5-1 _________________________________________________________

Religion and Ideology in Modern Russia

Liudmila Zhukova

“Hmm . . . then maybe you’re a member of the

Communist Party, Holy Father?”
“Maybe I am!

(Ilf and Petrov 1928, The Twelve chairs)1

The first loudspeaker: Orthodoxy, comrades!

The crowd: Hurray!
The second loudspeaker: Communism, comrades!
The crowd: Hurray!

(Dmitry Prigov 1979, Revolution: Radio-tragedy for

Two Loudspeakers)

The process of liberalization that began in the Soviet Union with what is known as
“perestroika” brought religion back into the public sphere for the first time since the October
Revolution of 1917. For seventy years, religion had been denounced as a “holdover from the old
regime” and as a pursuit of fringe dissidents and illiterate old women; in Soviet times, it could
only be justified by reference to the monuments of church art.2 Then, by contrast, religion gained
an opportunity to play a prominent role in the field of ideology, and it thus became an integral
argument in political debate, used to support views of all kinds, ranging from liberal to nationalist.
Furthermore, the leaders of the so-called traditional religions3 often adduce theological arguments
proper along with an appeal to national values and to the interests of the state. For example, Rabbi
Zinovi Kogan proclaimed at a certain interreligious meeting that “our common religion is our
Russia.”
This paper offers a survey of the forms and modes of interaction between the Russian state
and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in the field of ideology. The first section analyzes the
religious policy of modern Russia and the interplay between church and state, while the second
section examines cooperation between religious organizations and the state in the sphere of

1
Translated from the Russian by John Richardson.
2
The celebrations of “The 1000th Anniversary of the Baptism of Rus” in 1988 commenced with an exhibition at
the Academy of Arts entitled “1000 Years of Russian Art.”
3
Namely, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism—the four religions mentioned in the preamble to
the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations (1997).

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 Liudmila Zhukova

education, since both the Church and the rulers of the country consider education to be the
principal means of ideological upbringing.

Part I. Religion and State: From Confrontation to Mutually Beneficial Cooperation

The process that is taking place in Russia does not fit into the classical paradigm of
secularization that forces religion into the private domain. It can be more adequately described by
the term “deprivatization,” meaning that “religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to
accept the marginal and privatized role that theories of modernity and theories of secularization
have reserved for them…. Religions throughout the world are entering the public sphere and
arenas of political contestation not only to defend their traditional turf, as they have done in the
past, but also to participate in the very struggles to define and set modern boundaries between the
private and public spheres, between system and life-world, between legality and morality, etc.”4 J.
Casanova, however, believes that “the core of the theory of secularization, the thesis of differentia-
tion and emancipation of the secular sphere from religious institutions and norms, remains valid,”5
which is not quite so in Russia. Despite the obvious tendency to view Russia in public discourse as
part of Western European civilization, there has been no demand whatsoever for the experience of
European secularization that implies absolute religious neutrality. Moreover, many religious and
public figures deem this experience as totally inapplicable in Russia. The official position of the
ROC, declared in the name of Patriarch Alexy II and in the name of Metropolitan, then Patriarch,
Kirill on numerous occasions, can be roughly summarized as follows: nowadays, the world
consists of a number of civilizations that differ, above all, in terms of religion. These civilizations
ought to preserve their uniqueness in the face of the secular West. As regards Russia, it has to keep
to the traditional values (that is, to the values of Orthodox Christianity).6 Thus, in a recent speech
addressed to the people of Karelia, Patriarch Kirill said: “I dream that all our children, our youth,
who are often confused, perplexed, and taken captive by alien stereotypes, alien thinking, and alien
modes of behavior that are being inflicted upon our society not without evil intent—I dream that
these young people will also be able at some point to shake themselves free of this temptation; of
course there are quite a few spiritually mature and strong people among the young, and we
definitely associate our homeland’s future with such people.”7
The influence of the “traditional” religions on society and the state is directly proportional to
their number of adherents. The Russian Orthodox Church is most influential, and its impact on
various spheres of life is becoming more and more noticeable (for example, resistance to the gay

4
Casanova, J., Public religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 5-6.
5
Ibid., p. 6.
6
For more details, see Верховский А. Российское политическое православие: понятие и пути развития //
Путями несвободы. – М.: Центр «Сова», 2005. – С. 48-80. [Verkhovsky, A., “Russian Political Orthodoxy:
Notion and Course of Development,” Courses of Unfreedom]
7
Выступление Святейшего Патриарха Московского и всея Руси Кирилла на встрече с общественностью
Карелии // Седьмица.Ru. 03.06.2010. [“His Holiness, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia Speech Addressed
to the People of Karelia,” Sedmitza.ru, URL: http://www.sedmitza.ru/news/1217886.html]

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 Religion and Ideology in Modern Russia

parade in Moscow; cancellation of the modern art exhibition called “Beware of Religion”; protests
against TV programs containing “immoral” (from their viewpoint) material. The state usually takes
into consideration the opinion of Muslim leaders, too. It can be explained both by the significant
number of Muslims and by the fact that certain territories densely populated by Muslims are zones
of instability and conflict (Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia). Religious factors are extremely
important in the course of these conflicts. That is why state authorities seek the loyalty of Muslim
leaders. As for Buddhist and Jewish communities, their influence at state level is rather limited.
Thus, the arrival of the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of the Tibetan Buddhists, in Russia was
postponed several times due to problems with Russian-Chinese relations, and the visits that
followed were complicated by numerous restrictions.

