FIRST DIVISION

ARNELITO ADLAWAN, G.R. No. 161916

Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairman),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN and
NARCISA M. ADLAWAN, Promulgated:
Respondents.
January 20, 2006

The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties dispute over Lot 7226 and the house built
thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8842,[5] registered in the name of the late
Dominador Adlawan and located at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu. In his
complaint, petitioner claimed that he is an acknowledged illegitimate child[6] of Dominador who
died on May 28, 1987 without any other issue. Claiming to be the sole heir of Dominador, he
executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house built thereon. [7] Out of
respect and generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father, he granted their plea to
occupy the subject property provided they would vacate the same should his need for the
property arise. Sometime in January 1999, he verbally requested respondents to vacate the
house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an action for quieting of title[8] with the RTC.
Finally, upon respondents refusal to heed the last demand letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000,
petitioner filed the instant case on August 9, 2000.[9]

On the other hand, respondents Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age,
respectively,[10] denied that they begged petitioner to allow them to stay on the questioned
property and stressed that they have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house standing thereon
since birth. They alleged that Lot 7226 was originally registered in the name of their deceased
father, Ramon Adlawan[11] and the ancestral house standing thereon was owned by Ramon and
their mother, Oligia Maacap Adlawan. The spouses had nine [12] children including the late
Dominador and herein surviving respondents Emeterio and Narcisa. During the lifetime of their
parents and deceased siblings, all of them lived on the said property. Dominador and his wife,
Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who died without issue, also occupied the same. [13] Petitioner, on the
other hand, is a stranger who never had possession of Lot 7226.

Sometime in 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia needed money to finance the renovation of
their house. Since they were not qualified to obtain a loan, they transferred ownership of Lot
7226 in the name of their son Dominador who was the only one in the family who had a college
education. By virtue of a January 31, 1962 simulated deed of sale, [14] a title was issued to
Dominador which enabled him to secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral. Notwithstanding the
execution of the simulated deed, Dominador, then single, never disputed his parents ownership
of the lot. He and his wife, Graciana, did not disturb respondents possession of the property
until they died on May 28, 1987 and May 6, 1997, respectively.
Respondents also contended that Dominadors signature at the back of petitioners birth
certificate was forged, hence, the latter is not an heir of Dominador and has no right to claim
ownership of Lot 7226.[15] They argued that even if petitioner is indeed Dominadors
acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful because Dominador was
survived by his wife, Graciana.[16]
On February 12, 2002, the MTC dismissed the complaint holding that the establishment of
petitioners filiation and the settlement of the estate of Dominador are conditions precedent to
the accrual of petitioners action for ejectment. It added that since Dominador was survived by
his wife, Graciana, who died 10 years thereafter, her legal heirs are also entitled to their share in
Lot 7226. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:

In View of the foregoing, for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence, the plaintiffs cause
of action, the above-entitled case is hereby Ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[17]

On appeal by petitioner, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC holding that the title
of Dominador over Lot 7226 cannot be collaterally attacked. It thus ordered respondents to turn
over possession of the controverted lot to petitioner and to pay compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises. The decretal portion thereof, provides:

Wherefore, the Judgment, dated February 12, 2002, of the Municipal Trial Court of
Minglanilla, Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, is reversed. Defendants-appellees are directed to
restore to plaintiff-appellant possession of Lot 7226 and the house thereon, and to pay plaintiff-
appellant, beginning in August 2000, compensation for their use and occupation of the property
in the amount of P500.00 a month.

So ordered.[18]

Meanwhile, the RTC granted petitioners motion for execution pending appeal [19] which
was opposed by the alleged nephew and nieces of Graciana in their motion for leave to
intervene and to file an answer in intervention.[20] They contended that as heirs of Graciana,
they have a share in Lot 7226 and that intervention is necessary to protect their right over the
property. In addition, they declared that as co-owners of the property, they are allowing
respondents to stay in Lot 7226 until a formal partition of the property is made.

The RTC denied the motion for leave to intervene.[21] It, however, recalled the order
granting the execution pending appeal having lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the
petition filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals.[22]

On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the RTC and
reinstated the judgment of the MTC. It ratiocinated that petitioner and the heirs of Graciana are
co-owners of Lot 7226. As such, petitioner cannot eject respondents from the property via an
unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole owner of the property. Thus
WHEEFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated September 13, 2002 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-27806 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the Judgment dated February 12, 2002 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392 is REINSTATED. Costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner can validly maintain the
instant case for ejectment.
 Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of
Dominador. He in fact executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted property.
In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held that the questioned January 31, 1962 deed of sale
validly transferred title to Dominador and that petitioner is his acknowledged illegitimate son
who inherited ownership of the questioned lot. The Court notes, however, that the RTC lost
sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that
he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by
petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador
on May 28, 1987.[24] By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot
7226.[25] The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of
Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to
petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. The Court of Appeals thus correctly held that
petitioner has no authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226.

Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226, he can on his
own file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487
includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession
(accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).[26] A co-owner may
bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed,
however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole
owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed. [27]

The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained

A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as
co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for
the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the
co-ownership, the action will not prosper. (Emphasis added)[28]

In Baloloy v. Hular,[29] respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title claiming

exclusive ownership of the property, but the evidence showed that respondent has co-owners
over the property. In dismissing the complaint for want of respondents authority to file the case,
the Court held that
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an
accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such an action without the
necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit
the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the
unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the
sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads
the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.

In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the
subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that
the other co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to
the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court
rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its
possession, to the prejudice of the latters siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is
erroneous.
 Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to implead
his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent failed to comply with
the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the Philippines is also an
indispensable party as defendant because the respondent sought the nullification of OCT No. P-
16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as
party-defendant, any decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that the
absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to
the filing of the complaint including the judgment. The absence of the respondents siblings, as
parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof, including the judgment of the
court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present.[30]

In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer
in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even
executed an affidavit of self- adjudication over the disputed property. It is clear therefore that
petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the
co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father,
Dominador.

In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioners claim that he has the legal personality to
file the present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of respondents would benefit not
only him but also h
 G.R. No. 189420, March 26, 2014

RAUL V. ARAMBULO AND TERESITA A. DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, v. GENARO NOLASCO AND
JEREMY SPENCER NOLASCO, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review of the 7 October 2008 Decision 1 and 30 July 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA–G.R. CV No. 76449, which reversed and set aside the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 51, dated 19 September 2002.

Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, along with their mother Rosita Vda. De Arambulo,
and siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez, Ana Maria V. Arambulo, Maximiano V. Arambulo,
Julio V. Arambulo and Iraida Arambulo Nolasco (Iraida) are co–owners of two (2) parcels of land located in
Tondo, Manila, with an aggregate size of 233 square meters. When Iraida passed away, she was
succeeded by her husband, respondent Genaro Nolasco and their children, Iris Abegail Nolasco, Ingrid
Aileen Arambulo and respondent Jeremy Spencer Nolasco.

On 8 January 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief under Article 491 of the Civil Code with the RTC of
Manila, alleging that all of the co–owners, except for respondents, have authorized petitioners to sell their
respective shares to the subject properties; that only respondents are withholding their consent to the
sale of their shares; that in case the sale pushes through, their mother and siblings will get their
respective 1/9 share of the proceeds of the sale, while respondents will get ¼ share each of the 1/9 share
of Iraida; that the sale of subject properties constitutes alteration; and that under Article 491 of the Civil
Code, if one or more co–owners shall withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in
common, the courts may afford adequate relief.4

In their Answer, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for being premature. Respondents
averred that they were not aware of the intention of petitioners to sell the properties they co–owned
because they were not called to participate in any negotiations regarding the disposition of the property. 5

After the pre–trial, two (2) issues were submitted for consideration:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Whether or not respondents are withholding their consent in the sale of the subject properties; and
2. In the affirmative, whether or not withholding of consent of sale by the respondents is prejudicial
to the petitioners.6

On 19 September 2002, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to give their
consent to the sale. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners and against
the respondents:

1. Directing respondents Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy Spencer A. Nolasco to give their consent to the
sale of their shares on the subject properties;
2. Allowing the sale of the aforementioned properties;
3. Directing the petitioners and the co–owners, including the respondents herein to agree with the
price in which the subject properties are to be sold and to whom to be sold; and
4. Directing the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned properties in the
following proportion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a.) Rosita V. Vda. De Arambulo –1/9

b.) Primo V. Arambulo –1/9
c.) Maximiano V. Arambulo –1/9
d.) Ana Maria V. Arambulo –1/9
e.) Ma. Lorenza A. Lopez –1/9
f.) Julio V. Arambulo –1/9
g.) Raul V. Arambulo –1/9
h.) Teresita A. dela Cruz –1/9
i.) Genaro Nolasco, Jr. –1/4 of 1/9
j.) Jeremy Spencer A. Nolasco –1/4 of 1/9
k.) Iris Abegail A. Nolasco –1/4 of 1/9
l.) Ingrid Aileen Arambulo –1/4 of 1/97
Going along with petitioners’ reliance on Article 491 of the Civil Code, the trial court found that
respondents’ withholding of their consent to the sale of their shares is prejudicial to the common interest
of the co–owners.

Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal and the trial court gave due course to the appeal and the entire
records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision dated 7 October 2008, the Court of Appeals granted the appeal and reversed the trial court’s
decision. The Court of Appeals held that the respondents had the full ownership of their undivided interest
in the subject properties, thus, they cannot be compelled to sell their undivided shares in the properties. It
referred to the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code. However, the Court of Appeals, implying
applicability of Article 491 also observed that petitioners failed to show how respondents’ withholding of
their consent would prejudice the common interest over the subject properties.

