Aris (Phils.) Inc. vs. NLRC [G.R. No. 905501.

August 05, 1991] HELD:

Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J. YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioners.
FACTS:
RATIO:
On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of
petitioner, aggrieved by management’s failure to attend to their Presumption against unconstitutionality. The validity of the
complaints concerning their working surroundings which had questioned law is not only supported and sustained by the
become detrimental and hazardous, requested for a grievance foregoing considerations. As contended by the Solicitor General, it is
conference. Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Certainly, if the
for illegal dismissal against petitioner with NLRC of NCR. After due right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to
trial, Aris (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate within ten (10) regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its permanent
days from receipt private respondents to their former respective police power on the theory that the preservation of the lives of the
positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already filled up, citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is more vital than the
without loss of seniority right and privileges but with limited preservation of corporate profits. Then, by and pursuant to the
backwages of six (6) months. Private respondents filed a Motion For same power, the State may authorize an immediate
Issuance of a Writ of Execution pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a
6715. Petitioner and complainants filed their own Appeals. dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed
to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the motion for execution alleging
favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival
that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending
or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and its
appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time
family.
of its effectivity because it does not expressly provide that it shall be
given retroactive effect and to give retroactive effect to Section 12 Moreover, the questioned interim rules of the NLRC can validly be
thereof to pending cases would not only result in the imposition of given retroactive effect. They are procedural or remedial in
an additional obligation on petitioner but would also dilute its right character, promulgated pursuant to the authority vested upon it
to appeal since it would be burdened with the consequences of under Article 218(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
reinstatement without the benefit of a final judgment. amended. Settled is the rule that procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect. There are no vested rights in rules of
ISSUE:
procedure. A remedial statute may be made applicable to cases
Whether or not the provision under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 is pending at the time of its enactment.
constitutional.
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 14560, 36 SCRA 394 (November Congress’ inability to so define the words employed in a
19, 2001) statute will not necessary result in the vagueness or
ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or
Facts:
at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the highest-ranking distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA
statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain, and ordinary
7659..
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature
2. Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct
Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with
line which divides the valid from the constitutionality infirm.
reference to every other part.
That there was a clear violations of the fundamental rights
of the accused to due process and to be informed of the There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the provisions of R.A.
nature and cause of the accusation. 7080

Issue/s: 2. No. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the
standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The
1. Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for
burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond
being vague.
any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to
2. Whether or not Plunder Law requires less evidence for constitute a crime.
providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is
violates the rights of the accused to due process.
only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at
prohibitum. least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every
other act alleged in the information to have been committed by the
Ruling: accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
1. No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
because general terms are used therein, or because of the 3. No. It is malum in se. The legislative declaration in RA No.
employment of terms without defining them. There is no 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it
 does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
especially since in the case of plunder that predicate crimes which he is charged.
are mainly mala in se.
 A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lack
Its abomination lies in the significance and implications of the comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for
Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and it leaves law
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
of corruption, dishonesty, green and syndicated criminality that so and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche muscle. The first may be “saved” by proper construction,
of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money while no challenge may be mounted as against the second
to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of whenever directed against such activities.
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn,
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
the very survival of people it governs over.
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
Note: understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the
“vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
 A statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
mathematical exactitude.
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by
the statute. It can only be invoked against the specie of A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or
construction. proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
 The “Reasonable Doubt” standard has acquired such
prosecution, the transcendent value of all society of constitutionally
exalted statute in the realm of constitutional law as it gives
protected expression is deemed to justify along attacks on overly
life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused
broad statutes with no requirement that the persons making the
against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by
a statute draw with narrow specificity. The possible harm to society MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR
This do not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL
terorrem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
of free speech.
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF
Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official PHILIPPINES through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR
to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS.
Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress
upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY
mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN
vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF
criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
cause of the accusation against him. EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS
OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED
CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST
HIM phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY LOWERING THE accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE
COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER Combination — the result or product of combining; the act or
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD AND relationship as to obscure individual characters.
TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN MALA IN SE CRIMES BY Series — a number of things or events of the same class coming
CONVERTING THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN VIOLATION OF THE one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
DUE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive
meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law. As for
otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan 9
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1,
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists
of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly,
Ratio: pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the
In view of vagueness and ambiguity public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or
its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general
as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public
whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. officer and others conniving with him, follow to achieve the
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall
words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused
ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those attain a common goal.
words 8 The intention of the lawmakers — who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers — to use statutory With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the
assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The acquittal.
test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series
understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every
certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not
give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.
Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for- In view of mens rea
vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza
formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion — . . . Precisely
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy
statute. that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty
knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In view of due process
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide
theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable even the most basic services to its people, any form of
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates
predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn,
only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this
scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this reasoning is obvious context, no less heinous are the effect and repercussions of crimes
even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug
in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the offenses involving government official, employees or officers, that
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction
and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond and damage to society. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an that are sought to be attained by its enactment. Viewed broadly,
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent "plunder involves not just plain thievery but economic depredation
wrongness of the acts. which affects not just private parties or personal interests but the
nation as a whole." Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of "a
crime against national interest which must be stopped, and if
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the possible, stopped permanently."
amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to
say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect
this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by In view of estoppel
People v. Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality
The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally of R.A. No. 7080. The case at bar has been subject to controversy
valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact that
necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral one of petitioner's counsels was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law
part of it. and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a
Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to question its
constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact,
In view of presumption of innocence not of law. Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a
At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is means of preventing injustice. To hold that petitioner is estopped
essentially judicial. To declare what the law shall be is a legislative from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had
power, but to declare what the law is or has been is judicial. earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not only to him,
Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be expected to spell out with but to all others who may be held liable under this statute.
mathematical precision how the law should be interpreted under
any and all given situations. The application of the law will depend
on the facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence which will What is RICO
then be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is a United
is the constitutionally mandated function of the courts to interpret, States federal law that provides for extended criminal penalties and
construe and apply the law as would give flesh and blood to the true a civil cause of action for acts performed as part of an ongoing
meaning of legislative enactments. criminal organization. RICO was enacted by section 901(a) of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used enacted October 15, 1970). RICO is codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18
in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968. While its
which the statute was enacted and that tends to defeat the ends intended use was to prosecute the Mafia as well as others who
were actively engaged in organized crime, its application has been which are easily clarified by judicial construction, petitioner has, at
more widespread. best, managed merely to point out alleged ambiguities. Far from
establishing, by clear and unmistakable terms, any patent and
glaring conflict with the Constitution, the constitutional challenge to
In view of facial challenge the Anti-Plunder law must fail. For just as the accused is entitled to
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to the presumption of innocence in the absence of proof beyond
one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon reasonable doubt, so must a law be accorded the presumption of
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or constitutionality without the same requisite quantum of proof.
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single Petitioner now concludes that the Anti-Plunder Law "eliminates
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally proof of each and every component criminal act of plunder by the
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly accused and limits itself to establishing just the pattern of over or
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the criminal acts indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy."
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by
a statute drawn with narrow specificity.' All told, the above explanation is in consonance with what is often
perceived to be the reality with respect to the crime of plunder —
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes that "the actual extent of the crime may not, in its breadth and
have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, entirety, be discovered, by reason of the 'stealth and secrecy' in
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State which it is committed and the involvement of 'so many persons here
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful and abroad and [the fact that it] touches so many states and
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as territorial units."'
in the area of free speech.
"The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification
of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
In view of burden of proof (accused) according to PANGANIBAN, J. Constitution, not a doubtful or argumentative implication; a law
In sum, the law must be proven to be clearly and unequivocally shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution
repugnant to the Constitution before this Court may declare its is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. 'The presumption is always in
unconstitutionality. To strike down the law, there must be a clear favor of constitutionality . . . To doubt is to sustain.'
showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute
allows to be done. 40 To justify the nullification of the law, there
must be a clear, unequivocal breach of the Constitution; not a In view of burden of proof (State) according to KAPUNAN, J.
doubtful, argumentative implication. 41 Of some terms in the law The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural
due process as well as the right of the accused to be informed of the have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to
nature and cause of the accusation against him. A criminal statute constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" The meanings
should not be so vague and uncertain that "men of common of "combination" and "series" as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not
intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to clear.
its application. There are three distinct considerations for the
vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure that To quote Fr. Bernas again: "How can you have a 'series' of
individuals are properly warned ex ante of the criminal criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the
consequences of their conduct. This "fair notice" rationale was series are not proved to be criminal?" Because of this, it is easier to
articulated in United States v. Harriss: The constitutional convict for plunder and sentence the accused to death than to
requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that convict him for each of the component crimes otherwise punishable
fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his under the Revised Penal Code and other laws which are bailable
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart if the
principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be
proscribed. The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being
inherently wrongful and immoral, are patently mala in se, even if
While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does not require punished by a special law and accordingly, criminal intent must
Congress to spell out with mathematical certainty the standards to clearly be established together with the other elements of the
which an individual must conform his conduct, it is necessary that crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. By eliminating mens rea,
statutes provide reasonable standards to guide prospective R.A. 7080 does not require the prosecution to prove beyond
conduct. And where a statute imposes criminal sanctions, the reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder and
standard of certainty is higher. The penalty imposable on the person imposes a lesser burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paying
found guilty of violating R.A. No. 7080 is reclusion perpetua to the way for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. Given such penalty, the standard of clarity and definiteness death on the accused, in plain violation of the due process and
required of R.A. No. 7080 is unarguably higher than that of other equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
laws.
It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous law as
It has been incorrectly suggested that petitioner cannot mount a R.A. No. 7080 would put on the balance the life and liberty of the
"facial challenge" to the Plunder Law, and that "facial" or "on its accused against whom all the resources of the State are arrayed. It
face" challenges seek the total invalidation of a statute. Fr. Bernas, could be used as a tool against political enemies and a weapon of
for his part, pointed to several problematical portions of the law hate and revenge by whoever wields the levers of power.
that were left unclarified. He posed the question: "How can you
 constitutionally subject to regulation may not be achieved by means
In view of due process according to YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
It is an ancient maxim in law that in times of frenzy and protected freedoms. 9
excitement, when the desire to do justice is tarnished by anger and A statute, especially one involving criminal prosecution, must be
vengeance, there is always the danger that vital protections definite to be valid. A statute is vague or overbroad, in violation of
accorded an accused may be taken away. the due process clause, where its language does not convey
sufficiently definite warning to the average person as to the
Substantive due process dictates that there should be no prohibited conduct. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if people
arbitrariness, unreasonableness or ambiguity in any law which of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.
deprives a person of his life or liberty. The trial and other
procedures leading to conviction may be fair and proper. But if the In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the
law itself is not reasonable legislation, due process is violated. Thus, criminal intent is an important element of the criminal acts. Under
an accused may not be sentenced to suffer the lethal injection or the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are committed. Equally
life imprisonment for an offense understood only after judicial disagreeable is the provision of the Plunder Law which does away
construction takes over where Congress left off, and interpretation with the requirement that each and every component of the
supplies its meaning. criminal act of plunder be proved and instead limits itself to proving
only a pattern of overt acts indicative of the unlawful scheme or
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural conspiracy. 18 In effect, the law seeks to penalize the accused only
due process as well as the right of the accused to be informed of the on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy, and does away with
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Substantive due the rights of the accused insofar as the component crimes are
process requires that a criminal statute should not be vague and concerned. In other words, R.A. No. 7080 circumvents the obligation
uncertain. More explicitly — That the terms of a penal statute. . . of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt every fact
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it necessary to constitute the crime of plunder, because the law
what conduct on their part will render them liable to penalties, is a requires merely proof of a pattern of overt acts showing an unlawful
well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions scheme or conspiracy.
of fair play and the settled rules of law. And a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of I agree with petitioner's concern over the danger that the trial
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and court may allow the specifications of details in an information to
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process. validate a statute inherently void for vagueness. An information
cannot rise higher than the statute upon which it is based. Not even
In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a the construction by the Sandiganbayan of a vague or ambiguous
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities provision can supply the missing ingredients of the Plunder Law. The
right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the reasonable doubt.
accusation against him is most often exemplified in the care with
which a complaint or information should be drafted. However, the In short, all that R.A. No. 7080 requires is that each Justice must
clarity and particularity required of an information should also be be convinced of the existence of a "combination or series." As to
present in the law upon which the charges are based. If the penal which criminal acts constitute a combination or series, the Justices
law is vague, any particularity in the information will come from the need not be in full agreement. Surely, this would cover-up a wide
prosecutor. The prosecution takes over the role of Congress. disagreement among them about just what the accused actually did
or did not do. Stated differently, even if the Justices are not unified
in their determination on what criminal acts were actually
In view of vagueness according to SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. committed by the accused, which need not be proved under the
As a basic premise, we have to accept that even a person accused law, still, they could convict him of plunder.
of a crime possesses inviolable rights founded on the Constitution
which even the welfare of the society as a whole cannot override. The Special Prosecution Division Panel defines it as "at least three
The rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution are not subject to of the acts enumerated under Section 1(d) thereof." 33 But it can
political bargaining or to the calculus of social interest. Thus, no very well be interpreted as only one act repeated at least three
matter how socially-relevant the purpose of a law is, it must be times. And the Office of the Solicitor General, invoking the
nullified if it tramples upon the basic rights of the accused. deliberations of the House of Representatives, contends differently.
It defines the term series as a "repetition" or pertaining to "two or
When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be more."
necessary for the prosecution to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused, the legislature, in effect, rendered the A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital
enumerated "criminal acts" under Section 1 (d) merely as means punishment on acts already punished with lesser penalties by
and not as essential elements of plunder. This is constitutionally clearly formulated law is unconstitutional. The vagueness cannot be
infirmed and repugnant to the basic idea of justice and fair play. As cured by judicial construction.
a matter of due process, the prosecution is required to prove
beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the In fine, I can only stress that the one on trial here is not Mr.
crime with which the defendant is charged. The State may not Estrada, but R.A. No. 7080. The issue before this Court is not the
specify a lesser burden of proof for an element of a crime. 8 With guilt or innocence of the accused, but the constitutionality of the
more reason, it should not be allowed to go around the principle by law. I vote to grant the petition, not because I favor Mr. Estrada, but
characterizing an essential element of plunder merely as a "means" because I look beyond today and I see that this law can pose a
of committing the crime. For the result is the reduction of the serious threat to the life, liberty and property of anyone who may
burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond come under its unconstitutional provisions. As a member of this
Court, my duty is to see to it that the law conforms to the offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was
Constitution and no other. I simply cannot, in good conscience, denied.
fortify a law that is patently unconstitutional.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No.
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560. 26558 finding that a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists
November 19, 2001 to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.

