PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO 1069

PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURE FOR THE EXTRADITION OF PERSONS WHO HAVE

COMMITTED CRIMES IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY

WHEREAS, under the Constitution the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations;

WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the estate where it is committed
but also of any other state to which the criminal may have escaped, because it saps the
foundation of social life and is an outrage upon humanity at large, and it is in the interest of
civilized communities that crimes should not go unpunished;

WHEREAS, is recognition of this principle the Philippines recently concluded as extradition

treaty with the Republic of Indonesia, and intends to conclude similar treaties with other
interested countries;

WHEREAS, there is need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the
proper implementation of the extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the

powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree the following:

Section 1. Short-Title. This Decree shall be known as the "Philippine Extradition Law".

Section 2. Definition of Terms. When used in this law, the following terms shall, unless the
context otherwise indicates, have meanings respectively assigned to them:

(a) "Extradition" The removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against
him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government.

(b) "Extradition Treaty or Convention" An extradition agreement between the Republic of

the Philippines and one or more foreign states or governments.

(c) "Accused" The person who is, or is suspected of being, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines, and whose extradition has been requested by a foreign
state or government.

(d) "Requesting State or Government" The foreign state or government from which the
request for extradition has emanated.

(e) "Foreign Diplomat" Any authorized diplomatic representative of the requesting state
or government and recognized as such by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
 (f) "Secretary of Foreign Affairs" The head of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of the Philippines, or in his absence, any official acting on his behalf or
temporarily occupying and discharging the duties of that position.

Section 3. Aims of Extradition. Extradition may be granted only pursuant to a treaty or

convention, and with a view to:

(a) A criminal investigation instituted by authorities of the requesting state or government

charging the accused with an offense punishable under the laws both of the requesting
state or government and the Republic of the Philippines by imprisonment or other form
relevant extradition treaty or convention; or

(b) The execution of a prison sentence imposed by a court of the requesting state or
government, with such duration as that stipulated in the relevant extradition treaty or
convention, to be served in the jurisdiction of and as a punishment for an offense
committed by the accused within the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting state or
government.

Section 4. Request; By whom made; Requirements.

(1) Any foreign state or government with which the Republic of the Philippines has
entered into extradition treaty or convention, only when the relevant treaty or convention,
remains in force, may request for the extradition of any accused who is or suspected of
being in the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.

(2) The request shall be made by the Foreign Diplomat of the requesting state or
government, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied
by:

(a) The original or an authentic copy of either -

(1) the decision or sentence imposed upon the accused by the court of
the requesting state or government; or

(2) the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the authority of
the requesting state or government having jurisdiction of the matter or
some other instruments having the equivalent legal force.

(b) A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest
particulars as to the name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the
Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and
place of the commission of these acts;

(c) The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and
the designation or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation
of the request; and

(d) Such other documents or information in support of the request.

Section 5. Duty of Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Referral of Request: Filing of Petition. (1)
Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the
requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request
together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of these case.

(2) The attorney so designated shall file a written petition with the proper Court of First
Instance of the province or city having jurisdiction of the place, with a prayer that the
court take the request under consideration and shall attach to the petition all related
documents. The filing of the petition and the service of the summons to the accused
shall be free from the payment of docket and sheriff's fees.

(3) The Court of First Instance with which the petition shall have been filed shall have
and continue to have the exclusive power to hear and decide the case, regardless of the
subsequent whereabouts of the accused, or the change or changes of his place of
residence.

Section 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices. (1)

Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour
fixed in the order. We may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may
be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice.
Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to
answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the ace or set another date for the
hearing thereof.

(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be
promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case.

Section 7. Appointment of Counsel de Oficio. If on the date set for the hearing the accused
does not have a legal counsel, the presiding judge shall appoint any law practitioner residing
within his territorial jurisdiction as counsel de oficio for the accused to assist him in the hearing.

Section 8. Hearing in Public; Exception; Legal Representation.

(1) The hearing shall be public unless the accused requests, with leave of court, that it
be conducted in chamber.

(2) The attorney having charge of the case may upon request represent the requesting
state or government throughout the proceeding. The requesting state or government
may, however, retain private counsel to represent it for particular extradition case.

(3) Should the accused fail to appear on the date set for hearing, or if he is not under
detention, the court shall forthwith issue a warrant for this arrest which may be served
upon the accused anywhere in the Philippines.

Section 9. Nature and Conduct of Proceedings. (1) In the hearing, the provisions of the Rules of
Court insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings,
shall apply to extradition cases, and the hearing shall be conducted in such a manner as to
arrive as a fair and speedy disposition of the case.

(2) Sworn statements offered in evidence at the hearing of any extradition case shall be
received and admitted as evidence if properly and legally authenticated by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the Republic of the Philippines residing in the requesting
state.

Section 10. Decision. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting
the extradition, and giving his reasons therefor upon showing of the existence of a prima facie
case. Otherwise, it shall dismiss the petition.

Section 11. Service of Decision. The decision of the court shall be promptly served on the
accused if he was not present at the reading thereof, and the clerk of the court shall immediately
forward two copies thereof to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs through the Department of
Justice.

Section 12. Appeal by Accused; Stay of Execution

(1) The accused may, within 10 days from receipt of the decision of the Court of First
Instance granting extradition cases shall be final and immediately executory.

(2) The appeal shall stay the execution of the decision of the Court of First Instance.

Section 13. Application of Rules of Court. The provisions of the Rules of Court governing
appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in appeal in Extradition cases,
except that the parties may file typewritten or mimeograph copies of their brief within 15 days
from receipt of notice to file such briefs.

