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Scrupulosity in patients with obsessivecompulsive

disorder: Relationship to clinical and cognitive
phenomena

Article  in  Journal of Anxiety Disorders · February 2006

DOI: 10.1016/j.janxdis.2006.02.001 · Source: PubMed

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 Anxiety Disorders
20 (2006) 1071–1086

Scrupulosity in patients with obsessive–

compulsive disorder: Relationship to
clinical and cognitive phenomena
Elizabeth A. Nelson a, Jonathan S. Abramowitz a,*,
Stephen P. Whiteside a, Brett J. Deacon b
a
Department of Psychiatry and Psychology, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, MN, USA
b
Department of Psychology, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, USA
Received 27 July 2005; received in revised form 7 February 2006; accepted 7 February 2006

Abstract

Scrupulosity is often encountered among individuals with obsessive–compulsive

disorder (OCD), yet relatively few studies have examined this particular symptom
presentation. Using a large sample of OCD patients, the present investigation examined
(a) the relationship between religiosity and scrupulosity, (b) the association between
scrupulosity and the severity of OCD, anxiety, and depressive symptoms, and (c) the
connection between scrupulosity and cognitive domains related to OCD. Scrupulosity was
correlated with obsessional symptoms and several cognitive domains of OCD, including
beliefs about the importance of, and need to control intrusive thoughts, an inflated sense of
responsibility, and moral thought–action fusion. These results are examined in terms of
cognitive behavioral conceptualizations of OCD and the treatment implications of these
findings are discussed.
# 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Obsessive–compulsive disorder; Scrupulosity; Religious obsessions; Anxiety disorders

* Correspondence to: Mayo Clinic, 200 First Street SW, Rochester, MN 55905, USA.
Tel.: +1 507 284 4431; fax: +1 507 284 4158.
E-mail address: [email protected] (J.S. Abramowitz).

0887-6185/$ – see front matter # 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.janxdis.2006.02.001
1072 E.A. Nelson et al. / Anxiety Disorders 20 (2006) 1071–1086

Obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) is an anxiety disorder involving (a)

persistent unwanted anxiety-evoking thoughts, ideas, and images (i.e., obses-
sions) that are subjectively resisted, and (b) urges to reduce this anxiety via some
other thought or behavior (i.e., compulsive rituals). The themes of OCD symptoms
vary widely (e.g., contamination, aggression; for a review see McKay et al., 2004)
with one of the more recalcitrant presentations involving obsessions and
compulsions concerned with religion (e.g., Akhtar, Wig, Varma, Pershad, &
Verma, 1975). Religious OCD symptoms, often referred to as scrupulosity, typically
involve ‘‘seeing sin where there is none’’ and are frequently focused on minor
details of the person’s religion, to the exclusion of more important areas. Examples
include unwanted sacrilegious obsessional thoughts (e.g., about the Devil),
excessive doubt regarding whether one has committed a sin (e.g., daydreaming
while praying), and religious behavior taken to extreme (e.g., excessive confession).
Several studies suggest that scrupulosity is a common presentation of OCD.1
Examining the content of obsessions among 425 individuals with OCD, Foa and
Kozak (1995) found religion to be the fifth most common theme, with 5.9% of
patients endorsing it as a primary obsessional symptom. Antony, Downie, and
Swinson (1998) found that 24.2% of a sample of 182 adults and adolescents with
OCD reported obsessions having to do with religion (not necessarily their primary
obsession). Yet, despite the prevalence and recognition of scrupulosity as a
presentation of OCD, relatively few studies have examined its cognitive and
affective correlates.
Previous research suggests that a patient’s religious denomination and strength
of religiosity can influence his or her OCD symptoms (Abramowitz, Deacon,
Woods, & Tolin, 2004; Khanna & Channabasavanna, 1988; Sica, Novara, &
Sanavio, 2002) and clinical observations indicate that scrupulosity is often
inadvertently reinforced by the teachings of the individual’s religion.
Furthermore, fear and intolerance of uncertainty (often seen in individuals with
scrupulosity) result in distorted perceptions of the boundary between normal
religious behavior and obsessive–compulsive symptoms (Greenberg, 1987) which
may complicate cognitive behavioral therapy. As has been the case for other OCD
symptom subtypes such as hoarding (Steketee, Frost, Wincze, Greene, &
Douglass, 2000) and severe obsessions (Freeston et al., 1997), a clearer
understanding of scrupulosity may facilitate the development of more effective
treatment strategies for this particular presentation.

