense of “shirk” (“shirk”: associating a partner at God’s
side). Christians err in their understanding of the sonship of Jesus (5:72;
9:30), since Jesus according to the Qur’an is only a human being, a prophet
and messenger of God sent to Israel. And the Christians err in their belief
in the crucifixion of Jesus 84:157-158) and in their doctrine on the fall of
mankind.
It was perhaps at this time of growing estrangement from the Christians
that Muhammad proclaimed to have received the revelation of a Qur’an
verse which has been often quoted by today’s Muslim fundamentalistic
groups. This text openly refers to Christians as “evil-doers” or “evil-livers”
and warns the Muslims against taking Christians as their friends: “O you
who believe! Take not the Jews and Christians for friends. They are friends
one to another. He among you who takes them for friends is (one) of them.
Lo! Many of mankind are evil-livers” (5:51).
Are Christians unbelievers?

During this period of increasing disassociation, the Qur’an also tells us
that Christians insist on their (false) theological positions and that they are
“turned away” (5:75). They “confound the truth with falsehood and know-
ingly conceal the truth” (3:71) and therefore “Allah fights against them.
How perverse are they!” (9:30), because they stick to the sonship of Jesus.
Also many exhortations “to kill (or slay) the unbelievers” are found in
the Qur’an (e. g. 2:191; 4:89) as well as the statement that the unbelievers
“will abide in the fires of hell”. But neither the Qur’an nor Muslim theol-
ogy provides a clear-cut unanimous identification of the “unbelievers”: if it
is the Christians, if the “people of the book” can be understood to be unbe-
lievers or not, if this verse is only of contemporary importance and means
those unbelievers of Muhammad’s lifetime or if it still refers to those who
have heard the call of Islam but have refused to follow. Qur’anic state-
ments about Non-Muslims are so complex and elastic that specific inter-
pretations and their consequences for modern applications depend on pre-
sumptions not to be found within the text but only in the personal attitude
of the individual.
Emotional problems for Muslims by Western Criticism of

the Qur’an
In many Muslim countries Christians are a minority, sometimes Chris-
tians do not have access to better schools and jobs, do not play any impor-
tant role in society and are willfully held back from positions of influence
and prestige. In other countries they suffer from persecution. In all these
countries, the Muslim majority would be never exposed to open criticism
of Islam. Muslims are of the opinion that this is only as it should be, as
Christians are considered to be “dhimmis” (protegés) under Islamic guardi-
anship. At the same time, the Quran as well as many Muslim writers and
theologians openly and sometimes even harshly criticize the Christians, the
Bible and the Christian faith. Therefore, some Muslims are under shock
when they immigrate to the West because in their eyes Islam is criticized
“all the time” there, as a Muslim complained about in recent email conver-
sation. This creates emotional problems for many Muslims as the Christian
majority holds a position in Western society where they are no subjugates
to Islam, but it is them who are making the rules for the Muslim immi-
grants. And anybody criticizing any religion does not have to look for an
excuse. In this way, things are turned upside down in the Muslims’ eyes.
Everyone knows how unwise it is in most cases to question Muhammad
or to criticize Islam in a conversation with a Muslim friend as doors may
be closed forever (only in some cases open conversation may be possible if
both are already good friends, the Muslim is alone with his Christian friend
and not with his family – otherwise he lose his face – and he is not a very
devout Muslim).
Christians and Christianity as viewed by Contemporary

Muslims
It is only to be expected that later Muslim scholars reiterated and wrote
within the confines of this rather ambivalent Quranic presentation of Chris-
tianity. Islamic apologetics more often emphasize the later, negative
Quranic sayings. Over time, these have acquired normative value, abrogat-
ing those earlier, more positive statements about Christianity. Christians
violate Islam’s central dogma of tauhid (uniqueness of God) – and this is
the gravest sin possible as many writers hold. This is only made worse by
their rejection of Muhammad as the messenger of God. At the same time
one has to concede that individual Muslims often respect practicing Chris-
tians and some of the values contained in their religion more than Islamic
theology would allow them to do.
Islam’s Superiority over Christianity

Muslims view Christianity as an offshoot of Islam which, in turn, is re-
garded as the universal religion of mankind. Hence, Islam has been in exis-
tence since Adam and will endure as the only religion till the end of time.
Christians will not find mercy before God’s judgment seat since they have
fallen into grave doctrinal errors. The Quran repeatedly states that Chris-
tians who “disbelieve” will go to hell: “Those who disbelieve among the
People of the Book and the Polytheists, will be thrown in hellfire, to dwell
therein. They are the worst of creatures” (98:6). It can be assumed that the
phrase “those who disbelieve among the People of the Book” refers to
Christians who rejected Muhammad’s prophethood and Islamic monothe-
ism.
Many Muslims of today claim that Christians not only err in their belief,
however. The rapid moral decline of the West, accompanied by alcohol-
ism, prostitution, homosexuality, the existence of old-peoples homes, un-
married couples living together, drugs and wasteful consumption, all seem
to underline the belief that Islam holds a valid alternative. Support for this
view is taken from the Quran (3:110) which confirms that “you are the best
of peoples that evolved for mankind, commanding what is right and for-
bidding what is wrong”. The moral decline of the West “proves” Islam to
be true and superior, as many contemporary Muslim scholars and writers
claim. Islam, they argue, has all the answers to cure the ills of western so-
ciety. Only turning to Islam will bring healing and stability. – It goes with-
out saying that weaknesses and problems of the Muslim world are not dis-
cussed at the same time. Or if they are mentioned at all not very few
Muslim writers hold that any weakness in the Muslim world (like unem-
ployment, lack of infrastructure, schooling, jobs, adequate housing etc.) are
due to Western imperialism and the desire of the West to destroy the Mus-
lim world and Islam.
Christianity as Viewed by Selected Muslim Scholars

In writings of Muslim scholars about Christianity one finds surprisingly
few affirmative statements, many are rather disapproving and derogative.
In their studies, contemporary writers frequently refer back to Muslim
apologetic literature that emerged during Islam’s medieval period.
Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935)
Muhammad Rashid Rida is regarded as one of the most influential Mus-
lim scholars at the turn of the last century. Unlike his mentor, the re-
nowned Egyptian reformer Muhammad Abduh, Rida vehemently opposed
Christianity. In addition to being a Mufti (giving Islamic legal opinions)
Rida published the renowned Quranic commentary al-Manar, which he
compiled from notes and expositions by his former teacher.25
In his writings Rashid Rida addresses the question of the reliability of
the Christian scriptures, which he regarded as a combination of myths,
legend and history that have become interwoven with the message of
God26.
In his assault on the Christian revelation, Rida readily employs Biblical
historical criticism, first developed by Christian theologians in the West,
and applied to 19th century Islamic apologetics. In order to demonstrate the
absurdity of the Christian religion, Rida studied the works of European
theologians, philosophers and writers. Many of them published their works
in order to undermine and destroy the Christian faith in Europe.
Muhammad Muhammad Abu Zahra (1898-1974)
The late Muhammad Abu Zahra must be regarded as one of most influ-
ential personalities among Muslim scholars and apologist of the 20th cen-
tury. In addition to his post as professor for Religious Studies at the al-
Azhar, he lectured at the University of Cairo’s Faculty of Law. He wrote
about the reliability of the Christian scriptures.
It was in 1942 that Abu Zahra first began a series of “lectures about
Christianity. Like Rashid Rida before him, Abu Zahra expresses outright
opposition to Christianity in his writings. Abu Zahra applies methods of
historical criticism that had emerged earlier from Europe’s theological and
philosophical literature.
As a starting point, Abu Zahra He argues, that initial Christianity, as
taught by Jesus Christ himself, was in perfect harmony with Islam. How-
ever, due to the later corruption of the Biblical text, this ideal Christianity
can no longer be found in the Christian scriptures but has to be sought in
the Quran27. For Abu Zahra, the Trinity, which caused a major split in the
25
Malcolm Kerr. Islamic Reform. The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad
‘Abduh and Rashid Rida. Berkeley 1966
26
Mahmoud Ayoub. “Muslim Views of Christianity.” in: Islamochristiana (Rom)
10/1984, p. 58
27
Muhammad Muhammad Abu Zahra. muhadarat fi-n nasraniya. al-Qahira, 19663 p.
166
Christian church, is not part of this initial Christian teaching but was intro-
duced only as a result of the Philosophical School in Alexandria.28
Abu Zahra’s also goes on to include the contemporary Christian faith. In
the 3rd edition of his lectures he denies attacking the Christian religion,
stressing that it is his intention to ‘merely present scientific fact’29. What is
conveyed, however, is the Islamic reading vis-à-vis the corruption of the
Christian text, presented here as the result of scientific research. The possi-
bility that a different set of assumptions or approaches could produce dif-
ferent results is not considered: Islam and religion can only be viewed from
an Islamic perspective. Abu Zahra only knew Arabic, therefore his judg-
ment of Christianity is based entirely on apologetic literature available in
his mother tongue. Not surprisingly, his description follows the accepted
Muslim reading of the Biblical texts. The Christian faith is denied self-
representation.30
Ahmad Shalabi (1921-)
The Egyptian Ahmad Shalabi graduated from the University of Cam-
bridge with a PhD in history. As a religious scholar he published the trea-
tise ‘A Comparison of Religions’ (muqaranat al-adyan) where he dis-
cusses Christianity, and especially the themes of trinity, crucifixion, and
redemption.
The Christian religion, according to Shalabi, is a combination of the
Apostle Paul’s personal opinions coupled with pagan elements which he
introduced into Christianity.31
Shalabi argues that the accounts of Jesus’ birth, temptation and resurrec-
tion, as found in the four gospels, have been influenced by Buddhist leg-
ends and stories about pagan gods in India and the Middle East.32
One could easily find more literature of the like. In most cases Muslim
theologians of the 19th and 20th century are more negative towards Chris-
28
Muhammad Muhammad Abu Zahra. muhadarat fi-n nasraniya. al-Qahira, 19663 pp.
103-110; 129ff.
29
Hugh Goddard. Muslim Perceptions of Christianity. Grey Seal, London, 1996, p. 61
30
Hugh Goddard. Muslim Perceptions of Christianity. Grey Seal, London, 1996, p.
83f.
31
Ahmad Shalabi muqaranat al-adyan. al-Qahira, 19602, pp. 130-140; Mahmoud
Ayoub. “Muslim Views of Christianity.” in: Islamochristiana (Rom) 10/1984, p.
64.
32
Ahmad Shalabi muqaranat al-adyan. al-Qahira, 19602, p. 25ff; Mahmoud Ayoub.
“Muslim Views of Christianity.” in: Islamochristiana (Rom) 10/1984, p. 62.
tians and the Christian faith and scriptures than former ones. But on the
other side, the average Muslim who never earned a degree in Muslim the-
ology will not have any concrete knowledge of apologetically literature in
most cases.
Core Arguments in Islamic Apologetics Against Christian-

ity today
1. Christianity has been corrupted during the course of its history.
2. The biblical prophecies point to Muhammad, therefore he is the mes-
senger of God for Christians too.
3. Christianity has been allied with western imperialism to subdue the Is-
lamic world and subvert the Muslim faith.33
Overall, the arguments presented are those of the medieval Muslim writ-
ers with the exception that, by incorporating modern methods of historical
criticism, they are slightly modified to suit the modern context. In all these
writings a failure to consult reliable primary sources (like the Bible in it-
self) is evident. As Hugh Goddard34 correctly remarks, “the primary intent
of these authors is in no way to understand Christianity. The intent is to
buttress traditional Islamic belief or to rebut western influence politically,
socially and intellectually. Any ‘comparative religion’ is designed to assert
the superiority of Islam.”
It appears that Islamic statements about Christian-Muslim relations serve
one purpose mainly, the reassertion of the Muslin faith. While some publi-
cations are widely accessible, the existence of many others is only known
about as they do not enter the public sphere. Some of these “internal
notes”, and especially if they are written in the local language, are more
disapproving of Christianity than those meant for a wider circulation.
In general, contemporary treatises about Christianity do not diverge from
the basic teaching of the Quran. There seems to be a variety of arguments
brought forward against Christianity/the West under three or four headings:
33
Hugh Goddard. Muslim Perceptions of Christianity. Grey Seal, London, 1996, p. 93.
34
Hugh Goddard. Muslim Perceptions of Christianity. Grey Seal, London, 1996, p. 94.
Theology – Morality – Culture

1. Theology: When it comes to theology, some Muslim magazines and
journals which are published for Muslim readers in the West discuss ques-
tions like “shirk” (idolatry) and more or less openly declare Christians to
venerate three gods or label them as “kafir” (unbelievers) alongside with
atheists.35 Christians err in their belief in the trinity and Jesus’ sonship, in
his death on the cross, which is an abomination to Islam and rejected out-
rightly.
Other Muslim scholars openly call for an end to Christian mission as a
prerogative for genuine dialogue, peace and understanding. From their
perspective only Islam has the right to proselytize. While Christians are
tolerated in countries where Muslims are in the majority, they do not have
the right to expand or propagate their religion. “Equal rights” to proclaim
faith for Muslims as well as for Christians does not sound acceptable to
many Muslims even in a country which is not totally Muslim.
2. Morality: Other articles reflect the moral concerns of many Muslims
living in a non-Muslim society. They characterize Western society as such
as a “Zina-society”, that has become obsessed by fornication and adul-
tery.36 Fears to be defiled arise, since adultery, according to the Quran, is
one of the gravest sins a man or women can commit. In Islamic jurispru-
dence it merits the fixed hadd (death) penalty i.e. a an unalterable punish-
ment prescribed by canon law, which is considered a ‘right of God’ (haqq
Allah). The overall decline of morality and the break-up of the family make
many Muslims feel insecure.
3. Culture: When it comes to culture, there are also many problems for
devout Muslims: Islam prohibits the consumption of alcohol, blood, car-
rion, as well as pork and products derived from it. Muslims are concerned
that such unlawful substances or traces of such, possibly undeclared, could
have entered the food chain or be found in medical drugs. Any contact with
such unlawful substances ritually defiles a Muslim, his worshipping is in-
valid. A person in a state of ritual impurity may not touch the Quran or
pray. And finally, there are the important issues of marriage, divorce, the
ritual slaughter of animals, the right to Islamic holidays and the separation
of boys and girls during physical education which is not observed in the
West.
35
Huda – Die Rechtleitung. Muslimischer Studentenverein Karlsruhe e.V., 1/01.3;
1999, p. 20.
36
For example in the journal al-Islam, 1/01, 4-8.
Summary
Quran and Islamic Tradition present a multi-faceted picture of Chris-
tians, Christianity and the Christian revelation. Initially, at the start of Mu-
hammad’s mission in AD 610, acceptance rather then rejection character-
ized Muslim attitudes towards Christianity. Christians are viewed as
“People of the Book” ( ahl al-kitab), commended for their religious devo-
tion (Sura 5:82), and approved of for their faith in one God and creator .
This apparent acceptance is closely linked with the hope which Muham-
mad cherished earlier, that Jews and Christians would believe in his divine
mission. Only after he learned that both Jews and Christians rejected his
claim to prophethood, with Christians holding on to the Trinity of God,
Jesus’ sonship and his crucifixion, did Muhammad withdraw his earlier
support. Thereafter he reasoned that they had deviated from their original
revelation and fallen into grave error (2:116; 5:72-73; 4:157-158). This
subsequent period is marked by an increase of Quranic utterances, which
clearly distance and separate Islam from Christianity, warn Muslims
against having close links with Christians, and even condemn them for
their disbelief (98:6).
Therefore, Muslim-Christian relations are characterized by an overall
ambivalence. Muhammad’s own shifting positions vis-à-vis Christianity
which is reflected in the Quran, is how many Muslims feel: Indeed, on the
one hand there are many Muslims who appreciate the faith, moral princi-
ples and family values of practicing Christians. They also see similarities
in that both religions hold (prophets including Adam, Abraham, Moses,
Mary and Jesus). However, on the other hand there remain what appears to
be insurmountable barriers – trinity, sonship, crucifixion, and the conse-
quent accusation that Christians are idolaters.
In spite of the sympathies Muslims have for the ‘People of the Book’
and their faith, the dominant voices of Islamic scholarship suggest distanc-
ing, disapproval and denial. This is even more fuelled by cultural and
moral issues. Devout Muslims who may be members of a Muslim organi-
zation or even be politically active may have more negative feelings to-
wards Christians and distance themselves from Christians or even tell them
openly their dislike. The less they know about apologetics, Muslim theol-
ogy and arguments against the Bible the easier conversation may be.
6 What is a Fatwa?37
Fatwa’s (the Arabic plural is Fatawa) are Islamic scholars’ legal opin-
ions, in which scholars, either on their own initiative or on behalf of an
institution of ruler, give their personal assessment of a particular point of
Islamic law in the form of a written pronouncement.
The questions put to scholars stem as a rule from the applicant’s wish to
hear from a theological authority what the Koran, the tradition (reports of
Muhammad’s decisions in particular matters) or more generally the Sharia
says on the point at issue or whether there is a binding rule of conduct for
believing Muslims in the matter in question.
The person responsible for issuing such a legal pronouncement is the
mufti, who will answer the question to the best of his theological knowl-
edge in accordance with the guidelines of the legal school to which he be-
longs. This mostly takes the form of a prohibition of the action at issue or a
declaration that it is unobjectionable and therefore permitted. A mufti need
not have followed a prescribed course of training, nor does he occupy a
particular office, but he must be a Muslim of good reputation and familiar
with Islamic law in order to be able to assess the issue put to him. A
woman may also be a mufti, but not a judge.
Theoretically muftis were independent and bound only by their knowl-
edge of Islamic law and their conscience in arriving at a verdict on the
issue before them, but in practice they were given official posts and remu-
nerated by rulers who appointed and dismissed them at will. They have
thus been and still tend to be spokesmen of a theological institution or gov-
ernment. Celebrated muftis have published their answers either to genuine
questions or imaginary examples, and such compilations have become
frequently consulted works of reference on controversial issues.
Historically muftis enjoyed considerable authority even though in Sunni
Islam their pronouncements do not have the force of law. The weight at-
tributed to what is essentially one scholar’s personal opinion will depend
37
First published on the Website of the Islam Institute of the German Evangelical
Alliance (www.islaminstitut.de)
on his eminence, prestige and standing, but no-one is legally bound by it.
The person requesting an answer to a particular issue, nowadays often via
the Internet, is not required to abide by the verdict given but is free to seek
a second opinion without being obliged to abide by either. In Shiite Islam
however Fatwa’s are binding and must be complied with, which explains
why the fatwa pronounced by the supreme Shiite scholar Ayatollah
Khomeini against the British-born Muslim author Salman Rushdie in the
late 1980s had the force of law.
This institution of legal opinions makes it possible pronouncements on
contemporary issues not referred to in the normative legal texts dating from
the early period of Islam. It is therefore hardly surprising if Saudi-Arabia,
whose theologians propagate a particularly rigid form of Islam, makes fre-
quent public pronouncements via fatwa’s.
7 Islamic “Mission” (Da’wa)38
Muslim apologists (defenders of their faith) frequently emphasize – not

