POLITICAL LAW

Some Relevant Questions and Suggested Answers

Attorney EDWIN REY SANDOVAL

(Pre-week Notes)
(June 19 - October 21, 2019)

1. What is the Federal Paramountcy Doctrine? Is it applicable in the

Philippines?

Held:

The federal Paramountcy doctrine is a constitutional law doctrine

followed in federal states, particularly in the U.S. and Canada. The
application of this doctrine to the Philippine setting is legally inconceivable
because the Philippines has not adopted a federal form of government.
Furthermore, most of the states in the U.S. were previously independent
states who were obliged to surrender their sovereign functions over their
maritime area or marginal belt to the federal government when they
joined the federal union. Contrarily, the Philippines had a unitary system
of government until it adopted the ideas of decentralization and local
autonomy as fundamental state principles. Instead of different states
surrendering their imperium and dominium over the maritime area to a
federal government, the Philippine setting works in the opposite as the
National Government, which is presumed to own all resources within the
Philippine territory, is mandated to share the proceeds of the national
wealth with the LGUs. (Republic of the Philippines v. Provincial
Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018, En
Banc [Tijam], p. 35)

In a number of cases involving conflicting claims of the United

States Federal Government and the coastal states over natural wealth
found within the latter’s adjoining maritime area, the Supreme Court of
the United States of America, applying the Federal Paramountcy Doctrine,
consistently ruled on the fundamental right of the national government
over the national wealth in maritime areas, to the exclusion of the coastal
state. X x x (Republic of the Philippines v. Provincial Government
of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018, En Banc
[Tijam], p. 20)

2. The Province of Palawan demanded from the National Government its

equitable share in the utilization and development of national wealth (oil
resources) situated about 80 kilometers from Malampaya, northwest of
Palawan mainland, pursuant to Section 7, Article 10 of the Constitution, as
determined by the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) to be 40%.
Should the claim for equitable share be granted?

Ans.: No. The Malampaya oil resources are outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Province of Palawan, since the territorial jurisdiction of
local governments is limited only to their land area as provided in their
respective charters, including the 15 kilometer municipal waters from their
land area. It appears that the Malampaya oil reservoir lies 80 kilometers
from the land area of Palawan, therefore, outside the territorial

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 jurisdiction of the Province of Palawan. (Republic of the Philippines v.
Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. No. 170867, December
4, 2018, En Banc [Tijam], p. 20)

3. A proposal to change our government from unitary-presidential to federal

government will require an overhaul of the entire 1987 Philippine
Constitution. May it be validly effected through:

a. A petition signed by at least 12 per cent of the total number of

registered voters?

Answer: No. People’s initiative on the Constitution is allowed

only if what is involved is an amendment of the Constitution, not a
revision thereof. (Sec. 2, Article XVII, 1987 Constitution; Santiago v.
COMELEC; Lambino v. COMELEC)

b. An Executive Order issued by the President creating a constitutional

commission to draft the proposal whose members shall be appointed
by him representing various sectors in the country?

Ans.: A Constitutional Commission is not among the ways of

proposing amendments, or revision, of the Constitution under Article
XVII, 1987 Constitution. Besides, the President may not directly
propose amendments, or revision, of the Constitution. (Article XVII,
1987 Constitution)

c. Three-fourths vote of all the Senators and Congressmen?

Ans.: Yes, one of the ways of proposing amendments, or

revision, of the Constitution is through Congress, acting as a
constituent assembly, by three-fourths vote of all its members.
(Section 1(1), Article XVII, 1987 Constitution)

d. A Constitutional Convention called by the Congress for such purpose

whose members shall be elected by the people representing their
respective Congressional districts?

Ans.: Yes. One of the ways of proposing amendments, or

revision, of the Constitution is through a constitutional convention.
(Article XVII, 1987 Constitution)

4. In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating
the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. This
law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I).

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522.

The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with
the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among
others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of
baselines of archipelagic states like the Philippines and sets the deadline
for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying
with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the

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 location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and
classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG)
and the Scarborough Shoal, as “regimes of islands” whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.

However, the constitutionality of R.A. No, 9522 was challenged in

the SC on the ground that, in effect, it diminished our national territory.

Will the challenge prosper?

Ans.: It will not. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the

acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating,
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones ( i.e., the territorial
waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical
miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations
among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of
States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and
archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and
submarine lands along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by

UNCLOS III States parties to work-out specific basepoints along their
coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to
serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the
maritime zones and continental shelf.

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for

UNCLOS III States-parties to delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the
rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space
and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based
rights, namely: the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article
2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitation
laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living
and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77). (Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et al.
v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, 655 SCRA 476,
August 16, 2011, En Banc [Carpio])

5. The USS Guardian, an American naval vessel on its way to Indonesia from
its base in Okinawa, Japan ran aground in Tubbataha reef in the Sulu Sea
causing extensive damage to our corrals there. Several environmentalist
groups and individuals filed a petition in the Supreme Court for the
issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and demand for compensation for
damages caused to our corrals there, naming the Commander of the US
Pacific fleet as respondent. Will the petition prosper?