Religion and national identity

The idea of an inseparable bond between religion and nationality is rather popular in certain
segments of Russian society. Religious statistics published by religious organizations are in many
respects based on this assumption, and testify to the special claims that religious figures,
politicians, and national leaders who adhere to the principle of “one people - one confession” lay
with the authorities and society. The exclusive role of the ROC in public life is justified in their
opinion by the fact that the largest part of the Russian population indeed proves to be Orthodox by
birth, irrespective of the level of their actual involvement with the Church.8 Alexander Dugin, one
of the leading theorists of the special “Eurasian” Russian way, declares that “in the spiritual realm,
in culture, in social life, in matters of morals, even in politics, in the state system, and in
lawmaking, we must plainly and fearlessly say: “Orthodoxy is our solution.”9 One cannot help
calling to mind a conversation between Levsha (or Lefty),10 the main character of a story by
Nikolai Leskov (1831-1895), and some Englishmen: “Our Russian faith is the true faith; our
ancestors believed in it and so must we.” “But you don't know our faith,” said the Englishmen,
“we have the same Christian beliefs and we have the same Gospel.” “The Gospel is truly the same
for all,” said Lefty, “only our books are thicker than yours and our faith is fuller.”11
At the heart of Eurasianism lies the idea of Russia’s messianic mission, first expressed in the
1920s-1930s by a number of Russian thinkers, such as Piotr Savitsky, Nikolai Trubetzkoy, Nikolai

8
“Orthodoxy is claimed to be the ethnical religion of the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Byelorussians, the Chuvash,
the Moldovans, the Karelians, the Komi, the Ossetians, of part of the Udmurts and of the Mari, and so on. Owing to
this method of calculation, the latest all-Russian population census (2002) numbers around 120 million Orthodox
people (among them, almost 116 million are Russian, 3 million are Ukrainian, more than 1.5 million are Chuvash,
around 900 thousand are Moldovan, 800 thousand are Byelorussian, etc.).” Filatov, S., Lunkin, R., “The Statistics of
the Russian Religiosity: The Magic of Numbers and a Complex Reality,” Religion and Mass Media, URL:
http://www.religare.ru/2_20662.html. See also the results of the all-Russian survey provided by Public Opinion
Research Center in attachment 1.
9
Дугин А. Православие – наше решение // Информационно-аналитический портал “ЕВРАЗИЯ.org.” [Dugin,
A., “Orthodoxy is Our Solution,” Eurasia Foundation, URL: http://www.evrazia.org/article/1303.]
10
That is, a left-handed person. The full title of the story is The Tale of Cross-eyed Lefty from Tula and the Steel
Flea, first published in 1881.
11
Translated from the Russian by George H. Hanna. URL: http://home.freeuk.com/russica2/.

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 Liudmila Zhukova

Alexeev, and Georges Florovsky. They conceived of Russia as “a complex historical formation,”
“a particular historical universe” that involves the cultures of both Europe and Asia. Interestingly
enough, their attitude to Soviet Russia was not purely negative: Bolshevism is inadmissible insofar
as it is the essence of the “corrupt” Western world view; the Revolution, however, could further
Russia’s deliverance from the “oppression” of European culture and bring about a restoration of its
Eurasian peculiarity. Proponents of this view of Russia’s mission believe that even the atheist
ideology that was instilled by the Bolshevist state failed in that it led Russia astray from the
country’s “specific” way for good, inasmuch as “Orthodoxy is so deep inside Russians that it
cannot be knocked out of their heads even by centuries of licentious godlessness.”12 In a sense, the
Russian people simply have no choice, since belonging to “the Orthodox civilization” cannot be a
matter of choice: “Religion sometimes has a strictly personal dimension. Thus, everyone is free to
choose one’s way to salvation, and there can be no compulsion or violence in this case. Belonging
to a civilization, on the other hand, is not a matter of choice. By various means—by language,
culture, ethics, customs, symbols, habits, gestures, texts, and explicit and implicit standards of
behavior—civilization forms man’s personality from childhood, laying the ground for adult life
and framing the very first cultural reactions that are present in the unconscious now and then.”13

“One law for the rich, and another for the poor”

The formal foundation for equality of religions and for the equal distancing of all religions
from state institutions was created in 1997 by the Russian Federal Law “On Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Associations.” The law, however, has the following preamble: “Basing
itself on the fact that the Russian Federation is a secular state; recognizing the special contribution
of Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the establishment and development of Russia’s
spirituality and culture; respecting Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and other religions that
constitute an inseparable part of the historical heritage of Russia’s peoples; considering it
important to promote the achievement of mutual understanding, tolerance, and respect in questions
of freedom of conscience and freedom of creed; the Russian Federation hereby adopts this federal
law.”14 Though the preamble per se is null and void, it does have deep ramifications for religious
organizations, because it “brings to naught” any claim to “equality” with the Russian Orthodox
Church that actually results from the law.
The idea of “symphony” (“concordance”) between church and state that is so widespread in
conservative ecclesiastical and political ranks is normally renounced in official declarations; and
yet it is put into practice time and again. More often than not, officials appeal to the local eparchy

12
Шевченко М.Л. Вопросы неофита. Православие в современном мире // Независимая газета. 13.04.1996.
[Shevchenko, M., “Neophyte Questions. Orthodoxy in the Modern World,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta]
13
Дугин А. Наша цивилизация // Информационно-аналитический портал “ЕВРАЗИЯ.org.” [Dugin, A., “Our
Civilization,” Eurasia Foundation, URL: http://www.evrazia.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid
=3554]
14
See for example a translation of this law from Russian into English on the site of the Religion and Law
Consortium, URL: http://www.religlaw.org/document.php?DocumentID=1762.