least of all in events featuring religious dialogue – that Islam, in contrast to
the Christian churches, knows no kind of “mission”. In some cases, even a
renunciation of Christian mission is demanded since, as is claimed, it is
one of the greatest barriers to dialogue. This discussion about the legiti-
macy of mission is conducted at all only in the West since, in Islamic coun-
tries, Christian mission is forbidden everywhere, because it is judged in-
variably to be a danger to the civil order and the political stability of a
country. If Christians in Islamic countries nevertheless speak with Muslims
about their faith, then nationals of Western states can be deported to their
home countries, while native Christians have to reckon in some cases with
heavy punishment (fines, prison terms). In some countries – as, for exam-
ple, in Saudi Arabia – practicing Christians obtain work permits in most
cases only with difficulty, or even not at all. Foreign skilled workers from
Western countries lose their rights of residence there when they visit one of
the worship services held quietly in private houses. Asians, in most cases,
are jailed, sometimes mistreated, or even lose their lives. Frequently,
Christian mission is condemned by the press in Arabic countries while, on
the other hand, Islamic mission is hardly ever discussed. Thus, at first
glance, it might appear that it is only the Christian church that campaigns
for the faith and thereby causes displeasure, and that Islam, on the other
hand, does not.
Mission – a Matter only for the Church?

This, however, is not the case. Even if the identical concept of “mission”
does not exist in Islam, it still quite definitely recognizes the promotion of
the faith, propaganda, or the “call”, the “invitation” (Arabic: da’wah) to
Islam. For, the call proclaimed already in the Koran to recognize Islam as
the only true, divinely-revealed faith (sura 21:25; 9:33) and to submit one-
38
self to Allah (“Islam” = “submission”, “devotion”) is directed in principle
toward all human beings. Indeed, even Muslims take the view that “From
the very beginning, Islam was a missionary religion”39, for “Who would
have something better to say than the one who calls people to God, who
does what is right, and says: ‘I belong to those who have devoted them-
selves to God’?” (sura 41:33)
This universal claim made by Islam becomes clear in the course of his-
tory as well as in the eschatological view present in Islamic texts. In the
areas conquered by Islamic forces, Christians were “protected minorities”
(Arabic: dhimmis) who, as second-class citizens, were subjected to Islamic
rule and were required to pay a head tax, in some cases even a land tax.
These taxes, as well as various restrictions (e.g., the prohibition upon the
marriage of a non-Muslim man with a Muslim woman) and discrimination
(e.g., at that time as today, in regard to university study, military service, or
the attainment of influential positions in society), were a constant incen-
tive, indeed frequently a form of pressure, for conversion to Islam. In this
connection, of course, the Koran verse “There is no compulsion in relig-
ion” (sura 2:256) is cited repeatedly. What is correct is that Jews and
Christians in Islamic areas enjoyed a special status as “possessors of the
book” and, thereby, also a certain legal recognition. But, since Islam sees
itself as absolute and places itself above – in its view, falsified – Judaism
and Christianity, indeed holds the Muslim community to be superior to all
other religious communities (sura 3:110), this has more the significance of
a toleration than of a fundamental recognition on the basis of equality. For
this reason, according to majority conviction, Jews and Christians, too,
must be called to accept Islam: “With a little knowledge … about the Bible
[we can] prepare ourselves for dialogue with Christians. Most Christians
do not know their own Bible at all, but only what they hear again and
again in church.”40
Human rights organizations report repeatedly about the kidnapping of
Christian children or women in countries with underprivileged Christian
minorities such as Pakistan, or even Egypt or the Sudan, and also about the
forced conversions of children and/or the forced marriages of women to a
Muslim husband. Although such action will be condemned by many Mus-
lims as an act forbidden in Islam, it is still a fact that the family members
39
Meaning and Significance of Dawah ila-Allah. A Guide to the Propagation of Islam
(Markazi Maktaba Islami: Dehli, 1983), p. 43.
40
Sadiya Plath. “Sie entstellen die Schrift an ihren richtigen Stellen...’ (Sure 5:13).
Bibeltextstellen für Muslime im Dialog mit Christen”. In: al-Islam, 4/2000, pp. 11-
14, here p. 11.
7 Islamic “Mission” (Da’wa) 71
concerned in such cases only very seldom receive effective support from
the Islamic government in their country, which in many cases is not willing
or able to put an effective stop to such injustice against the Christian mi-
nority.
The “invitation”, or call, to accept Islam should be extended, in the Mus-
lim view, to all non-Muslims, but also to all Muslims who do not observe
Islam completely. Calling non-Muslims and “inconsistent” Muslims to
Islam is considered by Muslim theologians to be an unconditional duty
inherent to Islam that the Muslim community as a whole must fulfill, even
if every individual cannot be a “da’iya”, a “propagandist”, for Islam:
“Every Muslim is, on the basis of his faith, a missionary for Islam”41, and
everyone who does not comply with this duty to pursue da’wah will be
called to account for this failure on the day of judgment. In addition, the
one who fails in this duty makes himself into an outsider in regard to the
worldwide “ummah” (community of Muslims)42
Muslim theologians take the view that da’wah is “an important form of
jihad”43, that is, of the “effort on the path of God”, and sometimes also that
jihad is a form of da’wah. Thus, da’wah work is not a task that belongs to
the past, but rather exists wherever Muslims live as a minority among a
non-Muslim majority, a concern more urgent than ever, “an invaluable
opportunity”44, for “da’wa opportunities are everywhere”45.
The goal of the dissemination of Islam is ultimately the creation of a uni-
form society in which, first of all, Islamic law (Sharia) is established over
all people. Such a homogenous community, in which everyone is a Mus-
lim, then will be a society, in this view, in which peace and justice rule.
The Muslim community should work toward the reshaping of society al-
ready today; in any case, though, this society of justice will be established
at the end of times, after the appearance of the Antichrist, after all non-
Muslims once again have had the opportunity to turn to Islam.
41
Ibid., p. 12.
42
Dr. Ahmad H. Sakr. “Dialogue with Non-Muslims”. In: The Muslim World League
Journal, vol. 25/11, March 1998, pp. 18-20, here p. 18.
43
Ahmad al-Khalifa. “Da’wa in Deutschland – Probleme und Perspektiven”. In: al-
Islam. Zeitschrift von Muslimen in Deutschland, 3/2001, pp. 11-13, here p. 11.
44
Sakr. “Dialogue”, p. 18.
45
www.netmuslims.com/resources/dawah-intro.html (5.8.2003)
How does Islamic Mission Occur?

In the past decades, Saudi-Arabia especially has devoted itself increas-
ingly to the expansion of Islam and, above all in Subsaharan Africa, con-
ducts “missionary work” that is linked with conversion-dependent aid. The
initiators of this work are, in some cases, Islamic propaganda organizations
and, in some cases, wealthy individuals – from the Gulf States, for exam-
ple – who sometimes contribute considerable sums of donated funds to the
spread of Islam. Where the only accessible school in a village instructs
every child in Islam or only in this case waives the school fees; where ac-
cess to water and medical assistance is available only to the “newly con-
verted”, it is not seldom the case that extended families or even entire vil-
lages convert from animism or Christianity to Islam. An instruction for the
Muslim “missionary” thus runs so: “Visit the sick … help the needy… ex-
change gifts”46, for “it is exactly other deeds [doing good], too, that win
especially the hearts of the poor and of the unliberated for Islam”47.
The expansion of Islam also occurs through influence upon public life
(e.g., the media, churches, and politics), through the assertion of special
rights for the Muslim community in courts of law, through the sending of
teachers of the Koran, the training of African or Asian imams and legal
scholars in Arabia, through the printing and dissemination of copies of the
Koran and of Islamic literature, through prison visits, correspondence
courses, lectures, open house at mosques, radio and television broadcasts,
through CDs and videos that are produced in many languages of the world,
subsidized and then given away free in mosques and bookstores.
Especially in Saudi-Arabia, various organizations have been founded
that, with the support of the Saudi government, conduct da’wah at home
and abroad on a high organizational and financial level. Thus, the “World
Assembly of Muslim Youth” (WAMY), founded in 1972, has the goal “to
introduce Islam to non-Muslims in its purest form as a comprehensive sys-
tem and a way of life”, and “to assist Muslim organizations all over the
world through training, communication, and cooperation.”48 The building
of mosques, especially in poorer Islamic countries, as well as the subse-
quent sending of prayer leaders (imams) to them, who then export the rigid
46
www.muslima-aktiv.de/5dawah.htm (5.8.2003)
47
Ahmad von Denffer. Da’wa in der Zeit des Propheten, Schriftenreihe des Islami-
schen Zentrums München, 12, Munich, 2001, p. 12.
48
www.wamy.co.uk/bd_about.htm
Saudi-Arabian interpretation of Islam, also serves the pervasion with Islam
of a district only partially or not at all Islamicized.
In the course of construction of the mosque, a Koran school also is
erected in most cases, in which the children very early on are made ac-
quainted with the fundamentals of the religion. Along with the erection of
the Koran school, pressure is frequently applied to adopt an Islamic dress
code, especially for the women, so that in this society the consciousness for
“appropriate” clothing and conduct gradually aligns itself on Islamic
norms. Non-Muslim women who do not observe this dress code are mo-
lested in some cases, are harassed in public, or are denied the right of
school attendance. Such cases and those of a similar nature are reported,
for example, from some of the federal states in northern Nigeria that, be-
ginning in 2000, have proclaimed the complete introduction of Sharia.
Here it is clear that, in the process of the Islamization of a society, Muslim
activists first of all emphasize that the demanded changes in law apply only
to Muslims, but that in a second step non-Muslims, too, are to be forced
under the dictates of Sharia – the divine law with eternal, universal valid-
ity.
Practical Tips for Da’wah

In Islamic periodicals and especially on the Internet, there are numerous
practical tips for da’wah work; some recall principles important for the
public relations practiced by Christian churches.49 The personal conversa-
tion as a means of promoting Islam is especially favored: “Personal con-
versation in private is the method of choice”50.
In order to be successful in da’wah work, it is important first of all for
the person to acquire knowledge about Islam and to know the Koran, the
tradition, and the stories about Mohammed’s life. Only then will it be pos-
sible to provide answers in conversation with those of a different faith. On
the other hand, words are not everything: Da’wa can occur through writ-
ing, speaking, through proper conduct, one’s own attitude, through behav-
ior, through sympathy and aid”51. It is also important that one presents
49
Thus, for example, it is reported that Christians have developed a method of going
from house to house and inviting people to engage in conversations about God.
“Islamic Dawah: Presenting Islam.” In: The Muslim World League Journal, vol.
25/8, Dec 1997, S. 17-20, here p. 18.
50
Ibid.
51
Dr. Ahmad H. Sakr. “The Islamic Concept of Dawah.” In: The Muslim World
himself as a positive example: “The best Da’wa is being a good exam-
ple”52. Politeness and respect are seen as the preconditions for da’wah: “To
invite someone also means being polite, friendly, and inviting, taking care
of that person, and showing him understanding”53, or: “Be friendly and try
to be humorous”54. A pleasant outward appearance is also important (“be
clean and neat”), “never eat raw onions or garlic when you go to the
mosque or meet with people”55, and “chew gum or something for good
breath”56.
Those proclaiming Islam are advised against judging other religions
negatively or conducting debates, for: “Debates may be a pleasure for
Muslims, but for others they can be an agony, and if one torments another,
one will not win him to his cause”57. An appeal is also made for modesty
and for appropriate manners: “No one should boast about what he does,
also not about the effect he may have, or what he has achieved. No one
should claim that he applies the best of all methods”58. Or: “The task of
bringing someone closer to Allah … should not be connected with arro-
gance, thinking you’re the teacher and everyone else should be lucky
you’ve embarked on a crusade to save them”59. Some instructions for
da’wah forbid the propagandist to become angry in response to criticism
from his partner in conversation: “Do not become annoyed or vow revenge
if one has attacked you”60.
In a country with religious freedom, there is nothing to be said against a
respectful, peaceful promotion of Islam that does not exert pressure or dis-
dains those who believe differently, and does not apply pressure through
the awarding of privileges. More clarity, though, could be created if repre-
sentatives of Islam would profess this goal openly, also in regard to Ger-
man society. Christians, for their part, should not let themselves be de-
League Journal, vol. 25/8, December 1997, pp. 12-16, here p. 15.
52
53
Islamic Dawah: Presenting Islam. In: The Muslim World League Journal, vol. 25/8,
Dec 1997, p. 17-20, here p. 17.
54
Sakr. “Dialogue”, p. 20.
55
56
57
Islamic Dawah: Presenting Islam. In: The Muslim World League Journal, vol. 25/8,
Dec 1997, pp. 17-20, here p. 19.
58
Sakr. “Concept”, p. 15.
59
www.themodernreligion.com/dawah/dawah-12tips.html (5.8.2003)
60
terred from speaking of their faith to Muslims, too, but also should not
become weary of continuing to point out the imbalance that arises from the
fact that Muslims in the West enjoy a great deal of religious freedom,
while this human right is denied to Christians everywhere in the Islamic
world.
8 Apostasy and Sharia61
Muslim theology considers Islamic law (shari’ah means “path to the wa-
ter well”) to be God-given, not of human origin. Muhammad received
these laws and rules by revelation. They are summarized in the Koran and
tradition. The sharia (the body of regulations which must be followed by a
Muslim if he wishes to fulfill the requirements of his faith) is considered to
be a perfect system of law for the best of mankind at all times and all over
the world. Muslim theologians hold that if all peoples were to follow the
regulations of the sharia, all people would live in perfect peace, harmony
and justice.
Fundamentals of Islamic Law and jurisprudence