Hence, the instant petition seeking the reversal of the appellate court’s decision and praying for the
affirmance of the trial court’s decision that ordered respondents to give their consent to the sale of the
subject properties. Petitioners emphasize that under Article 491 of the Civil Code, they may ask the court
to afford them adequate relief should respondents refuse to sell their respective shares to the co–owned
properties. They refute the appellate court’s finding that they failed to show how the withholding of
consent by respondents becomes prejudicial to their common interest. Citing the testimony of petitioner
Teresita A. Dela Cruz, they assert that one of the two subject properties has an area of 122 square meters
and if they decide to partition, instead of selling the same, their share would be reduced to a measly 30–
square meter lot each. The other property was testified to as measuring only 111 square meters.
Petitioners reiterate that all the other co–owners are willing to sell the property and give respondents their
share of the proceeds of the sale.

At the core of this petition is whether respondents, as co–owners, can be compelled by the court to give
their consent to the sale of their shares in the co–owned properties. Until it reached this Court, the
discussion of the issue moved around Article 491 of the Civil Code. We have to remove the issue out of
the coverage of Article 491. It does not apply to the problem arising out of the proposed sale of the
property co–owned by the parties in this case.

The Court of Appeals correctly applied the provision of Article 493 of the Civil Code, which
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Art. 493. Each co–owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co–owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co–ownership.

Upon the other hand, Article 491 states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Art. 491. None of the co–owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing
owned in common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the
consent by one or more of the co–owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may
afford adequate relief.

As intimated above, the erroneous application of Article 491 is, in this case, an innate infirmity. The very
initiatory pleading below was captioned Petition For Relief Under Article 491 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners, likewise petitioners before the RTC, filed the case on the submission that Article 491 covers
the petition and grants the relief prayed for, which is to compel the respondent co–owners to agree to the
sale of the co–owned property. The trial court took up all that petitioners tendered, and it favored the
pleading with the finding that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x To this court, the act of respondents of withholding consent to the sale of the properties is not only
prejudicial to the common interest of the co–owners but is also considered as an alteration within the
purview of Article 491 of the New Civil Code. x x x. Hence, it is deemed just and proper to afford adequate
relief to herein petitioners under Article 491 of the New Civil Code. 8

That a sale constitutes an alteration as mentioned in Article 491 is an established jurisprudence. It is

settled that alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or
disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration.9 Alienation of the thing by sale of the
property is an act of strict dominion.10 However, the ruling that alienation is alteration does not mean that
a sale of commonly owned real property is covered by the second paragraph of Article 491, such that if a
co–owner withholds consent to the sale, the courts, upon a showing of a clear prejudice to the common
interest, may, as adequate relief, order the grant of the withheld consent. Such is the conclusion drawn by
the trial court, and hinted at, if not relied upon, by the appellate court.

Ruling that the trial court erred in its conclusion, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on Article 493 in
support of the finding that respondents cannot be compelled to agree with the sale. We affirm the reversal
by the Court of Appeals of the judgment of the trial court.

1. There is co–ownership whenever, as in this case, the ownership of an undivided thing, belongs to
different persons.11 Article 493 of the Code defines the ownership of the co–owner, clearly establishing
that each co–owner shall have full ownership of his part and of its fruits and benefits.

Pertinent to this case, Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co–owners with full
ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by the petitioners of their parts shall not
affect the full ownership by the respondents of the part that belongs to them. Their part which petitioners
will sell shall be that which may be apportioned to them in the division upon the termination of the co–
ownership. With the full ownership of the respondents remaining unaffected by petitioners’ sale of their
parts, the nature of the property, as co–owned, likewise stays. In lieu of the petitioners, their vendees
shall be co–owners with the respondents. The text of Article 493 says so.

2. Our reading of Article 493 as applied to the facts of this case is a reiteration of what was pronounced in
Bailon–Casilao v. Court of Appeals.12 The rights of a co–owner of a certain property are clearly specified in
Article 493 of the Civil Code. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Art. 493. Each co–owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it[,] and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or [the] mortgage,
with respect to the co–owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co–ownership.

As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co–owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other co–owners who did not consent to the sale.13 This is
because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided
share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing
owned in common.14 Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are
valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale
to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co–owner of the disputed parcel
of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers
in the enjoyment thereof.15

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co–owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale
of the entire property by one co–owner without the consent of the other co–owners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the co–owner–seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co–owner of
the property.16 (Italics theirs).

Nearer to the dispute at hand are the pronouncements in the 1944 case of Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong.17
Citing Manresa on Article 399 which is the present Article 493 of the Civil Code, the Court
said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x Article 399 shows the essential integrity of the right of each co–owner in the mental portion which
belongs to him in the ownership or community.

xxxx

To be a co–owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition of the disposal of
the thing, of the free use of his right within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it
necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the
interested parties be obtained.18 (Underscoring supplied).

The Court in Lopez further cited Scaevola:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

2nd. Absolute right of each co–owner with respect to his part or share. – With respect to the latter, each
co–owner is the same as an individual owner. He is a singular owner, with all the rights inherent in such
condition. The share of the co–owner, that is, the part which ideally belongs to him in the common thing
or right and is represented by a certain quantity, is his and he may dispose of the same as he pleases,
because it does not affect the right of the others. Such quantity is equivalent to a credit against the
common thing or right and is the private property of each creditor (co–owner). The various shares ideally
signify as many units of thing or right, pertaining individually to the different owners; in other words, a
unit for each owner.19 (Underscoring supplied).

The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as such by the Court, agree that co–owners such as
respondents have over their part, the right of full and absolute ownership. Such right is the same as that
of individual owners which is not diminished by the fact that the entire property is co–owned with others.
That part which ideally belongs to them, or their mental portion, may be disposed of as they please,
independent of the decision of their co–owners. So we rule in this case. The respondents cannot be
ordered to sell their portion of the co–owned properties. In the language of Rodriguez v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal,20 “each party is the sole judge of what is good for him.”21

3. Indeed, the respected commentaries suggest the conclusion that, insofar as the sale of co–owned
properties is concerned, there is no common interest that may be prejudiced should one or more of the
co–owners refuse to sell the co–owned property, which is exactly the factual situation in this case. When
respondents disagreed to the sale, they merely asserted their individual ownership rights. Without
unanimity, there is no common interest.

Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co–owners may bring a suit for partition, which is one of
the modes of extinguishing co–ownership. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co–owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co–ownership, and that each co–owner may demand at any time partition of the
thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Civil
Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co–owners cannot agree that it be
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed. This is resorted to (a) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co–
owners but because of the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would
prejudice the interests of the co–owners, and (b) the co–owners are not in agreement as to who among
them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co–owners.22
This is the result obviously aimed at by petitioners at the outset. As already shown, this cannot be done
while the co–ownership exists.

Essentially, a partition proceeding accords all parties the opportunity to be heard, the denial of which was
raised as a defense by respondents for opposing the sale of the subject properties.

The necessity of partition could not be more emphasized than in Rodriguez v. Court of First Instance of
Rizal,23 to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x That this recourse would entail considerable time, trouble and expense, unwarranted by the value of
the property from the standpoint of the [respondents], is no legal justification for the apportionment of
the property not agreeable to any of the co–owners. Disagreements and differences impossible of
adjustment by the parties themselves are bound to arise, and it is precisely with such contingency in view
that the law on partition was evolved.24

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is DENIED without prejudice to the filing of an action
for partition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CV No. 76449 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Reyes,* JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 201011 January 27, 2014

THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, all surnamed

DIMAGUILA, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 15,
2011Decision and the March 5, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 92707,
1 2

which affirmed the August 23, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Santa Cruz, Laguna
3

(RTC), in Civil Case No. SC-3108.

The Facts

On July 5, 1993, the respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia Monteiro (Spouses Monteiro), along with Jose,
Gerasmo, Elisa, and Clarita Nobleza, filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages before the RTC, against
the pet1t10ners, Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria Dimaguila (The Dimaguilas),
together with Rosalina, Jonathan, Eve, Sol, Venus, Enrique, Nina, Princess Arieta, and Evangelina Borlaza. The
complaint alleged that all the pmiies were co-owners and prayed for the pmiition of a residential house and lot
located at Gat. Tayaw St., Liliw, Laguna, with an area of 489 square meters, and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 1453. Spouses Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro
Dimaguila (Pedro).

In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that there was no co-ownership to speak of
in the first place. They alleged that the subject property, then owned by Maria Ignacio Buenaseda, had long
been partitioned equally between her two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, through a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, with its southern-half portion assigned to Perfecto and the northern-half portion to
Vitaliano. They claimed that they were the heirs of Vitaliano and that Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with
the property as they were not heirs of either Perfecto or Vitaliano.

During the course of the proceedings, several incidents were initiated, namely: (a) Motion to Dismiss for lack of
legal capacity to sue of Spouses Monteiro and for lack of cause of action; (b) Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order of denial thereof, which was denied; (c) Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents; (d) Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order granting the same, which was denied; (e) Motion to Defer Pre-trial; (f) Notice
of Consignation by the petitioners in the exercise of their alleged right of redemption of the share being claimed
by the Spouses Monteiro in light of the deed of sale they produced and claimed to have been executed by the
heirs of Pedro in their favor; (g) Motion to Remove Sonia Monteiro (Sonia) as plaintiff, which was denied; (h)
Motion for Reconsideration thereof, which was also denied; (i) Motion for Clarification and/or Extended
Resolution; and (j) Motion to Suspend Proceedings due to a pending Petition for Certiorari before the CA
assailing several of the RTC orders. The proceedings resumed after the promulgation by the CA of its April 5,
2000 Resolution in CA-G.R. No. SP 52833, which upheld the assailed RTC orders.