FACTS: Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558
on the ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder
indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information
Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
for Plunder charged more than one offense. Same was denied.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2
billions of pesos through any or a combination or a series of overt or
and 4 of the Plunder Law which states that:
criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property,
of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
him:
business associates by any combination or series of the following
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness means or similar schemes:

2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal (1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation
prosecutions of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable (2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
under The Revised Penal Code. percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
separate Informations against petitioner. office concerned;
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of (3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
corporations and their subsidiaries; favor of the State (underscoring supplied).

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
including the promise of future employment in any business criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
enterprise or undertaking; conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
ISSUE:
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
HELD:
and the Republic of the Philippines.
NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public
that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
amended information itself closely tracks the language of the law,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.
acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion will confuse petitioner in his defense.
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to
due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
terms without defining them.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
S. ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners,
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most
vs.
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA;
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR
respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
PURISIMA; and HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., Respondent.
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one

which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon
protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some Facts:
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6,
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National
effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned provisions contain
take chances as in the area of free speech. a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation
of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective
January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs Executive Secretary satisfied, to wit:
Bills Must Originate EXCLUSIVELY from the House of . . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
Representatives; Undue Delegation of Legislative Power; Equal of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-
Protection Clause added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following
conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic 2. Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative
Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth power in violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the
percent (2 4/5%); or Constitution.

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the 3. Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and
previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%). equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes

abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of
Discussions:
taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale 1. Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law,
or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to
the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives, but
refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise Senate has the power not only to propose amendments, but
to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported also to propose its own version even with respect to bills
goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause, which are required by the Constitution to originate in the
influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about House. the Constitution simply means is that the initiative
the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an
standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any application must come from the House of Representatives
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts,
aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the the members of the House can be expected to be more
latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other
to impose the increased tax rate or not. hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected
to approach the same problems from the national
perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
Issues: enactment of such laws.

1. Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in 2. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue
Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
Constitution. whether the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that
 nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be
delegate of the legislature. raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection,
the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a
3. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means
rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent
that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons
arbitrariness.
or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.”