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 Religion and Ideology in Modern Russia

(diocese) for expert examination in cases when a certain religious organization is declared to be “a
dangerous sect,” when they have to approve of the construction of a prayer house by some
protestant congregation, and so on. In May 2010, for example, the Kemerovo Orthodox Eparchy
conducted an expert examination of the documents of an association of Jehovah’s Witnesses on the
request of the Main Department of Internal Affairs, and it came to the conclusion that “the
Jehovah’s Witnesses organization has no religious character, no biblical basis for its views; it
cannot be numbered among the Christian confessions, and it bears the marks of a commercial
cult.”15
The ROC authorities assert that the Church upholds the secular state and the separation of
church and state, but, as a matter of fact, the Russian Orthodox Church has an exclusive
relationship with the state: it enters into joint operation agreements with various ministries, such as
the Ministry of Social Security and Labor, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense,
etc. More specifically, the treaty with the Ministry of Defense stipulates the “development of
interaction in restoring the Orthodox traditions of the Russian army and the navy, as well as
fostering soldiers’ moral motivation for military service, their commitment, and acts of bravery for
the benefit of Russia.” 16 For instance, various corps of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation got “patron saints”: Great-Martyr Barbara is the patron of the Strategic Missile Forces;
the epic Russian hero and saint Ilya Muromets (Elijah of Murom) is the patron of the Border
Forces; Elijah the Prophet, who, according to the biblical narrative, ascended into heaven in a
whirlwind on a chariot of fire, is the patron of the Airborne Forces, etc. The State Fire Fighting
Service distributes posters calling for responsible fire management along with posters showing a
fireman standing next to The “Burning Bush” icon and summoning the people to “Honor the
Burning Bush and the Fire Emergency Service.”17
Anatoly Shatalov, vice-chairman of the Synodal Department for Cooperation with the Armed
Forces and Law-Enforcement, said to the press that, by entering into agreements with
power-wielding agencies, the ROC is attempting to “fill an ideological vacuum.” He points out
that “today, the notion of a ‘moral factor’ that determines fighting readiness and capacity remains
valid for power structures…. This moral factor has to be invested with certain ideology. Previously,
Marxism-Leninism served the purpose, but since it has gone and the moral factor remains, we have
come close today to realizing what exactly will create spiritual and moral foundations.
Commanding officers understand that religion only, and no other ideology, can be such a
foundation nowadays.”18

15
Кулешова Е.А. Религиоведческая оценка “Устава местной религиозной организации Свидетелей Иеговы
«ЦЕНТРАЛЬНАЯ, КЕМЕРОВО»” // Информационно-консультационный центр Св. Иринея Лионского.
24.05.10. [Kuleshova, E. A., Scientific Religious Evaluation of “The Statutes of the Local Religious Organization of
Jehovah’s Witnesses” «TSENTRALNAYA, KEMEROVO», St. Irenaeus of Lyon Information and Consulting
Center, URL: http://iriney.ru/sects/witness/news094.htm]
16
Соглашение о сотрудничестве // Сайт “Научный атеизм” [“Cooperation Agreement,” Scientific Atheism site,
URL: http://www.atheism.ru/archive/archive.phtml?id=24.]
17
Literally, “Почитай Неопалимую купину и службу 01.”
18
Коробов П. Боеугодное дело: Подписан договор о сотрудничестве между РПЦ и МВД // Газета
«Коммерсантъ». №216 (3055). 18.11.2004. [Korobov, P., “God Pleasing/Military Pleasing Deed: A Treaty on

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 Liudmila Zhukova

Faith instead of ideology

According to the Church authorities, in view of the sheer absence of ideology of any kind, let
alone in view of “the impossibility” of ideology that has been substituted by trendy lifestyles and
behavior patterns fashioned by TV and commercials, the Church remains the only power that is
capable of forming an essential mindset. Sooner or later, one is disillusioned with ideology;
popular culture is always superficial and does not give answers to the fundamental questions of the
human being, whereas the Church speaks to the heart. “No ideology in the history of the human
race has existed for more than three or four generations. The first generation struggles for
enforcement of an ideology. They murder their like; they say that humanity has finally found the
solution to all problems, and that as soon as those who disagree are compelled to exercise these
postulates, there will be heaven on earth. The second generation continues the fight, though
oftentimes they are not as committed; the third generation utters all the clichés, but begin living
their own life; and by the fourth generation, the ideology loses all power.”19
In spite of opposing faith and ideology, Church leaders have been eager “to arm” themselves
with Soviet patterns of ideological mass events. To wit, the 2007 celebration of the Day of Slavic
Literature and Culture comprised more than twenty stage shows, singing of “Gimn Slovu,”20
fireworks, and singing of “Podmoskovnye Vechera” (“Moscow Nights”), a most popular post-war
Soviet song. At the same time, “the official Church rhetoric, as a rule, makes no reference to either
the Gospels or God; the state and the national clearly suppress the religious both in style and
content, and Christianity turns into Caesarianity.”21 Lately, the Church has begun to encourage the
establishment of Orthodox youth organizations analogous to the Pioneer and Komsomol
organizations of the Soviet period. In May 2010, Hegumen Ioasaph (Poluyanov), head of the
Patriarchal Center for the Spiritual Development of Children and Youth under the Danilov
Monastery (St. Daniel Monastery), held a briefing for reporters in order to announce the center’s
new program for training young church leaders. He explained that the program was modeled on
“the training of young commanding officers in wartime.”22