Section 14. Service of Decision of Court of Appeals. The accused and the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, through the Department of Justice, shall each be promptly served with copies of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

Section 15. Concurrent Request for Extradition. In case extradition of the same person has
been requested by two or more states, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, after consultation with
the Secretary of Justice, shall decide which of the several requests shall be first considered, and
copies of the former's decision thereon shall promptly be forwarded to the attorney having
charge of the case, if there be one, through the Department of Justice.

Section 16. Surrender of Accused. After the decision of the court in an extradition case has
become final and executory, the accused shall be placed at the disposal of the authorities of the
requesting state or government, at a time and place to be determined by the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, after consultation with the foreign diplomat of the requesting state or
government.

Section 17. Seizure and Turn Over of Accused Properties. If extradition is granted, articles
found in the possession of the accused who has been arrested may be seized upon order of the
court at the instance of the requesting state or government, and such articles shall be delivered
to the foreign diplomat of the requesting state or government who shall issue the corresponding
receipt therefor.
Section 18. Costs and Expenses; By Whom Paid. Except when the relevant extradition treaty
provides otherwise, all costs or expenses incurred in any extradition proceeding and in
apprehending, securing and transmitting an accused shall be paid by the requesting state or
government. The Secretary of Justice shall certify to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs the
amounts to be paid by the requesting state or government on account of expenses and costs,
and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall cause the amounts to be collected and transmitted to
the Secretary of Justice for deposit in the National Treasury of the Philippines.

Section 19. Service of Court Processes. All processes emanating from the court in connection
with extradition cases shall be served or executed by the Sheriff of the province or city
concerned or of any member of any law enforcement agency;

Section 20. Provisional Arrest. (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to the
relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force; request for provisional arrest
of the accused pending receipt of the request for extradition made in accordance with Section 4
of this Decree.

(b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Manila, either through the diplomatic channels or direct by post or
telegraph.

(c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting on his behalf
shall upon receipt of the request immediately secure a warrant for the provisional arrest
of the accused from the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of the province or
city having jurisdiction of the place, who shall issue the warrant for the provisional arrest
of the accused. The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation through the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall inform the requesting of the result of its request.

(d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs has not received the request for extradition and the documents mentioned in
Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall be released from custody.

(e) Release from provisional arrest shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the
accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently in accordance with the
relevant treaty of convention.

Section 21. Effectivity. this Decree shall take effect immediately and its provisions shall be in
force during the existence of any extradition treaty or convention with, and only in respect of,
any foreign state or government.

DONE in the City of Manila , this 13th day of January in the Year of Our Lord nineteen hundred
and seventy-seven.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 139465. October 17, 2000]

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.

RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:

On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, we dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the
petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence.i[1]
On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. He
assails the decision on the following grounds:
"The majority decision failed to appreciate the following facts and points of substance and
of value which, if considered, would alter the result of the case, thus:
I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to the filing
of an extradition petition in court and a preliminary investigation.
II. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a denial of
fundamental fairness.
III. In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing requirement satisfies no higher
objective.
IV.The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the Philippine
Extradition Law is intended to prevent flight.
V. There is a need to balance the interest between the discretionary powers of government
and the rights of an individual.
VI.The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice and
hearing may be dispensed with in this case results in a non sequitur conclusion.
VII. Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the Executive Branch
necessitating notice and hearing.
VIII. By instituting a 'proceeding' not contemplated by PD No. 1069, the Supreme
Court has encroached upon the constitutional boundaries separating it from the other two co-
equal branches of government.
IX.Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition
proceedings."ii[2]
On March 28, 2000, a 58-page Comment was filed by the private respondent Mark B.
Jimenez, opposing petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
 On April 5, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance
of Action and Filing of Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed on June 7, 2000 a Manifestation with
the attached Note 327/00 from the Embassy of Canada and Note No. 34 from the Security
Bureau of the Hongkong SAR Government Secretariat. On August 15, 2000, private respondent
filed a Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File Rejoinder in the event that petitioner's April 5,
2000 Motion would be granted. Private respondent also filed on August 18, 2000, a Motion to
Expunge from the records petitioner's June 7, 2000 Manifestation with its attached note
verbales. Except for the Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of Action, the Court
denies these pending motions and hereby resolves petitioner's Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration.
The jugular issue is whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
First. P.D. No. 1069iii[3] which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time
when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its
supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court, viz:
"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service of Notices. - (1)
Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour
fixed in the order . . . Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received
the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set
another date for the hearing thereof.
(2)The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be
promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case."
It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be
answered by the extraditee.
There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an
extraditee the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition
request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while
the request is still undergoing evaluation. We cannot write a provision in the treaty giving
private respondent that right where there is none. It is well-settled that a "court cannot alter,
amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of any clause, small or great, or dispense with any of
its conditions and requirements or take away any qualification, or integral part of any stipulation,
upon any motion of equity, or general convenience, or substantial justice."iv[4]
Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in
light of their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to which
the Philippines is a signatory provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in light of its object and purpose."v[5] (emphasis supplied) The preambular paragraphs of P.D.
No. 1069 define its intent, viz:
"WHEREAS, under the Constitution[,] the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations;
WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is
committed but also of any other state to which the criminal may have escaped, because it saps
the foundation of social life and is an outrage upon humanity at large, and it is in the interest of
civilized communities that crimes should not go unpunished;
WHEREAS, in recognition of this principle the Philippines recently concluded an extradition
treaty with the Republic of Indonesia, and intends to conclude similar treaties with other
interested countries;
x x x." (emphasis supplied)
It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines forge extradition treaties to arrest
the dramatic rise of international and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug trafficking.
Extradition treaties provide the assurance that the punishment of these crimes will not be
frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be the
unbending commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will not be coddled by any
signatory state.
It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will
minimize if not prevent the escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and expedite their
trial. The submission of the private respondent, that as a probable extraditee under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty he should be furnished a copy of the US government request for his
extradition and its supporting documents even while they are still under evaluation by petitioner
Secretary of Justice, does not meet this desideratum. The fear of the petitioner Secretary of
Justice that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee must be deeply rooted on the
experience of the executive branch of our government. As it comes from the branch of our
government in charge of the faithful execution of our laws, it deserves the careful consideration
of this Court. In addition, it cannot be gainsaid that private respondent’s demand for advance
notice can delay the summary process of executive evaluation of the extradition request and its
accompanying papers. The foresight of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes did not miss this danger.
In 1911, he held:
"It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all the factitious niceties of a
criminal trial at common law. But it is a waste of time . . . if there is presented, even in
somewhat untechnical form according to our ideas, such reasonable ground to suppose him
guilty as to make it proper that he should be tried, good faith to the demanding government
requires his surrender."vi[6] (emphasis supplied)
We erode no right of an extraditee when we do not allow time to stand still on his prosecution.
Justice is best served when done without delay.
Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the parties
themselves to the RP-US Extradition Treaty as well as the general interpretation of the issue
in question by other countries with similar treaties with the Philippines. The rule is
recognized that while courts have the power to interpret treaties, the meaning given them by the
departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is
accorded great weight.vii[7] The reason for the rule is laid down in Santos III v. Northwest
Orient Airlines, et al.,viii[8] where we stressed that a treaty is a joint executive-legislative act
which enjoys the presumption that "it was first carefully studied and determined to be
constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law in the country."
Our executive department of government, thru the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), has steadfastly maintained that the RP-US Extradition Treaty
and P.D. No. 1069 do not grant the private respondent a right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of an extradition process.ix[9] This understanding of the treaty is shared by
the US government, the other party to the treaty. x[10] This interpretation by the two
governments cannot be given scant significance. It will be presumptuous for the Court to
assume that both governments did not understand the terms of the treaty they concluded.
Yet, this is not all. Other countries with similar extradition treaties with the Philippines
have expressed the same interpretation adopted by the Philippine and US governments.
Canadianxi[11] and Hongkongxii[12] authorities, thru appropriate note verbales communicated to our
Department of Foreign Affairs, stated in unequivocal language that it is not an international
practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. We cannot disregard such a convergence of views
unless it is manifestly erroneous.
Fourth. Private respondent, however, peddles the postulate that he must be afforded the
right to notice and hearing as required by our Constitution. He buttresses his position by likening
an extradition proceeding to a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a preliminary
investigation.
We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of
the guilt or innocence of an accused. xiii[13] His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court
of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only
relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee
especially by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. xiv[14] As held by the
US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:
"An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards
that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition
pursuant to a valid treaty."xv[15]
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown
trial.xvi[16] In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition
proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards.xvii[17] In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for
convictionxviii[18] while a fugitive may be ordered extradited "upon showing of the existence of a
prima facie case."xix[19] Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory
upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. xx[20] The United States
adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in
balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign relations before
making the ultimate decision to extradite.xxi[21]
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in
an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process
safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the
procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action."xxii[22] The concept of due
process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind
of procedure."xxiii[23]
Fifth. Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of his right to
notice and hearing considering the alleged threat to his liberty "which may be more priceless
than life."xxiv[24] The supposed threat to private respondent’s liberty is perceived to come from
several provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow provisional
arrest and temporary detention.
We first deal with provisional arrest. The RP-US Extradition Treaty provides as follows:
"PROVISIONAL ARREST
1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person
sought pending presentation of the request for extradition. A request for provisional arrest
may be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine
Department of Justice and the United States Department of Justice.
2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain:
a) a description of the person sought;
b) the location of the person sought, if known;
c) a brief statement of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the time and location
of the offense;
d) a description of the laws violated;
e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or finding of guilt or judgment of
conviction against the person sought; and
f) a statement that a request for extradition for the person sought will follow.
3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of the disposition of its application
and the reasons for any denial.
4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged from custody upon the
expiration of sixty (60) days from the date of arrest pursuant to this Treaty if the executive
authority of the Requested State has not received the formal request for extradition and the
supporting documents required in Article 7." (emphasis supplied)
In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069 provides:
"Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest.- (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to
the relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the
provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition made in
accordance with Section 4 of this Decree.
(b)A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Manila, either through the diplomatic channels or direct by post or telegraph.
(c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting on his behalf
shall upon receipt of the request immediately secure a warrant for the provisional arrest of the
accused from the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of the province or city having
jurisdiction of the place, who shall issue the warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused.
The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
shall inform the requesting state of the result of its request.
(d)If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
has not received the request for extradition and the documents mentioned in Section 4 of this
Decree, the accused shall be released from custody." (emphasis supplied)
 Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 clearly provide that private
respondent may be provisionally arrested only pending receipt of the request for
extradition. Our DFA has long received the extradition request from the United States and has
turned it over to the DOJ. It is undisputed that until today, the United States has not requested
for private respondent’s provisional arrest. Therefore, the threat to private respondent’s liberty
has passed. It is more imagined than real.
Nor can the threat to private respondent’s liberty come from Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069,
which provides:
"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1)
Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as
practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour
fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which
may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of
justice. . .
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be
promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (emphasis
supplied)
It is evident from the above provision that a warrant of arrest for the temporary detention of
the accused pending the extradition hearing may only be issued by the presiding judge of the
extradition court upon filing of the petition for extradition. As the extradition process is still in
the evaluation stage of pertinent documents and there is no certainty that a petition for
extradition will be filed in the appropriate extradition court, the threat to private respondent’s
liberty is merely hypothetical.
Sixth. To be sure, private respondent’s plea for due process deserves serious
consideration involving as it does his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process,
however, collides with important state interests which cannot also be ignored for they
serve the interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of
interests approach which is a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law." xxv[25] The approach
requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation."xxvi[26] These interests usually consist in the
exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government’s
promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other.xxvii[27]
In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the private respondent’s claim to due
process predicated on Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . ." Without a bubble of
doubt, procedural due process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized society which accords
paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be accorded the weight it deserves.
This brings us to the other end of the balancing pole. Petitioner avers that the Court should
give more weight to our national commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite
the extradition to the United States of persons charged with violation of some of its laws.
Petitioner also emphasizes the need to defer to the judgment of the Executive on matters
relating to foreign affairs in order not to weaken if not violate the principle of separation of
powers.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its
evaluation stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private respondent is
nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater
weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of
Justice. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, we held that the "Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government."xxviii[28] Under our constitutional scheme, executive power
is vested in the President of the Philippines.xxix[29] Executive power includes, among others, the
power to contract or guarantee foreign loans and the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements.xxx[30] The task of safeguarding that these treaties are duly honored
devolves upon the executive department which has the competence and authority to so act in
the international arena.xxxi[31] It is traditionally held that the President has power and even
supremacy over the country’s foreign relations.xxxii[32] The executive department is aptly accorded
deference on matters of foreign relations considering the President’s most comprehensive and
most confidential information about the international scene of which he is regularly briefed by
our diplomatic and consular officials. His access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data is
also unlimited.xxxiii[33] The deference we give to the executive department is dictated by the
principle of separation of powers. This principle is one of the cornerstones of our democratic
government. It cannot be eroded without endangering our government.
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to
do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered by our
government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving
crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this
trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the
peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part
of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational
crimes.
In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is
not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the
length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a
determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated
otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are
at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an
individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."xxxiv[34] We have explained why an
extraditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords
an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is
filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extradition is
merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for extradition. The extraditee's right to
know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition process to
accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential
extraditees which can be precipitated by premature information of the basis of the request for
his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be
more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive, which
has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign
relations. Needless to state, this balance of interests is not a static but a moving balance
which can be adjusted as the extradition process moves from the administrative stage to the
judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on factors that will come into play. In sum,
we rule that the temporary hold on private respondent's privilege of notice and hearing is a
soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness
should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no
denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.
 We end where we began. A myopic interpretation of the due process clause would not
suffice to resolve the conflicting rights in the case at bar. With the global village shrinking at a
rapid pace, propelled as it is by technological leaps in transportation and communication, we
need to push further back our horizons and work with the rest of the civilized nations and move
closer to the universal goals of "peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations."xxxv[35] In the end, it is the individual who will reap the harvest of peace and prosperity
from these efforts.
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision in the
case at bar promulgated on January18, 2000 is REVERSED. The assailed Order issued by the
public respondent judge on August 9, 1999 is SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on August 17, 1999 is made PERMANENT. The Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 25 is enjoined from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza, Purisima, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., joined the dissent of J. Melo & J. Ynares-Santiago.
Melo, J., see dissent.
Vitug, J., I join in the dissent and reiterate my separate opinion in the original ponencia.
Quisumbing, J., in the result.
Buena, J., I join the dissent of Justice Consuelo Y-Santiago.
Ynares-Santiago, J., see separate dissent.
i[1] Rollo, pp. 442-443; Decision, Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Ralph C. Lantion and Mark B. Jimenez, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000, pp. 39-40.