Rulings: Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 94723. August
21, 1997)
1. R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue
bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father
the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR.,
introduce amendments to the House bill when it included and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners,
provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate vs.
income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT,respondents.
any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the
Ponente: TORRES, JR.
amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the
House revenue bill. FACTS:
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only Respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed
of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is and lured the 12-year old petitioner Karen Salvacion to go with him
constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its in his apartment where the former repeatedly raped latter. After
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what the rescue, policemen recovered dollar and peso checks including a
job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of foreign currency deposit from China Banking Corporation (CBC).
his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the Writ of preliminary attachment and hold departure order were
only way in which the legislative process can go forward. issued. Notice of Garnishment was served by the Deputy Sheriff to
CBC which later invoked R.A. No. 1405 as its answer to it. Deputy
3. Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power
Sheriff sent his reply to CBC saying that the garnishment did not
of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications
violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely
for the purposes of taxation has long been established.
incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a
Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
court order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia
legis. CBC replied and invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular “Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de
No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of Greg Bartelli are otro.” Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any vehement urge of conscience. It would be unthinkable, that the
administrative body, whatsoever. Central Bank of the Philippines questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a
affirmed the defense of CBC. device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing,
acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
ISSUE:
Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here?
Whether or not Sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 and Sec. 8 of
Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of
RA 6426 amended by PD 1246 otherwise known as the “Foreign
the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the
Currency Deposit Act” be made applicable to a foreign transient.
foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a
HELD: transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of
a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny.
NO. The provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No.
1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby
held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar
Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Padua (G.R. No. L-
circumstances.
72873. May 28, 1987)
RATIO:
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
[T]he application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
vs.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is
applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This
would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that Ponente: CRUZ
“in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is FACTS:
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail. Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a
parcel of land registered in ‘the name of their deceased parents.
One of them transferred his undivided share by way of absolute
sale. A year later, his sister sold her share in a “Con Pacto de Retro redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
Sale”. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot,
While [courts] may not read into the law a purpose that is not there,
representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently
[courts] nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for
enclosed the same with a fence. with their consent, their son
its enactment. In doing so, [courts] defer not to “the letter that
Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part
killeth” but to “the spirit that vivifieth,” to give effect to the law
of the enclosed area.
maker’s will.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to
petitioners but was dismissed when it appeared that he was an
American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking Facts:
the same right of redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed
the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having
been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed
there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all
the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. public officials of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede.
Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court. There respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019
ISSUE: (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170
(falsification of legislative documents) and 171 (falsification by
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. public officers) of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code
1088 of the New Civil Code. of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). The respondent
officials were allegedly causing alteration of Ordinance No. 018/92
HELD:
by increasing the allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M without
YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue.
court reinstated.
The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
RATIO: on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of
jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales
against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code
although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt
of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative
either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years
sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their
between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the
President. On September 1992, a TRO against Hagad was filed and
granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose
enforcing suspension. preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at
that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it
Issue:
became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of
Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the
of 1898) has been divested of his authority extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991
to conduct administrative investigations over local elective official (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already
by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160. prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the
Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the
Held: President.
No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to
RA 6770 is not removed by LG Code of 1991.
Berces, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 112099.
There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it February 21,1995)
has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent
provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner,
matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, vs.
as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF
settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR
favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents
application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a
Ponente: QUIASON
clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied
repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, FACTS:
interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e.,
Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two
every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with
administrative cases against respondent incumbent Mayor and
other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
obtained favorable decision suspending the latter. Respondent
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have
Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the
known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution in
conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any
accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code
implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to
(LGC). The Office of the President thru the Executive Secretary
harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.
directed “stay of execution”. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Mecano vs. COA (G.R. No. 103982. December 11, 1992)
Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with
vs.
grave abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
(1991) impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18
(1987). Ponente: CAMPOS, JR.
ISSUE: FACTS:
Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground
Administrative Order No. 18. that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA)
HELD:
Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied petitioner’s claim on the
NO. Petition was dismissed. “Stay of execution” applied. ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292), solely for
RATIO:
the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an “appeal the latter. Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of
shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory.” As Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that “the
worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or
to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA,
decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the
officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its
appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 entirety the RAC.
of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct
ISSUE:
language expressive of such intention.
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the
abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.
condition that a substantial conflict must be found between the
new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a HELD:
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on
an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of
petitioner’s claim for benefits.
the new and old laws.
RATIO:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute Issue: Whether or not R.A. 7166 repeal section 231 of the Omnibus
of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the Election Code saying that the winners should be proclaimed by the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention Board of Canvassers.
must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there
Held: No, since R.A. 7166 neither expressly or impliedly repealed
must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent
section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code.
in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention
to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a
general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of,
and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the TATAD VS DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. G.R. No. 124360 and 127867. November 5, 1997
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner,
statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against
inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to vs.
know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE
inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
pari materia.

Case Title: Florezil Agujetas and Salvador Bijis, petitioner v. Court of

Appeals and the People of the Philippines, respondents Facts:

G.R. No. 106560, August 23, 1996 The petitioner question the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 “An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.”
The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase
Facts: The petitioner assail the decision of the public respondent and the (b) full deregulation phase through EO No. 372.
Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an
Court of Mati, Davao Oriental finding them guilty as charged for undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Sec.
failure to proclaim a winning elected candidate. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining
when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard to
determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are “There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is
considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test
to the US dollar is considered stable. and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he
Issues: will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map
1. Whether or not Sec 5(b) of R.A. 8180 violates the one title out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
one subject requirement of the Constitution. delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a
2. Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power. allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
3. Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies, combinations in restraint of 3. A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in
trade and unfair competition one or more persons or companies, consisting in the
exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or
trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or
the whole supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of
market structure in which one or only a few firms dominate
the total sales of a product or service. On the other hand, a
combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or
Discussions:
understanding between two or more persons, in the form of
1. The Court consistently ruled that the title need not mirror, a contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of
fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a association, for the purpose of unduly restricting
law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain
title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how commodity, controlling its production, distribution and
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade
with or foreign to the general subject, and may be without statutory authority. Combination in restraint of
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for trade refers to the means while monopoly refers to the end.
the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

2. Adopting the ruling from Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs.

POEA, the Court states that:
 mandates: “The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies
when the public interest so requires. No combinations in
Rulings:
restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.”
1. The Court does not concur with this contention. The Court
has adopted a liberal construction of the one title – one
subject rule. The Court hold that section 5(b) providing for LIDASAN VS. COMELEC
tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180
FACTS
which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
The section is supposed to sway prospective investors to RA No. 4790 entitled “ An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton
put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on in the province of Lanao del Sur ‘, was signed into law and came to
imported petroleum.[i][20] We shall, however, return to the light later that barrios mentioned in the body of that statue are
validity of this provision when we examine its blocking within the municipalities of the Province of Cotabato and not of
effect on new entrants to the oil market. Lanao del Sur only. Prompted by the coming elections, COMELEC
adopted its resolutions for the purposes of establishments of
2. Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the completeness test
precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes. The
and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted that
Office of the President recommended the COMELEC that the
Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full
operation of the statue be suspended until “ clarified by correcting
deregulation will start at the end of March 1997, regardless
legislation”. COMELEC stood by its own interpretion, hence this
of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end
motion by Bara Lidasan as a resident, taxpayer and a qualified voter
of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no
of Parang Cotabato.
discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus,
the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to
advance the date of full deregulation before the end of ISSUE
March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the Whether or not the title of the statue conforms with the
judgment of the President. He is to time it as far as constitutional requirement.
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is
stable.
HELD
3. Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly
violated by the aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180
No. The title of RA No. 4790 projects the impression that solely the We Will Write a Custom Essay Specifically
province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. For You For Only $13.90/page!
Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the
adjacent Province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao
ORDER NOW
del Sur town. Such title did not inform the people in towns in
Cotabato and the province itself that part of their territory is being This events triggered the original action for certiorari and
taken away and added to the adjacent province of Lanao del Sur. prohibition filed by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the
Transfer of sizable territory from one province to another is as detached portion of Parang Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the
important as the creation of a municipality, yet, the title did not 1967 elections. Affected by the implementation of RA 4790, Lidasan
reflect this fact. The legislative purpose is not expressed in the title, now questions the constitutionality of the said Act. ISSUE: Is
hence RA No. 4790 is null void. Republic Act 4790 valid considering that such Act creates a
Municipality which includes barrios from another province. HELD:
Lidasan vs. Comelec GR NO. L-280892 Petioner: BARA LIDASAN
RA 4790 is declared NULL and VOID. 1. Constitutional requirement
Respondent: COMELEC FACTS: The Chief Executive signed the House
“no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than
Bill 1247 which is now known to be Republic Act 4790, “An Act
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”.
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur”. Such new Municipality includes 21 barrios, 9 of which are from This provision imposes limitations upon the legislative power. a.
Lanao del Sur, and the other 12 are from Cotabato. (From Lanao: Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,Dagowan,Bakikis, Bungabung, heterogenous subjects. b. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung and From Cotabato: Togaig, language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. These were
Magabo,Tangabao,Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamawakan). all not complied with because the title of the Act provides that it is
“An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
The Comelec, prompted by the coming election adopted the
Lanao del Sur”.
resolution which provides for the barrios that will be included in
Lanao del Sur. Apprised by this happening, the Office of the The part which says “in the Province of Lanao del Sur” projects that
President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended it is just Lanao del Sur which is affected by the creation of Dianaton,
to the Comelec that the said resolution be suspended until clarified where in truth it also affects barrios in two municipalities of
by the correcting legislation. But the Comelec stood by its own Cotabato. Therefore, the Court finds the title deceptive for the Act
interpretation, and declared that the RA 4790 should be has actually two purposes , and those are : 1. ) to create the
implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme municipality of Dianaton allegedly from twenty-one barrios in the
Court. towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur;
and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the
province different from Lanao del Sur. last regular barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong
Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. At least
The title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full
29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the
impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of
25% requirement provided by law. Acting on the petition for recall,
Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato
public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to
itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their
approve the petition and set recall election date. To prevent the
towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao
holding of recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and
Court a petition for injunction which was later dismissed. Petitioner
provinces were actually affected by the bill. Thus, the limitations on
filed petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction,
the provision of one subject in a bill and the requirement as to the
insisting that the recall election is barred by the Sangguniang
language of the bill were violated.
Kabataan (SK) election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government Code
Removal of the barrios of Cotabato included in the new municipality (LGC) which states that “no recall shall take place within one (1) year
of Dianaton will not treat the defects of the Act and shall still render from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year
the Act unconstitutional because the valid part is not independent immediately preceding a regular local election“.
of the invalid portion. DISSENTING OPINION Fernando, J. 1. The
ISSUE:
subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton and it was
clearly embodied in the title. 2. The legislature is not required to Whether or not the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to
make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. SK elections, where the recall election is for Barangay post.