Cooperation between the ROC and MIA Has Been Signed,” Kommersant, URL: http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc.aspx?DocsID=525786&ThemesID=1011]
19
“Религиозное воспитание в эпоху постмодерна.” Выступление председателя Отдела внешних церковных
связей Московского Патриархата митрополита Смоленского и Калининградского Кирилла на XV
Рождественских чтениях // Патриархия.ru. Официальный сайт Русской Православной Церкви. 30.01.2007.
[“Religious Education in the Postmodern Era,” speech of Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, head of
the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, at the XV Christmas Readings, official
site of the Russian Orthodox Church, URL: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/189897.html]
20
A hymn to the “Word” or to the “Tale” based on Slovo o polku Igoreve [The Tale of Igor's Campaign], an
anonymous epic poem written in the Old Slavic language.
21
Волкова Е. Религия и художественная культура: худой мир лучше доброй ссоры //Двадцать лет
религиозной свободы в России. М.: РОССПЭН, 2009. С. 209. [Volkova, E., “Religion and Arts: Better a Lean
Peace than a Fat Victory,” 20 Years of Religious Liberty in Russia]
22
Солдатов А. Гвардия Патриарха идет на мушкетеров Кремля? Создание многотысячных молодежных
отрядов – серьезная заявка на борьбу за власть // НОВАЯ ГАЗЕТА. №60. 07.06.2010. [Soldatov, A., “Will the
Patriarch’s Guards Attack the Kremlin Musketeers? Creation of Youth Troops of Many Thousands is a Strong
Claim to Power Struggle,” Novaya Gazeta, URL: http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2010/060/19.html]

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 Religion and Ideology in Modern Russia

Evidently, the country’s leaders badly need to fill the ideological vacuum and are about to
delegate the task to the ROC. One modern analyst reckons that the state “does this by way of
experiment, and the outcome of the experiment is not apparent. As Nikolai Berdyaev rightfully
mentioned, we live in an era of ‘the New Middle Ages’; nevertheless, this does not imply that for
some reason Orthodoxy, which had been natural for the Middle Ages but lost its actual social
impact in the eighteenth century, should bounce back in the twenty-first century, even in the shape
of the ‘modern’ rhetoric of Patriarch Kirill.”23
It must be said, however, that further development of the situation can take different and even
unexpected twists. On the face of it, Patriarch Kirill is engaged in efficient cooperation with the
authorities. On the other hand, certain tensions within the patriarch-president alliance are quite
possible. First of all, as shown by the recent experiment of introducing the “basics of Orthodox
culture” into the school curriculum, the ability of the Church to manipulate public opinion proves
to be rather stretched. Secondly, the media have exposed surprising hypotheses concerning the
political ambitions of Patriarch Kirill, who seems to be a powerful player with public charisma and
considerable financial capacity. Alas, he is already at the top of his church career—he is patriarch.
It follows that the only real alternative for him is to become chief of state. One may appreciate
how appealing this idea is: patriarch and president being one person is the highest possible
realization of the “symphony” principle. After all, it would be a sin to bury such a remarkable
political talent—the patriarch’s admirers believe God gave Kirill the gift of producing political,
social, and economic doctrines and concepts instead of the gift of praying in a monastic cell.
Indeed, Kirill’s speeches resemble those of a political leader rather than the lowly and spiritual ser-
mons of a clergyman of fervent prayer.24 Though such projects cannot be taken seriously (despite
the “Cyprus precedent”25), it is clear that a greater self-dependence of the present patriarch, as
compared to his predecessor, might sooner or later provoke the displeasure of the country’s rulers.
To sum up, whereas various political forces complain about the lack of ideology after the
defeat of Communism, religion (represented mainly by the Russian Orthodox Church) aspires to

23
Черняев А.В. Патриарх Кирилл как новый Никон. Заметки к годовщине интронизации // НГ Религии.
03.02.2010. Режим доступа: http://religion.ng.ru/politic/2010-02-03/4_kirill.html [Chernyaev, A. V., “Patriarch
Kirill as a New Patriarch Nikon: Notes on the First Anniversary of the Enthronement,” NG Religii, URL:
http://religion.ng.ru/politic/2010-02-03/4_kirill.html]
One can observe that the public utterances of the patriarch often break the traditional practice of the ROC. Take, for
example, his statement regarding sexual relations, made at the III Candlemas Readings of Orthodox Youth: “The
God-given instinct of procreation is closely associated with the spiritual life of man. There cannot be real love,
family love, without carnal pleasures. This is a great gift of God given to man not only for the sake of procreation,
but also for abundant life and the fullness of joy” (Interfax-Religion, 16.02.2009, URL:
http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=28852). Public utterances of the hierarchs on the subject are so rare
that Patriarch Kirill’s declaration was seen as “a breakthrough.”
24
Солдатов А. “Подумай о будущем России!” Действительно ли Патриарх Кирилл имеет президентские
амбиции, или Немного о лозунгах “патриаршего шествия” 24 мая 2010 г. // Портал-Credo.Ru. [Soldatov, A.,
“‘Think of the Future of Russia!’ Does Patriarch Kirill Really Have Presidential Ambitions? or a Glimpse of the
Slogans of ‘the Patriarchal Procession,’ on May 24, 2010” Credo.Ru, URL: http://portal-credo.ru/site/?act=
news&id=77910&type=view]
25
In the years 1960–1977, archbishop and ethnarch of the autocephalous Cypriot Orthodox Church Makarios III
was at the same time president of the Republic of Cyprus.