1
Scrupulosity, with a focus on morality, is also mentioned in DSM-IV-TR as a symptom of
obsessive-compulsive personality disorder (OCPD). However, whereas the thoughts and doubts
pertaining to morality are experienced as unwanted and unwelcome (i.e., ‘‘ego-dystonic’’) in
OCD, they are experienced as consistent with the person’s world view (i.e., ‘‘ego-syntonic’’) in
OCPD. More specifically, scrupulous thoughts, ideas, and images (i.e., obsessions) in OCD are
associated with (a) anxiety and fear, (b) subjective resistance (i.e., they elicit rituals and neutralizing
responses), and (c) other types of obsessions (e.g., sexual, violent; McKay et al., 2004). In contrast, the
scrupulous ideation in OCPD (a) does not evoke anxiety or fear, (b) is not subjectively resisted, and (c)
is not associated with violent and sexual obsessions.
 E.A. Nelson et al. / Anxiety Disorders 20 (2006) 1071–1086 1073

Tek and Ulug (2001) compared groups of OCD patients with and without
religious obsessions, finding no between group differences in global OCD
symptom severity. However, patients with religious symptoms endorsed a greater
number of obsession categories on the symptom checklist of the Yale-Brown
Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989a, 1989b) relative to
patients without religious OCD symptoms. Consistent with this result, a growing
number of factor and cluster analytic studies on the structure of obsessive–
compulsive symptoms as assessed by the Y-BOCS symptom checklist have
reported that religious obsessions load on a factor with sexual obsessions, and
often with aggressive and somatic obsessions (e.g., Mataix-Cols, Rosario-
Campos, & Leckman, 2005; McKay et al., 2004). Less often, religious obsessions
were found to load with checking and mental compulsions. Taken together, these
findings suggest that religious OCD symptoms do not necessarily represent a
more severe presentation of OCD per se, but do appear to be most strongly
associated with other obsessional phenomena, as opposed to with compulsive
rituals (with the possible exception of checking and mental neutralizing).
Contemporary cognitive-behavioral models of OCD implicate specific
cognitive phenomena in the development and maintenance of the disorder.
These cognitions include: (a) overestimation of threat (the belief that negative
events are especially likely and would be especially awful); (b) inflated
responsibility (the belief that one has the power to cause, and/or the duty to
prevent, negative outcomes); (c) overimportance of intrusive thoughts (the belief
that the mere presence of a thought indicates that the thought is significant); (d)
the need to control intrusive thoughts (the belief that complete control over one’s
mental processes is both necessary and possible); (e) perfectionism (the belief that
mistakes and imperfection are intolerable); and (f) intolerance of uncertainty (the
idea that it is important to be 100% certain that negative outcomes will not occur
(Frost & Steketee, 2002). The essential tenet of cognitive-behavioral models (e.g.,
Rachman, 1998; Salkovskis, 1999) is that OCD develops when unpleasant, yet
harmless, intrusive thoughts, doubts, impulses, and images are misinterpreted
along the lines of the cognitive factors described above. This misappraisal evokes
anxiety and motivates efforts to reduce this anxiety via neutralizing behavior (e.g.,
rituals) which is reinforced by the immediate (albeit temporary) reduction in
distress it engenders (for further description, see Rachman, 1997).
Studies with nonclinical samples have found that certain OCD-relevant
cognitive styles are related to religiosity (i.e., strength of religious devotion). For
example, greater religiosity was associated with inflated responsibility,
perfectionism, and dysfunctional beliefs about the importance of, and need to
control, intrusive thoughts among Catholics in Italy (Sica et al., 2002) and among
Protestants in the U.S. (Abramowitz et al., 2004). Rassin and Koster (2003) found
that religiosity was positively correlated with the belief that thoughts (even
involuntary ones) are the moral equivalent of actions (i.e., moral thought–action
fusion [TAF]), but not the belief that thinking of a negative event increases the
probability that the event will occur (i.e., likelihood TAF). Collectively, these
1074 E.A. Nelson et al. / Anxiety Disorders 20 (2006) 1071–1086