But since the Koran only deals with a very limited number of legal is-
sues these few cases are insufficient to form the basis of a complete system
of regulations that would solve all legal questions which arise in human
society. They were insufficient to form the basis of a complete system of
regulations even in the seventh century, let alone in modern times. In cases
which the Koran does not deal with, Muslim theologians and jurists tried to
find guidelines with the help of the hadith (Muslim tradition) and the cases
described therein. At no time in history has the sharia as such been applied
completely. Even though Islamic fundamentalists today demand a “return”
to the sharia in its entirety (as in the Sudan or Saudi-Arabia), the question
remains whether this is possible at all. Until modern times the sharia has
only been applied to single areas like family law. It has never been applied
in its entirety anywhere.
Thus, the term sharia means an ideal corpus of law (the God-given laws
and rules), which was never put into practice. Today, the law codes of the
different Muslim countries are mostly a mixture of Koran regulations, local
customary law, elements of law codes dating back to the Persians or the
Romans and some elements from European law codifications. In the twen-
61
Reprinted from: Christianity & Society Vol. XV (2005) No. 1 , pp. 24-27. Original:
http://www.kuyper.org/main/uploads/volume_15_no_1.pdf
tieth century European law compendiums influenced several codifications
of Muslim law, so that some countries (especially those which came under
colonial rule) adopted parts of the European legal regulations.
The sharia in itself comprises legal norms concerning inheritance law,
family law, criminal law and property law, but also cultic and ritual regula-
tions (Arab. ibadat) such as keeping the religious holidays, prayer (Arab.
salat), almsgiving (Arab. zakat), fasting (Arab. sawm), the pilgrimage to
Mecca (Arab. hadjdj) and the “Holy war” (Arab. djihad). The sharia regu-
lates the relationship of the individual towards God, his family and society.
This means that whether a Muslim gets married according to the regula-
tions of the sharia or whether he will perform prayer in the prescribed way
is by no means his personal decision or a question of how much he person-
ally would like to abide by the prescriptions of his faith. Rather, it is a legal
issue. This is why there is no “private sphere” in Islam in the literal sense
of the word. The sharia gives rules not only for practicing Islam as a relig-
ion, but also for the conduct of daily affairs in one’s family and in society:
e.g. how to greet each other, how to get married, how to raise children,
how to behave towards one’s parents, how to keep contracts or how to
dress properly is equally prescribed by sharia law. This is one of the rea-
sons why apostasy is not considered a “private matter” as would be the
case in a Western context.
The Koran itself contains relatively few legislative regulations. It does
contain some regulations against unfair business practices and against vio-
lating contracts. Moreover, it contains some regulations concerning crimi-
nal law such as punishment for theft, murder or adultery. However, the
described cases are mostly individual regulations, not part of a systematic
law code.
Following Muhammad’s death in 632 AD, there was no comprehensive
Islamic law code that could have been used to establish a functioning ad-
ministration and jurisdiction in the quickly expanding Muslim empire. A
solutions had to be found to solve this problem.
One starting point was the texts of traditions that were collected in the
eighth century. Muhammad’s decisions, his likes and dislikes (and also the
conduct of his companions) were considered to be of normative value be-
cause Muhammad was considered to be the perfect example for his follow-
ers. During the rule of the Umayyads, the first Islamic dynasty after Mu-
hammad (661–750), the sunna (the habit) of the prophet and the first four
caliphs were considered to be of growing importance for the Muslim com-
munity (Arab. umma). Since the habits and behavior of Muhammad were
considered to be of divine character also each hadith was traced back to
8 Apostasy and Sharia 79
Muhammad himself, thus establishing a “chain” of transmitters. Therefore
sunna has the same authority as the text of the Koran itself.
Early Developments of Islamic Law

The famous scholar Muhammad ibn Idris ash Shafii (767–820) was the
founder and “father” of Islamic jurisprudence (Arab. fiqh). He combining
the regulations of the Koran and sunna of Muhammad as recorded in the
hadith texts with the early legal practices of the Muslim community. Thus
he developed the discipline of Islamic jurisprudence or the “principles of
jurisprudence” (Arab. usul al-fiqh). According to ash-Shafii, Islamic juris-
prudence is based on four elements:
1. The “book” (Arab. al-kitab), i.e. the Koran.
2. The sunna of the prophet (as it is reported in the texts of tradition).
3. Analogies or reasoning (Arab. qiyas), i.e. decision-making in analogy
with cases described in the Koran or hadith.
4. Consensus of opinion (Arab. idjma), i.e. the consensus of all Muslim
believers concerning a specific legal question, as they are represented
by Muslim theologians.
In principle, these four sources of Muslim law were accepted by all or-
thodox schools of law, even if these schools of law interpreted them differ-
ently or gave one or another element preference over others.
Five Categories of Good and Bad

Even when we look at those legal questions the Koran deals with, still
relatively few things are forbidden or allowed in plain words. Many things
seem to be disapproved of, but not forbidden. Therefore Islamic jurispru-
dence has developed a system which categorizes everything a Muslim may
do:
(1) Prescribed or obligatory. Something may be prescribed (Arab. fard)
or obligatory (Arab. wadjib), mandatory or required (Arab. lazim). It may
be an obligation for the individual Muslim (Arab. fard al-’ayn), such as the
daily prayer, or for the whole Muslim community (Arab. fard al-kifaya)
such as fighting the djihad. Failure to perform something that is obligatory
is considered to be sin and should be punished.
(2) Recommended. Something may be recommended (Arab. mandub) or
preferred (Arab. mustahabb), meritorious or desirable. A Muslim who does
not perform extra prayer which is recommended on certain religious holi-
days will not be punished, but one who performs extra prayer will be re-
warded by Allah.
(3) Permissible or allowed. Something which is permissible or allowed
(Arab. mubah), such as travelling in an airplane, is “neutral” because there
is no law that forbids it, and those who do such things will not be punished
nor reprimanded.
(4) Reprehensible or not recommended. Something which is reprehensi-
ble or not recommended (Arab. makruh), such as eating specific types of
fish, will not be punished because it is not sin, but neither is it neutral or
recommended.
(5) Forbidden or prohibited. Something that is forbidden or prohibited
(Arab. haram) is not left to the decision of the individual believer and is
not accepted or tolerated by society or the State; e.g. drinking alcohol or
getting married to two sister at the same time.
Sunni and Shiite Schools of Law

Sunni Islam today knows four schools of law (Arab. madhahib), which
were developed during the course of the eighth century AD in the centers
of Islamic learning. Each of them is named after its founder or his students.
They differ in dogmatics and the interpretation of Koranic regulations. In
addition there is mainly one Shiite school of legal thought.
Hanifite School
The Hanifite school of law was founded by Abu Hanifa (ca. 700–767
AD) and became the school of law of the Caliph dynasty of the Abbasids
(750–1258 AD). It spread from Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasids,
eastwards towards India. The Hanifite school became the official school of
law of the Ottoman empire. Today it is predominant on the Balkans, in the
Caucasus, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, India, China, Bangladesh
and Turkey. In Austria the Muslim community of the Hanifite school has
gained official recognition by the State. The Hanifite school accepts ash-
Shafii’s four sources of law, but also adds personal reasoning (Arab. ra’I)
to it as well the consideration of what is the best solution to a problem in
regard to the well-being of society (Arab. istihsaan). The Hanifite school is
the most liberal school.
Maliki School
The Maliki school was founded by Abd Allah Malik ibn Anas (c. 715–
795 AD), a leading jurist of Medina. The Maliki school, which emerged as
a counterpart to the Hanifite school, spread mainly to North Africa (Tuni-
sia, Algeria and Morocco), Spain, West Africa and Central Africa. Today
the Maliki school may also be found in Upper Egypt, Mauretania, Nigeria,
West Africa, Kuwait and Bahrain. Apart from the four sources of jurispru-
dence of ash-Shafii, the Maliki school of law additionally recognizes the
“public interest” (Arab. istislah) to be of importance for a decision.
Shafi’ite School
The Shafi’ite school of law was founded by Muhammad ibn Idris ash-
Shafii (767–820 AD). Ash-Shafii was a student of Malik ibn Anas and
tried to reconcile the Maliki and the Hanifite school of law. However by
attempting so, his own school of law emerged. Ash-Shafii tried to limit the
amount of hadith texts to those that truly report Muhammd’s conduct. One
of the characteristics of the Shafi’ite school is the fact that ash-Shafii ac-
cepted only the four sources of law mentioned above.
The Shafi’ite school of law was established in Bagdad and Cairo and
spread to Syria, Horasan and Buchara. Today, it can be found mostly in
Indonesia, East Africa, Southern Arabia, South East Asia, Yemen, Malay-
sia, Singapore, the Philippines, Somalia, Djibouti, Tanzania, Kenya and
Uganda.
Hanbali School
The Hanbali school of law was founded by Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn
Hanbal (780–855 AD). He is the author of an extensive hadith collection
called al-Musnad, which contains approximately 80,000 hadith texts.
Ahmad ibn Hanbal was a student of ash-Shafii and became famous when
he argued that the Koran was the non-created word of God. For this belief
he was imprisoned and persecuted by the Abbasid Caliph al-Mamun, who
held that the Koran was “created.”
The Hanbali school is more a mixture of various groups of hadith schol-
ars rather than Ahmad ibn Hanbal’s own school. In principle this school
advocated accepting only the Koran and the hadith as the basis of Islamic
jurisprudence. It opposed any form of humanly influenced decisions. Until
the eighteenth century the Hanbali school did not have any significance.
But then Hanbalit Muhammad ibn ’Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) revived
the Hanbali school with the so-called Wahhabi movement, which has
strongly influenced not only the whole of the Arabian Peninsula, but also
Africa, Egypt and India up until the present day.
Shiite Schools of law
The most important Shiite school of law is the school of the “Jafarites”
or “Imamites.” According to Shiite belief it goes back to the sixth Imam
Hazrat Ja’far as-Sadiq (700—765 AD).
The Closing of the Door of Ijtihad

After the beginning of the tenth century no further school of law came
into existence. Legal problems were solved in accordance to the Koran and
hadith texts, but new sources of law were not accepted. Muslim theologi-
ans called this phenomenon later “the closing of the door of idjtihad.” Id-
jtihad means independent reasoning or analytical thought, i.e. the interpre-
tation of the available sources in order to come to a decision in cases that
are not specifically dealt with in the Koran or the hadith. It is yet unclear
how the closing of the gate of idjtihad came about. From the nineteenth
century onwards Islamic theologians have demanded the “re-opening of the
door of ijtihad” in order to be able to address the issues of modern life in
an adequate way. Muslim reform theologians of the nineteenth century saw
the reason for the decline of the Islamic world in modern times in the fact
that the door of idjtihad had been closed already in the tenth century and
that there was no further possibility of development regarding how to deal
with modern legal issues.
Summary
1. Not practicable: Sharia is not an easy subject to deal with. There are
many different opinions among Muslims about what the sharia really
teaches and how sharia should be applied in modern society. In theory, the
Muslim world is of the unanimous opinion that the sharia is the ideal law
and would bring about peace and justice for everyone. But how that can be
achieved in a practicable way remains an open question, since the sharia
has never been fully applied in any Muslim country, and those countries
that have tried to apply it (such as Iran) have realized that it has caused a
lot of suffering to the people and in fact did not automatically lead to
greater wealth or more justice within society.
2. Process of development? Since the “door of ijtihad” was believed to
have been closed in the tenth century AD there is little maneuvering space
for adjusting the sharia to modern times. Any discussion about the validity
of the sharia must be dealt with under the heading of how to apply the
sharia and not whether it can be applied to contemporary society.
3. Variety of application: Some people in the West would like to have a
handbook of sharia, so that, for example if there is a case of adultery re-
ported in the press in a country like Nigeria or Sudan, one could turn to
one’s handbook and ascertain what should happen to the couple involved
according to sharia law. But there is no such handbook, and moreover, one
could never be written. Although sharia deals with the case of adultery and
gives some guidelines for dealing with it there remain several possibilities
regarding whether the woman or the man involved in the case should be
punished and if so how they should be punished. In some cases the woman
may be publicly accused of adultery (less likely the man) and she would be
sued at court. But if the woman belongs to a more wealthy, respected fam-
ily and has some protectors in high positions in the government she would
probably not be accused. Perhaps nothing at all will happens as long as the
adultery does not come to public notice. Alternatively the family of the
woman involved may decides to solve the problem by themselves and ei-
ther keep the woman in the house and forbid her to leave it any more, or
send her away -or even kill her to restore their honor. In this case there will
be no “case of adultery” followed up in court -although the sharia pre-
scribes a public trial and the proof of four male witnesses or a confession
from the woman.
4. Ways to bypass sharia: In the case of a divorce, the sharia prescribes
that the children may remain with her mother as long as they are toddlers
(in case of boys) or until puberty (in case of girls), at which point they then
“belong” to their father and his family. But if the former husband is not
able to care for the children or his second wife will not accept them, he
might leave the children with his former wife if she refrains from claiming
her “mahr” (i.e. the second part of her dowry, which she should get on the
day of her divorce). This is clearly against the sharia, but happens every
day in the Muslim world.
5. Can God tolerate man’s failures? When taking a closer look at the
sharia and especially the hadith texts, one realizes that the hadith texts
very often and very harshly threaten those who do not follow the many
detailed regulation of the “sunna” with hell-fire. At the same time, there
are many exceptions and ways to bypass individual regulations in order to
make the burden of the believer lighter, as the Koran states in several
verses. It seems to me that the reason for this harsh damnation on the one
hand and on the other hand the availability of many ways to avoid follow-
ing all the regulations is in the image of God and the concept of sin in Is-
lam. If there is no reason for a Muslim to fail in his duty because he is able
to perform what is right at any time if he is only prepared to try, there is no
reason for God to have mercy on him, and he will be punished with hell-
fire.
9 The Significance of Islamic Tradition62
Islamic tradition (Arabic: hadith – transmission, tradition, report) is sub-

stantially more extensive than the Koran. It is concerned with reports about
Mohammed compiled by Muslim theologians in several collections as late
as approximately two centuries after his death. These hadithe provide in-
formation about how Mohammed (and the first “companions of the
Prophet”) lived and which views they held in regard to particular ques-
tions. But, the tradition also includes detailed instructions on the necessary
ablutions before ritual prayer, explanations of the order of prayer (also in
the mosque), regulations for the fast during Ramadan or the pilgrimage to
Mecca, clothing regulations for men and women, rites pertaining to Mus-
lim burial, as well as dietary commandments (prohibition of alcohol and
pork). In addition, the traditional texts also treat questions of Islamic law,
above all of marital and family law, but also of criminal and inheritance
law and of the law of testimony.
In the Muslim view, the traditional texts have the same authority in legal
questions as does the text of the Koran. That is, the traditions acknowl-
edged as “genuine” are considered to be just as inspired by God as is the
Koran. Indeed, in cases of conflict, the tradition can claim an even higher
authority than the Koran. If, for example, the tradition demands the stoning
of married adulterers, but the Koran, in contrast, demands “only” the
whipping of them (sura 24:2), then the traditional stoning rule, and not
whipping, is considered by the overwhelming majority of Muslim theolo-
gians as binding. And if the Koran names no penalty for apostates who turn
their back upon Islam, but merely threatens them with condemnation to
Hell in the afterlife, but the tradition on the basis of Mohammed’s word
(“Whoever changes his religion is to be killed!”) demands the death pen-
alty, then this instruction is considered as binding by the four Sunni legal
schools – that is, by the absolute majority in Muslim theology.
The tradition, thus, explains and interprets the text of the Koran, or even
sharpens its meaning. In legal questions, therefore, it is not enough just to
62
follow the rules of the Koran, for the instructions from the tradition also
are binding upon the believer. In all other non-legal questions, Moham-
med’s way of life, his “habit” (Arabic: sunna Muhammadiya) is to be con-
sidered by Muslims as a binding guide. This way of life must be emulated
in every way possible. Thus, if the tradition disapproves of men wearing
gold and silk (reason: whoever wears gold and silk in this world will not
wear them in Paradise) and reports that Mohammed, for this reason, is said
to have worn a silver ring, then it is appropriate to the emulation of Mo-
hammed’s “habit” to wear silver rings exclusively.
The question of the authenticity of individual texts from the tradition has
been answered differently by Muslims and non-Muslims. Soon after Mo-
hammed’s death, many stories about his behavior, habits, and his alleged
or actual comments were circulating in the Muslim community. Later, re-
ports about his comrades-in-arms and the first caliphs (rulers after Mo-
hammed), even about Mohammed’s favorite wife, Aisha, also were added
to these. At this time –in the first two centuries after Mohammed’s death in
632 A.D.— the tradition in all probability was not yet systematically col-
lected and, was, at best, only partially compiled in a written form.
Prompted by the necessity to create a binding legal system for the rap-
idly expanding Muslim world empire –and in the knowledge that the Ko-
ran alone contained too few, and hardly any systematically gathered, legal
statements, as well as in the desire to record reports about Mohammed and
his way of life for the Muslim community, Muslim scholars beginning in
the ninth century A.D., when the hadithe already in circulation were quite
numerous and the question of the authenticity of such traditions must have
been a burning issue, compiled six collections which today are acknowl-
edged by Muslims as “authentic tradition”:
1. The compiler of the hadith collection which is the oldest, most fa-
mous, and considered as authoritative is ’Abd Allah ibn Isma’il al-Buhari
(ca. 810-870 A.D.). His collection of tradition encompasses 97 chapters
and 3460 sub-chapters. The Arabic title of the work is al jami’ as-sahih al-
musnad min al-hadith rasul Allah, or sahih, for short.
2. Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj (died 875 A.D.) composed the work al-jami’ as-
sahih, which contains approximately 12,000 traditional texts.
3. Abu-Dawud al-Sijistani (ca. 817-888/889 A.D.) compiled approxi-
mately 4800 traditional texts in his kitab as-sunan.
4. Abu ’Abd Allah Muhammad b. Maja (ca. 819-886 A.D.) collected
about 4341 traditions in his work kitab as-sunan.
9 The Significance of Islamic Tradition 87
5. Abu ’Isa Muhammad at-Tirmidhi (ca. 820-892 A.D.) collected 4000
traditions.
6. Abu Abd ar-Rahman an-Nasa’i (ca. 830-915 A.D.) collected ap-
proximately 5000 traditions in his work kitab as-sunan.
The question of the authenticity of a tradition was discussed intensely by
theologians and compilers already in the early Muslim period, and numer-
ous texts were rejected as legend. A text then was acknowledged as au-
thentic when it:
1. possessed, above all other aspects, a flawless, that is, an unbroken,
chain of transmission (Arabic: isnad) back to a direct companion of the
Prophet (someone, thus, who personally knew Mohammed),
2. was testified to in several sources, and
3. the transmitter of the tradition was known as a reliable informant of
good repute.
Because of the great weight placed upon an unbroken chain of transmis-
sion, a tradition (Hadith) always consists of two parts: the chain of those
handing down the tradition back to Mohammed (Arabic: isnad), and the
story itself, the text (Arabic: matn). According to the opinion of the major-
ity of Muslim theologians, it is not the content of a tradition that can de-
termine the authenticity of the tradition, but rather always only a flawless
chain of transmission. Some traditions contain statements and regulations
that for non-professionals are difficult to understand. Others, in the non-
Islamic view, appear quite one-sided or even problematic.
Examples from Tradition63