HELD:

Paras vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996) NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and
academic.
16APR
RATIO:
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,
vs. Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the
prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year
Ponente: FRANCISCO
immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription
FACTS: is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of
the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose
the official’s replacement in the said election who certainly has a
longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall G.R. No. 123169
election.
Facts:
It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall
Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City
provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one
in 1994. Sometime in October 1995, A petition for his recall as
referring to an election where the office held by the local elective
Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent
official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the
COMELEC resolved to approve the petition and set the recall
electorate.
election on November 13. In view of the petitioner’s opposition,
By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it on December 16,
the limitation stated under the same Section 74(b) now referred to 1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place, the
as Barangay Elections. petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial
court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court
CONCURRING OPINION:
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. The public
DAVIDE: respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996, rescheduled the
recall election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for
A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an certiorari. The petitioner argues the pursuant to Section 74b of the
election participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, Local Government code: “no recall shall take place within one (1)
are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1)
voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now
least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he barred (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 1996.
be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration
prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118).

Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 Issue:
to 21 (Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the
include many who are not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz.,
provisions of Section 74b of the Local Government Code.
those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK
elections be considered a regular election (whether national or
local).
Held:
PARAS v COMELEC
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute deficiency, P367,994.00, and ESSOs earlier overpayment of
must be interpreted with reference to the context, that every part P221,033.00 (for which it had been granted a tax credit). ESSO thus
of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, asked for a refund. The Internal Revenue Commissioner denied the
and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. claim for refund. ESSO appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals which
Paras’ interpretation of the law is too literal that it does not accord ordered payment to ESSO of its refund-claim representing overpaid
with the intentions of the authors of the law. The spirit rather that interest.
the letters of a law determines its construction. Hence, it was held
The Commissioner argued the tax credit of P221,033.00 was
that the “regular local election” refers to an election where the
approved only on year 1964, it could not be availed of in reduction
office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled.
of ESSOs earlier tax deficiency for the year 1960; as of that year,
1960, there was as yet no tax credit to speak of, which would
reduce the deficiency tax liability for 1960. In support of his
CIR vs ESSO Standard Eastern (G.R. No. L-28502-03. April 18, 1989)
position, the Commissioner invokes the provisions of Section 51 of
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, the Tax Code.
vs.
ISSUE:
ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC. and THE COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, respondents. Whether or not the interest on delinquency should be applied on
the full tax deficiency of P367,994.00 despite the existence of
Ponente: NARVASA
overpayment in the amount of P221,033.00.
FACTS:
HELD:
Respondent overpaid its 1959 income tax by P221,033.00. It was
NO. Petition was denied. Decision of CTA was affirmed.
granted a tax credit by the Commissioner accordingly on 1964.
However, ESSOs payment of its income tax for 1960 was found to be RATIO:
short by P367,994.00. The Commissioner (of Internal Revenue)
The fact is that, as respondent Court of Tax Appeals has stressed, as
wrote to ESSO demanding payment of the deficiency tax, together
early as 1960, the Government already had in its hands the sum of
with interest thereon for the period from 1961 to 1964. ESSO paid
P221,033.00 representing excess payment. Having been paid and
under protest the amount alleged to be due, including the interest
received by mistake, as petitioner Commissioner subsequently
as reckoned by the Commissioner. It protested the computation of
acknowledged, that sum unquestionably belonged to ESSO, and the
interest, contending it was more than that properly due. It claimed
Government had the obligation to return it to ESSO That
that it should not have been required to pay interest on the total
acknowledgment of the erroneous payment came some four (4)
amount of the deficiency tax, P367,994.00, but only on the amount
years afterwards in nowise negates or detracts from its actuality.
of P146,961.00—representing the difference between said
The obligation to return money mistakenly paid arises from the of the Ombudsman since his messenger had to attend to some
moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the personal matters which the latter complied. Before proceeding to
payee admits the obligation to reimburse.The obligation to return the office of the Ombudsman, he talked to Oscar Perez and the
money mistakenly paid arises from the moment that payment is latter advised him that he could sign his name if ever he would be
made, and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. When he arrived
to reimburse. The obligation of the payee to reimburse an amount at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City, he was asked to sign
paid to him results from the mistake, not from the payee’s his name on a log book and instead of writing his own name, he
confession of the mistake or recognition of the obligation to wrote “Oscar Perez”, afterwhich he proceeded to the Administrative
reimburse. Division and hand in the letter to Loida Kahulugan, Chief of the
Administrative Division in order to get a furnished copy of the
A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead
complaint. Before petitioner left, he was greeted by an
to absurd results. Statutes should receive a sensible construction,
acquaintance and from there Loida learned that the one who
such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid
introduced his name as Oscar Perez is actually the petitioner himself
an unjust or absurd conclusion.
so the latter reported the matter immediately to
the Deputy Ombudsman who ordered that petitioner be accordingly
charged.
CESARIO URSUA, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents On December 18,1990 petitioner without leave of court filed a
G.R. No. 112170. April 10,1996. demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to
prove that his supposed alias was different from
Facts: his registered name was fatal to its cause. Petitioner contends that
On May 9,1989, provincial governor of Cotabato requested the no document from the civil registry was presented to show
Office of the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation regarding the registered name of the accused which according to him was a
bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.The RTC
benefits and it was found out that the petitioner Cesario Ursua, a rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec.1 of
Community Environment and Natural Resources officer was Commonwealth Act No.142 as amended by R.A. No.6085. On May
involved in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and illegally-cut 31,1993, The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the said
logs in the area. So, a complaint was filed against him which was petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the C.A. contending that he has
initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. not violated C.A. No.142 as amended by R.A. No.6085 as he never
used any alias name, he only used such name on one occasion with
On August 1 1989, Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, an express consent of Oscar Perez himself.
wrote to the Office of the Ombudsman to furnished him a copy of
the complaint and asked petitioner to bring that letter to the Office Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has violated Sec.1 of Commonwealth Act CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,
No.142 as amended by R.A.6085 or otherwise known as An Act to vs.
Regulate the Use of Aliases. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Ruling:
Ponente: BELLOSILO
No, the petitioner did not violateSec.1 of C.A No.142 as amended by
R.A. 6085. The court ruled that there is no evidence showing that he FACTS:
had used or was intending to used that name in addition to his real
Petitioner wrote the name “Oscar Perez” in the visitor’s logbook and
name. That name was used in an isolated transaction where he was
used the same in receiving the copy of a complaint against him at
not even legally required to expose his real identity. While the act
the Office of the Ombudsman. This was discovered and reported to
may be covered by other provisions of law, it does not constitute an
the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that the petitioner be
offense within the concept of C.A. No.142
accordingly charged. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of
Section 1 of Commonwealth ActNo.142 provides that except as a violating Sec.1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085
pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases“. The
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of a Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with some modification of
pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any sentence.
name different from the one which he was registered at birth in the
ISSUE:
office of the civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first
time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the Whether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within
Bureau of Immigration upon entry, or such substitute name as may the prohibition of Commonwealth Act No. 142.
have been authorized by a competent court provided, that persons
whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and HELD:
who have not been baptized, have one one year from the approval NO. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that
of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of of the RTC was reversed and set aside and petitioner was acquitted
their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and of the crime charged
one or two surnames.
RATIO:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner CESARIO URSUA is acquitted of the crime charged. [A]n alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be
used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions
Ursua vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112170. April 10, 1996) in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or
baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a
competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No.
by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which 229 which requires an early warning device to be carried by users of
they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several motor vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of
different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a due process and transgresses the fundamental principle of non-
fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a delegation of legislative power.
single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends
Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land
to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day
Transportation Commisioner set forth the implementing rules and
forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142
regulations of the said instruction.
as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen
Time and again [courts] have decreed that statutes are to be
Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when it came
construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils
out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which
sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for
could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the
its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be
emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as
construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The
amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in
court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a
Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation
literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
Commission,"
would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of
patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make
law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A.
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car
No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. Moreover, as
owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early
C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against
warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." are
the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is
unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a
the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object
compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory
is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would
on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical
be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.
alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified
set of Early Warning Device (EWD)."