Ans.: The petition will have to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

because of the principle of sovereign equality of all states as well as the
doctrine of state immunity from suit. The suit, in effect, is a suit against
the United States since the USS Guardian, an American naval vessel, is
considered an extension of the territory of the US under customary

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 international law. Besides, the respondent is the Commander of the
American Pacific Fleet. The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to
complaint filed against public officials in the performance of their duties.

The demand for compensation for damages had been rendered

moot and academic in this case because the US government, as expressed
by the US embassy in the Philippines, already signified its intention to pay
damages, the only request, which is a reasonable one, is that a panel of
experts made up of scientists be constituted to assess the total damage
caused to our corrals because of the incident. (Most Rev. Pedro D.
Arigo, et al. v. Scott H. Swift, et al., G.R. No. 206510, 735 SCRA
102, September 16, 2014, En Banc [Villarama, Jr.])

6. When does life begin?

Ans.: Life begins at fertilization, i.e., the moment the sperm cell
meets the egg cell, in which event a zygote (fertilized ovum) is produced.
That zygote has life already, and anything introduced to prevent it from
being implanted in the uterus (mother’s womb) is considered abortive, or
abortifacient and, therefore, prohibited.

The argument that life begins at implantation (the stage that the
zygote is implanted in the uterus), which is a later stage, is not backed up
by medical research and medical science. (James M. Imbong, et al. v.
Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014,
En Banc [Mendoza])

7. What principles animate the Philippines’ national population program?

Ans.: The Philippine national population program has always been

grounded on two cornerstone principles: “principle of no-abortion”
and the “principle of non-coercion.” These principles are not merely
grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the
constitutional protection which expressly provided to afford protection to
life and guarantee religious freedom. (James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014, En
Banc [Mendoza])

8. The resident mammals of Tanon strait (the small body of water separating
Cebu from Negros, which is one of the protected area system under our
environmental laws [NIPAS]) filed a petition in court questioning the
constitutionality of a service contract agreement entered into between the
Philippine government and a Japanese petroleum corporation for
largescale exploration, development and utilization of petroleum and other
mineral oils in Tanon strait. In their petition, they were joined by human
beings as stewards of nature. It appeared that the service contract
agreement was signed on behalf of the Philippine government by the
Secretary of Energy.

a. Procedural Issue: Were the resident marine mammals (dolphins,

toothed whales and other cetacean species) of Tanon strait the
proper parties to file the petition in court?

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 Ans.: Although the Court did not rule squarely on the issue
(though it cited a dissenting opinion of an American justice that
even inanimate objects like rivers and forests may be proper
parties in environmental cases), yet the Court allowed the petition
to prosper. After all, in their petitions they were joined by human
beings as stewards of nature and, under Section 5 of the Rules for
the Enforcement of Environmental Laws (citizen’s suit), any citizen
of the Philippines may bring a petition in court for the enforcement
of environmental laws. (Resident Marine Mammals of the
Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et al. v. Secretary Angelo
Reyes, et al., GR Nos. 180771 and 181527, April 21, 2015,
En Banc [Leonardo-De Castro, J.])

b. Substantive Issue: Was the service contract agreement valid

considering that it was signed by the Secretary of Energy as a
member of the Cabinet on behalf of the Philippine government
applying the doctrine of qualified political agency?

Ans.: Under Section 2, Article XVII, 1987 Constitution (4 th

paragraph), such an agreement should be signed by the President.
As clarified by the Court, if it is the Constitution itself which
mandates that the act should be performed by the President
himself, the doctrine of qualified political agency may not be validly
invoked, especially since what is involved is largescale exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources, which form part
of the patrimony of the nation. (Resident Marine Mammals of
the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et al. v. Secretary
Angelo Reyes, et al., GR Nos. 180771 and 181527, April 21,
2015, En Banc [Leonardo-De Castro, J.])

9. Ms. C was a student of ABC University taking up doctorate degree in

Anthropology. During the defense of her dissertation paper, questions
were raised as to the authenticity of some of her research materials.
While the investigation is pending, she was allowed to graduate by ABC
University, and was conferred the doctorate degree during graduation
ceremonies. Thereafter, it was established that many of her dissertation
materials were plagiarized by her. Consequently, ABC University revoked
the degree conferred on her during graduation.

a. Was the act of ABC University of revoking the degree conferred on

her during graduation valid? Clarify.

Held:

In Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology

(68 SCRA 277 [1975]), the SC pointed out that academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning is a freedom granted to “institutions of higher
learning” which is thus given a “wide sphere of authority certainly extending
to the choice of students.” If such institution of higher learning can decide
who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom
it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was

obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the

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honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does
not terminate upon the “graduation” of a student, for it is precisely the
“graduation” of such a student that is in question. (UP Board of Regents
v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine,
G.R. No. 134625, Aug. 31, 1999, 2nd Div. [Mendoza])

b. What is academic freedom? What are the essential freedoms

subsumed in the term academic freedom of institutions of higher
learning?

