EN BANC Paz and Teresita L.

Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of

the same Barangay and Municipality.
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, respondent OIC Governor, the pertinent portions of which read:
JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J. DE LA ROSA and JOSE M.
RESURRECCION, petitioners, xxx xxx xxx
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been
the Province of Rizal, HON. ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as appointed as such on March 20, 1986;
OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G.
MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and
V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and TERESITA L. in the performance of my duties thereof, I among others,
TOLENTINO, respondents. have signed as I did sign the unnumbered memorandum
ordering the replacement of all the barangay officials of all
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: the barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal;

An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin That the above cited memorandum dated December 1,
respondents from replacing them from their respective positions as 1986 was signed by me personally on February 8,1987;
Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal. That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to
all concerned the following day, February 9. 1987.
As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the
Petition, and petitioner's their Reply to respondents' Comment. FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.

In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.
Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other petitioners Angel S.
Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and
Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February
Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited
Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the
from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay
Barangay Election Act of 1982.
Councilmen, respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3
of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall
Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have
OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor was has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
"by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the
Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986, which
Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents provided:
Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S.
 SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By
employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in that date, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have
office until otherwise provided by proclamation or been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor
executive order or upon the designation or appointment could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate
and qualification of their successors, if such appointment respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
is made within a period of one year from February
25,1986. Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure
specially considering that the Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it
By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the
of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and that barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and communities.2 Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of
not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the local governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays
provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of form a part, 3 and limits the President's power to "general supervision"
Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been over local governments. 4 Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same
repealed for being inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
Provisional Constitution.
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
Examining the said provision, there should be no question that barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973 Constitution, may be three years ...
continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence
of any of the events mentioned. 1 Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law,
therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.
proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective Barangay
officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the designation Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent
of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one- between the term of six (6) years for elective Barangay officials and the
year period which ended on February 25, 1987. 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still
operative, pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold reading:
that February 8, 1977, should be considered as the effective date of
replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
keeping with the dictates of justice. proclamations letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
the aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed
to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor
Constitution reading. on February 8, 1987 designating respondents as the Barangay Captain
and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the
immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of
supersede all previous Constitutions. this Petition. Without costs. SO ORDERED.
 corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-
Republic of the Philippines Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares
SUPREME COURT at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Manila
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS
EN BANC state —

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY

CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC —
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set
forth below by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3,
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase
vs.
the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL
of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF
THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and
execute with the GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International
Marketing/Reservation System Contract or
BELLOSILLO, J.: other type of contract specified by the
Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the Manila Hotel. . . .
grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified b. The Highest Bidder must execute the
Filipinos, 1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with
of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila GSIS . . . .
Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not self-
executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement.
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING
Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national
BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER —
economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning
Bidder/Strategic Partner after the following conditions are
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance
met:
System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and a. Execution of the necessary contracts
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23,
eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise and/or 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. 2 In a b. Requisite approvals from the
close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the
 Government Corporate Counsel) are It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the
obtained. 3 national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the
national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match
Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a the highest bid in terms of price per share. 8
manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art.
Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . . 5 which respondent GSIS refused to XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy
accept. since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of done." 9
the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does
and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the
restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils,
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm. all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Banc after it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the
set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae. therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel
fall under the patrimonyof the nation. What is more, the mandate of the
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the
the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument Philippines as a State.
which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud
legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony,
and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being
the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the
become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51%
since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national
business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government- patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really
owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right
being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of
stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding
which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. 7 rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is
misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is
the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is
condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
bid had not yet taken place. action. 13

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been
should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in
capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the
not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that
for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
act required of them by petitioner. presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power
governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. law. 14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it
It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the has always been, that —
nation. 10 It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of
government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing .
is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with of the Constitution should be considered self-executing,
which all private rights must be determined and all public authority as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
administered.11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, implementing statute. 15
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract. Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —
principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and
carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am
government providing for the different departments of the governmental asking this question as the Chairman of
machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of the Committee on Style. If the wording of
citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general principle, such as "PREFERENCE" is given to QUALIFIED
those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self- FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why
 do we not make it clear? To qualified right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to
Filipinos as against aliens? be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution,
Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
the word "QUALIFIED?". available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean
that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely
"TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10,
whom? As against aliens or over aliens? second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third
paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are
that is understood. We use the word not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to
"QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
prospective laws will always lay down Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to
conditions under which business may be regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
done. For example, qualifications on the national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same
setting up of other financial structures, et logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by
cetera (emphasis supplied by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified
respondents) Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional
MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16
provisions are merely statements of principles and policies, which are
basically not self-executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are simply
way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for not in point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions on personal
enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-
as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details building 23 the promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of
may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature education.25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to the
of constitutional provisions. constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on
education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the of the youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human
constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice liberation and development.33 A reading of these provisions indeed
to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights
protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions
reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations must be
that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the based. Res ipsa loquitur.
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such
a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987
from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself
and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila
its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a City. 37During World War II the hotel
legislation to put it in operation. It is per sejudicially enforceable When was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military
our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall the hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the
give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's,
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost
right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be every political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any and reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by failedcoup d' etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed"
its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations President of the Philippine Republic.
must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus
ibi remedium. For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to
the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated
Commission 34 explains — with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
and developed refers not only to out rich natural constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock,
resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control
also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot
Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
mines and other natural resources but also the mental stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that
ability or faculty of our people. theFilipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold
is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38
to heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but Our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission
Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide
in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse is recognized.
for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant
events which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an
Center of the 1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the amendment to the Nolledo amendment.
inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official And the amendment would consist in
Guest House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries substituting the words "QUALIFIED
and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS
hospitality. 36 OF THE PHILIPPINES OR
CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS
WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING
STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
CITIZENS. COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL
xxx xxx xxx GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here,
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, as intended by the proponents, will include
apparently the proponent is agreeable, but not only individual Filipinos but also
we have to raise a question. Suppose it is Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-
a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, controlled by Filipinos. 40
do we not give it preference?
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment —
would refer to an individual Filipino. What
about a corporation wholly owned by MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like
Filipino citizens? to request Commissioner Nolledo to
please restate his amendment so that I
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, can ask a question.
Madam President.
MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention? RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND
CONCESSIONS COVERING THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we
PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE
would be limiting it if we say that the
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
preference should only be 100-percent
FILIPINOS."
Filipino.
MR FOZ. In connection with that
MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning
amendment, if a foreign enterprise is
clear because "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS"
qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also
may refer only to individuals and not to
qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be
juridical personalities or entities.
given a preference?
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
President. 39
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified
xxx xxx xxx
in some aspects than the Filipino
enterprise, will the Filipino still be
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I preferred?
request that the amendment be read
again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will
MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41
read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by
Nolledo continues — arguing that the subject provision is not self-executory and requires
implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of constitutional provision — by the government itself — is only too
"MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE STATE SHALL GlVE distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even some of the provisions
embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That means of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have
that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant of juridical life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We
concessions, privileges and rights covering the national cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the
patrimony. 42 failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In
fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission government is apt —
regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner
Nolledo 43 — The executive department has a constitutional duty to
implement laws, including the Constitution, even before
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro- Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable
Filipino" bias in all economic concerns. It is better known legal standards for executive action. When the executive
as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the
never found in previous Constitutions . . . . constitutional command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the
Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative of
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that
Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
preference shall be given to those citizens who can make
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation
a viable contribution to the common good, because of
every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional
credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT
command. That is not how constitutional government
mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to
operates. 45
Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would
be counter productive and inimical to the common good. Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed
to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a
separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and
specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be
concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
carried out with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent
"qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter
Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr. Joaquin G.
shall be chosen over the former."
Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents
GSIS and MHC a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so of persons distinct from the government are considered "state action"
considered by respondent GSIS and selected as one of covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public
the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in function;" (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the
accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and,
petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is
expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
another hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state
proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. 44 action." Without doubt therefore the transaction. although entered into by
respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a
subject to the constitutional command. 46 public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed
but also to the government as elements of the State. After all, to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid
government is composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative, of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the
the State is correspondingly directed to the three(3) branches of 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to
injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from skirting of the basic law.
the State.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These
the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into
negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do
requisite approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of the business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and
the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be the laws of the forum.
declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from
the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is
of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the
interested parties. bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino
qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional
rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong
being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel
law that all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had
the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being. matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by
respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the of action.
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer
this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard
that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the
of price per Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any
to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder other ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of
notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people. The
fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would
injunction itself. rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so
than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are
Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure
actions. that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are
not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It
Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48
execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business
the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the viability and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A
after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines
higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will always
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after
embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself
for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49
This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun,
under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a
the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino
it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less people and from whom all government authority emanates. In
undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal.
encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any interpretation of any
sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of
ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override
could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice the demands of nationalism. 50
Narvasa —
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
function to substitute its judgment for that of the privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a
legislature or the executive about the wisdom and commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted
feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines
Court has not been spared criticism for decisions as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would
perceived as obstacles to economic progress and prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the
development . . . in connection with a temporary dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines.
injunction issued by the Court's First Division against the Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role
sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and
partner, certain statements were published in a major culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul
daily to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates that — a place with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has
the Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to played a part in the shaping of a country. 51
doing business here.
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no of respondents to sell the historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of
business of the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this
epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable
alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we
ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified
Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and all that it
stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will
vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On
the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the
national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and
well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of
the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this
Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty
of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and
protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for purpose.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima,

Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines x---------------------------------------------------------x
SUPREME COURT
Manila G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

EN BANC ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M.

CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003 WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, vs.
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT,
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER x---------------------------------------------------------x
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
x---------------------------------------------------------x JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003 CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV, HENRY LANOT, KIM
HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners, BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS
QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention, BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO,
vs. FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO,
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents, SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR.,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO,
JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO
YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER
CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE
ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE
SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA,
ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, x---------------------------------------------------------x
REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR.,
AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents, G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR,
MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO,
x---------------------------------------------------------x EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE,
LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA,
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003 MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA,
WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL,
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA,
CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY
ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON
MALLARI, petitioners, ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS,
INC., petitioner-in-intervention, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER
vs. QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA,
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO
NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
REPRESENTATIVES,respondents, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention. vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON.
x---------------------------------------------------------x SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED
BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003 FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. x---------------------------------------------------------x

GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs. vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents. U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.
PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS,
x---------------------------------------------------------x LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON,
ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA,
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003 KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-
PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND vs.
ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners, VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT
vs. FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND
HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents. REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO
G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE vs.
G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents. x---------------------------------------------------------x

x---------------------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003 NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,

vs.
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN
vs. REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PRESIDENT, respondents. PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003 INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY
THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY
vs. LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU
DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents. PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
x---------------------------------------------------------x THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
PRESIDENT,respondents.
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U.
VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how
passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the
x---------------------------------------------------------x
determination by the independent branches of government of the nature,
scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003 Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional,
vs. at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the
PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE sentiments thereon.
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the
present controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing of
x---------------------------------------------------------x the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003 bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a
political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of
CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU conscience.
PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD
MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this
INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared
CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public
POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this (2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned referred to the proper Committee within three session days
to it by the sovereign people. thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote
of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration
acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
destroying their indispensable co-equality.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the
government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power is Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
interdependence and coordination among these branches where the
delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
suprema lex. Senate shall forthwith proceed.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides: (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
ARTICLE XI
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
Accountability of Public Officers cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Senate.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further
the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high punishment according to law.
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but (8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
not by impeachment. effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the one-third (1/3) of the Members of
12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the House, impeachment
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House proceedings are deemed
Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous
initiated at the time of the filing
House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress.
of such verified complaint or
The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House resolution of impeachment with
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation: the Secretary General.
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II RULE V
RULE V Section 17. Bar Against
Initiation Of Impeachment
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT Proceedings. – Within a period of
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
one (1) year from the date
Section 2. Mode of Initiating AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment proceedings are
Impeachment. – Impeachment shall deemed initiated as provided in
be initiated only by a verified Section 16. – Impeachment impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official Section 16 hereof, no
complaint for impeachment filed by Proceedings Deemed Initiated.– impeachment proceedings, as
any Member of the House of In cases where a Member of the more than once within the period of
one (1) year. such, can be initiated against the
Representatives or by any citizen House files a verified complaint of same official. (Italics in the original;
upon a resolution of endorsement by impeachment or a citizen files a emphasis and underscoring
any Member thereof or by a verified verified complaint that is endorsed supplied)
complaint or resolution of by a Member of the House through
impeachment filed by at least one- a resolution of endorsement
third (1/3) of all the Members of the against an impeachable officer, On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
House. impeachment proceedings against Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella,
such official are deemed initiated which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in
on the day the Committee on aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by
Justice finds that the verified the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
complaint and/or resolution againstFund (JDF)."3
such official, as the case may be,
is sufficient in substance, or on the
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
date the House votes to overturn
impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
or affirm the finding of the said
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court
Committee that the verified
for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
complaint and/or resolution, as the
other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives
case may be, is not sufficient in
Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
substance.
Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on
August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
In cases where a verified Constitution which reads:
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed,
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
as the case may be, by at least
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
 upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious
shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and
days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8,
vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of
sixty session days from such referral, together with the mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records
thereof. of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are
consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the impeachment complaint.
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date,
the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental
Constitution. importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance
of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting
with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event
Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the
District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., impeachment trial.
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the
at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition
Representatives.13 involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to
conduct the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint,
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this
within a period of one year." nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared
that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to unconstitutional.
use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment,
that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers
Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition
victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from
in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second
that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then
impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the
House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with
and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the the second impeachment complaint.
House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only
constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules
and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void. be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc.,
they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a
of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which
Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the
allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and
"a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second
second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional
therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of
and the Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of
prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan
from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of
complaint. national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the
Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in
members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the
Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from
allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate
filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount public from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due
interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment course.
Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment
be declared null and void. In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges
in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were
and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without
of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse
taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L.
complaint. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest
in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the
that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be
enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the Articles of Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and
Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In
null and void. addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that
House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the
alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of
complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the
House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment
Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried
the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void. because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of
quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint
involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the
House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the
Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited Court directed him to participate.
from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon. Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its
Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions;
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well
and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30
second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on
and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal
declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and
Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and
against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that
same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment would render the petitions moot.
trial.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by
160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this
Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House
preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second government under the Constitution, from the performance of its
impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even
G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion
2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the
unconstitutional. consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court
over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole
power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court
to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici
Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel
provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22 and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the
principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court 3, 2003, to wit:
resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions;
(b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and
5, 2003. whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it
is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law a) locus standi of petitioners;
or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no
justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its
receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the
c) political question/justiciability;
principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of
impeachment;
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and
160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress impeachment;
and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal
of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial f) constitutionality of the House Rules on
determination. Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution; and
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this
160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold
the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the
160295, and 160310. essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review
have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention
were admitted. Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution
of judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
complaint. course of government along constitutional channels, for then
the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution: government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations
and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to
speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of article VIII of our Constitution.
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who
is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon
powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v.
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when
Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries,
whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the
it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned
to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of properly is the power of judicial review under the
powers between the several departments and among the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
integral or constituent units thereof. actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren
power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
however limited, has established a republican government pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people
agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
 legislative departments of the government.24(Italics in the original; When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
emphasis and underscoring supplied) Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine
the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the judicial power the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable."26 As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is
indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of
explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and
"been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people
and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case for which it serves.
of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first
articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express provision
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
constitution, have that rank. and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law various departments of the government. x x x And the
repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
as other departments, are bound by that instrument.28(Italics effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of
in the original; emphasis supplied) its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised
by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
out by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review among the three great departments of government through the definition
in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit: and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between
them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or balancing operation."34
custom or practice to the contrary.
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse
of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the
afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale regime. x x x
for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship
speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional xxx
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power
xxx of the agencies and offices of the government as well as
those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
It says: government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
such lower courts as may be established by law. jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
I suppose nobody can question it.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle
first and explain. matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the
excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
government.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique
during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the Fernando, declared:
circumstance that in a number of cases against the
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the We look to the language of the document itself in our search
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is
got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and sought to be attained. They are to be given theirordinary
other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law meaning except where technical terms are employed in
failed because the government set up the defense of political which case the significance thus attached to them
question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document,
we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as
questions involved. It did not merely request an possible should be understood in the sense they have in common
 use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the Justice Manuel Moran declared:
people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the
need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could
underscoring supplied) not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for
the benefit of one person without considering that it could
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to
framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself
v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise: alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that
great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court
held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in affirmed that:
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and
the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from
and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
particular provision and the purpose sought to be the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to particular subject should be considered and interpreted
make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, made to stand together.
speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it
declared: In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and
must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that nugatory.45(Emphasis supplied)
the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v.
the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to
and underscoring supplied) arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
 in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to
for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently
understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to
impeachment proceedings.
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement
and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling
Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as
impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review. Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia
vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly
al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional
character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can
the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47 trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development
have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole have cut the umbilical cord."
power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of
judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine
determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the
proceedings.49 power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme
Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of
on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in
in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of
cases of impeachment. such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to
impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same
official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this
undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the
should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested,
recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56 is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and
enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the
above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
power of judicial review. independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by
respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases
concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of
legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is
exercise of the power of judicial review. subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and
power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in
seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people
held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the
review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the original)
Standing a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to
sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party in certain areas.
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been
constitutional questions.69 personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action
taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is
that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the
sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
contends. which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have
standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to xxx
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving
paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is
procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the
not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the
the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of
the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the
importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of
party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the
remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of
cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens,
petitioners standing. individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal
profession – which were supposedly violated by the alleged
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil
procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and
the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given
reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant standing by this Court.
by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able
interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also
. . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct
underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all
complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some protect the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class
fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res
mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they
interest. were before the court.89Where it clearly appears that not all interests can
be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit
public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being ought to fail. Since petitionersadditionally allege standing as citizens and
deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole
must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or
contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the
to all members of the public.80 following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
taxpayer's suit should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack
transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is
funds. satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental
importance.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any
official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on
legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues
vested by the Constitution in his office.83 raised are of paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does
not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an
While an association has legal personality to represent its interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least,
members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts
the outcome will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the
interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the
citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by
issues presented by it.
the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be
of the law authorizing intervention.92 denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet
the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262.
Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and
for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention. spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against
abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is
Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners
Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations
Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for omitted)
intervention had been complied with.
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally,
transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him
Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" with standing.
to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the Ripeness and Prematurity
grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter branch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the
in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted. courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the
limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing
differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in
Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th
independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned
the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of acts having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint
Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules
the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite
herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and
substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied
was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue. with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
petitions are premature. Amicus curiaeformer Senate President Jovito R. by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
House and Senate should first be exhausted. measure.99 (Italics in the original)

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without
Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking
attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases,
to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and
Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases,
questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are presented however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues
on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v.
a motion to dismiss. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973
Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House of a Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a people in their sovereign capacity.
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment
complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question
and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the
continue to suffer their injuries. Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a
Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either review and its application on issues involving political questions, viz:
or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the
fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the
issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose,
or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three
earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and
be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it. the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce
its decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to
Justiciability conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the most
powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the
Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz: Committee on the Judiciary.

