Loss of The USS Thrasher Hearing Proceedings
Loss of The USS Thrasher Hearing Proceedings
Loss of The USS Thrasher Hearing Proceedings
"THRESHER';
STANFORD
LIBRARIES
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT C
CONGRESS 01 THE UNITED STATES
EIGHTY-ISGHTII CONGRESS
-..A.U.-I. j»»«i<K]J-i.'in»~rrr «»••<•.•*•««•""•••"-•
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
Krag, Robert L., LCDR, USN, Staff, Deputy Commander, Submarine Force, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet.
Allen, Philip H., LCDR, USN, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
Billings, John H., LCDR, USN, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
Biederman, Robert D., LT, USN, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
Prescott, Robert D., Civilian Employee, Design Division, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
Charron, Robert E., Civilian Employee, Design Division, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
Guerette, Paul A., Civilian Employee, Design Division, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
Fisher, Richard K., Civilian Employee, Design Division, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
Whitten, Laurence E., Civilian Employee, Combat Systems Division, Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard.
Beal, Daniel W., Jr., Civilian Employee, Combat Systems Division, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard.
Des Jardins, Richard R., Civilian Employee, Combat Systems Division, Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard.
Critchley, Kenneth J., Civilian Employee, Production Department, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard.
Currier, Paul C., Civilian Employee, Production Department, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard.
Abrams, Fred P., Civilian Employee, Production Department, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard.
Palmer, Franklin J., Civilian Employee, Production Department, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard.
Dineen, George J., Civilian Employee, Production Department, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard.
Moreau, Henry C., Civilian Employee, Production Department, Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard.
Corcoran, Kenneth R., Contractor's Representative, Sperry Corp.
Jaquay, Maurice F., Contractor's Representative, Raytheon Corp.
Keuster, Donald W., Contractor's Representative, Sperry Corp.
Stadtmuller, Donald T., Contractor's Representative, Sperry Corp.
FOREWORD
On April 10,1963, while engaged in a deep test dive, approximately
200 miles off the northeastern coast of the United States, the nuclear
submarine, SSN-593, the TJ.S.S. Thresher, was lost at sea with all
persons aboard—112 naval personnel and 17 civilian technicians.
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, by law, is required to make
continued studies of problems related to the development, use, and
control of atomic energy. In compliance with this responsibility, as
chairman of the Joint Committee, on being notified on April 10 of the
loss of the Thresher, I immediately dispatched specially qualified staff
members of the Joint Committee to New London, Conn., where the
naval court of inquiry was scheduled to convene. The court of inquiry
did convene in New London on April 11 and then on April 13 moved
to the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, the design and construction yard
for the Thresher. The sessions continued at the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard until the court closed its inquiry on June 5, 1963. During
this 56-day period, the court heard testimony from 120 witnesses,
recorded 1,700 pages of testimony, and examined 255 exhibits.
Throughout the entire proceedings, most of which were behind closed
doors, the Joint Committee was represented through its staff who at-
tended as official observers.
At the conclusion of the proceedings, a copy of the 12-volume record
of the court, including its findings, opinions, and recommendations,
was made available to the Joint Committee. Not until the court had
officially completed its work, and after tiie court had submitted its
report to the Navy, did the Joint Committee hold its own hearings.
The committee did, however, receive regular progress reports from its
staff during the court proceedings.
It was my expressed belief, in consultation with other members of
the committee, that no outside investigation into the cause of the
tragedy should be conducted until the Department of the Navy had
been gjiven an opportunity to complete its investigation.1 Thereafter,
the Joint Committee held its hearings in two parts.
During the first part on June 26, 27, and July 23,1963, the commit-
tee received testimony in executive session from the Secretary of the
Navy, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logis-
tics) , the president of the court of inquiry, the Chief of the Bureau of
Ships, and senior naval officers of operating elements of our naval
submarine forces. During this initial phase, the committee received
information on the design, construction, operation, and maintenance
of nuclear submarines. Special emphasis was given to those elements
of design and construction which, based upon the testimony and evi-
dence obtained during the naval court of inquiry and the committee's
own interrogation of witnesses, were deficient and in need of corrective
action.
/See floor statement of Senator Pastore on April 22, 1963, p. 144.
VXt
FOREWORD
One year later, on July 1, 1964, the committee again received testi-
mony in executive session from the Office of the Secretary of the Navy
and senior naval officers responsible for the design, construction, and
operation of nuclear submarines in order to ascertain what actions
had been instituted to correct the acknowledged deficiencies that ex-
isted. U v ) : '^ v;';,d • • .
Although there has been much speculation as to the cause of the
Thresher loss, the committee must conclude from its own study of the
facts developed thait the! Specific catise is not khotm. It was imjportaiit,
therefore, that all aspects of the Thresher'sdesign, construction, and
operation be reviewed to uncover'whatever weaknesses may have ex-
isted at the time, whether or not they were the proximate cause of
the accident.
Investigations reveale'd that in parts of the ship, practices,1 condi-
tions, and standards existing at the time were short of those required
to insure safe operation of the TJvresher. Basically, the ship was built
to two standards. /The standards of design and construction for the
nuclear ppwerplant" were niore stringent than for the rest of the ship.
Of particular note is that the technical specification requirements were
not greatly different, but that adherenceto them was far more strict
for the nuclear powerplant than for the rest of the ship.
It is'also obvious that while nuclear power was revolutionizing the
submarine as a weapon's system during'the past 10 years, the more
conventional aspects of the submarine and its safety devices were not
keeping pace with the more stringent performance requirements of
greater endurance higher speed, and deeper submergence. For ex-
ample, the design and limited blowing capability of the deballasting
system which might have been adequate for the World War II and
•postwar conventional submarines were inadequate as an emergency
system for the larger, deeper diving j higher performance nuclear sub-
marines.Similarly the use;of the less costly method of joining metal
piping systems by brazing is questionable for hazardous salt water
lines subject to the tremendous pressures of deep-depth as compareid
to welding which is a more expensive and time-consuming'method.
Corrective 'action is now being taken by the Department of the Navy
in both of these areas.
It is extremely unfortunate that this tragedy had to occur to bring a
number of unsatisfactory conditions into the open. The committee is
favorably impressed, however^ with the scope of the Navy's planned
program to improve th'& quality and safety of new submarines and
those already in the fleet. The program to bring about the necessary
improvements is very costly arid will take much time to complete. It
now appears that the cost to upgrade our submarine program will be
greater than if at the outset the higher, standards' comparable to those
used in the nuclear powerplant had been adoptecl throughout the ship.
The lesson is obvious. There is no substitute for proper attention to
quality of material and workmanship in the first instance. The.'initial
extra costs which may be involved will eliminate much greater addi-
tional expense later on but much more importantly, it could mean the
saving of the lives of the men who man our submarines.
FOREWORD IX
For some time the Joint Committee has been concerned with the
problem of the lack of continuity of military personnel in the manage-
ment of highly technical programs. There is no doubt that a policy
which requires military officers to be transferred every 2 to 3 years
is not conducive to efficient technical management of complex tech-
nical projects which require periods of 6 or more years to complete.
For example, in the nuclear powerplant of the Thresher there was
a continuity of technical management; Admiral Bickover has been in
charge of the program from its inception. But in the nonnuclear parts
of the submarine there were so many changes of personnel in respon-
sible positions involved in the design and construction of the ship
that fixing individual responsibility is impossible. Unless there is
a drastic change in the present military technical management
concepts, whereby competent individuals will be assigned tech-
nical responsibility for time periods commensurate with the time
required to complete a technical project without adverse effect
on their promotion opportunities, the high standards of efficiency
and safety required will be most difficult to attain.
This committee, in light of its public safety responsibilities, has
voiced concern on many occasions about the pressures to reduce the
standards of selection and training that have been the hallmark of the
naval nuclear propulsion program. The Thresher's loss should re-
emphasize the need for continuing to uphold the high standards of
selection, training, qualification, and requalification which is one of the
keys to the long-term safety record in Admiral Eickover's program.
The committee reaffirms the position it has expressed previously
that there must be no relaxation of existing procedures used in
selecting, training, and assignment of nuclear propulsion per-
sonnel.
A number of the recommendations made by the court of inquiry
are still under study by the Navy Department. The Joint Committee
has requested the Navy Department to keep it informed regarding
future actions with respect to the recommendations which have been
made.
The hearings held by the Joint Committe, of necessity, had to be in
executive session because the testimony included classified defense
information. However, it has been the long-established policy of the
Joint Committee that it has a responsibility to make public as much
information as possible consistent with the national defense security
requirements of the United States. Accordingly, with the assistance
and cooperation of the Navy Department, the hearing records were
reviewed for classification and classified information deleted prior to
publication.
The committee hopes that these hearings will be carefully studied
by all who are engaged in military technical development, for they
contain many lessons for which we have already paid a high price.
If the lesson is learned that excellence in design, fabrication, opera-
tions, and training cannot be compromised in modern high perform-
ance military systems, the men of the Thresher will not have died in
vain.
JOHN O. PASTORE. Chairman.
December 1964
CONTENTS
(A short subject index will be found on p. 191)
Pan
Wednesday, June 26, 1963 1
Thursday, June 27, 1963 29
Tuesday, July 23, 1963 59
Wednesday, July 1, 1964 91
STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES
Atomic Energy Commission:
Barney, James T., Commissioner 88,90
Rickover, Vice Adm. Hyman G., Manager, Naval Reactors Branch,
Division of Reactor Development 60-90, 102, 105, 111, 122-131
Leighton, David T., Assistant Manager for Surface Ship Projects,
Naval Reactors Branch, Division of Reactor Development 77,81
Panoff, Robert, Assistant Manager for Submarine Projects, Naval Re-
actors Branch, Division of Reactor Development 64,82
Department of the Navy:
Austin, Vice Adm. Bernard L., president of the Naval War College, and
president of the court of inquiry on Thresher— 4-27
BeLieu, Kenneth E., Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Installations and
Logistics 120-131
Bishop, Capt. Charles, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (in
charge of technical information group of search effort) 39-40, 44, 54-57
Brockett, Rear Adm. William A., Chief, Bureau of Ships 8-27,
32-58,71-72, 82-83
Curtze, Rear Adm. C. A., Deputy Chief, Bureau of Ships 95-120, 124-126
Kern, Capt. D. H., Head of Submarine Branch, Bureau of Ships 109,112
Korth, Fred, Secretary of the Navy 2-9,
15, 26,30-32,40-42,48-58
Maurer, Rear Adm. John H., Director, Submarine Warfare Division,
Naval Operations 30-53
Ramage, Vice Adm. L. P., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Fleet
Operations and Readiness) 93-94,
105,109-110,116-117,121-123,130
Rickover, Vice Adm. Hyman G., Assistant Chief, Bureau of Ships
(Nuclear Propulsion) 60-4X),
102,105, 111, 122-131
Stephan, Rear Adm. Edward C., Oceanographer of the Navy (chair-
man of Deep Submergence Systems Review Group) 50-54
Wilkinson, Rear Adm. Eugene P., Director, Submarine Warfare, Office
of Chief of Naval Operations 124
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL INSERTED IN THE RECORD
List of submarine safety program tasks 99
Membership of the Submarine Safety Steering Task Group 97
Memorandum from Admiral Rickover dated February 13, 1962, on the
delay due to welding problems in the reactor plant systems of the
Tinosa 73
XI
XII CONTENTS
APPENDIXES
Appendix 1: Navy memorandum concerning submarine salt water piping
systems '. 133
Appendix 2: Navy memorandum concerning silver-brazed piping in U.S.S.
Thresher^.. 134
Appendix 3: "The Never-Ending Challenge," by Vice Adm. H. G. Rickover,
at the 44th Annual National Metal Congress,, October 29, 1962 136
Appendix 4: Statement by Senator John O. Pastore on the floor of the
Senate, April 22, 1963 144
Appendix 5: Correspondence concerning Join? Committee staff representa-
tion at the naval court of inquiry—-i-,-....,^-^--*,.. __^ r .___ 146
Appendix 6: Correspondence concerning findings of naval court of
inquiry _ -____^a^.__ fr 146
.Appendix 7: Correspondence concerning delay in schedule and loss of
radiographs of U.S.S. Tinosa . _____^^^, TT _ r . _,.,155
Appendix 8: Correspondence concerning classification of information relajtr,
<.v.ing to the loss of the U.S.S. Thresher- ____.^___-__ T .<__._'_ 109
Appendix 9: Correspondence concerning additional information," .requested
by Joint Committee. ___!' ___'___'1_1 ______'__1_1________: 166
Appendix 10: "The Need for a/High IQ t( Integrity-Quality)," remarks
by Rear Adm. Charles A. Curtze, Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Ships
at the Ninth Annual Gas Turbine Conference and Products Show, of
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, March 4, 1964 '__*„_ 169
Appendix 11: Floor statement by Congressman Chet Holifield in honor
of those who were lost in Thresher ' „_, r_ 173
Appendix 12: Memorandum concerning submarine safety steering task
group—— ----- ^____^___-______L__ __. ._„_____ 174
Appendix 13: Status of shipbuilding program for nuclear powered ships
'• .authorized by Congress __, , ' 175
Appendix 14: Eulogies placed in the Congressional Record, April 22, 1963,
by Senator John O. Pastore-., , . <, -^—, —— , 177
Appendix 15: Review of inspection procedures for HT-80 submarine hull
welds •___«. ^ „_ 183
Appendix 16: Photographs of Thresher debris __' '__,_i . 186
Appendix 17: Thresher (SS(N) 593) chronology ,_______,_ 189
[These hearings were held in executive session. Classified security
information was presented during the executive session. The
I hearing record was then reviewed and specific items designated
( ,by |he Pepartmentof Defense and Navy Department as being;
! classified informatiori!;were deleted prior to publication.]
LOSS OF THE U.S.S, "THRESHER"
Since the Navy has completed its investigation and the matter has
been reviewed within the Navy Department, I believe that now is
an appropriate time for the committee to hold this meeting. Our
meeting today, for the first time will give the committee an opportunity
to hear directly from the Navy on this tragedy.
In arranging for this meeting I thought it best not to specify any
g articular individual or individuals as witnesses, but rather permit the
ecretary of the Navy to bring with him whomever he wished. I
would hope from the distinguished group of officers that Mr. Korth
has with him, the committee will be able to receive a very thorough re-
view of this matter.
In addition to the information developed by the court of inquiry,
we hope we will receive whatever information was developed sub-
sequently by the Navy. I also hope Navy representatives will be pre-
pared to advise us on what actions have been or are being taken to
assure that there will not be another tragedy.
Now before I begin, I would like to mention that in addition to the
Joint Committee staff, Mr. Ben Grilleas, from the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Preparedness Subcommittee is also present in accordance with pre-
vious discussions I have had with Senator Stennis. Senator Stennis
addressed himself to the Navy Department, saying that he wanted a
report and at that time the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed
Services Committee would decide what they would do. I had a talk
with Mr. Stennis last week, and I invited him to participate with us
in a joint hearing if that were necessary, and he was very gracious
about it, and he said that he would think that over but that in all
probability he would either assign several members of his committee
to come to these hearings ex officio, or that he would send a member
of the staff.
I am glad to see that he has sent a member of the staff. I want the
staff member to know that these are highly classified hearings and that
I am glad to see that he has top secret and "Q" clearances so that there
is no question at all about security. I want to welcome him here, and
he can sit forward with us, in one of the chairs here, and make himself
as comfortable as possible.
Mr. Korth, I leave it up to you to address yourself to this committee
in any way you think is proper.
STATEMENTS OF HON. FRED KORTH, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY;
VICE ADM. BERNARD L. AUSTIN, PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE AND PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY ON
"THRESHER"; AND REAR ADM. WILLIAM A. BROCKETT, CHIEF OF
THE BUREAU OF SHIPS
Secretary KORTH. At the outset, let me say to you and to the members
of the Joint Committee that I am very pleased that you have asked me
to be present with you here today to discuss the findings of the court of
inquiry, which looked into the circumstances surrounding the loss at
sea of the U.S.S. Thresher. It may be helpful to you if I indicate some
discussions which I have already had on this matter, and some of the
actions, which are already underway as a result of this unfortunate in-
cident.
I have, as a matter of highest priority, directed the Chief of Naval
Operations to prepare a plan for establishment of a submarine safety
LOSS OF THE TJ.S.S. "THRESHER" 3
But with that one limitation, we tried diligently, and I think suc-
ceeded fairly well in having as much open hearings as possible, be-
cause we realized there was much interest hi this tragedy and that if
we couldn't have a reasonable amount of the hearings in open court,
it would cause the people of our country, and the press in particular,
to feel that there was something that was being kept from them which
they should know about. >
I can assure you and the committee, sir, that this court sought the
truth, the whole truth, and without any concern as to where the
chips might fall. I hope tHat the recommendations of this court will
accomplish what we hoped they would, and that is to make it safer
to operate the submarines we already have built and to build greater
safety into those yet to be built.
I would be happy to answer any questions which the committee
might wish to address to me.
Chairman PASTORE. Before you do, I would like to address myself
to the Secretary.
This group that you are assembling to report on October 1, what
will be their function?
DEEP SUBMERGENCE SYSTEMS GROUP
you would expect him to stay with her from the day she begins until
the day she completes. But occasionally there are things that upset
the applecart. There are resignations and there are just distributions
of shortages, as it were, and although I don't have the details on
this case——
Kepresentative HOLIFIELD. May I give them to you? There was a
change in the Threshers assistant ship's superintendent in November
of 1962, and a change in the Thresher's chief superintendent in De-
cember of 1962. And in January of 1963 there was a change of the
Threshers chief executive officer and in the same month there was
a change of the Thresher's commanding officer.
So there in a period of less than 90 days, four of your top people
on this job were removed and this was during the time when as we
understand it, when the submarine was in overhaul and where it
would seem like to me the continuity of superintendents should have
remained in the same people.
Admiral BROCKETT. I knew about the cases of the people being
transferred but I have not developed, just having gotten access to
some of the material, why it happened insofar as the shipyard was
concerned.
I do know where these changes normally start from. Let us assume
that there is a death or resignation. The latter is our biggest problem
at the moment.
Representative HOLIFIELD. On the face of it, if I was doing a com-
plicated job of construction I wouldn't want the four top men to be
pulled out of it, and four strangers come into it to take on a job
without a complete transfer of the background of experience and
knowledge of those four men. It just looks to me—and I think it is
probably a fault of the system which requires rotation, rather than
continuity—as if this is a weak point.
Admiral BROCKETT. I would agree.
Secretary KORTH. I agree.
Chairman PASTORE. May I ask Admiral Austin, did the court place
any emphasis upon this incident that we are discussing now, with
relation to what the causes might have been?
Admiral AUSTIN. Mr. Chairman, we placed sufficient emphasis on
it to pull it out of 1,700 pages of testimony and make it one of those
166 facts. We did not feel that it warranted an opinion on our part.
We felt that the facts spoke for themselves.
Representative, HOLIFIELD. I don't quite follow you on that, Ad-
miral. It is either important enough, it seems to me, to require a
recommendation of a change or it is unimportant. I am not comper
tent to judge as to whether it is important or not.
Secretary KORTH. It is important enough for me to now look into
this sufficiently.
Representative HOLIPIELD. Maybe I am in error. In opinion 53
of the court record, it says that:
A substantially contemporaneous transfer of Thresher's commanding officer
and executive officer and ship's superintendent and assistant ship's superin-
tendent in the final stages, was not conducive to optimum completion of the
work undertaken*
So apparently you have rendered an opinion on that.
Admiral AUSTIN. I stand corrected. =
10 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
was not available for questioning, sir, and we could not ask him
whether or not he considered this a dangerous thing.
Chairman PASTORE. I am talking about the commandant of the
yard who passed upon this.
Admiral AUSTIN. We did question him, sir, and he, in retrospect, ad-
mitted that he thought he should have looked into this more thor-
oughly, but at the time he did not consider it a dangerous situation.
They were trying to meet a deadline date for the completion of the
ship's availability, and to have gone further with the testing would
have required unlagging of piping and delaying the ship and run-
ning up the cost of the overhaul and, you know, the many attendant
things when you delay the ship.
Chairman PASTORS. Are the procedures of the Navy such that this
man could make the final determination, and he could pass on the final
judgment without consulting with the Bureau of Ships ? Is that the
procedure, and could he make that final determination?
Admiral BROCKETT. In the normal course of events we expect our
people in the field to make decisions affecting the work that is in
process in their shipyards. Again, the 20-20 hindsight on this is that
it should probably not have been done and it should have been reported
up the line.
Representative HOLIFIELD. Was not this known at the Bureau of
Ships?
Admiral BROCKETT. It was not known——
Representative HOLHTELD. Were there any telephone conver-
sations ?
Admiral BROCKETT. This is what I don't know, Mr. Holifield, or at
least it didn't come to my attention. I was in a position not as the
Chief of the Bureau of Ships, but I was one notch farther down the
line, in the chain in which this information would have come.
Representative HOLIFIELD. Understand I am not trying to be a
Monday morning quarterback.
Admiral BROCKETT. I was closer to it in November last than I am
now, by one notch.
INADEQUATE PIPING INSPECTION
Representative HOLIFIELD. I notice that opinions 18, 21, and 22 state
very plainly that the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard did not aggres-
sively pursue the ultrasonic inspection of silver brazed joints as re-
quired by the Bureau of Ships letter of August 28,1962, exhibit 115.
The deputy commander of the submarine force, did not aggressively
pursue the ultrasonic inspection, nor did the commanding officer of
the Thresher; 21, that the management of the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard did not exercise good judgment in determining not to unlag
pipes in order to continue the directed ultrasonic tests directed, after
November 1962. That the Bureau of Ships improvement and cor-
rective action regarding the silver brazed problem were not applied at
the Bureau level or in the field with sufficient vigor, and then it con-
tinues along that line.
I refer back to the letter of August 28, 1962, which required ultra-
sonic inspections, and I am still unclear in my mind as to why the
requirement was not continued after the first of December or there-
abouts, and if this was a Bureau of Ships letter, what was the final
determination, the response to that letter. (See app. 2, p. 134.) Was
there a report required or not ?
18 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
Eepresentative BATES. How long do you think that will take, Ad-
miral?
Admiral BROCKETT. We haven't programed it yet, in the sense of
setting dates on it. We are considering different ships, now, as they
come up, and what has to be done to them before we want them to go
to sea below restricted depths. We are being conservative as you might
expect.
REINSPECTION OF EXISTING SUBMARINES
Representative BATES. This means then unlagging and checking all
points?
Admiral BROCKETT. This means going through the entire ship in
essence on this point.
The program is underway right now, and there has been quite a bit
of work done already.
Eepresentative BATES. Might I ask one question there ?
In reference to the commanding officer who was advised as to this
condition, what is the source of that information ?
Admiral AUSTIN. There was a documentary proof of that. He got
a copy of the report which was submitted by the quality assurance
people in the Portsmouth Naval Yard, asking for a decision and re-
porting what they had done and asking for a decision as to whether
or not they should unlag and continue, and he got a copy of that.
Eepresentative WESTLAND. You are speaking of Harvey when you
say the commanding officer?
Admiral AUSTIN. No, sir; this was Axene, then, at the time the
memo was written. Now, whether or not Harvey actually saw that
or not, I don't know, sir. But Axene was the commanding officer at
the time that memorandum was written from the quality assurance
division of the yard to the production or design department asking
for this proceeding.
Eepresentative WESTLAND. So you do not know whether or not Har-
vey knew that there was this 14-percent deficiency as a result of your
tests?
Admiral AUSTIN. It is difficult to determine what he did know, sir.
Eepresentative HOLIFIELD. Now, I might recall in relation to your
question on page 18, of the classified section, where it says:
The commanding officer, Axene, evaluation of the first year of operations con-
tained in his letter, serial No. 16 November 1962, called Thresher the best
ASW submarine afloat today.
FLOODING DANGER IN "THRESHER" POINTED OUT
In pointing out Thresher's deficiencies, he highlighted her over-
complexity in certain areas [classified matter deleted] and the vulner-
ability of her auxiliary seawater system. •;-•'• , f
He stated:
In my opinion the most dangerous condition that exists in Thresher is the
danger of salt water flooding while at or near test depth.
Now, he gave this report as he was leaving and as Harvey was his
replacement, Harvey must have known about this; did he not?
Admiral AUSTIN. It would be presumed, Mr. Chairman, that he
did know about it, but, of course, we can't be certain.