On January 2, 2001, upon resumption of the proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for Leave to
Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint. The RTC granted their motion. The amended complaint abandoned
4

the original claim for partition and instead sought the recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property
occupied by the Dimagui as and other defendants, specifically, the potiion sold to the couple by the heirs of
Pedro. Furthermore, only Spouses Monteiro were retained as plaintiffs and the Dimaguilas as defendants.

In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas' admission in their original answer that
the subject propetiy had already been partitioned between Perfecto and Vitaliano, through a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945, and that during their lifetime, the brothers agreed that Perfecto
would become the owner of the southern-hal f portion and Vitaliano of the northern-half portion, which division
was observed and respected by them as well as their heirs and successors-in-interest.

Spouses Monteiro further averred that Perfecto was survived by Esperanza, Leandro and Pedro, who had
divided the southern-half portion equally amongst themselves, with their respective 1 /3 shares measuring 81.13
square meters each; that Pedro's share pertains to the 1 /3 of the southern-half immediately adjacent to the
northern-half adjudicated to the
Dimaguilas as heirs of Vitaliano; that on September 29, 1992, Pedro's share was sold by his heirs to them
through a Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan (Bilihan) with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and
Leandro appearing in an Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver; and that when they attempted to take possession
of the share of Pedro, they discovered that the subject portion was being occupied by the Dimaguilas.

In their Answer to the amended complaint, the Dimaguilas admitted that the subject property was inherited by,
5

and divided equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but denied the admission in their original answer that it had
been actually divided into southern and nmihern portions. Instead, they argued that the Extrajudicial Partition
mentioned only the division of the subject property "into two and share and share alike." In effect, they argued
the existence of a co-owenrship, contrary to their original position. The Dimaguilas further argued that the
Bilihan did not specify the metes and bounds of the property sold, in violation of Article 1458 of the Civil Code.
Even assuming that such had been specified, they averred that the sale of a definite portion of a property owned
in common was void since a co-owner could only sell his undivided share in the property.

During the trial, Spouses Monteiro presented Pedrito Adrieta, brother of Sonia Monteiro (Sonia), who testified
that Perfecto was his grandfather and that at the time of Perfecto's death, he had two properties, one of which
was the subject property in Liliw, Laguna, which went to his children, Esperanza, Leonardo and Pedro. Pedro
was survived by his children Pedrito, Theresita, Francisco, and Luis, who, in turn, sold their rights over the
subject property to Sonia.

Sonia testified that she was approached by Pedro's son, Francisco, and was asked if she was interested in
purchasing Pedro's 1/3 share of the southern portion of the Bahay na Sato, and that he showed her a deed of
extrajudicial partition executed by and between Perfecto and Vitaliano, as well as the tax declaration of the
property to prove that the property had already been partitioned between the two brothers.

Engineer Baltazar F. Mesina testified that he was the geodetic engineer hired by Spouses Monteiro to survey the
property in Liliw, and recounted that he checked the boundary of the subject property, subdivided the lot into
two and came up with a survey plan.

Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented a certified true copy of
the cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners.

Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
testified that as part of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the records of surveyed land, including cadastral
maps from the region.

One of the Dimaguilas, Asuncion, was the sole witness for the defendants. She testified that their first counsel
made a mistake when he alleged in their original answer that the property had already been partitioned into
n01ihern and southern portions between the two brothers, as the original answer had been rushed and they were
never given a copy of it. She claimed that the mistake was only pointed out to her by their new counsel after
their former counsel withdrew due to cancer. She further testified that there was no intention to partition the
"bahay na bato" which stood on the subject property, in order to preserve its historical and sentimental value.

Ruling of the RTC

In its August 23, 2007 Decision, the RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and ordered the Dimaguilas to
turn over the possession of the subject 1 /3 portion of the southern-half of the property, to wit:

WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:

a. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to peacefully vacate and turn-over
possession of 1/ 3 of the southern portion of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453,
specifically described as "A" of Lot 877 in the sketch plan marked as Exhibit "I", within 60 days from
the finality of this Decision, failing which let a writ of possession issue;

b. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily, the amount of ?500 per month in
the form of rent for the use of the property from July 1993 until the property is vacated;

c. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily, attorney's fees of P30,000 and
litigation expense of P20,000.

SO ORDERED. 6
The RTC found that although the extrajudicial partition merely divided the property into two share and share
alike, evidence aliunde was appreciated to show that there was an actual division of the property into south and
north between Perfecto and Vitaliano, and that such partition was observed and honored by their heirs. These
pieces of evidence were the cadastral map of Liliw and a corresponding list of claimants, which showed that the
7

subject property had long been registered as Lot 876 (northern-half), claimed by Buenaventura Dimaguila
(Buenaventura), an heir of Vitaliano, and Lot 877 (southern-half), claimed by Perfecto.

The RTC held that the manner of partition was admitted by the Dimaguilas themselves in their original answer.
It gave no credence to the claim of Asuncion that such admission was an error of their fonner counsel and that
she was unaware of the contents of their original answer. It noted that the Dimaguilas had strongly maintained
their theory of partition from 1992 when the complaint was first filed, and only changed their defense in 2001
when Spouses Monteiro filed their amended complaint. It keenly observed that it was precisely their admission
which propelled Spouses Monteiro to amend their complaint from one of partition to recovery of possession.
Thus, the RTC concluded that there was indeed a partition of the subject property into southern-half and
northern-half portions between Perfecto and Vitaliano and that the Dimaguilas were estopped from denying the
same.

As to the authenticity of the Bilihan, where the 1 /3 share of Pedro was sold to Spouses Monteiro, the RTC
found the document to be regular and authentic absent any piece of evidence to the contrary. It stated that the
proper persons to contest the sale were not the Dimaguilas, who were the heirs of Vitaliano, but the heirs of
Perfecto. It noted that the records showed that the heirs of Esperanza and Leandro (Pedro's siblings), had
signified their conformity to the pa1iition and to the sale of Pedro's 1 /3 portion.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed August 15, 2011 Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

The CA found that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a preponderance of evidence thru their
presentation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, the cadastral map and the municipal assessor's records. It
8 9

noted, more importantly, that the Dimaguilas themselves corroborated the claim of partition in their original
answer. It likewise ruled that the petitioners were estopped from denying their admission of partition after the
respondent spouses had relied on their judicial admission.

The Dimaguilas also insisted on their argument, which was raised before the RTC, but not addressed, that the
Bilihan should not have been admitted as evidence for lack of a documentary stamp tax, in accordance with
Section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code (N!RC). Citing Gabucan v. Manta and Del Rosario v.
10

Hamoy, the CA, however, ruled that if a document which did not bear the required documentary stamp was
11

presented in evidence, the court should require the proponent to affix the requisite stamp. The CA noted that the
RTC had failed to direct Spouses Monteiro to affix the stamp and merely reminded the presiding judge to be
more vigilant on similar situations in the future. Nonetheless, it held that the petitioners did not possess the
necessary personality to assail the sale between Spouses Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro because it pe1iained to
the southern-half of the property to which they had no claim.

The CA likewise found sufficient basis for the award of rentals as compensatory damages since Spouses
Monteiro were wrongfully deprived of possession of the 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the subject property.
It also upheld the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses by the RTC, considering that Spouses
Monteiro were compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their rights and interest.

In its assailed March 5, 2012 Resolution, the CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.

Hence, this petition.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS AN ACTUAL
PARTITION OF THE PROPERTY COVERED BY TAX DECLARATION NO. 1453.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 1/3 PORTION OF THE
SOUTHERN HALF OF THE PROPERTY WAS SOLD TO THE RESPONDENTS.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE EXHIBIT C, THE

BIL/HAN NG LAHA T NAMING KARAPATAN.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE
ENTITLED TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE 1/3 PORTION OF THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE
PROPERTY.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR
RENTALS FOR THE USE OF THE PROPERTY FROM JULY 1993 UNTIL VACATED.

VI

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES.

VII

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE PETITIONERS'
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT AND TO GRANT THE COUNTERCLAIMS
INTERPOSED THEREIN. 12

The Dimaguilas argue that their original allegation regarding the partition of the subject property into northern
and southern portions was a mistake of their former counsel, and it was not their intention to partition the
property because to do so would damage the house thereon. Even assuming an admission was made, the
petitioners aver that such was made only by some, but not all, of the co-owners; and that partition can only be
made by all co-owners, and allowing the admission is tantamount to effecting partition by only some co-owners.
Spouses Monteiro themselves, in their original complaint, made an admission that they were co-owners of the
property and asserted that there was no partition. The evidence aliunde considered by the RTC, consisting of the
cadastral map and the list of claimants, were timely objected to during the trial as hearsay and a violation of the
best evidence rule.

The petitioners reiterate that the Bilihan should not have been admitted into evidence because it lacked the
documentary stamp tax required by Section 201 of the NIRC, providing that no document shall be admitted in
evidence until the requisite stamps have been affixed thereto. They argue that the ruling of petitioners' lack of
personality to assail the deed of sale is different from the issue of the deed of sale's admissibility as evidence.
They conclude that considering that no documentary stamp was ever affixed on the deed of sale, such should
never have been admitted into evidence and consequently, should not have been relied upon by the lower courts
to prove the sale of 1/3 of the southern portion; and that considering that the Bilihan is inadmissible as evidence,
the respondent spouses have no basis for their claim to the subject 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the
property. Thus, they insist that the lower courts erred in awarding to Spouses Monteiro the possession of the
subject prope1iy, the rentals, attorney's fees and litigation expenses, and in failing to rule on their counterclaim
for demolition of improvements and payment of damages.