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 Liudmila Zhukova

function as ideology. Contemporary Russian authorities deem the official ideology as the “cement”
that holds society together and consider it “the only way to guarantee order both in minds and in
society.”26 The Church, on its part, is willing to offer society and the state a “national cause”
(hereby avoiding the term “ideology”), but it expects state support and exclusive forms of
interrelation with state agencies in return. In recent decades, the ROC insisted on cooperation in
the field of education most diligently, arguing that the younger generation is in need of moral
instruction. The following section of the article presents an analysis of the recent developments in
the field of religious education in Russia.

Part II. Religious Education in Modern Russia

In July 2009, the president of Russia Dmitry Medvedev said that he supported the idea of
including religious studies into the curriculum of Russian schools, assuming that schoolchildren
and their parents would select the subject themselves. They may choose from the so-called basics
of Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, or Buddhist cultures. If preferred, one can choose a course
describing at once a number of basic religions represented in Russia or one can study secular
ethics. Secular teachers, and not priests, are supposed to teach these subjects, in order to secure
impartial instruction in the basics of any religious tradition.
The experiment introducing the spiritual/ethical component into the secondary education
system started in 2010 in eighteen regions belonging to six federal districts. About 256 thousand
pupils and 44 thousand teachers took part in the experiment.
The choice of only the four given religious traditions for teaching at school has been
determined by factors other than their dissemination. Orthodoxy and Islam are the two major
religions in Russia. The number of Buddhists (550 thousand) and the number of Jews (50
thousand) is, however, comparable to the number of Protestants and Catholics, but the latter
confessions are not taught at school.
As already mentioned, it happened so that Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism came to
be considered as “traditional” Russian religions. The legally insignificant distinction gave the
Orthodox, the Jews, the Muslims, and the Buddhists the right to lay claim to some privileged
attitude of the state.

Advocates and opponents

The president’s decision put an end to a long-lasting dispute about the feasibility of
introducing religious studies or confessional subjects into the school curriculum. It also provided
an answer to the recent “Address of the Leaders of Traditional Religious Communities regarding
Issues of Teaching Religious Culture at School,” signed by His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of

26
Agadjanian A., “Public Religions and the Quest for National Ideology: Russia’s Media Discourse,” Journal for
the Scientific Study of Religions 40, no. 3 (September 2001), p. 363.

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 Religion and Ideology in Modern Russia

Moscow and All Russia, by Mufti Sheikh Ravil Gainutdin, chairman of Russia’s Mufti Council, by
Russia’s chief rabbi Berl Lazar, and by Damba Ajusheev, chairman of the Buddhist Traditional
Sangha of Russia. The address says: “We believe that schoolchildren should be acquainted not
only with masterpieces of world and Russian literature and art, but should also, first of all, acquire
strong moral goals and adopt basic norms of decent social life. Nobody can become a true citizen
of the state and a member of society without knowledge of the fact that the commandments of God,
such as “Thou shalt not kill,” “Thou shalt not steal,” and others should be observed by both
believers and by unbelievers. That’s why we ask you as head of state, when adopting new
standards of general education, to promote the introduction of a basic course on the history and
culture of traditional religions.”27
The Russian Orthodox Church has for long been lobbying for a course on the basics of
Orthodox culture, positioning it as a course in culture. Attempts to introduce priests and other
Orthodox spokesmen to school began as early as in the 1990s, but at that time, the Ministry of
Education strictly adhered to secular principles, and so in 1993, it banned any religious lessons on
the grounds that they were a violation of the constitution. At the same time, Orthodox activists
organized non-state Orthodox schools, but extreme clericalism at such educational institutions
resulted in a very low level of churching, insomuch that in 2003, a secret Komsomol cell was
uncovered in one of these schools.28
In 1997, a new version of the Law on Freedom of Conscience was passed. It emphasized the
role of the four “traditional” religions, and after its enactment, the process of introducing Orthodox
subjects into the educational system was resumed.
In 1999, Patriarch Alexy II sent a letter to all eparchies ordering the introduction of basic
Orthodox courses in all regions of Russia. The courses were to be called “Basics of Orthodox
Culture” (instead of “Orthodox Doctrine,” for example) to avoid objections from teachers who had
been “brought up in an atheistic tradition.”29
In 2002, 10 thousand copies of the textbook Basics of Orthodox Culture were published.
The textbook was written by Alla Borodina, deputy principal in one of the Moscow schools. This
time, due to explicitly confessional content and intolerant attacks against other “traditional”
religions, attempts at teaching Orthodoxy at school were rebuffed by some religious organizations,
scientists, and spokesmen. Nevertheless, the “Basics of Orthodox Culture” course was taught as an
optional course in many regions of Russia, and the press frequently reported that Muslim children
were forced by their teachers to attend these lessons, too.
According to the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, in the year
2009, the basics of Orthodox and Orthodoxy-related subjects were taught to 430 thousand

27
Обращение лидеров традиционных религиозных общин РФ к президенту России Дмитрию Медведеву по
вопросу о преподавании религиозной культуры в школах // Интерфакс-Религия. 20.07.2009. [“Address of the
Leaders of Traditional Religious Communities of the Russian Federation to the President of Russia Dmitry
Medvedev in Matters of Teaching Religious Culture at Schools,” Interfax-Religion, URL:
https://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=documents&div=907]
28
Mitrokhin, N. А., Clericalisation of Education in Russia (Moscow, 2005), p.16.
29
Ibid., p. 18.