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions.
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other It says:
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in could not publish any story not only because our main writers
such lower courts as may be established by law. were already incarcerated, but also because those who
succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being
I suppose nobody can question it. the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional
Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the
first and explain. fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the
proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971
Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle
of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon.
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
representatives of Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable
excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the
to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the 1973
government.
Constitution was presented to the President around December 1,
1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in
our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The
deposed regime was marred considerably by the purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of
circumstance that in a number of cases against the the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in
government, which then had no legal defense at all, the January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our colleague,
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of
got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the
authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and
and other matters related to the operation and effect of announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to
martial law failed because the government set up the be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be
defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of
"Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of
it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but into existence. The questions to be propounded were released
it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the with proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was
martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in
familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the
the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court
start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When
of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the
Martial law was announced on September 22, although the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the
proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force
the delay in its publication was that the administration had because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the
apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the
21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session
the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media
room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are
and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In
1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling
force. to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your
wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the main marital duty to her husband. There are some rights
government was that the issue was a political question and that guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them
the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. by actual compulsion would be highly derogatory to human
dignity."
xxx
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 that:
to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the
Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did enforceable . . .
they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any
referendum proceeding. The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,
hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a government, the Supreme Court has, also another important
majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no function. The powers of government are generally
referendum. considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that
a big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid
another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue or not is vested in courts of justice.
was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the
case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power
"political question" was set up. There have been a number of of the agencies and offices of the government as well as
other cases in the past. those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected government or any of its officials has acted without
because the issue was clearly justiciable. jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as
to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
xxx
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power?
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to
What is a political question?
settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function:
to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are
 I have made these extended remarks to the end that the MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
subject of the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied) FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not
intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice
Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus: MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to
power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it
alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the
law. definition that we might make may not cover all possible
areas.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example? problems arising from the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact
seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
questions. But there is a difference. power.104 (Emphasis supplied)

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"? From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this
ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
the government had authority or had abused its authority to hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended
the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly
duty to decide. political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."

xxx Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for
respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts
decided by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
need for votes.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken
with the political question doctrine? jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the
effectivity of the present Constitution.
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice
Irene Cortes, held:
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
 The present Constitution limits resort to the political question without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a
which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have political decision already made; or thepotentiality of
normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice
Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared: Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and
Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of
recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one
has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
provision by no means does away with the applicability of The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American
the principle in appropriate cases."108 (Emphasis and concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept,
underscoring supplied) for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far
less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this constitutional issue.
Court ruled:
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of
even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
were to assume that the issue presented before us was political conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now
proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and apply this standard to the present controversy.
underscoring supplied.)
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable
political questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
Identification of these two species of political questions may be complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case Constitution.
of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the judiciary.
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
 IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on decision upon such question will be
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution. The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question
importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or
to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been
the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
Commission.113 case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it
grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination
of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the
framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several
betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could
positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided
court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a
scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII. rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is applied."119
Lis Mota
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that,
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever it directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into
possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to
Court held: likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and
jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally
a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the
or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that independence of the judiciary.121
when it is raised,if the record also presents some other
ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of
be left for consideration until a case arises in which a the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed
from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment,
require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be
broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of
opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the
raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-
adversely affected by the Court's ruling. mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have
Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz: verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors
point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both that:
houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides: "We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of
Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation Fuentebella x x x"124
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the
be respected. Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to
automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not
of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they
Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that
the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
respected, including the right to due process and the right not be any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
compelled to testify against one's self.123 upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which
shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session
Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority
al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto sixty session days from such referral, together with the
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads: consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt
thereof.
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who
opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there
should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review
impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise
asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that
least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction
as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the
at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses
complaint. because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option
Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is
provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no
against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise,
Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2)
intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court
invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august
additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it
petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is
petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
petitioners as well.
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge
for the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that because no other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion
said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it
Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of
own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and
decision. fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has
laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this
as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice,
whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as lurking in [his] office."130
a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution. The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had
already been settled in the case ofAbbas v. Senate Electoral
Judicial Restraint Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate
Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case
ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to said
power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's
membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification
was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
 Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court,
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his particularly a majority of them, is nothing short ofpro
other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by
objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case
or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if with the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators. judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power
of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned
Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to abandon
has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly participation of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the
imposed by no less than the fundamental law. original)

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court
framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the when it exercises its power of judicial review.
possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—
elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited
thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review,
of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v.
seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides TVA135 as follows:
no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose 1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation
disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to
simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as
and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
Senators, singly and collectively. controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself legislative act.'
from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, 2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of
sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its 3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power
of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that: other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule
 has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided 5. that the parties are not in estoppel
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question,
the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the 6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of
a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court
Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can in the exercise of judicial review:
be sustained on an independent state ground.
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon power
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to
striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
official interested only in the performance of his official duty will
result of its enforcement
not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed
the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. 3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity possible opportunity
Act was not entertained although made by the Commonwealth on
behalf of all its citizens. 4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.136
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at
the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits. Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for
judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety
it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would
a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home
question may be avoided (citations omitted). and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to
remove an impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this
argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized
against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority
in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States
and erode public confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a
constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their
required by the facts of the case constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate,
a crisis.
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of act.
the operation of the statute
 x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia,
executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution,
judgment has not only juridical effects but also political contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3
consequences. Those political consequences may follow even (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body,
where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that
act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3
to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3
for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member
follows." 138 of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution
of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split of the House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the
and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings
or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order against the same officials could not have been violated as the
was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven
law regime. Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the
coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term
manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any
of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate
disrespect for the fundamental law of the land. Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as
proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he
by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141 (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral
arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on
justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the
within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of complaint and take initial action on it.
their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of
laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary "Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third
[public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it
protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice
by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the
own personal beliefs.142 oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a
for Impeachment Proceedings comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end.
adopted by the 12th Congress The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the
Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments
 leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the
beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the
referral to the Committee on Justice. committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment
is the one approved by the body.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the
votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein
"impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation,
initiated." The language is recognition that initiation happened the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it
earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body
time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is could help in rearranging these words because we have to be
looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules
the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records: of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The
Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the
procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these indicate this on record.
would need some time for Committee action.
xxx
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the
Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration
which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all
borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the
of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang United States regarding impeachment.
Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the
resolution covers several steps in the impeachment I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any
proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to
committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the
Senate. word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then
capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word
xxx "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at
least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded."
thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed
 I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
as the House of Representatives of the United States is same official more than once within a period of one year,
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified (Emphasis supplied)
complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it
the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment
"Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of proceeding."
the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the
Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is
that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The
only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following
Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you, the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be
Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the
udnerscoring supplied) legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first
provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the
and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No
Officers.144 other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a
case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes
of the complaint. In his amicus curiaebrief, Commissioner Maambong from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand,
explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an
impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of
Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a
that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed
of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the
of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either
was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the
Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145 Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be
forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a
Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least
Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving. Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this
point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he
the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the
impeachment, viz: Senate as impeachment court.

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because
that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding"
xxx
initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by
the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of
The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within
action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that a one year period.
follow.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by
meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
necessary… toinitiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified
proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the
not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment
Constitution. by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court
may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the
his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein
understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who
reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue
sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different
ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and
ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened
confuse it. the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are
so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced
initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The perspectives and disinterestedness.148
House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present
contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulisby equating petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who
"impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding." participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice
Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the
doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the
complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint. deliberations and proceedings thereof.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8)
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power
Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is
premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of
promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced. either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best
judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However,
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice
its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and
section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that
limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature.
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. InArroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph &
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while
limitations on its power to make rules, viz: the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
Section 3. (1) x x x violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more
referred to the proper Committee within three session days
reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote
of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty
session days from such referral, together with the corresponding With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will
by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof. trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume
jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases
shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the
involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US
1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
rules. It held:
Senate shall forthwith proceed.
"x x x
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one year.
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house
may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day,
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power,
passed this as one of its rules:
then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend
the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in reason for courts to categorically reject the political question
the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power.
and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to
determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890) discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The government." This power is new and was not granted to our
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also
what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. our courts in view of our experience under martial law where
Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial
of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led
the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the
It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable of government.155
relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be xxx
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are
open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this
of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution
rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a
length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once branch or instrumentality of government or any of its
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court
or tribunal." against the other branches of government despite their more
democratic character, the President and the legislators being
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass elected by the people.156
upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was xxx
found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional
restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the
method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a
attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
of separation of powers.154 Government' constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the
Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court
xxx vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This provision was
dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that
 a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that
abuses in government. x x x "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to
xxx how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is
given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the
acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to
new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our
activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions
as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached
constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are
this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
not by finding out what it should not do but what Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of
resuscitating a past that petrifies the present. the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members
bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they
review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if
we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe
the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice,
our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official
depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own Constitution.
history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
supplied) former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
the Constitution are involved. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the officer within a one-year period.
constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules.
Conclusion The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the
process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective
consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and
conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment
controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go
exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn
struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at
position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other
demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the
Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative
air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from the of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of
business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith – having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official
relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of
resulting instability upon areas of national life. constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief
Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much
Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the
told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with truth.
respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official. The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts
When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve
this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits
are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time,
"judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by
have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings. whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it
rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is
question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity
already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the
conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any member
judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to
construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the
land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its
which only this Court can properly and competently address and members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under
our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any
that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as
can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on. essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure
respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other
government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting
that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has
discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to
numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any
other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does
not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is
solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put
to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the
Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a
crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this
Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is
equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic
process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use
of force and aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure

in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003
is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from passing in audit any
SUPREME COURT disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act
Manila No. 4913; and

EN BANC 2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.

G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967 The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the
House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs. 1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to
AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents. increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a
maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum
G.R. No. L-28224 November 9, 1967 of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may
be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
(PHILCONSA), petitioner,
vs. 2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates
from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to
No. 28196: be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Juan T. David as amicus curiae 3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents. Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of
the House of Representatives to become delegates to the
No. 28224: aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their
Salvador Araneta for petitioner. respective seats in Congress.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the
CONCEPCION, C.J.: President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing
that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned
Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the
G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary
general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
injunction.
The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the hearing
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:
thereof, on October 28, 1967, the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of
respondents. Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David and counsel for the
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Philippine Constitution Association — hereinafter referred to as the
Act No. 4913, or from performing any act that will result in the holding of PHILCONSA — were allowed to argue as amici curiae. Said counsel for
the plebiscite for the ratification of the constitutional amendments the PHILCONSA, Dr. Salvador Araneta, likewise prayed that the decision
proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of in this case be deferred until after a substantially identical case brought
Congress of the Philippines, approved on March 16, 1967; (b) the by said organization before the Commission on Elections,1 which was
Director of Printing from printing ballots, pursuant to said Act and expected to decide it any time, and whose decision would, in all
probability, be appealed to this Court — had been submitted thereto for a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel —
final determination, for a joint decision on the identical issues raised in declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ
both cases. In fact, on October 31, 1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
Court the petition in G. R. No. L-28224, for review bycertiorari of the between the several departments and among the integral or constituent
resolution of the Commission on Elections2 dismissing the petition units thereof." It is true that in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,5 this Court
therein. The two (2) cases were deemed submitted for decision on characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one, declined to
November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of respondent, the pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in
memorandum of the petitioner and the reply memorandum of respondent Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution — which
in L-28224. was being submitted to the people for ratification — satisfied the three-
fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief
citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L- Accountant of the Senate,6 Avelino vs. Cuenco,7 Tañada vs.
28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and Cuenco,8 and Macias vs. Commission on Elections.9 In the first, we held
voters similarly situated. Although respondents and the Solicitor General that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are
have filed an answer denying the truth of this allegation, upon the ground under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as
that they have no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine
thereof, such denial would appear to be a perfunctory one. In fact, at the the number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the
hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor General expressed himself in favor third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having
of a judicial determination of the merits of the issued raised in said case. the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act on behalf
of the party having the second largest number of votes therein, of two (2)
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party,
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non- of the, Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared
profit and non-partisan organization the objective of which is to uphold unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the
the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon the
erosions or onslaughts from whatever source. Despite his ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible
aforementioned statement in L-28196, in his answer in L-28224 the according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we
Solicitor General maintains that this Court has no jurisdiction over the rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues
subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the same is "merely therein raised were political questions the determination of which is
political" as held in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito.3 Senator Arturo M. beyond judicial review.
Tolentino, who appeared before the Commission on Elections and filed
an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition therein, was allowed to appear Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments
before this Court and objected to said petition upon the ground: a) that thereto is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to
the Court has no jurisdiction either to grant the relief sought in the Congress.10 It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the
petition, or to pass upon the legality of the composition of the House of repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours11 — to make,
Representatives; b) that the petition, if granted, would, in effect, render in and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may
operational the legislative department; and c) that "the failure of propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same
Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not have the explicitly grants such power.12Hence, when exercising the same, it is said
legal effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, notas
thereafter, nor of rendering its acts null and void." members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent
assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their
JURISDICTION authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the
same function,13 for their authority does not emanate from the
Constitution — they are the very source of all powers of
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,4 this Court — speaking
government, including the Constitution itself .
through one of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the notwithstanding, it is urged that said resolutions are null and void
Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the because:
Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final
say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. 1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed
Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose
to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen;
the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact
that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court,14 the 2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose —
power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently amendments or call a convention therefore but may not avail of both —
political character of treaty-making power. that is to say, propose amendment and call a convention — at the same
time;
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress — acting as a
constituent assembly — violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, 3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution
not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that shall be submitted for ratification, must be
this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez aspecial election, not a general election, in which officers of the national
Vito,16 the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members and local governments — such as the elections scheduled to be held on
of the Court are unanimous on this point. November 14, 1967 — will be chosen; and

THE MERITS 4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which
proposals for amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification,
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads: must be held under such conditions — which, allegedly, do not exist —
as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the
The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three- nature and implications of said amendments.
fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen
this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such
amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution,
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which which provides:
the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned
proposed, either by Congress, or by a convention called by Congress for among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to
that purpose. In either case, the vote of "three-fourths of all the members the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately" is have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an
necessary. And, "such amendments shall be valid as part of" the apportionment within three years after the return of every
"Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall
at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the
ratification." same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National
Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall
been approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory.
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately. This,
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections
no apportionment having been made within three (3) years thereafter, the held in 1935. This theory assumes that an apportionment had to be made
Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became necessarily before the first elections to be held after the inauguration of
illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in 1938.19 The assumption, is,
facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen, respectively; and that, however, unwarranted, for there had been no enumeration in 1935, and
consequently, the disputed Resolutions, proposing amendments to the nobody could foretell when it would be made. Those who drafted and
Constitution, as well as Republic Act No. 4913, are null and void. adopted the Constitution in 1935 could be certain, therefore, that the
three-year period, after the earliest possible enumeration, would expire
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an apportionment after the elections in 1938.
within three years after the enumeration or census made in 1960. It did
actually pass a bill, which became Republic Act No. 3040,17 purporting to What is more, considering that several provisions of the Constitution,
make said apportionment. This Act was, however, declared particularly those on the legislative department, were amended in 1940,
unconstitutional, upon the ground that the apportionment therein by establishing a bicameral Congress, those who drafted and adopted
undertaken had not been made according to the number of inhabitants of said amendment, incorporating therein the provision of the original
the different provinces of the Philippines.18 Constitution regarding the apportionment of the districts for
representatives, must have known that the three-year period therefor
Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the would expire after the elections scheduled to be held and actually held in
failure of Congress to make a valid apportionment within the period 1941.
stated in the Constitution, Congress became an "unconstitutional
Congress" and that, in consequence thereof, the Members of its House of Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of
Representatives are de facto officers. The major premise of this process the original Constitution in 1935 and of the amendment thereof in 1940
of reasoning is that the constitutional provision on "apportionment within strongly indicate that the provision concerning said apportionment and
three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise," is the effect of the failure to make it were expected to be applied to
mandatory. The fact that Congress is under legal obligation to make said conditions obtaining after the elections in 1935 and 1938, and even
apportionment does not justify, however, the conclusion that failure to after subsequent elections.
comply with such obligation rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional,
or that its Members have become de facto officers. Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the last
enumeration was submitted to the President on November 30, 1960, it
It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, follows that the three-year period to make the apportionment did not
Congress has not made a valid apportionment as required in said expire until 1963, or after the Presidential elections in 1961. There can be
fundamental law. The effect of this omission has been envisioned in the no question, therefore, that the Senate and the House of Representatives
Constitution, pursuant to which: organized or constituted on December 30, 1961, were de jure bodies,
and that the Members thereof were de jure officers. Pursuant to the
. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of theory of petitioners herein, upon expiration of said period of three years,
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that or late in 1963, Congress became illegal and its Members, or at least,
fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by those of the House of Representatives, became illegal holder of their
the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. . . . . respective offices, and were de facto officers.

The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period
period to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is without a reapportionment, had the effect of abrogating or repealing the
dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the House of
Congress shall continue to function with the representative districts Representatives, and are not aware of any rule or principle of law that
existing at the time of the expiration of said period. would warrant such conclusion. Neither do they allege that the term of
office of the members of said House automatically expired or that
they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress, upon the lapse of said As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed
period for reapportionment. In fact, neither our political law, nor our law collaterally.23 It may not be contested except directly, by quo
on public officers, in particular, supports the view that failure to discharge warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned
a mandatory duty, whatever it may be, would automatically result in the upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer.24 And the reasons
forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect. are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office;
and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
relative to the election of Members of Congress in 1965 were not
repealed in consequence of the failure of said body to make an It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar
apportionment within three (3) years after the census of 1960. Inasmuch because the acts therein involved have not been completed and
as the general elections in 1965 were presumably held in conformity with petitioners herein are not third parties. This pretense is untenable. It is
said Election Law, and the legal provisions creating Congress — with a inconsistent withTayko vs. Capistrano.25 In that case, one of the parties
House of Representatives composed of members elected by qualified to a suit being heard before Judge Capistrano objected to his continuing
voters of representative districts as they existed at the time of said to hear the case, for the reason that, meanwhile, he had reached the age
elections — remained in force, we can not see how said Members of the of retirement. This Court held that the objection could not be entertained,
House of Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers owing to because the Judge was at least, a de facto Judge, whose title can not be
the failure of their predecessors in office to make a reapportionment assailed collaterally. It should be noted that Tayko was not a third party
within the period aforementioned. insofar as the Judge was concerned. Tayko was one of the parties in the
aforementioned suit. Moreover, Judge Capistrano had not, as yet,
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the finished hearing the case, much less rendered decision therein. No rights
President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the had vested in favor of the parties, in consequence of the acts of said
Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable violation of the Constitution,20 the Judge. Yet, Tayko's objection was overruled. Needless to say, insofar as
enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but also, their Congress is concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions herein
main function. This provision indicates that, despite the violation of such contested and Republic Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has
mandatory duty, the title to their respective offices remains unimpaired, nothing else to do in connection therewith.
until dismissal or ouster pursuant to a judgment of conviction rendered in
accordance with Article IX of the Constitution. In short, the loss of office The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under
or the extinction of title thereto is not automatic. consideration is untenable.

Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress Available Alternatives to Congress
are merely de facto officers, it would not follow that the contested
resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void. In fact, the main Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may
reasons for the existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest either propose amendments to the Constitution or call a convention for
demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an office that purpose, but it can not do both, at the same time. This theory is
created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public based upon the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the
— as distinguished from the officer in question — is concerned.21 Indeed, Constitution by the disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, a weak one,
otherwise, those dealing with officers and employees of the Government in the absence of other circumstances — and none has brought to our
would be entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their title to attention — supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In
the positions they hold,before dealing with them, or before recognizing fact, the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-
their authority or obeying their commands, even if they should act within versa, when the spirit or context of the law warrants it.26
the limits of the authority vested in their respective offices, positions or
employments.22 One can imagine this great inconvenience, hardships It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to
and evils that would result in the absence of the de facto doctrine. the constitutional provision on Congress, to be submitted to the people
for ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
convention in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which
Constitution, in general. In other words, the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
2 is different from that of R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the
amendments proposed under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein
ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the referred to is a "special," not a general, election. The circumstance that
constitutional convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although the three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to
three (3) resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress
and put to a vote separately, or one after the other. In other words, they deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does
were notpassed at the same time. not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in
general elections.
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history
thereof anything that would negate the authority of different Congresses It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the
to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass proposed amendments, that the same be submitted to the people's
the same in, different sessions or different days of the same approval independently of the election of public officials. And there is no
congressional session. And, neither has any plausible reason been denying the fact that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits
advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the proposed amendments is likely to be overshadowed by the great
same day. attention usually commanded by the choice of personalities involved in
general elections, particularly when provincial and municipal officials are
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional to be chosen. But, then, these considerations are addressed to the
convention to propose amendments, why not let the whole thing be wisdom of holding a plebiscite simultaneously with the election of public
submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise, proposing some officer. They do not deny the authority of Congress to choose either
specific amendments, to be submitted for ratification before said alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without qualification, in
convention is held? The force of this argument must be conceded. but the abovequoted provision of the Constitution. Such authority becomes
the same impugns the wisdom of the action taken by Congress, not even more patent when we consider: (1) that the term "election," normally
its authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof to permit Members refers to the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular
of Congress to run for election as delegates to the constitutional vote; and (2) that the word used in Article V of the Constitution,
convention and participate in the proceedings therein, without forfeiting concerning the grant of suffrage to women is, not "election," but
their seats in Congress. Whether or not this should be done is a political "plebiscite."
question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art.
On this question there is no disagreement among the members of the XV of the Constitution, should be construed as meaning a
Court. special election. Some members of the Court even feel that said term
("election") refers to a "plebiscite," without any "election," general or
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in special, of public officers. They opine that constitutional amendments are,
a General Election? in general, if not always, of such important, if not transcendental and vital
nature as to demand that the attention of the people be focused
Article XV of the Constitution provides: exclusively on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon may
reflect no more than their intelligent, impartial and considered view on the
merits of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-
by extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone the partisan political
fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
considerations that are likely to affect the selection of elective officials.
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to
this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such
This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of (6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the back of
which should be promoted. The ideal conditions are, however, one thing. the ballots which shall be used on November 14, 1967.
The question whether the Constitution forbids the submission of
proposals for amendment to the people except under such conditions, is We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably
another thing. Much as the writer and those who concur in this opinion inadequate to comply with the constitutional requirement that proposals
admire the contrary view, they find themselves unable to subscribe for amendment be "submitted to the people for their ratification," and that
thereto without, in effect, reading into the Constitution what they believe said measures are manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint,
is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced from the letter to inform the people of the amendment sought to be made.
thereof, since the spirit of the law should not be a matter of sheer
speculation. These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the people
of the subject submitted to them for ratification, from the original
The majority view — although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to Constitution down to the Parity Amendment. Thus, referring to the
declare Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutional — as ably set forth in the original Constitution, Section 1 of Act No. 4200, provides:
opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however, otherwise.
Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be
Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People published in the Official Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for
Violate the Spirit of the Constitution? three consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said
election, and a printed copy of said Constitution, with the
It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on Ordinance appended thereto, shall be posted in a conspicuous
March 16, 1967, so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have place in each municipal and provincial government office building
had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second day of
question. Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides: April, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, and shall remain posted
therein continually until after the termination of the election. At
(1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues least ten copies of the Constitution with the Ordinance appended
of the Official Gazette, at least twenty days prior to the election;" thereto, in English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling
place available for examination by the qualified electors during
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be posted in a election day. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal local
conspicuous place in every municipality, city and provincial office building dialects as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior
and in every polling place not later than October 14, 1967," and that said shall also be kept in each polling place.
copy "shall remain posted therein until after the election;"
The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of
(3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in each Commonwealth Act No. 34, reading:
polling place, to be made available for examination by the qualified
electors during election day;" Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the Official
Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as at least fifteen days prior to said election, and the said Article V
may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall be kept in shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and
each polling place;" provincial office building and in each polling place not later than
the twenty-second day of April, nineteen and thirty-seven, and
shall remain posted therein continually until after the termination
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said
of the plebiscite. At least ten copies of said Article V of the
amendments in English, Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the
Constitution, in English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each
principal native languages, for free distributing:" and
polling place available for examination by the qualified electors
 during the plebiscite. Whenever practicable, copies in the made an issue on the amendments now being contested and have,
principal native languages, as may be determined by the accordingly, refrained from discussing the same in the current political
Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept in each polling place. campaign. Such debates or polemics as may have taken place — on a
rather limited scale — on the latest proposals for amendment, have been
Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the 1940 due principally to the initiative of a few civic organizations and some
amendments, is of the following tenor: militant members of our citizenry who have voiced their opinion thereon.
A legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of the failure of
The said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its
in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty constitutionality or unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than
days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted those existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts
in a conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial or omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those that take place
government office building and in every polling place not later subsequently to the passage or approval of the law.
than May eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty, and shall remain
posted therein until after the election. At least ten copies of said Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the
amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made sufficiency or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the submission
available for examination by the qualified electors during election thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967, depends —
day. When practicable, copies in the principal native languages, in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this
as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also phase of the case, constitute the minority — upon whether the provisions
be kept therein. of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to fairly apprise the people of the
gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is — under
As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 73 is to R. B. H. No. 1 — the increase of the maximum number of seats in the
the effect that: House of Representatives, from 120 to 180, and — under R. B. H. No. 3
— the authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to
the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the
The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish
duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We —
in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette at least twenty
who constitute the minority — believe that Republic Act No. 4913
days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall be posted
satisfies such requirement and that said Act is, accordingly,
in a conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial
constitutional.
government office building and in every polling place not later
than February eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and
shall remain posted therein until after the election. At least, ten A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the
copies of the said amendment shall be kept in each polling place proposed maximum of representative districts are actually apportioned by
to be made available for examination by the qualified electors R. B. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not
during election day. When practicable, copies in the principal improbable, however, that they are not interested in the details of the
native languages, as may be determined by the Commission on apportionment, or that a careful reading thereof may tend in their simple
Elections, shall also be kept in each polling place. minds, to impair a clear vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who
are more sophisticated, may enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading
the copies of the proposed amendments posted in public places, the
The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in
copies kept in the polling places and the text of contested resolutions, as
connection with the former proposals does not arise from the law enacted
printed in full on the back of the ballots they will use.
therefor. The difference springs from the circumstance that the major
political parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the
Constitution — except, perhaps, the woman's suffrage — and, It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to
consequently, debated thereon at some length before the plebiscite took realize or envisage the effect of R. B. H. No. 3 upon the work of the
place. Upon the other hand, said political parties have not seemingly Constitutional Convention or upon the future of our Republic. But, then,
nobody can foretell such effect with certainty. From our viewpoint, the
provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the
electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their
seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions
of delegates to the Convention.