The assignment of errors boils down to two main issues:

I. Whether there was a pa1iition of the subject property; and

2. Whether the 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the subject property was sold to the respondent
spouses.
 Ruling of the Court

At the outset, it must be pointed out that the petitioners' assignment of errors calls for the Court to again
evaluate the evidence to determine whether there was a partition of the property and whether the 1/3 portion of
the southern half was sold to the respondent spouses. These clearly entail questions of fact which are beyond the
Court's ambit of review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, especially considering that the findings of fact of
the RTC were affirmed by the CA. On this ground alone, the present petition must be denied. Nonetheless, the
13

Court shall delve into these factual issues to finally put this case to rest.

Partition of the Subject Property

Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of proof to establish their case by a
preponderance of evidence, which is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side,
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence." Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.14

To prove their claim of partition, the respondent spouses presented the following: (1) the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition, dated October 5, 1945, executed by and between the brothers Perfecto and Vitaliano; (2) the cadastral
map of Liliw Cadm-484, dated August 6, 1976, showing that the subject property had been divided into
15

southern and northern portions, registered as Lot Nos. 876 and 877; and (3) the Municipal Assessor's records 16

showing that the said lots were respectively claimed by Buenaventura and Perfecto.

It is undisputed that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition stated that Perfecto and Vitaliano agreed "to divide
between them into two and share and share alike" the subject property, including the house situated thereon. It
appears, however, that the property was actually partitioned into definite portions, namely, southern and
northern halves, as reflected in the cadastral map of Liliw, which were respectively claimed by an heir of
Vitaliano and Perfecto himself. It, thus, appears that the subject property had already been partitioned into
definite portions more than 20 years prior to the original complaint for partition filed in 1993, and that such
division had been observed by the brothers' heirs. As earlier pointed out, the petitioners themselves admitted to
this very fact in their original answer, to wit:

(b) On September 5, 1945 the brothers PERFECTO and VITALIANO DIMAGUILA executed a deed of
EXTRA JUDICIAL PARTITION of the aforedescribed property dividing the same into two (2) equal parts as
indicated in the aforesaid deed as follows, to wit:

xxx

(c) As a result of the foregoing partition and as known by all the parties in this case from the beginning or as
soon as they reached the age of discernment PERFECTO DIMAGUILA became the sole and exclusive owner
of the southern half of the aforedescribed property and VITALIANO DIMAGUILA became the sole owner of
the northern half of the same property; the house that was built thereon and still existing up to this time was
likewise equally divided between the two (2) DIMAGUILA brothers in accordance with the extrajudicial
partition of half equal shares;

xxx

2. In other words, the share of VITALIANO DIMAGUILA in the above described property has already been
long segregated and had passed on to his heirs as is very well known by all the parties in this case; 17

xxx

(Emphases in the Original)

Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a pa1iy in the course of the
18

proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former
counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them. Petitioner Asuncion testified:

Q So, why was that allegations (sic) made in the Answer?

A May be, (sic) in his rush to file the Answer, Atty. Paredes filed the same without giving us a copy ... 19
This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Furthermore, the Court notes that this
20

position was adopted by the petitioners only almost eight (8) years after their original answer was filed, in
response to the amended complaint of the respondent spouses. In their original answer to the complaint for
partition, their claim that there was already a partition into northern-half and southern-half portions, was the
very essence of their defense. It was precisely this admission which moved the respondent spouses to amend
their complaint. The petitioners cannot now insist that the very foundation of their original defense was a
palpable mistake.

Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the
21

person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The respondent
spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners' admission and so amended their original complaint for partition to
one for recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from
denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the property.

Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners would actually be
sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented by the respondent spouses. If anything,
the additional evidence they presented only served to corroborate the petitioners' admission.

The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral map and the list of claimants presented by the
respondent spouses, on the ground that they violated the rule on hearsay and the best evidence rule.

Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3( d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
22

Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a
23

copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.24

Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the area covered by
the map were presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the Municipal
Assessor's Office, a repository of such documents. The second was Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee,
who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The
cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as ce1iified true copies of original public records, fall under the
exception to the best evidence rule.

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official
records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance
25

of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the
inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable
transactions in the course of his duty. The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity
of performance of official duty.26

Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise
and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding
27

list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law.
As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are primafacie evidence of the facts stated therein.

Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition, they presented no evidence to contradict the
evidence of the respondent spouses. Thus, even without the admission of the petitioners, the respondent spouses
proved by a preponderance of evidence that there had indeed been a partition of the subject property.

Sale of 1/3 Portion of the Southern-half

To prove that 1/3 of the southern-half portion of the subject property was sold to them, Spouses Monteiro
presented a deed of sale entitled Bilihan ng Lahat Naming Karapatan, dated September 29, 1992, wherein
28

Pedro's share was sold by his heirs to them, with the acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and Leandro in an
Affidavit of Conformity and Waiver. The petitioners argue that the Bilihan should not have been admitted into
29

evidence because it lacked the documentary stamp tax required by Section 201 of the NIRC.
On August 29, 1994, the petitioners filed a motion for the production and/or inspection of documents, praying
30

that Spouses Monteiro be ordered to produce the deed of sale, which they cited as the source of their rights as
co-owners. On November 20, 1995, Spouses Monteiro submitted their compliance, furnishing the RTC and the
31

petitioners with a copy of the Bilihan. On January 3, 1996, the petitioners filed a notice of consignation,
32 33

manifesting that they had attempted to exercise their right of redemption as co-owners of the 1/3 portion of the
southern half of the property under Article 1623 of the Civil Code by sending and tendering payment of
34

redemption to Spouses Monteiro, which was, however, returned.

By filing the notice of consignation and tendering their payment for the redemption of the 1/3 portion of the
southern-half of the property, the petitioners, in effect, admitted the existence, due execution and validity of the
Bilihan. Consequently, they are now estopped from questioning its admissiblity in evidence for relying on such
for their right of redemption. Additionally, the Court notes that the copy of the Bilihan which was originally
35

submitted by Spouses Monteiro with its compliance filed on November 20, 1995, does in fact bear a
documentary stamp tax. It could only mean that the documentary stamp tax on the sale was properly paid. The
Bilihan was, therefore, properly admitted into evidence and considered by the RTC.

In any case, as correctly held by the lower cou1is, the petitioners, as heirs of Vitaliano, who inherited the
northern-half po1iion of the subject property, do not possess the necessary personality to assail the sale of the
southern-half portion between Spouses Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro. They are not real parties-in-interest
1â wphi1

who stand to be benefited or injured by the sale of the 1/3 portion of the southern-half over which they have
absolutely no right. As correctly ruled by the courts below, only fellow co-owners have the personality to assail
the sale, namely, the heirs of Pedro's siblings, Esperanza and Leandro. They have, however, expressly aquiesced
to the sale and waived their right to the property in the affidavit presented by Spouses Monteiro. As such, the
36

petitioners have no right to their counterclaims of demolition of improvements and payment of damages.

With Spouses Monteiro having sufficiently proved their claim over the subject I /3 portion of the southern-half
of the prope1iy through the Bilihan, the lower courts did not err in awarding possession, rentals, attorney's fees,
and litigation expenses to them.

The Court, however, finds that the award of rentals should be reckoned from January 2, 2001, the date the
Spouses Monteiro filed their Amended Complaint seeking recovery of the subject portion. Interest at the rate of
6% per annum shall also be imposed on the total amount of rent due from finality of this Decision until fully
paid.37

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 15, 2011 Decision and the March 15, 2012 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, in CA-G .R. CV No. 92707 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that:

a. The award of rent at the rate of P500.00 per month shall be reckoned from January 2, 2001 until the
property is vacated; and

b. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on the total amount of rent due from finality of
this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 121069. February 7, 2003]

BENJAMIN CORONEL AND EMILIA MEKING VDA. DE CORONEL, petitioners, vs.

FLORENTINO CONSTANTINO, AUREA BUENSUCESO, AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This refers to the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
March 27, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 440231 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan, Branch 8, dated April 12, 1993 in Civil Case No. 105-M-912; and the resolution of said
appellate court, dated July 4, 1995, denying the motion for reconsideration of its decision.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
The subject property consists of two parcels of land situated in Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan,
designated as Cadastral Lots Nos. 5737 and 5738. The property is originally owned by Honoria
Aguinaldo. One-half (1/2) of it was inherited by Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel together with her sons
Benjamin, Catalino and Ceferino, all surnamed Coronel. The other half was inherited by Florentino
Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso.
On February 20, 1991, Constantino and Buensuceso filed a complaint for declaration of
ownership, quieting of title and damages with prayer for writ of mandatory and/or prohibitory
injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan (Branch 8) against Benjamin, Emilia and John
Does, docketed as Civil Case No. 105-M-91. Plaintiffs allege that: on April 23, 1981, Jess C. Santos
and Priscilla Bernardo purchased the property belonging to Emilia and her sons by virtue of a deed of
sale signed by Emilia; on June 21, 1990, Santos and Bernardo in turn sold the same to Constantino
and Buensuceso by virtue of a compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 8289-M; they are the owners
of the subject property and defendants have illegally started to introduce construction on the premises
in question; and pray that defendants respect, acknowledge and confirm the right of ownership of the
plaintiffs to the share, interest and participation of the one-third (1/3) portion of the above described
property.
After defendants filed their Answer, pre-trial ensued wherein the parties stipulated that: (1) the
property in question was previously owned by Honoria Aguinaldo, one-half (1/2) of which was
inherited by the defendants while the other half was inherited by the plaintiffs from the same
predecessor; (2) it was admitted by counsel for the defendants that there was a sale between Jess
Santos and the plaintiffs covering the subject property; and (3) that there was no evidence presented
in Civil Case No. 8289-M by either of the parties and that the decision therein was based on a
compromise agreement.3
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the decretal
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby made in favor of plaintiffs, the Court hereby declares plaintiffs
as the sole and absolute owners of the properties covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 28960 and
28961 of Hagonoy, Bulacan, and orders the defendants to respect, acknowledge and confirm the right
of ownership of plaintiffs over the whole property described above, to remove whatever improvements
introduced by them thereon, and to pay the plaintiffs, solidarily and severally P10,000.00 as attorneys
fees and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
 On appeal brought by defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court
and denied defendants motion for reconsideration.
Hence, herein petition brought by defendants, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CONTRACT [OF] SALE EXECUTED BY A PARENT-CO-OWNER, IN HER
OWN BEHALF, IS UNENFORCEABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARES OF HER CO-HEIRS-
CHILDREN;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE MINOR CHILDREN CAN RATIFY UNAUTHORIZED ACTIONS OF THEIR
PARENTS;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CO-HEIRS ARE INDISPENSABLE DEFENDANTS IN AN ACTION FOR
DECLARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND QUIETING OF TITLE;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE WHICH IS A PRIVATE DOCUMENT WAS
SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED WHEN THE COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS
ADMITTED ONLY ITS EXISTENCE BUT NOT ITS CONTENTS.5
The third issue was raised by the petitioners for the first time with the Court of Appeals. They
claim that the complaint should have been dismissed because private respondents failed to implead
the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino who died in 1983 and 1990,6 respectively, in their complaint as
indispensable parties. We do not agree.