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 Liudmila Zhukova

schoolchildren in thirty-nine regions, that is, to the 70 percent of all schoolchildren in Russia. Very
few schoolchildren studied the basics of Islam, of Buddhism, or of Judaism.
According to a sociological survey held in September 2009, 25 percent of Russian citizens
approve of the introduction of the course, 44 percent have no objection, 13 percent disapprove, 6
percent are against it, and 11 percent have no definite opinion.30
Seemingly, the new option suggested by the president took into consideration the interests of
the representatives of all religions, as well as those of unbelievers who are offered a course on
secular ethics for their children. But it failed in practice. Besides the four religions termed
“traditional” in the abovementioned address, there are more than four hundred centralized religious
organizations, whose followers are practically refused the right to bring up their children according
to their religious tradition. One of the most actively developing Christian denominations in modern
Russia is the Pentecostal Church. Head of the church in Russia, Sergey Ryakhovsky, is a member
of the Council for Cooperation with Religious Organizations under the president of the Russian
Federation. Nevertheless, the children of Pentecostals together with those of other Protestants will
have to choose between a general course on the history of religions and a course in secular ethics,
because the president’s project does not allow for a separate course on Protestantism.
Moreover, it is doubted that schoolchildren belonging to “traditional” religions will have an
opportunity to study their religious teachings in the case of their belonging to a religious minority.
Will two or three children count, or will they have to follow the choice of the majority? There is a
danger of possible confrontation that may arise as a result of dividing the children of one grade on
the basis of their confession. In August 2009, the Internet site of Russian atheists published an
address in which the possibility of studying secular ethics by those who did not want to take
religious classes was favorably received. At the same time, the authors of the document are
worried about the proposed division of school students according to confession, as it can “result in
escalation of conflict between the representatives of various confessions, as well as between
believers and unbelievers. Moreover, absence of any mention of pagan beliefs, non-Orthodox
Christianity, Oriental, and other religions on the list of school subjects constitutes discrimination
against people of other confessions.”31 The authors of the document are concerned about the fact
that in practice, the school authorities will make schoolchildren and their parents choose a
common discipline for everyone.
Thus, a half measure, taken as an obvious concession to the ever-increasing pressure from the
clerical faction, cannot and will not bring any positive changes to education. The only proper way of
solving the problem is to separate school from religion and to restrict religious education to educa-
tional institutions founded by religious organizations at their own expense and on their own accord.
Archdeacon Andrey Kuraev, a professor at the Moscow Theological Academy and a member

30
The survey was published by the Levada Center, URL: http://www.levada.ru/press/2009090301.html.
31
Об инициативе введения в государственных средних школах предмета “Духовно-нравственное
воспитание” 04.08.2009 // Сайт “Научный атеизм” [“On the Initiative of Introducing to State Secondary Schools
a Course on ‘Spiritual and Moral Upbringing,’” Scientific Atheism site, URL: http://www.atheism.ru/archive/text/
2234.phtml]

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 Religion and Ideology in Modern Russia

of the Expert and Consulting Council on the Problems of Freedom of Conscience under the State
Duma32 of the Russian Federation in matters of public and religious organizations, commented on
the abovementioned statements by saying, “A significant part of the vox populi thinks that the
Russian Orthodox Church is one of the Kremlin towers…. To onlookers, it seems that the Church
wants to educate children only to satisfy its will to power…. This is wrong.” Kuraev is convinced
that ethics but not Orthodoxy must be a compulsory subject at school: “For twenty years, Russian
schooling had been reformed under the motto, ‘School must educate; it must not bring up.’”33 It
was a natural motto at the time of educational “perestroika,” when school was to be rid of
excessive pro-Communist propaganda. “Today, the pedagogical community tends to think that
upbringing is not the task of the family only. Children can absorb some moral values at school, too.
We are witnessing the pedagogical counter-revolution that I have long awaited: new educational
standards include a new obligatory area of education—‘the spiritual and moral component.’ Within
this new obligation, there exists free choice, including the choice of studying the basics of
Orthodox culture. I wouldn’t mind if 60 percent of children attended secular ethics classes, and
only 30 percent, Orthodox ethics. Let another 10 percent take other religious classes. The main
thing is that working on our conscience must come back to school.”34

Position of the Jews, the Muslims, and the Buddhists in the past and in the present

Mufti Sheikh Ravil Gainutdin, chairman of Russia’s Mufti Council, said in reply to President
Dmitry Medvedev’s proposal concerning religious education that introduction of the basics of
religions into the school curriculum “promotes moral upbringing. Furthermore, we support your
policy that is aimed at observing the democratic principles and rights of all schoolchildren,
including atheists.”35 It should be noted that two years earlier, the Religious Board of Muslims of
Russia strongly objected to introducing the “Basics of Orthodox Culture” course into school
programs. In 2007, Ravil Gainutdin defined the statement that “every Russian citizen must know
both Orthodox culture and the history of Russia” as suggesting the predominance of one culture
and one nation over the rest.
Until recently, the Traditional Buddhist Sangha had no definite attitude to the problem. The
Buddhist spokesmen claim they keep to the principles of secular state, “but at the same time, we
think that…children should be given knowledge about the basics of religion and of the Buddhist
outlook…. However, actual introduction of the basics of religion into the curriculum is
inappropriate. We are concerned that those who are not sufficiently skilled could start teaching this
new subject and give wrong ideas of religion.”36

