Guglielmo De Puppi Milan, the 10th of November,2018

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VIRTUES AND VICES OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT

The aim of this essay is to analyse the positive and negative sides of semipresidentialism after
considering how it developed (historical context is always a useful tool) and the characteristics
which distinguish it. We will concentrate on Durverger and other scholars’ description to capture its
specific aspects, then look a bit deeper into the content of constitutions to see how this system can
be very different from state to state, and how in each state can both provide optimal political
solutions or vice versa result in impasses not profitable for genuine democratic debate. Among the
“virtues” we will talk about the providing of stability, flexibility and the prevention from a party or
a single person controlling the political scenario. Among the “vices” we will mention cohabitation,
problems of coordination (legitimacy and accountability), the risk of authoritarian tendencies in
some countries.

The term semipresidentialism was initially introduced by the French journalist Hubert Beuve-Mèry
in a 1959 article (Le Monde, “De la dictature temporaire au régime semi-présidentiel”), although it
was Maurice Duverger, a French jurist, that further developed (in “Echec au roi” and in “A New
Political System Model--Semi-Presidential Government”, published in the European Journal of
Political Research) the concept, still today debated and controversial, of this form of government
with its peculiar features. Semipresidentialism emerged in particular after Duverger’s studies on the
historical processes which led to the formation of the French Fifth Republic. The weak parliamentary
system that characterized the Fourth Republic was infact substituted by a semi-presidential form of
government with the establishment of a new constitution, proposed in 1958 by Charles De Gaulle,
which guaranteed the direct election of the President of the Republic (in 1965 the first popular
election took place). However, semipresidentialism had already developed before in other states as
Finland, the Weimar Republic, Austria, Ireland and Iceland. It was introduced in Portugal after the
fall of the regime and the Carnation Revolution and spread consistently between the late 80s and
first 90s, promoted by the third wave of democratization, in countries as Poland, Ukraine and Russia.
In our days some experts count more than 50 semi-presidential systems, others say that the total
number hovers between 30-40.

Before starting a brief explanation of the basic aspects of this political system we should spend a
few words on the two predominant forms of government of which semipresidentialism is a sort of
way in between. In presidential systems the executive power is attributed only to the head of state,
while legislative power is in the hands of parliament. In a parliamentary form, instead, the the head
of state is distinct from the head of government, whose role is that to lead the executive with the
support of the majority of parliament (confidence).

Semipresidentialism can be defined as an attempt to overcome the dichotomy between

presidentialism and parliamentarism and to address inadequacies of both systems. According to
Duverger’s analysis, which focuses primarily on the content of the constitution, there are three
fundamental parameters to determine whether dealing with semi-presidential form of government
or not: first of all the president of the republic must be elected through popular and universal
suffrage; secondly, he or she must possess some determinant powers; finally, he or she must share
the guidance of the state with a prime minister and other ministers responsible for the executive;
they will stay in office relying on the support of the parliament (and in some cases of the president
him/herself). However, these criteria are not always respected, therefore they not completely
reliable to determine if a state can be considered semi-presidential. It is just sufficient to look back
at the history of one of the countries that are part of the so called “pleaide” (the seven states that
were taken into consideration by Duverger), as Finland, to realize that the president is not always
directly elected by people (the president of the republic was chosen by an electoral college until
1986). The second and third parameters also should be clarified. It is surely true that the president
has important powers, however they can vary a lot depending on the constitutional asset of a state.

The fundamental aspect of semipresidentialism is represented by the presence of both a Head of

State and a Head of Government (each of them has precise competences). While the president of
the republic receives his mandate through a direct election, the prime minister is appointed by the
president himself and almost exactly as in a parliamentary system his executive can be carried out
if and only if he has the confidence of parliament. From both a legal and political prospective this
form of government is based on an enduring principle, that of a balance between three political
bodies, the Head of State, the Head of Government, and Parliament, achieved through “the creation
and functioning of dynamic relations of mutual interactions” (“The Semi-Presidential System”,
Vitalino Canas). These mutual interactions must be guaranteed by the constitution and at the same
time by the political context, and, depending on the country, can take various forms and work in
different ways. In order for these bodies to interact in a constructive manner two conditions are
required: an equal level of legitimacy and a correct distribution of powers between them.
Differences in legitimacy would make it difficult for the political system to work as a semi-
presidential form of government. Actually, all the three bodies equally rely on direct election (the
investiture of a prime minister by the majority of parliament can be considered equivalent to direct
suffrage). Let’s imagine for instance that the Head of State is selected and removed by Parliament:
that would clearly generate a situation of imbalance in the system. Legitimacy is necessary but
insufficient alone. If powers are not endowed in such a way that favours interactions, again, the
semi-presidential form of government would fail. There is no fixed scheme for distribution of powers
as long as the principle of balance is respected: therefore, no possibility for one body to acquire
essential and permanent influence over the others.