A careful reading of the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan which is a private document, not having
been duly notarized, shows that only the share of Emilia in the subject property was sold because
Benjamin did not sign the document and the shares of Ceferino and Catalino were not subject of the
sale. Pertinent portions of the document read as follows:
KASULATAN NG BILIHANG PATULUYAN
PANIWALAAN NG LAHAT:
Kaming mag-iinang Emilia Micking Vda. Coronel at Benjamin M. Coronel kapwa may sapat na
gulang, Pilipino, naninirahan sa nayon ng Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan, sa kasulatang ito ay
malaya naming:
PINATUTUNAYAN
Na, kami ay tunay na nagmamay-ari ng isang lagay na lupang Bakuran na minana namin sa
aming Lolong yumaong Mauricio Coronel, na ang ayos, takal at kalagayan ay ang sumusunod:
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 5737
Bakuran sa nayon ng Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan na may sukat na 416 Square Meters ang
kabuuan 208 Square Meters Lot A-1 ang kalahati nito na kanilang ipinagbibili.
xxxxxxxxx
Na, dahil at alang-alang sa halagang DALAWAMPUT LIMANG LIBONG PISO (P25,000) salaping
Pilipino, na aming tinanggap sa kasiyahang loob namin, buhat sa mag-asawang Jess C. Santos at
Prescy Bernardo, kapwa may sapat na gulang, Pilipino at naninirahan sa nayon ng Sta. Monica,
Hagonoy, Bulacan, sa bisa ng kasulatang ito, ay aming isinasalin, inililipat at ipinagbibili ng bilihang
patuluyan ang lahat ng aming dapat na makaparte sa lupang Bakuran Nakasaad sa dakong unahan
nito, sa nabanggit na Jess C. Santos at Prescy Bernardo o sa kanilang tagapagmana at kahalili.
Na, ako namang Jess C. Santos, bilang nakabili, ay kusang loob ding nagsasaysay sa
kasulatang ito na ako ay kasangayon sa lahat ng ditoy nakatala, bagaman ang lupang naturan ay
hindi pa nahahati sa dapat magmana sa yumaong Honoria Aguinaldo.
Na, sa aming kagipitan inari naming ipagbili ang aming karapatan o kaparte na minana sa
yumaong Guillermo Coronel ay napagkasunduan namin mag-iina na ipagbili ang bakurang ito na
siyang makalulunas sa aming pangangailangan x x x.
 Na, kaming nagbili ang magtatanggol ng katibayan sa pagmamayari sa lupang naturan, sakaling
may manghihimasok.
SA KATUNAYAN NITO, kami ay lumagda sa kasulatang ito sa bayan ng Malabon, Rizal ngayong
ika-23 ng Abril, 1981.
(Signed) (Signed)
EMILIA MICKING Vda. CORONEL JESS C. SANTOS
Nagbili Nakabili
(Unsigned) (Signed)
BENJAMIN M. CORONEL PRISCILLA BERNARDO
Nagbili Nakabili7
Thus, it is clear, as already stated, that petitioner Benjamin did not sign the document and that
the shares of Catalino and Ceferino in the subject property were not sold by them.
Since the shares of Catalino and Ceferino were not sold, plaintiffs Constantino and Buensuceso
have no cause of action against them or against any of their heirs. Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, indispensable parties are parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action. In the present case, the heirs of Catalino and Ceferino are not
indispensable parties because a complete determination of the rights of herein petitioners and
respondents can be had even if the said heirs are not impleaded.

Besides, it is undisputed that petitioners never raised before the trial court the issue of the private
respondents failure to implead said heirs in their complaint. Instead, petitioners actively participated in
the proceedings in the lower court and raised only the said issue on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
It is a settled rule that jurisdictional questions may be raised at any time unless an exception arises
where estoppel has supervened.8 In the present case, petitioners participation in all stages of the
case during trial, without raising the issue of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over indispensable
parties, estops them from challenging the validity of the proceedings therein.
Further, the deed of sale is not a competent proof that petitioner Benjamin had sold his own share
of the subject property. It cannot be disputed that Benjamin did not sign the document and therefore,
it is unenforceable against him.

Emilia executed the instrument in her own behalf and not in representation of her three children.
Article 493 of the Civil Code states:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Consequently, the sale of the subject property made by Emilia in favor of Santos and Bernardo is
limited to the portion which may be allotted to her upon the termination of her co-ownership over the
subject property with her children.

As to the first, second and fourth issues it has been established that at the time of execution of
the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan on April 23, 1981 9, the subject property was co-owned, pro-
indiviso, by petitioner Emilia together with her petitioner son Benjamin, and her two other sons,
Catalino and Ceferino. No proof was presented to show that the co-ownership that existed among the
heirs of Ceferino and Catalino and herein petitioners has ever been terminated.
Applying Articles 1317 and 1403 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals ruled that through their
inaction and silence, the three sons of Emilia are considered to have ratified the aforesaid sale of the
subject property by their mother.
Articles 1317 and 1403 (1) of the Civil Code provide:
 Art. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or
unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal
representation or who has acted beyond his powers shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified,
expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by
the other contracting party.
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or
legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers.
xxxxxxxxx
We do not agree with the appellate court. The three sons of Emilia did not ratify the sale. In
Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot10 we held that:
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some
unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is
this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore
unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification.
No evidence was presented to show that the three brothers were aware of the sale made by their
mother. Unaware of such sale, Catalino, Ceferino and Benjamin could not be considered as having
voluntarily remained silent and knowingly chose not to file an action for the annulment of the sale.
Their alleged silence and inaction may not be interpreted as an act of ratification on their part.

We also find no concrete evidence to show that Ceferino, Catalino and Benjamin benefited from
the sale. It is true that private respondent Constantino testified that Benjamin took money from Jess
Santos but this is mere allegation on the part of Constantino. No other evidence was presented to
support such allegation. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof
under our Rules of Court.11 Neither do the records show that Benjamin admitted having received
money from Jess Santos. Even granting that Benjamin indeed received money from Santos,
Constantinos testimony does not show that the amount received was part of the consideration for the
sale of the subject property.

To repeat, the sale is valid insofar as the share of petitioner Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel is
concerned. The due execution of the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan was duly established when
petitioners, through their counsel, admitted during the pre-trial conference that the said document was
signed by Emilia.12 While petitioners claim that Emilia erroneously signed it under the impression that
it was a contract of mortgage and not of sale, no competent evidence was presented to prove such
allegation.

Hence, Jess C. Santos and Priscilla Bernardo, who purchased the share of Emilia, became co-
owners of the subject property together with Benjamin and the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino. As
such, Santos and Bernardo could validly dispose of that portion of the subject property pertaining to
Emilia in favor of herein private respondents Constantino and Buensuceso.
However, the particular portions properly pertaining to each of the co-owners are not yet defined
and determined as no partition in the proper forum or extrajudicial settlement among the parties has
been effected among the parties. Consequently, the prayer of respondents for a mandatory or
prohibitory injunction lacks merit.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Plaintiffs-private respondents Florentino Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso are declared
owners of one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the subject property plus the one-fourth () undivided
share of defendant-petitioner Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel; and, defendant-petitioner Benjamin
Coronel together with the heirs of Catalino Coronel and the heirs of Ceferino Coronel are declared
owners of one-fourth () share each of the other one-half (1/2) portion of the subject property, without
prejudice to the parties entering into partition of the subject property, judicial or otherwise.
2. The order of removal of the improvements and the award of the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fees and costs of suit are DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125233. March 9, 2000]

Spouses ALEXANDER CRUZ and ADELAIDA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. ELEUTERIO

LEIS, RAYMUNDO LEIS, ANASTACIO L. LAGDANO, LORETA L. CAYONDA and the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Lexj uris

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Private respondents, the heirs of spouses Adriano Leis and Gertrudes Isidro,13 filed an action before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig seeking the nullification of the contracts of sale over a lot
executed by Gertrudes Isidro in favor of petitioner Alexander Cruz, as well as the title subsequently
issued in the name of the latter. Private respondents claimed that the contracts were vitiated by fraud
as Gertrudes was illiterate and already 80 years old at the time of the execution of the contracts; that
the price for the land was insufficient as it was sold only for P39,083.00 when the fair market value of
the lot should be P1,000.00 per square meter, instead of P390.00, more or less; and that the property
subject of the sale was conjugal and, consequently, its sale without the knowledge and consent of
private respondents was in derogation of their rights as heirs.