Held:

Academic freedom of educational institutions has been defined as the

right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and
how best to attain them - free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a
wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students.
(University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 761,
774-775, March 7, 1994 [Nocon])

In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong (G.R. No. 99327, 27 May

1993), this Court cited with approval the formulation made by Justice Felix
Frankfurter of the essential freedoms subsumed in the term “academic
freedom” encompassing not only “the freedom to determine x x x on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught (and) how it shall be
taught,” but likewise “who may be admitted to study.” (Isabelo, Jr. v.
Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., 227 SCRA 595-597, Nov. 8,
1993, En Banc [Vitug])

10.What is the Bicameral Conference Committee? Describe the nature of its

function.

Ans.: It is a mechanism for compromising differences between the

Senate and the House of Representatives, since what we have in the
Philippines is a bicameral Congress consisting of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. (Philippine Judges Association v. Secretary Prado) As
the term suggests, its members come from both the Senate and the
House of Representatives.

By the nature of its function, a bicameral conference committee is

capable of producing unexpected results - results which sometimes may
even go beyond its own mandate. (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance)

11.Integrated in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) is the Priority

Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) wherein each Senator has a lump-
sum discretionary fund of P200 million and each Congressman likewise
shall have such lump-sum fund of P70 million to be used for local
development projects (otherwise known as congressional pork barrel).
The ones who identify the project/s, the implementing agencies and the
intended beneficiaries are the individual members of Congress
themselves. Discuss the reasons why this congressional pork barrel was
declared unconstitutional?

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 Ans.: First, the PDAF violated the principle of separation of
powers. The work of Congress ends upon the enactment of the budget
(GAA). When it comes to implementation of the budget, that function
belongs to the officials in the executive branch, as Congress’ functions is
limited only to monitoring and overseeing whether the budget is properly
being implemented by said officials (oversight function). Under the PDAF,
in effect, the individual members of Congress are the ones implementing
the budget since it is they identify who identify the project/s to be
implemented, the implementing agencies, and even the beneficiaries;

Second, it violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative

power. The power of appropriation was delegated by the Constitution to
the Congress as a body. That power may no longer be delegated to
individual members of Congress. Under the PDAF, there was further
delegation of the power of appropriation to the individuals members since
the amount is lump-sum, not itemized;

Third, it denied the President his item veto. Under Section 27, 2 nd
par., 1987 Constitution, the President is authorized to veto an item or
items in an appropriation, revenue and tariff bill, but the veto will not
affect the item or items to which he does not object. Since the PDAF is
integrated in the General Appropriations Act (which is an appropriations
bill), the President cannot exercise his item veto since the amount
appropriated is lump-sum, not itemized;

Fourth, the PDAF impaired public accountability. Since the

individual members of Congress are the ones implementing the PDAF,
Congress, as a body, can hardly be expected to monitor and oversee
whether its members are properly implementing the project/s; and

Fifth, the PDAF subverted genuine local autonomy. In the Local

Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), to strengthen the autonomy of local
governments, which is an important state policy, at every level of local
government, local development councils were created to identify and
prioritize development projects to be implemented in their respective
localities. Under the PDAF, since the individual senators and
congressmen, who are national government officials, are the ones who
identify and implement the project/s to be introduced in the locality, in
effect, this undermines the function of local development councils.
(Belgica, Jr., et al. v. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R.
No. 208566, 710 SCRA 1, Nov. 19, 2013, En Banc [Perlas-
Bernabe, J.])

12.What is the Power of Augmentation? Who may validly exercise such?

What are the requisites for such power to be validly exercised?

Ans.: Once the budget (GAA) has been enacted, no law shall be
passed authorizing any transfer of appropriation (Section 25[5], Article VI,
1987 Constitution). The exception is known as the Power of
Augmentation. However, only the President, the Senate President, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions, may
validly exercise such power of augmentation.

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 But, for the power to be validly exercised, the following are the
requisites:

First, there must be a law authorizing them;

Second, the funds to be used to augment must come from

savings in their respective departments (and savings may only be
realized upon the completion of the project, or at the end of the
fiscal year); and

Third, there shall be no cross-border transfer of funds

(following the doctrine of separation of powers).
(Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino III, et al. G.R. No., 209287, 728 SCRA 1, July 1,
2014, En Banc [Bersamin])

13.Was this power of augmentation validly exercised by the Aquino

administration when it adopted and implemented the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP)?

Ans.: No. First, there was no law authorizing its adoption; second,
the funds that were used were not actually savings because savings may
only be determined upon the completion of the project, or at the end of
the fiscal year. In the case of the DAP, what were arbitrarily declared
savings were unappropriated amounts, as well as the funds for slow
moving projects; and, finally, there was cross-border transfer of funds,
i.e. savings of the executive branch were used to augment the funds of
the Senate. (Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino III, et al. G.R. No., 209287, 728 SCRA 1, July 1, 2014, En
Banc [Bersamin])

14.When a House of Congress conducts an inquiry in aid of legislation, and

the person summoned to appear before that body but did not appear or
refused to cooperate, he/she may be cited in contempt, and may even be
sent to prison. How long must he/she remain in prison?

Ans.: Until the inquiry is terminated, and the inquiry is terminated

upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report, or upon the
last adjournment of Congress. (Arvin R. Balag v. Senate of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 234608, July 3, 2018, En Banc [Gesmundo])

15.May the President validly exercise emergency power motu proprio to

address the worsening traffic situation in the country? What are the
requisites for Congress to validly delegate this power to the President?