We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished and

esteemed brethren, who opine otherwise, but, we feel that such factors
affect the wisdom of Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R. B. H. Nos. 1
and 3, not theauthority of Congress to approve the same.

The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to

strike down acts of the Executive or of Congress transcending the
confines set forth in the fundamental laws is not in derogation of the
principle of separation of powers, pursuant to which each department is
supreme within its own sphere. The determination of the conditions under
which the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people is
concededly a matter which falls within the legislative sphere. We do not
believe it has been satisfactorily shown that Congress has exceeded the
limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could
have done something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter
thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of human endeavor is
beyond improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be constitutional
and valid. Six (6) Members of this Court believe, however, said Act and
R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of the Constitution.

Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring
Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid,
the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss
and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered.

Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a few words on
the question of jurisdiction.
 Republic of the Philippines and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar, taxpayers and
SUPREME COURT interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional
Manila Convention. Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming
during the oral argument that it prejudices their rights as such candidates.
EN BANC After the Solicitor General had filed answers in behalf the respondents,
hearings were held at which the petitioners and the amici curiae, namely
Senator Lorenzo Tañada, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Senator Jovito
Salonga, and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez argued orally.
G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970
It will be recalled that on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a
Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, passed
MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner,
Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional
vs.
Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of
JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and
two delegates from each representative district who shall have the same
CESAR MILAFLOR, as members thereof, respondents.
qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second
Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election
G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970 Code.

IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November
REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF R.A. No. 6132, OTHERWISE KNOWN elections of that year, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted
AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M. Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and
GONZALES,petitioner, practically restating in toto the provisions of said Resolution No. 2.
vs.
COMELEC, respondent.
On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly,
passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of
Manuel B. Imbong in his own behalf. March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of
320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts
Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf. according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a
representative district shall be entitled to at least two delegates, who shall
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor have the same qualifications as those required of members of the House
General Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr., and Solicitors Raul I. Goco, Bernardo P. of Representatives," 1 "and that any other details relating to the specific
Pardo, Rosalio A. de Leon, Vicente A. Torres and Guillermo C. Nakar for apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of,
respondents. the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementing
legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of
Lorenzo Tañada, Arturo Tolentino, Jovito Salonga and Emmanuel Pelaez this Resolution." 2
as amici curiae.
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted
Republic Act No. 6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and
expressly repealing R.A. No.
MAKASIAR, J.: 4914. 3

These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well
pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong as the particular provisions embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of
8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only implementing details indispensable to a fruitful
par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody the
advanced by petitioner Gonzales. above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of
funds.
I
3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is
The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers vested by the present Constitution solely and exclusively
and employees, whether elective or appointive, including members of the in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power
Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers and employees of to enact the implementing details, which are now
corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A.
of the filing of their certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting
this Court, on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details
application of and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII are matters within the competence of Congress in the
of the Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due process exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which
or of the equal protection of the law. Likewise, the constitutionality of power encompasses all matters not expressly or by
paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 was upheld. 4 necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the
Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as
II lone as such statutory details do not clash with any
specific provision of the constitution, they are valid.
Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, we sustain
the constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress 4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent
acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making Assembly, omits to provide for such implementing details
authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly, because — after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting
as a legislative body, can enact the necessary
implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority
1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly
is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as
pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has full and
amended by Res. No. 4.
plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments
or to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths
vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting 5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing
separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a details may be vetoed by the President is no argument
constitutional convention were passed by the required against conceding such power in Congress as a
three-fourths vote. legislative body nor present any difficulty; for it is not
irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential
veto or Congress can reconvene as a Constituent
2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of
Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required
such plenary authority to call a constitutional convention
implementing details.
includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary
implication, all other powers essential to the effective
exercise of the principal power granted, such as the III
power to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment,
and compensation of the delegates as well as Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of
appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the delegates is not in accordance with proportional representation and
election of delegates and for the operation of the therefore violates the Constitution and the intent of the law itself, without
Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all other pinpointing any specific provision of the Constitution with which it collides.
Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution allotted two delegates by R.A. No. 6132 despite the fact that it has a
does not expressly or impliedly require such apportionment of delegates population very much less than several other congressional districts,
to the convention on the basis of population in each congressional each of which is also allotted only two delegates, and therefore under-
district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally represented, vis-a-vis Batanes alone, does not vitiate the apportionment
allocate one delegate for, each congressional district or for each as not effecting proportional representation. Absolute proportional
province, for reasons of economy and to avoid having an unwieldy apportionment is not required and is not possible when based on the
convention. If the framers of the present Constitution wanted the number of inhabitants, for the population census cannot be accurate nor
apportionment of delegates to the convention to be based on the number complete, dependent as it is on the diligence of the census takers,
of inhabitants in each representative district, they would have done so in aggravated by the constant movement of population, as well as daily
so many words as they did in relation to the apportionment of the death and birth. It is enough that the basis employed is reasonable and
representative districts. 5 the resulting apportionment is substantially proportional. Resolution No. 4
fixed a minimum of two delegates for a congressional district.
The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot
possibly conflict with its own intent expressed therein; for it merely While there may be other formulas for a reasonable apportionment
obeyed and implemented the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent considering the evidence submitted to Congress by the Bureau of
Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 Census and Statistics, we are not prepared to rule that the computation
delegates should be apportioned among the existing representative formula adopted by, Congress for proportional representation as, directed
districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but fixing in Res. No. 4 is unreasonable and that the apportionment provided in
a minimum of at least two delegates for a representative district. The R.A. No. 6132 does not constitute a substantially proportional
presumption is that the factual predicate, the latest available official representation.
population census, for such apportionment was presented to Congress,
which, accordingly employed a formula for the necessary computation to In the Macias case, relied on by petitioner Gonzales, the apportionment
effect the desired proportional representation. law, which was nullified as unconstitutional, granted more representatives
to a province with less population than the provinces with more
The records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77 sponsored by inhabitants. Such is not the case here, where under Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
Senator Pelaez which is now R.A. No. 6132, submitted to this Tribunal by 6132 Batanes is allotted only two delegates, which number is equal to the
the amici curiae, show that it based its apportionment of the delegates on number of delegates accorded other provinces with more population. The
the 1970 official preliminary population census taken by the Bureau of present petitions therefore do not present facts which fit the mould of the
Census and Statistics from May 6 to June 30, 1976; and that Congress doctrine in the case of Macias et al. vs. Comelec, supra.
adopted the formula to effect a reasonable apportionment of delegates.
The Director of the Bureau of Census and Statistics himself, in a letter to The impossibility of absolute proportional representation is recognized by
Senator Pelaez dated July 30, 1970, stated that "on the basis of the the Constitution itself when it directs that the apportionment of
preliminary count of the population, we have computed the distribution of congressional districts among the various provinces shall be "as nearly
delegates to the Constitutional Convention based on Senate Bill 77 (p. 2 as may be according to their respective inhabitants, but each province
lines 5 to 32 and p. 3 line 12) which is a fair and an equitable method of shall have at least one member" (Sec. 5, Art. VI, Phil. Const., emphasis
distributing the delegates pursuant to the provisions of the joint supplied). The employment of the phrase "as nearly as may be according
Resolution of both Houses No. 2, as amended. Upon your request at the to their respective inhabitants" emphasizes the fact that the human mind
session of the Senate-House Conference Committee meeting last night, can only approximate a reasonable apportionment but cannot effect an
we are submitting herewith the results of the computation on the basis of absolutely proportional representation with mathematical precision or
the above-stated method." exactitude.

Even if such latest census were a preliminary census, the same could still IV
be a valid basis for such apportionment.6 The fact that the lone and small
congressional district of Batanes, may be over-represented, because it is
Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue devote all their time to the convention, pursuant to their representation
deprivation of liberty without due process of law and denies the equal and commitment to the people; otherwise, his seat in the convention will
protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected delegate from be vacant and his constituents will be deprived of a voice in the
running "for any public office in any election" or from assuming "any convention. The inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent popular
appointive office or position in any branch of the government government political figures from controlling elections or positions. Also it is a brake
until after the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention." on the appointing power, to curtail the latter's desire to 'raid' the
convention of "talents" or attempt to control the convention." (p. 10,
That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural right to a public Answer in L-32443.)
office, is axiomatic under our constitutional system. The State through its
Constitution or legislative body, can create an office and define the Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No.
qualifications and disqualifications therefor as well as impose inhibitions 6132 is a valid limitation on the right to public office pursuant to state
on a public officer. Consequently, only those with qualifications and who police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.
do not fall under any constitutional or statutory inhibition can be validly
elected or appointed to a public office. The obvious reason for the The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional
questioned inhibition, is to immunize the delegates from the perverting Convention is likewise constitutional; for it is based on a substantial
influence of self-interest, party interest or vested interest and to insure distinction which makes for real differences, is germane to the purposes
that he dedicates all his time to performing solely in the interest of the of the law, and applies to all members of the same class. 7 The function
nation his high and well nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme of a delegate is more far-reaching and its effect more enduring than that
law of the land, which may endure for generations and which cannot of any ordinary legislator or any other public officer. A delegate shapes
easily be changed like an ordinary statute. With the disqualification the fundamental law of the land which delineates the essential nature of
embodied in Sec. 5, the delegate will not utilize his position as a the government, its basic organization and powers, defines the liberties
bargaining leverage for concessions in the form of an elective or of the people, and controls all other laws. Unlike ordinary statutes,
appointive office as long as the convention has not finally adjourned. The constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No
appointing authority may, by his appointing power, entice votes for his other public officer possesses such a power, not even the members of
own proposals. Not love for self, but love for country must always Congress unless they themselves, propose constitutional amendments
motivate his actuations as delegate; otherwise the several provisions of when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
the new Constitution may only satisfy individual or special interests, Constitution. The classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor
subversive of the welfare of the general citizenry. It should be stressed repugnant to the sense of justice of the community.
that the disqualification is not permanent but only temporary only to
continue until the final adjournment of the convention which may not As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law,
extend beyond one year. The convention that framed the present which is to insure that the proposed amendments are meaningful to the
Constitution finished its task in approximately seven months — from July masses of our people and not designed for the enhancement of
30, 1934 to February 8, 1935. selfishness, greed, corruption, or injustice.

As admitted by petitioner Gonzales, this inhibition finds analogy in the Lastly, the disqualification applies to all the delegates to the convention
constitutional provision prohibiting a member of Congress, during the who will be elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970.
time for which he was elected, from being appointed to any civil office
which may have been created or the emolument whereof shall have been
V
increased while he was a member of the Congress. (Sec. 16, Art. VI, Phil.
Constitution.)
Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners
as violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal
As observed by the Solicitor General in his Answer, the overriding
protection of the laws, freedom of expressions, freedom of assembly and
objective of the challenged disqualification, temporary in nature, is to
freedom of association.
compel the elected delegates to serve in full their term as such and to
This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal be violated. The right of a member of any political party or association to
protection of the laws, peaceful assembly, free expression, and the right support him or oppose his opponent is preserved as long as such
of association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they are always member acts individually. The very party or organization to which he may
subject to the pervasive and dormant police power of the State and may belong or which may be in sympathy with his cause or program of
be lawfully abridged to serve appropriate and important public interests. 8 reforms, is guaranteed the right to disseminate information about, or to
arouse public interest in, or to advocate for constitutional reforms,
In said Gonzalez vs. Comelec case the Court applied the clear and programs, policies or constitutional proposals for amendments.
present danger test to determine whether a statute which trenches upon
the aforesaid Constitutional guarantees, is a legitimate exercise of police It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so
power. 9 narrow that the basic constitutional rights themselves remain substantially
intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a valid infringement of the
Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits: aforesaid constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners.

1. any candidate for delegate to the convention In the aforesaid case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, this Court
unanimously sustained the validity of the limitation on the period for
(a) from representing, or nomination of candidates in Sec. 50-A of R.A. No. 4880, thus:

(b) allowing himself to be represented as The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates
being a candidate of any political party or presents a question that is not too formidable in
any other organization; and character. According to the act: "It shall be unlawful for
any political party, political committee, or political group to
nominate candidates for any elective public office voted
2. any political party, political group, political committee,
for at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days
civic, religious, professional or other organizations or
immediately preceding an election, and for any other
organized group of whatever nature from
elective public office earlier than ninety days immediately
preceding an election.
(a) intervening in the nomination of any
such candidate or in the filing of his
The right of association is affected. Political parties have
certificate, or
less freedom as to the time during which they may
nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such,
(b) from giving aid or support directly or however, as to render meaningless such a basic right.
indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable Their scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is not
to or against his campaign for election. unduly narrowed. Neither is there infringement of their
freedom to assemble. They can do so, but not for such a
The ban against all political parties or organized groups of whatever purpose. We sustain its validity. We do so unanimously. 10
nature contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is confined to party or
organization support or assistance, whether material, moral, emotional or In said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court likewise held that the
otherwise. The very Sec. 8(a) in its provisos permits the candidate to period for the conduct of an election campaign or partisan political activity
utilize in his campaign the help of the members of his family within the may be limited without offending the aforementioned constitutional
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, and a campaign staff guarantees as the same is designed also to prevent a "clear and present
composed of not more than one for every ten precincts in his district. It danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral process." 11
allows the full exercise of his freedom of expression and his right to
peaceful assembly, because he cannot be denied any permit to hold a
public meeting on the pretext that the provision of said section may or will
Even if the partisan activity consists of (a) forming organizations, But aside from the clear and imminent danger of the debasement of the
associations, clubs, committees or other group of persons for the electoral process, as conceded by Senator Pelaez, the basic motivation,
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or according to Senate Majority Floor Leader Senator Arturo Tolentino, the
propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding political sponsor of the Puyat-Tolentino amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec.
conventions, caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, is to assure the candidates equal protection of the
similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking laws by according them equality of chances. 16 The primary purpose of
any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party; and the prohibition then is also to avert the clear and present danger of
(c) giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election campaign another substantive evil, the denial of the equal protection of the laws.
either directly or indirectly, (Sec. 50-B, pars. (a), (b), and (c), R.A. 4880), The candidates must depend on their individual merits and not on the
the abridgment was still affirmed as constitutional by six members of this support of political parties or organizations. Senator Tolentino and
Court, which could not "ignore ... the legislative declaration that its Senator Salonga emphasized that under this provision, the poor
enactment was in response to a serious substantive evil affecting the candidate has an even chance as against the rich candidate. We are not
electoral process, not merely in danger of happening, but actually in prepared to disagree with them, because such a conclusion, predicated
existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied. To assert as it is on empirical logic, finds support in our recent political history and
otherwise would be to close one's eyes to the reality of the situation." 12; experience. Both Senators stressed that the independent candidate who
wins in the election against a candidate of the major political parties, is a
Likewise, because four members dissented, this Court in said case rare phenomenon in this country and the victory of an independent
of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, failed to muster the required eight votes candidate mainly rests on his ability to match the resources, financial and
to declare as unconstitutional the limitation on the period for (a) making otherwise, of the political parties or organizations supporting his
speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or opponent. This position is further strengthened by the principle that the
against the election of any party or candidate for public office; (b) guarantee of social justice under Sec. V, Art. II of the Constitution,
publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials; and (e) directly includes the guarantee of equal opportunity, equality of political rights,
or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or and equality before the law enunciated by Mr. Justice Tuazon in the case
propaganda for or against any candidate or party specified in Sec. 50-B, Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration. 17
pars. (c), (d) & (e) of R.A. 4880. 13
While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per
The debasement of the electoral process as a substantive evil exists se it is equally true that Congress in the exercise of its broad law-making
today and is one of the major compelling interests that moved Congress authority can declare certain acts as mala prohibita when justified by the
into prescribing the total ban contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or organization support
6132, to justify such ban. In the said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this proscribed in Sec. 8(a),which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of
Court gave "due recognition to the legislative concern to cleanse, and if association as well as expression, for the reasons aforestated.
possible, render spotless, the electoral process," 14 impressed as it was
by the explanation made by the author of R.A. No. 4880, Sen. Lorenzo Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better
Tañada, who appeared as amicus curiae, "that such provisions were attained by banning all organization support." 18
deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary
and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to The questioned par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) likewise can easily pass the
the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive balancing-of-interest test. 19
partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late
has marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this In the apt words of the Solicitor General:
country. He did invite our attention likewise to the well-settled doctrine
that in the choice of remedies for an admitted malady requiring
It is to be noted that right now the nation is on the
governmental action, on the legislature primarily rests the responsibility.
threshold of rewriting its Constitution in a hopeful
Nor should the cure prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to
endeavor to find a solution to the grave economic, social
fundamental rights, be ignored or disregarded." 15
 and political problems besetting the country. Instead of social, civic, religious, or professional associations. The ban is germane
directly proposing the amendments Congress has chosen to the objectives of the law, which are to avert the debasement of the
to call a Constitutional Convention which shall have the electoral process, and to attain real equality of chances among individual
task of fashioning a document that shall embody the candidates and thereby make real the guarantee of equal protection of
aspirations and ideals of the people. Because what is to the laws.
be amended is the fundamental law of the land, it is
indispensable that the Constitutional Convention be The political parties and the other organized groups have built-in
composed of delegates truly representative of the advantages because of their machinery and other facilities, which, the
people's will. Public welfare demands that the delegates individual candidate who is without any organization support, does not
should speak for the entire nation, and their voices be not have. The fact that the other civic of religious organizations cannot have
those of a particular segment of the citizenry, or of a a campaign machinery as efficient as that of a political party, does not
particular class or group of people, be they religious, vary the situation; because it still has that much built-in advantage as
political, civic or professional in character. Senator against the individual candidate without similar support. Moreover, these
Pelaez, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Codes civic religious and professional organization may band together to
and Constitutional Amendments, eloquently stated that support common candidates, who advocates the reforms that these
"the function of a constitution is not to represent anyone in organizations champion and believe are imperative. This is admitted by
interest or set of interests, not to favor one group at the petitioner Gonzales thru the letter of Senator Ganzon dated August 17,
expense or disadvantage of the candidates — but to 1970 attached to his petition as Annex "D", wherein the Senator stated
encompass all the interests that exist within our society that his own "Timawa" group had agreed with the Liberal Party in Iloilo to
and to blend them into one harmonious and balanced support petitioner Gonzales and two others as their candidates for the
whole. For the constitutional system means, not the convention, which organized support is nullified by the questioned ban,
predominance of interests, but the harmonious balancing Senator Ganzon stressed that "without the group moving and working in
thereof." joint collective effort" they cannot "exercise effective control and
supervision over our
So that the purpose for calling the Constitutional leaders — the Women's League, the area commanders, etc."; but with
Convention will not be deflated or frustrated, it is their joining with the LP's they "could have presented a solid front with
necessary that the delegatee thereto be independent, very bright chances of capturing all seats."
beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience.
The civic associations other than political parties cannot with reason
xxx xxx xxx insist that they should be exempted from the ban; because then by such
exemption they would be free to utilize the facilities of the campaign
The evil therefore, which the law seeks to prevent lies in machineries which they are denying to the political parties. Whenever all
the election of delegates who, because they have been organization engages in a political activity, as in this campaign for
chosen with the aid and resources of organizations, election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, to that extent it
cannot be expected to be sufficiently representative of the partakes of the nature of a political organization. This, despite the fact
people. Such delegates could very well be the that the Constitution and by laws of such civic, religious, or professional
spokesmen of narrow political, religious or economic associations usually prohibit the association from engaging in partisan
interest and not of the great majority of the people. 20 political activity or supporting any candidate for an elective office. Hence,
they must likewise respect the ban.
We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of
the laws is not unduly subverted in par. I of Sec. 8(a); because it does not The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join
create any hostile discrimination against any party or group nor does it with others or join any existing organization. A person may run
confer undue favor or privilege on an individual as heretofore stated. The independently on his own merits without need of catering to a political
discrimination applies to all organizations, whether political parties or party or any other association for support. And he, as much as the
candidate whose candidacy does not evoke sympathy from any political
party or organized group, must be afforded equal chances. As
emphasized by Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure
equal chances to a candidate with talent and imbued with patriotism as
well as nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilize their services if
elected.