findings suggest possible relationships between religiosity, scrupulosity, and

maladaptive cognitive processes in OCD. In the only study to date that has
examined relationships between religious OCD symptoms and cognitive
variables, Tolin, Abramowitz, Kozak, and Foa (2001) found that in comparison
with patients with contamination or symmetry-related obsessions, those with
religious obsessions were more likely to show increased perceptual aberration and
magical ideation, and decreased insight into the irrationality of obsessional fears.
Understanding how scrupulosity is related to pertinent cognitive variables
could help in advancing specific conceptual models of religious OCD symptoms
from which effective cognitive-behavioral treatments might be derived. However,
to date there is no research investigating associations between scrupulosity and
these cognitive variables in OCD samples. The present study was therefore
conducted to further investigate the phenomenon of scrupulosity in a clinical
sample of patients with OCD. Specifically, we examined (a) the relationship
between religiosity and scrupulosity; (b) the association between scrupulosity and
the severity of OCD, anxiety, and depressive symptoms; and (c) the links between
scrupulosity and other obsessive–compulsive symptoms and related cognitive
phenomena. Findings from previous research led to the hypothesis that
scrupulosity would be specifically related to increased obsessional symptoms
and checking and neutralizing rituals, but not to global OCD, depression, or
anxiety symptom severity. We also predicted that scrupulosity would be
associated with the following cognitive variables: inflated responsibility,
intolerance of uncertainty, beliefs about the importance of (and need to control)
intrusive thoughts, and moral (but not likelihood) TAF.

1. Method

1.1. Participants

The sample consisted of 71 consecutively referred adult (18 years) patients

(37 males, 34 females) who received a diagnosis of OCD at an outpatient anxiety
disorders clinic (diagnostic procedures are described below). Patients with
comorbid Axis-I disorders were included, yet those with Axis-II (personality)
disorders were excluded. The most frequently occurring comorbid conditions
were depressive disorders (n = 22; 29%). The mean age of the sample was 34.73
years (S.D. = 10.70). A large proportion of the patients was married (40.0%) and
currently employed (46.4%). On average, patients had completed 15.3 years
of education.

1.2. Measures

The following measures of OCD and related symptom severity, and related
cognitive distortions, were completed for the study:
 E.A. Nelson et al. / Anxiety Disorders 20 (2006) 1071–1086 1075

Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989a,

1989b). Global severity of OCD independent of the specific symptom theme was
measured using the Y-BOCS, a semi-structured clinical interview that includes a
symptom checklist and 10-item severity scale. The severity scale contains items
assessing the following parameters of obsessions (Items 1–5) and compulsions
(Items 6–10): (a) time, (b) interference, (c) distress, (d) resistance, (e) and degree
of control associated with obsessions and compulsions. Each item is rated on a
scale from 0 (no symptoms) to 4 (extreme), yielding a total severity score that
ranges from 0 to 40, and obsessions and compulsions subscales ranging from 0 to
20. The measure has satisfactory psychometric properties (Goodman et al.,
1989b) and is considered the gold standard measure of obsessive–compulsive
symptom severity.
Obsessive–Compulsive Inventory—Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002). The
severity of OCD symptom dimensions was assessed via the OCI-R, an 18-item self-
report questionnaire based on the earlier 84-item OCI (Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis,
Coles, & Amir, 1998). Participants rate the degree to which they are bothered or
distressed by various OCD symptoms in the past month on a 5-point scale from 0
(not at all) to 4 (extremely). The OCI-R assesses six dimensions of obsessive–
compulsive symptomatology: (a) washing, (b) checking, (c) obsessing, (d)
neutralizing, (e) ordering, and (f) hoarding. Preliminary data suggest that the OCI-R
possesses adequate internal consistency and test-retest reliability (Foa et al., 2002).
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelsohn, Mock, &
Erlbaugh, 1961). This is a widely used 21-item self-report scale that assesses
affective, cognitive, motivational, vegetative, and psychomotor components of
depression. It is regarded as an excellent measure of a patient’s general distress.
Scores of 10 or less are considered normal; scores of 20 or greater suggest the
presence of clinical depression. The BDI has been shown to have good reliability
and validity (Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait version, Form Y. (STAI-T; Spielberger et al.,
1983). The STAI-T is a 20-item scale that measures the stable propensity to
experience anxiety and the tendency to perceive stressful situations as threatening.
The STAI-T has demonstrated high test-retest reliability, internal consistency, and
concurrent validity with other anxiety questionnaires (Spielberger et al., 1983).
Penn Inventory of Scrupulosity (PIOS; Abramowitz, Huppert, Cohen, Tolin, &
Cahill, 2002) is a 19-item self-report measure developed to assess scrupulosity
in the context of OCD (i.e., religious obsessions). The PIOS consists of two
subscales: one measuring fears of having committed a religious sin (Fear of
Sin; e.g., I am afraid of having sexual thoughts), and the other measuring the fears
of punishment from God (Fear of God; e.g., I worry that God is upset with me).
Items are scored on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (constantly).
Participants are also asked to indicate their current religious affiliation and
degree of religious devotion on a scale from 1 (not at all devoted) to 5 (very
strongly devoted). Responses to the religious devotion item are strongly
correlated with other aspects of religious observance, such as frequency of
1076 E.A. Nelson et al. / Anxiety Disorders 20 (2006) 1071–1086