What is the deficiency of a woman? She is deficient in her intelli-
gence and her religion
“Once Allah’s messenger went out to the Musalla (to offer the prayer) of ‘id-
al-Adha or al-Fitr prayer. Then he passed by the women and said: “O women!
Give alms, as I have seen that the majority of the dwellers of Hell-fire were you
(women).” They asked: “Why is it so, O Allah’s Messenger?” He replied: “You
curse frequently and are ungrateful to your husbands. I have not seen anyone
more deficient in intelligence and religion than you. A cautious sensible man
could be led astray by some of you.” The women asked: “O Allah’s Messenger!
What is deficient in our intelligence and religion?” He said: “Is not the evidence
63
The chains of transmission are not given here.
of two women equal to the witness of one man?” They replied in the affirmative.
He said: “This is the deficiency in her intelligence. Isn’t it true that a woman can
neither pray nor fast during her menses?” The women replied in the affirmative.
He said: “This is the deficiency in her religion.”64
What is true faith?
To do good to one another: “To wish for one’s (Muslim) brother what
one likes for one-self is a part of faith. None of you will have faith till he
wishes for his (Muslim) brother what he likes for himself”
To love Muhammad more than one’s father, children and all mankind:
“To love the Messenger (Muhammad) is a part of faith. Allah’s Messenger
said: ‘By Him in whose hands my life is, none of you will have faith till he
loves me more than his father and his children’”65
Hospitality
“Abu Huraira … narrated, that Allah’s messenger [Muhammad] … had
said: ‘Whoever believes in Allah and the last judgment shall treat his
guests with due respect. This is one day and one night and feeding them for
three days. Beyond that it is sadaqa [a gift]. And the guests are not allowed
to stay with their host until they make him feel embarrassed.’”66
Prayer is expiation of sins
“Narrated Abu Huraira …: ‘I heard Allah’s messenger … saying: ‘If
there was a river at the door of anyone of you and he took a bath in it five
times a day would you notice any dirt on him?’’ They said: ‘Not a trace of
dirt would be left.’ The Prophet … added: ‘That is the example of the five
prayers with which Allah annuls evil deeds.’”67
64
“The Book of Menses.” in: Sahih al-Bukhari Arabic-English. Vol. 1, ed. by Dr.
Muhammad Muhsin Khan. Kitab Bhavan: New Delhi, 1984, pp. 179-180
65
“The Book of Belief (Faith)” in: Sahîh al-Bukhari Arabic-English. Vol. 1. hg. v. Dr.
Muhammad Muhsin Khan. Kitab Bhavan: New Delhi, 1984, pp. 19-20
66
Al-Buhari. Hadith No. 6135, quoted from: Auszüge aus Sahih Al-Buharyy. Aus dem
Arabischen übertragen und kommentiert von Abu-r-Rida’ Muhammad Ibn Ahmad
Ibn Rassoul. IB Verlag Islamische Bibliothek: Köln, 1989, p. 618
67
“The Book of the Times of Prayers.” In: Sahih al-Bukhari Arabic-English. Vol 1,
ed. by Muhammad Muhsin Khan. Kitab Bhavan. New Delhi, 1984, p. 301
10 Women in Islam68
There is only very little that can be said in general about all women in
Islam. The differences in the circumstances of life created by the urban or
rural environment are too large; the gap between women in Afghanistan
and Tunisia, between sternly religious families and secularized Muslims in
the Western world, is too great. The question whether the woman con-
cerned obtains access to schooling changes the circumstances of her life
just as decisively as does her age at marriage and the view of the individual
family about which Islamic regulations are to be applied in this family and
how strictly. This article names several of these fundamental guidelines
without, thereby, claiming automatically to describe the concrete living
conditions of all Muslim women.
Men and women – Equal before God?

The public debate over women’s role in Islam tends in the West to cen-
tre round the issue of the head-scarf, seen as symbolizing women’s inferi-
ority, yet not all practicing Muslim women wear the scarf and not all of
them are of the opinion that this is indispensable. In fact it is Islamic mar-
riage law which cements women’s inferior legal status as divinely or-
dained. The relevant provisions of the Sharia are linked to local cultural
norms and time-honored traditions with roots in tribal society which were
retained with the arrival of Islam. Some of the widely accepted standards
of decency are a mixture of culture, religion and tradition.
Muslim apologists have always insisted that Islam believes in the equal-
ity of men and women and adduce as evidence that the Koranic creation
account makes no distinction between man and woman (39:6). God is said
to have created man and woman “from a single soul” (sura 4:1) to be mu-
tual “friends” and “protectors” (9:71) and set “love and mercy” between
them (30:21). The tradition praises the man who treats his wife “best” as
68
Parts of it first published in: Islam und Christlicher Glaube/Islam and Christianity.
Journal of the Islam Institute of the German Evangelical Alliance. 4/2004, 2: 26-
29
being the best believer. Muslim apologetic further adduces the common
duty of men and women to observe the five pillars of Islam: the Creed,
Prayers, the Fast, the Alms, the Pilgrimage, as well as the promise to both
of great rewards in the after-life: “to whoever does right and believes, be it
man or woman, we will give a good life. And we will apportion them their
reward according to their best deeds” (16:97).
Despite their fundamental equality Muslim theologians assert the tasks
God has given women differ from men’s. As women bear the children and
the responsibility for home and family, so men are responsible for the fam-
ily’s protection and maintenance, in other words to be the breadwinner
who has dealings with society at large. Differing tasks mean different
rights, so it is no more than an expression of “justice between the sexes”
that only a half-share of an inheritance falls to the woman, since she does
not bear the financial responsibility for the family. The principle enunci-
ated in the Koran that a man’s testimony can only be outweighed by the
testimony of two women takes account of the fact that women’s biology
predisposes them to greater emotional fluctuations than men and that it
would be an imposition on their often insufficient capacity of recall to ask
them to decide another person’s fate in a court of law.
Men and women are equal in Islam in the sense that both are promised
access to paradise and expected to observe the “five pillars” of Islam. On
the other hand women are excluded from religious practice during men-
struation, childbirth and childbed.
Touching the Koran, entering a mosque, saying liturgical prayers and
fasting during Ramadan are all prohibited. Only men are required to attend
Friday prayers at the mosque and to listen to the sermon whose content is
frequently of political or social importance. If women attend the mosque at
all, a practice frowned upon by some theologians and even prohibited by
others, they do so separated from the men in a small and usually bare room
in the balcony or basement which is sometimes in a bad state of neglect
through disuse. Only a sixth of the 1.2 billion Muslims are native Arabic
speakers, and it is difficult for women who are unfamiliar with the lan-
guage to recite the prescribed ritual prayers in Arabic correctly and in full,
to read and understand the Koran or to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca.
Women’s Status in Family and Society

The social separation of the sexes is regarded as means of maintaining
decorum. Men and women live virtually in different worlds, to a certain
10 Women in Islam 91
extent even within the family circle. This is apparent in the dress code,
which does not permit men to see a woman to whom they are not related
unveiled, but also in the fact that Islam knows no neutral ground where
men and women can meet. The wider family admits of a certain level of
contact, but innocuous intermingling of the sexes outside the family circle
is impossible and smacks of adultery. Muslim theologians have even rec-
ommended women should refrain from greeting relatives in public because
other passers-by will not be aware they are related.
Children in Islam are brought up very differently according to sex. Sons
especially develop a close emotional attachment to the mother, while the
father is primarily respected as the authority figure. After circumcision,
usually between four and nine years of age, fathers increasingly initiate
sons into the male world, while the mother traditionally instructs daughters
in household responsibilities, training them for their future role as house-
wife and mother. Except in the case of serious impediment, marriage is the
norm for men and women and guarantees a woman’s livelihood.
Woman’s legal Status

Islamic marriage and family law is prejudicial to women in a number of
ways. It is not only men’s right, according to the majority of Muslim theo-
logians, to punish his wife by ignoring her or to beat her in case of discord
(sura 4:34). Aside from questions of inheritance and legal testimony,
women are at a disadvantage compared with men in marital law, divorce
and custody proceedings.
The Koran permits men up to four wives and an unspecified number of
concubines (4:3). The traditional divorce procedure allows a man to di-
vorce his wife simply by pronouncing the formula “I repudiate you” with-
out the need for giving grounds or going to court. Some Muslim countries
have already introduced checks to this procedure and lay down that an
attempt at reconciliation must be made in court.
Women can only obtain a divorce in court and are only granted one if
they can prove serious misconduct by the husband. A husband is only
bound to pay alimony for a few months, so divorce leaves a woman with-
out means and without children, for Islamic marriage law invariably grants
custody to the husband once the children are out of infancy. Several Mus-
lim countries have improved the legal status of women today.
Marriage Contracts in Islam

The vast majority of Muslim marriages are today still arranged by the
parents.
Only in large cities is there a change in the trend. Arranged marriages
tend traditionally to be associated with decency and respectability, while
marriages “for love” smack of immorality and Westernization. Marriage
within the extended family is favored because familiarity with the cousin
and his parents make it easier to assess the chances of a successful mar-
riage than in the case of an outright stranger. It also guarantees the “com-
patibility” of the marriage partners with respect to social background, edu-
cation, religion and character which Islam requires, and ensures the dowry
stays within the family. It is also easier for the bride’s family to put pres-
sure on a relative to save the marriage where it is in danger of breaking up.
A Muslim marriage is very different from its Christian counterpart.
Apart from the dowry, which provides financial security against a possible
divorce, there is always a marriage contract having the character of a civil
contract in law and setting out the mutual rights and duties of the marriage
partners.
Cornerstone of the marriage contract are the husband’s responsibility to
earn a livelihood and the wife’s duty of obedience (sura 4:34). The duty of
obedience has of late led some wives to include “escape clauses” in the
marriage contract permitting them for instance to pursue education or ca-
reer subsequent to marriage, since the husband in principle has the right to
determine how often and to what purpose his wife may leave the house.
Otherwise should he forbid his wife to attend university after the wedding
on the grounds that he does not consider it compatible with decency, she
must submit without demur.
Islamic marriage law demands submission particularly in sexual rela-
tions, for by paying the dowry the husband acquires the right over his
wife’s body, and she has no grounds to refuse him except ritual impurity or
during the fast, since according to established precedent refusal, like infer-
tility, gives the husband the right to repudiate her.
The traditional religious wedding ceremony is presided over by an
imam, the mosque precentor or religious official, in urban areas marriages
are also registered. The groom and the two obligatory witnesses sign the
marriage contract. The bride does not even need to be present, the contract
being generally signed on her behalf by her guardian (wali in Arabic) act-
ing as her legal representative. The most important clause in the contract
lays down the amount of the dowry, consisting of the “dawn gift” of cloth-
ing, furniture, jewellery and money which the wife receives from groom’s
family at the wedding, and the “evening gift”, the compensation due to the
wife if they are divorced, since alimony only has to be paid for three
months or until the delivery of a yet unborn child.
God’s blessing is not invoked at a Muslim wedding, a civil rather than a
religious ceremony whose purpose is to seal a contract which explicitly
anticipates the possibility of divorce in the form of the “evening gift”. In
the wedding ceremony the marriage partners take no vow of mutual fidelity
nor make a promise of mutual care “for better or for worse”. Quite the
reverse: except in Turkey and Tunisia the husband has the right to take up
to three additional wives. Unlike Christian marriage vows there is no
promise of lifelong, exclusive devotion to one person. If the worse does
come to the worst, such things as incurable illness, a prison sentence, im-
potence or infertility are generally regarded in Islam as grounds for divorce
for both husband and wife. The idea of lifelong spiritual fellowship before
God, marriage as partnership for service, is not central to the Muslim view
of marriage, rather a compact setting out the rights and privileges of both
sides. Nor is there any promise or vow to “love and honor” one’s partner,
for the biblical commitment to mutual love is foreign to Muslim marriage.
Up to Four Women
Polygyny (multiple wives) – possibly unlimited – probably existed in
pre-Islamic Arabia. In sura 4:3, the Koran limits the number of a man’s
wives to four and, beyond this, allows an unlimited number of concubines:
“And if you fear not acting justly in regard to the orphans, than marry
women as it befits you: two, three, or four. But, if you fear not acting
justly, then marry only one, or whatever [female slaves] you possess. In
this way, you can most easily avoid doing injustice” (4:3).
A few countries, such as Tunisia, legally forbid polygamy. In the other
countries, however – provided that the marriage contract makes no other
provision – a woman can do nothing if her husband desires to take a sec-
ond wife. In several Islamic countries today, though, she can require in the
marriage contract that she be guaranteed the right to a divorce if her hus-
band takes a second wife during her lifetime. In the other Islamic countries,
polygamy is in no way the rule, but – simply for economic reasons – al-
ways the exception, since the Koran and Islamic tradition demand that all
women be treated justly in regard to the material care and affection pro-
vided by the husband.
A few Muslim theologians have interpreted the only Koran verse that
mentions the number of four wives (in sura 4: 3) in the sense that the Ko-
ran here actually speaks explicitly against polygamy, since the equal treat-
ment of several wives is never really possible, as the Koran itself concedes:
“And you will not really be able to treat your wives justly, however much
you try to do so” (4: 129). The majority of Muslim theologians, however,
has held fast to the permission, in principle, to marry four wives.
The Duty of Marriage

In Islam, voluntary unmarried existence is actually unthinkable. The Ko-
ran, of course, clearly commands marriages in sura 24: 32: “And give in
marriage those among you who are single.” The Islamic tradition declares
marriage to be a good custom that is to be observed, that is, it is sunna:
“Marriage is a part of my sunna, and whoever is against my sunna is
against me,” so Mohammed is reported to have said.69 Unmarried, di-
vorced, or widowed women in the Islamic world usually do not live alone
but, rather, move in again with their extended family, which has the goal of
seeing them married again. The fundamental reason for this is the Islamic
concept of marriage that assumes that, without the control of the extended
family, a single woman living alone would give rise to rumors about her
moral conduct.
Early Marriages
The Koran makes no concrete statements about an acceptable age for
marriage. It is known of Mohammed that he married some of his wives
while they were very young or still children, especially his later favorite
wife Aisha, who was six years old at the time. This fact later was cited
repeatedly as justification for child marriages. Today, the law books of
most Islamic countries contain provisions that determine a minimum age
for marriage, which is frequently set at 14 to 16 years for girls and ap-
proximately 16 to 18 years for boys, a regulation that, in practice in rural
areas, is not infrequently circumvented by the misrepresentation of birth
dates. Thus, for example, Moroccan women report that, as recently as sev-
eral decades ago, girls not yet in puberty, at the age of eleven or twelve
years, were given in marriage. However, it happened that the marriage of
69
Hans Bauer. Von der Ehe. Das 12. Buch von al-Gazâlî’s Hauptwerk. Halle: Max
Niemeyer, 1917, p. 5.
nine year-olds also occurred, and that girls became mothers already at the
age of ten or eleven.70
Arranged Marriages and Marriage Contracts