Impressed as We are by the eloquent and masterly exposition of Senator

Tañada for the invalidation of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132,
demonstrating once again his deep concern for the preservation of our
civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights, We are not persuaded to
entertain the belief that the challenged ban transcends the limits of
constitutional invasion of such cherished immunities.

WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A.
No. 6132 including Secs. 2, 4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot
be declared unconstitutional. Without costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Castro, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.

Teehankee, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines petitioners cast in the traditional form of constitutional litigation any more
SUPREME COURT persuasive. For reasons to be set forth, we dismiss the petitions.
Manila
The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 3 and March
EN BANC 12, 1981. 4 On March 10 and 13 respectively, respondents were required
to answer each within ten days from notice. 5 There was a comment on
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981 the part of the respondents. Thereafter, both cases were set for hearing
and were duly argued on March 26 by petitioners and Solicitor General
SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner, Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents. With the submission of pertinent
vs. data in amplification of the oral argument, the cases were deemed
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, submitted for decision.
THE NATIONAL TREASURER, THE DIRECTOR OF
PRINTING, respondents. It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset, that the petitions
must be dismissed.

1. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the
G.R. No. L-56404 April 2, 1981 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive
Secretary, 6 dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare
invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six 7 to
RAMON A. GONZALES, MANUEL B. IMBONG, JO AUREA MARCOS-
four. 8 It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no
IMBONG, RAY ALLAN T. DRILON, NELSON B. MALANA and GIL M.
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force
TABIOS, petitioners,
and effect." 9 Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be
vs.
said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It
THE NATIONAL TREASURER and the COMMISSION ON
made manifest that, as of January 17, 1973, the present Constitution
ELECTIONS, respondents.
came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme
Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the
Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be
obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of
FERNANDO, C.J.: law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental
law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect.
three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions1 proposing constitutional As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black 10 and
amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged Murphy, 11 the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In
constitutional infirmity. Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate
Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an
the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally
are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is
is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this
Javellana 2 ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. To put it at its mildest, Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in
such an approach has the arresting charm of novelty – but nothing else. point is People v. Sola, 12 promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the
It is in fact self defeating, for if such were indeed the case, petitioners first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten
have come to the wrong forum. We sit as a Court duty-bound to uphold cases may be cited. 13
and apply that Constitution. To contend otherwise as was done here
would be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility. Nor are the arguments of
2. We come to the crucial issue, the power of the Interim Batasang Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission
Pambansa to propose amendments and how it may be exercised. More on Elections 18 to dispose of this contention. Thus: "3. And whether the
specifically as to the latter, the extent of the changes that may be Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the
introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an
and the standard required for a proper submission. As was stated earlier, entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic
petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the challenged resolutions system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the
are tainted by unconstitutionality. people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be
no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. 4. The fact that the
(1) The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no
indubitable. The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes
explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: "The Interim Batasang the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate,
Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by
the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the the sovereign people." 19 There is here the adoption of the principle so
Members thereof."14 One of such powers is precisely that of proposing well-known in American decisions as well as legal texts that a constituent
amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested body can propose anything but conclude nothing. 20 We are not disposed
the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments to deviate from such a principle not only sound in theory but also
upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its advantageous in practice.
members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on
Amendments. 15 When, therefore, theInterim Batasang Pambansa, upon (3) That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose
the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as amendments as well as the standard for proper submission. Again,
a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do petitioners have not made out a case that calls for a judgment in their
so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments favor. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above
embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent
parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is Concerned, the body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is
question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-
amendments is not new. In Occena v. Commission on Elections, 16 filed fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well
by the same petitioner, decided on January 28, 1980, such a question when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments
was involved although not directly passed upon. To quote from the could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional
opinion of the Court penned by Justice Antonio in that case: "Considering convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this
that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to
extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the
inferior courts from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a requirement of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority
restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution and was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an
has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized
Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes
said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the
of the proposed amendment." 17 Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National
Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3
(2) Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a
proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity? As
of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be
Successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done viewed not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before
was to revise and not to amend. It suffices to quote from the opinion of the holding of the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such
amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it
could not plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to
the proposed changes. As to the period, the Constitution indicates the
way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to the
applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such
amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by
the InterimBatasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on
February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of
the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period
provided by the Constitution. Thus any argument to the contrary is
unavailing. As for the people being adequately informed, it cannot be
denied that this time, as in the cited 1980 Occena opinion of Justice
Antonio, where the amendment restored to seventy the retirement age of
members of the judiciary, the proposed amendments have "been
intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa,
as well as through the mass media, [ so that ] it cannot, therefore, be said
that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed amendment [ s ]." 22

WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.

Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De

Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the
SUPREME COURT respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in
Manila obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for
being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.
EN BANC
As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the
COMELEC, the Count required that copies thereof be served on the
Solicitor General and the Constitutional Convention, through its
G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971 President, for such action as they may deem proper to take. In due time,
respondent COMELEC filed its answer joining issues with petitioner. To
further put things in proper order, and considering that the fiscal officers
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
of the Convention are indispensable parties in a proceeding of this
vs.
nature, since the acts sought to be enjoined involve the expenditure of
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE
funds appropriated by law for the Convention, the Court also ordered that
AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971
the Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Convention
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S.
be made respondents. After the petition was so amended, the first
MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III,
appeared thru Senator Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate
VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA,
Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist petitioner's
LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V.
action.
BORRA, Intervenors.
For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of
Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.
arguments and even possible confusion, and considering that with the
principal parties being duly represented by able counsel, their interests
Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the would be adequately protected already, the Court had to limit the number
1971 Constitutional Convention. of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to the Convention who,
more or less, have legal interest in the success of the respondents, and
Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for respondent so, only Delegates Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S.
Disbursing Officer of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria,
Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all
Intervenors in their own behalf. distinguished lawyers in their own right, have been allowed to intervene
jointly. The Court feels that with such an array of brilliant and dedicated
counsel, all interests involved should be duly and amply represented and
protected. At any rate, notwithstanding that their corresponding motions
BARREDO, J.: for leave to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been denied,
the pleadings filed by the other delegates and some private parties, the
latter in representation of their minor children allegedly to be affected by
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission
on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, the result of this case with the records and the Court acknowledges that
1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the they have not been without value as materials in the extensive study that
voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines has been undertaken in this case.
to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people
pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention
1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of
resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly
convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of
sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 the Philippines is amended to as follows:
respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under
and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by
Republic Act 6132. The pertinent portions of Resolution No 2 read as (male) citizens of the Philippines not
follows: otherwise disqualified by law, who are
(twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over
SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to and are able to read and write, and who
propose amendments to the Constitution of the shall have resided in the Philippines for
Philippines, to be composed of two elective Delegates one year and in the municipality wherein
from each representative district who shall have the same they propose to vote for at least six
qualifications as those required of Members of the House months preceding the election.
of Representatives.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the
xxx xxx xxx Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with
SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the the local elections in November 1971.
Convention shall be valid and considered part of the
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to
cast in an election at which they are submitted to the the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be
people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the without prejudice to other amendments that will be
Constitution. proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on other portions of the amended Section or
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent on other portions of the entire Constitution.
the different cities and provinces fixed originally in Resolution No 2.
Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of
After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the the sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or from its
Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Its preliminary unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced
labors of election of officers, organization of committees and other plebiscite; provided, however that should there be no
preparatory works over, as its first formal proposal to amend the savings or unexpended sums, the Delegates waive
Constitution, its session which began on September 27, 1971, or more P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem.
accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: . By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal,
called upon respondent Comelec "to help the Convention implement (the
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1 above) resolution." The said letter reads:

A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF September 28, 1971

ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO The Commission on Elections Manila
18
Thru the Chairman
BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971
Constitutional Convention: Gentlemen:
 Last night the Constitutional Convention passed D
Resolution No. 1 quoted as follows: I
O
xxx xxx xxx S
D
(see above) A
D
O
Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No.
6132 otherwise known as the Constitutional Convention
P
Act of 1971, may we call upon you to help the Convention
.
implement this resolution:
M
Sincerely, A
C
( A
S P
g A
d G
. A
) L

D P
I r
O e
S s
D i
A d
D e
O n
t
P
. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite on condition that:
M
A
(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the
C
printing of separate official ballots, election returns and
A
tally sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense;
P
A
G (b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own
A security measures for the printing and shipment of said
L ballots and election forms; and
 (c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered creation of the Ad Hoc Committee ratifying all acts
to the Commission in time so that they could be performed in connection with said implementation.
distributed at the same time that the Commission will
distribute its official and sample ballots to be used in the Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic
elections on November 8, 1971. Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof
subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as
What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident
intervenors' Governors' statement of the genesis of the above proposal: with the elections of eight senators and all city, provincial and municipal
officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in
The President of the Convention also issued an order obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite
forming an Ad Hoc Committee to implement the directed by said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the
Resolution. calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power
lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be
This Committee issued implementing guidelines which exercised by the Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the
were approved by the President who then transmitted Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented
them to the Commission on Elections. to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. On the other
hand, respondents and intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix
The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a
the date and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the ratification of
report on the progress of the implementation of the
any amendment the Convention may deem proper to propose is within
plebiscite in the afternoon of October 7,1971, enclosing
the authority of the Convention as a necessary consequence and part of
copies of the order, resolution and letters of transmittal
its power to propose amendments and that this power includes that of
above referred to (Copy of the report is hereto attached
submitting such amendments either individually or jointly at such time
as Annex 8-Memorandum).
and manner as the Convention may direct in discretion. The Court's
delicate task now is to decide which of these two poses is really in accord
RECESS RESOLUTION with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question
the Convention approved a resolution authored by of jurisdiction. They contend that the issue before Us is a political
Delegate Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a question and that the Convention being legislative body of the highest
recess of the Convention from November 1, 1971 to order is sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are
November 9, 1971 to permit the delegates to campaign beyond the control of the Congress and the courts. In this connection, it
for the ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies of is to be noted that none of the respondent has joined intervenors in this
the resolution and the transcript of debate thereon are posture. In fact, respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the
hereto attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum, convention expressly concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their answer
respectively). acknowledging that the issue herein is a justifiable one.

RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the
decision of this Court in the case of Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774,
On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution wherein the members of the Court, despite their being divided in their
No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming opinions as to the other matters therein involved, were precisely
the authority of the President of the Convention to unanimous in upholding its jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished counsel
implement Organic Resolution No. 1, including the have either failed to grasp the full impact of the portions of Our decision
they have quoted or would misapply them by taking them out of context.
There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress
its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of the Congress, purporting to apportion the representatives districts for the
acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a House of Representatives, upon the ground that the
constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing apportionment had not been made as may be possible
amendments to the Constitution, which concededly is at par with the according to the number of inhabitants of each province.
former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that very case of Gonzales relied Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4)
upon by intervenors should dispel any lingering misgivings as regards cases that the issues therein raised were political
that point. Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion questions the determination of which is beyond judicial
held for the Court thus: . review.

As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to
139, 157), this Court — speaking through one of the propose amendments thereto is not included in the
leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Section
respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. 1, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). It is part of the
Laurel — declared that "the judicial department is the only inherent powers of the people — as the repository
constitutional organ which can be called upon to sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours (Section 1,
determine the proper allocation of powers between the Art. 11, Constitution of the Philippines) — to make, and,
several departments and among the integral or hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress
constituent units thereof." may propose amendments to the Constitution merely
because the same explicitly grants such power. (Section
It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court 1, Art. XV, Constitution of the Philippines) Hence, when
characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political exercising the same, it is said that Senators and members
one declined to pass upon the question whether or not a of the House of Representatives act, not as members of
given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a Congress, but as component elements of aconstituent
proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was assembly. When acting as such, the members of
being submitted to the people for ratification — satisfied Congress derive their authority from the Constitution,
the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental unlike the people, when performing the same function, (Of
law. The force of this precedent has been weakened, amending the Constitution) for their authority
however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the
(81 Phil. 818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14, very source of all powers of government including the
1949), Tañada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957) Constitution itself.
and Macias v. Commission on Elections, (L-18684, Sept.
14, 1961). In the first we held that the officers and Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly,
employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its amendments to the Constitution, the members of
supervision and control, not of that of the Senate Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental
President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final
Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond
necessary for quorum in the Senate; in the third, we constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside
nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet
having the largest number of votes in said chamber, that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to the
purporting to act, on behalf of the party having the second rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed
largest number of votes therein of two (2) Senators by the fact that the Constitution expressly confers upon
belonging to the first party, as members, for the second the Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to lower courts.)
party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1),
 Art. VIII of the Constitution), despite the eminently political True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with
character of treaty-making power. extra ordinary powers generally beyond the control of any department of
the existing government, but the compass of such powers can be co-
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of extensive only with the purpose for which the convention was called and
Congress — acting as a constituent assembly — violates as it may propose cannot have any effect as part of the Constitution until
the Constitution is essentially justiciable not political, and, the same are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily follows that the
hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that acts of convention, its officers and members are not immune from attack
this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken on constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full force and
in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter should be effect in its entirety and in everyone of its parts the existence of the
deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court Convention notwithstanding, and operates even within the walls of that
are unanimous on this point. assembly. While it is indubitable that in its internal operation and the
performance of its task to propose amendments to the Constitution it is
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, not subject to any degree of restraint or control by any other authority
the Convention is not supreme. Nowhere in his petition and in his oral than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any
argument and memoranda does petitioner point otherwise. Actually, what of its officers or members can rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty
respondents and intervenors are seemingly reluctant to admit is that the or property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this country the
Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other convention of the same equal protection of the laws or the freedom of speech and of the press in
nature, owes its existence and derives all its authority and power from the disregard of the Bill of Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor, for that
existing Constitution of the Philippines. This Convention has not been matter, can such Convention validly pass any resolution providing for the
called by the people directly as in the case of a revolutionary convention taking of private property without just compensation or for the imposition
which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new government born of or exacting of any tax, impost or assessment, or declare war or call the
either a war of liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against Congress to a special session, suspend the privilege of the writ of
an existing government or of a bloodless seizure of power a la coup habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render judgment in a controversy
d'etat. As to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the between private individuals or between such individuals and the state, in
convention is completely without restrain and omnipotent all wise, and it violation of the distribution of powers in the Constitution.
is as to such conventions that the remarks of Delegate Manuel Roxas of
the Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez refer. It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not
No amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the current convention and cannot validly assert, much less exercise, in the light of the existing
came into being only because it was called by a resolution of a joint Constitution, the simple question arises, should an act of the Convention
session of Congress acting as a constituent assembly by authority of be assailed by a citizen as being among those not granted to or inherent
Section 1, Article XV of the present Constitution which provides: in it, according to the existing Constitution, who can decide whether such
a contention is correct or not? It is of the very essence of the rule of law
ARTICLE XV — AMENDMENTS that somehow somewhere the Power and duty to resolve such a grave
constitutional question must be lodged on some authority, or we would
have to confess that the integrated system of government established by
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by
our founding fathers contains a wide vacuum no intelligent man could
a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate
ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their learning, experience and
and of the House of Representatives voting separately,
craftsmanship in constitution-making.
may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be
valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed.
majority of the votes cast at an election at which the The very decision of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales, so much
amendments are submitted to the people for their invoked by intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the irrefutable logic and
ratification. wealth of principle in the opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice
Laurel in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 134, reading:
... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft The Constitution is a definition of the powers or
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has
the government. The overlapping and interlacing of provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
functions and duties between the several departments, rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
however, sometimes makes it hard to say where the one constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social superiority over the other departments; it does not in
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmark of reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
department is the only constitutional organ which can be authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
between the several departments and among the integral instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
or constituent units thereof. truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review
As any human production our Constitution is of course under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial
lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
within the power of our people, acting through their exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
established a republican government intended to operate could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of and to strike conclusions unrelated to actualities.
check and balances and subject to specific limitations and Narrowed as its functions is in this manner the judiciary
restrictions provided in the said instrument. The does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary
had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the in the determination of actual cases and controversies
course of government along constitutional channels, for must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, expressed through their representatives in the executive
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment and the and legislative departments of the government.
principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly the limitations and restrictions embodied in our But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of
Constitution are real as they should be in any living power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to
Constitution. In the United States where no express be remembered that, in the language of James Madison,
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the the system itself is not "the chief palladium of
possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to constitutional liberty ... the people who are authors of this
speak of its historical origin and development there, has blessing must also be its guardians ... their eyes must be
been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of ever ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ...
more than one and half centuries. In our case, this aggression on the authority of their Constitution." In the
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear last and ultimate analysis then, must the success of our
implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in
Constitution.
the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in and that it is not subject to constitutional restriction. The
consultation rooms and court chambers. Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the
government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by authority under the fundamental law between
resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the departmental powers and agencies of the government are
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and
other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other
adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last European types of constitutional government, the framers
day for the filing of protests against the election, returns of our Constitution adopted the American type where the
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly; written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the
notwithstanding the previous confirmations made by the judicial department. In some countries which have
National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the declined to follow the American example, provisions have
petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts
effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental
to entertain protests against the election, returns and law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition,
submitted after December 3, 1935 then the resolution of courts are bound to assume what is logically their
the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921
surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the expressly provides that courts shall have no power to
respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, Chap. IV). The
power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the former Austrian Constitution contained a similar
National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, declaration. In countries whose constitution are silent in
1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true
as the last day for filing protests against the election, in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas,
returns and qualifications of members of the National in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to
Assembly, should be upheld. Constitutional Charter of the Czechoslavak, Republic,
February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX,
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial
it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between constitutional courts are established to pass upon the
the National Assembly on the one hand and the Electoral validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the
Commission on the other. From the very nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final
republican government established in our country in the constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority
light of American experience and of our own, upon the between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable we to decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who
obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission as undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus
we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a created in our constitutional system which may in the long
constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask
namely, to determine all contests relating to the election, these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum
returns and qualifications of the members of the National abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be constitutional system. Upon principle, reason, and
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the
its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach admitted facts of the present case, this court has
of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
 matter of the present controversy for the purpose of At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand
determining the character, scope and extent of the the most accurate and unequivocal statement of the real issue which the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the Court is called upon to resolve. Petitioner has very clearly stated that he
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns is not against the constitutional extension of the right of suffrage to the
and qualifications of the members of the National eighteen-year-olds, as a matter of fact, he has advocated or sponsored in
Assembly." . Congress such a proposal, and that, in truth, the herein petition is not
intended by him to prevent that the proposed amendment here involved
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did be submitted to the people for ratification, his only purpose in filing the
in Angara, these postulates just quoted do not apply only to conflicts of petition being to comply with his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he
authority between the three existing regular departments of the can, any violation of the Constitution of the Philippines even if it is
government but to all such conflicts between and among these committed in the course of or in connection with the most laudable
departments, or, between any of them, on the one hand, and any other undertaking. Indeed, as the Court sees it, the specific question raised in
constitutionally created independent body, like the electoral tribunals in this case is limited solely and only to the point of whether or not it is
Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent assemblies constituted by within the power of the Convention to call for a plebiscite for the
the House of Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic or ratification by the people of the constitutional amendment proposed in the
principle whatsoever, and none has been convincingly shown to Us by abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form provided
any of the respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling should not in said resolution as well as in the subject question implementing actions
apply to the present Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate and resolution of the Convention and its officers, at this juncture of its
elected directly by the people, since at best, as already demonstrated, it proceedings, when as it is a matter of common knowledge and judicial
has been convened by authority of and under the terms of the present notice, it is not set to adjourn sine die, and is, in fact, still in the
Constitution.. preliminary stages of considering other reforms or amendments affecting
other parts of the existing Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction No. 1 itself expressly provides, that the amendment therein proposed
of the Court over the present case. It goes without saying that We do this "shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in
not because the Court is superior to the Convention or that the the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the
Convention is subject to the control of the Court, but simply because both amended section or on other portions of the entire Constitution." In other
the Convention and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule words, nothing that the Court may say or do, in this case should be
of law, and "upon principle, reason and authority," per Justice Laurel, understood as reflecting, in any degree or means the individual or
supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under collective stand of the members of the Court on the fundamental issue of
the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to vote, simply
respondents and intervenors have joined in this case. because that issue is not before Us now. There should be no doubt in the
mind of anyone that, once the Court finds it constitutionally permissible, it
will not hesitate to do its part so that the said proposed amendment may
II
be presented to the people for their approval or rejection.
The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and
petition. Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to
enthusiasm of the youth have not blinded them to the absolute necessity,
order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the
under the fundamental principles of democracy to which the Filipino
proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise
people is committed, of adhering always to the rule of law. Surely, their
of suffrage under Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution proposed in
idealism, sincerity and purity of purpose cannot permit any other line of
the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form
conduct or approach in respect of the problem before Us. The
provided for in said resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and
Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was born, in a great measure,
resolution of the Convention?
because of the pressure brought to bear upon the Congress of the
Philippines by various elements of the people, the youth in particular, in
their incessant search for a peaceful and orderly means of bringing about passed upon by the Court do not necessarily impose upon Us the
meaningful changes in the structure and bases of the existing social and imperative obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court considers
governmental institutions, including the provisions of the fundamental law it to be of the utmost importance that the Convention should be
related to the well-being and economic security of the underprivileged untrammelled and unrestrained in the performance of its constitutionally
classes of our people as well as those concerning the preservation and as signed mission in the manner and form it may conceive best, and so
protection of our natural resources and the national patrimony, as an the Court may step in to clear up doubts as to the boundaries set down
alternative to violent and chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In by the Constitution only when and to the specific extent only that it would
brief, leaving aside the excesses of enthusiasm which at times have be necessary to do so to avoid a constitutional crisis or a clearly
justifiably or unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the streets, plazas demonstrable violation of the existing Charter. Withal, it is a very familiar
and campuses, the youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions are to be
people, do not want confusion and disorder, anarchy and violence; what resolved by the Supreme Court only when there is no alternative but to
they really want are law and order, peace and orderliness, even in the do it, and this rule is founded precisely on the principle of respect that the
pursuit of what they strongly and urgently feel must be done to change Court must accord to the acts of the other coordinate departments of the
the present order of things in this Republic of ours. It would be tragic and government, and certainly, the Constitutional Convention stands almost
contrary to the plain compulsion of these perspectives, if the Court were in a unique footing in that regard.
to allow itself in deciding this case to be carried astray by considerations
other than the imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it
provisions of the Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger measure than clear that the Convention came into being by a call of a joint session of
when it binds other departments of the government or any other official or Congress pursuant to Section I of Article XV of the Constitution, already
entity, the Constitution imposes upon the Court the sacred duty to give quoted earlier in this opinion. We reiterate also that as to matters not
meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by interpreting and construing its related to its internal operation and the performance of its assigned
provisions in appropriate cases with the proper parties, and by striking mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and
down any act violative thereof. Here, as in all other cases, We are its officers and members are all subject to all the provisions of the
resolved to discharge that duty. existing Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its latter task of
proposing amendments to the Constitution, it is subject to the provisions
During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need of Section I of Article XV. This must be so, because it is plain to Us that
for constitutional reforms, to the point of being convinced that meaningful the framers of the Constitution took care that the process of amending
change is the only alternative to a violent revolution, this Court would be the same should not be undertaken with the same ease and facility in
the last to put any obstruction or impediment to the work of the changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the most valued
Constitutional Convention. If there are respectable sectors opining that it power, second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such
has not been called to supplant the existing Constitution in its entirety, as the one our founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and which
since its enabling provision, Article XV, from which the Convention itself we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the
draws life expressly speaks only of amendments which shall form part of Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other conceivable
it, which opinion is not without persuasive force both in principle and in aspect of the lives of all the people within the country and those subject
logic, the seemingly prevailing view is that only the collective judgment of to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and drafting
its members as to what is warranted by the present condition of things, it. A constitution worthy of the people for which it is intended must not be
as they see it, can limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the prepared in haste without adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious
Convention may propose, hence the complete substitution of the existing that correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less
constitution is not beyond the ambit of the Convention's authority. importance than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be
Desirable as it may be to resolve, this grave divergence of views, the conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation. From the
Court does not consider this case to be properly the one in which it very nature of things, the drafters of an original constitution, as already
should discharge its constitutional duty in such premises. The issues observed earlier, operate without any limitations, restraints or inhibitions
raised by petitioner, even those among them in which respondents and save those that they may impose upon themselves. This is not
intervenors have joined in an apparent wish to have them squarely necessarily true of subsequent conventions called to amend the original
constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it that their November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the
handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or changed, not Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent
only for reasons purely personal but more importantly, because written Comelec in that direction are null and void.
constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for some time, if
not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:
and exigencies of the people, hence, they must be insulated against
precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political 1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently
moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with clear. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent
them limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose
people themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment. And amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number
when such limitations or conditions are so incorporated in the original of amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose. The
constitution, it does not lie in the delegates of any subsequent convention same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall
to claim that they may ignore and disregard such conditions because be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the
they are as powerful and omnipotent as their original counterparts. votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or
degree the number and nature and the scope and extent of the amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or
amendments the Convention may deem proper to propose. Nor does the convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which
Court propose to pass on the issue extensively and brilliantly discussed means only one.
by the parties as to whether or not the power or duty to call a plebiscite
for the ratification of the amendments to be proposed by the Convention (2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and
is exclusively legislative and as such may be exercised only by the appropriateness of this provision. As already stated, amending the
Congress or whether the said power can be exercised concurrently by Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as constitution
the Convention with the Congress. In the view the Court takes of present making itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important
case, it does not perceive absolute necessity to resolve that question, as the whole of it if only because the Constitution has to be an integrated
grave and important as it may be. Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the
even of a consensus among the members of the Court in respect to this government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately formidable
issue creates the need for more study and deliberation, and as time is of and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights,
the essence in this case, for obvious reasons, November 8, 1971, the liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies
date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is calling, being nigh, We and aspirations of the people, on the other. lt is inconceivable how a
will refrain from making any pronouncement or expressing Our views on constitution worthy of any country or people can have any part which is
this question until a more appropriate case comes to Us. After all, the out of tune with its other parts..
basis of this decision is as important and decisive as any can be.
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation them for the purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part
or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole
by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its
amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in
there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote
be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in and determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the
a single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a
now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to
the Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with
purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing
constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their
judgment as to its acceptability. judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is
a possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. themselves are stating that the sole purpose of the proposed amendment
Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the
resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief,
voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice
required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra,
Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are "no proper submission".
other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the
proposed amendment, although it may already be observed that under III
Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to
eighteen under conditions he feels are needed under the circumstances, The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of
and he does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is there any the Constitutional Convention. Much less does the Court want to pass
possible indication whether they will ever be or not, because Congress judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years old
has reserved those for future action, what kind of judgment can he render to vote. But like the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the
on the proposal? people under the Constitution which is to decide in appropriate cases
with appropriate parties Whether or not the mandates of the fundamental
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what law are being complied with. In the best light God has given Us, we are of
changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention the conviction that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has
will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has
means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant been called to formulate, the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and
value at all. Who can say whether or not later on the Convention may all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate the
decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of the political condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election"
units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other or plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the Convention
words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing may propose. We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the
substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect proposed amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article
of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not
Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently separately from but together with all the other amendments to be
determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different proposed by this present Convention.
institutions which the Convention may establish and of which presently
he is not given any idea? IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted.
Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they
ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as
must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents
relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the
harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things, where the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in
Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar
thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately
the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this executory. No costs.
requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not
contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued
SUPREME COURT another related decree, Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the
Manila previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of
presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and
EN BANC canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the
national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly,
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree
No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote
below. 2
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued
NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree
recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976
the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such
body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing
VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner, for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the
vs. referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
The questions ask, to wit:
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO
SALAPANTAN, petitioners,
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve
vs.
the following amendments to the Constitution? For the purpose of the
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE
second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite
NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
MARTIN, J,:
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim
injunction relates to the power of the incumbent President of the
Batasang Pambansa. Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa which
Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the
shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall
absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.
include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives
elected from the different regions of the nation, those who shall not be
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and
Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the
16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the
other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and
the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the sectors shall be
the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers.1 determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or
sector and the, manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated
by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any
members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, important matter whether of national or local interest.
privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the
regular National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall 8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these
not exercise the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the amendments shall continue in full force and effect.
Constitution.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from shall have proclaimed that they have been ratified by I majority of the
the election and selection of the members, convene the interim Batasang votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have
been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision
Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.
the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its
functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V.
prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and
SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with
the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections
Constitution.
from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16;
to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as
powers and functions, and discharge the responsibilities of the regular Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on
President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-
such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.
The President (Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy
Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is
necessary.
no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal
until martial law shall have been lifted. basis.

