US vs.

Tanedo
Facts: On January 26, 1909, Cecilio Tanedo, a landowner, went with some workers to
work on the dam on his land, carrying with him his shotgun & a few shells. Upon reaching
the dam, the accused went on his way to hunt for wild chickens, meeting the victim,
Feliciano Sanchez, the latter's Mother and Uncle. The accused went into the forest upon
the recommendation of the deceased to continue his search for the elusive wild chickens.
Upon seeing one, Tanedo shot one, but simultaneously, he heard a human cry out in
pain. After seeing that Sanchez was wounded, Tanedo ran back to his workers and asked
one, Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide the body, which they did by putting it amidst
the tall cogon grass, & later burying in an old well. Only 1 shot was heard that morning &
a chicken was killed by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found at the scene of
the crime. There was no enmity between the accused and the deceased. Prior to the trial,
the accused denied all knowledge of the crime, but later confessed during the trial. The
lower court found the accused guilty of homicide, having invited the deceased into the
forest & intentionally shooting him in the chest. Accused was sentenced to 14 yrs, 8 mos
& 1 day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnifications & costs. The accused
appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty

Held: No. The idea that Tanedo intended to kill Sanchez is negated by the fact that the
chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having only one shot fired. Also,
according to:
§ Article 1 of the Penal Code: Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions
punished by law…
§ Article 8: He who while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by
mere accident without liability or intention of causing it.
§ Section 57 of Code of Criminal Procedure: A defendant in a criminal action shall be
presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt
that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal. In this case there
is no evidence of negligence on the part of the accused, nor is it disputed that the accused
was engaged in a legal act, nor is there evidence that the accused intended to kill the
deceased. The only thing suspicious is his denial of the act and his concealment of the
body. The court quoted State vs. Legg: "Where accidental killing is relied upon as a
defense, the accused is not required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the
evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the state
to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that
for the state and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing
was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit."
Court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.

People vs. Fallorina

Facts:At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent asked permission from his
mother Felicisima if he could play outside. She agreed.5 Together with his playmate
Whilcon "Buddha" Rodriguez, Vincent played with his kite on top of the roof of an
abandoned carinderia beside the road in Sitio Militar, Barangay Bahay Toro. Beside
thiscarinderia was a basketball court, where fourteen-year-old Ricardo Salvo and his
three friends, nicknamed L.A., Nono and Puti, were playing backan, a game of basketball.

Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from the main road across the
basketball court. He was nonplussed when he looked at the person driving the
motorcycle and recognized the appellant. Ricardo knew that the appellant abhorred
children playing on the roof of the carinderia and berated them for it. His friend Ong-ong
had previously been scolded by the appellant for playing on the roof.

Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When the appellant
saw Vincent and Whilcon, the former stopped his motorcycle and shouted at them,
"Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo magsibaba d'yan!" After hearing the shouts of
the appellant, Whilcon immediately jumped down from the roof. 6 Vincent, meanwhile,
was lying on his stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he heard the appellant's
shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. Vincent turned his back, ready to get
down from the roof. Suddenly, the appellant pointed his .45 caliber pistol7 towards the
direction of Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent was hit on the left parietal area. He fell
from the roof, lying prostrate near the canal beside the abandoned carinderia and the
basketball court.8

Whilcon rushed to help Vincent up but was shocked when he saw blood on the latter's
head. Whilcon retreated and left his friend.9 The appellant approached Vincent and
carried the latter's hapless body in a waiting tricycle and brought him to the Quezon City
General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead on arrival.

Meantime, word reached Vincent's parents that their son was shot and brought to the
hospital. They rushed to the hospital, only to see their son's already lifeless body. The
appellant was nowhere to be found.

Issue: WON the appellant is exempted from criminal liability

Held:NO. The basis for the exemption is the complete absence of intent and negligence
on the part of the accused. For the accused to be guilty of a felony, it must be committed
either with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.

The elements of this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful
act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4)
without any fault or intention of causing it. An accident is an occurrence that "happens
outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act of our will,
lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences." If the consequences
are plainly foreseeable, it will be a case of negligence.

In this case, the appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, his defense.
First. The appellant appended to his counter-affidavit in the Office of the Quezon City
Prosecutor the pictures showing the hole on the roof of the carinderia to prove that he
shot the victim accidentally. However, when the investigating prosecutor propounded
clarificatory questions on the appellant relating to the pictures, the latter refused to
answer.
Second. The appellant did not see what part of the gun hit the victim. There is no
evidence showing that the gun hit a hard object when it fell to the ground, what part of
the gun hit the ground and the position of the gun when it fell from the appellant's waist.

Third. In answer to the clarificatory questions of the court, the appellant testified that the
chamber of his pistol was loaded with bullets and was cocked when he placed it on his
right waistline. He also testified that the gun's safety lock was on. He was asked if the
gun would fire if the hammer is moved backward with the safety lock in place, and the
appellant admitted that even if he pulled hard on the trigger, the gun would not fire

Fourth. The trial court was witness as the appellant's counsel himself proved that the
defense proffered by the appellant was incredible.
Fifth. After the shooting, the appellant refused to surrender himself and his service
firearm. He hid from the investigating police officers and concealed himself in the house
of his friend SPO3 Angelito Lam in Valenzuela City, and transferred from one house to
another for three days to prevent his arrest:

Amployo vs. People

Facts:Kristine Joy Mosquera was eight years old on 27 June 1997 , [8] having celebrated
her eighth year the day before. A grade III student, she was walking to school (which was
just a short distance from her house) at around seven oclock in the morning when she
was met by petitioner who emerged from hiding from a nearby store. Petitioner and
Kristine Joy were neighbors. Petitioner approached Kristine Joy, touched her head,
placed his hand on her shoulder where it then moved down to touch her breast several
times. Petitioner thereafter told Kristine Joy not to report to anybody what he did to her.