attending religious worship services (Abramowitz et al., 2002). The PIOS has
adequate psychometric properties in nonclinical samples (Abramowitz et al.,
2002) but has not been studied in clinical groups.
Thought–Action Fusion Scale (TAFS; Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman,
1996). This is a 19-item self-report measure of the tendency to believe that
thoughts are equivalent to actions. Twelve items assess moral TAF, which is the
belief that thoughts are the moral equivalent of actions (e.g., ‘‘Having a
blasphemous thought is almost as sinful to me as a blasphemous action’’); three
assess likelihood-self TAF, which is the belief that merely thinking about harm
coming to oneself increases the likelihood of being harmed (e.g., ‘‘If I think of
myself being in a car accident this increases the risk that I will have a car
accident’’); and the remaining four items assess likelihood-other TAF, which is
the belief that thinking about harm coming to someone else increases the
likelihood of that person being harmed (e.g., ‘‘If I think of a relative/friend losing
their job, this increases the risk that they will lose their job). Agreement with each
item is rated on a scale from 0 (disagree strongly) to 4 (agree strongly). The
instrument’s psychometric properties are good and have been described by
Shafran et al. (1996). We combined the likelihood self- and likelihood-other
scales in the following study.
Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory (III; Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions
Working Group [OCCWG], 2003). The III is a 31-item semi-idiographic
questionnaire that assesses appraisals or interpretations of unwanted, distressing
intrusive thoughts, images or impulses. After reading a definition of unwanted
mental intrusions (which includes several examples), respondents identify two
intrusive thoughts, images, or impulses they have recently experienced. They then
rate the extent to which they believe in each of the 31 statements as related to the
identified intrusive thoughts (e.g., ‘‘Thinking this thought could make it
happen’’). Strength of belief is rated from 0 (‘‘I did not believe this idea at all’’) to
100 (‘‘I was completely convinced this idea was true’’). The 31 items form three
subscales: (a) importance of thoughts, (b) responsibility, and (c) control of
thoughts. As suggested by the scale’s developers (OCCWG, 2003), to ease
interpretation we transformed the 100-point scale by dividing by 10.
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, &
Ladouceur, 1994). The IUS is a 27-item self-report measure of the need for
assurance (sample items: ‘‘Uncertainty makes life intolerable;’’ ‘‘I always want to
know what the future has in store for me’’). The scale has adequate psychometric
properties and validity (Freeston et al., 1994). Items are rated on a scale from 1
(not at all characteristic of me) to 5 (entirely characteristic of me), and summed to
produce a total score ranging from 27 to 135.

1.3. Procedure

Packets containing the self-report measures described above were mailed to

the patient’s home in advance of the initial clinic appointment. Patients returned
 E.A. Nelson et al. / Anxiety Disorders 20 (2006) 1071–1086 1077

their completed packets to their assessor at their first visit. Diagnostic evaluations
took place in an anxiety disorders specialty clinic housed within a large academic
medical center. Each patient received our standard 1.5- to 2-h diagnostic
assessment performed by a trained psychologist who administered the anxiety and
mood disorders sections of the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview
(MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998), a structured diagnostic interview that has
demonstrated good reliability (Sheehan et al., 1998). Axis II psychopathology
was assessed by means of a semi-structured interview that was based on DSM
criteria. On the basis of the primary symptoms identified by the Y-BOCS
checklist, clinicians classified each of these patients according to the five cluster
model of OCD symptom presentation identified by Abramowitz, Franklin,
Schwartz, and Furr (2003). Thus, OCD patients were classified as belonging to
one of the following five groups: harming (n = 20), contamination (n = 15),
hoarding (n = 2), unacceptable obsessional thoughts with religious, violent, and
sexual content (n = 22), or symmetry (n = 9). Clinicians had been instructed in
how to classify patients in this way by observing while others conducted similar
interviews, and by conducting such interviews themselves under direct
supervision. All classifications (and supporting data) were subsequently reviewed
with the clinic supervisor (the second author), and only patients for whom
consensus was reached (100% agreement) were included in the study. This
resulted in the exclusion of three patients for whom consensus was not reached.