ii[2]
Rollo, p. 495; Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, p. 4.

iii[3]
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country"
signed into law on January 13, 1977.

iv[4]
Note, The United States v. The Libelants and Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, 10 L. Ed. 826 (1841), citing
The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1.

v[5]
Article 31(1), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

vi[6]
Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 511 (1911), citing Grin v. Shine, 187 US 181, 184, 47 L. Ed. 130, 133, 23
S. Ct. Rep. 98, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 366. See Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U.S. 387, 405, 52 L. Ed. 1113, 1122, 28 S. Ct.
714.

vii[7]
Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 US 187, 192 (1961); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933), citing
Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 52, 73 L. Ed. 610, 49 S. Ct. 223; Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468, 57 L. Ed.
1274,1283, 33 S. Ct. 945, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 397.

viii[8]
210 SCRA 256, 261 (1992).

ix[9]
Rollo, p. 399.

x[10]
See Original Records, pp. 467-482, Annex “B” of petitioner's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration entitled
“Observations of the United States In Support of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration by the Republic of the
Philippines” signed by James K. Robinson, Asst. Attorney General and Bruce C. Swartz, Deputy Asst. Attorney
General, Criminal Division, US Department of Justice and Sara Criscitelli, Asst. Director, Office of International
Affairs, Criminal Division, Washington, D.C.

xi[11]
See Original Records, pp. 506-507, Note 327/00 dated March 10, 2000 from the Embassy of Canada.

xii[12]
See Original Records, p. 509, Note No. (34) in SBCR 1/27 16/80 Pt. 27 dated March 22, 2000 from the
Security Bureau of the Hongkong SAR Government Secretariat.

xiii[13]
Defensor-Santiago, Procedural Aspects of the Political Offence Doctrine, 51 Philippine Law Journal 238, p.
258 (1976).

xiv[14]
Elliot, No Due Process Right to a Speedy Extradition, Martin v. Warden, Atlanta Pen., 993 F.2d 824 (11th
Cir. 1993), 18 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 347, 353 (1995), citing Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 482
(2d Cir.).1

xv[15]
Wiehl, Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend Toward Extending Greater Constitutional Procedural
Protections To Fugitives Fighting Extradition from the United States, 19 Michigan Journal of International Law
729, 741 (1998), citing United States v. Galanis, 429 F. Supp. 1215 (D. Conn. 1977).