6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for
exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever respondent Commission on Elections, The Solicitor General principally
the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is
is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of
judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to
exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of instructions, exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards
which shall form part of the law of the land. normalization.

7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary
constituted but their functions, powers, and composition may be altered Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by VICENTE M.
by law. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting
that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National
the Commission on Elections may be called at any time the government Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be
on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and inquired into.
ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming 2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure
Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. political one, lying outside the domain of judicial review. We disagree.
The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers judicial question. 8 This is especially true in cases where the power of the
under Martial Law, the incumbent President cannot act as a constituent Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the legislature, is
assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum- seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to
plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National
submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After
for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the
President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15- power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the
.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than
years of age and above. calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal of
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit. amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential
Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
I Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure for amendments,
written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended,
raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos.
Justiciability of question raised.
991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and
effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this
(Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad) possess locus standi to Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution
challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive
1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court
Presidential Decrees are of such nature-may be contested by one who en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared
will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its enforcement. At the unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. ..." The
instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties
may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending, like all
an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and
constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth of Presidential hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that
Decree No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within
effective implementation of its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No. 1031 its limits.
appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. 6
The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality
expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them
of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the
with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating
legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable
said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that
or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the
open discretion to entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case, We
act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the
deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the
Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to
assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending
process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue
therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, was a justiciable one. With Identical unanimity. We overruled the
the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning
Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual
interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the
followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. 10 writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view
taken by this Court in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs.
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We,
of non-justiciability, that the question of the President's authority to accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the same reason, We
propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission on
submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez
the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,
themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and urged by the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief
procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof
Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has are, however, substantially the same as those given in support on the
been followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite
themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to
Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a be legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. As a consequence.
power which includes the competence to determine whether the Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of
constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its
this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the virtual reiteration."
submission to and ratification by the people.
II
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases
underline the preference of the Court's majority to treat such issue of The amending process as laid out
Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-political
impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor in the new Constitution.
General that the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73
"submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or 1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore "is
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this
a political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the
Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly
issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in the Ratification
upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a
Cases 12involving the issue of whether or not the validity of Presidential
constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly
Proclamation No. 1102. announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people
may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
of the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention,"
constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its
partakes of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of' the
Members, submit the question of calling such a
Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised
convention to the electorate in an election.
is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority view,
said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the
theory of the respondents therein that the question whether Presidential SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
ratification or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later
was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it
 than three months after the approval of such amendment referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays")
or revision. reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim
National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be
instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of
power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads: Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were
deemed automatically members of the I interim National Assembly, were
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973, the
special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a people had already resolved against it.
majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to
this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect 3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the
when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof. proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual
function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in the amending
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by
the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided
normally, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National
(1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the National
members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two- Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to
thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of
of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a
election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character
Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a and that of a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of
majority vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon special policy, not of law. 17Such being the case, approval of the President of any
call by the interim Prime Minister,. proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President
to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation.
The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the
amendments to the Constitution. 19
incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to
when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. Speaking
for the majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The III
Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the
determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim Concentration of Powers
National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and
order in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member in the President during
of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the
Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were crisis government.
aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was
given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National 1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the
Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a Philippines is a crisis government today are more or less concentrated in
matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened 'immediately', made by the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of
Delegate Pimentel (V) was rejected. The President's decision to defer the government power in a democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective
convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the separation of
people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the powers. In most free states it has generally been regarded as imperative
ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted that the total power of the government be parceled out among three
against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the
mutually independent branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts
believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any one branch should promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President
exercise any two or more types of power, and certainly a total disregard shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid,
of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or
47, 'the very definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified,
powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental action. By revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations,
this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
to a decisive emergency action in behalf of the state and its independent incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly
existence. There are moments in the life of any government when all modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.
powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action, even if
this means the temporary union of executive, legislative, and judicial "It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional
power in the hands of one man. The more complete the separation of Convention delegate, "that the Constitutional Convention, while giving to
powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more the President the discretion when to call the interim National Assembly to
necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is evident in a session, and knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a
comparison of the crisis potentialities of the cabinet and presidential vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to
systems of government. In the former the all-important harmony of exercise the lawmaking powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire
legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither governmental machinery." 24 Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an extremely
guaranteed nor to be to confidently expected. As a result, cabinet is more important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which extends over a
easily established and more trustworthy than presidential dictatorship. period of time. The separation of executive and legislature ordained in
The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and the Constitution presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis
expanded; it must also be freed from the normal system of constitutional government. The steady increase in executive power is not too much a
and legal limitations. 21 John Locke, on the other hand, claims for the cause for as the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the
executive in its own right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside problems the President has been called upon by the Filipino people to
the ordinary laws in the meeting of special exigencies for which the solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion, secession,
legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad recession, inflation, and economic crisis-a crisis greater than war. In
emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the government short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the President's
from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so that the crisis may be power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the
ended and normal times restored. national forces, yet the facts of our political, social, and economic
disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting the same, indefinite
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is power should be attributed to tile President to take emergency
now a conceded valid at. That sun clear authority of the President is measures 25
saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus: 23
IV
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially
convene the interim National Assembly and shall preside Authority of the incumbent
over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have
been elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers President t to propose
and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-
five Constitution and the powers vested in the President
amendments to the Constitution.
and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until the
calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect the
interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who 1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally
shall then exercise their respective powers vested by this consigned to the interim National Assembly during the transition period.
Constitution. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully
addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the
exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the
body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the President of its present powers in a referendum to be held on October 16
period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the . 28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential
Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the Decree 995 of September 10, 1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9
President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap
dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan
National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution voted in session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on
and of law for the President to assume that constituent power of the October 16, the previously quoted proposed amendments to the
interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative Constitution, including the issue of martial law .29 Similarly, the
functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the
discharging the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no submission of the proposed amendments to the people on October 16.
reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to All the foregoing led the President to initiate the proposal of amendments
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree
peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed
the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that amendments) to the people in the National Referendum-Plebiscite on
nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim October 16.
National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the
Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it V
imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the
people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its The People is Sovereign
very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose
amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is
away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process
easily seen. In the Philippines, a republican and unitary state, sovereignty
would leave the governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the
"resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective
them.30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that
of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal times." In
particular organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the
these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete
Constitution, the highest power exists." 31 This is the concept of popular
forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all,
sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely the people,
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President
is sovereign 32 In consequence, the people may thus write into the
now, are mere agents of the people .26
Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence
of express constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because, as Holmes said,
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is all experiment." 34 "The
referendums of January 1973 and February 1975, the people had already necessities of orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require
rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The Lupong that one generation should be permitted to permanently fetter all future
Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a self-limiting
Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and the Pambansang decision of the people when they adopt it. 35
Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about the
same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in
2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the
1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had
people to exercise their sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The
informed the President that the prevailing sentiment of the people is for
proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the
the abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned
thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the
the lifting of martial law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The
sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority who can
national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently proposed to
presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal vein, the
submission of those proposed amendments and the question of martial their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the
law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people totality of the executive power of the President. 39It is participated in by all
themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are
may well be said that the amending process is a sovereign act, although illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex- convicts . 40 A "plebiscite," on the other
the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not
somehow in a particular body. otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and
who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
VI place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
election Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is not
Referendum-Plebiscite not imposed. It is generally associated with the amending process of the
Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
rendered nugatory by the
VII
participation of the 15-year olds.
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of
martial law stultifies in main the freedom to dissent. That speaks of a
1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1)
bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation of Justice
Do you want martial law to be continued? - is a referendum question,
Fernando, 41 is impressed with a mild character recorded no State
wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted by the
imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there are restraints of the
desire of the Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that
individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression of that
their true pulse may be felt to guide the President in pursuing his program
liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-plebiscite on October 16
for a New Order. For the succeeding question on the proposed
recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly The
amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may participate. This
President himself had announced that he would not countenance any
is the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the
suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested in
new Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the votes
winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people
of those 18 years old and above which will have valid bearing on the
on the issues at hand. 42 Thus, the dissenters soon found their way to the
results. The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously asked to
public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the
answer the referendum question and the plebiscite question does not
proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the 1973
infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing objectionable in
Constitution, which is already a settled matter. 43 Even government
consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and
employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to
submitting to them for ratification of proposed constitutional amendments.
participate in public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the
The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds above) is
referendum-plebiscite issues. 44
readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay
center, one containing the ballots of voters fifteen years of age and under
eighteen, and another containing the ballots of voters eighteen years of VIII
age and above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years of
age and under eighteen shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters Time for deliberation
eighteen years and above contained in another ballot box. And, the
results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be separately prepared for the is not short.
age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes. 38
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." not too short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite
A "referendum" is merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of the day. The
assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people foe people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law
four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same The three issues are
issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for
discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for 1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos.
constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum Case, 991, 1031 and 1033 political or justiciable?
recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication
in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the women's 2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the
suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite environmental circumstances now obtaining, does the President possess
on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the
append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski was required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his
published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 proposals by the people?
days prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act 492). For the 1940
Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within
reelection of the President and Vice President, and the creation of the
the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the Parity
Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting the Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate
economy as well as the independence of the Republic was publicized in Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo,
three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G.
plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)." 45 Martin are of the view that the question posed is justiciable, while
Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C.
Aquino hold the view that the question is political.
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no
provision as to the specific date when the plebiscite shall be held, but
simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices
approval of such amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in
United States Supreme court held that this matter of submission involves the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma
"an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his
economic," which "are essentially political and not justiciable." The concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183),
constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time specifically dissents from the proposition that there is concentration of
within which the people may act. This is because proposal and ratification powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus raising serious
are not treated as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments.
endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be widely
separated in time; second, it is only when there is deemed to be a Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices
necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view
implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed
disposed of presently, and third, ratification is but the expression of the amendments for ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo
approbation of the people, hence, it must be done and Makasiar expressed the hope, however that the period of time may
contemporaneously. 47 In the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the be extended. Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of
Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the felt the view that the question is political and therefore beyond the
needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando
fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be regarded as waived, and not adheres to his concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in
again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by proper body Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate Justices Teehankee
and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the President's lack of
IN RESUME authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the amendments,
etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with
sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection
under the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of
Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).

Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,

Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at
bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion, Associate Justice
Fernando concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and
Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.

ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are

hereby dismissed. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines vs.
SUPREME COURT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Manila PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by
SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY.
EN BANC SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN; GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., in his capacity as the present and
G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008 duly appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process; and/or
SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary. respondents.
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by
GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR
EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners, x--------------------------------------------x
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 183951 October 14, 2008
PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by
SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as
SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. represented by HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, in his capacity as
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the Provincial Governor, HON. FRANCIS H. OLVIS, in his capacity as
present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser Panlalawigan, HON. CECILIA JALOSJOS CARREON,
on the Peace Process, respondents. Congresswoman, 1st Congressional District, HON. CESAR G.
JALOSJOS, Congressman, 3rdCongressional District, and Members
x--------------------------------------------x of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Zamboanga del
Norte, namely, HON. SETH FREDERICK P. JALOSJOS, HON.
G.R. No. 183752 October 14, 2008 FERNANDO R. CABIGON, JR., HON. ULDARICO M. MEJORADA II,
HON. EDIONAR M. ZAMORAS, HON. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, HON.
CEDRIC L. ADRIATICO, HON. FELIXBERTO C. BOLANDO, HON.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, as represented by HON.
JOSEPH BRENDO C. AJERO, HON. NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON.
CELSO L. LOBREGAT, City Mayor of Zamboanga, and in his
ANECITO S. DARUNDAY, HON. ANGELICA J. CARREON and HON.
personal capacity as resident of the City of Zamboanga, Rep. MA.
LUZVIMINDA E. TORRINO, petitioners,
ISABELLE G. CLIMACO, District 1, and Rep. ERICO BASILIO A.
vs.
FABIAN, District 2, City of Zamboanga, petitioners,
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL [GRP], as represented by HON.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
RODOLFO C. GARCIA and HON. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his
PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL (GRP), as represented by RODOLFO
capacity as the Presidential Adviser of Peace Process, respondents.
C. GARCIA, LEAH ARMAMENTO, SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK
RYAN SULLIVAN and HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as
the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process,respondents. x--------------------------------------------x

x--------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 183962 October 14, 2008

G.R. No. 183893 October 14, 2008 ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, and AQUILINO L.
PIMENTEL III, petitioners,
vs.
THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAWRENCE
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
LLUCH CRUZ, petitioner,
PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman x--------------------------------------------x
RODOLFO C. GARCIA, and the MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT
PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI, petitioners-in-intervention.
MOHAGHER IQBAL, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------x
x--------------------------------------------x
MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC
FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-in- (MUSLAF), respondent-in-intervention.
intervention.
x--------------------------------------------x
x--------------------------------------------x
MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR PEACE &
SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS, petitioners-in-intervention. DEVELOPMENT (MMMPD), respondent-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x x--------------------------------------------x

MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal DECISION

Mayor NOEL N. DEANO, petitioners-in-intervention,
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
x--------------------------------------------x
Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the
THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by President in pursuing the peace process.While the facts surrounding this
MAYOR CHERRYLYN P. SANTOS-AKBAR,petitioners-in-intervention. controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the
government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue
x--------------------------------------------x involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a
long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a
THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep. by HON. SUHARTO T. delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds
MANGUDADATU, in his capacity as Provincial Governor and a within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it
resident of the Province of Sultan Kudarat, petitioner-in-intervention. must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly
restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the
x-------------------------------------------x Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process
effectively.
RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of
Indigenous Peoples in Mindanao Not Belonging to the I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS
MILF, petitioner-in-intervention.
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
x--------------------------------------------x (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace
negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO G. AWAT,
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
JOSELITO C. ALISUAG and RICHALEX G. JAGMIS, as citizens and
residents of Palawan, petitioners-in-intervention.
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being
under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of
the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter
manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist- suspended all its military actions.5
Maoist orientations.1
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli
materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic
who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this principles and agenda on the following aspects of the
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral
signing the same. Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties
in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the further by the Parties in their next meeting."
concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties
beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on
July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing
on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading
General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the
Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed
MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among others, the on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many
commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from
respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific 2002 to 2003.
settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to
attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July
agenda are on-going.2 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief
peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator
Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.6
smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process. Towards the end of
1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala
Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.3 In response, then President Joseph form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.
Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF.
II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military
offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus"
resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF ever embodied in an instrument - the MOA-AD which is assailed
member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591,
Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962.
Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the
negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously
discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.4
Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without
Ancestral Domain7 and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process operative effect, and that respondents be enjoined from executing the
(PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. MOA-AD.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato8 and Vice-Governor On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino
Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition,20docketed as G.R. No.
Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.9 Invoking the respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any
right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners
official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating
the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents Panel represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal.
of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon.
Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file
unconstitutional.10 their petitions-/comments-in-intervention. Petitioners-in-Intervention
include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President Franklin
This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela21 and Mayor Cherrylyn
183752, also for Mandamus and Prohibition11 filed by the City of Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat22 and Gov. Suharto
Zamboanga,12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Mangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte,23 Ruy
Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang
Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded Panlungsod member Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both
from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat,
in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void. Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal
Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral
By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Movement for Peace and Development (MMMPD) filed their respective
Restraining Order commanding and directing public respondents and Comments-in-Intervention.
their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-
AD.13 The Court also required the Solicitor General to submit to the Court By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the
and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD,14 to petitions. Respondents filed Comments on the petitions, while some of
which she complied.15 petitioners submitted their respective Replies.

