CLJ 2010 2 1020
CLJ 2010 2 1020
CLJ 2010 2 1020
v.
A the Enactment (‘r. 7(a)’), the DR may only exercise his discretion
in determining the “remuneration” of the auctioneer by way of
taxation according to O. 59 of the RHC and not according to
r. 7(b) of the Enactment (‘r. 7(b)’). The auctioneer, on the
contrary, contended that the DR had applied the correct
B principles when he used r. 7(b) as a guide when exercising his
discretion under r. 7(a). The auctioneer further submitted that this
court should not interfere with the quantum allowed by the DR,
and that the proposed intervener had no locus standi to participate
in the taxation proceedings.
C
Held (allowing the application):
(2) Rule 7(a) is very clear. It does not provide that the taxing
officer can “fix” the auctioneer’s remuneration. All that it
F provides is that the auctioneer’s remuneration shall be at the
taxing officer’s discretion. Since the legislature uses the words
“discretion of the taxing officer”, it must mean that there must
be taxation, and what else can a taxing officer do except to
tax costs. Rule 7(b) does not refer to any taxing officer. It
G merely fixes the “commission” of the auctioneer. Taxation must
be carried out according to the established principles and shall
have regard to various factors such as the properties involved,
the time expended and whether any special skill was exercised.
By cleaving rigorously to r. 7(b), the DR had fettered his
H discretion to judicially consider all circumstances which are
relevant to the case. Each case has to be considered on its
own merits and is subject to the taxing officer’s own
discretion. A person or body conferred with duties or with
discretionary powers to make decisions may not avoid his or
I its duties or fetter himself or itself in the discharge of such
duties. Such fettering of discretion may be way of a fixed rule.
1022 Current Law Journal [2010] 2 CLJ
(3) It was the considered opinion of this court that the ground
for review in this case was not limited to a question of C
quantum. The DR in the present instance had exercised his
discretion capriciously or mischievously, and had failed to take
into account, on the facts, pertinent factors. In short, he had
merely awarded what was billed by the auctioneer without
proper taxation. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd v. D
Ernest Cheong Yong Yin (foll). (paras 21 & 22)
[Order accordingly.]
Case(s) referred to:
Bar Council v. Datuk V Kanagalingam [2000] 3 CLJ 697 FC (refd)
Chan Kok Choon JP v. MBF Finance Bhd [2000] 4 CLJ 453 CA (refd) H
Chin Choy & Ors v. Collector of Stamp Duties [1979] 1 MLJ 169 (refd)
Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor v. Adong Kuwau & Ors [2002] 4 CLJ 259
FC (refd)
Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v. Damansara Jaya Sdn Bhd [1999] 7
CLJ 481 HC (refd) I
Maror & St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation [1952]
AC 189 (refd)
CIMB Bank Bhd v. World Nova Sdn Bhd;
[2010] 2 CLJ Pang Ming Wa (Intervener) 1023
For the plaintif - Leney Andrew Albert; M/s Syed Alwi, Ng & Co
For the intervener - LS Chin; M/s Hema Rubini & Co
G
Reported by Suresh Nathan
JUDGMENT
H
Mohd Zawawi Salleh JC:
[2] The learned deputy registrar had taxed the Auctioneer’s Bill A
of Cost on 4 January 2008 and had allowed a sum of
RM118,007.50 as his remuneration for an auction scheduled on
12 July 2007 that was aborted by an order of the High Court.
4.1 Chang Keok Hai (“the auctioneer”) was appointed for the C
auction of properties ordered to be sold by the High Court
of Johor Bahru under the following foreclosure proceedings:
(a) Pang Ming Wa, the proposed intervener, has filed the
following application:
4.7 The auctioneer had done all things necessary for the said
H
auction including to the following:
[9] In this instant case, the auctioneer had done everything for E
the preparation of the auction and was ready, willing and able to
conduct the auction which was fixed on 12 July 2007. The
auction was only aborted on the morning of the auction and as
such, the auctioneer should be entitled to the remuneration as
deemed fit by the taxing officer under r. 7(a). A proper guide for F
the taxing officer in this case is r. 7(b) which states the
remuneration which the auctioneer is entitled to if no sale takes
place. The question that has to be answered is why should the
auctioneer be entitled to anything less than if the auction had
proceeded and if no sale took place? Learned counsel submitted G
that the learned deputy registrar was correct in being guided by r.
7(b) in fixing the remuneration of the auctioneer in this instant
case.
[10] Learned counsel urged this court not to interfere with the
H
discretion of the taxing officer upon a mere question of quantum
if the taxing officer has exercised his discretion correctly and after
considering all the circumstances.