Ans.: No. Emergency power is merely a delegated power from

Congress. For Congress to validly delegate this power to the President,
the requisites are, as follows:

1. There must be war or other national emergency;

2. The delegation must be for a limited period only;
3. It is subject to such restrictions as Congress may prescribe; and
4. It must always be pursuant to a declared national policy.
(Section 23[2], Article VI, 1987 Constitution)

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16.The three important powers of the President under Section 18, Article VII,
1987 Constitution, are his calling-out power as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, his martial law power, and his power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The last two have expressly been
made subject to judicial review (3 rd par., Section 18, Article VII, 1987
Constitution), whereas his calling-out power is a political question as held
by the Court in IBP v. Zamora. How do we explain the difference in
treatment of these three powers considering that they are all found in the
same provision?

Ans.: The reason for the difference in treatment of these powers

is that the martial law power and his power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus are his greater powers as they involve direct
curtailment and suppression of individual freedoms and civil liberties
thereby necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Supreme
Court, whereas his calling-out is the lesser and more benign power as it
does involve direct curtailment and suppression of individual freedoms
and civil liberties. (IBP v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, G.R. No.
141284, Aug. 15, 2000, En Banc [Kapunan])

17.During the first visit of then US President Barack Obama to the Philippines
in 2013, the Philippines entered into an Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA) with the USA which, in effect, will allow the US to
preposition its troops and military equipment and facilities, on a rotational
basis, in Philippine military bases. The Senators then urged Malacanang
to forward the EDCA to the Senate for concurrence but the latter refused
contending that the EDCA is merely an executive agreement and,
therefore, will not require concurrence by the Senate.

a. Whose contention should be upheld? Explain.

Ans.: Malacanang’s contention should be upheld following the

ruling in Saguisag v. Ochoa. The EDCA merely seeks to implement the
earlier treaties the Philippines’ entered into with the US, i.e., the 1951
Mutual Defense Treaty and the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement, both
treaties were duly concurred in the Senate, thus, it is a mere executive
agreement.

Take note that under the EDCA, the US does not really want to
establish in the Philippines permanent military bases; what it merely want
is to have access to Philippine military bases where it may preposition its
troops and other military facilities, on a rotational basis, so that in case of
a crisis situation in the South China Sea, it can respond immediately.
(Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 212426, Jan. 12, 2016, En Banc
[Sereno, CJ])

b. Is an executive agreement an equally binding international

obligation?

Held:

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 In international law, there is no difference between a treaty and an
executive agreement as to their binding effect upon the states concerned
for as long as the functionaries have remained within their powers.
International law continues to make no distinction between a treaty and
an executive agreement: they are equally binding international
obligations. (BAYAN [Bagong Alyansang Makabayan] v. Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000, En
Banc [Buena])

18.Were former President Estrada, former Chief Justice Corona, and former
Chief Justice Sereno impeached? Were all of them removed by
impeachment?

Ans.: Both former President Estrada and former Chief Justice

Corona were impeached, that is why there was an impeachment trial; with
respect to former Chief Justice Sereno, there was no impeachment trial.
She was removed through a quo warranto proceeding.

As to their removal, former Chief Justice Corona was found guilty in

his impeachment trial and thus removed. But with respect to former
President Estrada, he was not removed by impeachment as the
impeachment court that tried his impeachment case was rendered functus
oficio when the prosecutors walked out of that impeachment trial. The
Court later held that he resigned (Estrada v. Desierto). As to former Chief
Justice Sereno, she was removed through a quo warranto proceeding.

19.What provisions in the Bill of Rights are governed by the exclusionary rule
on evidence (so that any evidence obtained in violation of any such
provision will be inadmissible in any proceeding and for whatever
purpose)? Enumerate and briefly describe each.

Ans.: Section 2 – The right against unreasonable searches,

seizures and arrests.

Section 3 – The right to privacy of communication and

correspondence.

Section 12 – The custodial investigation rights.

Section 17 – The right against self-incrimination.

20. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted an Ordinance

prohibiting aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural
entities in Davao City. For that matter, all agricultural entities are
mandated to shift to other forms of spraying (whether manual or truck-
mounted boom) within three months from the effectivity of the ordinance
or face sanction. The reason for said enactment were complaints received
by the Davao City government from people residing in villages adjacent to
banana plantations who claimed that due to the pesticide drift caused by
aerial spraying, their health and safety are threatened/endangered. In
effect, the residents invoked their right to health and to have a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature
(Sections 15 and 16, Article II, 1987 Constitution). It was established that
banana plantation owners resort to aerial spraying to combat the “Black

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Sigatoka” disease and other menaces that threaten the production and
harvest of bananas.

It was also provided in the Ordinance that all agricultural entities in

Davao City must provide for a 30-meter buffer zone from the boundaries
of their property to be devoted to growing diversified trees taller than that
which they traditional plant.

The constitutionality of said Ordinance was challenged by banana

plantation owners and exporters. Resolve.