Eepresentative HOLIFIELD. You cannot be sure. Then in the Bureau
of Ships August letter (see app. 2, p. 134) as to the instructions—you
said that the intent of the Bureau is that the inspection directed by
this letter shall serve as a pilot test of silver-brazed piping inspection
LOSS OF THE TJ.S.S. '"THKESHER" 21
Representative HOSMER. And you are working out on the new ships,
and you are taking it out ?
Admiral BROCKETT. Not necessarily; this is a recommendation of
the court. We have another design group which was mentioned also
working on this. My personal inclination, although I don't have all
of the technical facts, is to weld whenever we can.
Representative HOSMER. Is there any thought of redesigning the
whole system and cutting some of this piping out ?
Admiral BROCKETT. This has been done, and as a matter of fact on
the ships that are in the 1963 program, there has been development of
those plans to eliminate joints. One of the best ways to have a good
joint is not to have any at all. So efforts have been bent in this
direction.
Representative HOSMER. Was that before this event ?
Admiral BROCKETT. This design is 2 years old.
Representative HOSMER. And in other words, it was recognized that
these joints were something desirable to get rid of ?
Admiral BROCKETT. In any system, get rid of the joints.
Representative HOSMER. And to work out a design that would cure
it.
Admiral BROCKETT. That is correct.
24 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER'^
.Mr. CONWAY. I would like for the record to go back to the point
about the yard submitting its report on the silver brazing after the
loss of the Thresher, which you mentioned was in response from: a jig
of the Bureau of Ships. I think that if you will check the record^ the
jig from the Bureau of Ships went out 2 days after the Thresher, was
lost, April 12, so that the jig did come but not until after the Thresher
had been lost.
Admiral BROCKETT. If I may comment on our mail system, it was
probably written a week before.
PREVIOUS SUBMARINE CASUALTIES
[classified matter deleted] built on the same basic design as the earlier
nuclears [classified matter deleted].
MORALE EFFECTS
So there are two things. One is how fast does the water come in
through a leak, and how fast can you blow out your ballast tanks.
In both cases, they are working against you as you go deepier.
But if you come up [classified matter deleted] you do get an assur-
ance factor [classified matter deleted]. Although I haven't seen the
calculations I will estimate that with the size which the court of inquiry
mentions [classified matter deleted] that recovery of the ship might
well have been possible [classified matter deleted].
Senator ATKEN. Thank you.
Chairman PASTORE. Could you give us the factor of the freeze ele-
ment with reference to deballasting [classified matter deleted] ? l
Admiral BROCKETT. That would be substantially the same, the pos-
sibilities of this happening.
Chairman PASTORE. Two to one?
Admiral BROCKETT. No, because you get this drop in temperature
immediately when your upstream pressure is two times or more greater
than your downstream. You reach a so-called critical flow situation,
your temperature drops down well below freezing. Depth is not
significant insofar as freezeup is concerned.
Chairman PASTORE. Have we ever had trials before with relation to
deballasting at those depths ? That is, actual experiments ?
Admiral BROCKETT. What has actually been done in the past under
testing conditions is to demonstrate that you can in fact blow, but
it is not carried through to the exhaustion of the air banks or the
complete deballasting of the tanks. Specifications in this respect, as I
answered Senator Jackson's question the other day were really those
which have been carried through from World War II insofar as the
amount of air that you carried which was the primary thing addressed
by the specifications.
Representative HOSMER. May I ask, Mr. Chairman, why hasn't there
been an increase in deballasting capability, considering these depths
and so forth?
Are you just going on the theory that you are going to ride the
thing through on power and planes ?
Admiral BROCKETT. The dynamics of the situation are important,
and in the normal course of events—and I think you can check me on
1
Subsequent to the lose of Thresher, dqckside tests were conducted of an identical high-
pressure air system aboard the Tinosa, sister ship to Thresher. The Tinosa was nearing
completion at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The purpose of the high-pressure air
system is to provide air in order to displace water from the ship's ballast tanks thereby
increasing buoyancy. During the tests, ice formed on the screen-type wire strainers in
the air piping system cutting off air flow to the ballast tanks. Also see pp. 35, 37, 108,
and 112.
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 33
this—if you do get in trouble you want to have way on and you get
much faster reaction from your planes and get out of trouble, as it were,
in a hurry.
Secretary KORTH. I think Admiral Maurer should speak to that as
an operator.
REQUIREMENT FOR HIGH SPEED DURING TESTS
Representative HOSMER. As I understand it, the policy is not to
keep very much on during the tests.
Admiral MAURER. Doing that is an error in judgment on the part of
the operators. Most of these commanding officers of these high-speed
ships feel that their primary ability to recover lies in the fact that they
have this tremendous power available.
I think that this tragedy has emphasized the absolute requirement
that we either have it or we have the ability to recover from it as soon
as possible. [Classified matter deleted.]
Representative HOSMER. I was speaking as a matter of routine dur-
ing tests.
As I understand it the operational instructions were to proceed at a
very slow speed, maybe 3 knots or something.
Admiral MAURER. This was not specified, no, sir.
Representative HOSMER. That was the skipper's discretion.
Admiral MAURER. At the commanding officer's discretion. Unfor-
tunately, as a result of this it has come out—and that is one of the
things that has already been passed out to the forces afloat. [Classified
matter deleted.]
There is always a balance in this situation [classified matter deleted].
The commanding officer has weighed the two situations and has usually
come up with some sort of compromise. [Classified matter deleted.]
ADVANTAGES OF OPERATING AT DEPTH
Chairman PASTORE. Mr.Morris?
Representative MORRIS. What are the advantages of operating at
various depths?
Admiral MAURER. There is an offensive advantage in that you are in
a position to take advantage of sound channels within the ocean spec-
trum. It could well be that [classified matter deleted] that you would
have a layer which is a dividing line between waters of different den-
sities and different sonar propagation characteristics. So if you were
below the [classified matter deleted] position you would not hear a
target.
Or if you were above it, you would. The vagaries of the ocean are
such that if you have the ability to go above or below these separations
in the ocean spectrum, you can select at will, you can conduct a much
more effective search for targets.
Contrariwise, it is of tremendous value from a defensive standpoint
in that the destroyer types that might be seeking you out or enemy
submarines that might be seeking you out would be above that layer
and you could be below it, you would be much less susceptible to
detection, also. [Classified matter deleted.]
There is the added advantage if the ship is constructed for a [classi-
fied matter deleted] test depth in the intermediate range you have
a tremendous strength factor from the point of view of damage
control. I think these, in general, are the advantages. [Classi-
fied matter deleted.]
Can you think of any others that would be pertinent ?
34 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
hazard, it seems, with only the power that you had [classified matter
deleted]. The thing that looks funny to me as a layman is this:
There are two. One is, that you put in reducers, which in itself could
be a factor of trouble. I can't see why you went to a high pressure and
then used it at a lower pressure unless you wanted a longer blow. Yet
you never exhausted the time period of a [classified matter deleted]
blow in tests.
I don't understand those things.
Admiral BROCKETT. Two reasons. At the same volume you can get
more air [classified matter deleted] if you follow me. You have more
pounds of air in your system in the same size bottles.
Representative HOLIFIELD. I understand.
Admiral BROCKETT. Space is something you are always looking for.
Secondly, the [classified matter deleted] criteria was something that
had been carried on, granted, from the other boats. But, as I recall,
the question of the ability of the ballast tanks to take the sudden
[classified matter deleted] air pressure is a design problem which we
are now thrashing with because we want to bypass that reducer.
But we are not quite ready to do it until we are sure we can make
the ballast tank structure itself strong enough to take that immediate
application [classified matter deleted] of pressure. It can be dissipated
some, but these are still things we are looking at.
[Classified matter deleted.]
TESTING OF AIR REDUCER VALVES
Representative BATES. Didn't you ever test these reducer valves for
the higher pressure ? Weren't those ever tested, or did you presume
originally that you had a maximum considerably in excess of the
design ?
Admiral BROCKETT. I fell off the track.
Representative BATES. You used the same valves [classified matter
deleted] ?
Admiral BROCKETT. Downstream from your reducer.
Representative BATES. The same ones ?
Admiral BROCKETT. That is right.
Representative BATES. Did you ever make that test to see whether
or not they were adapted to the greater pressure ?
Senator BENNETT. They had a reducer between them ?
Admiral BROCKETT. It was [classified matter deleted] downstream
from the reducer. The reducer is the first thing you see. Down-
stream from it [classified matted deleted].
Representative BATES. I am talking about the valve itself. Did you
use the same valves to reduce this pressure ?
Admiral BROCKETT. No.
Representative BATES. They are different valves ?
Admiral BROCKETT. It is a different valve [classified matter de-
leted].
Representative BATES. I thought somebody said the other day it was
the same one.
Mr. CONWAT. Downstream they are the same valves.
Representative BATES. The pressure is the same. I thought you
meant the initial ones.
LOSS OF THE TT.S.S. "THRESHER" 37
Mr. CONWAY. Apropos of Mr. Bates' question, did you ever check
these Marotta reducing valves to see whether they could handle the
full load [classified matter deleted] with a full tank. Were they ever
fully checked out ? I refer to the ones that froze up.
Representative BATES. These are the ones I am talking about.
Mr. CONWAY. I know.
Admiral BROCKETT. Yes, that is the Marotta reducers. From my
own knowledge, I don't know.
Mr. CONWAY. I gather from the testimony of the court they never
did.
Admiral BROCKETT. This is my impression, too. But from my own
knowledge that I cannot—I can quote here, I don't know.
TESTING OF SLOWDOWN ON OTHER CLASSES OP SUBMARINES
Chairman PASTORE. What have we done on the remaining fleet afloat
[classified matter deleted] ? Are we safe with regard to all of them ?
Admiral BROCKETT. In regard to the blow, Senator ?
Chairman PASTORE. Yes.
Admiral BROCKETT. Yes. We have gotten rid of the strainers and
we have run several time tests alongside the dock and this would indi-
cate whether or not there is a f reezeup. The opposing pressure merely
means that you equalize earlier.
It is a more stringent test in a sense so far as freezing is concerned
to dump your banks at the surface because your opposing pressure is
less.
Consequently, you bleed further down. With the system clean and
with the strainers out, this has worked out and we have a complex of
data on this. We have had it all come in by message and are assem-
bling it. The last one I saw was within the specifications.
Chairman PASTORE. Has any test been made at depth to blow it out
completely since the disaster ?
Admiral BROCKETT. Not that I know of, sir.
Chairman PASTORE. Why not ? Don't you think that would be the
best criteria ?
Admiral BROCKETT. I am not sure.
Chairman PASTORE. We may be confronted with another incident.
I am wondering now with all of these submarines afloat with a limi-
tation [classified matter deleted] why we don't get an actual test on
this blow [classified matter deleted].
Admiral MAURER. Mr. Senator, if I may speak to that, sir, we have
had ships [classified matter deleted] prior to the time of this incident
that blew their tanks dry—completely dry—[classified matter de-
leted].
Chairman PASTORE. Without trouble ?
Admiral MAURER. Without trouble; yes, sir.
Kepresentative HOLIFIELD. That is what we have been trying to find
out.
Representative BATES. That is the first I have heard that.
Chairman PASTORE. With or without the filters ?
Admiral MAURER. That was with the strainers; yes, sir.
Representative HOLIFIELD. And they didn't freeze up ? (See pp. 32,
35,108, and 112.)
Admiral MAURER. No, sir.
34-920—65 • • A
38 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
Our basic training when we get in trouble is first speed, then angle,
and then ballasting. I think our primary reliance has been, and I
think this covers the nuclear submarines as the older ones, when you
get in trouble, the first thing you crank up speed, get an up angle on
the boat and deballast.
Mr. CONWAY. The ballast system is the most critical emergency sys-
tem? If it is that much of an emergency system, the question would
be, Why hasn't it been tested ? It is the most emergency system you
apparently have.
COMMANDING OFFICER OF "SKYLARK"
vinced yet because I have not acquired all the information as to how
good a silver-brazed joint is, and what the significance of 60 percent
is. I know this is a lot better than 10 percent.
Mr. CONWAY. Another recommendation is that for new construc-
tion submarines welded piping joints be specified for joints of more
than 2 inches in inside diameter in hazardous systems. This was
another recommendation. This also has not been adopted ?
Admiral BROCKETT. It has not been implemented; no, sir.
Chairman PASTORE. Are there any other questions ?
POSSIBILITY OF RADIATION RELEASE
build in enough safety in these ships so that you can make them com-
pletely foolproof. But we can build these ships so that if the com-
manding officer and the crew react properly and in the most timely
fashion that they will be able to recover from almost any casualty that
might take place.
SUBMARINE SAFETY TASK GROUP
Chairman PASTORE. What are we doing now, and what have we
done since the time of the disaster to assure ourselves that the work
at these shipyards is satisfactory ?
Admiral BROCKETT. First of all, there have been developments, as
I mentioned, in several areas. If I might, Mr. Chairman, I again
mention the submarines' steering safety task group, which has been set
up in the Bureau of Ships. I would like to read you the projects that
we have. These are broad categorical titles, and under each one of
these there are a series of tasks. I think it might help to bring to-
gether some of the questions that have been asked about various things
in the submarines.
I will address myself to your question directly as I get toward the
end of this list:
Task No. 1 is the sea water system subjected to submergence pressure.
[Classified matter deleted.]
No. 2. Fabrication methods, materials, and test procedures for haz-
ardous piping systems. This is not only salt water, but high pressure
air and hydraulic systems.
No. 3. Machinery components in hazardous sea water systems.
These are your condenser heads, for instance, your salt water pumps
that see sea pressure.
No. 4. The mandatory use of class plans and components in vital
systems. This is an argument with the shipbuilders. We feel once we
draw a set of plans, they should be followed across the board by every-
body.
No. 5. High pressure air systems which include the question of
blow rate and air capacity.
No. 6. Submarine readiness for builders and sea trials. This is to
have a certification that they are ready to go.
No. 7. Protection from sea water of electrical systems.
' No 8. Submarine pressure structure penetration, a review of this.
We think we are all right, but we have to take a look at it as well.
No. 9. Consolidation of information for damage control sections of
the ship's information book, so that the ship has a ready place to
find the various methods of operation and what to do if a particular
casualty happens.
No. 10. Ship control system. This is the question of the planes.
No. 11. Habitability versus safety. In making the ships nice to live
on, have we possibly introduced some things which are not good from
a damage control standpoint. Access to control valves, for instance,
those that are not normally used, but you might want to get to them
in a hurry.
No. 12. A submarine test tank. This is a proposal which is quite
interesting. It seems a little far out when you first look at it. That
was my first reaction. The more I read it, the better I liked it. This is
the idea of having a tank which can pressurize, put a full-sized
submarine in, and put on the pressure to see what you have.
46 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
And finally, the submarine safety program task to revise and in-
stitute an expanded quality assurance program. One of the things
that we find is no matter how many pieces of paper we produce in
Washington, you do not always find they are observed in the field.
As a result, we are sending out audit teams to find out how well the in-
structions are being carried out. Our first team is at Ingalls right
now.
This quality control problem is a difficult one. If I can philosophize
on that, the pride of workmanship of the individual mechanic is not
enough even where it exists. It is too bad, but it is so. We have the
hardest time trying to convince people of this fact. I knew it took
me a long time to believe it, and I finally became convinced of it about
4 years ago. You talk to shipbuilders and you get their pride of
workmanship routine. Then you can go around and point out to them
some things which certainly warrant improvement. It is a difficult
thing to sell. You have to have it, and you have to have an active
program of inspection. Quality control of material, and audit to
make sure that those who are supposed to be assuring the quality are
in fact doing it, this is our attack.
Representative BATES. That is what these two fellows were telling
me in Portsmouth. We tell everybody but they don't care. We have
some pride in our work, but they don't care. The more I hear about
this, the more I think these fellows have something.
Chairman PASTORE. Who doesn't care?
Representative BATES. The man they reported to.
Chairman PASTORE. They did not mean the Navy ?
Representative BATES. The same as what the admiral is saying.
Here they have some pride in their work, realization that they are going
to sea. This is what they told me in 1960. Here is the admiral saying
the same thing. They don't care up there. Let it go.
Representative HOLIFIELD. This is happening throughout America
in our industrial plants as we mechanize and automate. The pride of
craftsmanship of the old trained artisan is gone. The young men are
not going into these difficult artisan craftsmanship jobs to learn. They
don't have to. They join a union, and if they stay there so long some-
how or other they get stepped up and they get to the point where they
are drawing journeymen's wages without the skills they had in the old
days. We might as well face it. I don't know what the fault is. May-
be it is the fault of our civilization. I find that in my own business in
California. I hire a man and pay him top wages, and I don't get the
resultant craftsmanship.
Admiral BROCKETT. I want to make this clear. This is not a ship-
yard phenomenon. This is a national phenomenon.
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 47
Mr. CONWAY. Does this mean that all of your submarines that you
have worked prior hereto will have to be rechecked under these new
procedures?
Admiral BROCKETT. We will have to go back through and our aim
is the ability to certify that a particular system is ready to go to sea
[classified matter deleted]. For the moment we are going to have to
say this system has been checked [classified matter deleted]. Then
what we hope to do in connection with the studies being made on flood-
ing rates and the modification to the blow systems, which are being
made, is to certify this ship is good for x number of feet [classified
matter deleted]. We are going to have to work our way back to test
depth.
Representative HOSMER. I wonder if Admiral Stephan wishes to
speak?
Secretary KORTH. I was going to say that at some appropriate point,
I would like Admiral Stephan to make a few brief remarks here, and
subject himself to such questions as you may have.
Chairman PASTORE. Are you through with these gentlemen ?
TJSE OF COMMUNICATIONS RECORDERS
FIGURE 1A
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 53
FIGURE 2A
RepresentativeHOLIFIEIJX What?
Captain BISHOP. O rings. They are gaskets that are used in sub-
marine hydraulic piping. These were retrieved from the ocean floor
in the area in which we believe Thresher lies. There are three dif-
ferent types of O rings in that group, and all three of these types of
O rings were known to have been in the spare parts kit aboard the
Thresher. Two of the types were also common to other types of
ships. So this is not positive proof that these came from Thresher,
but it is a very high confidence level.
The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard people and the supply people have
all verified that these were in fact the type carried in the Thresher.
One other piece of positive evidence which I did not bring with me
which is fragile in nature is a piece of submarine battery grid which is
about the size of my hand, and badly banged up. This has been
identified through chemical analysis as having the same chemical con-
stituents as the battery grids of nuclear submarines, which are differ-
ent from the battery grids of the diesel boats or from regular commer-
cial batteries. They are peculiar to nuclear submarines. The Exide
battery representative has measured the geometry of the grid and
identified it as one from the Thresher. (See fig. 3A, p. 56.)
56 LOSS OF THE TJ.S.S. "THRESHER"
FIGUEE 3A
This has been reported to the board of inquiry as evidence as coming
from the Thresher. These articles were all found in the area in which
the Trieste is now diving.
RADIOACTIVITY SURVEY
area. There has not been a complete survey throughout the whole
area yet. In other words, samples have been taken as a spot check.
There have been bottom cores taken in various places throughout the
area, and the mud has been analyzed, and just background radioac-
tivity was present.
The Trieste has aboard her three separate radioactivity measuring
instruments so that if she does in fact locate the hull or a major part
of the hull of the Thresher, she should be able to determine whether
there is any radioactive effluent from it.
Representative BATES. How close does she have to be to get a
reading ?
Captain BISHOP. This depends on the strength of what is coming
out, and whether the reactor compartment is open. If the reactor
capsule is intact, she practically has to hit it to get a reading.
Representative BATES. Is there such a possibility ?
Captain BISHOP. I believe so.
Secretary KORTH. Possibility of what ?
Captain BISHOP. That the reactor is still intact.
Secretary KORTH. Absolutely. Certainly Admiral Rickover thinks
so.
Captain BISHOP. The major capsule in which the reactor is located,
the core itself, if it did not shatter on impact with the bottom.
Representative BATES. Still, if all the piping is banged away, you
would be getting water contaminated in the area.
Captain BISHOP. You would expect there would be some, yes, sir.
Chairman PASTORE. Are there any further questions ?
LOCATION OF "THRESHER"
Representative HOSMER. I would like to ask this: It seemed every-
body figured they would find the ship within a couple of weeks at
least. It is a great big hunk of iron. How do you explain the vast
difficulties that have been encountered in locating it ? I hear so many
things about locating nuclear explosions in Russia and so forth.
Captain BISHOP. If you like, I can run through the operation to date
to give you a feel for what the problem is.
Representative HOSMER. I didn't mean the technical question. I
meant a short feel for the thing.
Secretary KORTH. I will say this. I will stick my neck out a little
bit, because I have confidence in the people I have talked with. I am
confident that we are going to find the Thresher.
Representative MORRIS. What are you going to have after you find
it?
Secretary KORTH. We are not going to have very much.
Representative MORRIS. What are you going to prove after you
find her?
Secretary KORTH. I think we have to find her.
Representative MORRIS. What advantage can you possibly get
from it after you find it? No question but what it is lost.
Secretary KORTH. You might be able to get some indication of
where the implosion occurred which might in turn indicate to you
where the flooding was. These are all possibilities or "mights."
Chairman PASTORE. Unless, gentlemen, there are any more ques-
tions, I want to thank these gentlemen for coming. We are going to
explore this further, but I don't think we are going to bring you up
as a group. With your kind permission, we would like to call on any
58 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
t
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
subject to some correction. But these are only symptoms; they are not
the problems themselves. We must beware that not only the symptoms
are treated; we must be sure to recognize and treat the disease itself.
If we are to glean every iota of experience from the loss of the Thresher
these symptoms must be traced back to their causes. It was to this
course of action I hoped the court would address itself. In my testi-
mony I made points which, had they been followed persistently, would,
I believe, have uncovered the basic underlying weaknesses in our ship
design and construction.
TESTIMONY BEFORE COURT OF INQUIRY
In the Thresher, this work was all completed before she last went to sea.
The operating forces have also been concerned over failures in submarine
sea water systems. The deputy commander, submarines, Atlantic Fleet, sent
a message to the Bureau of Ships in September of 1961, with copies to the Chief
of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, and com-
manders of the Atlantic and Pacific submarine forces. The subject was "Sub-
marines salt water piping systems." (See app. 1, p. 133.) This message referred
to several submarine flooding incidents of 1960 and 1961, and said in part:
"Recent instances of flooding in submarines because of defective sea water
piping or flexible hoses, are cause for grave concern. We have been fortunate
thus far in that casualties have been handled promptly and correctly, and that,
except in one case [classified matter deleted] electrical apparatus has not been
involved. Continued dependence upon such tenuous and unfortunate circum-
stances, particularly when considering additional hazards imposed under war-
time conditions, is obviously unacceptable. It is considered that urgency of
problem and inherent danger of disaster must be brought more forcibly to the
attention of all concerned, and that corrective preventive action must be pursued,
even more aggressivly than has been done * * *."
I do not know what action is planned for silver-brazed joints in systems not
under my cognizance. I do know, however, that inspection of a small percentage
of these silver-brazed joints in several operating nuclear submarines, built by
different yards, has shown a number of them to be defective. For example, last
week a survey of but 36 silver-brazed joints in one submarine revealed that
7 joints had less than 40 percent bond. Two of these [classified matter deleted]
joints had 10 percent bond or less * * *.
I have just learned that during the recent stay of Thresher at Portsmouth
about 5 percent of her silver-brazed joints were ultrasonically inspected. These
joints were in critical piping systems, 2-inch diameter or larger. The inspection
revealed that about 10 percent of those checked required repair or replacement.
If the quality of the joints so inspected was representative of all the Thresher's
silver-brazed joints this means that the ship had several hundred substandard
joints when she last went to sea.
Representative HOLIFIELD. Our figure on this is 14 percent.
Admiral RICKOVER. The figures may have changed because more ac-
curate information has been made available. I am merely pointing out
a principle, sir. Not only on this ship but on other ships they would
test a sample. They would find a percentage wrong in a sample. Then
they would only repair those they found wrong in that sample. That
is the point I am trying to make here. You may be quite right about
the actual percentage.
Senator ANDERSON. One percent is high. Wouldn't you say even if
1 percent is wrong that you ought to go over the rest of the ship and
see how many j oints were defective ?
Representative HOLIFIELD. What is being done on the Tinosaf
Admiral RICKOVER. I believe a great deal is being done.
Admiral Brockett, who recently became Chief of the Bureau, is
handling this. He is requiring ultrasonic testing of silver-brazed
joints.
Representative HOLIFIELD. What is happening with the sister ship,
Tinosa?