Meanwhile, the City of Iligan16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated
Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that that the Executive Department shall thoroughly review the MOA-AD and
respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and
already been signed, from implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD thus moved to dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of
be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead pleadings, respondents' motion was met with vigorous opposition from
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent. petitioners.

The Province of Zamboanga del Norte,17 Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice- The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008
Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar that tackled the following principal issues:
Jalosjos, and the members18 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari, 1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
Mandamus and Prohibition,19 docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They
 (i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the
of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and Philippines;

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local 6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North
Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the
consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas
of the draft; covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable
question; and
2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe
for adjudication; 7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior
valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the
3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines.24
Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective
initiated the MOA vis-à-vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5; Memoranda. Most of the parties submitted their memoranda on time.

4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD
on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7)
under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in
involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) the subject five petitions and six petitions-in-intervention against the
including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 MOA-AD, as well as the two comments-in-intervention in favor of the
(LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;] MOA-AD, the Court takes an overview of the MOA.

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;
Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes
5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic not only four earlier agreements between the GRP and MILF, but also
of the Philippines would be BINDING itself two agreements between the GRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli
Agreement, and the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of the
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the
Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or administration of President Fidel Ramos.
political subdivision not recognized by law;
The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes - the organic act
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)25 and the
conform to the MOA; Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),26 and several international law
instruments - the ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to the UN Declaration
Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among
of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES others.
RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) &
Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact
ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;] rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada (or
territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros
territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be
device." accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people" as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands
During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or
see the world through a simple dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-Islam (the colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full
Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to blood, including their spouses.30
those lands where Islamic laws held sway, while the second denoted
those lands where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-
outlawed or ineffective.27 This way of viewing the world, however, AD, includes not only "Moros" as traditionally understood even by
became more complex through the centuries as the Islamic world Muslims,31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
became part of the international community of nations. islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous
peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has
As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with not been specifically defined.
distant States and inter-governmental organizations, the classical division
of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the
New terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving non- ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by
Muslim territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada (land virtue of their prior rights of occupation.32 Both parties to the MOA-AD
of compact) and dar-ul-sulh (land of treaty) referred to countries which, acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public
though under a secular regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative domain.33
relations with Muslim States, having been bound to each other by treaty
or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-
countries which, though not bound by treaty with Muslim States, governance, which right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality
maintained freedom of religion for Muslims.28 exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and
the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as
It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all
the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada and dar-ul-sulh simply refers to all other the elements of a nation-state in the modern sense.34
agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government - the
Philippines being the land of compact and peace agreement - that The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the
partake of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority of the sultanates. As
"any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understandings, gathered, the territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled
obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for a framework by several sultanates and, specifically in the case of the Maranao, by
that elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]."29 the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent
principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of
The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND whom was supreme over the others.35
ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS," and starts with its main body.
The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having
Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance. entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations."

A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous
peoples of that territory, particularly those known as Indians. In Canada,
each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called "First
Nation," hence, all of them are usually described collectively by the plural The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on
"First Nations."36 To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the the territorial waters between the Central Government and the BJE, in
Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" - suggesting its exclusive favor of the latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation
entitlement to that designation - departs from the Canadian usage of the agreement.44 The activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct on
term. the territorial waters are enumerated, among which are the exploration
and utilization of natural resources, regulation of shipping and fishing
The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical activities, and the enforcement of police and safety measures.45 There is
Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with
Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.37 respect to the internal waters of the BJE.

B. TERRITORY C. RESOURCES

The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic
as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the
the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships
Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.38 and understandings, however, are not to include aggression against the
GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present agreements.46
geographic area of the ARMM - thus constituting the following areas:
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of
Significantly, this core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del the Central Government. The Central Government is also bound to "take
Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.39 necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international
meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized
Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine
municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two categories, official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements
Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of
plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other. incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or
Thus, Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain.47
twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD.40 Category B
areas, also called "Special Intervention Areas," on the other hand, are to With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all
be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural
separate agreement - the Comprehensive Compact.41 gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the
party having control within its territorial jurisdiction." This right carries
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction the proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so
over all natural resources within its "internal waters," defined as requires," the Central Government may, for a fixed period and under
extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area;42 that reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or
the BJE shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the direct the operation of such resources.48
BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines
(RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total
these territorialwaters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the
interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and BJE.49
management over all natural resources.43 Notably, the jurisdiction over
the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint."
The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro judicial system and correctional institutions, the details of which shall be
people arising from any unjust dispossession of their territorial and discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.
proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall
be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible, reparation As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008
is to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties.50 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons of the Peace
Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, penultimate paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as "the
contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and representatives of the Parties," meaning the GRP and MILF themselves,
Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements and not merely of the negotiating panels.53 In addition, the signature page
(IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine of the MOA-AD states that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd
Government, including those issued by the present ARMM.51 Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, "ENDORSED
BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic
D. GOVERNANCE Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace
Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF"
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri
observe and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of
Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for the effective whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August 5, 2008.
enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual
implementation" of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective
participation of the third party shall not in any way affect the status of the lists cum maps of the provinces, municipalities, and barangays under
relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.52 Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on
TERRITORY.
The "associative" relationship
between the Central Government IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
and the BJE
A. RIPENESS
The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and
the BJE as "associative," characterizedby shared authority and The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be controversies.54 Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve
based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions.55 The
with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact. limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies
defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power,
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing of the branches of government.56
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments,
with due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and within An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an
the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
Compact. As will be discussed later, much of the present distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There
controversy hangs on the legality of this provision. must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.57The Court can decide the
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between
institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking, opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination.58
education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force,
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the 2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act stipulations:
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it.59 For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a xxxx
prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture,60 and the d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements,
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, using all
to itself as a result of the challenged action.61 He must show that he has possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as
a result of the act complained of.62 enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A
attached herein (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral
The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that part of this framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties
is ripe for judicial review in the present petitions, reasoning that shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all
outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen
The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points (15) months from the signing of the MOA-AD.
subject to further negotiations and legislative enactments as well
as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful xxxx
agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal
that does not automatically create legally demandable rights and GOVERNANCE
obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly
complied with. x x x
xxxx
xxxx
7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the
actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the
In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it
Court has no authority to pass upon issues based on hypothetical to occur effectively.
or feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete
bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD,
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
there are no concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners'
existing legal framework shall come into forceupon the signing of
and intervenors' rights since the acts complained of are mere
a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
contemplated steps toward the formulation of a final peace
changes to the legal framework with due regard to non-
agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury,
derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated
if at all, is merely imaginary and illusory apart from being
timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive
unfounded and based on mere conjectures. (Underscoring
Compact.64 (Underscoring supplied)
supplied)
The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.
The Solicitor General cites63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD:
Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the
TERRITORY
present controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,65 this Court held:
xxxx
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt
 act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or executive order requires that "[t]he government's policy framework for
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. peace, including the systematic approach and the administrative
structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process x x x be
xxxx governed by this Executive Order."76

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP
constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without consulting the local
alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x government units or communities affected, nor informing them of the
settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the proceedings. As will be discussed in greater detail later, such omission,
courts.66 by itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under E.O. No. 3.
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,67 the United States
Supreme Court held that the challenge to the constitutionality of the Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-
school's policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that "any provisions of
was ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer had yet been led under the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall
the policy, because the policy was being challenged as unconstitutional come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon
on its face.68 effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework," implying an
amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate stipulation, in effect,guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the
ripeness. For example, in New York v. United States,69 decided in 1992, Constitution. Such act constitutes another violation of its authority. Again,
the United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New these points will be discussed in more detail later.
York challenging the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent
not to take effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that that exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3
New York had to take immediate action to avoid the provision's and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make
consequences.70 a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an
actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a
The present petitions pray for Certiorari,71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies granted by law when any tribunal, Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in judiciary to settle the dispute.77
the case of prohibition, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of B. LOCUS STANDI
jurisdiction.72 Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.73 Certiorari, largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."78
Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief
acts of legislative and executive officials.74 sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently
arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised.79
The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive
Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February 28, 2001.75 The said
When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is Constitution to determine whether the other branches of government
lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.80 When the issue and have not abused the discretion given them, has brushed aside
concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and technical rules of procedure.91
has an interest in the execution of the laws.81
In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No.
For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that 183591) Province of Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of
public funds are illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752)
that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an and petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of
invalid or unconstitutional law.82 The Court retains discretion whether or Isabela and Municipality of Linamon havelocus standi in view of the
not to allow a taxpayer's suit.83 direct and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their
territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended
In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for
Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but their inclusion in the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE
nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt.
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar
Constitution in his office.84 Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing as citizens and
taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right
An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its or privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that they
members,85 but the mere invocation by theIntegrated Bar of the are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident
Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their
the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing.86 invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues at hand,
however, the Court grants them standing.
As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to
protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.87 Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing
as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the
Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE
facts that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their
intervention,88 such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable
success of either of the parties. transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for their
personality to intervene in these petitions.
In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality
on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his
the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,89 where technicalities of being a member of the Senate and a citizen to enforce compliance by
procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-
paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the AD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the
precedents.90 The Court's forbearing stance on locus standi on issues requisite standing as an intervenor.
involving constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of
fundamental rights. With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman
of the 3rd district of Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo
tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter, case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for
citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation.99
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as
taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust
petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the them into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above
procedural technicality on locus standigiven the paramount public interest in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only
in the issues at hand. in David, but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo100 and Manalo v.
Calderon101 where the Court similarly decided them on the merits,
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot
and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of notwithstanding.
peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal
Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim Petitions not mooted
lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case
may be, in the resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the
prays for the denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not
legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing. moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the
MOA-AD did not push through due to the Court's issuance of a
B. MOOTNESS Temporary Restraining Order.

Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered
with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the a mere "list of consensus points," especially given its nomenclature,
subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on
what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional implications of
sign the MOA."92 these "consensus points," foremost of which is the creation of the BJE.

In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is
out that the President had already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel.93 a commitment on the part of respondents to amend and effect
necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,94 this Court held that the "moot and provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the present
academic" principle not being a magical formula that automatically petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but
dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot to other on-going and future negotiations and agreements necessary for
and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the its realization. The petitions have not, therefore, been rendered moot and
Constitution;95 (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-AD,102 the
public interest is involved;96 (c) the constitutional issue raised requires manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding of the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the GRP Panel not withstanding.
public;97 and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.98
Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest
Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where
there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount
defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily public interest, involving a significant part of the country's territory and the
ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that
tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including
possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides
impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide a decision on the merits in the present petitions toformulate controlling
the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most
its negotiating entity. especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF regarding
Ancestral Domain.
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.103 where the Court did not
"pontificat[e] on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then
case or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to the nation as Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban inSanlakas v. Reyes104 in which he
a whole." stated that the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review" can
override mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper case has
The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of
in Suplico, what was assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand- their issuance." They contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over
alone government procurement contract for a national broadband the subject matter for the doctrine to be invoked.
network involving a one-time contractual relation between two parties-the
government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this
involved specific government procurement policies and standard Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City of Iligan
principles on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will
exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to the treat it as one for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications and raises
transactions and parties involved in the controversy. questions that need to be resolved.105 At all events, the Court has
jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions.
The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements
Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again
In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a
of agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The number of landmark cases.106 There is a reasonable expectation that
MOA-AD which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del
Agreement is the third such component to be undertaken following the Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela,
implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same
the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002. problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in
another or any form.
Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of
August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated that "no matter what It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have
the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the become moot, respondents having, by Compliance of August 7, 2008,
MOA[-AD],"mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of
Agreement 2001. the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished, or
have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD.
Need to formulate principles-guidelines
V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be
drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are
Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one relating to
or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other
Executive Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an relating to its provisions, viz:
agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because that is the
only way that long-lasting peace can be assured," it is minded to render
1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope
public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest
later initialed the MOA-AD? aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better
perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation112 so that they may
2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws? be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a
responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an
ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed
public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by
the people.113
Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of
public concern, as provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights:
The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or matter of public concern114 faces no serious challenge. In
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public
for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to concern.115 In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real
such limitations as may be provided by law.107 estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds,116 the need for
adequate notice to the public of the various laws,117 the civil service
eligibility of a public employee,118 the proper management of GSIS funds
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,108 the Court has recognized the
allegedly used to grant loans to public officials,119 the recovery of the
statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was
Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth,120 and the identity of party-list
eventually accorded constitutional status.
nominees,121 among others, are matters of public
concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self- integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at
executory constitutional right.109 large.

In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,110 the Court ruled Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include
that access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In
acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of
democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and agreements, the Court has categorically ruled:
political significance.
x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of
x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a
There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise,
problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for
enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. the public to expose its defects.
As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information
depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since,
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark
if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." x x x111
until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates
 the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought
a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have clarification on the issue, is enlightening.
intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from
participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr.
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Presiding Officer, did I get the Gentleman correctly as having said
We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor that this is not a self-executing provision? It would require a
a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all legislation by Congress to implement?
its transactions involving public interest."122 (Emphasis and italics
in the original) MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I
accepted an amendment from Commissioner Regalado, so that
Intended as a "splendid symmetry"123 to the right to information under the the safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause "as
Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II may be provided by law"
of the Constitution reading:
MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the immediately take effect and Congress may provide for
State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national interest?
all its transactions involving public interest.124
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier
The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section that it should immediately influence the climate of the
28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no
concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking this
the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 principle, which is inconsistent with this policy.129 (Emphasis
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody supplied)
demands.125
Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this
the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards." The
people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates
be accountable by following such policy.126 These provisions are vital to that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same
the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd
officials at all times accountable to the people.127 to say that the broader130 right to information on matters of public concern
is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an
the Constitutional Commission so disclose: enabling law.Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an
implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.
MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will
not be enunciated or will not be in force and effect until after An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing
Congress shall have provided it. dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive
immediately but, of course, the implementing law will have to be and be responsive to the people's will.131Envisioned to be corollary to the
enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer.128 twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback
mechanisms.
 MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the peace
the people be able to participate? Will the government process."135
provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can
participate and can react where the existing media facilities Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite
are not able to provide full feedback mechanisms to the to effectuate "continuing" consultations, contrary to respondents'
government? I suppose this will be part of the government position that plebiscite is "more than sufficient consultation."136
implementing operational mechanisms.
Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the
MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and PAPP, one of which is to "[c]onductregular dialogues with the National
that is how these courses take place. There is a message and a Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant
feedback, both ways. information, comments, recommendations as well as to render
appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive
xxxx peace process."137 E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to
be "the principal forumfor the PAPP to consult with and seek advi[c]e
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of
one last sentence? society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the
comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society
I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives."138
talking about public officials but also network of private
business o[r] community-based organizations that will be In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on
reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more credence or the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to
credibility on the private network of volunteers and voluntary information and disclosure.
community-based organizations. So I do not think we are afraid
that there will be another OMA in the making.132(Emphasis PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion
supplied)
The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to
The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive process by which the
information, is evident in the "marching orders" to respondents. The MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of
mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive,
consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.
provided by E.O. No. 3.133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3
declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the
society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the consultation in a particular way or manner. It may, however, require him
people's participation. to comply with the law and discharge the functions within the authority
granted by the President.139
One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace
process is that it "should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to
values and principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not respondents' retort in justifying the denial of petitioners' right to be
by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by which they
by all Filipinos as one community."134Included as a component of the treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such
comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment disregard of the express mandate of the President is not much different
for peace, which includes "continuing consultations on both national and from superficial conduct toward token provisos that border on classic lip
local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the
service.140 It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual these will be implemented.145 The MOA-AD is one peculiar program
refusal to perform the duty enjoined. that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people,146 which could pervasively and
As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number
not tenable under the premises. The argument defies sound reason when of inhabitants from their total environment.
contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing consultation
and dialogue on both national and local levels. The executive order With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples
even recognizes the exercise of the public's right even before the (ICCs/IPs), whose interests are represented herein by petitioner Lopez
GRP makes its official recommendations or before the government and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the
proffers its definite propositions.141 It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 IPRA, the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in
seeks to elicit relevant advice, information, comments and matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies.147 The MOA-
recommendations from the people through dialogue. AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-
compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act,148 which
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior
executive privilege in view of their unqualified disclosure of the official informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.
copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally complying with
the Court's August 4, 2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any
document's disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation that it was government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
complying therewith ex abundante ad cautelam. domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the
ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all
Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In
declares it a State policy to "require all national agencies and offices to proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without
conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, complying with the IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-
non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their
sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented authority. As it seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to
in their respective jurisdictions"142 is well-taken. The LGC chapter on necessary changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on
intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy: Governance suspends the effectivity of all provisions requiring changes
to the legal framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be discussed in
Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be the following section.
implemented by government authoritiesunless the consultations
mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government
prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This
Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be has to be so if the country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty
implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation residing in the people and all government authority emanating from
sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of them.149
the Constitution.143 (Italics and underscoring supplied)
ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Paño,144 the Court held that the above-stated policy
and above-quoted provision of the LGU apply only to national programs With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question
or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. that they cannot all be accommodated under the present Constitution and
Among the programs and projects covered are those that are critical to laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before
the environment and human ecology including those that may call for this Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the
the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its
provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use
of any legal infirmity because any provisions therein which are of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD.
inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until the
necessary changes to that framework are made. The validity of this Keitner and Reisman state that
argument will be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon
how [a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power
voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state,
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other,
presently worded. the principal, while maintaining its international status as a
state. Free associations represent a middle ground between
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the integration and independence. x x x150 (Emphasis and
powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers underscoring supplied)
granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under
present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the
assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-
the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,151 are associated
serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The
namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close
MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a
actually framed its provisions with it in mind. mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was
confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 membership.
on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last
mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and
describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their
Government. own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law
of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign
Bangsamoro juridical entity shall beassociative affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall
characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as
structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial relating to or affecting either government.
and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions
in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM,
established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the the U.S. government has the authority and obligation to defend them as if
relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within these
associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any
The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to third country from having access to these territories for military purposes.
be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive
Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free
international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law association is understood as an international association between
instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is
subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and each
party may terminate the association consistent with the right of Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions,
independence. It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.- therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional
associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
American model of free association is actually based on an underlying
status of independence.152 SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
independence. Examples of states that have passed through the status provided.
of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-
Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
become independent states.153 Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
with the international legal concept ofassociation, specifically the social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty
with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and Philippines.
the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the
Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to The BJE is a far more powerful
participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border entity than the autonomous region
agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues recognized in the Constitution
pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands
forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its
governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the relationship with the national government being fundamentally different
U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it
meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Convention,154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory,
Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever
The concept of association is not recognized under the present any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it - which has
Constitution betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized
under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the national The defining concept underlying the relationship between the
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the
ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.
other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the
independence. autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, (7) Educational policies;
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
region." (Emphasis supplied)
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the
As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous (Underscoring supplied)
region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still
be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous
2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the
the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to
ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice,
Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the
another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It
mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with
ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand
therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any
unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries:
voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE. provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not
include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the
The MOA-AD, moreover, would not Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is only the President
comply with Article X, Section 20 of who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary155 instructs:
the Constitution
In our system of government, the President, being the head of
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external
follows: relations and is the country's sole representative with
foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into
(1) Administrative organization; treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign
relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the
(2) Creation of sources of revenues; sole authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the
scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the
rights ofindigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development; unity and development." (Underscoring
supplied) An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity.
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development; While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties
between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the
portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, delineation and recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's manner
has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear
conducive to national unity. departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties
simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules,
Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass
also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among which are as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the
R.A. No. 9054156 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.157 aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-
Sulu-Palawan geographic region."
Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the
adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA- Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed
AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states: procedure, as illustrated in the following provisions thereof:

1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with
"Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who the following procedures:
are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its
adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at xxxx
the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether
mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are b) Petition for Delineation. - The process of delineating a specific
classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the
Indigenous people shall be respected. (Emphasis and ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with
underscoring supplied) the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;