xvi[16]
Section 9, P.D. No. 1069.

xvii[17]
Ibid.

xviii[18]
Section 2, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court.

xix[19]
Section 10, P.D. No. 1069.

xx[20]
See Article III of the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

xxi[21]
Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 Col. Law Rev., pp. 1314-1329.

xxii[22]
Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961), 6 L. Ed. 2d 1230, 1236, 81 S. Ct. 1743 (1961).

xxiii[23]
Morrisey v. Brewer, supra.

xxiv[24]
Comment on Petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, p. 37.

xxv[25]
Malayan Insurance Co. v. Smith, Bell & Co. (Phil.) Inc., et al., 101 SCRA 61 (1980), citing Republic v.
Purisima, 78 SCRA 470 (1977).

xxvi[26]
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1, 9 (1989), citing Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476
(1979), citing Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 27
SCRA 855, p. 899 (1960).

xxvii[27]
Blo Umpar Adiong v. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 712, 716 (1992).

xxviii[28]
63 Phil. 139, 157 (1936).

xxix[29]
Section 1, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.

xxx[30]
Id., sections 20-21.

xxxi[31]
Department of Foreign Affairs v. National Labor Relations Commission, 262 SCRA 39, 48 (1996), citing
International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990).

xxxii[32]
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989). See also Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145 (1990).

xxxiii[33]
U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S. Ct. 216, 81 L. Ed. 255 (1936).

xxxiv[34]
Morrisey v. Brewer, supra note 22, p. 481, citing Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 168, 95 L. Ed. 817, 852, 71 S. Ct. 624 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., Concurring), quoted in Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 263, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 296, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970).

xxxv[35]
Section 2, Article II, 1987 Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
 Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 148571           September 24, 2002

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent

Davide Jr., CJ, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Morales and Callejo, Sr.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

          In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for
their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the
extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is "No." The
explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.

The Case

          Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the
Orders dated May 23, 2001 1 and July 3, 2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. 3
The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.

          The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time
granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:

          WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent
Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently and
taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court
fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondent’s temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php
1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.

          Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its
Hold Departure List." 4

          Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of
Jimenez into legal custody.

The Facts

          This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5
          Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government, through diplomatic
channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by
Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of
Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the
secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action,
pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.

          Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing
with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a
Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the
Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. 8

          Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000
Resolution. 9 By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed
its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory.

          Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed
as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest
warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The
warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1)
conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section
371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US
Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5)
illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US
Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his
"immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

          Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-
Parte Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.

          In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing
on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial
court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

          After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post
bail in the amount of P100,000.

          The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below
issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12

          Hence, this Petition. 13

Issues

          Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:

I.
           The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee
before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

II.

          The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go
on provisional liberty because:

          ‘1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that
provides for such power.

          ‘2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and
Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot
be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.

          ‘3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to

extradition.

          ‘4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings

leading to extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the
applicant of the existence of special circumstances.

          ‘5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public
respondent received no evidence of ‘special circumstances’ which may justify release on bail.

          ‘6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will
engender a well-founded belief that he will not flee.

          ‘7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure
compliance by the Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

          ‘8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled
‘Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila,’ CA-G.R.
SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before
the issuance of the subject bail orders.’" 14

          In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice
and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional
liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of
the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to
seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. 15 We shall also preliminarily discuss five
extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive issues.

The Court’s Ruling

          The Petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Matters

          Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition

          Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition
Court: "(1) the issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective
memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no
useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the
need for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez ample opportunity to
escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law." 16

          For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1) even if
the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and
decides them, the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once
and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of
Appeals had in one case 17 ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to recognize the
decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there
are pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the
decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential
extraditees and would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the
Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing extradition treaties." 18

          As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has
been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though,
has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in
case of urgency. 19 As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration
before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as
those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. 20 Aside from
being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public interest.
Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.

          Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
when there are special and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:

          [T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly [before] it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This
has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely:
Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al.
As we have further stated in Cuaresma:

‘x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.’

          Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in
the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present
controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring
the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and
money.

          That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched
in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23

          ‘Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its
own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have
been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.’
          In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:

          This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we
entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify the same."

          In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings,
we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression
over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.

          Five Postulates of Extradition

          The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the
law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its
intent. 25 Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the
Philippines is a signatory, 26 understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the
issues raised here.

1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.

          First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the
arrest and the custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.

          With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals
from one country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become
more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and
crimes that transcend international boundaries.

          Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the
major effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is the only
regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try
them in accordance with municipal and international law. 31

          An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should
be restored to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals
seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of detection and
the threat of punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial
limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent
certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in the deterrence of
flight abroad in order to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of extradition
arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus
indirectly does the commission of crime itself." 32

          In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:

          The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is
to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More
and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention
are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny
easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to
the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to
crimes, especially transnational crimes."
          Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other
states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

          Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept
and trust, each other’s legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly authorized representative’s
signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to
protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. 35 That signature signifies our full faith that the
accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal
proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been
directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.

3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

          Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature.
In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in
a class by itself -- they are not.

          An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or
innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be
invoked by an extraditee x x x.

xxxxxxxxx

          There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In
contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow
admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be
satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be
ordered extradited ‘upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case.’ Finally, unlike in a criminal
case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our
courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.
The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion
in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nation’s foreign relations before making the
ultimate decision to extradite."

          Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the
innocence of the person sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during the extradition proceedings will
only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance
through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try
that person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the
prerogative of that jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine
whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
extraditable. 39

4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

          Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our
legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the
national interest.
          Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the requesting state. On the
other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world
community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an
extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. 41

          Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty.
42
This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to
extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding government, when it has
done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the
proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation to make the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the
Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.

5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

          Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience 44 of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the
accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting
state.

          The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a
propensity to flee. Indeed,

          extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the
requesting country. 45 Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the
conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the
requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of
his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost.
These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has
the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from
fleeing a second time?

First Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing

Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?

          Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from
justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives
him notice to escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a
dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers and war
criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.

          On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of
his constitutional right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule
setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been
filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.

          Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:

          SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately
upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the
accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a
warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any where within the Philippines if
it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will
best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received
 the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another
date for the hearing thereof.

          (2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly
served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (Emphasis ours)

          Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganan’s act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of
a warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.

1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law

          It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify
the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of
the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47
from them, 48 and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a
hearing can no longer be considered "immediate." The law could not have intended the word as a mere
superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.

          By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at
such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and
actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available
to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a
speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.

          Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the
following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the
Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G,
evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with
Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment);
(3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela
Byers" and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table of Contents for
Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L
"Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed
Statements in two volumes. 49

          It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate
for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be
arrested in order to "best serve the ends of justice." He could have determined whether such facts and
circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the extradition
request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting documents that
"probable cause" did exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated:

          In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for
extradition of herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to
proceed with the hearing against the extraditee." 50

          We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing
an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having
already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion
when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. 51
          Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the
accused to answer after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the
word "hearing" is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been
intended, the law could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition
proceedings are summary 52 in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more
reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings.

          It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not
inconsistent with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty
obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable
meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less reasonable x x x ." 53

          Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their
arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute
an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have

          intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the
accused from the requested state.

2. On the Basis of the Constitution

          Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or
a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:

          Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

          To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no
requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.

          In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of
conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. All we required was that the "judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his
independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence
of probable cause." 55

          In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing
before issuing a warrant of arrest:

          Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing
to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence."

          At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants
and their witnesses. 57 In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of
hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire
system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie
determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
          what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in
his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie
case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This
scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.

          That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the
adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a
more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondent’s demonstrated predisposition
to flee.

          Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:

          Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and
make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they
show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion,
the judge may

          require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of
the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is possible, the petition may be
dismissed at the discretion of the judge.

          On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the
petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not
inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to
escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of
justice" in extradition cases.

Second Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?

          Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:

          Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."

          Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all
persons, including those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to
the present case of Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent
with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply according to Section 9 of PD 1069.

          On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the
right to bail to a person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.

          Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings

          We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on
bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

          Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not
apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

          The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is
available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus finds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion." 61 Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely
emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean
that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

          That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from
the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal
cases against him, not before the extradition court.

          No Violation of Due Process

          Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall be
deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due process of law."

          Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not
amount to a violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process
is the opportunity to be heard 63 but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior
opportunity to be heard. 64 Where the circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a
subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to
be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation
of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.

          Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his
liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the
DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request
meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge’s independent prima facie
determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest;
and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the court’s custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail
rule.

          It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings
had already been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before
those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under
its laws. His invocation of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

          In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty
obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve
the Petition for Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had
previously shunned pales against the government’s interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in
cooperating with the world community in the suppression of crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist
in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and
palpable government interests." 66
          Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of
facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase
the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons
sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in
the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings,
adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives
from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.1âwphi1.nêt

          The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14
67
of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state
to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would
fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need
for their speedy disposition.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

          The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the
constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to
protect and enforce constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough
to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or
property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70

          Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee
has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception,
only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a
danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71
including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants
provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.

          Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from
general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered
requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an
executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its
barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial
prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by
caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or
compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the
limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.

          Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the
Court to grant his request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and
shall now discuss them.

          1. Alleged Disenfranchisement

          While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of
Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000
residents. We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked the
disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:

          When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a
more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal
illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
           In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.

          The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.’
This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

          Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is
being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner
from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

          The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an
excuse to free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate of the people’ are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of
Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the
highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The
duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique
skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve
provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular
duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

          A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations

are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.

          The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert
that their interests are disregarded.

          We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification
in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which
lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging
to the same class." 73

          It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it
was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents
were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative,
including his detention pending the final resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we
are constrained to rule against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant
him bail.

          2. Anticipated Delay

          Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be
unfair to confine him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that
extradition cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition
petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a
rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action.

          We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is
quite another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely
anticipatory and academic.

          However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of
bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail
would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out
and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.

          3. Not a Flight Risk?

          Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the
extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the
preliminary stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as
the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching
closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his
ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the
Petition for Extradition.

          In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the
applicant has been taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the
present case, the extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be
granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.

Brief Refutation of Dissents

          The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a
cop-out. The parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient opportunity
both by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondent’s claim to bail. As
already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant, but also private
respondent’s prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then
position papers on the application for bail, both of which were separately filed by the parties.

          This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and
the Position Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not
normally observed in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been
submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional
pleadings -- entitled "Manifestations" by both parties and "Counter-Manifestation" by private respondent -- in
which the main topic was Mr. Jimenez’s plea for bail.

          A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court
would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and
verbal propositions, private respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is
absolutely no need to rehear factual matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr.
Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion
and strength in his legal reasoning.

          In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting
Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all
relevant questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these
already very delayed proceedings, 74 which our Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we
need now is prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm
decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.

          Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a case is
one of extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its
length and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental
fairness of potential extraditees.