AVAILABILITY OF WELD RADIOGRAPHS
Admiral RICKOVER. I think on that ship they have found that they
didn't have all the radiographs of the hull welds so they have had to
go back and do a lot of reradiographing. The Thresher has forcibly
pointed up a large number of inadequacies which the Navy is at-
tempting to correct. You can't take a ship, however, that is already
designed and built and correct everything on it. You can't do that.
You have to do all you reasonably can. You have to weigh the need
of the ship as compared to what you have to do on it. If I were in
the top position, I would do what I possibly could and then send
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHEH" 69
were merely a goal to shoot for, and did not need to be taken literally. This
was aggravated by the opinion, also prevalent, that the quality of welding and
inspection required by the specifications was unnecessarily stringent. There-
fore, in order to insure satisfactory welding in areas under my cognizance, I
found it necessary to set up my own welding and radiography inspection teams.
These teams audited all yards doing nuclear work, to determine if our specifica-
tions were being complied with. Weaknesses and noncompliance were found in
practically all yards, although some yards were better than others. Defective
welds, poor radiography and incomplete inspection records were typical.
Following such inspection the management of the shipyard and the Chief of the
Bureau of Ships were advised of the deficiencies found. I took corrective action
for work in my areas.
Kepresentative MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have one question.
You state, "Defective welds, poor radiography and incomplete in-
spection records were typical." Does that mean they were the rule
rather than the exception ?
Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, they were the rule. Shortly after the war
we took in some of the subs we used in the Pacific and took off the
superstructures. Lo and behold, people wondered how those ships
could have stayed alive with some of the welding they found in the
hull. It is my considered opinion that some of the subs we lost during
the war by depth charges was because they had defective welding. I
think they just couldn't take it. Of course we don't know what really
happened since the ships did not come back. What I say is from what
I have seen and what I have learned. It shows that in a submarine
you can't afford to have defects of design and workmanship any more
than you can afford them in an airplane.
We found poor workmanship all over. I actually had to start
teaching people in the shipyards how to read the radiographs. I
worked for 2 years with the manufacturers and the shipyards and got
up new specifications on how to read them. There was no common
standard so you could have two people reading them and get two dif-
ferent results. I had to go to that extent. This new standard is now
used for nuclear work. I had to train the people in the shipyards
who were doing the nuclear work. I also trained some people who
were doing work other than nuclear. I think you can understand why
I have such strong feelings on this subject.
I also found it necessary to set up schools to train my own radiographers to
monitor the reactor plant welding of the shipyards. Further, I assisted the
Bureau in training some of the personnel in naval shipyards and supervisor of
shipbuilding offices. In addition, I established requirements for the qualification
of inspectors for nondestructive testing. Also, I set up a special group in our
naval reactor laboratories to guide and monitor all phases of the reactor plant
welding in the yards.
I have special teams that go around constantly checking both private yards,
Navy yards and the factories that make our material. My own teams go around
and require them to demonstrate to us they are welding and testing properly.
As a consequence of what we found I have been inspecting and correcting, as
necessary, welds under my cognizance in all nuclear plants built before we
learned that specification requirements were not being met. This is being done
by reviewing radiographs and repairing substandard welds as the ships become
available. In those instances where the inspection records are not adequate, or
where satisfactory radiographs are not available, new radiographs of the welds
in question have been and are being taken.
In the case of the Tinosa, being built here at Portsmouth, the number of sub-
standard welds and radiographs were so great that correction of the defects led
to a delay in the scheduled completion of the ship. This delay was reported
by the Chief of the Bureau of Ships to the Chief of Naval Operations as being
due to the need for repairs to reactor plant welding.
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 71
4. Reference (c) cites the additional cost and time delay involved as a justifica-
tion for not meeting the Navy's standard welding requirements. It seems to
me that Portsmouth has taken it upon itself to make a decision that rightly
belongs with the Bureau of Ships. I consider it is the responsibility of the
Bureau of Ships to set standards of quality for construction or repair of all
ships. This is not a responsibility which, to my knowledge, has been delegated
to the Bureau's field organizations. It appears that Portsmouth in nonnuclear
areas of the ship has decided to set its own standards and is acting as the final
judge whether these standards should be met. I consider this to be wrong, for
it indicates that the Bureau is abdicating its headquarters responsibility. As is
the case in any technical issue where the field organization feels that standards
set by the Bureau are not proper, these should be argued on a technical basis.
Until the issue is resolved, it is the responsibility of the field organization to
comply with the Bureau standards.
5. I am concerned about the increasing difficulty of obtaining high quality
work in our shipyards and of obtaining compliance with standards established
by the Bureau. This is especially the case where one portion of the Bureau is
attempting fully to comply with Bureau standards, while in areas under the
responsibility of other portions of the Bureau local option is permitted, and the
requirement for adherence to standards is not enforced.
6. Insofar as Tinosa is concerned, I do not see how the problem of its non-
nuclear pipe welding can be lightly set aside. High integrity steam and salt
water systems are equally as important in a submarine as the nuclear systems;
all involve safety of the ship. Based on experience with the reactor plant
welding, I recommend the shipyard be required to comply with applicable
Bureau welding specifications.
H. G. RICKOVER.
CO. 400
600
700
Representative HOLIFEELD. That was in February of 1963.
Admiral RICKOVER. No; 1962.
Representative HOLEETELD. In 1962 and it was April of this year
when the tragedy occurred. This was about 14 months before the loss
of the Thresher.
Senator CURTIS. Is it oversimplification to ask why the work is of
such poor quality ? «•
Admiral RICKOVER. No; I think that is quite a logical question.
I think people just did not believe that adherence to the specifications
was necessary.
Senator CURTIS. Was it a careless attitude on the part of the work-
men?
Admiral RICKOVER. Careless attitude, in my opinion, on the part of
all concerned. I don't believe you can blame the workmen alone. All
of the workmen have a man over them. There is a foreman. There
are officers in the field. If I have a job to do and it doesn't get done
well, I am not going to blame the workmen.
Senator BENNETT. You have an inspector over the workmen.
Admiral RICKOVER. You have inspectors. You have all sorts of
people. Suppose the inspectors think the standards are not neces-
sary. And this is actually the case.
(Off the record discussion.)
Senator ANDERSON. One of the reasons I insisted we have an addi-
tional hearing on this is the warning 14 months ahead of the occur-
rence that something might be done wrong.
Admiral RICKOVER. There were many other warnings too.
Senator ANDERSON. I just believe, regardless of what may have hap-
pened, the refusal to take a look at this might have had some bearing
upon it. It might not.
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 75
gasket—
or that the ballast tank blowing system depends on a single remotely operated
valve that needs electric power should be reevaluated.
DEBALLASTING SYSTEM
The lack of adequate specifications and quality control can result in question-
able workmanship in brazed piping in salt water systems. These are an integral
part of the ship's hull boundary and should be considered as such.
It is, therefore, most important that we reappraise our approach in the design
and building of submarines. In doing this it would be well to remember the
words of Admiral Carney, then the Chief of Naval Operations, who wrote in
July of 1955, and I will quote:
"It is realized that in the ships laid down in the last few years, and being
delivered at this time, it was the desire of the Bureau to incorporate a number
of advances and techniques and materials. Undoubtedly, some of these have
contributed to the efficiency of the ship, but unfortunately, other items have
84 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
proved faulty and have resulted in long delays in the delivery of the ships to
the fleet, and in costly alterations or replacements.
"The Chief of Naval Operations has supported the Bureau of Ships in the
construction of ships for experimental and development purposes. Examples
are U.S.S. Timmerman, U.S.S. Albacore, experimental PT boats, and the Miami
hydrofoil boat. Each of these has made its contribution to the improvement
of future designs.
"However, a large number of ships which are enumerated in the 1956 shipbuild-
ing and conversion program are for service in the fleet and are not to be con-
sidered as being built for experimental purposes. Neither the ships nor the
appurtenances thereto.
"The Chief of Naval Operations welcomes and encourages progress in the
design of ships and their component parts, and in the use of new and improved
materials, all of which should lead to improvements in efficiency and effective-
ness. It is mandatory, however, that the traditional naval characteristics of
ruggedness and reliability not be sacrificed or in any way impaired in future
construction."
Now, I will come to my recommendation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
These are my recommendations. I am speaking just for myself
now.
DEPTH IJMITATIONS
As a first step, I would start with the following:
(1) For submarines that are operating, I recommend:
(a) Limit, for the time being, the normal operating depths [classified matter
deleted] unless the operation of the ship requires otherwise. In this case the
depth should be left to the discretion of the commanding officer. Limiting the
depth [classified matter deleted] would enhance safety as follows:
(1) Reduce stresses on the hull and salt water piping systems.
(2) Reduce the amount of flooding for a given si/.e of leak.
(3) Give the ship proper buoyancy margin when blowing ballast tanks. The
buoyancy attainable from blowing these tanks decreases with the depth.
BBAZING ELIMINATION
(6) It is my opinion from the many failures that we have had in silver
brazed joints that they should be eliminated in sea water and high pressure
systems wherever possible. I do not consider such joints to have the integrity
required of salt water systems in deep diving submarines.
(o) I would check, as soon as practicable, one operating submarine from each
building yard for integrity of the hull, the salt water systems, the hydraulic and
high pressure air systems.
(d) In addition, I would institute a program to check all operating ships as
they are made available. Here I would give priority to ships from yards where
the workmanship is found to require it.
(2) For ships in design or early construction stages, the following should be
considered:
(a) Modify the designs to specify welded salt water systems, high pressure
air and hydraulic systems. If this cannot be done in the space or time available,
then I would limit a submarine having brazed joints in its salt water system
[classified matter deleted] or else make the changes necessary to accommodate
welded systems.
COMPLIANCE WITH SPECIFICATIONS
(6) The question of whether applicable specifications are being complied with
by the yard should be looked into. It is possible that the specifications have been
waived from time to time. In the future waivers to specifications should be
granted only by the Bureau of Ships.
(c) Standards comparable to those I have instituted for the reactor plants
in welding, radiography, nondestructive testing, and quality control should be
used for all systems and structures involving ship's safety, and training pro-
grams for welders and radiography personnel instituted to accomplish this.
These personnel must meet prescribed standards with respect to competence and
qualifications.
(3) The operating forces should be requested to reassess the need for deep
operating depth. Account should be taken by them of the increased danger as
the depth is increased. It is possible that insufficient consideration to increased
hazards and reduced margins under casualty conditions has been given when
decisions were made to increase the operating depth of our submarines.
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 85
Ships Submarine Type Desk, the shipyard commander, the shipyard planning
officer, the shipyard design superintendent, the commanding officer of Thresher,
and others. I requested them, on a crash basis, to detail in writing the whole
sequence to insure safety during the dive. Of course all this was done during
the night. The plan, as finally evolved, which I approved, provided for a
slow, deliberate descent at given stages; at each stage there was to be a cycling
of all sea valves, flapper valves, and other items affected by pressures. At each
valve station a man was present to observe and to act, if necessary. I did this
to assure that, as the ship went deeper, our damage control devices were in-
stantly operable. I also did this because of my concern at the lack of blowing
margin. Also I considered all this would be necessary since this was the first
time one of our submarines was to go to so great a depth, and particularly
because of the large number of new development items, including sea valves and
rubber piping.
The lack of planning for this dive was indicative to me of what I considered
the causal way in which the Navy was going to those great depths. An indica-
tion of this casualness can be obtained by reading the minutes of the meeting
held by the Ship's Characteristics Board and the Bureau of Ships in early 1959,
at which the Thresher's depth was discussed.
I did the best I could to bring the HY-80 situation to the highest level in the
Navy. I took the matter up with the Chief of the Bureau of Ships and the Chief
of Naval Operations early in 1959. Later that year, when cracks were dis-
covered in the submarine at Mare Island, I again took it up with the Chief of
Naval Operations. Submarine captains recommended to COMSUBLANT that
more extensive use of welding be made instead of sil-braze. In one case a captain
recommended full welding of all sea water lines on deeper submarines. Despite
this, the endorsement that came out of COMSUBLANT merely recommended that
an economic assessment of this be made. Now insofar as deeper submarines,
I did not object to having one ship do this and try it out. I did object to predicat-
ing a large number of ships until the Thresher design had been fully proved
at sea. I went to the Chief of Naval Operations, who appointed the President
of the Board of Inspection and Survey to conduct a study. He recommended to
the Chief of Naval Operations that the Navy proceed as planned.
CONCLUSIONS
with a promise to get to the top, we will not keep good people in the
Navy. Why then is it reasonable to expect good civilians to want to
work for the Navy if they are denied the ability to get to the top in
their fields, provided they have the requisite talents ? I have long ad-
vocated that the best man should get the job whether he is an officer or
a civilian.
Another factor I believe to be responsible for many of the Navy's
technical difficulties is the lack of individual responsibility. Of course,
the present transient management concept generally precludes assign-
ment of individual responsibility. It is significant to me how few
of the senior people in the responsible management positions at the
time of Thresher's loss had anything to do with her basic design.
It is rare for an officer both to start and finish a job. For example,
during the 5 to 6 years encompassed in the design, construction,
and evaluation of the Thresher, some of the key job changes were
approximately as follows: The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, which
was assigned the detail design responsibility for the Thresher^ had
three shipyard commanders, three production officers, five planning
officers, and three design superintendents. The Bureau of Ships dur-
ing this period had two Chiefs of Bureau, six or so heads of the
Design Division, and three heads of the submarine type desk. Some
of the individual Bureau technical codes concerned with the Thresher
had about four to six changes of management during this saine pe-
riod. Of course, these figures do not include the numerous changes in
the subordinate ranks which were made during this period. How can
you have individual responsibility on this basis ?
Much of the effort of the court was directed to finding out who
was responsible for the design of the Thresher- who made the funda-
mental technical decisions; who authorized deviations from plans; who
authorized deviations from the specifications. The inadequate ballast
tank blowing system is a case in point: Who is responsible? With
the present Navy system, this is an almost impossible question to
answer. The nearest you can come is to say that "The Navy is respon-
sible." In other words all you can do is to point to a collectivity.
In my own area, for example, when the adequacy of a scram procedure
is questioned—"It is Kickover's procedure." And this is as it should
be.
In this connection I believe you will be interested in the following
testimony I gave this committee on June 15, 1961:
Senator JACKSON. * * * One of the problems concerning the committee is
the pinpointing of responsibility in the event of nuclear accidents. We had
the one at Arco, the SL-1. How can the Joint Committee ascertain what in-
dividual or individuals are responsible for a specific project?
Admiral RICKOVEE. * * * Responsibility is a unique concept: it can only
reside and inhere in a single individual. You may share it with others, but
your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it, but it is still with you.
You may disclaim it, but you cannot divest yourself of it. Even if you do not
recognize it or admit its presence, you cannot escape it. If responsibility is
rightfully yours, no evasion, or ignorance, or passing the blame can shift the
burden to someone else. Unless you can point your finger at the man who is
responsible when something goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really
responsible * * *.
Representative BATES. Did you say that "off the cuff"?
Admiral RICKOVER. Most of it, yes.
Representative BATES. That is pretty well said.
88 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
Senator ANDERSON. I think you did say it all "off the cuff."
Admiral RICKOVER. I don't remember whether I did or not. 1 think
you were there, sir.
I think that last sentence:
Unless you can point your finger at the man who is responsible when something
goes wrong, then you have never had anyone really responsible—
expresses the real dilemma and it is not going to be changed by the
military services. Of that I can assure you. It will only be changed
by Congress.
Congress after all does share this responsibility. You have a con-
current responsibility. Your responsibility doesn't end once you have
appropriated the money.
Representative MORRIS. I am glad you brought that out, Admiral.
Representative HOLIFIELD. I believe this is true.
Representative MORRIS. Not only with respect to the military but
with the civilian agencies also. With civilian agencies you may waste
money, but with the military you may waste the country's life.
Commissioner RAMEY. The AEC has some responsibility too.
Admiral RICKOVER. Yes. I was talking here of the relation of Con-
gress to the Military Establishment. I was not implying that the
Atomic Energy Commission does not have responsibility.
Representative HOLIFIELD. Of course a procedure of specialization
has grown up in these giant corporations like Standard Oil, for in-
stance. A corporation like that wouldn't think of having a man from
the production department take over the advertising department or
the sales department. You do have these large organizations with re-
sponsibility placed in specialized compartments.
However, with the military, it seems to me, to a great extent you
have to make every member of the Armed Forces a generalist rather
than a specialist.
Admiral RICKOVER. Mr. Chairman, this is a subject on which I hope
the Armed Services Committee of the House or Senate might call on
me to testify. Essentially it gets down to personnel. It gets down to
the kind of people you bring into the organization, how you educate
and train them and what ideas you inculcate in them.
Whenever something goes wrong, do you say: "Read another book
on leadership" ? We have a long document which lists the leadership
books you should read. That is the easy way to solve problems. "Read
another book on leadership. Find out how to persuade a man to work
hard and to keep him happy while he is working hard." You not only
have to get him to work hard, but get him to feel happy about working
hard.
Sometimes I feel all we do is talk about leadership and principles
and define them by rules of conduct. What are those rules ? You are
not supposed to have a soup spot on your blouse. Abraham Lincoln
had a lot of soup spots. You are not supposed to drink. Ulysses S.
Grant drank.
Representative HOLIFIELD. Let's not take this too far. [Laughter.]
Admiral RICKOVER. I was only talking about military people.
You are not supposed to run around with women. Napoleon ran
around with women.
Such rules are not the basic essentials of leadership. There is more
to it than that. I think perhaps we lose sight of this with our nice
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 89
easy rules and the idea that all we have to do is to follow rules and
we are great leaders. I have never been a great leader, but then I
have never read the rules.
Representative HOLIFIELD. You had better continue.
Admiral RICKOVER. The present-day technical complexity is beyond
the point where you can count on "the system" to do the job well.
So, while steps are being taken to correct obvious deficiencies as ex-
emplified by the Thresher, what about all the other parts of our ships
and their complicated equipment for which there is no real individual
responsibility ?
On the other hand, if you eliminate transient technical management
and assign individual responsibility, other benefits logically follow.
Only then can the necessary detailed technical control, the establish-
ment and enforcement of proper standards, and the selection and train-
ing of personnel be done at the level commensurate with the degree
of technical excellence required by modern-day weaponry. I don't
mean to imply that this can be done overnight. I think it will take
many years, perhaps a generation, to bring this about. Corrective
action will have to be taken at every level, from the standards set for
entry into the Navy for enlisted men and midshipmen through their
education and training at service schools, the Naval Academy, and
subsequent schools. The same applies to the civilian personnel of the
Navy. Unless the civilian management of the Navy, assisted by the
Congress brings about the change, it will not happen. Unless there
is permanence of technical management, there can be no effective up-
grading of the Navy's in-house technical capability to keep it abreast
of the demands of the times.
My views sum up as follows:
(a) There is insufficient information to pin down what really hap-
pened to the Thresher. I do not know. We therefore have to look at
everything that may have contributed to her loss.
(b) I do know there were weaknesses in her design, fabrication,
and inspection that must be corrected. These are symptomatic of the
basic problems facing the Navy today in the conduct of its technical
work.
(c) Significant upgrading must be effected in our bureaus and
shipyards in design, fabrication, and inspection.
(d) This upgrading cannot be done until there is permanence of
technical management and assignment of individual responsibility^
(e) There must be a change in the philosophy that the Navy exists
for its people and that the career of its people takes precedence.
Promotion should be on the basis of results and contributions to the
Navy, not on the multiplicity of jobs a man has had.
(/) Outdated concepts of the officer-civilian relationship should be
abandoned—the best man should get the job.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared testimony.
Representative HOLHTELD. Thank you, Admiral Rickover, for your
testimony. It has been a long day for many of us. I am sure there
are a lot of questions that come about as a result of your testimony.
However, I think if there is no objection on the part of the members
of the committee we will review your testimony and ask you to come
back at a later date. I don't want to preclude anyone from asking
any questions they may want now. We have another 17 minutes be-
fore 5 o'clock.
90 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
Up to a few months ago, the Navy Department had taken the posi-
tion that all of 1the earlier hearings were classified and nothing could
be made public. Although we did not agree with the Navy that every-
thing discussed at our hearings was classified and continued to argue
the point, I would like to note for the record that Bending resolution of
this disagreement no information from our hearings was released by
this committee despite the fact that numerous stories and public state-
ments have been made by others, including Navy sources. (See app. 8,
p. 159.)
In the past few months with the excellent cooperation of Secretary
BeLieu, Adm. William Brockett, and Admiral Wilkinson—I under-
stand you were made admiral today. On behalf of the committee I
wish to extend our congratulations—specific points have been identified
in the earlier hearings which are classified and must remain so. Sec-
retary BeLieu, Admiral Brockett, and Admiral Wilkinson have been
very cooperative and helpful to this committee in our desire to present
as complete a public record as is possible in this case.
With the deletion of the classified material, we are now ready to
release the record of our earlier hearings in order that the public can
be adequately informed of the circumstances surrounding the loss of
Thresher. The public will also be made aware of the changes which
are required in our nuclear submarine program and have before them
a record of the progress that has been made as a result of the lessons
learned from the loss of Thresher.
Before releasing last year's hearings, the chairman thought that it
would be only fair that the Navy Department have an opportunity to
testify as to the corrective actions that have been taken since last year
and that this be made part of the record to be released. A key report,
and one which the committee very much appreciated receiving, was a
memorandum furnished to the committee by Secretary Nitze on Feb-
ruary 5, 1964, commenting on progress made in a number of the sig-
nificant areas discussed during the earlier hearings. (See app. 9, p.
166.)
Today we resume our hearings with the purpose of learning what
improvements have been brought about in the field of development,
design, fabrication, test, and operation of nuclear submarines.
We are also interested in learning what changes have been made
with respect to one of the personnel problems identified; namely that
of transient technical management in the Navy's submarine program.
The importance of nuclear submarines to the Nation's security is so
great that I believe no stone should be left unturned to keep our
submarine program second to none.
We are very pleased to have with us this afternoon, Admiral Rick-
over, without whose efforts we probably would not be in this pre-
eminent position concerning nuclear submarines, Admiral Curtze,
Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Ships; Admiral Ramage, Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Sub-
marine Warfare; and their principal assistants. I understand Mr.
Ken BeLieu, who is at the moment the Acting Secretary of the Navy,
will be here shortly. He has been unavoidably detained for a short
period.
Unfortunately Admiral Brockett, Chief of the Bureau of Ships, is
unable to be with us this afternoon because of a previous commitment.
He is now on the west coast with Secretary Nitze.
1
See app. 8, pp. 15® to 166 for exchange of correspondence on this point.
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 93
First, I will discuss the operational actions taken by the Navy since
the loss of Thresher. The operating depth of all submarines with a
deep design test depth [classified matter deleted] has been restricted.
[Classified matter deleted.] This interim restriction applies to all
SSN's, all SSBN's, and the 10 deep-hulled post-World War II diesel
submarines, and will remain in effect until all subsaf e measures have
been accomplished and certified by the Bureau of Ships in the case of
each submarine. [Classified matter deleted.] Until all plans and
material for the complete subsaf e package are available, the submarines
now in overhaul and in the late stages of contruction are modified
item by item. The subsafe package will be completed on these ships
during their next overhaul. The builders' sea trials and the post
overhaul trials have been changed to reflect the lessons learned from
the loss of Thresher. Some of the new requirements include the
following: Test dives are made in depth of water limited to 1% times
the test dive depth [classified matter deleted], a submarine rescue
vessel is in attendance and tape records all communications, the main
ballast tank blow capability is also tested dockside and during a shal-
low dive prior to the deep dive. In addition all new construction sub-
marines are authorized to make three controlled dives [classified
matter deleted]—one for a system integrity check, one to test the emer-
gency main ballast tank blow at this depth, and one after postshake-
down availability to test the same two items again. These dives
[classified matter deleted] feet are done to demonstrate that the ship
is safe to this depth in the event of a depth excursion below the
[classified matter deleted] operational limit. Prior to each submarine
sea trial, the Bureau of Ships conducts an audit of the ship and the
building records, and certifies the ship to be materially ready for the
trials. Various other procedural changes have been made to improve
94 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
Task
No. Brief description
1 Review design of sea-water systems subjected to submergence pres-
sure.
2 Investigate hazardous piping systems with respect to adequacy of
materials, fabrication methods, and test procedures.
3 Review design of machinery components in hazardous sea-water
systems.
4 Mandatory use of class plans and components in vital systems.
5 Review design of high-pressure air systems, including MET blow
systems.
6 Insure proper readiness requirements for submarine builders and
insure sea trials.
7 Investigate electrical systems—to provide protection from sea water.
8 Review adequacy of submarine pressure structure penetrations.
9 Consolidation of information for damage control sections of ships
information book.