Held:

The Court held that although the Ordinance was an exercise by the
Davao City Government of its police power under the general welfare
clause (Section 16, R.A. No. 7160), yet its exercise was invalid for several
reasons, to wit:

First, it violated the due process clause. The impossibility of

carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application within three
months can readily be appreciated given the vast area of the affected
plantations and the corresponding resources required therefor.

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom

spraying alone will consume considerable time and financial resources
given the topography and geographical features of the plantations. As
such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of
three months. Requiring plantation owners and other affected individuals
to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month
period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation
of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse
of police power.

Second, it violated the equal protection clause.

The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but

results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even
manual spraying or truck mounted boom spraying produces drift that may
bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks
to the community and to the environment. The ban against aerial
spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve.
In the process, the ordinance suffers from being “underinclusive” because
the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same
mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. A classification that is drastically
underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrrational
means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended
purpose of the law.

Aside from being underinclusive, the ordinance also tends to be

“overinclusive” because its implementation will affect groups that have no
relation to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose. Its
implementation will unnecessarily impose a burden on a wider range of
individuals than those included in the intended class based on the purpose
of the law.

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 The overinclusiveness of the ordinance may also be traced to its
Section 6 by virtue of its requirement for the maintenance of the 30-meter
buffer zone. This requirement applies regardless of the area of the
agricultural landholding, geographical location, topography, crops grown
and other distinguishing characteristics that ideally should bear a
reasonable relation to the evil sought to be avoided. As stated earlier,
only banana plantations could rely on aerial technology because of the
financial capital required therefor. Section 6 also subjects to the 30-meter
buffer zone requirement agricultural entities engaging in organic farming,
and do not contribute to the occurrence of pesticide drift. The
classification indisputably becomes arbitrary and whimsical.

A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to

undercut the governmental claim that the classification serves legitimate
political ends. In this light, Section 5 and Section 6 of the ordinance has
to be struck down for carrying an invidious classification, thereby violating
the equal protection clause.

Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings

that are only ideal venues for the investment of machineries and
equipment capable of aerial spraying. It effectively denies the affected
individuals the technology aimed at efficient and cost-effective operations
and cultivation not only of banana but of other crops as well. The
prohibition against aerial spraying will seriously hamper the operations of
the banana plantations that depend on aerial technology to arrest the
spread of the Black Sigatoka disease and other menaces that threaten
their production and harvest. The effect of the ban will not be limited to
Davao City in view of the significant contribution of banana export trading
to the country’s economy.

The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive

and unreasonable in light of the existence and availability of more
permissible and practical alternatives that will not overburden plantation
owners and those dependent on their operations as well as those who
stand to be affected by the ordinance.

Third, it was an ultra vires act on the part of the Davao City
Government. The power to regulate the application and use of chemicals
and pesticides is vested in the Fertilizer and Pesticides Authority (FPA) – a
national government agency. This power is not among those devolved to
local governments under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).
(Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters
Association, Inc., et al., GR No. 189185, 16 August 2016, En Banc
[Bersamin, J.])

21.Briefly explain the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine and the “doctrine of

overbreadth.”

Ans.: The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that the law should

be declared void for being vague as it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of ordinary intelligence will probably have to guess as to its
meaning and differ in its application. Such vague law is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: first, it law violates due process as it fails to

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 afford persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid and second, it gives law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and, in effect,
it becomes an arbitrary flexing of the government’s muscle. However, for
this doctrine to be invoked, the act must be utterly vague on its face, i.e.,
that it cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by statutory
construction.

The doctrine of overbreadth meanwhile states that a governmental

purpose to regulate an activity subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly thereby invading
the area of constitutionally protected freedoms like freedom of expression,
freedom of religion and other fundamental rights.

22.What are “content-based” restrictions on free speech, as distinguished

from “content-neutral” regulations? Is the Public Assembly Act (BP 880) a
“content-based” restriction or “content-neutral?” Explain.

Ans.: Content-based restrictions are restrictions on the speech

itself, or the contents of the speech. They are censorial in character and,
therefore, constitute a prior restraint on freedom of expression. That
being the case, they come to the court with a heavy presumption of
unconstitutionality. To justify such restriction, it is not enough that the
government is able to point out some compelling interest, but that the
measure is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses, i.e., that the measure is
not overbroad; it does not suffer from the vice of vagueness; it is not
unreasonable. In other words, it is in content-based restrictions that the
clear-and-present-test is applied.

Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, are restrictions not

on the contents of the speech itself but rather, on the incidents of the
speech, i.e., the manner, the time and the place of the speech. That
being the case, to justify such, a deferential approach is required, i.e., not
the clear-and-present-danger test because, as explained in one case,
applying the clear-and-present danger test to content neutral regulations
is just like “using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when all that is required
is just an ordinary hammer.” (Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447,
March 31, 1998 [Mendoza])

The Public Assembly Act is held to be a content neutral regulation

as it does not totally prohibit the holding of rallies and public assemblies;
it merely regulates them. In fact, under said law, there are even
instances when one may hold a rally even without permit from the local
authorities. (BAYAN, et al. v. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838, April
25, 2006, En Banc [Azcuna])

23.The producer and director of the popular local TV drama series “Ang
Probinsiyano” were castigated and threatened by PNP authorities as the
show tended to depict the PNP in a negative light. Subsequently, the
director of the TV show, upon instruction of the TV station management,
had to edit certain portions of the story plot to comply with the demand of
PNP authorities. If you are asked to question this act of PNP authorities,
what constitutional issue/s will you raise? Elaborate.