To the present day, marriages occur frequently within the network of
family relations, above all between cousins, because marriage also is con-
sidered very much under the aspect of a bond between two families. Once
young people reach marriageable age and are not yet promised to a cousin,
the traditional way is the arrangement of a marriage through the mother or
an older female relation of the groom. Of course, modern marriages are
certainly not arranged everywhere, and the number of “love marriages” –
above all in urban areas – is steadily increasing.
If the family arranges the marriage, however, the mother of the groom
will make inquiries at the appropriate time about the family of the chosen
young woman and about her financial circumstances, but above all about
her reputation, her health, and her domestic abilities. One or two visits in
the home of the young woman take place, on the occasion of which the
amount of the marriage portion and the festivities are discussed. If both
families reach agreement, then an official date for the wedding is set and
the couple is considered engaged. The assent on the part of the young
woman plays a more important role today than in earlier times. Today, she
is free to reject at most one candidate, but a second or third candidate less
so, since she then easily can be considered difficult and unmarriageable
and, thus, can bring shame upon her family.
The actual marriage ceremony is simple; the presence of the bride is not
absolutely necessary. She can have her father, brother, or other male rela-
tive stand in for her. Originally, the inclusion of an administrative authority
in the ceremony, for the registration of the marriage, was not required, but
only the presence of a clergyman as well as two witnesses. Today, mar-
riages are also frequently registered with the state authorities. The marriage
is purely a contract in civil law between the groom and the legal represen-
tative of the bride, and is given no particular divine blessing and includes
no promises of lifelong fidelity.
The marriage contract regulates, above all, the financial aspect of the
marriage portion (Arabic: mahr). The groom either pays the marriage por-
70
Fatima Mernissi (ed.). Der Harem ist nicht die Welt. Elf Berichte aus dem Leben
marokkanischer Frauen, Hamburg: Lüchterhand, 1988.
tion completely to his bride as her property at the time of the marriage
ceremony, or it is agreed upon that the first part (“morning portion”) is due
at the time of the wedding ceremony and the second part (“evening por-
tion”) in the case of divorce or the death of the husband, as a means of
providing the wife with some financial security in these cases.
The Wedding Celebration

At the following wedding celebration, men and women by tradition
celebrate separately. The high point of the festivities is the act of bringing
the bride into the house of the groom. There, the marriage is consummated
and, as proof of the virginity of the young woman, the bed sheets are
shown to the female relatives. The respectability of the bride and the honor
of the whole family are thus demonstrated. If the husband discovers that
his bride is no longer a virgin, she is sent back to her family in shame and
dishonor. For the family of the girl and for the bride herself, this is cer-
tainly the greatest conceivable disgrace of her life. Absolute abstinence
before marriage, as a rule, is not expected from the husband to the same
extent as from the woman.
The Provision for the Family

The husband is obligated to provide for the family. The wife, for her
part, legally cannot be forced to contribute to the livelihood of the family.
The wife has the obligation to care for the household and the children.
Joint ownership of property in our understanding of the concept does not
exist, since neither husband nor wife acquires the right to the property of
the other through the marriage. The morning portion at the time of the mar-
riage ceremony, as well as the evening portion in the case of divorce, is
considered the property of the wife and is not permitted to be used in meet-
ing the costs of living.
Once married the man, according to the Koran, has an unlimited right to
marital intercourse whenever he wishes. “Your women are a fertile field
for you. Go to your field whenever you wish” (2: 223). Refusal on the part
of the woman is always grounds for divorce, and there are some traditions
that pronounce a curse on the wife for her refusal. The wife, too, can sue
for divorce in this regard, but only after a long period of continuous sexual
neglect.
Sons and Daughters

An Islamic marriage never will voluntarily remain childless. Childless-
ness is considered to be a disgrace and the wife is almost always given the
blame for it. Infertility is a frequent ground for divorce. Often the “Evil
Eye” of a third party is seen as the cause of childlessness, and many infer-
tile women visit the graves of holy figures, or consult conjurors in order to
attain fulfillment of their desire for children by use of magical practices,
sacrifices, and occult ceremonies.
A birth is always a joyful event, especially the birth of a boy. The wife is
awarded full recognition really only through the birth of a child, for she
now has fulfilled the most important expectation of her parents and in-
laws. To have given birth to a son is such a tremendous event that many
mothers afterward are no longer called by their own names, but rather only
as the “mother of Azîz’” (Arabic: umm Azîz) or “mother of Ismâ’il’. The
tradition says that “Paradise lies at the feet of mothers”, and the Koran
demands esteem for and the respectful treatment of parents, especially in
their old age: “And we have commanded the people to be good to their
parents” (46:15). Only when the parents keep their child from the faith is
the child theoretically allowed to be disobedient.71
At the birth of a child, the prayer call is whispered in its left ear and the
confession of faith (“There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is his
Prophet.”) in its right ear. Special care is taken to ensure that the “Evil
Eye” might not possibly strike the child, for the high rate of infant mortal-
ity in the Islamic world was and is still today attributed above all to the
effects of the “Evil Eye”, that is, to the adverse magical practices of a third
party. For this reason, it is attempted to protect the child from this influ-
ence by using various protective magical practices, such as blue beads
sewn to the clothing of the child. Annemarie Schimmel mentions the cus-
tom of asking forty men named Mohammed for money and then buying
clothing for the child from the money received.72 Sometimes, among other
practices, a boy will be dressed in girl’s clothes so that the demons are led
astray from thinking that they have a boy before them.
71
Jacques Jomier., How to Understand Islam. London: SCM Press Ltd., 1989, p. 75.
72
Annemarie Schimmel, “Traditionelle Frömmigkeit”, in: Munir D. Ahmed and oth-
ers, Der Islam, III. Islamische Kultur, Zeitgenössische Strömungen, Volksfrömmig-
keit (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1990), pp. 242-266, here: p. 244.
Circumcision for Boys and Girls

Circumcision, which the Koran nowhere explicitly demands, is obliga-
tory for boys in the entire Islamic world, and is celebrated with a family
festival, usually when the boy is between seven and ten years of age. Af-
terwards, the boy belongs to masculine society and is gradually made ac-
quainted with the duties of his religion.
In spite of the official state prohibition of it in most Islamic countries,
the circumcision of girls is practiced to a greater or lesser extent in several
states, primarily in southern Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, as well as by the Bed-
ouins of North Africa. The Koran provides no basis at all for this custom
that has survived in only a few Islamic countries, where traditional groups
defend it stubbornly as a means of preserving the chastity of the unmarried
women. Some Muslim states condemn the circumcision of girls as repre-
hensible, but cannot effectively prevent its practice in certain areas of the
society. Only recently, the circumcision of girls, legally forbidden in Egypt
as early as 1959, was re-legalized there. It is possible that this custom has
its origins in African religions. In Egypt, the circumcision of girls was car-
ried out during the time of the Pharaohs.73 Thus, the circumcision of girls
should not be considered as specifically Islamic.
The Veil
Although in all Islamic countries full or partial veiling is practiced by at
least a portion of the women, the command to wear the veil is not at all so
easy to derive from the Koran. The Koran says merely that women should
cover themselves in a virtuous way for their own protection: “Oh, Prophet!
Speak to your wives and daughters and to the women of the believers that
they should draw their garments down low over themselves. Thus it is
most readily ensured that they are recognized and not molested. God is,
however, compassionate and ready to forgive” (33:59).
In the case of some of these instructions it is not easy to decide from the
context whether they concern only Mohammed’s wives or whether, be-
cause his wives are intended to be models for all women, all women in
general are addressed here indirectly.
73
Frank Bliss, Frau und Gesellschaft in Nordafrika. Islamische Theorie und gesell-
schaftliche Wirklichkeit (Bad Honnef: Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Ent-
wicklung, 1986), p. 118.
The veil, or the headscarf, is worn from about the age of puberty. The
woman then can show herself unveiled only before the men of her ex-
tended family. The Koran gives no clear instruction about whether the
“veil” means merely a headscarf worn over the usual clothing, as is fre-
quently usual in Turkey, or a full-length veil that leaves the face free or
provides only slits for the eyes, as is currently usual in Afghanistan.
Punishing the Wife for her “Rebellion”

Most Muslim theologians agree that the Koran concedes to the man the
right in certain situations to punish his wife (or wives): “The men take
precedence over the women because God has honored them more than the
others and because they give (to their wives) from their property … And if
you fear that the wives rebel (against you), then remove yourselves from
them in the marriage bed and beat them. If they then obey you, then under-
take nothing further against them!” (4:34)
The husband, as it seems, is given the right to resort to means of corporal
punishment if he merely fears that his wife could rebel against him. He can
use such punishment to compel her to obedience if admonishment and the
refusal of marital intercourse have not moved her to relent. Whoever exam-
ines the exact wording of the Koran verse could even say that the man not
only has the right, but even the duty to punish, for sura 4:34 is formulated
as a command to husbands: “Beat them!”
This is not to say that in every Muslim family the husband beats his wife
and in any non-Muslim family he does not! Some Muslim theologians and
also some female feminists are totally opposed to the idea that the Koran
allows the husband to beat his wife by arguing that the traditional transla-
tion of sura 4:34 is simply wrong. But till today they do not seem to be
influential enough to shake the arguments of mainstream Muslim theologi-
ans.
So there is also just as little justification for claiming that men in the Is-
lamic world would not avail themselves of this right. N. Tomiche men-
tions, for example, that the right of punishment is legally established in
Egypt. There are said to be courts there that concern themselves with the
permissible length of the stick with which the woman can be beaten.74
74
N. Tomiche. “Mar’a”. in: Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. VI (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991),
pp. 466-472, here: p. 471, and Frank Bliss. Frau und Gesellschaft in Nordafrika.
Islamische Theorie und gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit. Bad Honnef: Deutsche Stif-
tung für Internationale Entwicklung, 1986, p. 69.
“Moderate” punishment by the husband will hardly be a cause for legal
action against him, since the wife is assumed to be fundamentally respon-
sible for the success of the marriage and, in the case of punishment, the
assumption is abnormal behavior on her part.
In the tradition, it is reported of Mohammed himself that he confirmed
the right of punishment for the case that a wife received as a guest in her
home someone who the husband is not able to abide: “But, she should not
allow anyone to sit in your private quarters who you do not like. If she,
however, does this anyway, then you are permitted to punish her, but not
too hard. Her rights in regard to you are that you provide her in an appro-
priate form with food and clothing”75 .
The famous theologian Abû Hamîd al-Ghazâlî (died 1111) demands that
the “malice” of the wife be treated with “discipline and severity”76 and, in
the case of “disobedience on the part of the wife”, he advocates “forcibly
returning [her] to obedience”77. If her husband punishes her and, as a last
resort, beats her, then “he should beat her without causing her injury …,
that is, he should cause her pain, but not so that one of her bones is broken
or she bleeds. He also is not permitted to strike her in the face; that is for-
bidden”78.
Adultery
Adultery in general is considered in Islam to be a serious offence; the
Koran requires 100 lashes for the man and the woman (24:2) and warns
explicitly against leniency and compassion. In Islamic law, however, the
penalty of death by stoning has come to be accepted since the tradition
mentions this punishment and it is assumed that earlier the Koran also once
contained this “stoning verse”.
However, four witnesses are required to provide proof of adultery, a cir-
cumstance that is likely to be extremely rare. If this condition cannot be
fulfilled, then the charge is interpreted as a false accusation, which, accord-
75
From a translation by Talib Y. Fehlhaber. cited in: Ahmad v. Denffer, Wallfahrt
nach Mekka. Das Wichtigste über umra und hadsch, Schriftenreihe des
Islamischen Zentrums München, Nr. 15, Munich, 1987, p. 84, unfortunately with
no source reference.
76
Hans Bauer. Von der Ehe. Das 12. Buch von al-Gazâlî’s Hauptwerk Halle: Max
Niemeyer, 1917, p. 78.
77
Ibid., p. 87.
78
Ibid.
ing to Islamic law, likewise is punishable by death. A wife can ward off the
accusation of adultery made by her husband, but which he cannot prove
through the evidence of four witnesses, by calling upon God four times as
her witness that her husband is lying and the fifth time swearing to God
that she is innocent and imploring God that he otherwise might punish her
with his curse (24:6-9).
So are the legal provisions, which offer only few possibilities for legal
proceedings. It is quite another question how adultery, or the suspicion of
it, is punished in practice. One can certainly assume that a woman is not
very frequently charged with adultery in a court of law, but that the family
of a woman fallen into “disrepute” itself much more frequently assumes
the responsibility of punishment.
In fact, it appears that, in practice, the proven case of adultery is not al-
ways required for the punishment of a woman, but rather that only minor
deviations from socially accepted behavior are sufficient. For an unmarried
woman, this immoral behavior would exist, for example, in a conversation
with an unrelated man. The woman then gains a bad reputation and thus
has fewer chances for marriage. It can happen that a girl who once has
exchanged a few words with a young man in a public place is then shut up
completely at home and monitored constantly until she is married.
Jürgen Frembgen reports from his experiences gathered during several
lengthy stays in Pakistan: “Among the Pakhtun and Baluch, the forbidden
glance of a woman in the direction of a strange man, or a short conversa-
tion, already can be interpreted as unchaste behavior and adultery, which
makes further life together with her husband impossible and often enough
means the killing of the wife”79, or “contacts between a man and a woman
who are not married to each other can … be interpreted as adultery and
result in a vendetta”80.
Divorce and Repudiation of the Wife

The tradition, to be sure, records that Mohammed characterized divorce
as the most reprehensible of all permitted actions. Yet, divorces in Islamic
law were and are very simple for the man and, accordingly, frequent. The
husband can repudiate his wife at any time and without naming his grounds
79
Jürgen Frembgen, Alltagsverhalten in Pakistan (Berlin: Express Edition, 1987), p.
32.
80
Ibid., p. 74.
for it by repeating the divorce formula (for example: “I repudiate you!”)
three times. If he pronounces the formula only once or twice, then the di-
vorce is still revocable. He takes his wife back again before the “waiting
period”, the period in which a possible pregnancy would become evident,
has run out and consummates marital intercourse with her, which amounts
to a repeal of the divorce. If, however, the divorce formula has been spo-
ken three times, then the man can marry this particular woman again only
if she, in the intervening period, has been the wife of another man and
again has been divorced from him (2:228-230).
This regulation of the three-fold divorce formula is intended actually to
protect the woman from impulsive divorces that are pronounced in annoy-
ance, intoxication, or just in fun. Divorce, however, remained even in the
Islamic era a comparatively uncomplicated process for the husband, since
his decision alone is sufficient.
Today, however, this simple divorce has been made de facto more diffi-
cult in several Islamic countries. Often (but not everywhere), legal pro-
ceedings in a court of law are necessary. In some cases, too, the man must
initiate a legal action in order to obtain a divorce; sometimes he is urged to
undertake attempts at reconciliation. A particularly frequent ground for
divorce today is still likely to be the infertility of the wife or the birth of
several daughters and no son.
In most Islamic countries today, a wife, too, can obtain a divorce in cer-
tain cases, but always with the help of a formal trial. Among the grounds
that a wife can present before a court are several years’ absence of her hus-
band from the home and his presence at an unknown location, the neglect
of his obligation to pay support, a term in prison extending over several
years, continued impotence, neglect of marital duties for at least three
years, mental illness, dangerous, contagious, or repulsive diseases such as
leprosy or elephantiasis, exceptional cruelties on the part of the husband,
robbery of the wife’s property, hindrance of the wife in the practice of her
religious duties, verifiably unequal treatment of wives, seduction of the
wife to immorality, and a permanently immoral lifestyle (individual
“lapses” are not grounds for divorce81). The principle of irreconcilable
differences in the marriage also is applied today under certain conditions.
According to Islamic law, the children from a divorced marriage always
belong to the father. They can remain with the mother until they have
81
So Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law (Geoffrey Cumberlege: Ox-
ford University Press, 1949/1955), pp. 145-147, for at least the Indo-Pakistani
sphere.
grown out of infancy, that is, girls until ten or twelve and boys no older
than seven (in Iran only until the age of two). Afterwards, the children
come to their father or to his family and belong to him alone. The wife then
no longer has any rights in regard to her children, also no right of visita-
tion.
The Islamic Women’s Movement

The model and goal of the women’s movement in the Islamic world,
which is active in all countries at different levels of intensity, is not the
adoption of the – what in the Islamic view is considered to be a – decadent
and morally reprehensible western social order, and also not the liberation
from the regulations of the Koran. The women’s movement argues that
neither the Koran nor the tradition is correctly interpreted today, and that
Mohammed’s wives possessed a more privileged position than women
today. “Back to original Islam and its rights for women!” is the frequent
demand of Islamic women’s movements. A call for the assertion of
women’s rights in the framework of a suspension of Islam would have no
chance of being heard on a broad scale in the Islamic world. Women’s
rights advocates who would do so would be charged with being godless
and western. For this reason, women in the Islamic world have attempted
repeatedly to sue for their rights by “correctly interpreting” the statements
of the Koran and the tradition.
Differences with Christian Marriage