32
The lower house of the Russian parliament.
33
Interview with Archdeacon Andrey Kuraev, URL: http://diak-kuraev.livejournal.com/33152.html?page=3.
34
Ibid.
35
See Религия и общество [Religion and Society]: NEWSru.com, 21.07.2009, URL: http://www.newsru.com/
religy/21jul2009/soveshchanie.html
36
Махачкеев А. Момент школьной истины // Информ Полис (Улан-Удэ). № 12 (598). 24.03.2004
[Makhachkeev, A., “The Moment of School Truth,” Inform Polis (Ulan-Ude), URL: http://portal-credo.ru/site/?act

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 Liudmila Zhukova

Head of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia, Rabbi Berl Lazar, who supported
the idea of compulsory teaching of the basics of all religions, was satisfied with the suggested
solution to the problem: “A specific feature of Russia is that our religious leaders are friends, and
religious communities help each other. There is mutual respect among traditional religions….
Schoolchildren must know that Russia is a multinational country, and that each nation has its
traditions. I’m deeply thankful to the Ministry of Education for a decision that respects the
spirituality of every child and every family.”37

“Sidelined” religions

The leaders of the “traditional” religions are satisfied with the status quo that they enjoy.
However, the decision is in discord with the opinion of atheists and with the position of religious
organizations that are not considered “traditional” and, as a consequence, are not included in the
school curriculum. It should be noted that Protestantism came to Russia as far back as the
sixteenth century. No one can deny its influence upon Russian culture. The fact that it served as a
template for the reformation of the Russian Church that took place in the eighteenth century by the
Russian emperor, Peter the Great, speaks for itself. The Pentecostals, whose belief has not been
listed among the traditional religions, consider the decision on the separate teaching of each
religion to be a grave misunderstanding, if not an overt provocation, and wonder if such
pedagogical novelties will result in an increase of interconfessional tension. Bishop Konstantin
Bendas said, “Hundreds of millions of rubles from the federal budget will have been wasted by the
time everything reaches absurdity and fails. But, what is more important, students’ souls will be
crippled. This situation will lead to escalation of inter-religious tensions.”38
“Brother Konstantin would forget all his arguments if not only Orthodox Christianity but also
Protestantism were included in the school curriculum as a possible alternative,” retorted
Archdeacon Andrey Kuraev.39 He thinks that teaching such a subject as the basics of religious
studies, suggested by the Protestants, will hardly be efficient. Along those lines, Kuraev is opposed
to the teaching of the basics of Protestantism and Catholicism, explaining it in the following way:
“We agree with the Protestant doctrine, but we can’t agree with the things it rejects in our religion
(icons, infant baptism, etc.). Since criticism of other religions is inadmissible in our textbook, so a
Protestant teacher cannot criticize Orthodoxy, either. But what will we get if we exclude criticism
of Orthodoxy from Protestantism? We’ll get the fundamentals of Orthodox Christianity…. As for
the Catholics, they accept the Orthodox doctrine as a whole. But we don’t agree with their dogmas
of Purgatory and the Pope. However, I suppose a Catholic family or a parish can add these
‘flavors’ to the ‘common Christian bread’ by themselves. And what we will say about Orthodox

=monitor&id=3567]
37
See Jewish.ru, 21.07.2009, URL: http://www.jewish.ru/news/cis/2009/07/news994276316.php
38
Мошкин М. Духовные разночтения // Время новостей. N°136. 31.07.2009. [Moshkin, M., “Spiritual
Disagreements,” Vremya Novostey. URL: http://www.vremya.ru/print/234234.html]
39
Ibid.

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 Religion and Ideology in Modern Russia

Christianity will not be in discord with Catholic ethics.”40

Alongside the Protestants and the Catholics, some other representatives of ecclesiastical
Christianity that appeared as far back as the eighteenth century found themselves out of favor.
Among them were the Old Believers, Shamanism followers, traditional pagans and, of course, new
religious movements.
The authors of the open address to the president of Russia Dmitry Medvedev are against
making school overly clerical. They do not want to divide religions into “traditional” and
“non-traditional”; they insist on observing the constitutional principles of secular education, on
equality of all confessions before the law, and on the necessity of state cooperation with all public
organizations in Russia, including religious ones, in creating civil society in our country. Instead of
numerous subjects of confessional orientation, the authors of the address propose to introduce a
general course in religious studies, which unveils the history of various religions, analyzes each
religion and the conformity of its dogmas to scientific facts, and explains the atheistic position on
the matter. Of course, “sidelined” religious organizations can educate children at their Sunday
schools and higher confessional institutions. Even in this case, however, “non-traditional” religions
have no place, since the Russian Orthodox Church actively strives for the right to issue
state-approved diplomas in theology to graduates of its higher educational institutions. Institutions
teaching “non-traditional” religions will hardly gain this right.41