10 Review the reliability of ship control systems.
11 Investigate habitability features to insure that safety is not de-
graded.
12 Investigating the feasibility and cost of constructing submarine test
tank capability of testing full size submarines.
13 Review safety aspects of submarine shock tests against manned
14 submarines.
Revised and expanded quality assurance programs.
15 Investigate possibility of modifying submarine diving trainers to
permit training in flooding recovery action.
16 Investigate submarine location, salvage, and rescue features.
150°, insured against brittle fracture in low ambient air and ocean
temperatures (a problem with mild steels with NDT range 0° F. to plus
40° F. which are temperatures we do encounter). Further, tests made
at Dahlgren Proving Grounds in 1950 had demonstrated a fracture
toughness that was as good as any steel previously tested, giving ballis-
tic properties at least 95 percent as effective as the average quality of
special treatment steel (STS), commonly used as armor plate.
Despite the fact that during construction of the experimental sub-
marine ATbacore, HY-80 had proved to be weldable, problems in weld«
ing this steel began to manifest themselves as various submarine build-
ing yards began to use HY-80 in the greater thicknesses needed for
larger diameter, deeper depth submarines than had been employed in
ATbacore. Further, nonuniformities developed among the various
yards in carrying out critical HY-80 welding techniques. As a conse-
quence, the Chief, Bureau of Ships, ordered a complete review into the
use of this material for submarine hulls.
A detailed engineering review was completed and reported in a
comprehensive summary entitled "A Review of HY-80 in Submarine
Construction," dated January 5, 1960. This report was prepared by a
"blue ribbon" committee of the Bureau's Ship Design Division mili-
tary and civilian experts in ships structures and submarine design. To
assure appropriate breadth of view, this group consulted extensively
with experts in the academic, scientific, and industrial worlds. Pro-
fessor Freudenthal of Columbia University and Professor Munsie of
the University of Illinois made available their highly specialized
knowledge in structures, especially with regard to fatigue. Repre-
sentatives of Babcock & Wilcox Co., Air Reduction Co., Electric Boat
Division, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., as well as
those of the Naval Research Laboratory (then called the Material
Laboratory) and welding engineers from all naval shipyards involved
in submarine construction contributed to the analysis.
The principal conclusions and recommendations that were developed
by this review were that use of HY-80 steel should be continued for
high-performance military submarines of present characteristics; that
a surveillance program be established for submarines constructed of
this material; that certain improvements be made in the design and
fabrication techniques; and that a continuing program of research and
investigation into fatigue strength aspects be initiated.
This committee also recommended the establishment of a continuing
submarine structural program to encompass the foregoing recom-
mendations as well as to develop procedures and methods for apply-
ing newly developed materials (including HY-80) to the construction
of submarine hulls. This was done by the Bureau of Ships Instruc-
tion 4760.19 of February 18,1960. This program is still in full force
and effect. An Advisory Panel was formed to help assure establish-
ment of a sound and comprehensive long-range program. This Panel
was composed of some of the principal advisers who had been consulted
during the conduct of the review which led to the writing of "A Review
of HY-80 in Submarine Construction," as well as other academic,
scientific, and industrial experts of similar stature.
WELDING DIFFICUI/riES OF HY—80
During the course of this program, the initial difficulties encountered
in welding HY-80 steel have been largely overcome. The problem of
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 101
in preparation of the joints so that you don't burn through from one
side, but I don't think there is any real problem.
Representative BATES. Some welders advised me at one time that
this was a problem. As far as you know it does not present any prob-
lem.
Admiral CURTZE. The last time I was in Portsmouth I watched
them twin arcing strength frames on Dolphin, AGSS-555 [classified
matter deleted.] They were beautifully jigged and rolled under the
welder's covered arc. It was the most beautiful weld I have ever seen.
There was no problem at alL
Eepresentative BATES. So they are continuing to do that ?
Admiral CURTZE. Yes, sir.
Representative BATES. As far as you know there has been no prob-
lem.
Admiral CURTZE. Right.
Admiral RICKOVEH. If you have adequate radiographic procedures
it doesn't make any difference because the radiograph will show wheth-
er you have a fault in your welding and you can correct it.
Admiral CURTZE. That is right.
Representative BATES. The welders to whom I talked said this was
a new experience and they did not feel satisfied with it. However,
that was 4 or 5 years ago.
Admiral CTJRTZE. I watched this a month or two ago with complete-
ly submerged arcs; doing everything downhand under control and it
was a beautiful job.
Captain KERN. Admiral Curtze, in that area there have been new
NDT techniques developed to inspect twin arc welding by ultrasonics
and we have controls now on the twin arc welding techniques that we
did not have at that time.
Admiral CURTZE. May I proceed, sir ?
Representative HOLIFIELD. Go ahead.
Admiral CURTZE (reading) : Further, it has been possible to back-
fit improvements to minimize the problem of fatigue cracking in
earlier HY-80 submarines whose design details contributed to stress
concentrations that became significant under cyclic loading.
The later submarines incorporated improved structural details
which lower the stress to which the connections are subjected, thereby
further decreasing probability of fatigue cracking problems. Al-
though fatigue is not peculiar to HY-80 but is a problem in any highly
stressed steel under cyclic loading, special care must be exercised in
its use. The surveillance program is being carried out as was recom-
mended.
Thus, the submarine structural program has been and promises
to continue to be a highly productive and effective effort. Con-
tinuous and active review of all aspects of the use of HY-80 steel
in submarine structures assures the integrity of the submarine hull.
The Thresher design appraisal board, Admiral McKee's board,
made an independent examination of the use of HY-80 structure in
submarines, and concluded in its report of July 15,1963, that "HY-80
clearly is the best steel for military submarine hull construction and
the only satisfactory material available today." This conclusion was
based on the facts that HY-80 steel is the only proven material in
common usage among submarine builders which will give the struc-
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 103
You state,
All joints in sea-connected systems between the hull and backup valves for all
submarines, and inboard down to one-half inch in sea water open below 200
feet for all [classified matter deleted] submarines. All joints in these areas
[classified matter deleted] inches and above in all sea-water systems must be
welded.
In your answer did you intend to convey that is going to be done to
all existing submarines ?
Admiral CURTZE. We are doing the welding only on the SS (N)-tf7/,
which is the one we have just contracted for. This is for half inch
and above in all critical systems. This will not be done on the other
boats.
Representative HOLIFIELD. Then this is not retroactive as my ques-
tion would have implied a minute ago.
Admiral CURTZE. [Classified matter deleted] inches and larger, sir,
but half an inch to [classified matter deleted] inches
Admiral RICKOVER. The SS(N)-#77 submarine will have a [classi-
fied matter deleted]. The Bureau is about to award the contract.
That is the first one and the only one that will have these things that
you have mentioned. The others and the new ones that have been
awarded this year do not have it.
Representative HOLIFIELD. This interests me. If this is a require-
ment on future submarines, why shouldn't it be a requirement for
existing ones ? Is it because the expense is too great ?
Admiral CURTZE. We don't think with our present knowledge of
silver-brazed joints, Mr. Chairman, that we are in as bad a position
as we thought we were a year ago. We have trained our people. We
have trained people in the use of this ultrasonic testing technique.
Our specifications have been raised to reject any joint less than 60
percent full bond throughout the periphery of the joint where some-
thing less than 40 percent is all that is required to develop the strength
of the pipe as a pipe, not as a joint. We think by this careful quality
control and training that we need not backfit all of these submarines
with welded joints and fittings.
Representative HOLIFIELD. Are you requiring it on the SS (N)-671?
Admiral CURTZE. Yes, sir; we agree with Admiral Rickover that
this is the way to go.
Representative HOLIFIELD. This seems inconsistent to me. I could
understand it if you were to say, "This job is just too big and we
cannot go back to it, but there is going to be a permanent requirement
that the depth will be [classified matter deleted]." I could understand
that flexibility, but I can't understand your saying that this is some-
thing we are going to do in the future for safety purposes, but we are
not going to make it retroactive.
Admiral CURTZE. Mr. Chairman, it is possible to configure the design
of a new boat to permit this. It requires different spaces between tne
piping. As Admiral Rickover has pointed out, he mocks up everything
to permit this to happen.
In the meantime we are developing automatic pipe-welding ma-
chines which will operate in these constricted spaces. This is heing
done at Mare Island. Admiral Brockett and I feel strongly that
wherever possible we should go to 100-percent welding and the SS (N)-
671 is the first ship in which we are actually trying that.
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 107
We don't really know what all of the problems will be. The problem
of getting the boat back down to deep submergence in as short a time
as possible is a tremendous one. If you go to welded joints through-
put, we automatically generate a radiographic bottleneck to insure the
integrity of the joints.
Eight now we have a silver-brazing capability. Admiral Brockett
and I are not convinced in our own minds yet that with silver braze,
inspected with the techniques we have available to us and the people
trained at the level they now are, that we don't have a secure system.
One other thing we are looking at is the configuration of the piping
in new boats. The reason for this is that when the hull of a submarine
compresses, the piping system within them with fixed-end connections
alters. At least those secured to bulkheads or pumps or the hull of the
ship are wracked when the ship compresses. We have to go through
the piping systems of the submarine and make an entirely new layout
in 671 so that compression of the boat doesn't bring about sheer failures
and wracking failures in the body of the pipe, not in the joint.
We feel that we are on sound ground for these reasons, Mr. Chair-
man.
Representative HOLIFIELD. Then is 671 to be the only one or will all
of the submarines after 671 be given this new treatment ?
Admiral CURTZE. I can just give you my opinion on that, sir, and I
think; Admiral Brockett shares it. We wish to try for all critical sys-
tems to be welded from 671 on out, sir.
Representative HOLIFIELD. All right, proceed.
2. Flooding control and recovery
Admiral CURTZE. In addition to the above minimum level of in-
tegrity in the hull boundary and critical piping systems, an improved
flooding control and recovery capability will be installed.
(a) An emergency main ballast tank blow system in addition to the
normal main ballast tank blow system must be provided with a capa-
bility of recovering from a [classified matter deleted] hole flooding con-
tinuously. This system basically short circuits air from the air stor-
age banks into the ballast tanks and has a minimum of components and
piping which could fail or restrict the flow of air.
(&) Sea water valve control.—Centralized remote hydraulic control
will be provided for hull and backup valves in sea-connected systems
open to the sea below 200 feet to control flooding in case of failure of
piping or components inside the ship. Both hull and backup valves
[classified matter deleted] and larger will be so controlled for all sub-
marines and hull valves down to 1 inch in [classified matter deleted]
submarines. Provision will be made to provide flexibility to permit
retention of main propulsion power while shutting down the maximum
number of other valves from a minimum number of levers.
Representative HOLHTELD. Will this be done retroactively wherever
it is possible?
Admiral CURTZE. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact the main ballast
tank emergency blow system is in a lot of operating systems right now.
This is one thing we went at immediately, to provide immediate
capability for surfacing under any normal casualty condition.
(c) Access to and operation of vital equipment.—Each ship is being
studied to determine the adequacy of access to and operation of vital
equipment to insure that the tight machinery arrangement, silencing
108 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
New construction
Polaris submarines now under construction of the SSBN-316 class.—
On a not-to-delay ship delivery basis although certain portions must be
complete prior to deployment. Depth restrictions will not be removed
until complete certification requirements are fulfilled.
Polaris submarines in the -fiscal year 1963 and subsequent year build-
ing programs /S/SBN-640 class-—All certification items will be accom-
plished prior to delivery which will permit lifting of current depth
restrictions.
Thresher-type attack submarines of the SSN-593 class prior to
SSN-612 will be treated in the same way as SSBN-616 class.
SSN-612 to SSN-615 and SSN-621 will be delivered certified for
test depth operations.
SSN-637 class will be delivered certified for test depth operations.
Addressing myself to submarines in operation—the old boats:
SS and SSN's starting overhaul in fiscal year 1964 will be certified
where practicable based on availability of designs and material pro-
curement. They are at the bottom of the list naturally.
SS and SSN fiscal years 1965 and subsequent will be certified for
test depth operation during their overhaul.
SSBN's not certified during construction will be certified for test
depth during first overhaul commencing with SSBN-598.
This program will be brought to fruition [classified matter deleted]
in total.
The following paragraphs address themselves to our plans for
funding.
COST OF MODIFYING SUBMARINES
O.&M.N 25 45
R.D.T. &E 6 4
OPN 3 1
Total 34 50
The total funding requirements for SON funding have been determined
and are as follows:
[In millions]
Fiscal year 1958 $22.4
Fiscal year 1959 36.1
Fiscal year 1960 26. 5
Fiscal year 1961 29. 9
Fiscal year 1962 41. 3
Fiscal year 1963 . 28. 8
It has been determined that the above submarine safety effort can be funded
with currently available SON funds.
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 111
Length of overhauls
The impact of overhaul length of SS, SSN, SSBN, and A-3 retrofit has been
evaluated and is outlined below:
[ Classified material deleted. ]
I think of interest on the next page are the plans for implementation calling
[classified matter deleted],
Implementation
The above certification and improvement work has been implemented by
change orders in all new construction submarines and by letter on all applicable
submarines undergoing overhaul during fiscal years 1964 and 1965. Current
plans call for completion of certification according to the following time
schedule:
[Classified material deleted.]
General improvements
In addition to the above certification and improvement items developed for
and being applied to individual submarines many general improvements and
developments of interest are being accomplished under the submarine safety
program.
Flooding recovery capability
Flooding recovery capability studies have been completed in all post-World War
II classes of submarines, and reports of these studies have been provided to forces
afloat. In addition the recovery capabilities for most classes of submarines with
the improved emergency main ballast tank blow system required for certification
have been conducted and issued. These studies and others will be incorporated
in a new damage control manual for which prototypes are being prepared. Indi-
cations to date are that, with a few exceptions, an increase or redistribution of
high-pressure air storage is not required in existing submarines. The flooding
recovery studies conducted to date indicate that the use of stored high-pressure
air provides adequate recovery capability in current operating and new construc-
tion submarines.
[Classified matter deleted.]
These emergency main ballast tank blow systems have a minimum of piping,
joints, and components installed to minimize the potential of failure or freezeup.
New blow valves have been developed which provide the desired high air flow
rates and permit positive remote control over the valve and local manual over-
rides. All plans and components for this system are reviewed and approved by
the Bureau of Ships. Tests of this blow system in submarines where installed
have been conducted on the surface and down to depths [classified matter deleted]
to demonstrate its reliability and greatly increased recovery potential of this
system over the normal main ballast tank blow system provided in earlier sub-
marines.
DEBALLASTING SYSTEM TESTS
Representative BATES. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question ?
On these tests, do you blow as you would in time of emergency ?
Admiral CURTZE. Yes; blow first on the surface and then to satisfy
ourselves that this freezing up is no longer a problem; that by remov-
ing the restrictions in the line, by having the direct bottle through con-
trol valve back into a tank arrangement—we could blow unrestrictedly;
we have done so, starting on the surf ace and going ultimately to the
[classified matter deleted] level. We have actually blown up from
that level.
Admiral RICKOVER. We do that on all trials. The lever for doing
that is right where the captain stands. Even though there isn't any
emergency, on trials they test it, anyway.
Representative HOLIITELD. This was not done before. You only
had your dockside blowout. Actually this doesn't go to the depth
where the Thresher apparently got into trouble. [Classified matter
deleted.]
Admiral RICKOVER. There wasn't enough blowing capability until
these modifications were made.
112 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
means of overriding any possible safety feature you put in there. This
is being studied. I don't think we have an adequate answer.
Admiral CURTZE. Whatever we apply, of course, can only be applied
if the operating people think this is the proper way to go and it makes
sense to do it.
Admiral EAMAGE. I think one of the primary things we are trying
to inculcate into people now is when they are going deep to be sure
they have a positive trim. In other words, they don't go down heavy
so that when they get down there they will be in a positive buoyancy
so if anything happens at least you can start up and have that much
advantage to begin with.
Representative HOLIFIELD. Proceed.
QUALITY ASSURANCE
Admiral RICKOVER. May I say, sir, with respect to the first one you
mentioned, which is known as the HY-80 problem and to which Ad-
miral Curtze addressed himself at length, that I personally do not
agree with using it until we learn more about it. I would rather take
the lesser depth because cracks do develop in HY-80 material. The
Bureau of Ships has been studying this for several years.
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 125
You also mentioned the area of high pressure air systems. We still
use these systems. We have taken greater pains in their construction
and in assembling them. But I still do not believe in using anything
at a higher pressure or higher temperature in submarines unless we
have to do so. If you have to do it, you dp.
I would look into these things and see if I couldn't get them down to
a lower pressure. Obviously lower pressure is safer. There is not as
much chance of anything going wrong.
The third point you mentioned was the elimination of automatic
devices. There is considerable feeling among the operating people in
the Navy that many of these things should be eliminated. No attempt
at elimination has been made. I think it would be wise to do so
They are expensive. They take up space, add weight, and in many
cases you need special people to operate them. You would save people.
A reason given for the installation of this expensive and complex equip-
ment is that it would reduce the number of men needed to operate the
ship. Actually we have been able to reduce the number of untrained
seamen, but we have had to increase the complement with highly skilled
men to repair the complicated equipment. So there has been no saving
of manpower. In fact, it has caused problems in skilled manpower.
There is a question in the minds of many people whether these
equipments are necessary and whether they should not be removed. I
126 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
people that not a single naval nuclear operation has ever aborted and,
at this committee knows, they have all been safe. (See app. 13, p. 175.)
We do have this constant attempt to lower the selection and training
required. My remedy for that would be to eliminate some of the un-
necessary staffs and to take quite a number of people off the remaining
staffs and send them somewhere in the rest of the Navy where they can
be of some use. I think our trouble comes from having too many
people around who are inimical to this program.
Representative HOLIFIELD. The committee would hope that a deg-
radation of standards in the selection of operators and a degradation
in their training would not occur. I can foresee a lot of trouble if we
look upon this as a conventional submarine even though we hope in
tune it will become so. However, I would hope that there would be
no deterioration in the specialized training that is necessary to under-
stand the nuclear side of this and to appreciate the problems involved.
Mr. Secretary, as we prepare this record for printing, there are cer-
tain things we may need.
First we would like to have the status of the Navy's review of the re-
ports submitted by the Naval Court of1 Inquiry and what responses
have been made to the recommendations. Also if you will assign some
member of your staff or some other proper person to confer with Cap-
tain Bauser and others of our staff, we would appreciate it.
We would like to have your cooperation also in the review of the
transcripts and in the identification of specific items which are classi-
fied as against those that are not classified so that such material can be
deleted from the published record.
Secretary BELIEU. I will assign Captain Bobbins right now for
liaison with your staff and anyone else whom your staff thinks is nec-
essary.
I would like to add one personal comment to the subject Admiral
Eickover was discussing. This is something we understand and it has
been discussed at the highest level—with the Secretary.
I don't know of any living viable organization that doesn't have a
constant chitting book which pulls back and forth between the various
compartments. It is our intention to keep this program going and to
keep these procedures and standards. I know Admiral Rickover has
complete freedom night and day in my office and the Secretary's office
as well. So the committee does not need to fear there is any lack of
attention to this area.
We would be most delighted to cooperate with you in any way. It
is always a pleasure to do business with this committee, sir.
PERSONNEL AND ROTATION OF DUTY ASSIGNMENT
seemingly minor departure from the rules can produce complex casualties which
imperil the lives of submarines and/or render the ship unable to perform her
mission.
B. Expedite action to eliminate improperly designed connections from all
operating submarines.
C. Expedite replacement of steel retaining rings on flex hoses with monel and
review flex hose failures to determine what further corrective action may be
required to provide reliable installations.
D. Expedite development of reliable nondestructive test method for silver-braze
fittings. This is urgently needed to enable operating forces to locate and repair
defects.
E. In new design, reduce wherever possible potential hazard of salt water
spray damage to electrical equipment by physical separation, shielding of salt
water lines, provision of watertight closures for electrical equipment, or other
appropriate means.
APPENDIX 2
NAVY MEMORANDUM CONCERNING SILVER-BRAZED PIPING IN U.S.S. "THRESHER"
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
BUREAU OF SHIPS,
Washington, D.G., August 28,1962.
In reply refer to: C-SS (N) 593C1/9020—Serial 525-0232.
From: Chief, Bureau of Ships.
To: Commander, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard.
Subject: U.S.S. Thresher silver-brazed piping (U).
Reference: (a) Navshipyd Ptsmh conf Itr ser 0114-62 of May 9,1962
(b) Buships Itr ser 648X-160 of February 13,1962
(c) Buships Itr ser 525-1325 of May 29,1962
(d) Datmobas Report C-1399 of March 1962 (Skipjack)
(e) Datmobas Report C-1445 of July 1962 (Thresher).
Enclosure: (1) U/T results Thresher hydraulic piping (prechock test available).
1. Reference (a) suggests that measures taken in Thresher (SS(N)593) to in-
sure the integrity of silver-brazed piping are adequate and that no additional
measures should be required. In particular the suggestion is that the intent
of reference (b) has been met and that no more testing should be required
during Thresher's PSA. Reference (c) was written prior to Thresher's shock
tests and requires the shipyard to visually inspect salt water piping for visible
defects and to certify materials within the salt water piping system in accordance
with Navships 250^648-8.
2. It is significant that failures in silver-braze joints occurred during previous
shock test series of other submarines and, that as the shock loading was in-
creased, the number of silver-brazed piping failures increased. These failures
were for the most part due to substandard bond, insufficient pipe support, or use
of threaded fittings. To illustrate this point the following data have been
extracted from references (d) and (e) (classified matter deleted) :
3. In the documented silver-braze failures in Thresher, the majority occurred in
pipe joints less than 1 inch i.p.s. which were of the insert type but no solder
insert ring had been used. The result was no bond achieved in the joint but
very slight bond appeared in the vicinity of the face fed fillet.
4. Another factor (briefly alluded to in par. 2 above) which has contributed to
silver-braze joint failures is inadequate support of piping and valves. Long un-
supported runs of piping place undue stress upon the pipe and piping joints
when subjected to shock. An example is the failure of the drain line [classified
material deleted] in which a % inch i.p.s. silver-braze joint supported the valves
and piping associated with a vertical run of pipe about 10 feet long.
5. In an effort to demonstrate the validity of ultrasonic testing of silver-brazed
joints the Electric Boat Division was directed to conduct an inspection of cer-
tain joints in Thresher prior to the shock test series. The results of this
inspection are contained in enclosure (1). Preliminary review by the Bureau
of the joints which failed during shock test indicates that none of the failures
occurred in joints which had been certified as satisfactory in the pretest
ultrasonic inspection. It is requested that Portsmouth Naval Shipyard make a
detailed review of enclosure (1) for the purpose of verification. If the detailed
review confirms this finding the Bureau considers that the ultrasonic techniques
employed by Electric Boat Division provide a mechanism for quality control
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 135
APPENDIX 3
(This speech reflects the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect
the views of the Secretary of the Navy or the Department of the Navy.)
THE NEVER-ENDING CHAIXENGE
(By Vice Adm. H. G. Rickover, USN, at the 44th annual National Metal Congress,
New York, N.Y., October 29, 1962)
Progress—like freedom—is desired by nearly all men, but not all understand
that both come at a cost. Whenever society advances—be it in culture and
education or science and technology—there is a rise in the requirements man
must meet to function successfully. The price of progress is acceptance of
these more exacting standards of performance and relinquishment of familiar
habits and conventions rendered obsolete because they no longer meet the new
standards. To move but one rung up the ladder of civilization man must surpass
himself. The simple life comes "naturally," the civilized life compels effort.
In any advancing society some elements will accept the advantages of life
at a higher plateau yet ignore its obligations. This is readily seen when back-
ward people seek to modernize their society. Sociologists call it a "culture lag."
Something akin to culture lag exists even in highly developed countries such
as the United States. And, because all parts of a modern society are inter-
dependent, failure to meet rising standards in any sector becomes a brake on
general progress and harms society as a whole.
I need not spell out to this audience that we have no choice but to keep in the
forefront of civilization. Progress today is the sine qua non of national sur-
vival. It is the paramount national interest. Since our country is self-govern-
ing democracy, this paramount national interest is in the safekeeping of each
and every one of us. If we do not look after the national interest, no one else
will. That is what self-government means. In this instance, moreover, civic
duty is strongly reinforced by private interest. Were the Nation to falter in
its forward movement, we should all suffer dire consequences in our most
private lives. The Nation's paramount interest coincides with every citizen's
paramount self-interest.