The Islamic marriage differs from the Christian marriage in many re-
spects. Through the provision for the security of the bride with the evening
portion, the Islamic marriage in a certain sense reckons already at the time
of the marriage ceremony with the possibility of a later divorce and also
with the possibility of the man marrying additional women. A promise on
the part of the marriage partners with God’s help to remain true to each
other until death does not exist. Marriage in Islam is generally only a con-
tract in civil law that determines mutual obligations and is not an eternal
bond founded by God and blessed by him. The fear of a threatening di-
vorce is quite real for almost every Muslim woman when she does not
fulfill the expectations of her husband in the management of the household
and the number of children.
The Christian marriage, in contrast, is intended as lifelong companion-
ship with only one partner. Precisely because of the commitment to one
human being, that is, to exclusivity, it is compared in the Bible again and
again with the covenant between God and human beings, which likewise is
committed to exclusivity and is concluded for eternity. Married Christians
swear an oath before God that only death should separate them. Also in
contrast to Islam, mental illness, prison, or the impossibility of finding a
sufficient livelihood would not be a ground for divorce according to the
Bible, for it is exactly here that it ought to be demonstrated that Christian
marriages are maintained not only so long as the marriage partners “func-
tion” flawlessly, but precisely in those instances when he or she most ur-
gently needs counsel, help, and support. The Christian marriage vow to be
there for the partner in “good as well as evil days” obligates the partner to
sacrifice himself or herself for the other precisely in times of need. The
Bible speaks in many places of the fact that love for the neighbor or for the
marriage partner is not just a feeling, but also that there must be a decision
of the will for love, and that love means devotion and sacrifice (cf. Ephe-
sians 5:25-31). The Bible repeatedly exhorts husbands and wives to exer-
cise love in the marriage. It is not the codification of certain obligations in
the marriage, such as provision for the family or the care of children, that
forms the chief component of Christian marriage, but it is rather the intel-
lectual-spiritual communion of the marriage partners in their relationship to
God and the mutual completion of two, in nature, different human beings
borne by love and forgiveness that stands at the center of Christian mar-
riage. The story of creation already makes this especially clear. Adam
misses a partner that is like him, does not stand under him like the animals,
and does not stand over him like God, his Lord. After he has given all the
animals a name, he rejoices at the creation of the woman, for God says: “It
is not good for the man to be alone; I will make a partner for him that is
suitable to him” (Genesis 2:18).
Divorce was an “abomination” to God already in the Old Testament
(Malachi 2:11, 14-16) and was allowed at all only because of the “hard-
heartedness” of the people (Jesus in Matthew 19:8, Mark 10:5). Divorce in
the biblical understanding thus is intended to be an absolute exception, but
not allowed for from the very beginning. On the basis of this idea of life-
long companionship, a divorce in German law, too, is still a quite tedious
affair that “enforces” a complete year’s time to reconsider, even in severe
cases of irreconcilable differences. If only one marriage partner desires the
divorce, then even several years can pass before the divorce is finalized.
On the other hand, the Koran nowhere speaks explicitly about the intel-
lectual and spiritual communion of marriage partners and, to my knowl-
edge, this component remains practically unconsidered among the com-
mentators on the Koran and in the literature on questions concerning mar-
riage and the family. Since Islam has no ecclesiastical structure encom-
passing all the faithful and the mosque offers women only a limited sphere
of activity, a woman can live out her faith only in private. She cannot,
however, intellectually and spiritually shape her environment and culture
together with her husband.
11 “Islam” is not just “Islam”:
Sunni and Shiite Islam compared82
Sunni and Shiite Islam compared

Sunnism Shiism
1. Sunni Muslims believe that the 1. Shii Muslims believe that only
ruler of the Muslim community has a relative of Muhammad is entitled
to belong to Muhammad’s tribe, to to rule the Muslim community. The
the Quraysh. He has to be elected legal ruler is the Imam, a religious
by the community and then con- leader. He lives “in secrecy” today
firmed in his position. This ruler is and sends his messages to his com-
the caliph who enables his subjects munity. He has the highest authority
to live according to the laws and to teach, he is infallible and sinless.
regulations of the sharia. He is A Shii tradition says: “Whoever
judge and military leader and ap- does not know the Imam of his time
plies the God-given law but he has will die the death of an unbeliever.”
no teaching authority.
2. Sunni Muslims expect Jesus to 2. Shii Muslims expect the Imam
come back on earth at the end of the to return to the earth at the end of
times – either in the Umayyad the times. The Imam is believed to
mosque in Damascus or in Jerusa- live in secrecy since the 10th cen-
lem – then he will return to the earth tury.
as a prophet of Islam.
3. Most Sunni Muslims believe 3. Most Shii Muslims consider
that a temporary marriage for which the temporary marriage (mut’a-
the wife will get a payment at the marriage) as a form of marriage
end has to be considered as a form practiced by Muhammad and there-
of “prostitution” and is therefore fore allowed if not recommended.
forbidden.
82
the Islam Institute of the German Evangelical Alliance. 5/2005, 2: 18-19; 28-29
4. Sunni Islam has developed four 4. Shii Islam has developed its
schools of law (traditions) until the own traditions and interpretations of
10th century which go back to fa- Islamic law. Shii Islam does not
mous jurists and theologians of the accept the traditions of the first
early Islamic times and are prac- three Sunni caliphs (followers of
ticed till today. Muhammad’s), since they are con-
sidered as “usurpers”. Shii Muslims
therefore often curse them.
5. The four schools of law show 5. Shii Muslims pray in Shii
some minor differences concerning mosques if ever possible, and their
the interpretation of sharia and the ritual prayer differs from the Sunni
practice of the faith (e.g. when it majority to some respects. Many
comes to ritual prayer), but they Shii believers use a little piece of
acknowledge each other in princi- dried clay from Kerbela (where
ple. Muhammad’s grandson was killed)
on which they fall down with their
forehead while praying.
6. Sunni Muslims believe that the 6. Shii Muslims claimed from the
Koran text has been sent down unto very beginning that the Koran text
Muhammad and was transferred to had been falsified by Sunni Mus-
him by the angel Gabriel. Since lims, as to their belief Muhammad
then, it has been preserved without had designated his son-in-law and
any faults and errors till today. nephew ’Ali to become his succes-
sor. This claim has not been ac-
cepted by the Sunni majority after
Muhammad’s death.
7. In Sunni theology the concept 7. Shii theology considers the suf-
of suffering and redemption is of no fering of the Imams in history and
importance. The Koran denies the even more the suffering of Mu-
death of Jesus Christ on the cross hammad’s grandson al-Husai who
(sura 4:157-159) and Sunni theolo- has died a “martyr’s” death in 680
gians unanimously reject it. AD to be of eminent importance for
the redemption of today’s Shii Mus-
lim community.
8. If a Sunni Muslim has asked a 8. If a Shii believer sticks to the
scholar for a fatwa (legal opinion) tradition (“imitation”) of a certain
concerning a certain question and he Shii scholar, he is obliged to follow
hesitates to follow his advice, the the advice given to him in his fatwa.
believer is entitled to approach an-
11 “Islam” is not just “Islam“: Sunni and Shiite Islam compared 109
other scholar to hear his opinion and
ask for a second fatwa.
9. In view of Sunni Islam it is not 9. Shii Muslims believe that the
the duty of the Muslim community Koran text has many hidden, inner
to search for a “hidden meaning” in meanings beside the “outer” mean-
the Koran text, as we have it today. ing which is easy to be understood.
The hidden meanings are only
known to the Imam.
10. For Sunni Muslims the Mu- 10. For Shii Muslims the mourn-
harram processions and the visits of ing ceremonies in the month of Mu-
the graves of Shii saints and Imams harram are of utmost importance in
– especially if considered to be a order to repent and to receive re-
substitute for the pilgrimage to demption by remembering the death
Mecca – comes near to apostasy and of the last descendant of the Prophet
heresy. Muhammad in Kerbela 680.
Taqiya – The Dictate of Secrecy in Emergency

Rivalry and animosity characterized the relationship between Sunni and
Shiite Muslims from the very start, the key issue being the legitimacy of
rule, but there were also disputes about the “correct” text of the Koran and
the “correct” tradition, as well as numerous legal questions, with each side
accusing the other of “unbelief” and “heresy” till today.
Shiites have at times suffered persecution from Sunni rulers and dynas-
ties such as the Umayyads and Abbasids, and their places of pilgrimage
have again and again been destroyed by Sunnis. In modern Saudi-Arabia,
which recognizes only Sunni-Wahhabite Islam as the true faith, Shiites do
not enjoy genuine freedom of religion and are often regarded with suspi-
cion if not animosity. As a result many conceal their affiliation with the
Shiite community. The same is often true in the Gulf States. The Shiite
minority is all too often suspected of lack of identification with or loyalty
to the Sunni regime, and of entertaining relations with Shiite circles in Iran
with a view to overthrowing the government and introducing the Iranian
revolution. Fear of subversion has often led the Gulf States and Saudi-
Arabia to deport Shiite groups regardless of whether they were in fact po-
litically active or not.
The centuries-old and sometimes severe persecution of their minority
community led Shiites to take the view that in such an emergency they
should either emigrate or compulsorily conceal their faith to avoid unnec-
essary martyrdom and protect themselves and their community. This prac-
tice of taqiya, meaning ‘prudence’ or ‘concealment’ seems to have arisen
under the strict Sunni rule of the Abbasids in the 8th century AD. 83 Justifi-
cation was found in sura 16.106, which exonerates from divine wrath on
voluntary unbelievers those who “are externally driven to unbelief al-
though their heart has found eternal rest in faith”. The Koran extends
these dispensations to other emergencies such as threat of starvation or fear
of non-Muslim enemies, in which case one is allowed to eat meat which
has not been ritually slaughtered (6.119) and to entertaining friendships
with “unbelievers” (3.28). The term taqiya later came to be synonymous
with “hide”, “conceal” or even “lie”, and “practising taqiya” meant dis-
simulation to deceive others. .The term taqiya today is also applied to
Da’wah (the call or invitation to Islam), meaning to proceed in a tactical
way in order to proselytize.
Even Sunni theologians accept the principle of taqiya. One of the most
famous, al-Tabari (died 855) gave the following interpretation of sura
16.106: “If any one is compelled and professes unbelief with his tongue,
while his heart contradicts him, in order to escape his enemies, no blame
falls on him, because God takes his servants as their hearts believe.”84
Others held the view that taqiya was to be recommended for women, chil-
dren and handicapped but not binding on single persons, who could bear
persecution as long as it was limited to prison or non-fatal beating.85
The opinion of the vast majority of Shiites is that the persecuted believer
should practice “prudence” or “dissimulation” and pretend to be Sunni to
avoid persecution.86 Some Shiite scholars even went so far as teach
publically as Sunni theologians while secretly presiding over their Shiite
communities.87 Genuine equality and mutual recognition between Sunnis
and Shiites has never been attained in Muslim history and theology.
83
Moojan Momen. An Introduction to Shi’i Islam. The History and Doctrines of
Twelver Shi’ism. New Haven/London, 1985, p. 39.
84
al-Tabari. Tafsir. Bulak 1323, XXIV,122, quoted from R. Strothmann-[Mokhtar-
Djebli]. “Takiyya.” in: Encyclopaedia of Islam. vol. 10, Leiden 2000, pp.134-136,
see p. 134
85
Ibid. p. 134
86
Only the Shii group of the Zaidites is against taqiya.
87
Momen. “Introduction.” pp. 319-320 mentions some examples.
12 Suicide, Martyrdom and Jihad88
“Whosoever kills a human being for other than manslaughter or corrup-

tion in the earth, it shall be as if he had killed all mankind, and whoso
saves the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind”
(sura 5:32).
Does Islam Condone Violence?

The foregoing verse from the 5th sura, echoing almost verbatim pas-
sages referring to Israel in Mishna and Talmud89, has been frequently cited
in recent discussion about Islamic suicide attacks. Should it be taken to
mean Islam prohibits such attacks? The almost daily occurrence in recent
years of suicide attacks perpetrated by extremists who appeal to Islam to
justify their actions has raised the question whether Islam is inherently
militant or a religion of peace, a question to which Muslims themselves
give differing answers.
While some insist on the fundamental incompatibility of violence with
Islam on the grounds that “terror has nothing to do with our religion”90,
others maintain that attacks resulting in “innocent” victims are wrong and
not to be countenanced by Islam. There are also those who consider that in
a war such as the one currently opposing Israel and Palestine, casualties are
inevitable and justifiable: “We are at war, as we have never been before
88
89
4th Book (“Nezikin”). chap. “Sanhedrin”. par. 4, V. 5. Herbert Danby. Mishna.
London 1993
90
According to the Chairman of the “Central council of Muslims in Germany”
(ZMD), Nadeem Elyas, in the Stuttgarter Zeitung, 3 April 2004: “Manchen passt
es nicht, dass wir den Terror verurteilen” (Our condemnation of terrorism does not
suit everyone).
throughout history. If civilians are killed in the course of Palestinian op-
erations, this is not a crime“91.
In connection with the 11 September attacks there were Muslims who
concluded the attackers could not possibly be Muslims but terrorists whose
religious affiliation had no relevance for their deeds. This somewhat facile
solution to the problem fails to do justice to the fact that many extremists
claim, orally or in writing, that Islam is the mainspring and motive of their
attacks.
The simple answer to the question whether Islam is a militant religion or
a peaceful one that is being misappropriated for political ends is probably
“both”.
It is important to define the terms of the discussion. There can be no
doubt that the Koran unequivocally condemns killing innocent people. In
Islamic jurisprudence murder, manslaughter, terror and attacks against
innocent victims, including bodily injury, are serious crimes punishable in
a court of law. The Sharia reserves execution as a punishment for capital
offences such as adultery, sedition, apostasy or in martial law.
However not all Muslims would class a suicide bomb attack as murder
or manslaughter. This results from the differing conclusions Muslims draw
from Muhammad’s example. In the early part of his career from around
610 to 622 AD, Muhammad was a preacher calling his compatriots to faith
in Allah as sole creator and judge and pronouncing ethical principles such
as appeals for fair trading or solicitude for ageing parents.
In the last ten years of his life subsequent to his emigration (hijra) to
Medina in 622 AD, Muhammad acted as military commander, politician
and legislator and was able to gather many more followers round him,
whom he led in a number of military campaigns against those who resisted
his message and rule, principally three large Jewish and a number of Ara-
bic tribes. The Koran condemns these “infidels” and their opposition to
Islam, which in numerous verses is equated with opposition to God and his
Prophet. Muhammad’s enemies are denoted “friends of Satan”: “Those
who do believe battle for the cause of Allah; and those who disbelieve bat-
tle for the cause of idols. So fight the friends of satan (the devil). The
devil’s strategy is ever weak” (4:76).
91
’Abd as-Sabur Shahin, lecturer of Dar al-Ulum in Kairo, in: “al-Ahram al-’Arabi”.
15. Dec 2001, cited by Haim Malka. “Must Innocents Die? The Islamic Cebate
over Suicide Attacks.” in: Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2003, p. 5 (see also
www.meforum.org/article/530)
12 Suicide, Martyrdom and Jihad 113
Muhammad preached and lived out ethical principles and military com-
bat, and following his example is one of the immutable duties of every
pious Muslim. Theologians differ as to whether every individual Muslim is
bound to participate in the struggle to defend and propagate Islam.
The Koran calls upon Muslim believers to take up the struggle against
the enemy and the adversary and the following passages show Muhammad
appealed more than once to his followers to fight: “Warfare is ordained for
you, though it is hateful unto you; but it may happen that you hate a thing
which is good for you, and it may happen that you love a thing what is bad
for you. Allah knows, you know not” (2:216). And: “So fight in the way of
Allah – you are not taxed (with the responsibility for anyone) except for
yourself – and urge on the believers” (4:84)
“Infidels” and “hypocrites” are the target of the struggle: “O prophet!
Strive against the infidels and the hypocrites! Be harsh with them. Their
ultimate abode is hell, a hapless journey’s-end” (9:73)
Extremists who apply the early Muslim community’s struggle against
“infidels” to present-day conflicts can hardly be accused of misinterpreting
the Koran, for people who resist the spread of Islam can scarcely be con-
sidered as “innocent victims”, particularly in Israel, where there is not a
family without someone serving in the armed forces. From the extremists’
perspective it is easy to see how even those not involved in the war can be
considered enemies of Islam. According to this view, it is legitimate to take
the life of Islam’s enemies, who resist its spread, as Israel does by its very
existence, as this ultimately counts as defending Islam.
For Shiite Muslims suffering plays a particular role in the struggle
against the oppressor. In 680 AD al-Husain, Muhammad’s grandson and
last direct descendant, was defeated by a superior Sunnite army, sealing the
end of hopes of Shiite accession to power. The annual passion plays in the
month of Muharram recall al-Husain’s suffering as an example of the suf-
fering and unjust death of all oppressed in Islam, whose heirs the Shiites
consider themselves to be. Last but not least, defending and affirming Pal-
estinian rights is seen against the background of Islamic Middle-eastern
culture as defending the honor of the Arab nation and/or Muslim commu-
nity against an overweening “Christian” West.
Martyrdom
A word must be said in this context about the Koran’s view of martyr-
dom and its place in Muslim theology. In the mind of most Muslims to die
in Jihad, i.e. in God’s cause or striving for God’s purposes, promoting the
way of God, is rewarded by immediate access to Paradise. Several pas-
sages in the Koran assert that those killed in battle do not really die but
simply exchange life on earth for life in the hereafter: “Let those fight in
the way of Allah who sell the life of this world for the other. Whoso fights
in the way of Allah, be he slain or be he victorious, on him we shall bestow
a vast reward” (4:74). Or: “Think not of those, who are slain in the way of
Allah, as dead. No, they are living … jubilant because of that which Allah
has bestowed upon them of his bounty, rejoicing for the sake of those who
have not joined them but are left behind: that there shall no fear come
upon them neither shall they grieve” (3:169-170).
According to Muslim tradition those who die a natural death undergo in-
terrogation as to their faith by the two angels of the grave and may for a
time have to endure suffering for their sins, from which they can be re-
leased by Muhammad’s intercession and enter Paradise. Martyrs, on the
other hand, whose faith is not in question, enter Paradise immediately after
death without the need for awkward questions or any kind of purgatorial
suffering. Martyrs are also buried in their own blood-stained clothes with-
out the need for ritual ablution of the body.
There are a number of Koran verses which associate Paradise with sacri-
ficial involvement for God’s cause possibly resulting in death: “Now when
you meet in battle those who disbelieve, then it is smiting of the necks until,
when you have routed them, then making fast of bonds … and those who
are slain in the way of Allah, he renders not their actions vain. He will
guide them and improve their state, and bring them into the Garden which
he has made known to them”(47:4-6).
This concept of a martyr as one who actively lays down his life for God
differs from that of the New Testament and the Early Church of a martyr as
a person whose life is taken because they refuse to deny their faith when
faced with the alternative: renounce or die.
The Prohibition of Suicide and the Duty of Jihad