This was not the first time that the incident happened as petitioner had done this several
times in the past, even when Kristine Joy was still in Grade II. However, it was only during
this last incident that Kristine Joy finally told somebody ' her grandmother, who
immediately talked to Gnelida Mosquera, Kristine Joy's mother.
Mrs. Mosquera conferred with Kristine Joy who said that petitioner would sometimes
even insert his hand under her shirt to caress her breast. Mother and child then reported
the matter to the barangay. From the barangay, the case was referred to the DSWD then
to the Police Department of Subic,Zambales.

On 07 November 1997, Kristine Joy was seen by a psychologist, witnessLucrecia Cruz,

who reported that Kristine Joy was a victim of sexual abuse and was showing unusual
behavior as a result thereof. Among other things, Ms. Cruz detected in the eight-year old
child feelings of insecurity, anger, anxiety and depression. Guilt feelings were also
noted. All in all, Kristine Joy appeared on the surface to be a child with normal behavior
despite the experience, but on a deeper level, she developed a fear of going to school as
petitioner might again be hiding in the store waiting for her. She was deeply bothered
during the interview and even uttered ' Nahihiya ako sa mga magulang ko at
uncle ko bakatuksuhin akong bobo na hindi ko agad sinabi.

Kristine Joy continued going to school, but this time accompanied always by an adult
relative.
Issue: WON the accuse is criminally liable.
Held: NO. Petitioner cannot take refuge in his version of the story as he has conveniently
left out details which indubitably prove the presence of lewd design. It would have been
easy to entertain the possibility that what happened was merely an accident if it only
happened once. Such is not the case, however, as the very same petitioner did the very
same act to the very same victim in the past. Moreover, the incident could never be
labeled as accidental as petitioner's hand did not just slip from Kristine Joy's shoulder to
her breast as there were times when he would touch her breast from under her
shirt. Finally, the theory that what happened was accidental is belied by petitioner having
threatened Kristine Joy to keep silent and not tell on him.
People vs. Latosa
Facts:

On February 5, 2002, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Susan Latosa, herein appellant,
together with his husband Major Felixberto Sr. and two children Sassymae and Michael,
were in their house in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig. While Major Felixberto Sr. was asleep,
Sassymae saw her mother take Felixberto Sr.’s gun and leave. She asked her mother
where she was going and if she could come along, appellant refused.

Moments later, appellant returned and told Sassymae to buy ice cream. After Sassymae
left, appellant instructed Michael to join his sister, but he refused. Appellant thereafter
turned up the volume of the television and radio to full. Shorty after that, appellant gave
her son money to buy food. After buying his food, Michael went back to their house and
thereupon saw his friend Mac-Mac who told him that he saw appellant running away
from their house. Moments later, a certain Sgt. Ramos arrived and asked if something
had happened in their house. Michael replied in the negative then entered their house.
At that point, he saw his father lying on the bed with a hole in the left portion of his head
and a gun at his left hand. Michael immediately went outside and informed Sgt. Ramos
about what happened. Sgt. Ramos told him that appellant had reported the shooting
incident to the Provost Marshall office. Then, Sassymae arrived and saw her father with
a bullet wound on his head and a gun near his left hand. Appellant claimed that the
killing was an accident, that when Felixberto, Sr. woke up, he asked her to get his
service pistol from the cabinet adjacent to their bed. As she was handing the pistol to
him it suddenly fired, hitting Felixberto, Sr. who was still lying down.

 The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of parricide.
The RTC, in finding appellant guilty, considered the following circumstantial evidence
established by the prosecution: (1) shortly before the shooting, appellant asked her two
(2) children to do errands for her which were not usually asked of them; (2) at the time
of the shooting, only the appellant and

Felixberto, Sr. were in the house; (3) appellant was seen running away
from the house immediately after the shooting; (4) when Michael went inside their
house, he found his father with
a hole in the head and a gun in his left hand; (5) the medico-legal report showed that
the cause of death was intracranial hemorrhage due to the gunshot wound on the head
with the point of entry at the left temporal region; (6) the Firearms Identification Report
concluded that appellant fired two (2) shots; (7) Felixberto, Sr. was right-handed and the
gun was found near his left hand; (8) Sassymae testified that she heard Sta. Inez tell
appellant “bakit mo inamin. Sana pinahawak mo kay Major iyong baril saka mo
pinutok”; (9) appellant’s children testified that they were informed by Felixberto, Sr.
regarding the threat of appellant’s paramour, Sta. Inez, to the whole family; and

(10) Francisco Latosa presented a memorandum showing that appellant was terminated
from her teaching job by reason of immorality.

 The CA upheld the decision of the RTC. The CA held that since appellant admitted
having killed her husband albeit allegedly by accident, she has the burden of proving
the presence of the exempting circumstance of accident to relieve herself of criminal
responsibility. She must rely on the strength of her own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the
appellant has admitted the killing.

Issue: WON appellant has strongly established the exempting circumstance of accident
to relieve him from criminal liability.

Held: No. Since appellant argues that the exempting circumstance of accident should
be appreciated by the Court in her favor, it is therefore incumbent upon her to prove
with clear and convincing evidence that the following essential requisites of the
exempting circumstance are present: [1] she was performing a lawful act; [2] with due
care; [3] she caused the injury to her husband by mere accident; and [4] without fault or
intention of causing it. The Court however, found it incredulous that the pointing of the
gun towards her husband’s head and pulling the trigger be considered as performing a
lawful act with due care.