This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in c) Delineation Proper. - The official delineation of ancestral
the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping domain boundaries including census of all community members
together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral
living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs
and Tribal peoples, as follows: concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with the
community concerned and shall at all times include genuine
"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural involvement and participation by the members of the communities
community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the concerned;
autonomous region who are:
d) Proof Required. - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and include the testimony of elders or community under oath, and
economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession
national community; and or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such
ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers the following authentic documents:
in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own
social, economic, cultural, and political institutions." 1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and
traditions;
 2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2)
institution; consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition
thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication:
3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists,
of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided,
old villages; further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both
newspaper and radio station are not available;
4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements
concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from
concerned with other ICCs/IPs; publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains
Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable
5) Survey plans and sketch maps; action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof.
However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall require the submission of additional
6) Anthropological data;
evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall
reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after
7) Genealogical surveys; inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of
rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant
8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds
communal forests and hunting grounds; for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided,
furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims
9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims,
landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties
terraces and the like; and to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary
resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication
10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the according to the section below.
native dialect of the community.
xxxx
e) Preparation of Maps. - On the basis of such investigation and
the findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the
of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with present legal system, a discussion of not only the Constitution and
technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features domestic statutes, but also of international law is in order, for
and landmarks embraced therein;
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines
f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. - A complete "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
copy of the preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall part of the law of the land."
be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;
Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director
g) Notice and Publication. - A copy of each document, including a of Prisons,158 held that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part
translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall of the law of the land on account of which it ordered the release on bail of
be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) a detained alien of Russian descent whose deportation order had not
days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, been executed even after two years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin v.
provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published
Edu159 applied the aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the
Convention on Road Signs and Signals. free association or integration with an independent State or
the emergence into any other political status freely
International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of determined by apeople constitute modes of implementing the
"peoples," understood not merely as the entire population of a State but right of self-determination by that people. (Emphasis added)
also a portion thereof. In considering the question of whether the people
of Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian 127. The international law principle of self-determination has
Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC160 had evolved within a framework of respect for the territorial
occasion to acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination integrity of existing states. The various international documents
is now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle that support the existence of a people's right to self-determination
has acquired a status beyond ‘convention' and is considered a general also contain parallel statements supportive of the conclusion that
principle of international law." the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent
threats to an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of
Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on relations between sovereign states.
Civil and Political Rights161 and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights162 which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
that all peoples, by virtue of the right of self-determination, "freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which
and cultural development." the right to external self-determination can arise, namely, where a people
is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination or exploitation
The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be outside a colonial context, and - less definitely but asserted by a number
understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession. A distinction of commentators - is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to
should be made between the right of internal and external self- internal self-determination. The Court ultimately held that the population
determination. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again of Quebec had no right to secession, as the same is not under colonial
instructive: rule or foreign domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom to make
political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development,
"(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination citing that Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and
judicial institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent positions
126. The recognized sources of international law establish that therein.
the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled
through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in
political, economic, social and cultural development within the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON
the framework of an existing state. A right toexternal self- THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND ISLANDS
determination (which in this case potentially takes the form QUESTION.163 There, Sweden presented to the Council of the League of
of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in Nations the question of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands
only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under should be authorized to determine by plebiscite if the archipelago should
carefully defined circumstances. x x x remain under Finnish sovereignty or be incorporated in the kingdom of
Sweden. The Council, before resolving the question, appointed an
External self-determination can be defined as in the International Committee composed of three jurists to submit an opinion
following statement from the Declaration on Friendly on the preliminary issue of whether the dispute should, based on
Relations, supra, as international law, be entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland.
The Committee stated the rule as follows:
 x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this
treaties, the right of disposing of national territory is term has been used, in scholarship as well as international, regional, and
essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. state practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and
Positive International Law does not recognize the right of connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly
national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded
State of which they form part by the simple expression of a as "indigenous" since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion
wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other States to inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Otherwise stated,
claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive
refusal of the right to a portion of its population of groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the
determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some forces of empire and conquest.164 Examples of groups who have been
other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty regarded as indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the
of every State which is definitively constituted. A dispute aboriginal peoples of Canada.
between two States concerning such a question, under normal
conditions therefore, bears upon a question which International As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples situated
Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the within states do not have a general right to independence or secession
States concerned. Any other solution would amount to an from those states under international law,165 but they do have rights
infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve the amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal self-
risk of creating difficulties and a lack of stability which would not determination.
only be contrary to the very idea embodied in term "State," but
would also endanger the interests of the international community. In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General
If this right is not possessed by a large or small section of a Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
nation, neither can it be held by the State to which the national Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly Resolution
group wishes to be attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among
and underscoring supplied) those in favor, and the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of
The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right
not refer to a question which is left by international law to the domestic to autonomy or self-government, to wit:
jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception rather than the rule
elucidated above. Its ground for departing from the general rule, Article 3
however, was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation
originated at a time when Finland was undergoing drastic political
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By
transformation. The internal situation of Finland was, according to the
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
Committee, so abnormal that, for a considerable time, the conditions
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
required for the formation of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst
of revolution, anarchy, and civil war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national
government was disputed by a large section of the people, and it had, in Article 4
fact, been chased from the capital and forcibly prevented from carrying
out its duties. The armed camps and the police were divided into two Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination,
opposing forces. In light of these circumstances, Finland was not, during have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters
the relevant time period, a "definitively constituted" sovereign state. The relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and
Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not possess the right to means for financing their autonomous functions.
withhold from a portion of its population the option to separate itself - a
right which sovereign nations generally have with respect to their own Article 5
populations.
 Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen 2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate,
their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their
institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid
choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women,
State. youth, children and persons with disabilities.

Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to Article 26

indigenous peoples, has been understood as equivalent to "internal self-
determination."166 The extent of self-determination provided for in the UN 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories
DRIP is more particularly defined in its subsequent articles, some of and resources which they have traditionally owned,
which are quoted hereunder: occupied or otherwise used or acquired.

Article 8 2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and
control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or
subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture. use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.

2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention 3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these
of, and redress for: lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be
conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.
of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural
values or ethnic identities; Article 30

(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing 1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories
them of their lands, territories or resources; of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public
interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim indigenous peoples concerned.
or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration; indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures
and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to
(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite using their lands or territories for military activities.
racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.
Article 32
Article 21
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands
the improvement of their economic and social conditions, or territories and other resources.
including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment,
vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and 2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the
social security. indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative
institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior
 to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State,
and other resources, particularly in connection with the then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an
resources. acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain
and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources which they
redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social,
cultural or spiritual impact. Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples
to autonomy, does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the
Article 37 near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized
in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition,
observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other 1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying
constructive arrangements concluded with States or their for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any
successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United
agreements and other constructive arrangements. Nations orconstrued as authorizing or encouraging any
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in independent States.
treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land
Article 38 pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to
uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with
other laws unnecessary.
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples,
shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative
measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration. It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous
provisions that cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and the
laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the
Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human
signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law
Rights, must now be regarded as embodying customary international law
or grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates
- a question which the Court need not definitively resolve here - the
that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect
obligations enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to
until these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD
grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of the BJE, the
strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced below
particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more
for convenience:
specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for
flexibility in its application by the different States.
7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the
actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the
There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now
Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it
guarantee indigenous peoples their own police and internal security
to occur effectively.
force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide
protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced
dispossession of their lands - a function that is normally performed by Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the
police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to indigenous existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a
 Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary new legislation or even constitutional amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No.
changes to the legal framework with due regard to non derogation 3, which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No. 125,167 states:
of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be
contained in the Comprehensive Compact. SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the
comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as
Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are
the MOA-AD from coming into force until the necessary changes to the interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be
legal framework are effected. While the word "Constitution" is not pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion.
mentioned in the provision now under consideration or anywhere They shall include, but may not be limited to, the following:
else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is certainly broad
enough to include the Constitution. a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous
Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and
mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD the provisions thereof regarding projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal
the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require
Government, have already violated the Memorandum of Instructions administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional
From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the amendments.
"negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of
the sovereignty and territorial integrityof the Republic of the x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Philippines." (Emphasis supplied) Establishing an associative relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of
discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit respondents to address, pursuant to this provision of E.O. No. 3, the root
acknowledgment of an independent status already prevailing. causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to
"think outside the box," so to speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set
Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA- on signing the MOA-AD that included various social, economic, and
AD is defective because the suspensive clause is invalid, as discussed political reforms which cannot, however, all be accommodated within the
below. present legal framework, and which thus would require new legislation
and constitutional amendments.
The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the
MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section 5(c), which states that there shall The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause," however, cannot
be established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations stop here, because it must be askedwhether the President herself may
with different rebel groups to be "appointed by the President as her exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace Panel under E.O.
official emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face No. 3, Sec. 4(a).
discussions with rebel groups." These negotiating panels are to report to
the President, through the PAPP on the conduct and progress of the The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not
negotiations. possess. May the President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree
to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional
It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions
the Moro Problem through its negotiations with the MILF, was not which the present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a
restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as discussion of the extent of the President's power to conduct peace
they presently stand. One of the components of a comprehensive peace negotiations.
process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the "Paths to Peace,"
is the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms which may require
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with fundamental reconfiguration of the nation's constitutional structure is
rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit:
that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,168 in
issue was the authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion - x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance
an authority which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The transition must form the core of any post-conflict peace-building
Court held thus: mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti over the last
ten years, conflict cessation without modification of the political
"In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her environment, even where state-building is undertaken through
thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, technical electoral assistance and institution- or capacity-building,
upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled is unlikely to succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of
predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the states emerging from conflict return to conflict. Moreover, a
President's substantial proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or
limited democracies.
. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from
the grant of executive power and which are necessary The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process
for her to comply with her duties under the can play an important role in the political and governance
Constitution. The powers of the President are not transition. Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to
limited to what are expressly enumerated in the create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map
article on the Executive Department and in scattered on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace
provisions of the Constitution. This is so, agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the the new democracy will operate.170
Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of
the President as a reaction to the abuses under the In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and
regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of legal status of peace agreements, observed that the typical way that
specific powers of the President, particularly those peace agreements establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization
relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a and demobilization is by linking them to new constitutional
diminution of the general grant of executive power. structures addressing governance, elections, and legal and human
rights institutions.171
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and
at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in- constitution-making has been recognized by no less than the framers of
Chief powers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) the Constitution. Behind the provisions of the Constitution on
autonomous regions172is the framers' intention to implement a particular
Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly peace agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the
included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As GRP and the MNLF, signed by then Undersecretary of National Defense
Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari.
public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific
duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.169 MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have
some more questions, I will reserve my right to ask them if they
As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal are not covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions.
armed conflict will show, however, peace is rarely attained by simply
pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy
already exists in the Muslim region; it is working very well; it
 has, in fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my In Sanidad v. COMELEC,174 in issue was the legality of then President
question is: since that already exists, why do we have to go Marcos' act of directly submitting proposals for constitutional
into something new? amendments to a referendum, bypassing the interim National Assembly
which was the body vested by the 1973 Constitution with the power to
MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. propose such amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never
Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right thatcertain definite convened the interim National Assembly. The majority upheld the
steps have been taken to implement the provisions of the President's act, holding that "the urges of absolute necessity" compelled
Tripoli Agreement with respect to an autonomous region in the President as the agent of the people to act as he did, there being no
Mindanao. This is a good first step, but there is no question interim National Assembly to propose constitutional amendments.
that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli Against this ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma vigorously
Agreement itself and to the fuller standard of regional dissented. The Court's concern at present, however, is not with regard to
autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by state the point on which it was then divided in that controversial case, but on
policy.173(Emphasis supplied) that which was not disputed by either side.

The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted Justice Teehankee's dissent,175 in particular, bears noting. While he
pursuant to them have, to the credit of their drafters, been partly disagreed that the President may directly submit proposed constitutional
successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition that
of an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the he would have upheld the President's action along with the majority had
President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an the President convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his
end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee opined:
the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that
may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being "Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the
uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel essential departments of government, defines and delimits the
groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of
of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities. such powers, and the constituent power has not been granted to
but has been withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions follows that the President's questioned decrees proposing and
that she considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting submitting constitutional amendments directly to the
them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, people (without the intervention of the interim National
act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional Assembly in whom the power is expressly vested) are devoid
amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, of constitutional and legal basis."176 (Emphasis supplied)
pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose
the recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the
constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question of President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly
calling such a convention. consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the
Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the
While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that
powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, body were assumed as a certainty.
or the people through initiative and referendum - she may submit
proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to
not involve the arrogation of constituent powers. directly propose amendments through initiative and referendum, the
President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as a
formal proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what President
Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of whether Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose
these recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative. constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that
the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these
President's suggestions to the people, for any further involvement in the proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in
process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a whom constituent powers are vested.
genuine "people's initiative." The only initiative recognized by the
Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all
stated in Lambino v. COMELEC:177 provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present
Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a
"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the ‘people's Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to
voice.' However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP the legal framework." This stipulation does not bear the marks of a
Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the suspensive condition - defined in civil law as a future and uncertain event
COMELEC, that ‘ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the - but of a term. It is not a question of whether the necessary changes to
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for the legal framework will be effected, but when. That there is no
constitutional reforms.' The Lambino Group thus admits that their uncertainty being contemplated is plain from what follows, for the
‘people's' initiative is an ‘unqualified support to the agenda' of paragraph goes on to state that the contemplated changes shall be "with
the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the
forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of ‘people's voice' stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact."
or ‘sovereign will' in the present initiative."
Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath effect the changes to the legal framework contemplated in the MOA-AD -
of office,178 only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such which changes would include constitutional amendments, as discussed
presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change earlier. It bears noting that,
the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or
revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would
and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and be counted among the "prior agreements" from which there could
revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an be no derogation.
unconstitutional act.
What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would
The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to merely be the implementing details for these "consensus points" and,
propose constitutional amendments, since her authority to propose notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal
new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice framework.
for Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the
more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with
State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional
annual general appropriations bill has always been based on the budget amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the
prepared by the President, which - for all intents and purposes - is a laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to
proposal for new legislation coming from the President.179 conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it
must be struck down as unconstitutional.
The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the
above-discussed standards
A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United
similar provision appearing in the 1996 final peace agreement between Front (RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government had
the MNLF and the GRP is most instructive. been in armed conflict for around eight years at the time of signing. There
were non-contracting signatories to the agreement, among which were
As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would the Government of the Togolese Republic, the Economic Community of
be implemented in two phases. Phase Icovered a three-year transitional West African States, and the UN.
period involving the putting up of new administrative structures through
Executive Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN
(SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone Government, another
Development (SPCPD), while Phase II covered the establishment of the agreement was entered into by the UN and that Government whereby the
new regional autonomous government through amendment or repeal of Special Court of Sierra Leone was established. The sole purpose of the
R.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of the ARMM. Special Court, an international court, was to try persons who bore the
greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian
The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone
structure of the expanded autonomous region envisioned by the parties. since November 30, 1996.
To that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is,
however, a crucial difference between the two agreements. While the Among the stipulations of the Lomé Accord was a provision for the full
MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the pardon of the members of the RUF with respect to anything done by
legal framework" will be put in place, the GRP-MNLF final peace them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization since
agreement states thus: "Accordingly, these provisions [on Phase II] shall the conflict began.
be recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in the
amendatory or repealing law." In the Lomé Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created
an internationally binding obligation not to prosecute the beneficiaries
Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a of the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the
binding international law obligation on the part of the Philippines to participation of foreign dignitaries and international organizations in the
change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be finalization of that agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this
considered either as a binding agreement under international law, or a argument, ruling that the Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only
unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the international create binding obligations and rights between the parties in municipal
community that it would grant to the Bangsamoro people all the law, not in international law. Hence, the Special Court held, it is
concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in ineffective in depriving an international court like it of jurisdiction.
international law, however.
"37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of
The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have an internal armed conflict it is easy to assume and to argue
included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In addition, representatives of with some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the
other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These defendants seem to have done, that the mere fact that in
circumstances readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have addition to the parties to the conflict, the document
had the status of a binding international agreement had it been signed. formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of state
An examination of the prevailing principles in international law, however, or their representatives and representatives of international
leads to the contrary conclusion. organizations, means the agreement of the parties is
internationalized so as to create obligations in international
The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty180 (the law.
Lomé Accord case) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone is enlightening.
The Lomé Accord was a peace agreement signed on July 7, 1999 xxxx
40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the status as one which settles an international armed conflict
conflict and the mediator or facilitator of the settlement, or which, essentially, must be between two or more warring
persons or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took States. The Lomé Agreement cannot be characterised as an
place but who are not at all parties to the conflict, are not international instrument. x x x" (Emphasis, italics and
contracting parties and who do not claim any obligation from the underscoring supplied)
contracting parties or incur any obligation from the settlement.
Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives
41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful of States and international organizations not parties to the Agreement
authority of the State and the RUF which has no status of would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under
statehood and is to all intents and purposes a faction within international law.
the state. The non-contracting signatories of the Lomé
Agreement were moral guarantors of the principle that, in the In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount
terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace to a unilateral declaration of the Philippine State, binding under
agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by international law, that it would comply with all the stipulations stated
both parties". The moral guarantors assumed no legal therein, with the result that it would have to amend its Constitution
obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its representative accordingly regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for
appended, presumably for avoidance of doubt, an understanding this view is Australia v. France,181 also known as the Nuclear Tests Case,
of the extent of the agreement to be implemented as not including decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
certain international crimes.
In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the
42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must legality of France's nuclear tests in the South Pacific. France refused to
create rights and obligations regulated by international law so that appear in the case, but public statements from its President, and similar
a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under statements from other French officials including its Minister of Defence,
international law which will also provide principle means of that its 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the
enforcement. The Lomé Agreement created neither rights nor ICJ to dismiss the case.182 Those statements, the ICJ held, amounted to
obligations capable of being regulated by international a legal undertaking addressed to the international community, which
law. An agreement such as the Lomé Agreement which required no acceptance from other States for it to become effective.
brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates
a factual situation of restoration of peace that the Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French
international community acting through the Security Council government intended to be bound to the international community in
may take note of. That, however, will not convert it to an issuing its public statements, viz:
international agreement which creates an obligation
enforceable in international, as distinguished from
43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way
municipal, law. A breach of the terms of such a peace
of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have
agreement resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or
the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind
creating a threat to peace in the determination of the Security
may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of
Council may indicate a reversal of the factual situation of peace to
the State making the declaration that it should become
be visited with possible legal consequences arising from the new
bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the
situation of conflict created. Such consequences such as action
declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State
by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII arise from the
being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of
situation and not from the agreement, nor from the obligation
conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this
imposed by it. Such action cannot be regarded as a remedy for
kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even
the breach. A peace agreement which settles
though not made within the context of international negotiations,
an internal armed conflict cannot be ascribed the same
 is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar
pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor circumstances.
even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the
declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized
inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by in a later case decided by the ICJ entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali,183 also
which the pronouncement by the State was made. known as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public
declaration subject of that case was a statement made by the President
44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a of Mali, in an interview by a foreign press agency, that Mali would abide
State may choose to take up a certain position in relation to by the decision to be issued by a commission of the Organization of
a particular matter with the intention of being bound-the African Unity on a frontier dispute then pending between Mali and
intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the Burkina Faso.
act. When States make statements by which their freedom of
action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for. Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of
Mali's President was not a unilateral act with legal implications. It clarified
xxxx that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar
circumstances surrounding the French declaration subject thereof, to wit:
51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests
would be the last, the French Government conveyed to the 40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral
world at large, including the Applicant, its intention act, account must be taken of all the factual circumstances in
effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume which the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests
that other States might take note of these statements and cases, the Court took the view that since the applicant States
rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements were not the only ones concerned at the possible
and their legal consequences must be considered within the continuance of atmospheric testing by the French
general framework of the security of international Government, that Government's unilateral declarations had
intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential ‘conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its
in the relations among States. It is from the actual substance of intention effectively to terminate these tests‘ (I.C.J. Reports
these statements, and from the circumstances attending 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the particular
their making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act circumstances of those cases, the French Government could
must be deduced. The objects of these statements are clear not express an intention to be bound otherwise than by
and they were addressed to the international community as a unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it could have
whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each of the
undertaking possessing legal effect. The Court considers *270 applicants without thereby jeopardizing its contention that
that the President of the Republic, in deciding upon the effective its conduct was lawful. The circumstances of the present
cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to the case are radically different. Here, there was nothing to hinder
international community to which his words were addressed. x x x the Parties from manifesting an intention to accept the
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) binding character of the conclusions of the Organization of
African Unity Mediation Commission by the normal method:
As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a formal agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since no
a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only agreement of this kind was concluded between the Parties, the
when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly Chamber finds that there are no grounds to interpret the
addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound declaration made by Mali's head of State on 11 April 1975 as a
to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to unilateral act with legal implications in regard to the present case.
those statements would be detrimental to the security of international (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution.
amounted to a unilateral declaration on the part of the Philippine State to Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the
the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention,
with the clear intention of being bound thereby to the international or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only
community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment
were States and international organizations involved, one way or another, process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.
in the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated
merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a
the Lomé Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the portion of its own territory to the Moros for the sake of peace, for it can
conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change is not
international organizations does not mean that the agreement is inconsistent with what, in international law, is known as Jus
internationalized so as to create obligations in international law. Cogens.184 Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that decision.

Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, SUMMARY
not to give legal effect to such commitments would not be detrimental to
the security of international intercourse - to the trust and confidence The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to
essential in the relations among States. consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3.
In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of
are closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as already discussed, the Mali guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of
President's statement was not held to be a binding unilateral declaration the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for
by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to hinder the judicial review.
Philippine panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other
States, to manifest that intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount
agreement would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the
clear commitment to be legally bound to the international community, not petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
just the MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the signatures of the requisitelocus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David
participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of v. Macapagal-Arroyo.
that commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not have
resulted in a loss of face for the Philippine government before the
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the
international community, which was one of the difficulties that prevented
MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted
the French Government from entering into a formal agreement with other
the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an
countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal
exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave
agreement suggests that it had no intention to be bound to the
violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the
international community. On that ground, the MOA-AD may not
situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate
be considered a unilateral declaration under international law.
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d)
the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under
international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act
The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to
of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself,
carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the
sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse
government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-
lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro
AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain
Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their
similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
brazen willingness toguarantee that Congress and the sovereign
The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar
rendered moot in view of the respondents' action in providing the Court program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
and its annexes. drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec.
7, Article III of the Constitution is insplendid symmetry with the state Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation
interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance
information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the
even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate
to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to compromise.
reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern general right to information or the specific right to consultation is
involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive
information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement. MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.