AGUSTIN V. EDU - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent
accidents on streets and highways, including expressways or limited
AGUSTIN V. EDU G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
access roads caused by the presence of disabled, stalled or parked
FACTS: motor vehicles without appropriate early warning devices. The
hazards posed by these disabled vehicles are recognized by The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an
international bodies concerned with traffic safety. The Philippines is attitude which is, moreoever, at war with the principle of
a signatory of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and international morality.
Signals and the United Nations Organizations and the said Vienna
Petition dismissed.
Convention was ratified by the Philippine Government under PD
207. AGUSTIN vs EDU
ISSUE:

WON the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of Facts:
due process.
The letter of instruction providing for an early warning device for
HELD: motor vehicles is being assailed in the case at bar as being violative
of the constitutional guarantee of due process. Petitioner contends
NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police
that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel
power and there was no unlawful delegation of legislative power on
and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one‐sided,
the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state
onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make
authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or
manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car
property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the
owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so‐called early
particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote
warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are
public safety.
unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a
It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory
Constitution possesses relevance: “The Philippines adopts the on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified
of the nation.” set of EWD's."

Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this

country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its
Held:
word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of
legislative ratification of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions
thru P.D. No. 207 .
Petitioner’s contention is erroneous because the Letter of
Instruction was issued in the exercise of the police power which is
“nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty.” In the leading case of Calalang v. Williams, FACTS:
Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact
The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).
order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could
thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order for  On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued
the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.’ This transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local
doctrine was later reiterated again in Primicias v. Fugoso which government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
referred police power as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or  On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of
safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled “An
forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The
decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State which Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain
welfare of society.’ Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes.”
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could  On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued
be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled “Revoking
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or
narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or
with the well-being of the nation. What are critical or urgent Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling”, in Section 3
changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits
suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the issued by local governments.
conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to
intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and Amusement
to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which
calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.” expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all
forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments.
ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
Lim vs. Pacquing [G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995] ISSUE:
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and
non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
FACTS:
HELD:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to amend
NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional. Constitution, to lift term limits of elective officials, by people’s
initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said
RATIO:
people’s initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The
Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on proposition is: “Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all
record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, elective government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 )
altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article 8
(when the executive still exercised legislative powers). of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” Said Petition for
Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued by at least 12% total number of registered voters in the country, it
existence of ADC’s franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the
Court’s First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot
have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition.
only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section
Petitioners Sen. Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition
4(2) of the Constitution.
on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
And on the question of whether or not the government cognizable by the COMELEC.
is estopped from contesting ADC’s possession of a valid franchise,
a. Constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the
the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v.
Congress. No such law has been passed.b. Republic Act No. 6735
Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
provides for 3 systems on initiative but failed to provide any subtitle
on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative. This deliberate omission indicates matter of people’s
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 127325, March 19, initiative was left to some future law.c. COMELEC has no power to
1997 - Case Digest provide rules and regulations for the exercise of people’s initiative.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term
limits constitutes a revision.e. Congress nor any government agency SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the
has not yet appropriated funds for people’s initiative. Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on
the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of the
ISSUE:
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the Constitution.
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main
HELD: thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. The argument that the initiative on amendments to the
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 Constitution is not accepted to be subsumed under the subtitle on
National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope.
Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based on the scope
It was intended to include or cover people’s initiative on of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character.
amendments to the Constitution but, as worded, it does not
adequately cover such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987 National initiative – what is proposed to be enacted is a national
Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self- law, or a law which only Congress can pass.
executory. While the Constitution has recognized or granted the Local initiative – what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law,
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the ordinance or resolution which only legislative bodies of the
Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. municipalities, and barangays can pass.

Potestas delegata non delegari potest

FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act
does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
The inclusion of the word “Constitution” therein was a delayed What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized
afterthought. The word is not relevant to the section which is silent exceptions to the rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the
as to amendments of the Constitution. President; [2] Delegation of emergency powers to the President; [3]
Delegation to the people at large; [4] Delegation to local
governments; and [5] Delegation to administrative bodies.
 establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the
publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the
COMELEC
1987 Constitution.

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi

DELFIN PETITION
judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of
delegation of legislative authority. In every case of permissible
delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth
OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by
be conceded ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full compliance with the
the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are
power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional
sufficiently determinate and determinable – to which the delegate
amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the
must conform in the performance of his functions. Republic Act No.
power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No.
6735 failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.
2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave
The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300

The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required
number of voters. Without the required signatures, the petition
cannot be deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC requires
Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void. COMELEC
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is
cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have
that power under Republic Act No. 6735.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or
over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order: (a) fixing the given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The petition was merely
time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothing more than a
election officers to assist Delfin’s movement and volunteers in mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the
Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and attached “Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in
the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their newspapers of general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing
memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to
it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at
discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources. the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin
asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to
Defensor-Santiago vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997)
amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid
25APR exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No.
6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.
ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
ISSUE:
vs.
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative
CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution
People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action No. 2300 is valid. .
(PIRMA), respondents.
HELD:
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG
KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence
BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), in subtitles simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors. provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR. the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are
FACTS: declared void.

Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on RATIO:

Elections (COMELEC) a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A.
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” (Delfin No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the
Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
(2) Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the
omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend PUNO, concurring and dissenting
the Constitution was left to some future law.
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only Justice Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin
after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No.
before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and
only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing cannot implement the people’s initiative to amend the Constitution.
of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has
issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA
on the total number of registered voters in each legislative concur)
district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
VITUG, concurring and dissenting
establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its
election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for
voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’ identification cards used in the clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe
immediately preceding election. the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for
constitutional amendments.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. [T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is
6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained made permanent under the ponencia should be held to cover only
or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as having
Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the
any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the
Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not constitutional mandate on people initiative.
assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was
merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting
nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide
been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 has prepared a scholarly and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I
December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate
to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)
discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissenting
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing
for the majority, holds that:

(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion in entertaining the “initiatory” Delfin Petition.

(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to “be directly

proposed by the people through initiative,” there is no
implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is “incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.”

(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, “insofar as it prescribes rules and

regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void.”

I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory grounds above-mentioned only the eliminating all remarks made
petition can show the required number of signatures — in this case, about the action and conduct of the Acting Secretary of Justice, said
12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in
motions are hereby denied. Avance?C. J., Street and Ostrand, JJ.,
every legislative district — no public funds may be spent and no
adhering tot he dissenting opinion heretofore promulgated, concur
government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the
Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition nevertheless in this resolution.
absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from
Eugenio v. drillon
the majority’s two other rulings.
Facts.