2. Results

2.1. Descriptive statistics and internal consistency

As initial analyses indicated that the two subscales of the PIOS were highly
correlated (r = .85, P < .01), and that both the Fear of God and Fear of Sin
subscales correlated significantly with the total score (r’s = .94 and .98,
p’s < .01), all analyses reported below were conducted using the PIOS total
score. The ranges, means, and standard deviations for all study measures are
displayed in Table 1. Examination of the shape of the distributions indicated that
the range of scores was reasonably broad and, in the majority of variables,
normally distributed. The distributions of the remaining variables were mildly
positively skewed. A series of one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) indicated
that scores on the study measures were not related to gender (all p’s NS).
Similarly, correlational analyses indicated that scores were not related to age (all
p’s NS). Measures of clinical severity demonstrated acceptable internal
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha): alpha coefficients ranged from .71 (Y-BOCS)
to .91 (BDI). Other self-report measures also evidenced good internal consistency,
with alpha coefficients ranging from of .91 (IUS) to .96 (PIOS).
We examined whether PIOS scores differed across patients with different
OCD symptom presentations. Because there were only two patients with primary
1078 E.A. Nelson et al. / Anxiety Disorders 20 (2006) 1071–1086

Table 1
Range of scores, means, and standard deviations on measures of clinical severity, cognitions, and
scrupulosity for 71 patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder
Domain and measure Range M S.D.
Clinical severity
Y-BOCS total 14.00–36.00 24.17 4.87
Y-BOCS obsession 6.00–18.00 11.76 2.71
Y-BOCS compulsion 7.00–18.00 12.41 2.87
OCI-R total 7.00–66.00 28.14 12.96
OCI-R washing 0.00–12.00 4.91 4.41
OCI-R checking 0.00–12.00 5.30 3.79
OCI-R neutralizing 0.00–12.00 3.00 3.57
OCI-R obsessing 0.00–12.00 6.80 3.91
OCI-R ordering 0.00–12.00 5.25 4.14
OCI-R hoarding 0.00–12.00 2.87 3.53
BDI 2.00–49.00 17.39 10.89
STAI-T 36.00–78.00 55.96 10.33
Cognition
IUS 31.00–137.00 75.86 23.38
TAFS moral 0.00–44.00 19.70 11.61
TAFS likelihood 0.00–22.00 5.93 5.97
III importance of thoughts 0.00–90.00 36.59 23.22
III control of thoughts 3.00–100.00 58.65 24.44
III responsibility 0.00–99.00 54.67 26.43
Scrupulosity
PIOS 0.00–70.00 26.96 18.88
Note. Y-BOCS = Yale-Brown Obsessive–Compulsive Scale; OCI-R = Obsessive–Compulsive Inven-
tory—Revised; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Trait
Version; IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; TAFS = Thought Action Fusion Scale; III = Inter-
pretation of Intrusions Inventory; PIOS = Penn Inventory of Scrupulosity.

hoarding symptoms, we excluded this group from this analysis. Table 2 displays
the means and standard deviations on the PIOS across groups. A oneway
analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated significant between-group differences,
F(3, 62) = 3.95, P < .05. Post hoc Tukey HSD tests revealed that patients whose
main OCD symptoms were unacceptable obsessional thoughts had higher scores
than patients with primarily contamination symptoms (P < .05).

Table 2
Means and standard deviations on the PIOS for different OCD symptom presentations
Symptom presentation n M S.D.
Contamination 15 15.13 11.41
Harming 20 27.05 21.40
Symmetry 9 23.89 20.62
Unacceptable thoughts 22 35.55 16.88
 E.A. Nelson et al. / Anxiety Disorders 20 (2006) 1071–1086 1079

2.2. Relationship between scrupulosity, religiosity, and religious affiliation

Given that previous research with nonclinical samples found that scores on
the PIOS were associated with religious affiliation and strength of religious
devotion (Abramowitz et al., 2002), we examined these relationships in the
present clinical population. This sample contained 19 Catholics, 32 Protestants, 3
Jews, 3 individuals of other religious affiliations, and 14 individuals who
identified themselves as not religiously affiliated. To examine the association
between scrupulosity and religious affiliation, we compared PIOS scores across
religious groups, excluding the Jewish and ‘‘other religion’’ groups on the basis
of insufficient power. A one-way ANOVA revealed significant between group
differences, F(2, 62) 4.32, P < .05. Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD tests
revealed that Protestant patients (M = 33.47, S.D. = 18.12) scored significantly
higher (P < .05) on the PIOS than did patients with no religious affiliation
(M = 19.07, S.D. = 17.46), but not significantly higher (P > .05) than did
Catholic patients (M = 20.74, S.D. = 19.79). Correlational analyses, excluding
the 14 non-religious patients, indicated that PIOS scores were not significantly
related to the patient’s strength of religious devotion, r(57) = .24, NS. When we
computed similar correlations for Catholic and Protestant patients separately,
we found no significant relationships between PIOS score and strength of
religious devotion in either of these groups.