Conclusion

In most Western countries, the state managed to separate itself from the church in a civilized
way. In Russia, a sui generis separation between church and state took place after the October
Revolution of 1917 in a wild way. With the coming of “perestroika,” the militant atheism that had
been the dominant ideology for seventy years yielded to an idealistic understanding of religion as a
source of ethical values that endows its followers with high moral character. Religious leaders
came to insist that the confinement of religion within the sphere of personal emotions results in
moral crisis, and so it is necessary to restore belief to its previous position in society by building it
into education. Religious activists claim that most disciplines pertaining to the humanities, from
ethics and psychology to political science, are of religious origin.
The experiment of introducing spiritual and moral instruction to schools is an attempt to fill
the gap that appeared as a result of the collapse of the Soviet state ideology. It is hard to predict the
outcome of the experiment,42 but it is obvious that the development of a complete and objective
course on the history of religions, free of excessive influence of clerical circles, is a task for the
future, when society realizes the priority of secular values and comes to an understanding that a

40
Interview with Archdeacon Andrey Kuraev, URL: http://kuraev.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=211.
41
Nowadays in Russia, there are forty-nine Orthodox, sixty-eight Muslim, two Buddhist, two Jewish, twenty-eight
Protestant, and four Catholic higher theological educational institutions.
42
See attachment 2 for some immediate results of this experiment.

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 Liudmila Zhukova

single confessional ideology cannot be a basis for consolidation in a multi-confessional community.

Introduction of the basics of any religion into the school curriculum (even when multiple choices are
given) can result in clericalization of education and in long-term consequences not only in education,
but in other spheres of social life as well, first of all escalation of religious and national tension.

Attachment 1

All-Russian survey provided by Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM)

During 23-24 January, 2010, 1600 people were questioned in 140 populated areas of 42 regions of the
Russian Federation. The statistical error is less than 3.4%.43

What religion or world view do you follow?

(closed question, one answer)
2005 2006 2008 2009 2010
Orthodoxy 72 63 73 70 75
Islam 7 6 6 7 5
Roman Catholicism 1 1 >1 >1 1
Protestantism (Pentecostalism, Adventism, Lutheranism, Baptism, etc...) >1 >1 >1 >1 >1
Judaism - >1 >1 >1 >1
Buddhism >1 1 >1 1 1
I am religious but do not belong to any confession - 12 3 5 3
Nonbeliever 13 16 11 9 8
I am between belief and nonbelief 4 - 5 5 5
Other 1 1 - >1 >1
Hard to say 1 1 2 2 1

Do you participate in religious ceremonies, if yes – how often?

(closed question, one answer)
2006 2009 2010
Daily 4 3 4
Weekly 3 2 3
Monthly 4 3 4
Only on holidays 26 25 27
From time to time 24 26 28
I do not participate in any religious ceremonies 37 38 32
Hard to say 1 4 4

What can you personally say about the religious feelings of the people around you?
(closed question, one answer)
1991 2010
There are no changes in the religious feelings of the people around me. 12 17
Some time ago, the people used to hide their religious feelings, and now they do not
34 21
hide them.
More people embrace faith. 25 25
People participate in religious ceremonies because it became fashionable, and it has
19 16
nothing to do with real religious feelings.
Other 1 2
Hard to say 10 17

43
Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) press release no. 1461, URL: http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/
tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/13365.html?no_cache=1&cHash=782b2c1c4e, accessed May 5, 2010.

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 Religion and Ideology in Modern Russia

Were you baptized?

(closed question, one answer, % of Christians)
1989 2001 2002 2010
Yes 89 81 83 84
No 8 16 15 14
Hard to say 3 3 2 2

Do you read the Bible?

(closed question, one answer, % from Christians)
1993 2010
Yes 38 49
No 61 49
Hard to say <1 2

Attachment 2

Some results of the experiment on introducing a spiritual/moral component into the educational system44

Region Basics of Basics of Basics of Basics of Basics of Basics of

Orthodox Secular World Muslim Jewish Buddhist
Culture Ethics Religious Culture Culture Culture
Cultures
Central Federal District 55 - 75 % 16 - 37 % 6-8 % 0-0.2 % 0% 0-0.2 %
Siberian Federal District 15- 21 % 58 - 67 % 15- 21 % 1% 0.09 % 0-0.1 %
Northwestern District
- Jewish Autonomous
61.2 % 12.3 % 24 % 0.64 % 1.69 % 0%
Region
- Kamchatka 39 % 47 % 14 % 0.9 % 0% 0%
Urals Federal District
- Kurgan Region 20 % 60 % 18 % 1% 0.1 % 0.1 %
Volga (Privolzhsky)
Federal District
- Penza Region 0% 60 % 38 % 0% 0% 0%
- Udmurtia 16 % 52 % 27 % 2.7 % 0.3 % 0.2 %
- Chuvashia 34.8 % 30.5 % 32.8 % 1.8 % 0% 0%
Southern Federal
District
- Chechnya 0.36 % - - 99.64 % 0 0
- Karachay-
20 % 22.9 % 19.9 % 37 % 0 0
- Cherkessia
- Kalmykia 30 % 18 % 18 % 1% 1% 51 %
- Stavropol region 60 % ? ? ? ? ?

44
These data are based on Eugeniy Nasirov’s article “Orthodox Faith or Secular Ethics: The Choice of Children
and Their Parents” (Насыров Е. Православие или светская этика - выбор детей и их родителей), GZT.ru,
URL:http://www.gzt.ru/addition/-pravoslavie-ili-svetskaya-etika---vybor-detei-i-/296263.html, accessed March 17,
2010.

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