According to Duverger, semi-presidential states can differ a lot on the basis of powers given to the
president of the republic. Infact, he distinguishes between three different “models” of president
analysing “the actual content of the constitution” (we will focus on this aspect) and other factors as
“the combination of tradition and circumstances”, “the composition of parliamentary majority”,
“the position of the president in relation to this majority” (“Semi-presidentialism-Duverger’s
Concept, A New Political System Model”, Ernst Veser, University of Cologne). “Some constitutions
provide these controlling powers only to the head of state, notably by referring laws to the
constitutional court, the right of dissolution of parliament, the use of referendum, and orders in
council in exceptional circumstances”. In this case we talk about “all-powerful” president and find a
evident example in France. Some other constitutions add to powers mentioned before that to
dismiss the prime minister at the discretion of the president. In these states the government, in
order to stay in office, must rely on the confidence of parliament and at the same time of the
president of the republic. The head of state, therefore, shares his powers with the parliament. In
this category we could mention Portugal, although it confers the president diverse powers
compared to France. Actually, we should also refer to those constitutions which make “the
governing president more than a controlling force”: he shares executive powers with prime minister
and the cabinet. Finally, there are presidents who act merely as figureheads and have a more
marginal role in the guidance of the state (e.g. Austria and Ireland).
Actually, we could make a further distinction between semi-presidential forms of government.
Basing on what we have previously said, infact, we already know that in all forms of
semipresidentialism the president of the republic appoints the prime minister. In most semi-
presidential systems, the president cannot dismiss the head of government, though. We talk, for
this particular configuration of powers, about premier-presidentialism. The expression “president-
parliamentarism” is used, instead, when referring to constitutions which allow the head of state not
only to appoint but also to dismiss the prime minister, even if he has the support of parliament. The
former resembles a parliamentary system, the latter is nearer to a presidential form of government.

After looking at the structures which characterize semi-presidential system and differences
between the various forms it can assume in the preceding paragraphs, we will eventually focus on
the evaluation of its positive and negative sides, looking at some concrete examples. We must keep
in mind, however, that semipresidentialism, as it was underlined before, is still a very debated
constitutional form of government, and that many scholars have still sceptical opinions about it.

To begin with, among the “virtues”, experts, as Oreste Massari and Gianfranco Pasquino, mention
the fact that a fixed term president of the republic is essential to guarantee stability in the case of a
political crisis. If an unpopular prime minister is in office, for example, he can be removed by
parliament and subsequently replaced. In the meantime the head of state assumes
“extraordinary” powers in order to maintain the political apparatus of the state in function. Dual
legitimacies can prevent from deadlocks in legislation (especially in premier-presidential systems)
while the head of state acts as an arbiter. Actually, a second aspect that positively connotates
semipresidentialism is that of the presence of a dual executive (“bicephalous” system), with both a
president of the republic and a prime minister. Powers are shared and the president in turn has
limitations of independence in decision making, avoiding the risk of one single person taking all the
political scenario. Simultaneously the division of executive and the figure of the head of government
can result important to create political flexibility.

Sharing the executive power can unfortunately also end up in an impasse for semi-presidential
systems, known as cohabitation. This situation arises when the elected president and the majority
of parliament belong to different and competing parties. A diverse behaviour when voting for
president and parliament, as well as non-concurrent terms for the former and the latter can be two
possible causes of cohabitation. The last motivation was the reason for various periods of
cohabitation in France. The president term was seven years, that of the National Assembly, instead,
was five. The non- coincidence of the terms brought to three political impasses, the last one of
which, the longest, lasted from 1997 to 2002, and was defined by the president Chirac himself as a
state of “paralysis”. The rightist leader, in office since 1995, was infact forced, after the elections,
to appoint the socialist Lionel Jospin to premiership and to cooperate with a National Assembly
characterized by a left majority. A constitutional reform enacted in 2000, finally reduced president’s
term to five years with the objective of putting an end to the risks of cohabitation.