2.3. Relationship between scrupulosity and measures of clinical severity and

cognition

Pearson correlation coefficients were computed to examine the relationship

between the PIOS and the measures of symptom severity and cognition.
Because of the large number of correlations, we used a Bonferroni-corrected
significance level of P < .003 (.05/18). The results of this analysis, which are
displayed in Table 3, revealed a moderately strong and significant relationship
between the PIOS and the obsessing subscale of the OCI-R. However, no other
significant relationships with OCI-R subscales were detected. In addition, the
PIOS was not related to either the Y-BOCS total or subscale scores, nor to
either the BDI or STAI-T. A number of cognitive measures were significantly
related to the PIOS, including the moral (but not the likelihood) subscale of the
TAFS, and all of the III subscales.

2.4. Prediction of the PIOS total score through measures of clinical severity
and cognition

Multiple regression analysis was conducted to predict the total PIOS score. As
we thought that a tendency toward obsessional thinking would predict
scrupulosity, the OCI-R obsessing subscale was included in Step 1. Given the
relationship between OCD and general distress, Step 2 incorporated the BDI and
1080 E.A. Nelson et al. / Anxiety Disorders 20 (2006) 1071–1086

Table 3
Pearson correlation coefficients between the PIOS and measures of clinical severity and cognition for
71 OCD patients
Domain and measure r with PIOS total score
Clinical severity
Y-BOCS total .01
Y-BOCS obsession .08
Y-BOCS compulsion .06
OCI-R total .01
OCI-R washing .04
OCI-R checking .04
OCI-R neutralizing .12
OCI-R obsessing .40*
OCI-R ordering .22
OCI-R hoarding .06
BDI .28
STAI-T .32
Cognition
IUS .30
TAFS moral .44*
TAFS likelihood .04
III importance of thoughts .44*
III control of thoughts .60*
III responsibility .44*
Note. PIOS = Penn Inventory of Scrupulosity; Y-BOCS = Yale-Brown Obsessive–Compulsive Scale;
OCO-R = Obsessive–Compulsive Inventory—Revised; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; STAI-
T = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Trait Version; IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale;
TAFS = Thought Action Fusion Scale; III = Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory.
*
P < .003.

STAI-T. The cognitive measures found to be significantly related with scru-

pulosity (i.e., the III subscales and the TAFS moral subscale) were entered into
Step 3 of the model. Table 4 shows the results of this analysis. As expected, the
OCI-R obsessing subscale significantly predicted scores on the PIOS. However, in
Step 2, the BDI and STAI-T did not contribute significantly to the explanatory
power of the model. In Step 3, the III control of thoughts and TAFS moral
subscales (partial r’s = .39, .32, respectively; p’s < .05), but not III responsibility
or importance of thoughts subscales, added significantly to the regression model.
In the final regression model, the OCI-R obsessing subscale, the III control of
thoughts subscale, and the TAFS moral subscale were significant predictors that
accounted for 45.0% of the variance in the total PIOS score.

3. Discussion

The present study is the first to address the phenomenon of scrupulosity and
its affective and cognitive correlates in a clinical sample of OCD patients. We
 E.A. Nelson et al. / Anxiety Disorders 20 (2006) 1071–1086 1081

Table 4
Hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting the PIOS total score
Predictor B SEB b R2 DR2 P
Step 1 .16 .001
OCI-R – obsessions 1.94 0.53 .40 .001
Step 2 .20 .04 .002
BDI 0.16 0.33 .09 NS
STAI-T 0.24 0.35 .13 NS
Step 3 .45 .025 .000
TAFS-moral 0.47 0.17 .29 .009
III-importance 0.02 0.02 .29 NS
III-responsibility 0.01 0.01 .11 NS
III-control 0.04 0.01 .55 .001
Note. OCI-R = Obsessive–Compulsive Inventory—Revised; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory;
STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Trait Version; TAFS-M = Thought Action Fusion Scale,
moral subscale; III = Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory.

