Witness Protection As A Key Tool in Addressing Serious and Organized Crime
Witness Protection As A Key Tool in Addressing Serious and Organized Crime
ORGANIZED CRIME
Karen Kramer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Many countries are affected by criminal activities that have a profound impact on human security and
development, such as corruption, drug trafficking, serious and organized crime, human rights violations and
terrorism. Yet, the ability the criminal justice systems of countries to investigate and prosecute such forms of
serious crimes are often very limited. One of the challenges for many for countries is in obtaining the
cooperation of victims and witnesses in order to obtain important information and evidence about such
criminal matters.
This paper will discuss: 1) the globalization of organized crime as background on why organized
crime is a problem for all states; 2) why witness protection measures are important for the effective
functioning of criminal justice systems; 3) what is meant by the concepts of victim and witness assistance,
support and security; 4) some of the factors that have given rise to witness protection programmes; 5) the
objectives and key features and elements of most witness protection programmes; 6) the use of witness
protection; and 7) provide some recommendations. This paper looks at witness protection primarily from the
point of view of serious and organized crime but mentions also its use in the human rights context as well as
in the work of the International Courts and Tribunals.
The paper draws substantially from the UNODC Good Practices for the Protection of Witnesses in
Criminal Proceedings Involving Organized Crime manual published in 2008, as well as upon information
obtained from many colleagues working in the field of witness protection around the world whose expertise,
support and advice have been instrumental to the work of UNODC in supporting states in this area.
Although organized crime (and corruption) affect both developed and developing regions there is
*
Senior Expert, Division for Treaty Affairs, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
1 See also, The Globalization of Crime, A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, UNODC 2010.
2 Statement at UN Security council, SC/9867, February 2010.
3 A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations,
2004, p.2
4 Ibid.
― 3 ―
more of a risk for developing states. In developing regions where State institutions and mechanisms are in
transition, organized criminal groups have proven very successful in mobilizing themselves to meet the goods
and services demands of unregulated markets. They are able to use bribery and other forms of corruption to
co-opt public officials in order to achieve their criminal objectives. Overtime, these groups become more
powerful and are thus better able to threaten the growth of parallel legitimate structures.
As globalization increasingly guides a new international order, the dilemma becomes more obvious:
How can a multilateral system created to deal with tensions between States fight criminal groups that are non-
State, yet transnational and powerful enough to threaten sovereign States? 3 The answer is two pronged. States
must continue to strengthen their own capacity, but given the global nature of the threat, national efforts must
form part of a coordinated multilateral response.
At the national level, organized crime (and corruption cases) can be some of the most difficult and
complex to investigate and prosecute. Disrupting or dismantling criminal groups requires getting information
about actors, activities and financial dealings that can difficult to obtain because of the secrecy of their
operations and because corrupted officials are often paid to alert and protect them from such investigations.
The tools that are routinely used by successfully law enforcement investigations to bring down criminal
groups have been:
1) The use of criminal intelligence in order to understand the threats that presently and are likely to affect a
particular jurisdiction and region and to assist law enforcement authorities in prioritizing and allocating its
resources;
2) Informants and whistle blowers, to provide information about where to look and what to look for;
3) special investigation techniques, such as electronic surveillance and undercover operations, in order to
penetrate these groups and gain evidence;
4) the ability to persuade persons working for criminal organizations to provide information and, more
importantly, testimony about the identities and the activities of criminal organizations in exchange for
some leniency;
5) The ability to provide security to witnesses, including relocation and a new identity.
These elements, along with comprehensive and effective anti-money laundering schemes and the
ability to size and confiscate the proceeds of crime and the ability to effectively cooperate with other countries
for mutual legal assistance and extradition, are the main elements of any successful anti- organized crime
programme and are also key elements in the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases. Corruption too
thrives in secrecy where both the giver and the taker are beneficiaries.
― 4 ―
Assistance and support measures should be employed before, during and after a trial to help witnesses
in coping with the psychological and practical issues they may have in testifying. The may also be used in
coordination with procedural protections and other security measures. Security provided by the police is
aimed at providing physical security before during and after trial. Procedural protections are those that may
be used both to support a witness’ ability to testify as well as to enhance a safety before and during the trial.