It follows that the existence of a "culture lag'' in any important sector of our
society is the legitimate concern of every citizen. Insofar as special competencies
allow us to do so, we each have a right and a duty to call attention to factors
seriously impeding progress, and to suggest ways and means for overcoming
these obstacles. I submit that in my own field of reactor technology we have
a culture lag in that many involved with this new technology fail to recognize
that to exploit the power locked in the atom we must rise to a higher technolog-
ical plateau. And that consequently a more exacting standard must be met in
everything pertaining to this new source of power. Failure to understand this
reduces the benefit the Nation obtains from nuclear power.
Take the ways we make use of our nuclear power potential or how we operate
nuclear powerplants. If this is to be done wisely persons in authority must
possess an unusually high degree of general and technical knowledge and com-
petence. Unfortunately decisions affecting this field are sometimes made by
people who have little knowledge of nuclear engineering and of science. There
is danger this may lead to errors highly damaging to the position of the United
States or to the health and safety of the American people.
Thus, when persons who are authorized to deal with nuclear power as an
instrument of national policy are technically ignorant, they may incorrectly
appraise its importance. They may underrate the value to our Nation of the
near monopoly we currently enjoy in reactor technology and in consequence
fail to guard this asset with sufficient care. Again, when persons who are
authorized to administer nuclear powerplants are technically ignorant, they
may underestimate the hazards and in consequence fail to understand that
nuclear powerplants cannot be operated safely except by highly competent and
rigorously trained men. Reserving this task to persons so qualified may run
counter to traditional personnel policies based on equalizing career opportunities.
Administrators unfamiliar with nuclear science and engineering frequently resist
change in established practices. They do this because they have little con-
ception of the potential danger to large numbers of people if nuclear powerplants
are handled ineptly. If they understood the dangers of radiation they would
realize that safety must take precedence over their otherwise laudable desire
to give everyone a chance at running a nuclear plant.
LOSS OF THE U.S.8. "THRESHER" 137
As I have said, some elements of society will accept the advantages of life
at a higher plateau, yet ignore its obligations.
My remarks today concern the harmful results caused by failure of American
industry to live up to the exacting standards of reactor technology. We depend
on private industry to supply the materials and equipments for our nuclear
powerplants. Current industrial practices are, on the whole, not geared to the
standards imposed by this new technology.
While it has not been too difficult to focus management attention on the
nuclear reactor itself, which represents a novel development, it has been ex-
tremely difficult to get management to give effective attention to the conven-
tional components of these plants. Routine manufacturing and engineering
practices continue to be followed, even though experience has shown these
practices to be inadequate.
Successful operation of a nuclear powerplant depends on the reliability of
all its parts, the reactor as well as the conventional components—the heat
exchangers, pressure vessels, valves, turbogenerators, etc. Although these are all
designed and manufactured by long established procedures and so should present
no special difficulty, delivery and performance of these conventional items have
been less reliable than of the nuclear reactors themselves. Senior people in the
naval reactors group must therefore devote much of their time solving ever-recur-
ring problems in the design, materials and workmanship of conventional com-
ponents.
Compared with the complexity of nuclear engineering itself these problems
individually are minor in nature, yet they occur so frequently as to require a
disproportionate amount of our time. If we are to build successful nuclear
powerplants at reasonable cost and in reasonable time, the whole plateau of
industrial workmanship, engineering inspection, and quality control must be
raised well above the present level. This is the responsibility of management.
Management's technical function, after all, is to see to it that production meets
the customer's requirements.
We are altogether too prone in this country to expect magical breakthroughs
and shortcuts through science and engineering. We naively expect that the mere
expenditure of large sums of money by Government will rapidly and automatically
solve our technical problems and assure continued growth of our technology.
We place too much emphasis on streamlined techniques such as computer
programed management, instead of realizing that present technical problems are
less a matter of generating new ideas than of carrying them out in a straight-
forward, methodical, and painstaking manner. Only in this way can the new sci-
entific advances be turned to practical use. There is no substitute for constant
personal supervision of production work by management. The higher we advance
technically, the more important becomes the personal attention of the manager,
the less can he reply on merely issuing orders.
Too often management is satisfied to sit in plush offices, far removed physically
and mentally from the design and manufacturing areas, relying on paper reports
for information about the status of design and production in the plant itself—
the real center of the enterprise. This lack of firsthand evaluation results in
poorly designed and manufactured equipment, late delivery, or both. During
the past few years, hundreds of major conventional components, such as pressure
vessels and steam generators, have been procured for naval nuclear propulsion
plants. Less than 10 percent have been delivered on time. Thirty percent were
delivered 6 months to a year or more later than promised. Even so, reinspection
of these components after delivery showed that over 50 percent of them had to
be further reworked in order to meet contract specification requirements.
We have tried to improve matters by sending representatives of the naval
reactors group to manufacturer's plants to make on-the-spot checks of engi-
neering and production progress. Often our men discover extremely unsatisfac-
tory conditions of which management is unaware. The usual management reac-
tion is to disbelieve the facts submitted to them. Corrective action is therefore
often taken too late. The most prevalent inadequacy found in our audits is
failure to recognize that timely production of high quality components requires
almost infinite capacity for painstaking care and attention to detail by all ele-
ments of the organization, both management and nonmanagement; this is as true
for a so-called conventional "old-line" product as for a new one.
Fortunately, some companies are forward looking and receptive to new ideas
and try out our suggestions. For example, one company agreed to move the
offices of their executive and supervisory personnel to the plant manufacturing
areas. I would like to quote from a letter I received recently from that company:
138 LOSS OF THE TJ.S.S. "THRESHER"
"While we expected to obtain significant benefits from this move, the actual
results achieved to date have been far beyond our expectations. As a result of
this move, communications have been greatly improved among all levels of su-
pervisory personnel and issues can be resolved face to face with shop personnel
in an expeditious manner. We now have considerably less internal memoran-
dums and telephone calls, and we have actually reduced the size of our secretarial
staff.
"The fact that management personnel now have the opportunity to observe
from their office windows most of our manufacturing areas has improved the
attention being given to the work by operating personnel. Further, the close
proximity between engineering and operating personnel has improved relation-
ships and understanding of problems at all levels in the company; this has
resulted in improved quality, better cost control and shorter fabrication time."
Failure of management to meet the standards required by advancing tech-
nology reduces the benefit our Nation obtains from huge investments in research
and development. Of an annual total of about $16 billion, nearly $12 billion
come out of the taxpayer's pocket. The size of these expenditures places a great
responsibility on industry. It must get people into management who have the
competence to make certain that stockholders and taxpayers receive full value
for the money invested in new technology, and that the Nation's technical re-
sources are effectively used. Yet, time and again I have found that management
is reluctant to depart from outdated practices; that it is not informed of what is
actually going on in the plant; that it fails to provide the informed and strong
leadership necessary to bring about improvements in engineering and production.
It is not well enough understood that conventional components of advanced sys-
tems must necessarily meet higher standards. Yet it should be obvious that
failures that would be trivial if they occured in a conventional application will
have serious consequences in a nuclear plant because here radioactivity is in-
volved. Even in the non-nuclear parts of our plants we must have full reliability
if the great endurance of nuclear power is to be realized.
Management has a responsibility not only for successful engineering and pro-
duction in its own plant; it also has a responsibility for accuracy of the data it
supplies. These data are often used by other organizations when they design
components. I recall one case where the elevated temperature mechanical
strength properties of a common material, as given by the manufacturer and
used in the ASMB Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, were found on test to be 30
percent too high. Checking this we discovered that the mechanical properties
data presented as being firm were based on a limited test that had been con-
ducted 10 years previously and on but one heat of material which had been given
but a single fabrication heat treatment. We often found it necessary to run
our own tests to determine the true physical properties of many conventional
materials under varying conditions. And this, despite the fact that these ma-
terials have been in widespread industrial use for over 30 years. This experi-
ence does not speak well of management or of the effectiveness of technical
societies in seeing to it that correct technical data are available, and that sales-
manship does not overshadow technical excellence.
I should like to discuss two areas that are in need of continuous and pains-
taking attention to detail by management, by engineers, and by workmen. These
are:
First, incomplete understanding of basic manufacturing and inspection proc-
esses, and
Second, poor workmanship and poor quality control. Let me give you specific
examples:
1. Incomplete understanding of "basic manufacturing and inspection
processes.—When we design components for nuclear powerplants we make every
effort to utilize existing processes. At first we assumed basic processes that have
been in widespread industrial use for many years would be well understood.
Our experience showed this was ri6t so. I will describe some of the types of
difficulties we constantly encounter. They have to do with faulty welding, faulty
radiography and defective casting; that is, with deficiencies in basic conventional
processes of present-day technology.
The press frequently reports malfunctions of advanced components or systems
caused by failure of a weld, improper use of a routine process, or use of defective
materials. Industry apparently considers such failures to be inevitable, since
not enough is being done to correct the causes. The naval reactors and Ship-
pingport atomic power station programs have had their full share of these
problems.
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 139
There are 99 carbon steel welds in one particular nuclear plant steam system.
The manufacturer stated that all these welds were radiographed and met specifi-
cations. Our own reevaluation of these welds—using correct procedures and
proper X-ray sensitivity-—showed however that only 10 percent met ASME stand-
ards; 35 percent had defects definitely in excess of ASME standards and the
remaining 55 percent had such a rough external surface that the radiographs
obtained could not be interpreted with any degree of assurance. We found this
condition of unsatisfactory welds and improper radiography to be quite prevalent
in many segments of industry. When we insisted that manufacturers meet the
standards which had been established for many years as being necessary, very
high rejection rates for welds resulted. One manufacturer, over a 3-month period,
had to reject 47 percent of all carbon steel welds made in his shop; his rejection
rate for welds made in the field, where conditions were less favorable, was even
higher. In other types of welds a manufacturer had 85 to 100 percent rejection
rates. I would like to emphasize that this unsatisfactory welding situation came
to light only because we demanded that manufacturers prove to us they were
meeting the standards which they themselves had accepted in the contract.
While many of these unsatisfactory welds might be attributed to poor work-
manship, the underlying cause was management's failure to enforce standards.
As a result there has been insufficient incentive to develop new processes and
materials that would consistently produce acceptable welds. The blame for al-
lowing this condition to exist rests squarely with the technical societies responsi-
ble for establishing standards, and with purchasers of equipment who do not
insist that these standards are met.
We need to know a great deal more about welding. Take the case of unex-
plained variation in weldability from one heat of stainless steel to another.
Although stainless steel was developed 50 years ago and has been applied ex-
tensively throughout the world, I am constantly amazed how little is actually
known about this material. Recently we encountered difficulty in welding stain-
less steel forgings for valve bodies; previously there had been no problems with
these forgings. Investigating this we found that early this year the forging
manufacturer had made what he considered a minor change in the composition
of the material to improve its forgeability. His technical people failed to con-
sider that this small change might cause the material to respond differently
in subsequent manufacturing operations. Moreover, they did not even bother to
test a sample forging of the slightly modified material to determine its accepta-
bility. As a result, we now have more than 100 stainless steel forgings which
may have to be scrapped.
Casting is another basic process that is not fully understood. We often
have to order two to three times as many castings as we need, because we have
so much trouble obtaining satisfactory ones. Otherwise we may not have
enough acceptable castings on time. Here is an example of the kind of diffi-
culties we encounter: Two low alloy steel castings, 2.5 feet in diameter and 8
feet in length, were ordered. The castings were of a simple cylindrical shape
and conventional in design. The manufacturer promised a firm delivery date.
The first two castings, however, had to be scrapped because of internal defects.
The manufacturer then made three more castings; these also were unsatisfac-
tory. Because of this experience it became necessary to switch to forgings in
lieu of castings. Meanwhile delivery of the equipment has been greatly delayed.
The case is typical of failure to understand technical casting problems. Had we,
at the start, fully realized how little the manufacturer actually knew about
producing good castings, we could have ordered backup material and prevented
the long delay.
There have been casting problems with other common materials as well:
For instance, we have been unable to obtain certain large valve castings. When
we do receive acceptable castings, this is only after 200 to 300 weld repairs
have been made on each casting. Although this sort of difficulty has existed for
many years, industry has not yet developed adequate techniques for successfully
producing large castings.
Radiography is another basic process of contemporary conventional tech-
nology where we are constantly troubled with problems. Extensive use of
radiography for over 30 years led us to believe that this nondestructive testing
technique for determining soundness of welds and castings was well understood,
and that the sensitivity requirements of existing ASME and Navy specifications
were being met. We found this definitely not to be so. For years many of
these requirements have been consistently violated. In consequence, large
140 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
is that our nuclear submarines have to operate submerged for long periods of
time, even under the polar ice cap where it may not be possible to come to the
surface.
There have been many problems in material identification and control.
Recently a reactor component failed to function properly. The plant had to be
shut down for several weeks in order to remove this component, determine the
cause of failure, and correct it—at considerable expense. We finally traced the
cause of failure to the use of the wrong material in a small pin. The material
actually used was not as hard as the material specified; under adverse conditions
it tended to gall. Yet this component had passed production tests and quality
control inspection. The tests and inspection had obviously not been done prop-
erly. These problems are not unique to nuclear propulsion; similar incidents
occur in other fields, often with serious consequences. The use of a mild steel
pin instead of a special hardened steel pin in a ship's steering gear once caused
collision of two surface ships during a replenishment operation at sea.
Recently we discovered that a stainless steel fitting had been welded into a
nickel-copper alloy piping system. The fitting had been certified by the manu-
facturer as nickel-copper, and had all the required certification data including
chemistry and inspection results. In fact the words "nickel-copper" were actually
etched in the fitting. Yet it was the wrong material. The system was intended
for sea water service; had it been placed in operation with this stainless steel
fitting a serious casualty would have resulted. In checking with other customers
of this manufacturer we found that they too had received fittings of the wrong
material. The manufacturer simply had no effective quality control organiza-
tion. As a result we now have to check every fitting ever supplied by this manu-
facturer. The check is only partially completed, but 12 fittings of incorrect
material have already been discovered.
I feel rather strongly about this problem. On more than one occasion I have
been in a deeply submerged submarine when a failure occurred in a sea-water
system because a fitting was of the wrong material. But for the prompt action
of the crew, the consequences would have been disastrous. In fact I might not
be here today.
Not long ago we discovered a mixup in the marking and packaging of welding
electrodes which also could have had very unfortunate consequences. Welding
electrodes are purchased in cans, each supposedly containing electrodes of only
one type. The cans and the electrodes are individually so marked. Early last
year a shipyard reported that in one can several electrodes differed from the rest,
even though they bore the same color code mark. During the next 3 months, while
we were checking this matter in detail, we detected similar incorrect marking
and packaging of electrodes in cans from nearly every major electrode manu-
facturer in the United States. At our instigation the welding electrode industry
has now adopted an improved method of identifying each type of electrode; and
has also tightened quality control. Here again industry did not fulfill its obli-
gations. There was no reason why these corrective steps should not have been
taken earlier by the manufacturers themselves since this type of electrode mix-
up has been going on for years. What were the technical societies doing?
The cases I have given highlight the need for industry to pay more attention
to proper identification of materials from the time of melting, through the various
fabrication steps and until they are finally installed. Identification must be
such as will readily be understood by inspection groups, and must provide means
for checking the material right through to the final stage of fabrication.
Another quality control problem is caused by failure to follow specified
procedures or drawings. Here is a case in point: Material which had re-
quired a special heat treatment was delivered for a shipboard application.
On examining the records, we found that the material had been processed at
an incorrect temperature and had been in the furnace for an excessive length
of time; also, that the furnace temperature instruments had been out of cali-
bration. The company concerned could not have done much worse. Replace-
ment of this material resulted in considerable delay. In another case we
ordered electrical components that are used to indicate whether a valve is
open or closed. After several hundred of these had been installed several
failures occurred. It was discovered that a small piece of insulation, re-
quired and specified in the drawings, had been left out by the manufacturer.
In order to prevent failure of the installed components, they all had to be
replaced. Again there was delay and additional cost.
Similar cases of poor quality control are prevalent in areas other than
nuclear propulsion; areas where safety is just as important. About 10 per-
142 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
ponents of nuclear plants ought not to be "expected." They reveal human inade-
quacies that must be overcome if this Nation is to be competitive with its Russian
challenger and with the growing power of the European Common Market.
For the first time in our history we face competition without benefit of the spe-
cial advantages we enjoyed in the past: geographic isolation; enormously greater
per capita wealth in land and mineral resources; the largest internal market.
From now on we must excel without these advantages. Population growth
and rapid exhaustion of natural resources leave us in no better position than
Russia; and a united Europe will soon have as large a domestic market as we,
besides possessing great resources in human competence and ingenuity. In
truth, the inefficiencies we could afford in days gone by may now seriously en-
danger our world position.
What I have tried today is to give you an inkling of the factors that hinder
progress in reactor technology and in other new engineering development proj-
ects as well. During the remainder of this 44th Annual National Metals Con-
gress you will be hearing about new advances in many fields, particularly in
metallurgy. But much of the effect of the huge sums we are spending to achieve
these advances will be wasted if problems in conventional and routine areas pre-
vent us from making full use of these advances. It is a commonplace of his-
tory that great undertakings often flounder because of negligence in some small
detail, or because of some minor, obvious and easily corrected mistake.
I submit we must progress, and so we must pay the price of progress. We must
accept the inexorably rising standards of technology and we must relinquish
comfortable routines and practices rendered obsolete because they no longer meet
the new standards.
This is our never-ending challenge.
APPENDIX 4
STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN O. PASTOBE, CHAIRMAN, JOINT COMMITTEE ON
ATOMIC ENERGY, ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE, APRIL 22,1963
Mr. President, on the morning of April 9, at 8 a.m., the SS(N) 593 departed
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to undergo sea trials following extensive shipyard
overhaul. This submarine, the U.S.S. Thresher, under command of Lt. Comdr.
John W. Harvey, had aboard 112 naval personnel and 17 civilians. These men,
who set sail that morning, were never again to see their families and their
loved ones. The following morning, while undergoing a deep test dive, approx-
imately 200 miles off the coast of Cape Cod, the submarine went down with all
hands. I ask unanimous consent to place in the Record at this point the names
of those men, civilians and military, who went down with the Thresher—men
whose names will forever be part of the tradition and history of the U.S. Navy.1
The Nation mourns the loss of this submarine, the first nuclear submarine
to be lost at sea. The submarine, however, can be replaced. What cannot be
replaced are the lives of these 129 Americans. These men are irreplaceable.
A court of inquiry, under Vice Adm. Bernard L. Austin, has been convened,
and since April 11 has been conducting an investigation to ascertain the cause
of the loss. Admiral Austin, an officer experienced in the submarine service, is
assisted on the court by other senior naval officers from the submarine service.
They include Rear Adm. Lawrence Daspit; Capt. James B. Osborne, commanding
officer of the first U.S. Polaris submarine, the U.S.S. George Washington; Capt.
William C. Hushing; and Capt. Norman G. Nash. Capt. 'Saul Katz is counsel
to the court.
The court has been holding hearings at New London, Conn., and Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard. The hearings are in public except where classified information,
is involved.
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy by law is required to make continuing
studies of problems relating to the development, use, and control of atomic
energy. In compliance with this responsibility, as chairman of the Joint Com-
mittee, upon notification of the loss of the Thresher, I sent two senior staff rep-
resentatives to New London, Conn., as official observers to the court of inquiry.
The two staff men—Executive Director John T. Conway and Assistant Di-
rector Edward J. Bauser—have been present during the public and closed ses-
sions as the court of inquiry has been receiving evidence. They traveled with
the court by special military plane from New London, Conn., to Portsmouth, N.H.,
when the court moved the site of investigation on April 12.
1
See p. Ill for list of names.
LOSS OF THE TJ.S.S. "THRESHER" 145
Both of these committee staff men are particularly qualified to follow the course
of the court of inquiry's investigation. Mr. Conway, a naval officer during World
War II, holds a degree in engineering and in law and has been with the Joint
Committee staff nearly 7 years. Mr. Bauser is a retired Navy captain with
22 years of active duty. He holds a master's degree in nuclear engineering from
MIT and actively participated in the development, design, and test of nuclear
submarines, including the first one, the Nautilus.
These two men have been in continuous contact with me and report that they
are receiving the fullest cooperation from the Department of the Navy and the
court of inquiry. All classified information and evidence being obtained by the
court is being made available to the Joint Committee staff. Mr. Conway and
Mr. Bauser advise me that in their opinion the court of inquiry is making every
effort to ascertain the true cause of this terrible accident with the hope and
expectation of preventing similar occurrences in the future. The members of
the court, career Navy officers of the submarine service, have a bond of affinity
with their lost comrades that never can be fully understood by those who have
not shared the common experiences and dangers of the men in the submarine
service. This bond is such that it demands every effort be made to bring forth
all facts and that no stone be left unturned in discovering what the fault or faults
may be.
On April 17, as chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, I repre-
sented the committee at memorial services conducted by Francis Cardinal Spell-
man at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, at the conclusion of which His Eminence
met with the families of the lost men. I cannot describe to you the full depth
of the feelings shared by those who were present at these services and the other
services held that day by Bishop Henry Knox Sherrill of the Episcopal Church.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to place in the Record at the conclu-
sion of my remarks the prayer by Francis Cardinal Spellman and the memorial
message by Bishop Henry Knox Sherrill, together with the eulogy by Bishop
Daniel Feeney. I also request unanimous consent to place in the Record at the
conclusion of my remarks the remarks of Rear Adm. J. Floyd Dreith, USN, Di-
rector of the Chaplains' Division, the remarks by Comdr. Karl G. Peterson,
USN, Protestant chaplain, Lt. Comdr. Keven J. Keaney, USN, Catholic chaplain,
Rabbi Abraham I. Jacobson, and the Honorable Kenneth BeLieu, Assistant Sec-
retary of the Navy, at the memorial services for the U.S.S. Thresher at the Ports-
mouth Naval Shipyard on April 15,1963.
Many articles have been written and will be written in honor of the men of the
U.S.S. Thresher. In a discussion with Vice Admiral Austin, president of the
court of inquiry, at Portsmouth last week, he handed me a copy of an editorial
of the April 13 issue of the New York Times which had been reprinted in the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard newspaper—the Portsmouth Periscope. Admiral
Austin, himself a submariner, described this editorial as symbolizing the true
spirit of the U.S. Navy submarine service. I ask unanimous consent to place the
editorial in the Congressional Record at this point.
Mr. President, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy at 4 p.m. today will
meet in executive session at which time it will receive a report from its
executive director and assistant director, Mr. Conway and Mr. Bauser, as to
the investigation conducted to date by the court of inquiry. Since much
of this information obtained by the court is of a classified nature the Joint Com-
mittee meeting, of necessity, will have to be in executive session, As chairman
of the Joint Committee, I intend to have the committee, through its staff, con-
tinue to follow very closely the investigation of the court. The Joint Committee
has a responsibility to assure that an investigation is properly and thoroughly
conducted. The Joint Committee is particularly concerned that design and
manufacturing standards are adequate to meet the exacting service demanded
by nuclear submarines. Nuclear submarines must be operated as an integral
unit. Standards of all parts must be the highest possible and carefully adhered
to. I can assure the American public and the Congress that the Joint Com-
mittee will closely follow this investigation. I believe, however, the most efficient
manner of obtaining the facts at this time is to permit the court of inquiry to con-
duct its investigation unhampered by parallel congressional investigation. I be-
lieve it is important to permit the comrades of those men lost on the Thresher to
pursue the investigation without interference of other investigations. The Joint
Committee will continue to have representatives of its staff as observers during
the closed, as well as the open, session of the court. I have the assurance of the
full cooperation of the court of inquiry. While the investigation may take a
long time it is important that it be done thoroughly and fully in order that fu-
ture tragedies may be prevented.
146 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
APPENDIX 5
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF REPRESENTATION AT NAVAL
COURT OF INQUIRY
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY,
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
May 28,1963.
Hon. FRED KORTH,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the Joint Committee, I want to thank you
for the assistance rendered by your office in arranging for representation of the
Joint Committee at the naval court of inquiry investigating the loss at sea of
the U.S.S. Thresher on April 10, 1963. Members of the Joint Committee's pro-
fessional staff have been present as observers at the open and closed hearings of
the court and I understand that they have been given access to all information
and evidence received by the court.
It is my understanding that as of May 23, the court of inquiry had no plans to
call further witnesses or to recall previous witnesses although it was indicated
that the need to do so could arise prior to the submission of a final report to the
convening authority. I would like to request that in the event further witnesses
are called, or additional evidence taken, that the Joint Committee be notified so
that I may detail a staff member to be in attendance. In addition, I would
appreciate it if a copy of the testimony taken by the court would be forwarded
to the Joint Committee as soon as convenient. •
The Joint Committee continues to have a strong interest in the circumstances
surrounding the loss of the nuclear submarine Thresher and I would expect
that upon completion of the court's work, a full report will be made available to
the Joint Committee. I regard this as essential in order for the committee to
carry out its functions and fulfill its statutory responsibilities to the Congress and
the American people.