sought to examine the nature of this particularly understudied presentation of

OCD because of the challenges it poses in psychological treatment. Our data
indicate that scrupulosity symptoms are present in each presentation of OCD.
Although, as expected, patients suffering primarily with severe unacceptable
obsessional thoughts (i.e., religious, violent, and sexual obsessions) evidenced
greater levels of scrupulosity compared to those with primary contamination
symptoms. Also it is of note that the present clinical sample scored substantially
higher on the PIOS (M = 26.96, S.D. = 18.88) relative to the nonclinical sample on
which the scale was validated (M = 18.98, S.D. = 11.66; Abramowitz et al., 2002).
Consistent with out first hypothesis, scrupulosity was significantly associated
with obsessional symptoms as assessed by the OCI-R. However, in contrast to our
expectations, checking and neutralizing rituals were not related to scrupulosity.
The moderately strong relationship between scrupulosity and obsessional
problems is in line with the between-groups analysis discussed above, and with
several studies finding that religious obsessions load together with sexual and
violent/aggressive obsessions and comprise a collection of especially anxiety-
evoking (unacceptable, repugnant, immoral) obsessional thoughts (McKay et al.,
2004). This finding is also in line with cognitive-behavioral models of OCD. That
is, individuals with scrupulosity, who by their nature impose strict moral standards
upon themselves and are hypervigilant of moral/religious sin, might be
exquisitely sensitive to intrusive sexual or sacrilegious thoughts that conflict
with their belief/value system. For example, a scrupulous individual might find
even the passing thought of an extramarital sexual encounter with a stranger more
disturbing, and resist it more intensely, than would an individual without
scrupulosity, leading to obsessional problems.
In one previous study, Abramowitz et al. (2003) found that mental compulsions
that patients use to neutralize obsessional distress (e.g., mentally ‘‘cancelling out’’
1082 E.A. Nelson et al. / Anxiety Disorders 20 (2006) 1071–1086

bad thoughts) co-occurred with sexual, harming, and religious obsessions. Our
failure to find a relationship between scrupulosity and neutralizing deserves
further comment. One possible explanation for this null finding is that all of the
items on the neutralizing subscale of the OCI-R involve numbers and counting
(e.g., I feel I have to repeat certain numbers). Whereas some patients with OCD
use numbers and counting to neutralize obsessional fear, clinical observations
indicate that patients with religious obsessions typically use other neutralizing
strategies (e.g., thought suppression, mental phrases or prayers) to neutralize
these kinds of obsessions. Similarly, the lack of a relationship between
scrupulosity and checking symptoms requires further interpretating since some
factor analytic studies report that religious obsessions load with checking rituals
(e.g., Leckman, Grice, Boardman, & Zhang, 1997). However, items on the OCI-R
checking subscale mainly assesses the checking of household items such as
appliances, doors locks, and drawers, as opposed to checking with religious
authorities or checking for harm or mistakes, which are more likely to be present
among individuals with scrupulosity. Thus, although scrupulosity may be related
to some types of neutralizing and checking symptoms, the items on the OCI-R
may not be sensitive to the specific sorts of neutralizing and checking rituals
displayed by individuals with scrupulosity.
Consistent with previous findings (e.g., Tek & Ulug, 2001), we found that
scrupulosity was unrelated to global OCD symptom severity (e.g., time spent
with symptoms, functional interference) as assessed by the interviewer
administered Y-BOCS. This supports the view that compared to other types
of obsessions and compulsions, religious symptoms do not represent a generally
more severe variant of OCD. Although the correlation coefficients between
scrupulosity and depressive (.28) and anxiety symptoms (.32) were significant at
the P < .05 level, they were somewhat weak and not significant at the more
conservative Bonferroni-corrected significance level of P < .003. Thus, even if
religious obsessions are not associated with especially high frequency,
interference in functioning, difficulty with resistance or control (i.e., the
symptom parameters assessed by the Y-BOCS), these phenomena might
represent a particularly distressing presentation of OCD. Although additional
research is needed on this topic, the fact that scrupulosity involves the perception
of sin, violation of one’s moral standards, and fear of punishment (e.g., from
God), it is not surprising that religious obsessions are experienced as highly
depressing and anxiety-evoking.
In support of our second hypothesis, scrupulosity was moderately associated
with multiple cognitive biases believed to underlie the development of
obsessional symptoms, including moral TAF, overestimates of the importance
of and need to control intrusive thoughts, and inflated perceptions of
responsibility. These findings are consistent with previous research suggesting
that among religious individuals, an overly stringent moral code coupled with the
tendency to catastrophically misinterpret the significance of intrusive unwanted
thoughts set the stage for the development of obsessional problems (e.g.,
 E.A. Nelson et al. / Anxiety Disorders 20 (2006) 1071–1086 1083