The facts that gave rise to the complaint: Juri smis

Adriano and Gertrudes were married on 19 April 1923. On 27 April 1955, Gertrudes acquired from the
then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR) a parcel of land with an area of one
hundred (100) square meters, situated at Bo. Sto. Nio, Marikina, Rizal and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42245. The Deed of Sale described Gertrudes as a widow. On 2 March
1956, TCT No. 43100 was issued in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was also referred to therein
as a "widow."

On 2 December 1973, Adriano died. It does not appear that he executed a will before his death.
On 5 February 1985, Gertrudes obtained a loan from petitioners, the spouses Alexander and
Adelaida Cruz, in the amount of P15,000.00 at 5% interest, payable on or before 5 February 1986.
The loan was secured by a mortgage over the property covered by TCT No. 43100. Gertrudes,
however, failed to pay the loan on the due date.

Unable to pay her outstanding obligation after the debt became due and payable, on 11 March 1986,
Gertrudes executed two contracts in favor of petitioner Alexander Cruz. The first is denominated as
"Kasunduan," which the parties concede is a pacto de retro sale, granting Gertrudes one year within
which to repurchase the property. The second is a "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of
Absolute Sale covering the same property for the price of P39,083.00, the same amount stipulated in
the "Kasunduan." Jjj uris

For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property, ownership thereof was consolidated in the name
of Alexander Cruz in whose name TCT No. 130584 was issued on 21 April 1987, canceling TCT No.
43100 in the name of Gertrudes Isidro.

On 9 June 1987, Gertrudes Isidro died. Thereafter, her heirs, herein private respondents, received
demands to vacate the premises from petitioners, the new owners of the property. Private
respondents responded by filing a complaint as mentioned at the outset.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of private respondents. The
RTC held that the land was conjugal property since the evidence presented by private respondents
disclosed that the same was acquired during the marriage of the spouses and that Adriano
contributed money for the purchase of the property. Thus, the court concluded, Gertrudes could only
sell to petitioner spouses her one-half share in the property.

The trial court also ruled that no fraud attended the execution of the contracts. Nevertheless, the
"Kasunduan," providing for a sale con pacto de retro, had superseded the "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang
Bilihan," the deed of absolute sale. The trial court did not consider the pacto de retro sale an
equitable mortgage, despite the allegedly insufficient price. Nonetheless, the trial court found for
private respondents. It rationalized that petitioners failed to comply with the provisions of Article 1607
of the Civil Code requiring a judicial order for the consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a retro
to be recorded in the Registry of Property.

The dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision reads: lex

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring Exhibit G "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan" Null and Void and declar[ing]
that the title issued pursuant thereto is likewise Null and Void;

2. Declaring the property in litigation as conjugal property;

3. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Marikina Branch to reinstate the title of Gertrudes
Isidro;

4. Ordering the plaintiff[s] [sic] to comply with the provision[s] of Article 1607 in relation
to Article 1616 of the Civil Code;

5. Ordering the defendant[s] to pay plaintiff[s] P15,000.00 nominal damages for the
violation of plaintiffs rights;

6. Ordering the defendant[s] to pay plaintiff[s] the sum of P8,000.00 as and for attorneys
fees;

7. Dismissing defendant[s'] counterclaim; and

8. Ordering defendant[s] to pay the cost of suit. Jksm

 SO ORDERED.14

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals in vain. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, holding that since the property was acquired during the marriage of
Gertrudes to Adriano, the same was presumed to be conjugal property under Article 160 of the Civil
Code. The appellate court, like the trial court, also noted that petitioner did not comply with the
provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code.

Petitioners are now before this Court seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
First, they contend that the subject property is not conjugal but is owned exclusively by Gertrudes,
who was described in the Deed of Sale between Gertrudes and the DANR as well as in TCT No.
43100 as a widow. Second, assuming the land was conjugal property, petitioners argue that the same
became Gertrudes exclusively when, in 1979, she mortgaged the property to the Daily Savings Bank
and Loan Association. The bank later foreclosed on the mortgage in 1981 but Gertrudes redeemed
the same in 1983. Chief

The paraphernal or conjugal nature of the property is not determinative of the ownership of the
disputed property. If the property was paraphernal as contended by petitioners, Gertrudes Isidro
would have the absolute right to dispose of the same, and absolute title and ownership was vested in
petitioners upon the failure of Gertrudes to redeem the property. On the other hand, if the property
was conjugal, as private respondents maintain, upon the death of Adriano Leis, the conjugal
partnership was terminated,15 entitling Gertrudes to one-half of the property.16 Adrianos rights to the
other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his heirs, 17 which includes his widow Gertrudes,
who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the legitimate children.18 Thus, as a result of the
death of Adriano, a regime of co-ownership arose between Gertrudes and the other heirs in relation
to the property.

Incidentally, there is no merit in petitioners contention that Gertrudes redemption of the property from
the Daily Savings Bank vested in her ownership over the same to the exclusion of her co-owners. We
dismissed the same argument by one of the petitioners in Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals,19 where
one of the petitioners therein claimed ownership of the entire property subject of the case by virtue of
her redemption thereof after the same was forfeited in favor of the provincial government for non-
payment of taxes. We held, however, that the redemption of the land "did not terminate the co-
ownership nor give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership." We expounded, quoting
our pronouncement in Adille vs. Court of Appeals:20
 The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership
over the property held in common? Esmsc

Essentially, it is the petitioners contention that the property subject of dispute devolved
upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption within the period
required by law. He relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article
1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of
the entire property.

There is no merit in this petition.

The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone
(CIVL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE (1889), art. 1514.). While the records show that
petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that
did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing
state of co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no doubt that redemption of property
entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code: Esmmis

Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute
to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes.
Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of
his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No
such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.

The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a

vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a
partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its
totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to
redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto
in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-
owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-
ownership.

It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only dispose of her share in the
property owned in common. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. Es-mso

Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was registered in TCT No. 43100 solely
in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow." Where a parcel of land, forming part of the undistributed
properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to a purchaser who
merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the
purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased spouse. The
rationale for this rule is that "a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the
register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on
the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do
more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system."21

As gleaned from the foregoing discussion, despite the Court of Appeals finding and conclusion that
Gertrudes as well as private respondents failed to repurchase the property within the period stipulated
and has lost all their rights to it, it still ruled against petitioners by affirming the Regional Trial Court's
decision on the premise that there was no compliance with Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a
judicial hearing before registration of the property in the name of petitioners. This provision states: Ms-
esm

ART. 1607. In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee by
virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply with the provisions of article 1616 shall not
be recorded in the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has
been duly heard.

The aforequoted article is intended to minimize the evils which the pacto de retro sale has caused in
the hands of usurers. A judicial order is necessary in order to determine the true nature of the
transaction and to prevent the interposition of buyers in good faith while the determination is being
made.22E-xsm

It bears stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of Property of the
consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a condition sine qua non to the transfer of ownership.
Petitioners are the owners of the subject property since neither Gertrudes nor her co-owners
redeemed the same within the one-year period stipulated in the "Kasunduan." The essence of a pacto
de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested in the vendee a
retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated
period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said resolutory condition vests upon the vendee
by operation of law absolute title and ownership over the property sold. As title is already vested in
the vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate his title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not
impair such title or ownership for the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of
registering the consolidated title.23

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in that the petitioners are deemed
owners of the property by reason of the failure of the vendor, Gertrudes Isidro, to repurchase the
same within the period stipulated. However, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 130584, in the name of
Alexander M. Cruz, which was issued without judicial order, is hereby ordered CANCELLED, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43100 in the name of Gertrudes Isidro is ordered REINSTATED,
without prejudice to compliance by petitioners with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 76351 October 29, 1993

VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR, respondents.

Jose F. Manacop for petitioner.

Siruello, Muyco & Associates Law Office for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
GR CV No. 03933 declaring null and void the orders of 23 and 26 April, 1979, the judgment by default of 26 July
1979, and the order of 22 October 1979 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, Branch 30, and
directing the trial court to set the case for pre-trial conference.

Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers; Virgilio is the youngest of seven (7) children of the late
Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is the fifth. On 28 October 1969, the two brothers purchased a house and lot in
Parañaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the
brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was one-third. By virtue
of a written memorandum dated 23 February 1970, Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their interests in the
house and lot should be equal, with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners with
the Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession and enjoyment of the house together with their
father.

Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the deed of sale would
be executed and the title registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. It was further agreed that Senen would
take care of their father and his needs since Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu.

After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house
and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them.

Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to petitioner's demands, the latter filed on 12 January 1979 an action
to compel the sale of the house and lot so that the they could divide the proceeds between them.

In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale, be divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his
favor and one-third (1/3) to respondent. Petitioner also prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the house by
respondent after their father died.

In his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged that he had no objection to the sale as long as the best selling
price could be obtained; that if the sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided equally; and, that
being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the property.

Upon issues being joined, the case was set for pre-trial on 26 April 1979 with the lawyers of both parties notified of
the pre-trial, and served with the pre-trial order, with private respondent executing a special power of attorney to his
lawyer to appear at the pre-trial and enter into any amicable settlement in his behalf. 1

On 20 April 1979, Atty. Manuel S. Tonogbanua, counsel for respondent, filed a motion to cancel pre-trial on the
ground that he would be accompanying his wife to Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a
wedding.

On 23 April 1979, finding the reasons of counsel to be without merit, the trial court denied the motion and directed
that the pre-trial should continue as scheduled.