Summation

          As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:

          1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed
in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the
petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable.
The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the
fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed
therein.

          2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the
reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and
the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.

          3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or
innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights
of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a court’s request to police authorities
for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once
escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the
person would escape again if given the opportunity.

          4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it
complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The
magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to personally
examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately
issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to
appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.

          5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants
have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no
danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The
grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered,
under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of
right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.

          6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due
process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient
due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the
full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of
extradition.

          7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of
democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and
of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of
government.

          8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of
the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive
Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
           9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to
prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due
process" every little step of the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile
but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty
partner’s simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious
haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and
defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.

          10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid
the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.

          WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail
to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial
Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to
the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.

          SO ORDERED.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice

          WE CONCUR:

(signed)

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

JOSUE N. BELLOSILLO REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. VITUG VICENTE V. MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.:

"The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights."[1]
The proposal to curtail the right of an individual to seek bail from the courts of law, acting
in extradition cases, as well as his right to notice and hearing before being arrested, brings to
mind the not so distant past of the Spanish Inquisition and an uneasy realization that we have
yet to totally free ourselves from the grip of a dark page in history.
My reservation on the draft ponencia is premised on the following theses – first, it would
ignore constitutional safeguards to which all government action is defined, and second, it
would overstep constitutional restraints on judicial power.
Treaty laws, particularly those which are self-executing, have equal stature as national
statutes and, like all other municipal laws, are subject to the parameters set forth in the
Constitution. The Constitution, being both a grant and a circumscription of government
authority by the sovereign people, presents the ultimate yardstick of power and its limitation
upon which an act of government is justly measured. This instrument contains a rule for all
agencies of the government and any act in opposition thereto can only be struck down as
being invalid and without effect. When the great Charter gives a mandate, the government
[2]

can do no less than to accept it; its rejection would be an act of betrayal. The edict in its Bill
of Rights granting to all persons, without distinction, the fundamental right to bail, is clear. No
statute or treaty can abrogate or discard its language and its intent.
The draft ponencia would assume that the Constitution confines the grant of provisional
liberty to criminal cases, and that it has no application to extradition proceedings. This
assumption would have reason for being if it were solely in criminal cases that a person could
face an imminent threat of deprivation of his right to life or liberty, for indeed, it is this threat,
rather than case nomenclature, that must be the focus and it would be superficial to think
otherwise. While defying a neat definition, extradition has all the earmarks of a criminal
process --- an extraditee would suffer deprivations, be denied his freedom and restricted in
his movements, not much unlike a criminal indictee. Extradition proceedings involve an
extended restraint of liberty following arrest, peculiar to an accused in a criminal case, which
can even be more severe than an accompanying detention in a single state, for, at a
minimum, it can mean protracted proceedings in both the asylum state and the demanding
state and a forced transportation in between. In Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, the Court
[3] [4]

observed that bail is constitutionally available to all persons, even those against whom no
formal charges are filed.
"Indeed, if, as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already charged under a
formal complaint or information, there seems no legal and just reason for denying its benefits
to one against whom the proper authorities may not even yet conclude that there exists no
sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more favored position than the latter
would be, to say the least, anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of innocence in
favor of one already formally charged with criminal offenses ... a fortiori, this presumption
should be indulged in favor of one not yet so charged although arrested and detained."
“x x x xxx xxx
"We reiterate now that under the Constitution, all persons, without distinction, whether
formally charged or not yet so charged with any criminal offense, 'shall before conviction be
bailable,' the only exception being when charge is for a capital offense and the court finds
that the evidence of guilt is strong."
Notably, our extradition law (P.D. 1069, paragraph. 1, Section 9 thereof), expressly
provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court,
insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall
apply. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 114, of our Rules of Criminal Procedure is unequivocal
---
"All persons in custody shall, before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of
right, except those charged with capital offenses or an offense which, under the law at the
time of its commission and the time of the application for bail, is punished by reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong."
Nowhere in the Extradition Treaty with the United States is the grant of bail mentioned but so
also it is not prohibited. This obscurity must not be held to negate the right to bail; on the
contrary, it should be viewed as allowing, at the very least, the evident intendment and spirit
of the fundamental law to prevail.
A Constitution does not deal with details, but only enunciates general tenets that are
intended to apply to all facts that may come about and be brought within its directions. [5]

Behind its conciseness is its encompassing inclusiveness. It is not skin-deep; beneath that
surface is what gives it real life and meaning. It can truly be said that the real essence of
justice does not emanate from quibbling over patchwork but proceeds from its gut
consciousness and dynamic role as a brick in the ultimate development of the edifice. [6]

Resort to overly rigid procedures is being justified as a need to keep in line with our treaty
obligations. Verily, comity in our relations with sovereign states is important, but there are
innate rights of individuals which no government can negotiate or, let alone, bargain away.
Analogy between extradition process and proceedings where the right to bail is said to be
unavailing, i.e., deportation proceedings and proceedings before a military tribunal, would not
at all be apropos. Deportation proceedings are no more than inquiries and just involve the
simple fact of whether or not an alien has an authorized entry within a named country or, if
authorized, whether or not he has complied with the conditions for a continued stay thereat.
A subject found to be illegally staying in a country is merely transported back to his place of
origin. Most importantly, such a person is not considered to be under judicial custody.
Proceedings before a military tribunal, upon the other hand, are confined to members of the
military organization who give consent to its jurisdiction. The stringent proceedings before
such tribunals place emphasis on summary procedures, a speedy resolution of the case
being vital in maintaining discipline, obedience and fitness among the ranks that cannot [7]

obviously be compromised in any sound military establishment.