Sincerely yours,
JOHN O. PASTORE, Chairman.
APPENDIX 6
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING FINDINGS OF NAVAL COURT OF INQUIRY
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, D.C., June 20,1963.
Hon. JOHN O. PASTORE,
Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : Herewith is transmitted for information a copy
of the record of the proceedings of the court of inquiry appointed to investigate
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 147
the loss of the U.S.S. Thresher, together with the findings of fact, opinions and
recommendations of the court and the action of the commander in chief, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet, the convening authority. The record is now being routed to the
interested bureaus and offices of the Department for comment prior to final
action on the record.
Your attention is invited to the fact that a considerable portion of the
record is classified, as are certain of the findings and recommendations and
the convening authority's endorsement. The classified portions of this record
contain information affecting the national security and it is of the greatest
importance that it should not be released. Any unauthorized release would
seriously affect our nuclear ship and Polaris programs. For this reason I am
sure that you will agree with me that it is important that no information addi-
tional to that contained in the official press release should reach any unauthorized
persons.
The Judge Advocate General of the Navy is preparing detailed summaries of
the record which will be divided into unclassified material and classified mate-
rial. As soon as these summaries are completed I will forward copies to you
for the use of the committee.
Sincerely yours,
FRED KORTH.
[News release] 1
DEPAETMENT OF DEFENSE,
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIES,
Washington, D.C., June 20,1963.
"THRESHER" COURT OF INQUIRY REPORTS
A flooding casualty in the engineroom is believed to be the "most probable"
cause of the sinking of the nuclear submarine U.S.S. Thresher, lost April 10,
1963, 220 miles east of Cape Cod with 129 persons aboard.
The Navy believes it most likely that a piping system failure had occurred
in one of the Thresher's salt water systems, probably in the engineroom. The
enormous pressure of sea water surrounding the submarine subjected her inte-
rior to a violent spray of water and progressive flooding. In all probability
water affected electrical circuits and caused loss of power. Thresher slowed
and began to sink. Within moments she had exceeded her collapse depth and
totally flooded. She came to rest on the ocean floor, 8,400 feet beneath the
surface.
This opinion of the court of inquiry was made public today by Secretary of
the Navy Fred Korth.
The court, headed by Vice Adm. Bernard L. Austin, U.S. Navy, heard testi-
mony from 120 witnesses, both military and civilian, during the 8 weeks it was
in session at the Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, N.H. It recorded 1,700 pages of
testimony and gathered for the record some 255 charts, drawings, letters, photo-
graphs, directives, debris, and other exhibits bearing on the sinking.
The record of proceedings of the court was delivered last week to the con-
vening authority. Adm. H. Page Smith, U.S. Navy, commander in chief, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet, who transmitted it, with his comments, to the Secretary of the
Navy. Copies of the bulky 12-volume record are now being studied in the
Navy Department by engineers, designers, and experts in nuclear submarine
operations.
The court declared that, in its opinion, "the basic design of the Thresher-
class submarine is good, and its implementation has resulted in the development
of a high-performance submarine."
The bulk of the court's recommendations stated the need for careful review
of the design, construction, and inspection of vital submarine systems, such as
sea water and air systems, and a review of operating procedures to improve
damage control capability under casualty conditions such as flooding.
Certain actions have already been taken. For example, the Navy's Bureau
of Ships is applying a newly developed inspection technique to assure the integrity
of high pressure piping systems on all naval ships. Based upon ultrasonic
principles, the new method is being employed initially on nuclear submarines.
Personnel training and ultrasonic inspection equipment familiarization are
necessary and some rescheduling of submarine construction dates and overhaul
intervals will be required.
1
Furnished to the Joint Committee on July 1, 1963. See p. 155.
148 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
Much of the testimony heard by the court was received in closed session
and its overall report is classified "secret" to prevent disclosure of the capa-
bilities of the Navy's nuclear submarine force. Secretary Korth has authorized
the release of the following portions of the record which do not contain secret
information:
Among its opinions, the court stated that "the evidence does not establish
that the deaths of those embarked in Thresher were caused by the intent, fault,
negligence, or inefficiency of any person or persons in the naval service or
connected therewith."
The court also reported there was no evidence of sabotage or hostile action
in connection with the loss of Thresher. In addition, the court found that
there was no indication of increased radioactivity in the search area. Debris
recovered was also found to be free of radioactive material.
The record states that it is impossible, with the information now available,
to obtain a more precise determination of what actually happened.
The court did, however, offer a "reasonable rationalization of probable events"
which, when pieced together with known facts, provide the following chronology
of the death of the Thresher:
The Thresher, under command of Lt. Comdr. John W. Harvey, U.S. Navy,
departed Portsmouth Naval Shipyard on the morning of April 9, 1963, to conduct
scheduled sea trials following an overhaul period which extended from July
16, 1962, to April 11, 1963. Thresher was a unit of Submarine Development
Group 2 and was operating under the orders of commander, Submarine Force,
U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Administration) Portsmouth, for the sea trials. One
hundred and twenty-nine persons were aboard Thresher for the purpose of
executing official duties. Included in this number were 3 officers and 13 civilian
employees of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard; 1 officer from the staff of the
deputy commander, Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet; 4 civilian contractor's
representatives, and 12 officers and 96 enlisted men of the ship's company.
U.S.S. Skylark, commanded by Lt. Comdr. Stanley Hecker, U.S. Navy, was
designated to act as escort to Thresher during sea trials and effected a rendez-
vous with the submarine at 9 :49 a.m. on April 9 in the vicinity of latitude 42°
56' N, longitude 70° 26' W. Upon completion of a scheduled shallow dive, the
two ships proceeded independently during the night to a second rendezvous in
the vicinity of latitude 41° 46' N., longitude 65° 03' W. During this transit,
Thresher proceeded both submerged and surfaced and conducted various test
evolutions, including full power propulsion.
At 7:45 a.m. on April 10, the two ships were at the rendezvous point, separated
by a distance of 3,400 yards. The sea was calm with a slight swell. Wind
was from the north-northeast at 7 knots. Visibility was about 10 miles. No
other ships are known to have been in the vicinity.
Two minutes later, at 7 a.m., Thresher reported by underwater telephone
that she was starting a deep dive. Skylark maintained her approximate position
while Thresher reported course and depth changes as she maneuvered beneath
the surface. To personnel aboard Skylark, the dive appeared to be progressing
satisfactorily until about 9:13 a.m., when Thresher reported "Experiencing
minor difficulties. Have positive up angle. Am attempting to blow. Will keep
you informed."
Listeners aboard Skylark next heard sounds of compressed air rushing into
the submarine's ballast tanks as Thresher sought to regain the surface.
Three minutes later, at about 9:16 a.m., Skylark heard a garbled trans-
mission which was believed to contain the words "* * * test depth."
Upon receiving Thresher's message that she was experiencing minor difficulty,
her escort ship Skylark advised Thresher that the area was clear. She an-
nounced her own course and requested range and bearings from the sub-
marine. At about 9:15 a.m., Skylark asked Thresher "Are you in control?" and
repeated this query. At 9:21 a.m., Skylark established her position by loran as
latitude 42°45' N., longitude 64°59' W. She continued her attempts to com-
municate with Thresher by underwater telephone, sonar, and radio. Then, at
10:40 a.m., Skylark commenced dropping a series of hand grenades as a signal to
Thresher that she should surface. Skylark then sent a message to commander,
Submarine Development Group 2 reporting that she had lost contact with the
submarine.
The court of inquiry concluded that the Skylark's message "did not convey to
operational commanders the full extent of the information available." Lieu-
tenant Commander Hecker was named a party to the investigation but, in the
LOSS OF THE TJ.S.S. "THRESHER" 149
opinion of the court, Skylark's actions "could not conceivably have contributed in
any way to the loss of Thresher. * * *"
"The tragic loss of Thresher has caused the Navy to review in minute detail the
design, construction, operation, and overhaul of our nuclear submarines," Sec-
retary Korth said. "We have found nothing to cast doubt on the basic soundness
of the program, but in every analysis of a major catastrophe at sea, lessons are
learned. The record of proceedings of the court of inquiry headed by Vice Ad-
miral Austin is receiving most careful and detailed scrutiny. It will undoubtedly
serve to lessen the hazards inherent in operating beneath the sea."
RECEIVED FEOM DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, JUNE 25,1963,
SUMMARY OF EVENTS CONCERNING Loss AT SEA OF U.S.S. "THRESHER"
On April 10,1963, Adm. Robert L. Dennison, U.S. Navy, commander in chief,
U.S. Atlantic Fleet, ordered a court of inquiry to inquire into the circumstances
of the loss at sea of the U.S.S. Thresher (SS(N)-593) on April 10, 1963. The
court included Vice Adm. Bernard L. Austin, U.S. Navy, president, and the
additional members: Rear Adm. Lawrence R. Daspit, U.S. Navy; Capt. William
C. Hushing, U.S. Navy; Capt. James B. Osborne, U.S. Navy; and Capt. Norman
C. Nash, U.S. Navy. Capt. Saul Katz, U.S. Navy, was designated to serve as
counsel for the court.
The court met for the first time at 8:25 p.m. on Thursday, April 11, 1963.
Before the court closed on June 5, 1963, it heard 179 separate appearances of
witnesses and had occasion to recall 56 witnesses. The court developed 1,718
pages of testimony and received as exhibits in evidence 255 separate offers.
Among the witnesses who testified were Vice Adm. Hyman G. Rickover. U.S.
Navy, Bureau of Ships; Vice Adm. William R. Smedberg III, Chief of Naval Per-
sonnel; Vice Adm. Elton W. Grenfell, commander, Submarine Force, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet; Rear Adm. Lawson P. Rarnage, deputy commander, Submarine
Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; Rear Adm. William A. Brockett, Chief, Bureau
of Ships; Rear Adm. Ralph K. James, U.S. Navy, special assistant to the
Secretary of the Navy; Rear Adm. Charles J. Palmer, commander, Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard; and Rear Adm. Robert L. Moore, Chief, Office of Industrial
Relations. Comdr. Dean L. Axene, U.S. Navy, the former commanding officer
of Thresher, was questioned by the court very early in its proceedings and pro-
vided valuable background information.
The court considered many aspects of the circumstances surrounding
Thresher's loss in light of present day complexity of the modern submarine.
Information was developed regarding Thresher's construction, her postcommis-
sioning operations, and her postshakedown yard availability, in addition to
the operations at sea which resulted in Thresher's ultimate loss. The following
detailed determinations by the court of inquiry provide significant information
concerning the tragic loss of the Navy's first of a new class of nuclear-powered
attack submarines with her crew of 12 officers and 96 men and 21 additional
passengers on official business, 17 of whom were highly qualified civilian
employees.
"THRESHER" OPERATIONS AT SEA, APRIL 9 AND 10
Thresher, under the command of Lt. Comdr. J. W. Harvey, U.S. Navy, departed
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard on the morning of April 9, 1963, to conduct sched-
uled sea trials following a postshakedown availability which extended from
July 16,1962, to April 11,1963.
Thresher was a unit of Submarine Development Group 2, and was operating un-
der the orders of commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Adminis-
tration), Portsmouth, for the sea trials.
U.S.S. Skylark (ASR-20), under command of Lt. Comdr. Stanley Hecker, U.S.
Navy, was designated to act as escort to Thresher during sea trials, pursuant to
orders of commander, Submarine Flotilla 2. Commanding officer, Thresher, was
officer in tactical command of the two vessels.
At about 9:49 a.m. on April 9,1963, in the vicinity of latitude 42°56' N., longi-
tude 70°26' W., Thresher affected a rendezvous with Skylark. After Thresher
completed a scheduled shallow dive, the two ships proceeded independently dur-
ing the night to a second rendezvous in the vicinity of latitude 41°46' N., longi-
tude 65° 03' W. During transit, Thresher proceeded, surfaced, and submerged and
conducted various test evolutions, including full power propulsion.
34-920—65 11
150 LOSS OF THE U.8.S. "THRESHER"
At 7 :45 a.m., April 10, 1963, Skylark was in the vicinity of latitude 41°46' N.,
longitude 65°03' W., and Thresher reported to her that Skylark bore 147° true,
3,400 yards from Thresher. Shortly thereafter Thresher began a deep dive which
appeared to Skylark personnel to proceed satisfactorily until about 9 :13 a.m.,
when Thresher reported to Skylark to the effect, "Experiencing minor difficulties.
Have positive up angle. Am attempting to blow. Will keep you informed." After
this last clear message, Skylark received two further garbled communications.
At 9 a.m. on April 10, 1963, the sea was calm, with a slight swell. Wind was
from 015° true at 7 knots. Depth of water in this area is about 8,500 feet. Visi-
bility was about 10 miles. No other ships are known to have been in the vicinity.
Thresher was lost at sea with all on board at about 9 :18 a.m. on April 10, 1963,
in the vicinity of latitude 41°45' N., longitude 65°00' W. There was no evidence
of sabotage or enemy action in connection with the loss of Thresher.
"SKYLARK'S" ACTIONS DURING OPERATIONS WITH "THRESHER"
Upon receipt of Thresher's 9:13 a.m. communication—"Experiencing minor dif-
ficulties * * *" etc.—Skylark initiated certain actions. She advised Thresher of
Skylark's course and that the area was clear, and she requested range and bearing
from Thresher. At about 9:15 a.m., Skylark, in an attempt to establish communi-
cation not only by sonar and radio but also by underwater telephone, asked and
repeated this query: "Are you in control?" Skylark established its loran position
(logged at 9:21 a.m., as 41°45' N., 64°59' W.), and at 10:40 a.m. commenced
dropping a series of hand grenades indicating to Thresher that she should surface.
At about 10:45 a.m. the commanding officer, Skylark directed the operations
officer to initiate a message reporting the loss of contact with Thresher. Diffi-
culty was encountered with transmission of the message to DEL (Radio New
London), notwithstanding the fact that Skylark had conducted radio communica-
tion checks earlier that morning.
At 12:45 p.m. New London receipted for Skylark's message which stated: "Un-
able to communicate with Thresher since 0917R. Have been calling by UQO voice
and CW QHB CW every minute; explosive signals every 10 minutes with no suc-
cess. Last transmission received was garbled. Indicated Thresher was ap-
proaching test depth. My present position 41°43' N., 64°57' W. conducting ex-
panding search."
Therefore, Skylark's message did not convey to operational commanders the full
extent of the information then available, nor did any of Skylark's subsequent
reports include such additional information. Moreover, Thresher's last messages
were not disclosed to higher authority until April 12, when Lt. (j.g.) James D.
Watson, navigator of Skylark, boarded the U.S.S. Blandy with the underwater
telephone log which was examined by deputy commander, Submarine Force,
U.S. Atlantic Feet. However, the court of inquiry formed the opinion that
Skylark's commanding officer's failure to promptly notify higher authority of all
the information available to him pertinent to the circumstances attending the
last transmission received by Skylark from Thresher on April 10, as it was his
duty to do, did not contribute in any way to the loss of Thresher and was not
materially connected therewith.
THE SEAECH FOR "THRESHER"
Deputy commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (Rear Adm. L. P.
Ramage, U.S. Navy) was en route to New London, Conn., from Key West, Fla.,
and arrived at Trumbull Airport, Groton, Conn., at about 6:30 p.m. Upon noti-
fication of Thresher's status, he proceeded by helicopter to Newport, R.I., and
embarked in the U.S.S. Blandy to proceed to the scene of the search.
Command of the search force passed from commanding officer, Skylark, to com-
mander, Submarine Development Group 2 at about 5:30 a.m. on April 11, 1963,
and was subsequently exercised, for varying and consecutive periods, by deputy
commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; commander, Submarine De-
velopment Group 2; and commander, Submarine Squadron 8.
Shortly after 9:17 a.m., April 10, when efforts to communicate with Thresher
had been unsuccessful, Skylark commenced an expanding search pattern. Sonar
was the principal means of underwater detection available to Skylark. Patrol
aircraft and the U.S.S. Recovery (ARS-43) joined Skylark in the search area
during the afternoon.
At about 5:30 p.m., Recovery sighted an oil slick about 7 miles to the southeast
of Skylark's 9:17 a.m. position. Samples were collected and articles of debris
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 151
were recovered* These items and debris subsequently recovered were examined
by laboratory personnel of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard and were determined
to be materials which could have come from Thresher.
Radiation measurements were taken in the search area by surface ships and
submerged submarines, and the water samples and recovered debris, examined
by laboratory personnel, were found to contain no radioactivity beyond normal
background level.
As the search for Thresher continues naval units and personnel are being as-
sisted by civilian scientists and research ships.
CONSTRUCTION OF "THRESHER"
The bulk of the court's recommendations stated the need for careful review
of the design, construction, and inspection of vital submarine systems, such as
sea water and air systems, and a review of operating procedures to improve
damage control capability under casualty conditions such as flooding.
The court recommended that the quality assurance program at Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard be further emphasized and improved in scope along the lines
indicated in the court's opinions.
Further, the Bureau of Ships should require submarine shipbuilding activities
to adhere to specifications, and to obtain from it approval for all waivers where
this is not practicable. The Bureau of Ships should increase its audit activity to
insure adherence to specifications for submarine building, overhaul, and repair.
Early consideration should be given to the establishment of an organiza-
tion, similar to that employed in naval aviation, in the interest of safe sub-
marine operating procedures. Such an organization should be responsible for the
analysis of events and developments which pertain to submarine safety and
the timely dissemination of such information.
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 155
APPENDIX 7
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING DELAY IN SCHEDULE AND Loss OF RADIOGRAPHS OF
U.S.S. "TlNOSA"
"TINOSA" INFORMATION
The Navy today announced that the Tinosa (SSN-606) now under construc-
tion at the Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, N.H., has been ordered drydocked for
the purpose of taking additional radiographs of certain hull sections.
These additional radiographs are necessary because a block of radiographs
has been misplaced. Such documentation is required not only before the ship-
yard commander may certify the ship as ready for sea but also as a matter of
permanent record.
The commissioning of Tinosa previously scheduled for June 15 will be delayed
for several weeks. The delay has no relationship to the loss of U.S.S. Thresher.
APPENDIX 8
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING CLASSIFICATION OP INFORMATION RELATING TO THE
Loss OF U.S.S. "THRESHER"
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, D.C., August IS, 1963.
Mr. JOHN T. CONWAY,
Executive Director, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the
United States, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CONWAY : I am returning one copy of the transcript of the executive
session hearing before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on July 23, 1963.
160 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
This copy indicates those editorial changes which are considered desirable by
the witnesses concerned.
In addition to a review of the July 23 transcript for editorial changes, you
requested that the transcripts for June 26 and 27, and July 23 be reviewed for
classification and marked to indicate the specific information which is classified
for security reasons. After a thorough review and most careful consideration
of the situation, I do not believe it is in the best interests of the Navy to under-
take any declassification action at this time. I consider the entire subject
classified, and until the Court of Inquiry records have been reviewed, and the
hearing completed. I would be loath to release portions of the hearings. Such
patchwork release allows testimony to be taken out of context and, as you are
well aware, could be damaging to public confidence in the Navy. . At a later date,
I believe that declassification of portions of the testimony could be undertaken,
ami I would be most pleased to work with your staff.
Accordingly, I ask your understanding and assistance in this matter.
Sincerely yours,
FEED KORTH.
Enclosure: (1) Transcript of the executive session hearing, Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, July 23, 1963, re: loss of the U.S.S. Thresher (Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy Classified Document No. 7675 copy 2 of 10 A).
The Navy court of inquiry that investigated the Thresher case believed that a
piping failure subjected the interior of the Thresher to "a violent spray of water
and progressive flooding" that "in all probability" flooded electrical circuits and
caused a loss of power.
The court's findings and the current restudy were influenced by the fact that
piping failures and part floodings have occurred in a number of U.S. subma-
rines in recent years. None of them, except the Thresher, have involved loss of
the submarine or of life.
None of them involved nuclear reactors and none of them resulted in the re-
lease of any radioactivity. All of these materiel failures were checked or com-
pensated for before major damage was done.
The intensive reexamination of nuclear .submarines—built, building and
planned—is just starting. It has found nothing so far, Secretary of the Navy
Fred Korth noted, "to cast doubt on the basic soundness of the program" or on
the nuclear reactors, or on the general shape of the now standard, tear-dropped
shape, or shark-shaped, hull form. Rather, it is taking the form of a scien-
tific and engineering "who-done-it" to discover why such failures occur and how
they can be minimized.
RESEARCH IS STIMULATED
The studies have been greatly stimulated by the Thresher's loss. However, the
Navy Bureau of Ships, research departments of various industries, oceanographic
institutes and Government and private laboratories already had been engaged
for some years in wide-ranging studies directed toward submarines capable of
cruising silently at greater and greater speeds and greater and greater depths
with greater and greater safety.
These studies have involved new concepts. The experimental submarine
Albacore, for instance, was fitted with dive brakes and a drag parachute, which
was released from the top of the sail, or superstructure, to test the effects upon
underwater maneuvering and rate of descent.
The highest priority is now being given to checking all submarines for struc-
tural integrity, particularly high-pressure piping and safety features. Until
these checkouts are completed, arbitrary depth limits have been established that
are considerably less than the test depths for which operating submarines have
been designed.
The complex nature of this inspection task is brought about by the changes
in submarine design that nuclear power has caused. Conventional submarines
utilize electric batteries that supply power to electric motors for submerged cruis-
ing.
The fission of nuclear materials simply provides heat that must be transformed
into energy that can be harnessed to the submarine's propeller shafts. This
is done by utilizing the heat generated by fission to change fresh water into steam
in a heat exchanger, or boiler. The steam is then used to drive conventional
turbines geared to the propeller shafts.
FRESH WATER IS REUSED
Any such steamplant utilizes the fresh water in its system over and over.
After the steam expands through the turbine blades, it is piped back to a con-
denser, where it is cooled and, in the form of water, passes into the heat ex-
changer or boiler once again in a closed-cycle system. The cooling in the con-
denser is done by passing the steam over pipes filled with cool seawater.
Thus, the development of nuclear power meant that a maze of piping—much
more than in an electric-powered submarine and all of it open to sea pressure—
had to penetrate the strong pressure hull of the submarine and be routed through
her interior.
In addition to the sea water for the condenser, other high-pressure piping
is used for the evaporators, which make fresh water from salt water; for the
ship's toilet system; for air lines to ballast tanks; and for some other purposes.
Thus, to a far greater degree than the old electric battery submarines the
nuclear submarine not only has the tremendous pressure of the sea outside the
hull, hut also inside in high-pressure piping, bending and curving through the
ship.
FASTER CRUISING SPEEDS
Moreover, the submarine has been built to cruise much faster and far deeper
than its World War II predecessors. The greater the depth, the more difficult
162 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
the problems. Packing boxes around the propeller shafts, piping joints and
piping and the hull itself are subjected to tremendous pressures—more than 44
pounds a square inch for each 100 feet of depth.
For these reasons the complexity of the task of insuring safety has greatly
increased. The maze of piping presents the major problem to date. There are
more than 3,000 pipe joints in the nuclear submarine. During construction
each of these joints and the pipe itself is carefully inspected and tested by
several methods. The pipe joints are formed by welding, wherever space, which
is precious in the constricted interior of a submarine, permits, or by a process
called silver brazing, where space is limited.
Welding provides a built-up seam with new metal joining the two ends to-
gether ; silver brazing, utilizing a silver alloy, is a physical bonding of the two
ends of the pipe with the application of heat, somewhat similar to soldering.
There are various types of pipe joints, some inherently stronger than others.
No one type, because of space and other reasons, can be used for all purposes.
Welding normally is a somewhat stronger process than silver brazing, but both
have been used successfully for some years for joining high-pressure piping.
Silver brazing, however, is not used for joining high-pressure steam lines. The
developed inspection techniques for welded joints offer a much higher guarantee
of a good joint than do those for a brazed joint.
JOINTS ARE INSPECTED
In construction, physical inspection of the joint is the first step. A trained
inspector can tell a good deal by looking at a welded or brazed joint. X-ray or
gamma ray photography is then used on all welded joints to take a picture of the
cellular condition of the metal. Trained operators are required to read the photo-
graphs.
X-rays cannot be used for brazed joints, but ultrasonic inspection—the utili-
zation of sound energy passing through the joint and the measurement on an
oscilloscope of the reflected sound waves—can give a trained operator a picture
of a sound or faulty joint.