Witness protection programmes are considered a last resort providing more special protection measures,
including those of international relocation and identity change.6
A growing number of criminal justice systems provide a range services to victims as well as to
vulnerable witnesses which may include: information about the rights of victims, information about the roles
of actors in the criminal justice system, assistance in obtaining medical, social, and psychological service that
may be provided by the state or by non-governmental organizations and service providers, assistance in
obtaining compensation (victims), and providing a support person while testifying. Some jurisdictions
provide services only to victims and others provide services to victims and witnesses. Services may also be
provided to help minimize obstacles to participation in a criminal hearing or trial. (such as transportation and
child care).
Again, it is important to emphasize that the purpose of witness assistance as distinguished from
witness protection, is to achieve efficient prosecution and avoid secondary victimization. While such services
are generally provided first by the state, non-governmental organizations with experience in dealing with
vulnerable categories of the population can prove valuable partners in this process.7
The protection of witnesses is based on three building blocks complimenting and supporting each
other with the most complete system being a mixture of all three disciplines Witness protection thus refers to
a range of methods and measures that can be applied at all stages of the criminal proceedings to ensure the
safety and security of witnesses in order to ensure their cooperation and testimony. The measures taken
should be proportional to the threat and of limited duration.
It should be noted that protection of any form should never provide a motivation to testify but merely
remove or counter the witness’ view that he or she is in danger if he/she cooperates. Moreover, no person
should ever be forced to accept protection measures. Consent should always be given by a witness. As a
practical matter, unless you have a willing witness, witness security will in any case be a waste of resources.
Witness security measures fall into three categories, i) police protection/target hardening and good
5 See also the UN Guidelines on Justice for Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime.
6 UNODC Good Practices, p.27.
7 Ibid, p.28.
8 UNODC Good Practices, p.29.
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operational practices, ii) judicial and procedural measures, and iii) covert witness protection programmes.
In cases where a witness feels insecure but there is no ascertainable risk of threat, these feelings of
insecurity can be addressed by briefing them on personal security, which may include information on how to
increase the security of their homes (fortifying locks and windows), ensuring that they have mobile phones
and emergency contact numbers or an advocate or police officer that they can phone, etc.
In addition to the above, where there is some level of risk to a witness, the police can provide security
measures. Some usual police protective measures are close (body guard) protection, regular patrolling around
the witness’s residence and place of work, escort to and from the court, installation of security devices at the
witness’s home and perhaps the place of work, monitoring mail and phone calls, and temporary change of
residence etc.9
2. Procedural Protections
These refer to measures taken at the request of the prosecutor, the witness or sua sponte by the court
to ensure that the witness can testify free of intimidation and fear. There are usually no statutory restrictions
as to the types of crimes or witnesses for which such measures can be allowed.10 These measures can be
applied in sensitive cases (such as with trafficking in persons, sex crimes, or family crimes) and where there
are vulnerable victim-witnesses in order to prevent re-victimization by limiting their exposure to the public or
the media or to the accused, during the trial. Procedural measures may include:
(a) Anonymous testimony;
(b) Presence of an accompanying person for psychological support;
(c) shields, disguises or voice distortion;
(d) Use of a witness’s pre-trial statement instead of in-court testimony;
(e) Testimony via closed-circuit television or videoconferencing
(f) Removal of the defendant or the public from the courtroom.
One of the more complex of these procedural measures is the anonymous testimony. Anonymity refers
to the keeping of some or all of the witness’s identity detail hidden from the defence and the public in the rare
cases where the substance of the testimony itself does not identify the witness to the defence and where it can
be corroborated by other evidence. Of jurisdictions where this is permitted, some allow it only up to a certain
period before the trial.
In this way it is felt that the witness can be protected for the short period his or her identity is revealed
to the defence. In some jurisdictions, the witness may be examined in court by the defence but is not obliged
to state his or her true name or provide other personal details. This measure can be useful for the testimony of
undercover agents who would be in danger or where ongoing investigations would be compromised if their
true identity were known.
