G.R. No.

L-20687 April 30, 1966

MAXIMINO VALDEPEÑAS, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Appeal by petitioner Maximino Valdepeñas from a decision of the Court of Appeals,

affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, convicting him of the crime of
abduction with consent, and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
three (3) months and twenty-five (25) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year, eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, to indemnify Ester Ulsano in the sum of P1,000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The only question raised by petitioner is whether "the Court of Appeals erred in not
reversing the decision of the trial court, dated June 30, 1960, for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused and the subject matter of the action for the offense of
abduction with consent".

The pertinent facts are: On January 25, 1956, Ester Ulsano, assisted by her mother,
Consuelo Ulsano, filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Piat, Cagayan, a criminal
complaint,1 duly subscribed and sworn to by both, charging petitioner Maximino
Valdepeñas with forcible abduction with rape of Ester Ulsano. After due preliminary
investigation, the second stage of which was waived by Valdepeñas, the justice of the
peace of Piat found that there was probable cause and forwarded the complaint to the
court of first instance of Cagayan2 in which the corresponding information for forcible
abduction with rape3 was filed.4 In due course, said court of first instance rendered
judgment5 finding petitioner guilty as charged and sentencing him accordingly.6

On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals7 modified the decision of the court
of first instance, convicted him of abduction with consent and meted out to him the
penalty set forth in the opening paragraph of this decision. 1äwphï1.ñët

A motion for reconsideration and new trial having been filed by petitioner contesting the
finding, made by the Court of Appeals, to the effect that complainant was below 18
years of age at the time of the occurrence, said Court 8granted the motion, set aside its
aforementioned decision and remanded the case to the court a quo for the reception of
additional evidence on said issue. After a retrial, the court of first instance rendered
another decision,9reiterating said finding of the Court of Appeals, as well as its
judgment 10 of conviction for abduction with consent and the penalty imposed therein.
Petitioner appealed again to the Court of Appeals 11 which 12 affirmed that of the court of
first instance 13 with costs against the petitioner. Again petitioner filed 14 a motion for
reconsideration based, for the first time, upon the ground that "the lower court had no
jurisdiction over the person of appellant and over the subject matter of the action, with
respect to the offense of abduction with consent." Upon denial of the motion, 15petitioner
interposed the present appeal by certiorari.

Petitioner's theory is that no complaint for abduction with consent has been filed by
either Ester Ulsano or her mother, Consuelo Ulsano, and that, accordingly, the lower
court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction with
consent and had, therefore, no authority to convict him of said crime. We find no merit in
this pretense.

Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension,
with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 16 In the case at
bar, it is not claimed that petitioner had not been apprehended or had not submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Indeed, although brought before the bar of justice
as early as January 25, 1956, first, before the then justice of the peace court of Piat,
then before the court of first instance of Cagayan, later before the Court of Appeals,
thereafter back before said court of first instance, and then, again, before the Court of
Appeals, never, within the period of six (6) years that had transpired until the Court of
Appeals, rendered its last decision, 17 had he questioned the judicial authority of any of
these three (3) courts over his person. He is deemed, therefore, to have waived
whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his person, and, hence, to
have submitted himself to the Court's jurisdiction. What is more, his behaviour and
every single one of the steps taken by him before said courts — particularly the motions
therein filed by him — implied, not merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but,
also, that he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person.

Upon the other hand, it is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an
action — in this lease the crime of abduction with consent — is and may be
conferred only by law; 18 that jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon a
particular court, may not be conferred thereto by the parties involve in the offense; and
that, under an information for forcible abduction, the accused may be convicted of
abduction with consent. 19 It is true that, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code,

. . . the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not

be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been
expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be.

The provision does not determine, however, the jurisdiction of our courts over the
offenses therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same is
governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised Penal Code, which deals
primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the
culprits. The complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a condition precedent to
the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And
such condition has been imposed "out of consideration for the offended woman and her
family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the
scandal of a public trial." 20

In the case at bar, the offended woman and her mother have negated such preference
by filing the complaint adverted to above and going through the trials and tribulations
concomitant with the proceedings in this case, before several courts, for the last ten (10)
years. Petitioner says that the complaint was for forcible abduction, not abduction with
consent; but, as already adverted to, the latter is included in the former. Referring
particularly to the spirit of said provision of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, we
believe that the assent of Ester Ulsano and her mother to undergo the scandal of a
public trial for forcible abduction necessarily connotes, also, their willingness to face the
scandal attendant to a public trial for abduction with consent.

The gist of petitioner's pretense is that there are some elements of the latter which are
not included in the former, and, not alleged, according to him, in the complaint filed
herein, 21 namely: 1) that the offended party is a virgin; and 2) that she is over 12 and
under 18 years of age. The second element is clearly set forth in said complaint, which
states that Ester Ulsano is "a minor ... 17 years of age ...", and, hence, over 12 and
below 18 years of age.