After these inspections, there are various Slowdown and hydrostatic tests.
It has been found that even fine dust left in a piping system may jam or slow
the closing of a high-pressure valve, ground to fine tolerances. High-pressure air
blows out the system. The piping and the joints are then subjected to hydro-
static pressure tests—that is, water is pumped in under a pressure equivalent
to that to which the submarine and her high-pressure sea water piping would
be subjected at the deepest depth at which she will normally operate, and then
at her crushing depth.
In addition to this inspection procedure during construction, the pipe metals
themselves and some sample joints are tested again and again to the breaking
point under extreme hydrostatic pressure to determine the effect of metal fatigue.
It is this kind of testing that is now being done on all U.S. nuclear submarines.
The testing will extend ship overhaul periods, but it will not materially interfere
with the Polaris submarines now on patrol and with the operating schedules of
attack submarines. The inspection will be done as each returns to the yard for
overhaul. Lagging is stripped off all pipes and any suspected weak joints will
be replaced.
HULL SECTIONS X-RAYED
At the same time, hull sections will be X-rayed to discover any deterioration.
Any modifications in design—such as the relocation, or protection, of electrical
switchboards from exposure to flooding by broken piping than can be made will
be made.
More major design changes will be incorporated in submarines not yet built.
But just what they will entail no one can now say. So much has to be packed
into a small hull in a submarine, and a submarine is subjected to so many
stresses—the exact nature of some of them unknown—that any design must
represent a compromise between optimum combat effectiveness and optimum
safety. Diving deep into the sea at great depths is inherently hazardous, as
every submarine sailor knows; the problem is what level of risk should the
designer accept.
But it is already rather clear that future submarine designs will reduce mate-
rially the number of piping joints. The chances of failure, some designers
believe, are multiplied by the number of joints. The quality control of work-
LOSS OF THE TJ.S.S. "THRESHER" 163
The Navy believes that these, and many other developments, may make possible
test depths for operating submarines (as distinct from research and development
submarines) of a maximum of about 4,000 feet in the period of 1970-80. Many
officers see no combat or military requirement for any greater depth capability,
but some disagree.
In any event, the present and future designs and capabilities of the Navy's sub-
marines are now being put under the microscope. A board of experts and sub-
marine "elder statesmen"—including naval officers and civilian scientists—has
been established under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and
Development. It is called the Deep Submergence Systems Review Group and is
headed by Rear Adm. E. C. Stephan, a former Navy oceanographer.
164 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
In my view, the Navy's refusal to identify specific areas of the Thresher tran-
script which are classified is based, in part, on a desire to withhold information
which rightly belongs in the public domain. There can be no satisfactory justi-
fication for this attitude.
Accordingly, should the Navy persist in its refusal to identify those areas of
the Thresher transcript which are classified, I plan to initiate action leading
to the preparation of a report on the Thresher hearings, pursuant to the duty and
authority vested in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy by sections 202 and
206 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Your prompt attention to this matter will be appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
CLINTON P. ANDERSON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Security.
APPENDIX 9
CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY JOINT
COMMITTEE
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
February 5,1964-
Mr. JOHN T. COWWAY,
Executive Director,
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Congress of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CONWAY : Recently several members of your staff enumerated various
areas of interest concerning the Thresher hearings about which the Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy was desirous of obtaining additional information.
Accordingly, I have had material assembled on those specific items mentioned
and am enclosing it herewith for your information. In addition to this material,
it was requested that your staff be given a personal briefing by Rear Admiral
Stephan pertaining to his work in hull tests, search, and rescue vessels. As
the admiral has not conducted investigations in the area of hull tests, this por-
tion of your request is not entirely clear. Hull tests currently specified for
submarines are contained in shipbuilding specifications and the Bureau of Ships'
technical manual. If this is the type of information which is desired by the
Joint Committee, it can be provided on your request.
,It is hoped that the enclosed information meets the requirements of your
committee on this matter. You may be assured that the Navy is most pleased to
cooperate with you in this manner, and you will be informed with regard to fu-
; ifcure changes that are considered significant.
Sincerely yours,
PAUL H. NITZE,
Secretary of the Navy.
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 167
APPENDIX 10
THE NEED FOK A HIGH IQ (INTEGRITY-QUALITY)
Remarks by Rear Adm. Charles A. Curtze, U.S. Navy Deputy Chief of the Bureau
of Ships at the Ninth Annual Gas Turbine Conference and Products Show
sponsored by the Gas Turbine Power Division of the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Houston, Tex., March 4,1964
Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, gentlemen, ordinarily you might expect
me to talk about gas turbines or some new, intricate, and interesting device and
how it does its job for the Navy. I am not—I am going to tell you what you are
going to have to do for me if I am going to be successful in my job.
I need primarily a high IQ—I need ship and component integrity and quality
and you, gentlemen, representing the scope of industrial disciplines that you do,
are going to provide it for me.
Today, I propose to tell you how the Navy is going to extract it from you
because, in recent years, as I will point out later, IQ has not necessarily been
automatically discharged without a lot of pump priming. We simply cannot
tolerate or afford deficiencies in Navy ships and equipment. Too much is at
stake. Frankly, our ships are not all we would like them to be, and further,
are not all we know how to make them be and lastly, intend to make them be.
We are faced with critical operating and maintenance problems due to the
introduction of ultracomplex systems into the fleet. Many of these new systems
are not performing to promise because they are not reliable and are difficult to
maintain. There are a number of remedial actions we can take to bring these
problems under control. The purpose of my remarks here today is to plead for
intelligent help from you through generating an understanding of Navy problems
that you, as engineers, can do something about solving.
170 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
During a 1-year period over 9,000 items were found deficient. These 9,000
were supplied by some 270 manufacturers. This also made it clear that some-
thing was wrong with us, too. At least specification precision was lacking;
inspection less rigorous than necessary. The sweat needed to do things right
just is not being generated.
Checks in building yards disclosed material errors indicating poor control in
manufacturers' plants, and our own. We seemed to have lost the control we
needed to guarantee the kind of product we required. It was painfully ap-
parent that we could no longer depend on the methods of the past. I feel we
got a bit sloppy as an industrial nation—a tendency to engineer price or profit
and not value?
Admiral Rickover, who has addressed himself with force and effect on many
occasions to this area, summed this up as clearly as I have seen it anywhere as
follows:
"In many instances it is impossible to 'inspect' for the desired quality in
complex equipment, especially after the equipment has been fabricated. The
desired quality must be built into the equipment during all stages of design
and manufacture. No amount of inspection can fully assure the desired quality;
further, it is impracticable for the purchaser to duplicate all inspections and
checks that have to be made by the manufacturer. Therefore, in the procure-
ment of high-quality complex equipment it is most important that the purchaser
assure himself that the manufacturer he selects is not only capable of providing
equipment having the desired quality, but, whenever possible, is actually deliver-
ing similar high-quality equipment."
So much for how we got where we are and what's wrong. What's the fix?
The guiding thesis in our solution of these difficulties is first to establish an
orderly and systematic description of them. We think we can cope with these
difficulties once we have measured them and have established a solid quantita-
tive basis on which to build. We want to do away with vague will-o'-the-wisp
opinion surveys and reports and come up with good, solid figures and facts. We
are now making real progress along this road and have started in the education
of our own people and industry in what we are trying to do. Unfortunately, our
problem is not a simple one, for we have had to apply the most advanced tech-
nology to provide modern ships in support of our national position as a sea-
power. We are certain that we must have these systems to have the seagoing
fighting force the Nation needs.
Now every young engineer is dedicated to the thought that technology is a
wonderful thing but pragmatically it is not always an unmixed blessing. At
any time, the new nuclear-powered, missile-equipped, jet-age Navy is in danger
of bogging down in technological quicksand if we don't manage; properly—this
concerns me to motivate you.
It is no national secret that the necessary increases in combat, capability
of our ships and equipment have been won thus far with concurrent skyrocketing
costs and almost overwhelming complexity. We have invested heavily in the
technical promises for improved systems and in the process we traded off some
older and in most cases more reliable systems to get them. Those were the
tradeoffs. What happened to the payoffs? Unfortunately, some are still in
the state of promise and not yet performance.
I have already given you some illustrations of essentially engineering inade-
quacies in a number of areas. I will also describe some of the systematic
approaches we have recently given renewed credence to help us eliminate our
troubles.
I mentioned earlier that the roles have changed—technology is advancing
so rapidly, particularly in the missiles systems areas that we have been hard
pressed to develop parameters for material support or eqipment maintenance.
Our standard maintenance management program is designed to fill this heed.
We think the Bureau of Ships design work-study program gives us the start
we need to insure a ship system that can in fact be controlled from design through
delivery to operational dependability. It helps point out the areas of large,
quick, cheap, and easy return—we can initially attack where the payoffs are
greatest; it sets the relatively bloodless stones in good perspective—we don't
waste time squeezing them.
172 LOSS OF THE U.8.S. "THRESHER"
The increase in space and complement required by the new systems to meet
the new threats caused ships growth to the extent that a present-day escort ship
is bigger than most World War II destroyers. The new systems have improved
the eyes, ears, and kill capabilities of the new ships but the price in greater cost
in men and money was high. The complex new systems brought with them
difficult problems in maintenance, reliability, and communications.
Design work study is basically a logical, systematic, factfinding method of
determining the requirements for effectively operating and maintaining a ship—
how it can best be done, by whom and how fast. Just how complex a ship do
we need? Can we go conservative to maintain the basic ship and machinery
with lower levels of skills and fewer men? What are the optimum machinery
arrangements for easy maintainability? Do we need complicated feed systems
and high pressure lube oil systems when a return to lower pressures, lower
bearing loadings permit us to get along with familiar, tried and true hardware,
carbon moly pipe, horizontal blowers? Is the price in tonnage too much to pay?
Size, per se, really is the cheapest thing we build into a ship. It's what occupies
the larger volume that costs money.
The first ship design using the work study approach was the escort ship in
the Navy's 1964 program. The new approach resulted in an initial weight saving
of about 300 tons. This paid off in room for equipment and systems that sig-
nificantly increased the operational capability while permitting a substantial
reduction of personnel.
Because of the excellent results obtained with this ship, design work study
is now being applied to the design of a tank landing ship (LST) and a submarine
tender (AS) in our 1965 program. We envision design work study as a way
of life in ship design by 1970.
Considerations of maintenance and logistic support of our work studied ship
caused us to dust off the reports of World War II "automatic flow of spare
parts," from which we never really recovered but merely walked away from, and
progressive maintenance. We found we had no "use data" for the new equip-
ment in our ships.
The standard maintenance management system gave us the tool. This
really is not a new idea to the Navy or to industry. What started in 1947 as a
punch card operation, for systems sake, has come into its own—been given the
support to make it fly.
The new program set up by the Fleet Maintenance Division of the Chief of
Naval Operations was established specifically to define what maintenance had to
be done and when—and to provide a system which would allow complete control—
yet be clutched rather than geared to possible changes in the operating schedules.
Although only about a year old, this program is paying off in more than 200
ships. We are now able to get the shipwork done with existing personnel in
less time. Breakdowns are on the decline, weak links in the components defined
and corrective action possible.
This gives us a formal line management and technical feedback system that
will provide the fleet, Chief of Naval Operations, technical bureaus and you with
the data each of us needs to improve and control our singular efforts. As you
would guess—the most difficult part of this development is not so much defin-
ing what we need to know as learning how to get this data factually from our
sailors. They are still disposed to fix and forget.
One of the facts of our lives is competitive procurement. It's always men-
tioned in the same breath with low costs. It does give everyone a chance but
it complicates logistic support. There is always conflict between "inital buy"
and "cradle to grave" thinking.
The maintenance management program is expected to reduce casualties by
at least 50 percent through the accomplishment of engineered preventive main-
tenance. This in turn will reduce spare parts burnup and costs; the feedback
will provide us with data to assist in making more sensible buys and reduce
initial buys for new ships. A spinoff of the hoped for reduction in complexity
of basic plant hits at the heart of spare parts requirements.
To attack the problem of increased numbers and caliber of men on our ships,
both programs are involved. Work study integrates men with equipment, sys-
tems, and spaces and already has reduced the numbers of men required to
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 173
operate our ships. On the other hand, the maintenance management program
has materially reduced the maintenance time required of our sailors—lowered
the level of skill to accomplish the preventive maintenance tasks. A fringe
benefit is the reduction in training requirements and costs.
We intend to assure ourselves of "cradle to the grave" control. You control
your contributions for us. It would be quite impossible and in fact, from our
respective points of view, not only undesirable but unnecessary to have it other-
wise. Our quality assurance program is a planned and systematic pattern of
actions necessary to provide confidence that the product will perform satis-
factorily. This definition envisions progress that will insure quality at each
stage the product goes through we will require the control systems by spec and
conduct audits for adequacy and conformity. This is a touchy point but the
facts support the requirement.
As the most important outgrowth of these things, we will have the information
on which to base and support our specification requirements. Our specifications
never were goals, they were and are requirements. There will be no waivers of
them as such. If a change is supported by sound engineering logic, we will
change the specification. We are thinking about extending the use of non-
deviation plans in areas where the payoff is worth it.
We are going increasingly into full-scale space mockups to insure engineering
maintainability and planned easy replacement of components when necessary.
From these we are extending the use of dimensioned drawings—less and less
will be left to pipefitters' choice or chance.
You may ask—how can you talk of cost effectiveness and engineered value in
the face of all this? We are buying maintainability, reliability and long life.
We thought we were still getting it—we weren't. Our yardstick for cost is ship
life cost as opposed to initial buy. One of the least used tools of value engi-
neering is conservative engineering, at least let's use it where we can.
In summary, there is no single magic system that will assure this high IQ.
No matter how sharp the tools, they can only be used effectively if all personnel
involved are diligent. Top management must be attentive and relentless in nit
picking the details involved.
Effectiveness is in this case—as in all worthwhile things—largely propor-
tional to the sweat expended.
We are underway—I ask you to join, we need your help.
APPENDIX 11
April 10,1964.
FLOOR STATEMENT BY CONGRESSMAN OHET HOLIFIELD : IN HONOR OF THOSE WHO
WERE LOST IN "THRESHER"
On the morning of April 10, 1963, the nuclear submarine, Thresher, was lost
at sea, 200 miles off Cape Cod, while undergoing a series of test dives.
Exactly 1 year has passed since the tragic loss of the Thresher and the 129
brave men who were lost with her. In this past year, the 129 men of the Thresher
have become part of the history of American heroes who have given their lives
in the defense of freedom.
Yet, it is not enough to merely pay tribute to these men, for tributes—no mat-
ter how heartfelt—are only words. We must learn something from this tragedy so
that similar tragedies will not occur.
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, of which I am vice chairman, held
extensive hearings last year on the events surrounding the loss of the Thresher.
Our main objective was to assure that all measures were being taken to prevent
a similar tragedy. The record of the hearings was classified for security reasons,
but the Joint Committee has made every attempt to have the unclassified infor-
mation made public. Recently, the Secretary of the Navy agreed to assist the
committee in his endeavor. We now believe that a useful unclassified document
may be released in the near future.
174 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
Our investigation was undertaken not with, the purpose of ascribing blame, but
rather with the objective of developing all the lessons that could be learned from
the loss of the Thresher, so that it could be truly said that these 129 men did not
die in vain.
No words can soften the grief of the widows, the orphans, the mothers, the
fathers, the loved ones left behind by the men of the Thresher. We share their
grief, but we cannot erase it. We can only take comfort in the knowledge that
these men gave their lives in the defense of their country on the great, silent
battlefield of the cold war.
APPENDIX 12
MEMOEANDUM CONCERNING SUBMARINE SAFETY STEERING TASK GROUP
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.G., July 11,1964.
Memorandum for Mr. Conway.
Subject: Names and titles of the submarine safety steering task group.
1. The subject information was requested by the JCAE during testimony by
Rear Admiral Curtze, Deputy Chief, Bureau of Ships, on July 1, 1964. This
information has been provided by the admiral, as follows:
Deputy Chief of Bureau (code 101), chairman, Rear Adm. C. A. Curtze, U.S.
Navy.
Director, Ship Design Division (code 410), vice chairman, Capt. N. Sonens-
hein, U.S. Navy.
Head, Submarine Branch (code 525), Capt. D. H. Kern, U.S. Navy.
Director, Applied Research Division (code 340), Capt. M. L. Pittman, Jr., U.S.
Navy.
Head, Machinery Design Branch (code 430), Capt. W. R. Riblett, U.S. Navy,
relieving Capt. W. E. Weisert, U.S. Navy, detached, July 7, 1964.
Director, Hull Division (code 630), Capt. D. L. Creed, U.S. Navy, relieving Capt.
R. Riley, U.S. Navy, retired, July 1,1964.
Director, Machinery Division (code 640), Capt. D. G. Phillips, U.S. Navy.
Director, Assurance Systems Engineering Division (code 705), Cmdr. R. J.
Leuschner, U.S. Navy, relieving Capt. T. V. Hennessey, U.S. Navy, retiring
September 1,1964.
Submarine safety project officer (code 525), recorder, Cmdr. J. E. Rasmussen,
U.S. Navy.
Very respectfully, ,
SPENCER E. ROBBINS,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Director, Congressional Investigations.
LOSS OF THE U.8.S. "THRESHER" 175
APPENDIX 13
Status of shipbuilding program for nuclear-powered ships authorized by Congress
SUBMAEINES
Ship-
building Sea trials
Hull number and name program Builder com-
fiscal pleted
year
Attack type:
SSN 571 Nautilus 1952 Electric Boat 1955
SSN 575 Seawolfi 1953 do 1960
SSN 586 Triton . . 1956 do 1959
Small attack type:
SSN 578 Skate 1955 do 1957
SSN 579 Swordfish 1955 Portsmouth 1958
SSN 583 Sargo 1956 Mare Island „_ . 1958
SSN 584 Seadragon . -. . ... 1956 Portsmouth 1959
Guided-missile-type Regulus: SSGN 587 Halibut - 1956 Mare island 1959
Hunter-killer attack type' SSN 597 Tullibee 1956 Electric Boat 1960
Fast attack type:
SSN 585 Skipjack .. . 1956 do 1959
SSN 588 Scamp 1957 Mare Island 1961
SSN 589 Scorpion 1957 Electric Boat . - 1960
SSN 590 Sculpin - - 1957 Ingalls 1961
SSN 591 Shark 1957 Newport News . 1961
SSN 592 Snook 1957 Ingalls 1961
SSN 594 Permit 1958 Mare Island 1962
SSN 595 Plunger 1958 do 1962
SSN 596 Barb 1958 Ingalls 1963
SSN 603 Pollack 1959 New York Ship.-, 1964
SSN 604 Haddo — - --- - 1959 do.. 1964
SSN 605 Jack 1959 Portsmouth
SSN 606 Tinosa 1959 do —- 1964
SSN 607 Dace - - - 1959 Ingalls 1964
SSN 612 Guardfish 1960 New York Ship
SSN 613 Flasher 1960 Electric Boat
SSN 614 Greenling 1960 do-—
SSN 615 Gato . ... 1960 do.-
SSN 621 Haddock .. . 1961 Ingalls --
SSN 637 Sturgeon 1962 Electric Boat
SSN 638 Whale 1962 'Rpthfllmn
SSN 639 Tautoq — 1962 Ingalls
SSN 646 Grayling .. - - - - - 1963 Portsmouth.
SSN 647 Pogy 1963 New York Ship
SSN 648 ylspro 1963 Ingalls
SSN 649 Sunfish - - 1963 BeThelem
SSN 650 Pargo - - —. _. - —. 1963 Electric Boat
SSN 651 Queenfish . .. 1963 Newport News
SSN 652 - — _ - 1963 .do
SSN 653 Ray 1963 do
SSN 660 1964 Portsmouth
SSN 661 - 1964 Unassigned
SSN 662 - 1964 Mare Island
SSN 663 — 1964 Unassigned _ -
SSN 664 1964 do
SSN 665- — 1964 do
SSN 666 1965 do
SSN 667 -- 1965 do
SSN 668 1965 .do
SSN 669 1965 . do
SSN 670 - 1965 .... do _
SSN 671 - - 1965 do
Total attack submarines authorized 51; completed 22.
See footnote at end of table.
176 LOSS OF THE TT.S.S. "THRESHER"
Ship-
building Sea trials
Hull number and name program Builder com-
fiscal pleted
year
SURFACE SHIPS
APPENDIX 14
EULOGIES PLACED IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, APRIL 22, 1963, BY SENATOR
JOHN O. PASTORE
[New York Times, Apr. 13, 1963]
"THRESHER"
She was the finest product of the shipwright's art and one of the maritime
marvels of this technological age.
Like the great fish for which she was named, her kingdom was the ocean and
its black depths. She was the lead ship of a class designed to run silent, run deep,
and run fast—deeper and faster than any submarine of the past. She was shaped
like a teardrop and powered with the fissioned energy of the atom. Her cylin-
drical pressure hull of heavy steel was designed to withstand the crushing weight
of deep water.
When the klaxon sounded and the command "Dive! Dive!" echoed through
the boat last Wednesday morning there were no intimations of disaster. TJiresh-
er had already established her preeminence and power. Today, with Lieutenant
Commander Harvey and his crew, she lies many fathoms deep off the Con-
tinental Shelf. The Navy that built her and manned her may never know
what destroyed her; the silent forces of the deep are implacable enemies to de-
tailed investigation.
Yet no investigation is needed to reiterate certain verities. Death—of a ship
or a man—is not an end but a beginning; man builds upon the past. Throughout
the history of the sea men have died and ships have sunk. In the endless
history of conflict between man and nature men have lost but man has triumphed.
The earth's mountains have been conquered; the blue sky and the realm of
space are sealed and now the forbidding depths—so long beyond the reach of
man—are in process of conquest.
Man's indomitable spirit has never in history faltered in such extensions
of man's kingdom. The Thresher is gone but Thresher lives.
Let us pray. O God, the Creator, Redeemer of all the faithful, hear our sup-
plications and through Thy infinite love and mercy graciously grant the souls of
Thy servants departed remission of all their sins by which they may have de-
served the severity of Thy divine justice and punishments in the world to come.
Vouchsafe to them grace and mercy before the divine tribunal and let them
attain to everlasting rest and happiness through the infinite merits of Jesus
Christ. O God, great and omnipotent Judge of the living and the dead, before
whom we are all to appear after this short life to render an account of our works,
let our hearts, we pray Thee, be deeply moved at this sight of death. Let us be
mindful of our own frailty and mortality, that walking always in Thy fear and
in the ways of Thy commandments, we may after our departure from the world,
experience a merciful judgment and rejoice in everlasting happiness through the
same Christ our Lord.
Grant, O Lord, we beseech Thee, that while we lament the departure of Thy
servants, our brothers, out of this life, we may bear in mind that we are most
certainly to follow them. Give us grace to make ready for that last hour by a
divine and holy life. Teach us how to watch a,nd pray that when Thy summons
comes, we may go forth to meet the bridegroom and enter with him into life
everlasting through the same Christ our Lord. Almighty and most merciful
Father, who knowest the weakness of our nature, bow down Thine ear and pity
unto Thy servants upon whom Thou hast laid the heavy burden of sorrow. Take
away out of their hearts the spirit of rebellion and teach them to see Thy good
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
and gracious purpose in all the trials that shall descend upon them. Grant that
they should not languish on unabandoned grief nor sorrow as those who have
no hope, but through their tears look meekly up to Thee, the God of ail consola-
tion through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.
I feel sure that all of us have been consoled by the eulogy by Bishop Feeney
and in sympathy and sorrow we offer our prayers to Almighty God that God
will grant eternal rest to our heroes. Certainly very few tragedies in recent
years can so touch the heart of all Americans with sympathy and sorrow—
abiding sorrow and a desire to be helpful in their prayers. As Bishop Feeney
was speaking I thought of a few stanzas of a verse I learned long ago. "The
bravest battle that ever was fought shall I tell you where and when. On the
map of the world you find it not—it's in the hearts of the mothers and wives
of men," and I am sure that all of us feel and grieve deeply with you in the
loss of your dear ones. They, however, have reached the goal of enternal life.
In the prayers we are reminded that after this short life, and even the longest
life is short, but we can be happy in the thought that these men who did their
duty to their God and their country have received the award and, the reward of
eternal life. I like to think that when that last cry echoed through the Thresher,
"Dive," that shortly afterward the men of the crew heard the response—the
response that came from Almighty God—their Creator, their Redeemer, and their
Saviour—"Well done," and now you faithful servants enter thou in the proces-
sion of the kingdom prepared for you from the beginning of the world.