Another problem which can result from the sharing of powers is that of coordination. It has
sometimes happened, infact, that the competences of the president of the republic and the prime
minister are not well defined and specified by the constitution. In this case either circumstances or
previous agreements solve the situation, otherwise it is likely to end up in a conflict between the
two political bodies. This was the case of Poland back in 2008, when there was a long period of
debate between president Kaczyński and Donald Tusk on who was responsible of representing
Poland’s foreign policy in the European Council. The text of the constitution was very ambiguous on
the argument, containing articles which actually stated completely different things: Article 133 – 1.
“The President of the Republic, as representative of the State in foreign affairs...” – 3. “The President
of the Republic shall cooperate with the Prime Minister and the appropriate minister in respect of
foreign policy.” Article 146– “The Council of Ministers shall conduct the internal affairs and foreign
policy of the Republic of Poland.”. Almost like in presidentialism, even in semi-presidential systems
dual legitimacy can sometimes become a threat for interactions between the head of state and the
head of government. If semipresidentialism can be a good resource to generate conditions of
political stability and flexibility, at the same time it can bring to the exact opposite results, putting
into question the balance on which it is based. And finally, when a negative legislature, characterized
by wrong policies and reforms, is carried out, who is responsible for errors that have been made?
Accountability is another trivial point of a dual executive, being it difficult to determine who is it to
blame and for what.

Among the “vices”, what is surely the most negative side, being it also dangerous for the
maintenance of democracy within a country, is the risk of accumulation of powers in one institution,
fact which can occur in semi- presidential forms of government as well as under pure
presidentialism. The president of the republic does not only possess the power to conduct part of
the executive, as we have previously seen, but also to dismiss the chambers if the circumstances
force him to do so. The capability of the president to use the strong powers attributed to him by the
constitution in favour of his interests could easily lead to authoritarian tendencies and the abolition
of democratic principles. Especially with president-parliamentarism, in which the prime minister is
accountable to both president and parliament, this risk is tangible. An evident case of centralization
of powers in the hands of a single person, the president, is given by “Putin’s Russia”. After the fall
of the Soviet Union, in 1993 a new constitution was introduced, following the French model (very
powerful president). However, the Russian system granted the president even more powers: the
ability not only to dismiss the prime minister at his will, but also to dismiss parliament (Duma). In
the first section of the Russian constitution we find an entire chapter (chapter four, articles from 80
to 93) dedicated to the explanation of the roles of the president. Two of the most significant articles
recite the following:

Article 83. The President of the Russian Federation shall: a) appoint Chairman of the Government
of the Russian Federation subject to consent of the State Duma; b) have the right to preside over
meetings of the Government of the Russian Federation; c) decide on resignation of the Government
of the Russian Federation; …

Article 84.The President of the Russian Federation shall: a) call elections to the chambers of the
State Duma in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal law; b)
dissolve the State Duma in cases and under procedures envisaged by the Constitution of the Russian
Federation; c) call a referendum under procedures established by federal constitutional law; d)
introduce draft laws in the State Duma; e) sign and publish federal laws; f) present annual messages
to the Federal Assembly on the situation in the country and on basic directions of the internal and
external policies of the state.

The president has at his disposal a strong authority over the parliament and over prime minister,
therefore the balance on which semipresidentialism should be founded fails, although external
features of this system would still let us consider it semi-presidential. The political system together
with a constitution that, as we can clearly see from the above articles, guarantees huge powers (the
president in Russia is completely responsible of internal and foreign affairs), have been blamed in
recent years for having allowed Putin to obtain the almost total control over the country.

In conclusion, as I have tried to simply demonstrate in this piece of writing, semipresidentialism has
definitely some positive sides. It can grant stability in case of political crises, provide flexibility in the
executive, and at the same time prevent from single party-person taking all political scenario. All
these qualities can however turn easily into negative aspects as something affects the balance of
the system. Semipresidentialism has to handle the risks of cohabitation, coordination between the
head of state and head of government, dual legitimacy, and of deteriorating into authoritarian
system. All these threats of the systems are determined by its fragility. If the political context is
favourable to equal legitimacy and to a perfect balance, semipresidentialism can result in an
excellent form of government within democratic configurations. But when these fundamental and
basic requirements fail and the constitution is not strong enough to avoid deviations, then,
semipresidentialism will not be an optimal form of government.

REFERENCES

Ernst Veser, “Semi-presidentialism-Duverger’s Concept, A New Political System Model”,

Department of Political Science, School of Education, University of Cologne, pp 39-60.

Vitalino Canas, “The Semi-Presidential System”, 2004, Max-Planck-Institut fü r ausländisches

ö ffentliches Recht und Vö lkerrecht, pp 95-124.

Horst H. Bahro, “Virtues and Vices of Semi-Presidential Government”, Department of Political

Science, School of Education, University of Cologne, pp 1-37.

Justin Orland Frosini, “Introduction to Italian Public Law”, 2008, Giuffrè Editore, Chapter Three.

Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation:
Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism”,1993, Cambridge University Press, World’s Politics, Vol.
46, pp 1-22.

“Systems of Government: Semi-Presidential Models”, March 2012, Democracy Reporting

International, briefing paper no. 27.