Abramowitz et al., 2004; Sica et al., 2002). Our regression analysis indicated that
scrupulosity was best accounted for by the triumvirate of (a) obsessional
symptoms, (b) beliefs that unwanted thoughts are the moral equivalent of
unacceptable behavior (moral TAF), and (c) maladaptive beliefs about the
necessity of controlling unwanted intrusive thoughts. Abundant research indicates
that it is quite difficult to control or suppress intrusive thoughts (e.g., Abramowitz,
Tolin, & Street, 2001). Accordingly, the clinical manifestation of scrupulosity
may arise from the fear of negative religious consequences (e.g., punishment from
God, eternal damnation) resulting from inability to control intrusive thoughts
(e.g., sexual, sacrilegious) that are perceived as sinful and morally unacceptable
(i.e., equivalent to sinful behavior). In an effort to reduce obsessional distress,
individuals engage in compulsive (neutralizing) behaviors such as excessive
prayer, confession, and checking for reassurance from religious authorities,
among other strategies.
Whereas scrupulosity was not associated with likelihood TAF, it was related
with moral TAF. This is consistent with results reported by Rassin and Koster
(2003) and in line with the idea that certain aspects of religious doctrine foster the
belief that thoughts should be treated as the moral equivalent of actions. For
example, that thinking about harming someone is the same as committing harm.
Indeed, religious doctrine explicitly states that certain thoughts are sinful. For
example, in the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus cautions, ‘‘You have heard that it was
said ‘you shall not commit adultery’; but I say to you, that everyone who looks on
a woman to lust for her has committed adultery with her already in his heart’’
(Matthew 5:27–28; New American Standard Version). Research indicates that
many strongly religious Christians incorporate this doctrine into their belief
system (e.g., Cohen & Rozin, 2001). Future studies should examine the ways in
which individuals with religious OCD symptoms (regardless of their level of
religiosity) acquire such beliefs. The relationship between scrupulosity and moral
TAF also raises the question of how much the PIOS and TAF-moral subscale
overlap in what they purport to measure; indeed, both assess to some degree the
tendency to regard thoughts and behaviors as equivalent.
An important aim of psychopathology research is to inform clinical practice,
and the present findings have implications for the treatment of religious OCD
symptoms. Research indicates that exposure and response prevention (ERP) is the
most effective treatment for OCD (Kozak & Coles, 2005a), although many OCD
patients with scrupulosity have difficulty accepting and adhering to ERP because
it involves directly confronting situations and thoughts that are perceived to be
sinful. Some authors (e.g., Kozak & Coles, 2005b) have suggested using cognitive
therapy (CT) techniques to increase adherence to ERP, although to date, this
suggestion has not been studied empirically. Nevertheless, we speculate that some
CT techniques have relevance for facilitating ERP in cases of scrupulosity. For
instance, patients could be taught that everyone sometimes experiences unwanted
(morally repugnant) thoughts. The therapist could also arrange a meeting between
the patient and a clergy member to disconfirm the idea that the occurrence of
1084 E.A. Nelson et al. / Anxiety Disorders 20 (2006) 1071–1086

intrusive and unwanted thoughts (as opposed to deliberately thinking such

thoughts) is equivalent to committing sinful behavior. Prior to such a meeting, the
therapist should ensure that the clergy member understands the problematic
nature of the patient’s dysfunctional interpretations of intrusive thoughts. Patients
with scrupulosity might also benefit from learning an explanation for the
increased frequency and seemingly uncontrollable nature of obsessional thoughts
and doubts. For example, the patient can conduct an in vivo test of the thought
suppression paradox and be taught about the role attempted suppression plays in
maintaining obsessional thoughts. When patients recognize that faulty appraisals
of normal intrusive thoughts as ‘‘immoral’’ lead to affective distress and ill-fated
attempts to suppress such thoughts, it leads to the use of exposure techniques (as
opposed to suppression and avoidance) as a way of learning to reduce the
obsessional problem. Clark (2004) and Abramowitz (2001) provide treatment
descriptions illustrating the implementation of such strategies as a means of
making it easier for patients to engage in ERP.
A number of limitations of the present study should be pointed out. First, the
present study is cross-sectional in nature, which makes difficult to ascertain
whether individuals with religious obsessions and compulsions are more likely to
endorse particular cognitive biases, or if these biases predate the development of
scrupulosity. Longitudinal research is necessary to answer questions about causal
factors. Second, the present study included primarily self-report assessment
measures. Thus, the relationships between variables may have been inflated by the
solitary method of assessment.

Acknowledgment

This study was partially supported by grants from the Obsessive Compulsive
Foundation.

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