We are met together this afternoon for meditation, for worship, in order to
pray for strength and courage and in order to thank God for lives which have
been given in the service of the Nation and the free world. It is not a time,
therefore, for long and intricate speech, as Mr. Lincoln said at Gettysburg so long
ago. "It is not what we say here that matters," but certainly the whole Nation,
indeed the entire world, has been saddened and shocked by this event. This does
not change the hard reality of loss; the tragedy still remains, and it must not
or cannot be underestimated, but the fact that in countless churches on Easter
Day throughout this Nation prayers were offered for the families of these men,
the fact that everywhere people are praying for God's blessing upon them must
be a sustaining and a strengthening force in the realization of the great company
who share this experience to some degree with you.
These men were, of course, unusual in their gifts. They were chosen because
they had special aptitudes of training, of native ability, and, above else, of
character, in order to serve in a pioneer enterprise, in a new type of service for
the protection of the Nation and of the free world. So there are many memories
of what they were and what they did and a very deep sense of thanksgiving for
their service. We live in a strange world; it's a world in which there is peace,
and yet there is no peace. A world in which, unfortunately it seems, to the
moment impossible, to have international understanding and a genuine concord
among the nations of the world. This kind of service in days of so-called peace is
never as dramatic as wartime service. Someone said to me this morning that
perhaps this tragedy will make the ordinary casual citizen realize more deeply all
that the armed services are doing for us today, many times so undramatically.
It has been my lot at various times to be in similar situations. I recall conducting
a service in Honolulu Harbor over those who were lost in the attack at Pearl
Harbor. I remember conducting service during two World Wars where there
was again this tremendous loss. But what I would say now is from the point
.of view of the Nation, these men have given their lives for home and country just
as much as if they had been at Pearl Harbor or in the Coral Sea or in the events
of actual war.
I am confident that they did not wish war. I am confident that there was no
hate of others in their minds or hearts. I have always found in a long experi-
ence there is more hatred expressed by those who are at home far away from
action, than by those who are actually engaged in the struggle itself. No,
they were performing a very important service in keeping the peace of the world,
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 179
in making it impossible for aggressors to destroy our liberties, our heritage, and
all that is meant by freedom, in many nations of the world. So we owe them a
tremendous debt for they gave their lives very truly, not only that the rest of us
may be safe but that liberty and justice and freedom may pass on from our
generation to those yet unborn. Again, what I'm saying does not break the
impact of the hard loss but I say that here is a cause of humble pride. We are
not our own because we have been bought with so great a price. What can be
said in the way of comfort and strength ? I must be honest, there are no easy
answers to many of the things which happen in this world. Again and again,
as a parish minister, I have been in difficult circumstances and you just do
not know what to say. People say, "Why must this have been?" "Why?" and
I have to answer, "I do not know." There is a mystery in life and there is a
mystery in death, and no one, I think, clearly can see the way. But I have
faith in the Easter hope that someday, freed from the limitations of time and
of space when we do not see any more through a glass darkly but face to face,
somehow, sometime, in the goodness of God, these strands will be brought to-
gether and in God's Eternity we will find the will of God and know this answer.
The problem is as old as suffering, sin, and death. St. Paul asked the question
that I am suggesting now. St. Paul said, "What can we say to these things?
What can we say to these things?" Then after discussing some of the tribulations
which come to the children of man, he closes with that magnificent statement,
which is part of the Christian experience of the ages, and of us all, "For I am
persuaded that neither death nor life, nor things present, nor things to come,
shall be able to separate us from the love of God, in Christ Jesus, our Lord."
I had an only friend in Boston, a wonderful old man who lost a brilliant son
at an early age. His son was a remarkable physician. Before him were all
sorts of opportunities for overcoming illness and disease and suddenly he was
stricken just at the beginning of the manifestation of his powers. And I met
his old father on Beacon Street in Boston and I said, "We have all been thinking
of you and have been helped by the courage and faith which you and your family
have shown during this difficult time." The old man said, "Yes, thank you. 'I had
a letter yesterday. The letter read, you have been conquerors, you and your fam-
ily, through this experience.'" The old gentleman smiled and then he said, "I
wrote back. 'You entirely misunderstand. We have been more than conquerors
through Him that loved us.'" So we do not meet these changes and circum-
stances of life by ourselves, there are great invisible spiritual forces, the love of
God, the presence of the living Christ who rose from the dead himself, the
promise of strength and courage and peace even of deep abiding joy that is the
Easter message that is true for all times. So we pray to those who are imme-
diately and specially bereaved that they may feel underneath God's everlasting
arms, that they may feel something of this Easter joy. Death is swallowed up
in victory. And we pray that we may entrust to God's loving care all those who
are dear to us for this life and the life to come. May God give you strength
and courage and the everlasting hope.
Blessed are the d£ad who die in the Lord. Your Eminence, Your Excellency,
good frieds all in Christ, it is with the deepest conviction that I believe in the
immortality of the soul of man. It is not because great thinkers and philosophers
of all shades and culture over the ages have accepted this truth—no. I have a
stronger and a sounder basis for the conviction that is mine. We are still within
the period of the commemoration of the event that raises the ceremony of this
kind above the level of soft sentiment to the very lofty heights of reality. How
futile it would be, however permeated almost with mockery. Yes, more, how
degrading to the proud who still lives the ceremony of this kind meant only that
death was a completion of man's existence. The event that we commemorate
this last Friday taught us that death is no more a mystery, but rather that it
does not indicate the extension of man but is only an incident in the path of
man's existence from this life to the realization, the yearnings, the longings that
the human soul has ever experienced that can be satisfied only in the bosom of
the Infinite, the Inexhaustible and the Eternal God. This thought alone gives
180 LOSS OF THE U.S.8. "THRESHER"
dignity to a ceremony of this nature. The soul of man is immortal. The domi-
nant thought in our minds this noon is union, union of the temporal living with
those eternally living. In this spirit of union we cherish the love that has
united us over the years. We esteem the memory of friendship and the appre-
ciation of the character and the virtues of the loved ones. We know that the
character of a good man does not die, but continues to exercise its beneficent
influences just so long as those are those who are to carry on his memory. In this
spirit of loving union, we gather here this morning to express also our deep
gratitude to those whose services have been offered in behalf of our great coun-
try. Many of them had already exposed their lives before for us, others in the
first great challenge had already indicated the will to place themselves in peril
for us. Heroism is not always in the act, but frequently is it found in the deter-
mination and the will and the acceptance of what life may have for them. They
have been sacrificed on the alter of freedom. We are not deceived today that our
freedom is secure, for our freedom is still in danger and it is those who are willing
to accept the risks that we took as its guardians. On this sad and yet solemn
occasion I think it is not consolation or even sympathy that those who com-
memorate their loved ones are seeking from us, but rather I think we all should
be actuated by the spirit of mutual suffering and distress in union with those who
are suffering and in distress. With the wives, children, fathers, mothers, and all
the close kin of those today we commemorate, we do unite in spirit, suffering, sad-
ness, and distress and we all pray together the Almighty Father of us all may look
with pitying eye upon them and grant them the release from their suffering.
There was a noble President of the United States who had the gift of sympathy
and of mutual suffering with those who sought his help and on one occasion in
the dark days of the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln penned a letter to a mother
who suffered. With a bit of paraphrasing, you will permit me to read it. The
great Lincoln said, "I feel how weak and fruitless must be any word of mine
which should attempt to beguile you from the grief of a loss so overwhelming,
but I cannot refrain from tendering to you the consolation that may be found
in the thanks of the Republic for which they died. I pray that our Heavenly
Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement and leave you only the
cherished memory of the loved and lost and a solemn pride that must be yours
to have laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom. May God bless us
all, protect us all, and make us worthy of those whose memory this morning we
cherish."
MEMORIAL ADDRESS DELIVERED BY J. FLOYD DREITH, CHC, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR OF THE
CHAPLAINS' DIVISION, GIVEN AT MEMORIAL SERVICES FOR TJ.S.S. "THRESHER" AT
THE PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD, APRIL 15, 1963
Distinguished gue,sts, ladies and gentlemen, but particularly you, the bereaved
members of the families of the departed officers and men of the Thresher. The
entire Nation went into a state of shock last week when the word was flashed
on the news wires that the U.S.S. Thresher—with 129, both civilian and naval
personnel aboard—was lost at sea. Prayer groups were started among those,
one by Mrs. Korth, the wife of the Secretary of the Navy, beseeching Almighty
God, that He might find it in His wisdom and mercy to bring that ship and those
men safely back. In His wisdom and mercy He decreed otherwise. The fact
that the Nation went into shock is a high compliment to the U.S. Navy. Seldom
a week goes by that we don't read about an airplane crash. Daily, hundreds of
lives are taken upon our highways. We take all this more or less for granted.
But when a ship of the U.S. Navy is lost in peacetime, the entire Nation is
astounded, because it so seldom happens, and because the Navy has demonstrated
such high regard for the safety and welfare of its personnel. Those men that
went down on that ship were God's men, and I say this without having had
the privilege of knowing any one of them personally. A Russian cosmonaut may
encircle the globe and find no evidence of the existence of God. An American
sailor when he goes to sea is very much aware of the fact that he is God's child
and in God's hands.
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 181
It is given unto all men once to die. We seldom know when and the time is
never propitious whenever it does come for any of us, it seems, and we seldom
know how. But if we had the choice, the free choice given unto us by Almighty
God today, I'm sure that we could ask for no higher honor or glory than that
accorded to those men to give their lives in the service of their country upon the
altar not only of that country, but the altar of human dignity and freedom
throughout the world. And were they here now to speak to us I'm sure that they
would ask us not to grieve for them, because they could have selected no higher
honor or glory than that which was accorded unto them. The young son of Dr.
Keuster, a Navy scientist, who was aboard that ship, said to his mother, "Since
God holds the ocean in the hollow of His hands, our daddy is safe." And so
in that sense particularly you bereaved members, loved ones of the departed,
may I commend unto you that God holds them in the hollow of His hand and as
we commend them to the depths of the sea which they loved and their souls to
His tender mercy, may we here and now commit ourselves to a nobler service of
God in the service of our fellow men. To that may our Heavenly Father
strengthen us and bless us.
34-920—65 13
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
consolation, and the companionship of Thy saints, and in Thine own presence,
O Thou gracious, risen Saviour. Amen.
REMARKS BY BABBI ABRAHAM I. JACOBSON, D.D., AT THE MEMORIAL SERVICES FOR U.S.S.
"THRESHER" AT THE PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD, APRIL 15, iocs
Psalm 121: "I will lift up mine eyes unto the mountains; from whence shall
my help come? My help cometh from the Lord, who made heaven and earth.
He will not suffer thy foot to be moved; He that keepeth thee will not slumber.
Behold, he that keepeth Israel doth neither slumber nor sleep. The Lord is thy
keeper; the Lord is thy shade upon thy right hand. The sun shall not smite thee
by day nor the moon by night. The Lord shall keep thee from all evil; He shall
keep thy soul. The Lord shall guard thy going out and thy coming in, from this
time forth and forever."
Prayer
Out of the depths we call unto Thee, O God, our heavenly Father. In Thy
hands are the souls of all the living and the spirits of all flesh. Thy loving kind-
ness is never withdrawn from us, but abides with us, in death as in life. In Thy
wisdom, Thou hast laid upon us this heavy burden. Mayest Thou in Thy mercy,
give us the strength to bear it.
Guide us and sustain us. Give us the strength of faith that shall keep us from
murmuring against the justice of Thy dispensation, even when Thou dost afflict
us. Grant us we pray Thee the understanding which shall enable us to recognize
that the hand that woundeth is the hand that bindeth up again. Enable us al-
ways to be supported by the knowledge that these dear ones whom Thou in Thy
wisdom hast seen fit to take from us have reflected their deep love for our country,
their loyalty to their oath, and their courage in the face of their supreme trial.
What greater glory than to die for our beloved country. Thou art the life of all
life.
Kaddish memorial recited in Hebrew
Go your way for the Lord hath called you
Go your way and may the Lord 'be with you.
May your righteousness go before you and the glory of the Lord receive you.
Amen.
APPENDIX 15
REVIEW OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES FOE HY-80 SUBMARINE HULL WELDS
3960
Ser 634B-284
13 June 1960
Report on travel
Person making visit: H. S. Sayre, GS-13, Code 634B.
the supervisor's office. The identification method is good and all radiographs
can be identified within close limits as to location. An accurate cross check
is maintained at all production inspection, both radiographic and magnetic
particle. The Electric Boat Division radiographic procedures have been qual-
ified in accordance with the MIL—STD-271 requirements.
4. Action required.—Following completion of the review in each activity a
meeting with yard personnel was held and the findings were discussed. No
further Bureau action is required at this time. On receipt of Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard radiographic qualification tests necessary action will be taken to
expedite review and report of tests.
5. Detailed discussion.—Portsmouth Naval Shipyard: All radiographic inspec-
tion including taking the radiographs, processing, and review is under cognizance
of the shipyard laboratory. When a welded joint is ready for inspection, shop
26 notifies the laboratory and the radiograph is taken as time permits. In order
not to delay production the radiograph is taken as quickly as possible and, in
general, time is not taken to remove obstructions such as scaffolding, braces, etc.
The completed films are processed and reviewed in the X-ray laboratory. In
the case of welds requiring repair, the films are sent to shop 26 where they are
taken to the job for location of the defect. The repaired weld is radiographed.
If there is disagreement on interpretation between the laboratory and shop 26,
the radiograph may be referred to the shipyard welding engineer. It is stated,
however, that this situation does not occur very often. Shop 26 may request
reradiograph of a weld if they do not consider a radiograph of good quality.
Radiographic procedure: The radiographs initially taken on the SS(N)593,
605, and 606 hull welds were made with X-ray using calcium tungstate screens
and coarse grain medical-type film. About October 1959, iridium 192 sources
were obtained and DuPont 506 fine grain film was adopted as a standard with
no screens. Cobalt 60 is used for radiography of thicknesses of plating 2^4 inches
or over. In general butts were not flock-shot but on the SSB(N)602 some flock
shots were taken with cobalt 60 sources.
Quality of radiographs: The radiographs taken using X-ray and medical film
were of very poor quality. The films were grainy and the exposure varied across
the film. The radiographs in general showed penetrometers of the old type.
Many films were water streaked and showed pressure marks and the calcium
tungstate screens had been patched with Scotch tape so that the image of the
tape was superimposed in many cases across the weld area. In a number of
instances the films were taken with cables, wire baskets, or other obstructions
superimposed across the weld area. Shipyard personnel advised that the produc-
tion schedule did not permit removal of many obstructions.
Identification: Logs are kept of radiographs taken on each hull. Each com-
ponent such as butt weld, seam weld, pipe joint, etc., is assigned an item number
in sequence as radiographed and each radiograph taken of the item is numbered
or lettered sequentially. Individual radiographs are identified only with the
hull number, item and sequence number. Logs are kept to identify the item with
the component radiographed and to record the radiographic procedure used.
Until recently, identification of the radiograph to a particular hull location was
maintained only until the radiographs had been reviewed and necessary repairs
made. Correlation of radiographs to hull location can no longer be made for
subsequent inspection purposes. Last fall, on the 593, 605, and 606 hull welds,
a more uniform system was established by starting butt inspection at the 12
o'clock position looking forward, numbering the films sequentially counterclock-
wise, and seams starting at one end. Shipyard personnel did not consider that
accurate identification within a couple of feet of a location is possible after the
initial inspection is completed and ink location marks on the hull have been
obscured. A set of sketches of hull structure have been prepared by shop 26 for
use in connection with future inspection records. The radiographs are filed as
completed in boxes, roughly by date, and it was difficult to locate particular
radiographs for review.
Review of radiographs: All radiographs are reviewed for compliance with
acceptance standards by one of three experienced men in the radiographic
laboratory. Survey of random production radiographs indicated the shipyard
review to be good with regard to detection of defects. However, in a number
of instances technically poor radiographs had been accepted for final weld
inspection. Radiographic personnel advised that production schedules pre-
cluded retaking of radiographs in most instances. The viewing facilities were,
in general, poor and not conducive to accurate reading of films.
LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 185
Repair of defects: The rejected areas found are marked and the films are sent
to the shop for identification on the hull and repair. The defective areas are arc
air gouged and repair welds are made. The weld areas are preheated with
24-inch strip heaters and after repair the heater is left until the heat evens out,
then allowed to cool in air or under asbestos protection depending upon sur-
rounding atmospheric conditions. It was reported that the indident rate of
cracks in butts and seams is approximately 15 per hull and about 1 to 2 percent
repair due to slag-type defects. Repair welds are radiographed.
Radiographic sources available: Iridium 192 sources, two 100 curie, one 50
curie, one 30 curie; cobalt 60 sources, one 10-curie source; X-ray, one 250-kilo-
volt Triplett Barton machine and two CE kilovolt machines.
Magnetic-particle inspection: Magnetic-particle inspection is made by welders
in shop 26 trained for inspection by an instructor qualified by the shipyard
laboratory. All butts and seams are magnetic-particle inspected on inside and
outside surfaces, using alternating-current yoke inspection units. Code 303
spot checks the inspection on butt and seam welds and on high-pressure tanks.
Electric Boat Division.—Electric Boat Division radiographic inspection is made
in accordance with Shipyard Standard Procedure 3.20 Rev. A., Inspection Instruc-
tion No. 20. The responsibility for exposing, identifying, location marking, de-
veloping, and evaluating radiographs is assigned to the radiographic section of
the welding department. They are also responsible for originating and maintain-
ing radiography records and custody of all radiographs. The inspection depart-
ment requests radiographic inspection of final production welds in duplicate one
copy of which is kept by the inspection department as a check. The completed
films are processed and reviewed by either the head of the laboratory or his as-
sistant. The films are never taken to the job in order to avoid damage to the
films. In the case of weld repairs a tracing paper overlay is made of the film and
this is used in locating the defect on the job. A four-copy record sheet is kept of
all radiographic inspection. This sheet includes a complete description of the
welded joint covering all details of the welding procedure which is of invaluable
assistance in review of the films. The details on inspection of each film is made
by the radiographic department on this record sheet and reason for each rejection
are given in detail. When the radiographic department has reviewed the films,
repaired joints and retaken as necessary, the radiographs are submitted to the
Electric Boat Division inspection with the record sheet. The inspection depart-
ment evaluates all final production films to assure compliance with all require-
ments for identification, technical requirements, quality of radiograph, and ac-
ceptability of evaluation. Following review by the inspection department all
final production films are submitted to the supervisor of shipbuilding for review.
The films are all reviewed and the supervisor's office is currently keeping an ac-
curate record of the quality of all radiographs with view to future use of a
sampling inspection by the supervisor rather than 100-percent inspection. The
copies of the record sheet are kept as a permanent record in the folder with the
film, and in radiographic department, inspection department, and supervisors'
files.
Radiographic procedure: The radiographs are made on type AA film using
iridium 192 sources with lead screens for material thickness less than 2% inches
and cobalt 60 for thicker materials. All radiographs were single exposure and no
flock type inspection is done.
Quality of radiographs: Films viewed were of excellent quality. Approved
penetrometers were visible on all films. In all except a few films where there
was interference from framing, the exposure and sensitivity was consistent across
the film. The films were free from developing defects such as streaks or water
spots and through handling techniques the films were free of scratches.
Identification: Films were marked with the boat number, section, seam or
butt number, film number (such as S16A, where S-starboard, 16-film number,
A-first repair). All films were correlated by measurement as to location on the
hull. Electric Boat Division personnel reported that the radiographs could be
later identified with the hull location to within a few inches. All films of in-
dividual butts or seams are filed together and through the copies of the radiog-
raphy report in the files and with the film, particular radiographs can be readily
located for later review.
Review of radiographs: The viewing facilities for review of radiographs was
good. Survey of production radiographs showed the review to be good and in
all instances where radiographs were of defective quality the shots had been
retaken.
186 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
APPENDIX 16
PHOTOGRAPHS OP "THKESHEB" DEBRIS
FIGUBB 2. Starboard side of the U.S.S. Thresher sail with portions of the hull
number "593" visible.
188 LOSS OF THE U.S.S. "THRESHER"
FIGURE 3. Draft markings on the top-side rudder of Thresher. Part of the port
stern plane of the sunken sub can be seen in the foreground.
LOSS OP THE U.S.S. "THRESHER" 189
APPENDIX 17
"THRESHER" (SS(N)593) CHRONOLOGY
July 2, 1956—Authorized by the Congress.
October 1957—Construction and working plan preparation assigned to the Porte-
mouth (N.H.) Naval Shipyard.
March 1958—Ship's detailed specifications issued.
May 28,1958—Keel laid.
July 9, I960—Launched.
March 10, 1961—Reactor brought to critical.
April 30, 1961—Commenced sea trials.
August 3, 1961—Commissioned and assigned to Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet.
September 24 to October 16, 1961—At Portsmouth (N.H.) Naval Shipyard for
minor modifications, maintenance, and repairs.
October 17 to November 28, 1961—Underway operations.
November 29 to February 8, 1962—At Portsmouth (N.H.) Naval Shipyard for
minor modifications, maintenance, and repairs.
February 9 to April 15, 1962—Underway operations.
April 16 to May 19, 1962—At Electric Boat Division, Groton, Conn., for modifica-
tions in preparation for high shock testing.
May 20 to June 16,1962—Underway operations.
June 17 to June 29,1962—Tested for ability to withstand controlled underwater
high shock off Key West, Fla.
June 30 to July 15,1962—Underway operations.
July 16 to April 9, 1963—At Portsmouth (N.H.) Naval Shipyard for major
overhaul.
April 9, 1963—Underway from Portsmouth for sea trials following overhaul.
April 10, 1963—Lost at sea.
INDEX
Page
Armed Services Committee 2
Brazing versus welding:
Costs 62-64
Operator recommendations 86
Piping 80
Classification of information concerning loss of Thresher 159-165
Communication recorder 48
Court of inquiry:
Opinions and recommendations 153-154
Unsatisfactory condition found 5, 9,11,17-20
Deballasting system:
Blow valve improvement 4,167
Freezing of air system 32, 35, 37,108,112
Deep Submergence System Review Group 50
Depth limitation 19, 30,44,48, 69, 84, 93,103,168
Design deficiencies:
Changes from brazing to welding 25, 67, 78
Deballasting system 19, 37-38, 66, 83, 85-86, 111
Elimination of pipe joints 23
Extrapolation of World War II designs 16,22,97
Hydraulic system 82
Lack of continuity in personnel 87
Overcomplexity of design 20
Piping system changes 43
Salt water system 20, 67
Deviation from contract plans 11
Deviation from specifications:
Salt water piping 10,12
Differences in standards:
Compliance with specifications in reactor plant 26
Higher standards for reactor plant 61
Piping standard differences 42
Reactor plant piping 77, 79
Stringent reactor plant requirements 25
Enforcement of specifications 73,75, 84
History of Thresher 149-152,190
Hull defects 76-77,81
Hull steel (HY-80) 81-82,99-102
Hull welding 70-71,183
Radiographs 76, 79,183
Improvements planned:
Costs of 110
Deballasting system 111-112,167
Deballasting tests . 93
Design changes in deballasting system 96,107
Design changes in salt water system operation 96,107
Improved radiography 104
Protection of electrical equipment 108
Reduction in hull penetrations 110,112
Restriction in sea water valve openings 107
Safety Review Group 97,99
Summary 167-169
Training , 94
Welding in sea water systems 104,106
Welding of all critical systems 107
191
192 INDEX
Morale effects
Operating procedures
Operational factors:
Speed of operation 33,40
Operations:
Improvements in training planned 94
Personnel:
Rotation of ship's personnel 7-10,153,167
Rotation of technical personnel 7,8.86-88,90,167
Piping failures 68,84,133
Barbel 16,133
Ethan Allen 133
Skate 24,133
Snook 133
Thresher 21,133
Radiation release 44,56
Safety Task Group 45,174
Search for Thresher 30,44,53,150
Photographs 52-56,186-189
Radiation survey 56-57,151
Skylark:
Commanding officer 40-42,150,169
Submergence depth, military factors involved 33,44,80,82,84
Tests:
Deballasting tests added 94
Development of ultrasonic standards 21
Incomplete ultrasonic tests 12,14-15,17-18,22,24
Lack of complete deballasting test 35,37,39
Retest of existing ships 20,168
Tinosa:
Hull radiographs missing 68, 71-72,155,183
Radiographs 103,157
Workmanship:
Defects in Thresher piping 68
Failure to comply with specifications 66-67
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 6,17,19, 73-74,183
Radiography 70, 76,183
Silver-braze piping failures 134
Standards enforcement 46,69