― 6 ―
Where total anonymity is permitted, the witness testifies behind a shield or is disguised and
information relating to identity is not revealed. In practice, this measure is useful for cases where witnesses
who were innocent bystanders and whose identity is not already known to the defence. In most cases, the
defendant can readily identify the witness through his or her testimony.
In Germany, when total anonymity is granted, a law enforcement officer gives the evidence in court in
place of the witness, stating what the witness saw. The defence is allowed to challenge the testimony as
relayed by the law enforcement officer. Additionally, the defence has the right to submit in writing questions
to be put to the anonymous witness by the reporting officer, who will subsequently report the answers to the
court. The Federal Court of Justice has ruled that, because of it’s largely hearsay character, such testimony
has limited value unless otherwise corroborated by other material evidence.11
Another procedural measure that presents some legal issues in the use of shields to reduce potential
intimidation. Their use is not practicable in many jurisdictions to right of the accused to face-to-face
confrontation with the witness. Where used, screens should not prevent the judge, jury and at least one legal
representative of each party from seeing the witness and from the witness seeing them.12 The problem with
their use for many jurisdictions is that they prevent the accused from seeing the witness’s demeanour and to
challenge his or her credibility on this basis. In Japan, for example, screening is done in such a way that the
defence counsel can still see the witness so that the right to face-to-face examination is not greatly affected.13
Although the taking of remote testimony via videoconferencing is more often used in the context of
mutual legal assistance between states, it is also increasingly used to take the testimony of protected
witnesses. In this regard it can be used either to avoid direct contact between the witness and the defendant
and hence has value for some vulnerable witnesses. It can be also used when the physical security of a
witness at a particular court or jurisdiction cannot be adequately addressed.16
Video conferencing technology has advanced to allow for transmission with no interruption or delay
and with excellent visual displays. It is deemed reliable and once up and running, relatively easy and cost
effective to use. Moreover, the transmissions can be encrypted so as to prevent the identification of both
locations of the videoconference.17
11 Council of Europe, Terrorism: Protection of Witnesses and Collaborators of Justice (Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing,
2006. Also mentioned in the UNODC Good Practices, p.39.
12 UNODC, Good Practices for the Protection of Witnesses, p.35.
13 Ibid.
14 Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, Canada, Article 22.1(1), R.S., 1985c.30 (4th Supp.).
15 Fredric Lederer, The legality and practicality of remote witness testimony, p.20.
16 www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/stoc-cop-session5-conferencepapers, CTOC/COP/2010/CRP.2, p.2.
17 See, www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/stoc-cop-session5-conferencepapers, CTOC/COP/2010/CRP.8, Expert group Meeting on the
Technical and Legal Obstacles to the Use of Videoconferencing, Report of the Secretariat, p.2. and also, CTOC/COP/2010/CRP.2,
The technical and legal obstacles to the use of videoconferencing, Note by the Secretariat.
― 7 ―
At the international level, the use and acceptance of video-conferencing is rising at the international
criminal courts and tribunals which use it to take the testimony of victims, vulnerable witnesses or for
witnesses who are unable to travel to the court’s location for physical or psychological reasons, as well as for
protection purposes.
In summary, procedural measures can be grouped into three general categories depending on their
purpose:
(1) “Measures to reduce fear through avoidance of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant,”18
such as the use of pre-trial statements in lieu of in-court testimony (where permitted); removal of the
defendant from the courtroom` (while still watching the trial via a video link); and testimony via closed-
circuit television or audio visual links, such as video- conferencing.
(2) “Measures to make it difficult or impossible for the defendant or organized criminal group to trace the
identity of the witness,”19
by the use of anonymous testimony or a screen, curtain or two-way mirror to shield the witness while
giving testimony.
(3) “Measures to limit the witnesses’ exposure to the public and psychological stress.”20
such as by a change of the trial venue, removal of the public from the courtroom (hold the session “in
Camera”) and by having the presence of an accompanying person to provide support for the witness.”