Both the Koran (4:29) and Muslim tradition forbid suicide in the sense
of persons taking their own life in despair at their circumstances, over-
whelmed by need or from fear of torture and thereby deny God’s providen-
tial care.
An attack which is likely to prove lethal for its perpetrator is according
to this logic thus not classed as suicide but as Jihad, striking a legitimate
blow in God’s cause as a last resort against the illegitimate oppression of
the Muslim community. Jihad may also be seen as defending the human
rights of Muslims in Palestine who are deprived of them and as a check on
tyranny and injustice. From a Muslim point of view such action may take
peaceful forms such as the propagation of Islam on the internet, distribut-
ing copies of the Koran or donating grants for students at Muslim Universi-
ties.
On the other hand Jihad may also find militant expression, especially
when it involves defending Islam against its “enemies”, and the Koran
promises such militants forgiveness: “And what though you be slain in
Allah’s way or die therein? Surely pardon from Allah and mercy are better
than all that they amass” (3:157). Indeed, anyone laying down their life in
Jihad is not even to be regarded as dead: “And call not those who are slain
in the way of Allah ‘dead’. No, they are living, only you perceive not”
(2:154).
The Koran promises the great reward of Paradise to all who die in the
path of divine duty: “I suffer not the work of any worker, male or female,
to be lost … and those who fled and were driven force from their homes
and suffered damage for my cause, and fought and were slain, verily I
shall remit their evil deeds from them and verily I shall bring them into
Gardens underneath which rivers flow – a reward from Allah. And with
Allah is the fairest of rewards”(3:195).
Palestinian or Indonesian suicide bombers do not see themselves as sui-
cides who face divine retribution in the after-life but as militants who lay
down their lives in defense of Islam to end the (Western) aggressors’ op-
pression of the Muslim community (umma). While it is still true that Islam
forbids the murder of innocent people and appeals for peace, but a peace
which in the traditional view which will come when all humanity is gov-
erned by the Sharia and Islam has received universal recognition. Muslim
opinion differs widely on the question of which means are legitimate to
enforce the Sharia, whether Muslim propaganda, legal pressure in the
courts or terrorism and war.
Because of this, Muslim academics generally find it difficult to condemn
suicide attacks outright. They tend to be condemned in pronouncements
aimed at Western countries but condoned in statements destined for the
Muslim community. The grand sheikh of al-Azhar, the grand mufti of
Egypt, Sayyid Mohammed Tantawi, recently denied their legitimacy in
pronouncements to the West and commented on the attack on the US em-
bassy in Kenya in 1998 in the following terms: “Any explosion that leads
to the death of innocent women and children is a criminal act, carried out
only by people who are base, cowards and traitors“92. He made a similar
pronouncement subsequent to the attacks on the World Trade Centre in
New York 2001. The Sharia “rejects all attempts on human life, and in the
name of shari’a we condemn all attacks on civilians, whatever their com-
munity or state responsible for such an attack”93.
But as early as 1998 Tantawi declared publicly to Arab audiences that
Palestinian attacks were legitimate: “It is every Muslim, Palestinian and
Arab’s right to blow himself up in the heart of Israel“94, and: “Suicide
operations are of self-defense and a kind of martyrdom, as long as the in-
tention behind them is to kill the enemy’s soldiers and not women and chil-
dren“95.
The well-known Egyptian-born Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the highest
Sunni authority in Qatar and acknowledged legal expert (Mufti), makes a
distinction between “terrorism” and “martyrdom”, regarding Palestinian
suicide attacks as legitimate but not the 2001attacks on the World Trade
Center: “The Palestinian who blows himself up is a person who is defend-
ing his homeland. When he attacks an occupier enemy, he is attacking a
legitimate target. This is different from someone who leaves his country
and goes to strike a target with which he has no dispute”.96
The failure of Muslims to condemn suicide attacks needs to be under-
stood in the context of the duty of solidarity within the Umma, the com-
munity of all Muslims which forbids public criticism of other Muslims and
thus taking the part of non-Muslims. Some Muslims may perhaps regard
death in a suicide attack as predestined (maktub) and criticism of it as an
unlawful querying of a decree of divine providence. Finally account must
betaken of possible linguistic differences in the semantic value of terms
used in English pronouncements for the West and their Arabic equivalent.
Those who take Muhammad’s early life as their guide and regard the
propagation of and invitation to Islam as legitimate means in God’s cause
today can see Islam as a religion of peace. For those who apply the
92
Yotam Feldner. “Debating the Religious, Political and Moral Legitimacy of Suicide
Bombings (I)”. MEMRI, Inquiry and Analysis, 2 May 2001
93
Grand Sheikh condemns suicide bombings. BBC NEWS 4 Dec 2001
94
Feldner. Ibid.
95
Sut El-Ama (Ägypten), 26.4.2001, cited in: “Al-Hayat”. London-Beirut, 27.4. 2001
and in: “Debating the Religious, Political and Moral Legitimacy of Suicide Bomb-
ings (I)”. MEMRI, Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 53, 2 May 2001
96
Ar-Raya, Doha, 26. Oct 2002, cited from Haim Malka. “Must Innocents Die? The
Islamic Cebate over Suicide Attacks.” in: Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2003, p. 4
Koranic texts dealing with the struggle against infidels one-to-one to the
contemporary events in Palestine or the Western “oppression” of Muslim
countries, Islam can prove to be a religion with potential for violence.
13 Honor Killings and Ideas of Honor97
“Senel Habes, from Kilis, goes to the police station and reports that she
is being threatened by her divorced husband. In panic, she requests protec-
tion from the public prosecutor’s office. The authorities, however, ignored
her appeal for help, although an unmistakable danger for the victim was
plain. She bore distinct scars on her face from the acid that her husband
had poured on her. Twenty days later, Senel Habes was killed by her ex-
husband.”98
Honor killings take place today not only in the eastern part of Turkey. In
Germany, too, and in the other countries of Europe, women die “for rea-
sons of honor”. Till now, German criminal investigative departments do
not compile any separate statistics, but unofficial statistics quote at least 49
honor killings or attempts at such in Germany between 1996 and 2005.99
The United Nations estimate that ca. 5000 honor killings (along with a
high number of unreported cases) have been committed world-wide.100
Honor killings are known to have been committed in eastern Turkey, in
the neighboring lands among the Kurdish population, in Jordan and Syria,
in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, in Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon,
Ethiopia, and Kosovo, as well as in several countries outside the Mediter-
ranean area, such as Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, East Africa, Malaysia,
Papua- New Guinea, and Cambodia, as well as in migrant cultures in west-
97
98
Internationales Zentrum für Menschenrechte der Kurden IMK e. V. (Hg.). Mord im
Namen der Ehre. Entwicklungen und Hintergründe von Ehrenmorden. Bonn 2003,
p. 20
99
M. Böhmecke. Studie: Ehrenmord, Tübingen n. d. (2005), www.frauenrechte.de/
tdf/pdf/EU-Studie_Ehrenmord.pdf (1.7. 2006) p. 18f.+22 according to a statistics
of Papatya (Ed.). Verbrechen im Namen der Ehre in Deutschland. Berlin 2005
100
N. Sadik. The State of World Population 2000: Lives together, worlds apart: men
and women in a time of change. United Nations Populations fund,
www.unfpa.org/upload/lib_pub_file/468_filename_swp2000.pdf (1.7.2006), p.
9+33
ern countries.101 Silvia Tellenbach, in addition, cites the region of the
Maghreb and Yemen, for which she assumes 400 honor killings for the
year 1997 alone.102 Amnesty International assumes that several hundred
honor killings were committed in Pakistan in 2004,103 others claim 1500
murders yearly for Pakistan.104 Everywhere, there is a high number of un-
reported cases.
When Honor is offended against …

A girl or a woman is killed by a member of her own family for “reasons
of honor” when it is believed that she has not exhibited the respectable
conduct demanded of her in relationships between the sexes, has violated
her sexual integrity, and, thus, has ruined the honor of the entire family.
The loss of virginity is considered to be particularly reprehensible. In the
culture of the Near and Middle East, in which shame plays a major role,
the family is obliged to act when a violation of the social boundaries be-
comes public knowledge.
Thus, the reputation of a woman must be preserved without reproach at
all times. For this reason, the danger of falling victim to an honor murder
begins with puberty and ends only at death. A young woman who acts in a
disreputable way will have hardly any chance to marry and must fear
death. An older married or divorced woman can be locked away or beaten.
Older women watch over the younger ones; indeed, many a mother “her-
self … even takes part … when her own daughter is pushed under the trac-
tor and dies”.105
101
C. Stolle. “Nachwort”. in: H. Gashi. Mein Schmerz trägt Deinen Namen. Ein
Ehrenmord in Deutschland. Hamburg 2005, p. 249
102
S. Tellenbach. “Ehrenmorde an Frauen in der arabischen Welt. Anmerkungen zu
Jordanien und anderen Ländern.” in: Wuquf – Beiträge zur Entwicklung von Staat
und Gesellschaft in Nordafrika 13 (2003), 74-89, www.gair.uni-erlangen.de/
Tellenbach_Wuquf13.pdf, 1-14 (2.7.2006), p. 2
103
Amnesty International (Hg.). Pakistan. Honour killings of girls and women (1999),
web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGASA330181999 (5.7.2006)
104
This number was mentioned by Kai Müller at a conference in Berlin: “Verbrechen
im Namen der Ehre”, 9. März 2005 in Berlin, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, amnesty
international, Terre des Femmes, www.frauenrechte.de/tdf/pdf/Fachtagung_
Dokumentation_2005.pdf (2.7.2006), p. 3
105
IMK. op. cit., p. 16
13 Honor Killings and Ideas of Honor 121
Wherever these laws are in effect, the mere suspicion of conduct deviat-
ing from the norm already can bring a woman into disrepute. No action at
all is necessary; the woman has made herself the subject of gossip, and that
suffices. She has withdrawn herself from the legitimate control of her hus-
band or her father and, for this reason, a wrong or the desire to do wrong
can be imputed to her. Other reasons for an honor murder are the woman’s
resistance to an arranged marriage, her wish for a divorce, illegitimate
pregnancies – and, as a rule, of course, even in those cases where the
woman is a victim of a crime. It may be the case that this woman will have
to marry the man who raped her, an act that would terminate any possible
police investigation, since, after all, the injustice caused the family is con-
sidered as compensated for through the marriage.
In Pakistan, it is said that honor killings carried out because of economic
considerations are not a rarity, as in cases, for example, where a woman
refuses to renounce her inheritance.106 These murders are considered to be
“fake honor killings”, that is, as crimes based on a pretended defense of
honor. Or, a family may be deep in debt and may kill one of its own
women on the basis of alleged immoral behavior, but then accuses the man
in whose debt the family stands of being her lover. Because a rumor is
treated as an actual fact, the accused cannot defend himself effectively and
is obliged to waive the existing debts as “compensation” for the family’s
supposed loss of honor. The wrong done to the woman – duress, forced
marriage, or rape – is not a matter for discussion, for only the wrong done
to the man through the loss of honor demands compensation or punish-
ment.
The Family Council

If a family is confronted with a loss of honor, then, as a rule, the family
council will decide what is to be done. In minor cases, a girl will be taken
out of school, and a woman will be locked away, beaten, or given in mar-
riage to a man in another city without having a say in the matter. In serious
cases, the family will resolve to kill the woman, but will not inform the
victim of the decision. One day, or night, she will be shot, strangled,
stabbed, bludgeoned, stoned, burnt, pushed in front of a car, or thrown
from a bridge. Murder motives arising from reasons of honor frequently
are at the root of the acid attacks upon women especially widespread in
Bangladesh or of the burnings in India disguised as kitchen accidents, al-
106
S. Tellenbach. op. cit. p. 5
though the ostensible reasons for them are the too meager dowry payments
made by the parents of the bride. Other deaths are passed off as suicides.
The honor murder is the greatest possible use of violence against a woman,
planned out of especially base motives; it is actually an execution.
The Compulsion to Act

The honor that in the tribal society counts for more than the life of a hu-
man being must be defended, if necessary by removing the “stain”, as the
leader of a Jordanian tribe formulated it: “A woman is like an olive tree.
When its branch catches woodworm, it has to be chopped off so that soci-
ety stays clean and pure”.107
If a father or brother does not defend the family honor, then he himself
will be judged as weak, unmanly, and without honor. He loses face and
respect, or even his economic existence. For this reason, men are to be
considered as victims just as much as perpetrators. A twenty-five year-old
Palestinian discusses this duty: “I did not kill her, but rather helped her to
commit suicide and to carry out the death penalty she sentenced herself to.
I did it to wash with her blood the family honour that was violated because
of her and in response to the will of society that would not have had any
mercy on me if I didn’t.”108
Hence, an honor murder in most cases also is not considered by the soci-
ety to be a murder in the real sense of the term. The precondition for this
attitude is a society that has a higher opinion of the collective than of the
individual. Frequently, an underage member of the family is chosen as the
perpetrator so that the punishment – in case the crime comes before the
court at all – and the loss of working capacity are limited as much as pos-
sible.
Although the tradition of the honor murder must be thousands of years
old, it has been researched only very little to the present day. The veil of
silence lies upon the ancient tradition and has been lifted only in the last
few years, above all by organizations for human rights and for women’s
rights. Honor killings are tainted with the aura of disgrace and, for this
reason, any judicial or police investigations often lead nowhere and are
obstructed by a wall of silence.
107
Tarrad Fayiz in: “The Jordan Times” (Amman), Febr 5, 2000, quoted from Y. Feld-
ner. “‘Honour’ murders – Why the perps get off easy” (sic), in: MEQ 2000, 41-50,
www.meforum.org/article/50, 1-8 (2.7.2006), p. 1
108
Al-Ayyam (Ramallah). 1.6. 2000, quoted from Y. Feldner, op. cit. p. 2
Honor Killings and Islam

On the one hand, there is no question that the honor murder finds justifi-
cation neither in the Koran nor in Islamic tradition nor classical theology,
the more so since the tradition of the honor murder is considerably older
than Islam itself. On the other hand, honor killings are recorded today pri-
marily – although not exclusively – in Islamic societies. There, above all in
rural areas, many societies are dominated by semi-feudal, tribal structures,
in which women frequently are treated de facto as a kind of “property”
belonging to the man. These traditional standards of conduct are inter-
twined with the religious standards of Islam.
A factor deepening the imbalance between men and women in Islamic
countries is the demand anchored in Islamic marital law for the obedience
of the wife to her husband, based on Sura 4:34 and numerous traditions
stemming from Muhammad that emphasize the elevated legal and social
position of the man and that, in the primarily traditional opinion of Muslim
theologians, even include the corporal punishment of the wife in cases of
conflict (cf. Sura 4:34). Even if many a theologian rejects this interpreta-
tion and the practice in many Muslim families is quite different, the texts
handed down and the conservative interpretations of them still create a
climate in which violence against women frequently is considered as much
a part of daily life as are the principle of obedience and the limitations
placed on the rights of women. Thus, under the influence of a way of life
and a culture that that is organized according to a patriarchal-tribal system
and is oriented on the values of traditional Islam, the woman is assigned
the sole responsibility for the preservation of honor. For this reason, the
conservative traditional interpretation of the role of the woman, founded
upon Muslim values, favors the control of her, the legitimation of violence,
and then, in a certain sense, also the honor murder. To be sure, leading
religious personalities in various countries also have spoken out against the
honor murder. But, up to now, their appeals have not led to a social re-
orientation since the “felt” justification for the honor murder apparently is
deeply rooted.
Punishment for Honor Killing