A (a) Starlite Ceramic Industry Ltd v. Hiap Huat Pottery [1973] 1 LNS
143;
(b) Chan Kok Choon JP v. MBF Finance Bhd [2000] 4 CLJ 453;
(f) Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v. Damansara Jaya Sdn Bhd
[1999] 7 CLJ 481;
(g) Vincent Cheng Kim Chuan v. The Minister For Home Affairs &
D Ors [1992] 2 CLJ 945; [1992] 4 CLJ (Rep) 527;
(i) United Oriental Assurance Sdn. Bhd v. Penang Medical Centre Sdn
E
Bhd [1999] 2 CLJ 583; and
aggregated with the reserve price of the lots unsold and the A
rate of commission on both the lots sold and the lots unsold
shall be based on the total of such sale and reserve prices
so aggregated.
[16] It is settled law that in construing any statutes, the first task
is to look at the words in the legislation and apply the plain
I
meaning of the words in the statute and if there is no ambiguity
to the words used, the court is duty bound to accept it even if it
CIMB Bank Bhd v. World Nova Sdn Bhd;
[2010] 2 CLJ Pang Ming Wa (Intervener) 1031
[19] Low Hop Bing JC’s decision above was upheld by the Court
of Appeal in Penolong Kanan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Johor
Bahru v. Tan Beng Sooi (supra). The Court of Appeal held that the
registrar must exercise their discretion judicially. The practice of C
the Johor Bahru High Court by issuing a circular fixing the specific
sum due to the auctioneer as his remuneration under r. 7(a) was
ultra virus the Enactment and has no effect. In other words, under
r. 7(a), the taxing officer cannot award cost under r. 7(a) by
merely and blindly using a fixed sum. D
[21] Learned counsel for the auctioneer submitted that this court
should not interfere with the quantum allowed by the learned
deputy registrar. It is the considered opinion of this court that the
E
ground for review in this instant case is not limited to a question
of quantum. In the case of United Malayan Banking Corporation
Bhd v. Ernest Cheong Yong Yin [2007] 2 CLJ 332, Nik Hashim FCJ
had this to say:
[4] On an application for review under O. 59 r. 36(5) of the
F RHC the judge may make such order as the circumstances
require. By its terms the provision confers on the judge a
discretion. But the discretion is not unfettered. It must be
exercised judicially. The judge should not interfere with the taxing
registrar’s decision unless there is an error of principle or some
G
other material error (Diversey (Far East) Pte Ltd v. Chai Chung
Ching Chester & Ors (No. 2) [1993] 1 SLR 542; Chan Kok Choon
JP v. MBF Finance Bhd [2000] 4 CLJ 453) or the quantum
allowed is obviously wrong (Starlite Ceramic Industry Ltd v. Hiap
Huat Pottery [1973] 1 LNS 143; [1973] 1 MLJ 146) or the
registrar has exercised his discretion capriciously or mischievously:
H Corbett v. Ipoh Tin Dredging Ltd [1935] 1 LNS 33; [1936] MLJ
222 at p 224; see also Malaysian High Court Practice, 2001
Desk Edition 1 p 1933. Generally speaking, the discretion of the
registrar on taxation is final (see judgment of Sir John Leach, MR
in Alsop v. Oxford (Lord) [1833] 1 My. & K. 564, which was
quoted with approval by Abdul Malek Ahmad FCJ (as he then
I
1034 Current Law Journal [2010] 2 CLJ
was) in Gooi Hock Seng v. Chuah Guat Khim [2001] 1 CLJ 583; A
see also Llyods Bank plc v. Ang Cheng Ho Quarry & Ors [1993] 2
CLJ 210 where taxing officer on quantum will not be interfered
with.
[23] However, this is not the end of the matter. There is another
issue to be resolved. Learned counsel for the auctioneer submitted
C that the proposed intervener has no locus standi to participate in
the taxation proceedings, let alone to challenge it. The argument
of learned counsel is simply this: Learned counsel for the
intervener had submitted that taxation of costs must be done
according to the provisions of O. 59 rr. 20 and 21 of the RHC,
D relying on Public Bank Berhad v. Er Cheng Chan (supra). Order 59
r. 21(2) states that the notice of taxation need not be given to
any party who has not entered appearance or taken any part in
the proceedings which gave rise to the taxation proceedings. In
this instant case, the intended intervener is not a party to this
E proceedings as he had not obtained leave to intervene and had
not taken any part in this proceedings.
Conclusion
[27] At best, only the sum of RM851 for actual out of pocket
expenses and RM804 pocket expenses and RM804 disbursement B
in the bill of cost are claimable but not the claim of
RM118,507.50 which the auctioneer clearly claimed as “Fees –
r. 5 of the Enactment” which the auctioneer was not entitled to.