These measures may be used alone or in combination for greater protection. It is important to keep in
mind that however procedural measures are used, due consideration should be due consideration should be
given to balancing the witness’s legitimate expectation of physical safety against the defendant’ rights to a
fair trial.21
Sometimes the issue comes up as to whether informants can be provided protective measures and the
legislation of some countries includes informants as persons eligible for protective measures. But it should be
clarified that in most jurisdictions an informant is a person who provides information to authorities which is
used for the purposes of further investigation and their identity is not disclosed. Therefore, they do not
become witnesses. There is frequently confusion about the differences between being an informant, whistle
blower and witness so whistle blower protection so it is worth looking at these issues more closely.
There are many definitions of whistle-blowing but here it is preferred to view it as a means of
promoting accountability. Whistle-blowing can perhaps be best understood by breaking it into some key
elements:
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i) an act of disclosure;
ii) by a person with privileged access to data or information;
iii)of an organization;
iv) either public or private;
v) about corrupt, illegal, fraudulent or harmful activity;
vi) under the control of that organization;
vii)the disclosure is made to an internal entity or to external entities, such as regulatory bodies,
ombudsmen, anti-corruption entities, law enforcement agencies or the media;
viii) with the purpose of evaluating/assessing the risk, threat, conduct so that it can be removed,
stopped or reduced.
Whenever a risk arises that the activities of an organization have gone wrong, it is usually the people
working for the organization who first know about it. While employees are the people best placed to raise
concerns and so enable the risk to be removed, stopped or replace, they also often have the most to lose.
Whistleblowers can too can be victimized - they can ostracized by peers and management, suffer harassment,
be demoted or moved to less desirable locations, lose jobs, be charged with crimes or with violating
employment agreements for divulging information, or in some cases they may face physical danger.
So, let us return to the question of what is the difference between an informant and a whistle- blower.
The main difference is in motivation and also liability. Most informants are persons somehow involved in or
connected to unethical or illegal activities. They disclose information for personal benefit, some for money
but most as a means to reduce the liability for their own illegal conduct, either voluntarily or due to
coercion.22 Thus we can say that their motivation is generally for private gain.
By contrast, a whistle blower makes the disclosure not for any private benefit but in order to benefit a
larger community - whether it be the organization or for the public at large, or both.
“In most cases, whistleblowers receive no benefits for their disclosures outside of the ability to
maintain the status quo.”23 However, it is true that there are some anti-corruption laws that allow for rewards
to be given to those that disclose wrongdoing, mainly for fraud and corruption. In Asia, a number of countries
give rewards to those who have revealed corruption.24 Some of these, like the law of South Korea, give the
whistleblower up to a certain percentage of the money recovered.25 So, although there can be a benefit, there
is no guarantee for the whistleblower that his/her disclosure will result in a financial gain. This is certainly not
the case with paid informants.
A standard or tailor-made set of individual protection measures which are, for example, described in a
memorandum of understanding, signed by the responsible authorities and the protected witness or
collaborator of justice.26
The UNODC Good Practices for the Protection of Witnesses manual further defines a witness
protection programme as,
22 Whistleblowing, International Standards and Developments, David Banisar, May 2006, revised February 2009, page 4.
23 Whistleblowing, International Standards and Developments, David Banisar, May 2006, revised February 2009, p.4.
24 See Whistleblowing, International Standards and Development, pages 5, 37.
25 Ibid, p.37.
26 Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec (2005) 9, of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the protection of witnesses
and collaborators of justice.