A consistent criminal prosecution of the honor murder is the exception;
it is kept secret or hushed up out of fear, solidarity, or conviction. The
woman finds hardly any protection in filing a complaint with the police;
the guilty party escapes criminal prosecution. It may be, however, that he
even turns himself in to the police, proud of the fact of having restored the
honor of his family109 and in the knowledge that he has the majority of the
society on his side.
In many countries of the Near and Middle East, a reduction of the sen-
tence for an honor murder is granted on the basis of a “provocation”
caused by the dishonorable conduct of a wife or daughter. Article 340 of
the Jordanian penal code previously even allowed impunity for the honor
murderer if he had caught his wife red-handed in the act of adultery. Arti-
cle 98 permits a reduction of sentence if the perpetrator commits a criminal
offence out of justifiable anger at the false and compromising conduct of
his victim.110 In 2001, Article 340 was through royal decree so altered so
that now a reduction in punishment is provided for in place of impunity for
the honor murder of a woman caught in the act.111 In 2003, however, the
modification to the law in Article 340 was supposed to be ratified by the
Jordanian parliament, but was rejected by the lower house. For this reason,
the status of Article 340 is still uncertain.112 A reduction in punishment for
the honor murderer is possible not only in Jordan, but also in most of the
countries with a predominantly Muslim population.113 In Pakistan, the cur-
rent legal regulation states that an honor murder is to be treated as a mur-
der, but also that the judge can initiate a compromise, in the course of
which the family can forgive the offender and he can be acquitted.114
In Turkey, up until 2003, the penal code provided in Article 462 for a
reduced punishment for honor killings committed out of “provocation” ( a
presumed or actual act of adultery). The corresponding change in the law,
effective in 2005, is a step in the right direction, but the law still has to be
applied to its full extent. A continuing problem with the law is the fact that
a murder committed “in high passion” because of serious provocation still
may expect a judgment passed in consideration of extenuating circum-
109
S. Tellenbach. op. cit., p. 5
110
Ibid. p. 11
111
S. Tellenbach. op. cit., p. 14
112
M. Böhmecke. op. cit. p. 24
113
The penal codes of the following countries conclude such: Egypt: art. 237 StGB
1937 (no. 58), Iraq: art. 409 StGB 1966, Kuwait: art. 153 StGB, Libanon: art. 562
StGB 1942 (with several changes 1983-1999), Libya: art. 375 StGB, Marrocco:
art. 418 +420 StGB 1963, Syria: art. 548 StGB 1949 (changed 1953), Tunesia: art.
207 StGB 1991, VAE: art. 334, law No. 3 StGB 1978, Algeria: .art. 279 StGB
1991, Oman: art. 252 StGB
114
Majida Rizvi of the National Commission on the Status of Women in Pakistan in:
Fachtagung, op. cit., p. 7
stances.115 In the rural areas of Turkey, there has been up to now de facto
no punishment in the vast majority of cases.
Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, represented in the Jordanian par-
liament, branded the deletion of Article 340 as “un-Islamic” and as di-
rected against Sharia. A deletion, they said, amounted to a kow-towing
before the West (so some of the comments of the parliamentary representa-
tives) and was aimed at “destroying Islamic, social, and family values by
desiring to strip the men of their human nature when they caught their
wives in the act of adultery”.116
To be sure, other – likewise Islamic – voices, such as the Mufti of Gaza,
Sheik ’Abd al-Karim Kahlut, already have demanded the death penalty for
honor murderers, since, as is said, they are not authorized by Sharia to
carry out the death penalty.117 The “Jordanian Islamic Front” (IAF), the
majority of whose members sympathize with the Muslim Brotherhood, on
the other hand, characterized the honor murder as a virtual duty for the
man involved. It is, to be sure, wrong, it said, to take the law into one’s
own hands,118 but retribution for the moral offenses by the woman in the
family nevertheless is an Islamic act.119 Yotam Feldner, thus, is certainly
right when he confirms that, in a country with a predominantly Muslim
population, “Islamic” means not only what the Koran or the tradition de-
fines as Islamic, but also what a significant portion of the population
judges to be Islamic. When nearly two thirds of the population consider
honor killings not to be in conflict with the teachings of Islam, then the
honor murder cannot be separated effectively from religion in the con-
sciousness of larger parts of the population.120
Above and beyond this, there is much to be said for including not only
the performers of an honor murder in the legal judgment against it – as
recently occurred in the trial of the honor murder of Hatun Sürücü in Ber-
lin, in which only the perpetrator himself at first had been condemned – but
also all the members of the family involved in the decision, planning, insti-
gation, concealment, and aiding and abetting the performance of the act.121
115
M. Böhmecke. op.cit. p. 11
116
Quoted from S. Tellenbach. op. cit., p. 13
117
Ar-Risalah (Gaza), 11.7. 1998, quoted from Y. Feldner. p. 5
118
M. Fadel. “Honor Killings.” www.islamawareness.nt/HonourKilling/honor1.html
(5.7. 2006), p. 2
119
Compare the quotations from the Jordan Press at Y. Feldner. op. cit. p. 5
120
Y. Feldner. ibd.
121
This was also the conclusion of the Danish court which not only sentenced the
The range of measures, however, does not end with punishment. An active
education leading to the equality of the sexes, to the acknowledgement of
the state’s monopoly on force, and to the imparting of democratic values
should begin in kindergarten so that indifference and ignorance have no
chance – since, for those concerned, it is truly a matter of life or death.
perpetrator to long years of prison when the 18 year old Pakistani girl Ghazala
Khan was killed in East Denmark by her brother in 2006, but also her father and
two of her uncles, altogether nine family members: “Dänemarks Familie wegen
Ehrenmord verurteilt”. www.welt.de/data/2006/06/29/938170. (30.06.2006), p. 1
About the Author
Biography
Christine Schirrmacher, born in 1962 (MA in Islamic Studies, 1988; PhD in
Islamic Studies, 1991, University of Bonn, with a thesis dealing with the Mus-
lim-Christian controversy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) has studied
Arabic, Persian, and Turkish and is presently Professor of Islamic Studies at the
Department Religious Studies and Missiology of the Evangelisch-Theologische
Faculteit (Protestant University) in Leuven/Belgium and lecturer of Islam at
Freie Theologische Akademie (Free Theological Academy) in Giessen. She is
director of the Institut für Islamfragen (Institute of Islamic Studies) of the Ger-
man Evangelical Alliance, as well as an official speaker and advisor on Islam for
the World Evangelical Alliance (WEA). She lectures on Islam and security is-
sues, serves in continuing education programs related to politics, and is a con-
sultant to different advisory bodies of the German government.
Dr. Schirrmacher is a member of the Internationale Gesellschaft für Men-
schenrechte (International Society for Human Rights) (IGFM/ISHR), Frankfurt;
a member of the Deutsch-Jordanische Gesellschaft (German-Jordanian Society),
Berlin; and a curatorium member of the Evangelische Zentralstelle für Weltan-
schauungsfragen (Protestant Center for World View Questions), an academic
documentation and advisory center of the Protestant Church of Germany (Ber-
lin). She is engaged in current dialogue initiatives, formulating papers respond-
ing to the letter of the “138 Muslim theologians” to Christian leaders in October
2007, and will partake in the coming conference “Loving God and Neighbor in
Word and Deed: Implications for Muslims and Christians” of the Yale Center
for Faith and Culture, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, in July 2008.
Dr. Schirrmacher has visited many countries of the Muslim world of the Near
and Middle East, has been the speaker at national as well as international confer-
ences dealing with Islam, and is the author of numerous articles. She has also
written ten books, including the two-volume standard introduction Der Islam
(1994/2003) (Islam), Frauen und die Scharia (2004/2006) (Women under the
Sharia), and Islam und Christlicher Glaube – ein Vergleich (2006) (Islam and
Christianity Compared).
Published by the Author
Books by Christine Schirrmacher

Mohammed: Prophet aus der Wüste (with Thomas Schirrmacher). Leben – Werk –
Wirkung. Schwengeler: Berneck, 19841, 19862, 19903 (Biography of Mohammed)
Mit den Waffen des Gegners. Christlich-Muslimische Kontroversen im 19. und 20.
Jahrhundert, dargestellt am Beispiel der Auseinandersetzung um Karl Gottlieb Pfan-
ders ‘mìzân al-haqq’ und Rahmatullâh Ibn Halìl al’Utmânì al-Kairânawìs ‘izhâr al-
haqq’ und der Diskussion über das Barnabasevangelium. Islamkundliche Unter-
suchungen 162. Klaus Schwarz Verlag: Berlin, 1992 (Dissertation, Part 1: Chris-
tian missionary and Muslim apologetical literature of 19th and 20th century; Part
2: history of the “Gospel of Barnabas”, a forgery of the Middle Ages, serving as a
“proof” to argue against Christianity)
Der Islam: Geschichte – Lehre – Unterschiede zum Christentum. 2 vols. Hänssler:
Neuhausen, 1994/20032 (Major work on Islam – history, dogmatics, ethics, Sharia
and marital law, fundamentalism, detailed comparison of Islam and Christianity)
The Islamic View of Major Christian Teachings. RVB: Hamburg, 20011; The WEA
Global Issues Series, Vol. 2. VKW: Bonn, 20082; Spanish: La Vision Islamica de
Importantes Ensenanzas Cristianas. Funad: Nicaragua, 20021; RVB International:
Hamburg, 20032
Herausforderung Islam – Der Islam zwischen Krieg und Frieden. Hänssler: Holzger-
lingen, 2002 (Is Islam the religion of peace? What does Jihad mean?)
Kleines Lexikon der islamischen Familie. Hänssler: Holzgerlingen, 2002 (Muslim
family law and family values)
“Lexikon des Islam”, S. 428-549 in: Thomas Schirrmacher, Christine Schirrmacher u.
a. Harenberg Lexikon der Religionen. Harenberg Verlag: Düsseldorf, 2002 (Major
dictionary on world religions)
(with Ursula Spuler-Stegemann) Frauen und die Scharia: Die Menschenrechte im
Islam. München: Hugendubel, 2004 (Women under the Sharia – Human rights in
Islam)
Der Islam – Eine Einführung. St. Johannis Druckerei: Lahr, 2005 (Short Introduction
into Islam)
Islam und Christlicher Glaube – ein Vergleich. Hänssler: Holzgerlingen, 2006 (Islam
and Christianity compared)
Mord im “Namen der Ehre” zwischen Migration und Tradition. Institut für Recht-
spolitik an der Universität Trier: Trier, 2007 (Study on Honour killings, published
by State University of Trier)
Islamische Menschenrechtserklärungen und ihre Kritiker. Einwände von Muslimen
und Nichtmuslimen gegen die Allgültigkeit der Scharia. Institut für Rechtspolitik an
der Universität Trier: Trier, 2007 (Muslim Human Rights Declarations and Sharia,
published by State University of Trier)
About the Author 129
Die Scharia – Recht und Gesetz im Islam. Hänssler: Holzgerlingen, 2008 (Introduction
into Sharia law)
Islam and Politics: Sharia Law – Jihad – Women in Islam. The WEA Global Issues
Series, Vol. 4. VKW: Bonn, 2008
Recent articles by Christine Schirrmacher (selection)

“Rechtsvorstellungen im Islam”. S. 339-364 in: Horst Dreier, Eric Hilgendorf (Hg.).
Kulturelle Identität als Grund und Grenze des Rechts: Akten der IVR-Tagung vom
28.-30. September 2006 in Würzburg. Nomos: Stuttgart, 2008 (Development and
practical application of Sharia law, published by State University of Würzburg)
“Heterogen und kontrovers: Die innerislamische Debatte zum Thema Menschenrechte”.
S. 273-294 in: Hamid Reza Yousefi u. a. (Hg.). Wege zu Menschenrechten. Traugott
Bautz: Nordhausen, 2008 (Islamic Human Rights Declarations and its critics)
“Muslime in Deutschland: Ergebnisse der Studie – Eine Zusammenfassung”. Ge-
sprächskreis Nachrichtendienste in Deutschland e. V. – Mitgliederinformation
001/2208 (11.2.2008), Berlin, 2008 (Summary of a detailed study about Muslims in
Germany by Federal Minister of the Interior)
“Islam und Säkularisiserung: Dargestellt am Beispiel islamischer Menschenrechtser-
klärungen”. S. 363-406 in: Walter Schweidler (Hg.). Postsäkulare Gesellschaft: Per-
spektiven interdiszipinärer Forschung. Verlag Karl Alber: München, 2007 (Is the
Secularization of Sharia possible?)
“Herausforderung Islam”. S. 264-278 in: Hans Zehetmaier (Hg.). Politik aus christli-
cher Verantwortung. Hanns Seidel Stiftung & Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften:
Wiesbaden, 2007 (On the current challenge of Islam in Germany)
“Islam und Christentum in Europa: Eine Standortbestimmung”. S. 145-162 in: Lutz
Simon, Hans-Joachim Hahn (Hg.). Europa ohne Gott: Auf der Suche nach unserer
kulturellen Identität. Hänssler: Holzgerlingen, 2007 (What is Europe’s cultural and
religious identity?)
“Der Islam über den Frieden, den Jihad und das Zusammenleben von Muslimen und
Nichtmuslimen”. S. 259-276 in: Reinhard Hempelmann, Johannes Kandel (Hg.).
Religionen und Gewalt. V&R unipress: Göttingen, 2006 (Teachings of Islam about
jihad and martyrdom)
“Christen im Urteil von Muslimen: Kritische Positionen aus der Frühzeit des Islam
und aus der Sicht heutiger Theologen”. S. 12-34 in: Ursula Spuler-Stegemann.
Feindbild Christentum im Islam. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2006
(Lizenzausgabe von 20042) (The Islamic view of Christians since the early days of
Islam, published by the Federal government)
“Der Islam über den Frieden, den Jihad und das Zusammenleben von Muslimen und
Nichtmuslimen”. Lutherische Nachrichten 26 (2006) 1, S. 33-55 (What is the posi-
tion of Islam about peaceful coexistence of different religions?)
“Frauen unter der Scharia”. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 48/2004, pp. 10-16 (Bei-
lage zu Das Parlament 22.11.2004) (Women under Sharia, published by the Federal
Parliament)
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The Challenge of Muslim Immigration to Europe

Islam and Society

Islam and Society

VKW The WEA Global Issues Series 4

Verlag für Kultur und Wissenschaft

(Culture and Science Publ.)

Islam and Politics

1. Thomas K. Johnson – Human Rights

“The WEA Global Issues Series is designed to provide thoughtful

Islam and Society

Sharia Law – Jihad – Women in Islam

The WEA Global Issues Series

Verlag für Kultur und Wissenschaft

International Institute for Religious Freedom

The WEA Global Issues Series is sponsored by:

1 The Challenge of Muslim Immigration to Europe.................................... 7

The Present Situation – History and Background

2. The Political Challenge

Islamism as a Political Power

Differentiation Creates Sobriety

Making an Accounting is Required

3. The Question of Religion

It would almost seem as though many people in Germany have only

Are we adequately informed about Islam?

Developments and tendencies amongst Muslims in Ger-

Barriers to Religious Freedom?

Muslims expect answers

“Multi-culti” – a catchword we all know. A concept that today is looked

Stumbling into History

False Premises have been Brought along

Indifference and Ignorance were Cultivated

Non-Integration has been Reaped

Today: The Pursuit of Research into Causes

Discerning Islam in its Totality

Naming the Foundations of European Culture and Civili-

Recognizing the Basic Elements of the Jewish-Christian

Separation of Powers and Equality before the Law

and in Islamic Countries

Monopoly in the Use of Force, and Retribution

Dignity and Freedom of all People

… in the Christian View

and in Islamic Theology

No Fear of the Discussion of Values

Is Islam really a religion of peace, as for instance the “Islamic Charter”

Does the word Islam mean peace?

Was early Islam peaceful?

The Way to Peace

The Meaning of Peace

Islam – political or apolitical?

Muslims (sometimes even Nonmuslims) complain about Christians – or

The Islamic view of Christians: Qur’an and Hadith

Christians as seen by the Qur’an

The piety of the Christians

The Christians’ disapproval of Muhammad

Are Christians unbelievers?

Emotional problems for Muslims by Western Criticism of

Christians and Christianity as viewed by Contemporary

Islam’s Superiority over Christianity

Christianity as Viewed by Selected Muslim Scholars