In RE Garcia Digest

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In RE: Garcia

2 SCRA 984

FACTS:

Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the
required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he asserts that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod
City, of Filipino parentage. He had taken and finished the course of “Bachillerato Superior” in Spain and
was approved, selected and qualified by the “Insitututo de Cervantes” for admission to the Central
University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course, graduating there as “Licenciado en
derecho”. Thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims that under the
provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the Republic of
the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is entitled to the practice the law profession in the Philippines
without submitting to the required bar examinations.

ISSUE: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar

RULING:

The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the
Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be invoked
by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in
Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a
Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the
laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to
practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made
expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to
exercise the legal profession.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state
could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines, for reason that the Executive Department may not enroach upon the
consitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines, and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the
Congress of the Philippines.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO
VS.
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer,
with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation
leave per month.

On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of
April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.

Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only
two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days.

Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of
the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-
impairment of contracts;

2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

HELD:

On the first issue:

The answer is in the negative. Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is
not tenable.

The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a
business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble
end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.
On the second issue:

The answer is in the affirmative.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a
closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts
of one year or more;

Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and

Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of
petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL

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