― 9 ―
A formally established covert program, subject to strict admission criteria that provides for the
relocation and change of identity of witnesses whose lives are threatened by a criminal group because
of their cooperation with law enforcement authorities.27
One thing that all such groups have in common – whether we are talking about the Italian Mafia,
narcotics trafficking groups, terrorist cells, inner city gangs or “crews”, motorcycle and prison gangs – is the
code of silence that they impose on their members. If the code of silence is broken, the penalty is usually
death. When a justice collaborator decides to break the code of silence and collaborate with law enforcement
authorities in testifying for the prosecution against the members of the criminal organization, the organization
will call for his assassination. It is institutionally necessary for criminal organizations to keep their disaffected
members in line by guaranteeing that there is no “safe haven” from their retaliation.29
Therefore, witness protection programmes developed in order to provide a “safe haven” from such
retaliation for collaborators of justice. It is for the same reason that the successful reputation of a witness
protection program as a “safe haven” is its most important attribute. 30 If a witness protection program is
penetrated and protected witnesses are killed, then others will not consider the programme as an alternative
even if this means serving a long or even a life sentence in prison.31
Witness protection is also an issue for states that have suffered civil conflicts where government actors
committed crimes against its citizens, as in Argentina and Brazil. The same principles and criteria that apply
to the protection of witnesses for the prosecution or organized crime and other serious cases can be applied
for the prosecution of human rights violations. The main difference is that witnesses of human rights
violations are frequently victims of these crimes rather than criminal associates/collaborators of justice. For
these people, the measures of relocation and identity change may not be acceptable because they may imply
further victimization. Brazil for example, established a protection programme specialized to deal with human
rights cases under the authority of a Presidential Commission on Human Rights. While most services are
provided by the protection unit, support services and even relocation assistance are provided by a network of
vetted non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This system has been in place for several years and
― 10 ―
reportedly works well. Due to a history of human rights abuses and corruption by the government, this system
was developed as a way to gain the trust of civil society. The other advantage of this system is that NGOs
often have better resources than local government institutions as well as knowledge of local conditions and
culture.
As a result, the government began looking at the issue of witness protection in these cases. Although
the issues involved are too many for further discussion here. The situation in Argentina points to not only
failures of existing witness protection capabilities but likely also to other issues in the criminal justice system.
One should keep in mind that witness protection is but one tool of a criminal justice system that relies upon
the effective and appropriate responses in other areas.
The work of the ICC, and other international tribunals, in protecting victims and witnesses is
complicated by several factors. Unlike natural courts, they do not have their own police force that can protect
their witnesses nor do they have territorial jurisdiction to keep or relocate them. Moreover, many of the
32 The protection of witnesses of serious human rights violations: Cases in Argentina, Federico Borello, 2010.
33 Some evidence of the need for dedicated programmes with specialist expertise with the ability to provide the range of social,
educational and support services normally provided by protection programmes comes from the experience of countries with multiple
local police authorities providing witness protection services. Police forces may use different standards and criteria. For those
relocating witnesses, including abroad, these issues along with coordination with different local authorities can become problematic.
Further, it is probably not easy or resource practicable for all but the forces of the larger cities to have and to maintain the experience,
expertise and/or familiarity with issues relating to domestic and international relocation. As a result, there is a move towards
providing a centralized policy making and coordinating body for witness protection programmes that operate at local levels. This
issue requires, however, some further examination.
34 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).
― 11 ―
victims and witnesses of these courts and tribunals come from war, conflict or post-conflict zones where the
rule of law is lacking. It is difficult to maintain their safety when it is precisely those institutions that are
normally charged with protecting the public, such as the police and the military, who are the potential
aggressors, or are incapable or indifferent. For such witnesses, relocation abroad may be the only viable
option. However, this may mean not just severing all ties with family and friends left behind but also may
require adjusting to life in an entirely different culture and environment.
Yet it is often difficult for the ICC to find countries that will take in its victims and witnesses due to
legal and cultural difference, for example, the practice of polygamy can prove problematic for many
countries. Finally, there is the cost factor of supporting witnesses who are not likely to ever have the means in
a foreign environment to support themselves. Perhaps as a result of the above, only a handful of countries
have entered into memorandums of understanding agreements for cooperation in the relocation of witnesses
with the ICC. Another issue that has not been well defined is who is responsible for protecting witnesses
when tribunal proceedings conclude. This has led the International Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, for example, to provide training and support to national authorities. These are just some of
the issues and challenges related to the protection of victims and witnesses by the ICC and other international
courts.35
However, it is recommended that covert protection programmes be grounded in policies and a legal
framework due to their impact on the rights of the accused, the life of the protected persons and due to the
financial resources needed to fund such programmes. In addition, other laws, such as criminal procedure
codes and rules of court, will likely need to be reviewed and updated in order that they can provide for
procedural protections (if not contrary to other laws).