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 Ans.: What is involved in this case is a content-based restriction
on freedom of expression since the restriction is directed against the
content of the show itself which the PNP authorities wanted to be “edited”
to depict the PNP not in a negative light. This is censorship, a prior
restraint on freedom of expression, and comes to the court with a heavy
presumption of unconstitutionality.

Since the PNP authorities failed to show that the drama series
presents a clear and present danger to public safety and public welfare
that will warrant its “edition” to satisfy their demand, their act cannot be
sanctioned and must be restrained.

24.What is a “heckler’s veto?”

Ans.: A heckler’s veto is where the government suppresses a

particular speech, usually unpopular or unorthodox views, or even voice of
minority groups, because the government is afraid that said speech may
provoke a violent reaction on the part of the majority.

A heckler’s veto definitely infringes on freedom of expression,

which includes even “freedom for the thought we hate.”

25.The Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party filed a petition in the COMELEC for it to

participate in Party-List elections. The COMELEC disapproved its
application holding that it is disqualified since its members are “immoral,”
citing verses from the Bible and the Koran. Rule on this decision of the
COMELEC, citing legal reason.

Ans.: The act of the COMELEC is tainted with grave abuse of

discretion as it violated the non-establishment clause of freedom of
religion (Section 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution), and therefore, should
be nullified.

The COMELEC, as an agency of the government should not make

use of, or be guided by, religious standards in its decisions and actions.
Under the non-establishment clause, when it comes to religious
differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options; neutrality alone is its
fixed and immovable stance; it should not establish any religion, and
neither should it support one particular religion as against another. (Ang
LADLAD LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, 618 SCRA 32,
April 8, 2010, En Banc [Del Castillo])

26.In connection with the May 2013 senatorial elections, the Diocese of
Bacolod posted huge tarpaulins in the premises of its Cathedral in Bacolod
City categorizing candidates for Senator into either belonging to “Team
Buhay” (those who opposed the enactment of the Reproductive Health
[RH] Law), or “Team Patay” (those who supported it). In essence, the
tarpaulins urged the Catholic faithful to vote only for candidates belonging
to “Team Buhay” in the election.

The COMELEC ordered the Diocese to remove those tarpaulins as

they are considered unlawful campaign propaganda materials prohibited
under the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), otherwise those responsible
for their posting may be prosecuted for violation of election laws.

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 The Diocese argued that those tarpaulins are part of its religious
speech and, therefore, protected by the Constitution pursuant to the
Separation of Church and State Doctrine.

a. Comment on the merit of the argument raised by the Diocese of

Bacolod.

Ans.: The argument does not persuade. It was not a religious

speech; it has nothing to do with the creed, doctrine or beliefs of the
church which can be considered “a purely ecclesiastical affair of the
church” that will prohibit the state from intruding into. It was a political
speech by a religious group that may be subject to the police power of the
state. (The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented by the Most Rev.
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, et al. v. COMELEC, GR No. 205728,
January 21, 2015, En Banc [Leonen])

b. Will you uphold the order of the COMELEC under the

circumstances?

Ans.: No. The power of the COMELEC is to regulate the use of

political campaign propaganda to insure equal opportunity among
candidates and political parties during the elections. The tarpaulin cannot
be considered a campaign propaganda material which can be regulated by
the COMELEC under the police power; it was an opinion of a voter on an
issue of national significance which is beyond the power of the COMELEC
to regulate as it is protected by the Constitution under the freedom of
expression clause. (The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented by the
Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, et al. v. COMELEC, GR No.
205728, January 21, 2015, En Banc [Leonen])

27.Why was former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile allowed to post bail despite
that he was charged of plunder, a non-bailable offense?

Held:

In Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (3rd Div.), G.R. No.

213847, August 18, 2015, En Banc (Bersamin), the Court held:

“Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari,

the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of
bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the
trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further
mindful of the Philippine’s responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights x x x.

“This national commitment to uphold the fundamental

human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in
criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and
convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or
a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

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 “In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his having been
charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from
this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the
onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has
demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this
country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years
ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal
disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail
during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight
risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private
lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him
being at stake, he should be granted bail.

“The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents

another compelling justification for his admission to bail x x x.

“X x x

“Bail for the provisional liberty to the accused, regardless of

the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits
of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown
to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed,
denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not
serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

“Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not

unprecedented. X x x

“It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to

Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians
in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate
preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.