The draft ponencia would rely heavily on foreign jurisprudence, notably American cases,
to belabor the point that the right to bail is extraneous to extradition proceedings. The
citation, particularly of the jurisprudence obtaining in the United States, could be predicated
on the Eighth Amendment of the US Federal Constitution. This amendment however,
recognizes merely by implication the right to bail by simply disallowing excessive bail; it does
not expressly provide for the grant of bail. Individual states have incorporated into their own
[8]

state constitutions various versions – some give it as a matter of right and some do not – a
fact which partially explains the lack of uniformity in state jurisprudence on the matter. Where
some states provide for a constitutional right to bail, the same is almost invariably viewed as
affording a greater right than that provided in the federal charter. [9]

In contrast, the Philippine Constitution strongly and clearly mandates that, except for
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong, bail is an undeniable right of every person ---
"All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required."[10]
Thus, grappling in this jurisdiction with the compatibility of the grant of bail in extradition
proceedings with basic constitutional guarantees has not been and should not be a
predicament. Absent any standard, except for the constitutional limitation that the same be
not excessive, the grant of bail in the United States largely rests on judicial discretion under
the umbrella of judicial power. And so it has been so regarded in Wright v. Henkel, the [11]

primary case governing access to bail in United States extradition proceedings, where the
Court has held:
"We are unwilling to hold that the Circuit Courts possess no power in respect of admitting
bail other than as specifically vested by statute or that, while bail should not ordinarily be
granted in cases of foreign extradition, those courts may not, in any case, and whatever the
special circumstances, extend that relief."
Henkel, decided by the US Supreme Court in 1903, has been criticized to have imposed an
amorphous standard and has resulted in an incoherent and inconsistent approach to bail. [12]

While the clamor for its re-examination appears to be getting persistent by the day, it has [13]

nevertheless become the forerunner in the judicially-prescribed "special circumstances"

standard in deciding whether the bail should be granted or denied. These "special [14]

circumstances" vary – from reasons of ill-health to material prejudice – depending on the

peculiarities of the case.
In In re Mitchel, to cite an example, the court there caused the release of an extraditee
[15]
who was charged with larceny by the requesting state based on the assertion that his
continued detention rendered him incapable of consulting with his counsel. The court was
careful to emphasize that it had become imperative for him to obtain advice of counsel
because his entire fortune depended upon his doing so. The court then added that while he
had knowledge for a long time of the extradition, he had made no attempt to flee. [16]

But Philippine courts need not really bother borrowing from dicta in foreign jurisdictions.
The absoluteness of the constitutional grant under Section 13, Article, III of the Constitution
precludes any need for further standards than those explicitly expressed by it. Judicial
discretion is confined to the issue of whether or not the offense charged is a capital crime and
a determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The rule may appear to be
too simplistic but it is the correct approach. At all events, I would not be comfortable in
developing a "special circumstances" standard on the basis of mere pro hac vice
pronouncements from elsewhere. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons , this Court
[17]

has expressed unqualified acquiescence to the deeply ingrained policy of restraint against
unwarranted judicial adventurism that can otherwise easily get out of hand.
Given the foregoing, the trial court did not err, let alone commit a grave abuse of
discretion, in the grant of bail to the extraditee.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the Petition.

[G.R. No. 148571. December 3, 2002]

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REPRESENTED BY THE
PHILIPPINE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, etc. vs. HON. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN,
etc., et al.
En Banc
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court dated DEC. 3, 2002
G.R. No. 148571 (Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, etc. vs. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, etc., et al.)
In his "Motion for Leave of Court to File and to Admit Additional Arguments in Support of
Motion for Reconsideration" dated November 6, 2002, private respondent -- through his new
collaborating counsel, Atty. Froilan M. Bacungan - seeks, inter alia, "to exclude" the votes of
Justices Ma. Alicia Austria Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales and Romeo
J. Callejo Sr. on the ground that, allegedly, "they did not take part in the deliberations" of our
September 24, 2002 Decision.
The Motion is based on totally erroneous assumptions. All the above-named justices fully
participated in the deliberations of this case prior to the final voting. The mere fact that the
Oral Argument took place on August 14, 2001 and the Memoranda of the parties were filed
"under date of August 29, 2001" for private respondent and "under date of September 3,
2001" for petitioner does not mean that deliberations on the final resolution of this case took
place on .those dates. Because of various pleadings thereafter filed, the case "was deemed
submitted for resolution [only] on July 3, 2002, upon receipt by this Court of respondent's
Counter-manifestation" as stated plainly in footnote number 13 of the Decision.
The justices concerned had already been sworn into office and begun discharging their
official functions well before the discussions and deliberations took place.
The dates of the Oral Argument and the filing of the Memoranda and other pleadings are
not decisive with respect to the deliberations and the voting. After all, the justices read the
pleadings and the transcripts of the Oral Argument. And during the deliberations, they also
heard, read and discussed the other justices' arguments and opinions.
The participation of newly appointed magistrates in the deliberations and the voting on
cases that had already been submitted for resolution prior their appointments is a NORMAL
procedure that is applied to ALL cases in this Court. There is nothing unusual or irregular in
its application here.
In short, the prayer to exclude the aforementioned justices is utterly and absolutely
without factual or legal bases.
WHEREFORE, the prayer -- in private respondent's present Motion -- to exclude the
votes of Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio-Morales
and Romeo J. Callejo Sr. -- is unanimously DENIED with finality. The other prayers for the
reversal/modification of our Decision shall be ruled upon separately.
*
The Court, further Resolved to NOTE the Reply to petitioner's comment on the motion
for reconsideration, dated 26 November 2002 filed by counsel for respondent Mark B
Jimenez, Puno, J., abroad on official business; Azcuna, J., on leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D.VILLARAMA
Acting Clerk of Court