At minimum, legislation should specify:
i) protection measures that may be used;
ii) application and admission criteria and procedures;
iii) the authority responsible for the programme’s implementation;
iv) criteria upon which a witness may be terminated from the programme;
v) the rights and obligations of the parties;
vi) that the programme’s operations are confidential;
vii) provide for penalties for the disclosure of information about protection arrangements or about the
identity or location of protected witnesses37
35 For an analysis and information about the work related to protection of victims and witnesses of the ICC and the International
Tribunals, see, The Justice Sector Afterthought: Witness Protection in Africa, Chris Mahony.
36 UNODC Good Practices, p.44.
37 Ibid, p.44-45.
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some form of informal agreement directly between the authorities which may be modified on a case by case
basis. Some protection authorities are able to operate simply one protection authority to another. However,
probably more countries need some additional level of agreement which can be at the institutional level
(between police agency and ministry). An agreement can be as simple as, the Ministries of X of State A and
the Ministry of X of State B agree to cooperate for the protection of relocated protected witnesses.
States can ratify bi-lateral or multilateral treaties. One example of countries that went the treaty route
is the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). However, due to the length of time that treaties can take
to negotiate and ratify, this is the least practical solution. States can also join framework agreements done as
part of regional organizations.
The UNTOC and the UNCAC both contain provisions relating to the need to protect witnesses and
other persons from potential retaliation or intimidation with respect to the giving of testimony.38 Under both
Conventions protective measures could include physical protection, relocation, non-disclosure or limitations
on the disclosure of information concerning identity or whereabouts and by allowing the use of testimony via
communication technology such as, video links.39 The Protocol against Trafficking in Persons contains
provisions in Article 6 regarding assistance to and protection of victims of trafficking in persons, and the
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants contains in Article 16 provisions concerning protection and
assistance measures. There are many other Conventions, such as those relating to human rights, that touch up
the need to protect victims and witnesses.
― 13 ―
Where a programme is located within the police force, “ the isolation and autonomy (organizational,
administrative and operational) of the covert unit responsible for the implementation of the programme from
the rest of the police force is of great importance.”41
In a second category of countries, programmes are separated organizationally from the police and sit
under the equivalent of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior or the State Prosecutor.42
“In a third group of countries, programmes are implemented by a multidisciplinary body consisting of
high-level representatives of the law enforcement, prosecutorial, judicial and government authorities and
sometimes from civil society. That body takes decisions on such matters as admission to the programme and
termination. It may also exercise some oversight over implementation of the programme and make budgetary
submission to the Government.”43
There are additional models, such as that of Brazil where witness protection falls under a commission
for human rights and Kenya, which in 2010 created an independent witness protection agency which also has
an oversight body.
Within these categories, witness protection programmes can further organize themselves to have one
sub-unit dealing with victims and other dealing with collaborators of justice (former criminals).
Regardless of the location of the programme, the key issues to a programme’s success seem to be,
“separation from the investigation, confidentiality of procedures and operations, and organizational autonomy
from the regular police.”44
D. Neutrality
Admittance to a protection programme should never be viewed by the protected person (or the public)
as a reward for their cooperation. To safeguard their neutrality, witness protection programmes endeavor to,
admit witnesses according to a set of predetermined criteria among which the level of threat is a key
determinant; maintain separation from investigation agencies (as noted above); and make objective decisions
independently from the prosecution after obtaining and evaluating the prosecution ’s views about the
40 UNODC Good Practices, p.45. Countries in this category include, Australia, Austria, Canada, Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of China, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom.