As regards the first element, it is settled that the virginity mentioned in Article 343 of the
Revised Penal Code, 22 as an essential ingredient of the crime of abduction with
consent, should not be understood in its material sense and does not exclude the idea
of abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation, 23 because the essence of the
offense "is not the wrong done to the woman, but the outrage to the family and the
alarm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its members." 24

The complaint in the case at bar 25 alleges, not only that Ester Ulsano is a minor 17
years of age, but also that petitioner "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously" took her "by
force and violence ... against her will and taking advantage of the absence of her
mother" from their dwelling and carried "her to a secluded spot to gain carnal
intercourse with the offended party against her will, using force, intimidation and
violence, with lewd designs." This allegation implies that Ester is a minor living
under patria protestas, and, hence, single, thus leading to the presumption that she is a
virgin, 26 apart from being virtuous and having a good reputation, 27 for, as Chief Justice
Moran has aptly put it, the presumption of innocence includes, also, that of morality and
decency, and, as a consequence, of chastity. 28

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner Maximino Valdepeñas. It is so ordered.
[ GR No. 38725, Oct 31, 1933 ]

PEOPLE v. PEDRO MANABA +

This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Eulalio Garcia in the

Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros in criminal case No.
1827 dated November 15, 1932, finding the defendant guilty of
rape and sentencing him to suffer seventeen years and four
months of reclusion temporal, and the accessory penalties of the
law, to indemnify the offended party, Celestina Adapon, in the
amount of P500, to maintain the offspring, if any, at P5 a month
until said offspring should become of age, and to pay the costs.
The defendant appealed to this court, and his attorney de
oficio now makes the following assignments of error:
"1. El Juzgado a quo erro al no estimar en favor del acusado apelante la
defensa de double jeopardy o legal jeopardy que ha interpuesto.
"2. El Juzgado a quo erro al no declarar insuficientes las pruebas de
identificacion del acusado apelante.
"3. El Juzgado a quo tambien erro al pasar por alto las incoherencias de los
testigos de la acusacion y al no declarar que no se ha establecido fuera de
toda duda la responsabilidad del apelante.
"4. El Juzgado a quo erro al condenar al acusado apelante por el delito de
violacion y al no acceder a su mocion de nueva vista."
It appears that on May 10, 1932, the chief of police of Dumaguete
subscribed and swore to a criminal complaint wherein he charged
Pedro Manaba with the crime of rape, committed on the person of
Celestina Adapon. This complaint was filed with the justice of the
peace of Dumaguete on June 1, 1932, and in due course the case
reached the Court of First Instance. The accused was tried and
convicted, but on motion of the attorney for the defendant the
judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on the ground that
the court had no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or
the subject matter of the action, because the complaint had not
been filed by the offended party, but by the chief of police
(criminal case No. 1801).
On August 17, 1932, the offended girl subscribed and swore to a
complaint charging the defendant with the crime of rape. This
complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance (criminal case
No. 1827), but was referred to the justice of the peace of
Dumaguete for preliminary investigation. The defendant waived
his right to the preliminary investigation, but asked for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that he had previously
been placed in jeopardy for the same offense. This motion was
denied by the justice of the peace, and the case was remanded to
the Court of First Instance, where the provincial fiscal in an
information charged the defendant with having committed the
crime of rape as follows:
"Que en o hacia la noche del dia 9 de mayo de 1932, en el Municipio de
Dumaguete, Provincia de Negros Oriental, Islas Filipinas, y dentro de la
jurisdiccion de este Juzgado. el referido acusado Pedro Manaba,
aprovechandose de la oscuridad de la noche y mediante fuerza, violencia e
intimidacion, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente yacio y tuvo acceso carnal
con una niña llamada Celestina Adapon, contra la voluntad de esta. El
acusado Pedro Manaba ya ha sido convicto por Juzgado competente y en
sentencia firme por este mismo delito de violacion.
"Hecho cometido con infraccion de la ley."
The defendant renewed his motion for dismissal in the case on the
ground of double jeopardy, but his motion was denied; and upon
the termination of the trial the defendant was found guilty and
sentenced as hereinabove stated.
Whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy for the second time
or not when he was tried in the present case depends on whether
or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. The
offense in question was committed on May 9, 1932, or subsequent
to the date when the Revised Penal Code became effective.
The third paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
which relates to the prosecution of the crimes of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness reads as follows:
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall
not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or
her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be."
The Spanish text of this paragraph is as follows:
"Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o abusos
deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte agraviada, o de sus
padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al ofensor,
perdon expreso por dichas partes, segun los casos."
It will be observed that the Spanish equivalent of the word "filed"
is not found in the Spanish text, which is controlling, as it was the
Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code that was approved by the
Legislature.
The first complaint filed against the defendant was signed and
sworn to by the chief of police of Dumaguete. As it was not the
complaint of the offended party, it was not a valid complaint in
accordance with the law. The judgment of the court was therefore
void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and the
defendant was never in jeopardy.
It might be observed in this connection that the judgment was set
aside and the case dismissed on the motion of defendant's
attorney, who subsequently set up the plea of double jeopardy in
the present case.
The other assignments of error relate to the sufficiency of the
evidence, which in our opinion fully sustains the findings of the
trial judge.
The recommendation of the Solicitor-General is erroneous in
several respects, chiefly due to the fact that it is based on the
decision of July 30, 1932 that was set aside, and not on the
decision now under consideration. The accused should not be
ordered to acknowledge the offspring, if should there be any,
because the record shows that the accused is a married man.
It appears that the lower court should have taken into
consideration the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. The
defendant is therefore sentenced to suffer seventeen years, four
months, and one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the
offended party, Celestina Adapon, in the sum of P500, and to
support the offspring, if any. As thus modified, the decision
appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of both instances against
the appellant.
Street, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.