“On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the
trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the application
for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to
entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There
may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail x x x that the
courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail
without awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus balances the
scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through
ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time
realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.” (Juan Ponce Enrile v.
Sandiganbayan [3rd Div.], G.R. No. 213847, August 18,
2015, En Banc [Bersamin])

28.X was a natural-born Filipino citizen. Later, he became an American

citizen. With the enactment of RA 9225 (the Citizenship Retention and

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Reacquisition Act of 2003), he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before an
officer authorized to administer an oath in the Philippines. In the May 13,
2013 elections, he filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of his
hometown. In compliance with the requirement of RA 9225, he
renounced his American citizenship at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy. Later, it was established that he continued to
travel to the US using his American passport. His citizenship qualification
was questioned in a petition filed in the COMELEC. While the petition was
pending in the COMELEC, there came the election and he won and was
proclaimed and assumed office as Mayor.

a. Considering the foregoing, was his proclamation and

assumption of office valid?

Ans.: Not valid. When after renouncing his American citizenship,

it was established that he travelled several times to the US using his
American passport, that was held to be an effective recantation of his
renunciation and, therefore, he reverted to his prior status as a person
having dual citizenship hence, he is disqualified pursuant to Section 40
par. d of the Local Government Code (R.A. No 7160) which states that
those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
local position. (Casan Macode Maquiling v. COMELEC, et al., G.R.
No. 195649, April 16, 2013, En Banc (Sereno, CJ)

b. Assuming that his proclamation and assumption as Mayor was

declared invalid, who shall assume the position of mayor: the
Vice-mayor, or his opponent that obtained the second highest
number of votes?

Ans.: The opponent who obtained the second highest number of

votes should be proclaimed mayor. Since X was disqualified from running
for mayor in the first place, he having dual citizenship, it is as if he was
not a candidates at all and, therefore, the votes cast in his favor should
not have been counted. The opponent who obtained the second highest
number of votes actually was not a second placer; he was, in fact, the
first among the remaining qualified candidates and, therefore, should be
proclaimed and assume office as mayor. (Casan Macode Maquiling v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, En Banc
(Sereno, CJ)

c. Is a foundling a natural-born citizen? Reason/s.

Ans.: Although the Constitution is silent as to the citizenship of

foundlings, there was neither a restrictive language that will exclude them
as such. On the contrary, in the records of the deliberations of the
drafters of the 1934 Constitution, it was shown that there was an attempt
to confer natural-born citizenship to a foundling; the only reason that the
proposal was not carried out was that the framers considered the
possibility that there will be foundlings will be too few and too far
between, hence, no need for any such provision.

At any rate, even international law and our domestic laws on

adoption subscribe to the proposition that foundlings should be accorded

17
 the status of being natural-born citizens. Otherwise, it will be downright
discriminatory to deny them such a status because of the unfortunate
circumstance not of their own making . (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016, En
Banc [Perez])

29.The constitutionality of Republic Act No. 10367 (The Biometrics Law) was
challenged on the ground that it imposed substantive requirement in the
exercise of suffrage. Is the contention correct?

Held:

“With these considerations in mind, petitioners’ claim that

biometrics validation imposed under RA 10367, and implemented under
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, 10013, must perforce fail. To
reiterate, this requirement is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the
right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of
which the State has the right to reasonably regulate. It was
institutionalized conformant to the limitations of the 1987 Constitution and
is a mere complement to the Existing Voter’s Registration Act of 1996. X
xx

“Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to

the level of a literacy, property or other substantive requirement as
contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution – that is, one which
propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis
to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public
good – the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this
case.” (Kabataan Party-list, et al., v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 221318, December 16, 2015, En Banc [Perlas-Bernabe])

30.In the more recent case of Conchita Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals
(Sixth Division), GR Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, En Banc
(Perlas-Bernabe) the Supreme Court abandoned the doctrine of
condonation although the abandonment was given prospective application
only.

a. What is this doctrine of condonation, and the reason behind this

doctrine?

Ans.: A public official cannot be removed for administrative

misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule,
however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner.
(Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768, 773 [1992])

The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him
back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life
and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such
knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a
condonation of his past misdeeds. (Mayor Alvin B. Garcia v. Hon.
Arturo C. Mojica, et al., G.R. No. 139043, Sept. 10, 1999
[Quisumbing])

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 b. Briefly explain why this doctrine was abandoned.

Ans.: The Court observed that this doctrine was first applied in the
1959 case of Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija - which ruling was
based on an American case. Upon review of American cases on the
matter, the Court found that even in the US, this doctrine was not
uniformly recognized by American courts.

Besides, Pascual was decided under the 1935 Constitution which

Constitution does not give emphasis to the nature of public office as a
public trust - a novel feature of this 1987 Constitution.

Continuous observance of this doctrine will make a mockery of the

nature of public office as a public trust and the corresponding
accountability of public officers, hence, should be abandoned.

Moreover, the reason behind the adoption of said doctrine as

expressed in Garcia v. Mojica appears to be based on faulty reasoning for,
indeed, the electorate cannot possibly condone what it did not know,
since it is common knowledge that a misconduct is committed in secret.
(Conchita Carpio Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), GR
Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, En Banc (Perlas-Bernabe)

31.Congressman M was charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for

violation of the Anti-Graft law and grave misconduct in connection with
certain governmental contracts he entered into with private entities.
While the cases were being investigated by the Ombudsman, he was
placed under preventive suspension for six months. Was the preventive
suspension order validly issued? Clarify.