41 Ibid, p.46.
42 Columbia, the Netherlands, the Phillippines, South Africa and the United States.
43 Italy and Serbia both have this model. Ibid, p.46.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid, p.53.
46 Ibid, p.57.
― 14 ―
importance of the case and the evidence offered by the witness.47
Upon getting a referral request for protection, the witness protection programme will conduct an
assessment that will look at the following elements:
a) The level of threat to the person’s life;
b) The personality and psychological fitness of the person to adjust to and follow the stressful rules of
the programme;
c) The danger that the person may pose to the public if relocated under a new identity (typically
applies to justice collaborators);
d) The critical value of the witness’s trial testimony for the prosecution and the impossibility of
gaining such information from another source;
e) The importance of the case;
f) The family situation of the person, such as, number of family members that would need to be
included, their ages, any medical issues or special needs, their criminal records, etc.49
In contrast, “a risk assessment examines the chances of the threat materializing and assesses how it
can be mitigated. These assessments are conducted according to set standards and using a matrix. Action is
taken to reduce the probability of the threat being carried out. The risk assessment is conducted by the
protection authority and is a key factor in providing tailor-made protection to suit the needs of the witness.”51
2. Suitability of a Witness
In deciding whether to admit a person to a protection programme, the authority will have to balance
the threat against the ability of the witness (and family members) to maintain secrecy otherwise they risk
putting themselves and the programme’s integrity in jeopardy. Another factor is whether there is a likelihood
of relapse into criminal activity. Most protected witnesses are so-called career criminals who have never held
legitimate employment and only know a life of crime. Finally, there is the person’s willingness to abide by
47 Ibid, p.56.
48 Ibid, p.61.
49 Ibid, p.61.
50 Ibid, p.62.
51 Ibid, p.63.
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the strict limitations imposed by protection programmes on their personal life. Experience shows that over
time, many witnesses refuse to resign themselves to the restrictions imposed and either decides to leave the
programme voluntarily or are removed.52
4. The Agreement between the Protected Person and the Witness Protection Authority
Upon admission to a programme, witnesses and other protected persons are required to conclude a
memorandum of understanding (MOU), which defines the rights and obligations of both parties. The MOU
usually includes:
1) “a declaration by the witness that his or her admission to the protection programme is entirely
voluntary and that any assistance must not be construed as a reward for testifying;
2) the scope and character of the protection and assistance to be provided;
3) a list of measures that could be taken by the protection unit to ensure the physical security of the
witness;
4) the obligations of the witness and possible sanctions for violations;
5) the conditions governing the programme’s termination.”54
52 Ibid, p.63-64.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid, p.65.
55 Ibid, p.67.
56 Ibid.
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personal documentation.
Terms and conditions between the sending and receiving country are negotiated and set forth in an
agreement. Generally, the sending authority hands over responsibility for the safety of the protected persons
and is obliged to go through the receiving authority for any further contact with the witness. The receiving
country usually assumes all costs related to the protection measures. However, others negotiate a cost-sharing
agreement with the sending county and yet others require full reimbursement.57
With respect to the integration of the protected person(s), the receiving country may assist them in
finding employment and provide them with training, language courses, health care and other social benefits.
The immigration laws of the receiving country will determine whether protected persons are allowed to work
and may be able to issue them temporary work permits. Financial payments should take into account the
standard of living of the witness prior to entering the programme. However, only legally obtained assets are
taken into account in this assessment
Identity change is not done the same way in all programmes. In some cases, the identity change is a
permanent change in others, a new identity is provided. If the witness leaves or is terminated from the
programme, he/she can go back to their former identity.
Relocation and identity change can be especially difficult for accompanying persons, especially
children. Also electronics and internet use provides serious challenges for protected persons and for the
programmes. Witnesses can easily be traced by electronic devices, cell phone and the internet. It is not
possible for any programme to monitor every witness’ use.
H. Financing
The costs associated with setting up a witness protection programme are among the main reasons
countries hesitate to begin. There is no doubt that the costs for such programmes are expensive and this is the
main reason why such programmes must be aimed at only the most important cases and within these, only for
those witnesses who meet other criteria previously discussed.
The costs needs to be weighed against the possible benefits, such as disruption or dismantling of
criminal groups by being able to get to their leaders, shorter investigations and more efficient high level
prosecutions.