On May 10, 1972, Prospero Palmiano purchased on installment

basis from Florencio Eugenio and his co-owner/ developer Fermin

Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City. The Delta
Village Homeowners' Association, Inc. complained to the

National Housing Authority for non-development of their

subdivision and the NHA rendere...d a resolution on January 17,
1979
ordering Florencio Eugenio to cease and desist from making furthur Whether or not the petition of the Executive Secretary did not
sales of lots in said village or any project owned by him. Prospero abuse his discretion and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive
effect so
Palmiano filed a complaint case against against Eugenio because,
Eugenio sold a lot to the spouses, Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo. as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in
1976.
Palmiano alleged that he suspended his payments because of the
failure to develop the village. Held.

On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the The Court ruled that the Executive Secretary did not abuse his
right of Eugenio to cancel the contract with private respondent discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to

and dismissed Palmiano's complaint. cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.

On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA Stat Con relation:
and, applying P.D. 957, ordered Eugenio to complete the
The relation is that the statute was enacted to protect small lot
subdivision development and to reinstatem Palmiano's purchase owners from abuses of subdivision and developers. The principle of
contract over one lot, and as to the other. The Executive Secretary
social justice was adhered by giving the law retroactivity effect.
Franklin Drilon, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC and
denied the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit
People vs. Hon. Vicente Echavez, Jr. (G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 January
and for having been filed out of time. Eugenio filed a Petition for
28, 1980)
review before the Supreme Court.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th
In his Petition before this Court, Eugenio avers that the Executive
Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as
Secretary erred in applying P.D. 957 and in concluding that the non-
complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
development of the E & S Delta Village justified Palmiano’s non- vs.
payment of his amortizations. Eugenio avers that inasmuch as the HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN,
land purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the
MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S
effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot govern the
SUELLO, respondents.
transaction.
Ponente: AQUINO
Issue.
FACTS: The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by
the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the
Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations
decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban
against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized
communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule
by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before the accused could be
of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which
arraigned, respondent Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an
is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.
omnibus order dismissing the five informations (out of 16 raffled)
on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the
land through “stealth and strategy”, whereas under the decree the
City of Baguio v. Marcos G.R. No. L-26100. February 28, 1969
entry should be effected “with the use of force, intimidation or
threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio
landowner”, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral proceedings. In November
decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. From the 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land involved was the
order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Baguio Townsite which was declared public land. In July 25, 1961,
Act No. 5440. Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case on the following
grounds: 1) he and his predecessors have been in continuous
ISSUE:
possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times; 2) his
Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their
acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands. claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita
Buchholz opposed Lutes’ reopening on the following grounds: 1) the
HELD:
reopening was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931;
NO. Appeal was devoid of merit.Trial court’s dismissal was affirmed. 2) the petition to reopen the case was not published; and 3) as
lessees of the land, they have standing on the issue.
RATIO:

[T]he lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to
pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed
apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED
illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do on June 20, 1953
individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in
rural areas.
Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral
proceedings
 of Agriculture and Natural Resources on December 9, 1957, and
operates a petroleum refining
Ratio: The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing in
Proper Court under Certain Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title to plant in Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387
Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of which provides: "During the
Judicial Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years Next Preceding the
five years following the granting of any concession, the
Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act reads as “..in case such
concessionaire may import free of
parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have
been, or about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments,
judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding supplies and accessories,"
the approval of this act.” If the title is to be followed, November 13,
1922 is the date which should be followed, hence, would allow the respondent imported and was assessed the special import tax
reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date of the (which it paid under
institution of reopening of the case which was April 12, 1912, the protest).Court procedures: The Collector of Customs on February
petition would be invalid. 16, 1962, held that

respondent ESSO was subject to the payment of the special import

StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and tax provided in Republic Act
what may inadequately be omitted in the text may be supplied or No. 1394, as amended by R.A. No. 2352, and dismissed the protest.
remedied by its title. On March 1, 1962,

respondent appealed the ruling of the Collector of Customs to the

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs.ESSO STANDARD Commissioner of Customs
EASTERN, INC., who, on March 19, 1965, affirmed the decision of said Collector of
(Formerly: Standard-Vacuum Refining Corp. (Phil.), respondent. G.R. Customs. 3On July 2, 1965,
No. L-28329 August 17, respondent ESSO filed a petition with the Court of Tax Appeals for
1975 review of the decision of the

FACTS:Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2, Commissioner of Customs. The Court of Tax Appeals, on September
issued by the Secretary 30, 1967, reversed the
decision of herein petitioner Commissioner of Customs and ordered Civil Case No. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with ex-parte
refund of the amount of petition for preliminary injunction wherein plaintiffs pray for an
adjudication of their respective rights and obligations in relation to
P775.62 to respondent ESSO which the latter had paid under
the enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code against their filled
protest. Statutes subject of
milk products.
construction :a. R.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) – title, Art.
103, Art. 102, Art.
The controversy arose when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
104;b. R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW), as amended by R.A. No.
required the companies to withdraw from the market all of their
2352 – title
filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by
ISSUE: WON the exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
ESSO from custom duties the order with a warning of action if they failed.

granted byR.A. NO. 387 (PETROLEUM ACT OF 1949) should embrace

or include the special
Section of the Tax Code is as follows:
import tax imposed by R.A. NO. 1394 (SPECIAL TAX LAW).

HELD: Yes. Petition denied

Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. — All
condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which
the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale
FACTS: in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its
immediate containers, and in all the language in which such
containers are marked, with the words, "This milk is not suitable for
Private respondents (the companies) are engaged in the nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other
manufacture, sale and distribution of filled milk products equivalent words.
throughout the Philippines. Private respondent, Institute of
Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a
corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction which restrained
maintaining at its highest the standards of local filled milk industry, the CIR from requiring private respondents to print on the labels of
of which all the other private respondents are members. their rifled milk products the words.
Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an action for It was also apparent that Section 169 does not apply to filled milk.
prohibition and injunction with a petition for preliminary injunction. Following ejusdem generis, the provision specifically stated
Respondent-companied therein pray that the respondent Fair Trade skimmed milk which implies a restriction in scope of the classes of
Board desist from further proceeding from the action filed by the milk.
Philippine Association of Nutrition for misleading advertisement,
Vera v. Cuevas
mislabeling and/or misbranding. That petitoners' milk was not
labeled as an imitation of cow's milk. Facts:

Private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture, sale

and distribution of filled milk
Both cases was heard jointly.
products throughout the Philippines. The products of private
respondent, Consolidated
Respondent court held to perpetually restrain the CIR and the Fair
Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold
Trade Board from requiring respondent-companies to print on the
whereas those of private
labels on the filled milk products.
respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand
"Liberty;" and those of private
ISSUE: Whether respondent court was correct.
respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby."
Private respondent, Institute of

RULING: Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a

corporation organized for the

principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the

Yes.
standards of local filled milk

industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.

Section 169 of the Tax code has been repealed by implication. It was
CIR required the respondents to withdraw from the market all of
enacted together with Sections 141 and 177, which were already
their filled milk products which
repealed. Through it, Section 169 became a merely declaratory
provision, without a tax purpose, or a penal sanction. do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code
within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the order. Failure to comply will result to penalties. No, Section 169 of the Tax Code is not applicable to filled milk. The
Section 169 talks of the inscription use of specific and

to be placed in skimmed milk wherein all condensed skimmed milk qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed
and all milk in whatever skimmed milk" in the text of

form, from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part, the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause "all
sold or put on sale in the milk, in whatever form, from

Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other
containers, and in all the words, the general clause is

language in which such containers are marked, with the words, restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar
"This milk is not suitable for rule of ejusdem generis that

nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or with other
equivalent words.
ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
The CFI Manila ordered the CIR to perpetually restrain from and CTA September 30, 1969CASTRO, J.
requiring the respondents to print

on the labels of their product the words "This milk is not suitable for
Facts:
nourishment for infants less

than one year of age.". Also, it ordered the Fair Trade Board to
perpetually restrain from Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. is engaged in the production and milling
of centrifugal sugar, the sugar so produced being placed in
investigating the respondents related to the manufacture/sale of
containers known as jute bags. In 1957, It made two importations
their filled milk products.
of jute bags, free from customs duties and special import tax upon
Issue: the Petitioner’s filing of re-exportation and special import tax bond,
conditioned upon the exportation of the jute bags within one year
Whether or not skimmed milk is included in the scope of Section
from the date of importation.
169 of the Tax Code.