When the case was called for pre-trial as scheduled on 26 April 1979, plaintiff and his counsel appeared. Defendant
did not appear; neither his counsel in whose favor he executed a special power of attorney to represent him at the
pre-trial. Consequently, the trial court, on motion of plaintiff, declared defendant as in default and ordered reception
of plaintiff's evidence ex parte.

On 7 May 1979, defendant through counsel filed an omnibus motion to reconsider the order of default and to defer
reception of evidence. The trial court denied the motion and plaintiff presented his evidence.

On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against defendant, the trial court found him and plaintiff to be co-
owners of the house and lot, in equal shares on the basis of their written agreement. However, it ruled that plaintiff
has been deprived of his participation in the property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and lot, free
of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants, to delay partition. The trial court also
upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to demand partition. Since plaintiff could not agree to the amount offered by
defendant for the former's share, the trial court held that this property should be sold to a third person and the
proceeds divided equally between the parties.

The trial court likewise ordered defendant to vacate the property and pay plaintiff P1,200.00 as rentals 2 from January
1975 up to the date of decision plus interest from the time the action was filed.

On 17 September 1979, defendant filed an omnibus motion for new trial but on 22 October 1979 the trial court
denied the motion.

Defendant sought relief from the Court of Appeals praying that the following orders and decision of the trial court be
set aside: (a) the order of 23 April 1970 denying defendants motion for postponement of the pre-trial set on 26 April
1979; (b) the order of 26 April 1979 declaring him in default and authorizing plaintiff to present his evidence ex-
parte; (e) the default judgment of 26 July 1979; and, (d) the order dated 22 October 1979 denying his omnibus
motion for new trial.

On 16 October 1986, the Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court of 26 April 1979 as well as the
assailed judgment rendered by default., The appellate court found the explanation of counsel for defendant in his
motion to cancel pre-trial as satisfactory and devoid of a manifest intention to delay the disposition of the case. It
also ruled that the trial court should have granted the motion for postponement filed by counsel for defendant who
should not have been declared as in default for the absence of his counsel.

Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in not holding that the motion of defendant
through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory in character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court for
pre-trial and trial.

The issues to be resolved are whether the trial court correctly declared respondent as in default for his failure to
appear at the pre-trial and in allowing petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte, and whether the trial court
correctly rendered the default judgment against respondent.

We find merit in the petition.

As regards the first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pre-trial is mandatory. 3 A party who
fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default. 4 In the case at bar, where private
respondent and counsel failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the trial, court has authority to declare respondent in
default. 5

Although respondent's counsel filed a motion to postpone pre-trial hearing, the grant or denial thereof is within the
sound discretion of the trial court, which should take into account two factors in the grant or denial of motions for
postponement, namely: (a) the reason for the postponement and (b) the merits of the case of movant. 6

In the instant case, the trial court found the reason stated in the motion of counsel for respondent to cancel the pre-
trial to be without merit. Counsel's explanation that he had to go to by boat as early as 25 March 1979 to fetch his
wife and accompany her to a wedding in Dumaguete City on 27 April 1979 where she was one of the principal
sponsors, cannot be accepted. We find it insufficient to justify postponement of the pre-trial, and the Court of
Appeals did not act wisely in overruling the denial. We sustain the trial court and rule that it did not abuse its
discretion in denying the postponement for lack of merit. Certainly, to warrant a postponement of a mandatory
process as pre-trial would require much more than mere attendance in a social function. It is time indeed we
emphasize that there should be much more than mere perfunctory treatment of the pre-trial procedure. Its
observance must be taken seriously if it is to attain its objective, i.e., the speedy and inexpensive disposition of
cases.

Moreover, the trial court denied the motion for postponement three (3) days before the scheduled pre-trial. If indeed,
counsel for respondent could not attend the pre-trial on the scheduled date, respondent at least should have
personally appeared in order not to be declared as in default. But, since nobody appeared for him, the order of the
trial court declaring him as in default and directing the presentation of petitioner's evidence ex parte was proper. 7

With regard to the merits of the judgment of the trial court by default, which respondent appellate court did not touch
upon in resolving the appeal, the Court holds that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence
presented ex parte, petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of
them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter
the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.

Private respondent and his family refuse to pay monthly rentals to petitioner from the time their father died in 1975
and to vacate the house so that it can be sold to third persons. Petitioner alleges that respondent's continued stay in
the property hinders its disposal to the prejudice of petitioner. On the part of petitioner, he claims that he should be
paid two-thirds (2/3) of a monthly rental of P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,600.00.

In resolving the dispute, the trial court ordered respondent to vacate the property so that it could be sold to third
persons and the proceeds divided between them equally, and for respondent to pay petitioner one-half (1/2) of
P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,200.00 as monthly rental, conformably with their stipulated sharing reflected in their
written agreement.

We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals
by respondent as co-owner which we here declare to commence only after the trial court ordered respondent to
vacate in accordance with its order of 26 July 1979.

Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each
co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners
cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-
owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or
assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case, 8 this Court upheld the order
of the trial court directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil
Code.

However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to
petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. 9 Each co-owner of property held pro
indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he
shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of each
cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint ownership over the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the
same. 10

Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and
respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his continued
occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that
the sale can be effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent should pay a rental of P1,200.00 per
month, with legal interest; from the time the trial court ordered him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other
half of the property appertaining to petitioner.

When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered
the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly
also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of
petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. To this extent and
from then on, respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16 October 1986 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 69.12-P dated 16 July 1979 is
REINSTATED, with the modification that respondent Senen B. Aguilar is ordered to vacate the premises in question
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this and to pay petitioner Virgilio B. Aguilar a monthly rental of P1,200.00 with
interest at the legal rate from the time he received the decision of the trial court directing him to vacate until he
effectively leaves the premises.

The trial court is further directed to take immediate steps to implement this decision conformably with Art. 498 of the
Civil Code and the Rules of Court. This decision is final and executory.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 124118 March 27, 2000

MARINO, RENATO, LETICIA, IMELDA, ALICIA, LIGAYA, and ZENAIDA, all surnamed ADRIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CELESTINA, MANOLO and AIDA, all surnamed ADRIANO, respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Second Division,1 affirming in toto the Joint
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55,2 which dismissed Civil Case No. 88-115 for annulment
of will and ordered the disposition of the estate of Lucio Adriano in accordance with the provisions of his last will and
testament in Spec. Proc. No. 4442.
The pertinent facts are as follows:

The testator, Lucio Adriano also known as Ambrocio Adriano, married Gliceria Dorado on October 29, 1933. Out of
their lawful marriage, they had three children, namely, Celeste, Manolo, and Aida, private respondents in this case.
Sometime in 1942 or prior thereto. Lucio and Gliceria separated, and Gliceria settled in Rizal, Laguna where she
died on June 11, 1968. Also in 1942 or even earlier, Lucio cohabited with Vicente Villa, with whom he had eight
children Marino, Renato, Leticia, Imelda, Maria Alicia, Ligaya, Jose Vergel, and Zenaida, all surnamed Adriano. All
his children by Vicenta Villa are named petitioners in the instant case, with the exception of Jose Vergel, who died
before the inception of the proceedings.

On November 22, 1968, or five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta. Lucio and Vicenta and
their children lived in Candelaria, Quezon until the spouses separated in 1972.3

On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all his properties, and assigning among
others, his second wife Vicenta and all his children by his first and second marriage as devisees and legatees
therein. Among the properties bequeathed in the will were a 45,000 square meter lot and the residential house, rice
mill, warehouse and equipment situated thereon located in Candelaria, Quezon and registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. T-56553 in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon4 , which was disposed of in the following
manner; (1) to private respondents, Lucio's children by his first wife, 10,000 square meters of the disputed property,
including the warehouse, rice mill, and equipment situated thereon; (2) to Vicenta and petitioners, his children by his
second marriage the remaining 35,000 square meters, and (3) to private respondents, the residential house also
within the same property.5

On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private respondent Celestina Adriano, who was instituted in Lucio's will as its
executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will on February 18, 1981 before the RTC of Lucena City. The
probate case was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 4442. After due hearing and despite the Opposition filed by Vicenta,
the RTC allowed the probate of the will and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to petitioner-executrix
Celestina Adriano in an Order dated August 22, 1983. On November 10, 1983, Vicenta appealed said Order to the
then Intermediate Appellate Court, which in turn affirmed the probate of the will. Vicenta died on July 2, 1985.6

On August 17, 1988, and while the proceedings for settlement of estate were pending before the RTC, petitioners
instituted an action for annulment of Lucio Adriano's will which was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-115. In the
complaint plaintiffs-petitioners alleged that before the marriage of Lucio and their mother, Vicenta, on November 22,
1968, the two lived together as husband and wife and as such, acquired properties which became the subject of
inventory and administration in Spec. Proc. No. 4442. Plaintiffs claimed that the properties bequeathed in Lucio's will
are undivided "civil partnership and/or conjugal properties of Lucio Adriano and Vicenta Villa", and thus, the will
sought to be probated should be declared void and ineffective insofar as it disposes of the rightful share or
properties of Vicenta.7

It is also not disputed that the contested properties in Civil Case No. 88-115 and Spec. Proc. No. 4442 were also the
subject of a complaint filed sometime in 1980 by Vicenta against Lucio, docketed with the then Court of First
Instance of Quezon, Lucena City, Branch II as Civil Case No. 7534 wherein Vicenta sought the provisional partition
or separation of the properties pendente lite. The case was dismissed on January 28, 1991 without prejudice, for
lack of interest.

Spec. Proc. No. 4442 and Civil Case No. 88-115 were consolidated and jointly heard by the RTC.