In the beginning, witness protection programmes tend to be too ambitious and seek to cover too many
witnesses. Over time, strained resources and greater experience will allow for stricter criteria to be applied to
limit the number of participants. Even so, it is not easy to predict how many cases in the future will require
the services of a protection programme. For these reasons, it is important that when preparing a budget, the
concept of sustainability must be factored in. Funds need to be adequate to sustain relocation of witnesses for
some years. As protection is a long-term commitment, expenses are cumulative. Even after the end of the
initial resource-intensive period of relocation, some aftercare is often provided through periodic threat
assessment and emergency responses to counter any unexpected resurgence of the threat.
Countries where a family unit means an extended family face higher costs per witness. In some cases,
even where the number of cases decreases, costs can remain stable or even increase. This can occur because
57 Ibid, p.84.
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attention is focused on more important case where strong criminal groups are involved, making the
application of protection measures more vigorous and hence, more expensive.
Basic costs include:
a) Premises, equipment and training
b) Staff salaries and overtime;
c) Travel costs
d) Psychological assessment and counseling for witnesses (and for staff) if a person who can do these
is not hired on a full-time basis;
e) Financial allowances/payments to witnesses
f) Other costs of support, such as vocational, education, language training.
Expenses differ from state to state, and are dependant upon some of the following variables:
a) Existence of and use of alternative police arrangement for emergency and temporary security
provisions;
b) Admission criteria;
c) Socio-cultural environment which will impact how many family member will generally need to
accompany a witness;
d) The duration of stay in a programme;
e) Cost of living, including in relocation areas;
f) Fast and significant changes in the inflation rate;
g) Overreaching ability of organized criminal groups (for how long? Inside the entire country as well
as in other jurisdictions?)
h) The efficiency of a criminal justice system, which means how long a person has to be protected
before the trial can greatly increase the need for protection and its costs.
In order to fund a programme, it is important to have a regular source of funding and to have some
emergency funds in reserve. Funding might also come from the proceeds from the assets that witnesses
entering the program are obliged to hand over if acquired by illegal means. However, it is inadvisable to fund
programmes solely through sources that could vary year to year such as through proceeds of asset forfeitures.
The experience of others provides some recommendations for those states wanting to provide
protection measures and even establish dedicated witness protection programmes. First, counties can begin to
gain experience by using police and procedural protection measures. These measures when applied
appropriately by trained personnel can provide adequate protection for the vast majority of witnesses in need,
keeping in mind that protection measures are just one of other important tools that must be collectively and
effectively applied. If the legislative framework is not up to date or does not allow for needed measures,
establish an interagency task force that can educate itself on what is wrong and what could be improved. Such
as task force should ideally embrace officials of relevant law enforcement and judicial authorities, including
prison authorities, other governmental agencies, persons responsible for legislative drafting and policy
making. authorities, and NGOs, academics institutions or civil society institutions in order that they will
understand and support any required changes.
For those moving to the establishment of covert protection programmes, it is suggested that they take
serious the need to prioritize the kind of cases the protection programme will be used for as well as to
properly and effectively use threat assessments. All actors involved in this process should be clear about what
a witness protection programme is intended to provide and why. The term, “a tool of last resort” can not be
understated.
One of the common mistakes of countries is to want to and try to protect too many witnesses at the
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beginning. Instead, programmes should begin by taking just a few witnesses in a year in order to gain
experience and confidence. It has to be remembered that the integrity of any programme - keeping witnesses
safe and keeping operations confidential- is crucial to its long-term viability.
With respect to funding, it is difficult in the beginning to predict costs as there is a cumulative effect
for each witness; moreover extended families will quickly drain resources. A safe rule to go by is to expect
the unexpected by ensuring there is some reserve funding in case of emergencies. At the same time, protection
programmes need to progressively build cooperation with other counties. This too takes time because
cooperation in this area requires the trust and confidence of potential partners for the relocation of witnesses.
Finally, due to its nature, the community of witness protection authorities is a close group and most
are willing to provide expertise and other support to developing programmes.
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