Ans.: Not valid. In a criminal case like anti-graft, the Ombudsman

has no authority to impose preventive suspension because that power
belongs to the court where the information is filed. In the administrative
case for grave misconduct, members of Congress are exempt from the
administrative jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989).

32.For three consecutive terms, F was elected Mayor. During his 3 rd term, he
was placed under preventive suspension by the Ombudsman due to
administrative misconduct. Will he still be qualified to run again for Mayor
for the 4th term since his suspension has the effect of interrupting his
service as Mayor for the full term for which he was elected? Reason.

Ans.: Not anymore. To constitute an “interruption” of service

under Section 8, Article X of the Constitute, it must involve loss of title to
the office, not mere inability to perform the functions appurtenant to an
office. When F was placed under preventive suspension, he still remains
to be the mayor; there was no loss of title. Hence, the vice-mayor will
have to assume office not as mayor, but merely, as acting mayor.
(Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 184836, Dec. 23, 2009, En
Banc [Brion])

33.What are “jus cogens” norms? What are “erga omnes” obligations?

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 Ans.: “Jus cogens” literally means “compelling law.” A “jus
cogens” norm is a mandatory norm of general international law which
permits of no derogation and which may be replaced or modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law of the same character. An
example is the prohibition against the use of force under the UN Charter.

Under the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties, a treaty that

violates a “jus cogens” norm shall be invalidated.

“Erga omnes” literally means “in relation to the whole.” An “erga

omnes” obligation is an obligation of a State towards the international
community of states as a whole. Every State has a stake in its
compliance. An example is the law on genocide. A State is not supposed
to commit genocide, nor allow genocide to be committed anywhere.

Between an “erga omnes” obligation and an obligation of a State

towards another State in a treaty, an “erga omnes” obligation must
prevail.

34.The right to self-determination is now recognized as a generally accepted

principle of international law. That being the case, may the indigenous
peoples in the country validly invoke this right in order to secede from the
Republic of the Philippines?

Ans.: No. As a generally accepted principle of international law,

one has to distinguish between internal self-determination, i.e., a people’s
pursuit of its own political, economic, social and cultural development
within the framework of an existing state, from external self-
determination, which takes the form of the assertion of a right to
unilateral secession or separation.

However, as normally understood in international law, the right to

self-determination refers only to internal self-determination, i.e., a
people’s pursuit of its own political, economic, social and cultural
development within the framework of an existing state. The right to
external self-determination may be invoked only in extreme cases, i.e., in
case of people under colonial rule, or in case of people under foreign
domination and exploitation outside of a colonial concept. (The
Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of
the Philippines Peace Panel, G.R. No. 183591, 568 SCRA 402,
October 14, 2008, En Banc [Carpio-Morales])

35.What is the Right of Innocent Passage under the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)? May it be validly invoked
even by foreign naval vessels and submarines?

Ans.: It refers to the continuous and expeditious navigation of

foreign vessels through the territorial sea of a coastal State without
entering its internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside
internal waters. Passage is innocent if it is not prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal State. (Articles 17 - 19, UNCLOS)

20
 Yes. This right is available even to foreign naval vessels and
submarines and other underwater vessels. However, with respect to
submarines and other underwater vessels, these are required to navigate
on the surface and display their flags when exercising the right to
innocent passage. (Article 20, UNCLOS)

36.May a foreign vessel enter Manila Bay invoking the right of innocent
passage?

Ans.: No. Manila Bay is part of our internal waters. By definition,

the right of innocent passage is limited only to passage through the
territorial sea of a costal State without entering its internal waters.
(Article 18, UNCLOS)

37.What is the International Criminal Court (ICC), and what offenses fall
under the jurisdiction of this Court? Distinguish this from the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Ans.: The Rome Statute established the International Criminal

Court which “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons
for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” (Article I, Rome
Statute) Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the
Statute (Article 5, Rome Statute). (Pimentel v. Office of the Executive
Secretary)

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was created pursuant to

the United Nations (UN) Charter, whereas the International Criminal Court
(ICC) was created pursuant to the Rome Statute. In the ICJ (as the
principal judicial organ of the UN), only states may be parties thereto. An
individual may not bring a case before the ICJ. In the ICC, individuals
accused of having committed any of those offenses defined in the Rome
Statute may be charged, prosecuted and tried thereto.

38.What is International Humanitarian Law (IHL)? How is it distinguished

from International Human Rights Law?

Ans.: International humanitarian law (IHL) is the branch of public

international law which governs armed conflicts to the end that the use of
violence is limited and that human suffering is mitigated or reduced by
regulating or limiting the means of military operations and by protecting
persons who do not or no longer participate in the hostilities.
(Magallona, Fundamentals of Public International Law, 2005 ed.,
p. 291)

Distinguished from human rights law, IHL applies only in times of

armed conflict, whether national or international; whereas human rights
law applies both in times of war or in times of peace.

IHL permits of no derogation; whereas there are certain human

rights treaties that allow governments to derogate on certain rights in
times of public emergency.

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 IHL protects civilians and persons who no longer participate in
armed conflict (like prisoners of war and persons hors de combat);
whereas human rights law protects the individual from arbitrary acts of
governments at all times.

Give the Bar Your Best Effort!

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