Held:
However, out of the 44,800 jute bags imported first, only 8,647 b.) Whether or not interpretation or construction of an ambiguous
were exported and only 25,000 were exported out of the 75,200 or uncertain statute by the Executive Department or other
jute bags imported on the second shipment. In other words, of the Administrative Agencies be given consideration? In the case at bar,
total number of imported jute bags only 33,647 bags were exported the Bureau of Customs.
within one year after their importation. The remaining 86,353 bags
were exported after the expiration of the one-year period but
within three years from their importation. Held:

Petitioner requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's a.) Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act Of 1909 and the
extension of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 superseding sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code, while fixing
which was to expire the following day, citing reasons for its failure at one year the period within which the containers therein
to export the remaining jute bags within the period of one mentioned must be exported, are silent as to whether the said
year. However, this request was denied by the Commissioner. period may be extended. By reason of this silence, the Bureau of
Customs Issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to eliminate
confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the law, and,
Due to the petitioner's failure to show proof of the exportation of more specifically, to make officially known its policy to consider the
the balance of 86,353 jute bags within one year from their one-year period mentioned in the law as non-extendible.
importation, the Petitioner was required to pay the amount of
p28,629.42 representing the customs duties and special import tax
due thereon, which the petitioner paid under protest and later on b.) Considering that the statutory provisions in question (Section 23
demanded the refund of the amount it had paid. of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and Sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and
Customs Code) have not been the subject of previous judicial
interpretation, then the application of the doctrine of "judicial
Issues: respect for administrative construction (in the case at bar the
Bureau of Customs issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to
eliminate confusion and provide a guide as to how it shall apply the
a.) Whether or not the Commissioner of Customs is vested with law, and, more specifically, to make officially known its policy to
discretion to extend the period of one year provided for in section consider the one-year period mentioned in the law as non-
23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909. extendible., " would, initially, be in order.
 Only where the court of last resort has not previously which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical
interpreted the statute is the rule applicable that courts will give working out of the statute, and practical application of the statute
consideration to construction by administrative or executive presents the agency with unique opportunity and experiences for
departments of the state. discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or improvements in the
statute.

The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction

of an ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by the executive Cecilio de Villa vs. CA [G.R. No. 87416. April 08, 1991]
department or other agency charged with its administration or
Ponente: PARAS, J.
enforcement is entitled to consideration and the highest respect
from the courts, and must be accorded appropriate weight in FACTS:
determining the meaning of the law, especially when the
construction or interpretation is long continued and uniform or is [P]etitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial
contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute, or when Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145)
the enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency. with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent
court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no
offense was committed since the check involved was payable in
Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged
dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to
with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff and
Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine
Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon should be
Coin and Currency). A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the
given controlling weight.
nullity of the RTC ruling was filed by the petitioner in the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with costs
against the petitioner. A motion for reconsideration of the said
In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for
decision was filed by the petitioner but the same was denied by the
administrative or practical construction, the courts often refer to
Court of Appeals, thus elevated to the Supreme Court.
several factors which may be regarded as bases of the principle, as
factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in ISSUES:
particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These
Whether or not:
factors are the respect due the governmental agencies charged with
administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and (1) The Regional Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the
informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the case; and,
drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on
(2) The check in question, drawn against the dollar account of CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner,
petitioner with a foreign bank, is covered by the Bouncing Checks vs.
Law (B.P. Blg. 22). THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z.
HELD:
LORAYES, respondents.
YES on both cases. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
San Jose Enriquez, Lacas Santos & Borje for petitioner.
RATIO:
Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent.
For the first issue: The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case, subject
Ponente: PARAS
of this review, can not be questioned, as Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule
110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide. The information under FACTS:
consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in
[P]etitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court with
Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. After arraignment and after
sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of
private respondent had testified on direct examination, petitioner
Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the
moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: x x x (b)
person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information
That no offense was committed since the check involved was
in court which initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162
payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void
SCRA 191 [1988]).
pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value
For the second issue: Exception in the Statute. It is a cardinal of Philippine Coin and Currency). Accused’s motion to dismiss was
principle in statutory construction that where the law does not denied for lack of merit. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but
distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is his motion was subsequently denied by respondent court.
that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not
ISSUE:
except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil.
British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]). The Whether or not B.P. No. 22 covers foreign (currency) checks.
records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the
intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency HELD:
may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view.
RATIO:
Cecilio de Villa vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 87416. April 8, 1991)
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law
does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically,
the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts "SEC. 39.Compulsory Retirement. — Compulsory retirement, for
may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify officer and
it. Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks,
non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age fifty-six (56);
provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines though
Provided, That, in
payable outside thereof, or made payable and dishonored in the
Philippines though drawn and issued outside thereof, are within the case of any officer with the rank of chief superintendent, director or
coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn deputy
against current accounts in foreign currency.
director general, the Commission may allow his retention in the
[I]t is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual service for an
proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining the
construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (citation omitted). unextendible period of one (1) year.
Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement
means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative to private
deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted (citation
omitted). The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show respondents who are all members of the defunct Philippine
that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever Constabulary and have
currency may be the subject thereof. Courts may avail themselves reached the age of fifty-six.
of the actual proceedings of the legislative body to assist in
determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning. Private respondents filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for the issuance of an ex

parte restraining order and/or injunction before the RTC of Makati.

NPC (NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION) vs DE GUZMAN They aver that the age of
FACTS: retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of RA 6975 cannot be
RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the Philippine applied to them since they are
National Police Under a also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which provides:
Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government", "Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within
took effect on January 2, 1991. the transition
RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system for PNP period of four (4) years following the effectively of this Act, the
members. Section 39 reads: following
members of the INP shall be considered compulsorily retired: Respondent judge De Guzman issued a restraining order followed
by a writ of injunction. He
"a)Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year of
the effectivity declared that the term "INP" in Section 89 of the PNP Law includes
all members of the present
of this Act.
Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of the
"b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second
present members of the
year of the
Philippine National police before its creation and establishment, and
effectivity of this Act.
that Section 39 thereof shall
"c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year
become operative after the lapse of the four-year transition period.
of the
Thus, the preliminary
effectivity of this Act.
injunction issued is made permanent. Moreover, he observed,
"d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth among others, that it may have
year of the
been the intention of Congress to refer to the local police forces as
effectivity of this Act." the "INP" but the PNP Law

Respondents added that the term "INP" includes both the former failed to define who or what constituted the INP. The natural
members of the Philippine recourse of the court is to trace the

Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier constituted source of the "INP" as courts are permitted to look to prior laws on
as the Integrated the same subject and to

National Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in 1975. investigate the antecedents involved.

On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year ISSUE: Whether or not Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all
transition period provided in members of the present

Section 89 applies only to the local police forces who previously Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of its
retire, compulsorily, at age sixty (60) for those in the ranks of present members and that
Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher, while the retirement age for
Section 39 of RA 6975 shall become applicable to petitioners only
the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law. after the lapse of the four-year
transition period. component of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National
police, shall cease to be the
HELD:
national police force and lieu thereof, a new police force shall be
From a careful review of Sections 23 and 85 of RA 6975, it appears
establish and constituted
that the use of the term INP
pursuant to this Act."
is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute
could have just made a It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature
failed to define who the
uniform reference to the members of the whole Philippine National
police (PNP) for retirement members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of no moment that the
legislature failed to
purposes and not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from
the PC and it cannot be categorically restrict the application of the transition period in Sec.
89 specifically in favor of the
construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the
PC. local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the PC
component of the INP was
Contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that “the law
failed to define who constitutes already retirable at age fifty-six (56).

the INP”, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus, Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have
belabored on the supposed
"SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. — Upon the
effectivity of this Act, dubious meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such
a situation, courts are not
the present National police Commisdion and the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated without recourse in determining the construction of the statute
with doubtful meaning for they
National police shall cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary,
which is the nucleus of the may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative
body. In case of doubt as to
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National police shall cease to be
a major service of the what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the
provision during the legislative
Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated National police,
which is the civilian
deliberations may be adopted. Courts should not give a literal synthetic resin glues used in bonding lumber and veneer by
interpretation to the letter of the plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the
importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw
law if it runs counter to the legislative intent.
materials in the production of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section in November and December 1949 and P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior
89 of R.A. 6975 is thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second
sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of
applicable only to the local police force is clear. The question now is said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate
whether the classification is importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The
valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it must conform Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and
to the following requirements: approve the said refund on the ground that the exemption granted
by the board in not in accord with the provision of section 2 of RA
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; 2609.
(2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
Issue of the Case:
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from
the payment of the margin fee.
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class (People
vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12
Held:
[1939]).
No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of injunction issued
formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which is distinct from
on January 8, 1992 is
urea and formaldehyde. The petitioner’s contends that the bill
hereby LIFTED and the assailed decision of respondent judge is approved in Congress contained the conjunction “and” between the
REVERSED and SET ASIDE terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements
in the manufacture of “urea formaldehyde” and not the latter. But
this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the
Casco Chemical Co. vs Gimenez House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only
Facts of the Case: remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.
Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming
petitioner. Management Corporation (PGMC) for the operation of a
nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract violated the
provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from
Kilosbayan vs Morato holding and conducting lotteries through a collaboration,
association, or joint venture.
Legal Standing
2. Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement
(ELA) for online lottery equipment and accessories on
January 25, 1995. The agreement are as follow:

KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO 4. Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by

PCSO at which in no case be less than an annual
G.R. NO. 118910. July 30, 1993 rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. commercial operation.
RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, 5. Rent is computed bi-weekly.
EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE,
CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE 6. Term is 8 years.
CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. 7. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and
WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners, responsible for the facilities.
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine 8. Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the
Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING equipment at P25M.
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
3. Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA
invalid because:

4. It is the same as the old contract of lease.

5. It is still violative of PCSO’s charter.

Facts: 6. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not

been approved by the President and it is not most advantageous to
1. GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the the government.
contract between Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
 4. PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments 1. Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.

0. ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in 1. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling
the prior contract. sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in
1. ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the
interest because no constitutional issues were
exception provided in EO No. 301.
actually involved.
2. Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the
2. LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former
Board of Directors of PCSO.
appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present case is
3. Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery not the same one litigated by the parties before in
equipment. Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in
any sense be regarded as “the law of this case”. The
4. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. parties are the same but the cases are not.
5. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were 3. RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” cannot
not parties to the contract. still apply. An issue actually and directly passed
upon and determine in a former suit cannot again
be drawn in question in any future action between
Issues: the same parties involving a different cause of
1. Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law
legal standing to sue. at least when substantially unrelated claims are
involved. When the second proceeding involves an
2. Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in instrument or transaction identical with, but in a
operating an online lottery is valid. form separable from the one dealt with in the first
proceeding, the Court is free in the second
proceeding to make an independent examination of
the legal matters at issue.

4. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous

decision does not preclude determination of the
Rulings:
petitioner’s standing.
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
 5. Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here speculative. In any case, in the construction of
no constitutional question is actually involved. The statutes, the resumption is that in making contracts,
more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners the government has acted in good faith. The
are ‘real parties of interest’. doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason
for denying power.
6. Question of contract of law: The real parties are
those who are parties to the agreement or are 5. It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO
bound either principally or are prejudiced in their does not have the power to enter into any contract
rights with respect to one of the contracting parties which would involve it in any form of
and can show the detriment which would positively “collaboration, association, or joint venture” for the
result to them from the contract. holding of sweepstakes activities. This only
mentions that PCSO is prohibited from investing in
7. Petitioners do not have such present substantial
any activities that would compete in their own
interest. Questions to the nature or validity of
activities.
public contracts maybe made before COA or before
the Ombudsman. 6. It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement
which does not compete with their own activities.
2. Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is valid.
The Court held that is also based on speculation.
1. It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO Evidence is needed to show that the transfer of
now bears all losses because the operation of the technology would involve the PCSO and its
system is completely in its hands. personnel in prohibited association with the PGMC.

2. Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of 7. O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only to
business judgment and the Court is not inclined to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials
review. and equipment and not on the contracts of lease.
Public bidding for leases are only for privately-
3. Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by owned buildings or spaces for government use or of
law as a maximum. (4.3% of gross receipt is government owned buildings or spaces for private
discussed in the dissenting opinion of Feliciano, J.) use.
4. In the contract, it stated that the parties can change
their agreement. Petitioners state that this would
allow PGMC to control and operate the on-line Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. The
lottery system. The Court held that the claim is motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with finality.
KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

HELD:

Real Parties in Interest NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the
standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on
real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were
FACTS: actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the
present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be
Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the
and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An
ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former
receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between
employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule
the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated
million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an
because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable
Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in
violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the
bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous
Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's
law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no
Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate
determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.
of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their
moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because Kilosbayan vs. Morato (G.R. No. 118910. July 17, 1995)
they were not parties to the contract
25APR

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A.

ISSUES: RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO,
EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE,
CHRISTINE TAN, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V. VICTORINO, Whether or not the ELA between the Philippine Charity
JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, SEN. FREDDIE WEBB, SEN. Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. is
WIGBERTO TAÑADA, REP. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioners, invalid.
vs.
HELD:
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING NO. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction was
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents. dismissed. Pertinent to the issue, the SC held:
Ponente: MENDOZA xxx
FACTS: (3) that the ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and
is not contrary to the charter of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
[T]his suit was filed seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground
Office;
that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in
the first case [decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated (4) that under §1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity
v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)) invalidating the Contract of Sweepstakes Office has authority to enter into a contract for the
Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) holding of an on-line lottery, whether alone or in association,
and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC)]. collaboration or joint venture with another party, so long as it
Petitioners maintain (1) that the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) itselfholds or conducts such lottery; and
is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges of a joint
venture which were found in the Contract of Lease nullified in the (5) That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question did not
prior case; (2) that the ELA did not have to be submitted to a public have to be submitted to public bidding as a condition for its validity.
bidding because it fell within the exception provided in E.O. No. 301, RATIO:
§1 (e); (3) that the power to determine whether the ELA is
advantageous to the government is vested in the Board of Directors E.O. No. 301, §1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of
of the PCSO; (4) that for lack of funds the PCSO cannot purchase its supplies, materials and equipment. It does not refer to contracts of
own on-line lottery equipment and has had to enter into a lease lease of equipment like the ELA. The provisions on lease are found
contract; (5) that what petitioners are actually seeking in this suit is in §§ 6 and 7 but they refer to the lease of privately-owned
to further their moral crusade and political agenda, using the Court buildings or spaces for government use or of government-owned
as their forum. buildings or spaces for private use, and these provisions do not
require public bidding. It is thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can
ISSUE: be applied to the ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be
thought of as close to a contract of purchase and sale is the option
to buy given to the PCSO. An option to buy is not of course a appears to me, both under substantive law and the rules of
contract of purchase and sale. procedure, to still be an insuperable issue. I have gone over
carefully the pleadings submitted in G.R. No. 118910, and I regret
Indeed the question is not whether compared with the former joint
my inability to see anything new that can convince me to depart
venture agreement the present lease contract is “[more]
from the view I have expressed on it in G.R. No. 113375.
advantageous to the government.” The question is whether under
the circumstances, the ELA is the most advantageous contract that FELICIANO, dissenting
could be obtained compared with similar lease agreements which
With very great respect, it is submitted that the above conclusion
the PCSO could have made with other parties. Petitioners have not
has been merely assumed rather than demonstrated and that what
shown that more favorable terms could have been obtained by the
is in fact before this Court does not adequately support such
PCSO or that at any rate the ELA, which the PCSO concluded with
conclusion.
the PGMC, is disadvantageous to the government.
REGALADO, dissenting
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
I am constrained to respectfully dissent from the majority opinion
PADILLA, concurring
premised on the constitutional and procedural doctrines posed and
I join the majority in voting for the dismissal of the petition in this interpreted in tandem therein. I also regret that I have to impose on
case. the majority with this virtual turno en contra when I could have
indicated my disaccord by just joining Mr. Justice Davide in his
As to whether or not the ELA is grossly disadvantageous to the
commendably objective presentation of the minority position. I feel,
government, it should be stressed that the matter involves,
however, that certain views that have been advanced require a
basically, a policy — determination by the executive branch which
rejoinder lest they lapse into the realm of unanimous precedents.
this Court should not ordinarily reverse or substitute with its own
judgment, in keeping with the time honored doctrine of separation DAVIDE, dissenting
of powers.
I register a dissenting vote.
VITUG, concurring
I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings
I most humbly reiterate the separate opinion I have made in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Guingona, et al. (hereinafter referred to
in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al., vs. Teofisto Guingona, Sr., etc., et al. (G.R. as the first lotto case) regarding the application or interpretation of
No. 113375, promulgated on 05 May 1994). the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of the Charter of the
PCSO (R.A.. No. 1169), as amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and on the issue
Back to the core of the petition, however, the matter of the legal
of locus standi of the petitioners to question the contract of lease
standing of petitioners in their suit assailing the subject-contract
involving the on-line lottery system entered into between the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine
Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). Such reversal upsets the
salutary doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, and stare
decisis. It puts to jeopardy the faith and confidence of the people,
specially the lawyers and litigants, in the certainty and stability of
the pronouncements of this Court. It opens the floodgates to
endless litigations for re-examination of such pronouncements and
weakens this Court’s judicial and moral authority to demand from
lower courts obedience thereto and to impose sanctions for their
opposite conduct.