The trial court favored the evidence of private respondents, which indicated that the purchase money for the
contested properties came from the earnings of Lucio in a business partnership that he entered into in 1947, or
during the subsistence of his marriage to Gliceria. The trial court further found that Lucio's initial capital infusion of
P15,000.00 in the business partnership was in fact obtained from the conjugal fund of his first marriage. The
evidence of private respondents is thus summarized by the trial court.

Defendants evidence, on the other hand tends to show that the original common fund of Lucio (Ambrocio)
Adriano in the amount of P15,000.00 was invested by Lucio Adriano in a partnership called the "Central Rice
Mill & Co." which was formed and organized on November 30, 1947. Such initial investment came from the
savings of Lucio Adriano and Gliceria Dorado before World War II, which was earned by said spouses by
means of ambulant peddling of betel nuts and ikmo leaves and, subsequently, by the selling of (a) variety
(of) goods and rice retailing at a market stall which they acquired at the public market of Candelaria,
Quezon. On these savings, spouses Lucio Adriano and Gliceria Dorado added the proceeds of the sale of a
"Fairbanks" rice mill during the Japanese occupation sometime between the years 1943 and 1944. The
same rice mill was then located at the south end of Gonzales Street near the public marker of Candelaria,
Quezon, and was acquired by the same spouses through their joint efforts and industry made from the time
of their marriage in 1933.

It is likewise shown by defendants' evidence that on January 8, 1951, the Articles of Co-Partnership of
"Central Rice Mill & Co." was amended and its name was changed to "Quezon Central Rice Mill & Co."
Lucio Adriano then made a new investment into the partnership out of savings from the conjugal partnership
with Gliceria Dorado for the period of 1947 until 1950 in the amount of P18,750.00 (Exhibit "1-A") thereby
 increasing his investment to P33,750.00 (par. 7(c) of Amended Articles of Co-Partnership, Exhibit "1-A"). On
January 22, 1952, another partnership called "The Lessee of the Quezon Central Rice Mill" as formed by
Lucio (Ambrocio) Adriano and four (4) partners and he invested the amount of P25,000.00 (Exhibit "2")
thereby making his total capital investment reach the amount of P58,750.00.

On May 3, 1952, Lucio Adriano bought the share of Tan Kim Alias "Joaquin Tan", a partner who withdrew
from the partnership of the Quezon Central Rice Mill & Co. and who, in consideration of the sum of
P34,342.55 executed a Deed of Sale and Mortgage (Exhibit "3") in favor of Lucio Adriano covering his
proportional share in the properties of the partnership consisting of two (2) rice mills, two (2) diesel engines
and a camarin, which are situated at Candelaria, Quezon. Lucio Adriano declared these properties in his
name for taxation, purposes under TCT Property Index No. 22-11-01-043-B (Exhibit "4") and Tax
Declaration No. 564 (Exhibit "5")

All in all, the withdrawals made out of the savings of the conjugal partnership of Lucio Adriano and his wife,
Gliceria Dorado, are the following:

1. Upon signing of the contract of sale and mortgage (Exhibit "3"), Lucio Adriano paid the sum of
P10,342.45 and the balance of P24,000.00, as reflected in the statement of account of Tan Kim as
receivables from Lucio Adriano (Exhibit "6") were settled on subsequent dates;

2. Original copy of a receipt dated May 3, 1953 (Exhibit "7") covering expenses of registration of
Exhibit "3" in the sum of P160.00;

3. Handwritten list of registration expenses (Exhibit "8"); and

4. Originals of receipts covering amounts paid by Lucio Adriano to Tan Kim on various dates from
June 3, 1953 (Exhibits "9" to "20", inclusive) in the aggregate sum of P24,492.15.

It likewise appears from the evidence of the defendants that by the end of 1953, the total capital investment
of Lucio Adriano taken from his conjugal partnership with his first wife, Gliceria Dorado, reached the amount
of P94,744.88. In the late part of 1954, however, the same partnership was dissolved by means of a verbal
agreement reached by Lucio Adriano and his partners and this resulted to an equal division of the
partnership properties with the left portion thereof going to Tan Kang and Tan Giam and the right portion, to
Lucio Adriano and Francisco Ramirez. Furthermore, by the end of 1955, Francisco Ramirez withdrew his
share totalling P16,250.00 in favor of Lucio Adriano, who acquired the same, and from that time on, the
latter became the sole owner of the rice mill which he latter registered as the "Adriano Central Rice Mill".
When the partnership was finally dissolved in 1955, the total capital investment of Lucio Adriano therein was
P110,994.88, consisting of the fruit or income of his common fund with Gliceria Dorado, which was
cumulatively used in the acquisition of other properties listed in the inventory submitted to this Court by the
administratrix and defendant, Celestina Adriano de Arcilla on February 19, 1987.8

The decretal portion of the Order dated May 8, 1991 issued by the RTC of Lucena City reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Civil Case No. 88-115, this Court finds and so holds that no cogent reasons or grounds exist to
affect adversely, if not nullify, the testamentary dispositions and provisions contained in the Last Will
and Testament of the late Lucio (Ambrocio) Adriano. Accordingly, the complaint filed in this case is
hereby ordered dismissed with costs against plaintiffs.

In like manner, the counterclaim is hereby ordered dismissed.

2. In Spec. Proc. No. 4442, it is hereby ordered that the settlement, liquidation, and partitioning of
the estate of the late Lucio (Ambrocio) Adriano, more particularly the delivery of the respective
shares of his heirs, the plaintiffs and defendants, be effected and implemented in accordance with
the testamentary provisions set forth in the Last Will and Testament of the testator, Lucio (Ambrocio)
Adriano.

SO ORDERED.9

The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' appeal for lack of merit, and affirmed in toto the Joint Order of the RTC
of Lucena City.

As elevated before us, the petition takes issue only in respect of the property covered by TCT No. T-56553.
Petitioners insist that it was erroneous of respondent court not to have upheld the co-ownership of Vicenta to 1/2 of
said property, and to have declared the entire property as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Lucio and
Gliceria. The petition essentially relies on the following grounds: (1) TCT No. T-56553, issued to "Spouses, LUCIO
ADRIANO and VICENTA VILLA" 10 , constitutes conclusive and indefeasible evidence of Vicenta's co-ownership in
the property, 11 and (2) the Deed of Sale dated March 15, 1964, as annotated in OCT No. O-9198 12 , the mother title
of TCT No. T-56553, designates Vicenta Villa as a co-vendee. Petitioners maintain that the Deed of Sale, being the
"best evidence" of the contents thereof, proves Vicenta's co-ownership in the land.

We see no reason to reverse respondent court. Petitioners' insistence that a co-ownership of properties existed
between Lucio and Vicenta during their period of cohabitation before their marriage in 1968 is without lawful basis
considering that Lucio's marriage with Gliceria was then subsisting. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil
Code 13 requires that the man and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must
not in any way be incapacitated to marry. 14 Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio's
marriage with Gliceria subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. 15 Thus, we ruled in Pisueñe vs. Heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino
Villar16 that the prima facie presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal cannot prevail over
a court's specific finding reached in adversarial proceedings to the contrary.

As found by both the trial court and respondent court in this case, not only did petitioners fail to overcome the
presumption of conjugality of the disputed property, private respondents have also presented sufficient evidence to
support their allegation that the property was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal fund of his
first marriage. This factual finding, which is clearly borne out by the evidence on record, is binding and conclusive
upon us and will not be disturbed.

Although in cases of common-law relations where an impediment to marry exists, equity would dictate that property
acquired by the man and woman through their joint endeavor should be allocated to each of them in proportion to
their respective efforts, 17 petitioners in the instant case have not submitted any evidence that Vicenta actually,
contributed to the acquisition of the property in question.

We cannot agree with petitioners' bare and expedient assertion that, because the title to the property was registered
in the name of both Lucio and Vicenta, she should thereby be deemed owner to half of it. A certificate of title under
the Torrens system is aimed to protect dominion, and should certainly not be turned into an instrument for
deprivation of ownership. 18 Because a just and complete resolution of this case could only be arrived at by
determining the real ownership of the contested property, evidence apart from or contrary to the certificate of title
bears considerable importance. 19 This assumes peculiar force in the instant situation where the heirs of a lawful pre-
existing marriage stand to be deprived. Thus, in Belcodero vs. Court of Appeals, 20 we held that property acquired by
a man while living with a common-law wife during the subsistence of his marriage is conjugal property, even when
the property was titled in the name of the common-law wife. In such cases, a constructive trust is deemed to have
been created by operation of Article 1456 of the Civil Code over the property which lawfully pertains to the conjugal
partnership of the subsisting marriage.

Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. 1âwphi 1

In Vicenta's case, it is clear that her designation as a co-owner of the property in TCT No. T-56553 is a mistake
which needs to be rectified by the application of the foregoing provisions of Article 1456 and the ruling in Belcodero.
The principle that a trustee who takes a Torrens title in his or her name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration, is a well-known exception to the principle of conclusiveness of a certificate of title. 21

On petitioners' second ground, we note that the Deed of Sale dated March 15, 1964 which purportedly designates
Vicenta as a co-buyer of the property was not even presented in evidence. The entry in OCT No. 0-9198 of the
Deed of Sale bears no weight in proving Vicenta's supposed co-ownership, applying petitioners' own argument that
the document itself, the Deed of Sale in the instant case, is the best evidence of its contents. The memorandum in
the OCT is not admissible as evidence of the contents of said Deed of Sale, but only of the fact of its execution, its
presentation for notation, and its actual notation for purposes of constructive notice to the public of the preferential
rights created and affecting that property. 22 Besides, even if said Deed of Sale was submitted in evidence, it still has
no bearing because it could not be said to affect or bind third parties to the sale, such as private respondents
herein.1âwphi 1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 41509 is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.