An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave
dialogue or process of communication between the government and the abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation
people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was
species of these public rights. designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority,
and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty
justify the exercise of the people's right to be consulted on relevant and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
matters relating to the peace agenda.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying
consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on and the BJE, areunconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace independence.
partners and concerned sectors of society.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until
requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The
program critical to the environment and human ecology including those inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative
that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a
violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated
March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as
the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary
amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in
place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is
authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would
amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only
in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves
through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can
ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or

unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law,
respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a
constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.

WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and

intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the

GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to
law and the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this
SUPREME COURT petition.
Manila
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with
EN BANC public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a
"Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein Delfin
asked the COMELEC for an order
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA over the country;
ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs. 2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding Constitution, in newspapers of general and local
members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and circulation;
Action (PIRMA), respondents.
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in
KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), designated for the purpose.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors. Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the
Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a group of citizens desirous to avail of
the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the
members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the
DAVIDE, JR., J.: power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power
shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for
the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people
signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures
of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other
Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of initiative
volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates
was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few
to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by
scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986
the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral
Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent 1 and the
process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as
main sponsor 2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the
the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in
Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for
newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and
both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of
supervision of the COMELEC.
proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members and (2) by a constitutional convention. 4 For this and the other The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be
amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and
Section 8 of Article X 9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam
copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed
the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from the this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the
following proposition: (1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to
amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by
OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed
SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate
CONSTITUTION? Committee on Constitutional Amendments.

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to (2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems
the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on
number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to
COMELEC. provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike
in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to
issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency
Constitution (including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the
and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law
newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 which can be considered as implementing [the provision
December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions
1996 at 10:00 a.m. have been obviously left to a separate law.

At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following (3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of
appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the the law after publication in print media. This indicates that
People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA); the Act covers only laws and not constitutional
intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other amendments because the latter take effect only upon
lawyers, and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the ratification and not after publication.
Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK),
Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16
(LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on the
the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and
properly cognizable by the COMELEC. local laws, is ultra vires insofar asinitiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations
oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the
within five days. 13 Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the
Constitution to pass the implementing law.
 (5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the 2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC
term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN.
the power of the people's initiative. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE
ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF
people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO
government department, agency, or office has realigned THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE
funds for the purpose. DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL
TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS
the petitioners allege that in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail
expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters 3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC
amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions of IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY
additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE
the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY
and the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE
prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS.COMELEC, ET AL.
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. G.R. NO. 125416;

On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to 4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4,
comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten days from 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE
notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE
immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR
respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED
signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution. FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;

On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their 5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED
Comment 15 on the petition. They argue therein that: ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735
WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE
EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE
TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON
MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND
GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND
DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC. RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN
IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
 6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE (3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra
BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the
TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to
SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735,
ANNEX E, PETITION); which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM purposes of the Act.
OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED
UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A (4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of,
"REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN but mere amendment to, the Constitution because it
AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the
ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the
CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE entire document.
ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO
WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412- As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers
413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY petitioners' estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.). can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be
simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf requirements for initiative will be a priority government expense because
a Comment 16 which starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2
December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which January 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General contends that:
was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the
Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under (1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia,
COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations of the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2
petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows: on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and
guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes
R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the
amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle power to propose amendments to the Constitution.
for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on
requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws. the Constitution.

(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that (2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is
the proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in
shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite. the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and
Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions
 of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
provided for initiative on the Constitution. guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public
service and prohibiting political
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a dynasties. 19 Arevision cannot be done by initiative which,
material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of the
with initiative on the Constitution. Constitution, is limited to amendments.

(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes (2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and
a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision the limits provided for all other national and local elective
thereof. officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to
open up the political arena to as many as there are
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to
under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the break the concentration of political and economic powers
Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper
COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 empowerment for participation in policy and decision-
was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan making for the common good"; hence, to remove the term
Authority vs. COMELEC. limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987
Constitution.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the
temporary restraining order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments (3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of
and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that
stating that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen may be availed of by the people only if they are
Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials,
granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator but not as a premium for good performance. 20
Raul Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later
than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January (4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to
1997 at 9:30 a.m. be called the enabling law that implements the
people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the
Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the
Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d)
Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of
replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3%
that: per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may
oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the
role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a
and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any
mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution
decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite,
because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it
and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's
would involve a change from a political philosophy that
initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the
rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
tenure; and although the change might appear to be an
isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on
 (5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or (3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in
remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the that it does not have the required number of signatures.
COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure
for a people's initiativeunder Section 2 of Article XVII of (4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the
the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress or
Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not a constitutional convention. 22
constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former
does not set a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the
power. Motions for Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as
well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the
implements the people's right to initiate constitutional amendments. This respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days their
law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and
co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a
thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the respondents to
Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt
Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without of the said Petition in Intervention.
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its
publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the
contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and following pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light of the
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for
initiative which is signedby the required number of registered voters. He
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a
also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot
System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
avail of the authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is
Funds Therefor, was intended to include or
securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in
cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if
an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the
so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers
sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a
such initiative.
plebiscite, if warranted.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the
Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the
attached a Petition in Intervention raising the following arguments: conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution. 3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and
local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a
the required implementing law on the initiative to amend revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
the Constitution.
 4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has I
jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain an
order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY
(b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN PETITION.
movement and volunteers in establishing signature
stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no
of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court
on the 1987 Constitution. to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending
case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take answer. Thus:
cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC. 28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This being
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from
simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty days and proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court,
requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper
on House Bill No. 21505. remedy.

On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it 29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ
adopts the allegations and arguments in the main Petition. It further issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed
submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the
failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is
failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this
to lack of jurisdiction. case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly
divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both body politic of the questioned Comelec order. The
the Journal and the Record of the House of Representatives relating to consequent climate of legal confusion and political
the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of instability begs for judicial statesmanship.
stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference
Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional
1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. law is threatened by the political ambitions of man, only
the Supreme Court
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount
Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, majesty of the Constitution. 25
DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in due time,
their separate memoranda. 24 It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a
motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. 26 The COMELEC
special civil action. made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the
arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or
up the fifth issue which appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question. oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it
practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to
cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF
for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT
the case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT
dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and SYSTEM.
viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which provides: Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be
of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of of registered voters, of which every legislative district
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, must be represented by at least three per centum of the
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of registered voters therein. No amendment under this
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified section shall be authorized within five years following the
petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the five years thereafter.
defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action
or matter specified therein. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
right.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has
no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a
supported by the required minimum number of signatures of registered member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot
contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the
operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his
Memorandum, this Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure in
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan,
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative
Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not
set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the provide for its implementation.
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed
aside this technicality because the transcendental
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft
importance to the public of these cases demands that
Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if
Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional
we must, technicalities of procedure.
Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No.
332). 30 That section reads as follows:
II
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be First, on Section 1 on the matter of
proposed: initiative upon petition of at least 10
percent, there are no details in the
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths provision on how to carry this out. Do we
of all its members; or understand, therefore, that we are leaving
this matter to the legislature?
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as President.
provided for in Article___ Section ___of the
Constitution. 31 FR. BERNAS. And do we also
understand, therefore, that for as long as
After several interpellations, but before the period of the legislature does not pass the
amendments, the Committee submitted a new formulation of the necessary implementing law on this, this
concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus: will not operate?

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken
President. May we respectfully call up during the committee hearing,
attention of the Members of the especially with respect to the budget
Commission that pursuant to the mandate appropriations which would have to be
given to us last night, we submitted this legislated so that the plebiscite could be
afternoon a complete Committee Report called. We deemed it best that this matter
No. 7 which embodies the proposed be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is
provision governing the matter of initiative. right. In any event, as envisioned, no
This is now covered by Section 2 of the amendment through the power of initiative
complete committee report. With the can be called until after five years from the
permission of the Members, may I quote date of the ratification of this Constitution.
Section 2: Therefore, the first amendment that could
be proposed through the exercise of this
initiative power would be after five years. It
The people may, after five years from the date of the last
is reasonably expected that within that
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
five-year period, the National Assembly
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
can come up with the appropriate rules
percent of the registered voters.
governing the exercise of this power.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to
Committee Report No. 7. 32
the legislature — the details on how this is
to be carried out — is it possible that, in
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out effect, what will be presented to the
Section 2 are left to the legislature. Thus: people for ratification is the work of the
legislature rather than of the people?
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two Does this provision exclude that
simple, clarificatory questions. possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is
possibility because even the legislature nondebatable.
itself as a body could propose that
amendment, maybe individually or MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to
collectively, if it fails to muster the three- underscore the primacy of constituent
fourths vote in order to constitute itself as power we have a separate article in the
a constituent assembly and submit that constitution that would specifically cover
proposal to the people for ratification the process and the modes of amending
through the process of an initiative. the Constitution?

xxx xxx xxx MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam

President.
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the
sponsor that the intention in the proposal MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor
is to vest constituent power in the people inclined, as the provisions are drafted
to amend the Constitution? now, to again concede to the legislature
the process or the requirement of
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, determining the mechanics of amending
Madam President. the Constitution by people's initiative?

MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the MR. SUAREZ. The matter of
underlying precept of the proposal in implementing this could very well be
terms of institutionalizing popular placed in the hands of the National
participation in the drafting of the Assembly, not unless we can incorporate
Constitution or in the amendment thereof, into this provision the mechanics that
but I would have a lot of difficulties in would adequately cover all the
terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, conceivable situations. 33
as written. Would the sponsor agree with
me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate, It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned
constituent power has primacy over all Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND — not to REVISE — the
other legal mandates? Constitution; thus:

MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was
Madam President. suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor the extraordinary developments this year,
agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal has to be separated from the traditional
values, the Constitution is source of all modes of amending the Constitution as
legal mandates and that therefore we embodied in Section 1. The committee
require a great deal of circumspection in members felt that this system of initiative
the drafting and in the amendments of the should not extend to the revision of the
Constitution? entire Constitution, so we removed it from
 the operation of Section 1 of the proposed MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have
Article on Amendment or Revision. 34 modified the proposed amendment after
taking into account the modifications
xxx xxx xxx submitted by the sponsor himself and the
honorable Commissioners Guingona,
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and
seriously bothered by providing this Romulo. The modified amendment in
process of initiative as a separate section substitution of the proposed Section 2 will
in the Article on Amendment. Would the now read as follows: "SECTION 2. —
sponsor be amenable to accepting an AMENDMENTS TO THIS
amendment in terms of realigning Section CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE
2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE
1, instead of setting it up as another PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A
separate section as if it were a self- PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE
executing provision? PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH
EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable
BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST
except that, as we clarified a while
THREE PERCENT OF THE
ago, this process of initiative is limited to
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
the matter of amendment and should not
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION
expand into a revision which contemplates
SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE
a total overhaul of the Constitution. That
YEARS FOLLOWING THE
was the sense that was conveyed by the
RATIFICATION OF THIS
Committee.
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN
ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the THEREAFTER.
Committee was attempting to distinguish
the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY
Section 1 to include the process of
LAW PROVIDE FOR THE
revision; whereas theprocess of initiation
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE
to amend, which is given to the public,
OF THIS RIGHT.
would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President,
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were
considering that the proposed amendment
the terms envisioned in the Committee. 35
is reflective of the sense contained in
Section 2 of our completed Committee
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee amendment. 36
accepted. Thus:
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam to Section 2 clearly showed that it was a legislative act which must
President. I propose to substitute the implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
entire Section 2 with the following:
 MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam
Davide's amendment, is it possible for the President.
legislature to set forth certain procedures
to carry out the initiative. . .? MR. MAAMBONG. My first question:
Commissioner Davide's proposed
MR. DAVIDE. It can. amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it not cover the word
xxx xxx xxx "revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's between the words "amendments" and
amendment does not prevent the "revision"?
legislature from asking another body to set
the proposition in proper form. MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because
"amendments" and "revision" should be
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is covered by Section 1. So insofar as
correct. In other words, the initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
implementation of this particular right "amendments" not "revision." 38
would be subject to legislation, provided
the legislature cannot determine anymore Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing
the percentage of the requirement. amendments through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than
the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures,
including the determination of the proper MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be
form for submission to the people, may be made that under this proposal, what is
subject to legislation. involved is an amendment to the
Constitution. To amend a Constitution
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy would ordinarily require a proposal by the
the substantive right to initiate. In other National Assembly by a vote of three-
words, none of the procedures to be fourths; and to call a constitutional
proposed by the legislative body must convention would require a higher
diminish or impair the right conceded number. Moreover, just to submit the
here. issue of calling a constitutional
convention, a majority of the National
Assembly is required, the import being
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the
that the process of amendment must be
Constitution can the procedures which I
made more rigorous and difficult than
have discussed be legislated?
probably initiating an ordinary legislation
or putting an end to a law proposed by the
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37 National Assembly by way of a
referendum. I cannot agree to reducing
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment the requirement approved by the
strictly confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to — NOT REVISION of — Committee on the Legislative because it
the Constitution. Thus: would require another voting by the
Committee, and the voting as precisely
 based on a requirement of 10 percent. However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved
Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, Section 2 be amended by changing "percent" to "per centum" and
by way of an amendment, when the "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second
Commission shall take up the Article on paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide
the Legislative or on the National for the implementation of the exercise of this right. 44 This amendment
Assembly on plenary sessions. 39 was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section
2.
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to
amendments, and the final version, which the Commission approved by a The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on
vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows: the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not
self-executory.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam
President. Section 2, as amended, reads Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this
as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE
PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the
PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE exercise of the right than through the passage of a statute or legislative
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of
EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST Article XVII then reading:
BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST
THREE PERCENT OF THE The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO implementation of the exercise of this right.
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION
SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE
with
YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the
ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS exercise of this right.
THEREAFTER.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY power to provide for the rules implementing the exercise of the
LAW PROVIDE right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE carried out." 46
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a
approved on second reading on 9 July 1986.41 Thereafter, upon consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former
his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of
allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to
nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and
again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August referendum mentioned
1986. 42 in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill
No. 988, 48 which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act
well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as
Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements)
Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the
referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of
units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of
17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently a petition forinitiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c)
approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50and by the House of requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be
Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735. enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may
be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of
Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right?" initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:

A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer. (c) The petition shall state the following:

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be
2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as
Constitution. The said section reads: the case may be;

Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people c.2 the proposition;
under a system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by
any legislative body upon compliance with the c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized
and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied). c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That supplied).
section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As
pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted,
proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to
approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only strengthens the
"directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part,
conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only
amendments to the Constitution.
do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section
Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
was lifted from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a
III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and appropriately
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of
used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole
the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If
or in part." 52
Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation
of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section
for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy 9, which reads:
of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the (b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution
initiative on national and local laws. approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and (c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by
Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II majority of the votes cast in an election called for the
(National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based certification and proclamation of the Commission.
on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It (Emphasis supplied).
is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local (2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect
initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, initiative with the legislative bodies of local governments; thus:
ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities,
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's
and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative
organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for
into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we
indirect initiative with the House of Representatives,
quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
and other legislative bodies. . . .
Sec. 3. Definition of terms —
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the
COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the
xxx xxx xxx petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for
both national and localinitiative and referendum.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition on Local Initiative and Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision
proposing amendments to the Constitution; therein applies to both national and local initiative and referendum. It
reads:
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a national legislation; and Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall
prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for
proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the
or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis local legislative body to enact the said measure.
supplied).
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have providing for the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum
been a subtitle on initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 53 on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, it
failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national
accurate. Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and (k) The limitations on local initiative; and
the contents of the petition;
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the
number of votes for its approval; word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution"
and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition; Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the
proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines; and the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for
the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or
the paramount system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of
registered voters for the petition;
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned; insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations
the invocation of the power of initiative as a consequence thereof; as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58

(d) The formulation of the proposition; The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as
expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures; potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed; (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in
the local government unit concerned as to whether the required number (2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2)
of signatures have been obtained; of Article VI of the Constitution;

(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the (3) Delegation to the people at large;
proposition to the registered voters for their approval, which must be
within the period specified therein; (4) Delegation to local governments; and

(i) The issuance of a certification of the result; (5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60

(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi- amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power
judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is
delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed
which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required
its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. 62 signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain
assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in
subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after
then invalid. its filing. The petition then is theinitiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing
is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of
III the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to
prescribe the form of the petition; 63(2) to issue through its Election
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of
PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE registered voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its
CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID. verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and used in the immediately preceding election. 66
regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735
It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given
COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must
is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under
Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a
which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests. docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap
IV of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6
December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order
directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions.
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH
In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE
abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
DELFIN PETITION.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance
proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is
with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional
an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered
unnecessary, if not academic.

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be

permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient
law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of
the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to

the Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given
flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any
longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the
implementation of the right of the people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of

initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide
sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the

Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the

DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made

permanent as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as
against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD
SUPREME COURT PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights, Intervenors.
Manila
x--------------------------------------------------------x
EN BANC
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006 THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,Intervenors.

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH x--------------------------------------------------------x

6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
x--------------------------------------------------------x
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN,
MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. x ------------------------------------------------------- x
OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
x------------------------------------------------------ x CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON,
FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P.
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.

x--------------------------------------------------------x x ------------------------------------------------------- x

BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan- RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO
Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo BAYA, Intervenors.
Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary
General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary x -------------------------------------------------------- x
General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM
represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by its
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented
ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F.
by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA
BALAIS, Intervenors.
WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay,
ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman,
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer x -------------------------------------------------------- x
Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned
Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President,
MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x

SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.

CARPIO, J.:
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
The Case
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA
A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006
TABAYOYONG, Intervenors. of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an
initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
Antecedent Facts
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU
PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors. On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other
x --------------------------------------------------------x groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and
ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors. Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act
("RA 6735").
x -----------------------------------------------------x
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of
6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelveper centum (12%) of all
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG
registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least
PILIPINO, Intervenors.
three per centum(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of
x -----------------------------------------------------x the 6.3 million individuals.

G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006 The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article
A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners, XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift
vs. the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due
S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following
FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter
Doe,, Respondent. DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND
VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF
GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY
DECISION SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
 PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE opposing intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain
SYSTEM TO THE OTHER? that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also
challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the
the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum requirement for the
(Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.7 percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2,
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed
The Ruling of the COMELEC changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino
Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due
limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC
invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26
Elections8 declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative September 2006. After receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court
clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.9 considered the case submitted for resolution.

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the The Issues
writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution
of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to The petitions raise the following issues:
their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their 1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section
petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution
Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, through a people's initiative;
and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the
sovereign people." 2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to show cause why they Constitution; and
should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification of
signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the 3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition.
petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
The Ruling of the Court
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General
joined causes with the petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition There is no merit to the petition.
despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the
Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic
implement the system of initiative."
requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus,
there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to
supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The supporting comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the
intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to
grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The
XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People framers also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal
itself because the proponents must "prepare that proposal and pass it
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional around for signature."
provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. This section states: The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied) These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
meaning of an amendment "directly proposed by the people through "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition"
initiative upon a petition," thus: only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments.
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some
voters want to propose a constitutional amendment. Is the draft The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the
of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state
shown to the people when they are asked to sign? the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically
President. impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the
millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is
ready and shown to them before they sign. Now, who
prepares the draft? The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of
people's initiative from the United States where various State
constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States15 which
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
allow initiative petitions,the unbending requirement is that the people
must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an
a draft shown to them and they are asked whether or not they initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed
want to propose this constitutional amendment. amendments.16

MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in
proposal and pass it around for signature.13 (Emphasis several decisions of various courts. Thus, inCapezzuto v. State Ballot
supplied) Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the
First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the
proposed constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to
the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated
 [A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that
person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose
interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people.
significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity and not as
orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can
without the signer having actually examined the petition, could impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, amendments to the people. The proponents present favorably their
or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their
not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who
acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is gather the signatures.
the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested
interest in seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the
qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied) constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures. The proponents
bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained,
explained: or incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments
by initiative commonly are described in similar terms. x x x (The The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court
purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient a copy of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The
information so that registered voters can intelligently Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature
evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed
(publication of full text of amended constitutional provision their Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this
required because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached21 to
section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor
is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.")
(Emphasis supplied) The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the
signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's Memorandum are
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
the nature and effect of that which is proposed" and failure to do so is
"deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.19 Province: City/Municipality: No. of
Legislative District: Barangay:
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that Verified
the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments.
However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show Signatures:
that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence
on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF
must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE
sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY,
SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to
ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?" "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they
formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. Constitution.
My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to
amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof. Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-
gathering from February to August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated,
Precinct Name Address Birthdate Signature Verification
together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's
Number draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the
Last Name, First MM/DD/YY COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft of their
Name, M.I. amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty.
Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino
1
changed his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the
2 draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25
August 2006 petition.
3
4 The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the
draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months
5 earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures.
Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25
6 August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition,
7 filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:

8 I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended]

Petition in my personal capacity as a registered voter, for and on
9 behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as
10 shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and
as representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis
_________________ _________________ supplied)
__________________
Barangay Official Witness Witness
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign) The Lambino
(Print Name and Sign)Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 to the present petition. However, the "Official Website of the
Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"22 has posted the full text of
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither
does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the
oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006. RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE
PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON CHARTER
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987
system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the CONSTITUTION
 WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a common stand on the approach "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic)
to support the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change through people's initiative and
Commission on Charter Change; referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The
proposals of the Consultative Commission24 arevastly different from the
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration
for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission
and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives in affect all provisions of the existing Constitution, from the Preamble to
Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005; the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound
impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter existing Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed
Change created by Her Excellency to recommend amendments changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport
to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the
December 2005; introduction of new Transitory Provisions.

WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more
developments in Congress which militates against the use of the than six months before the filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30
expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution; August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members Group caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with the
and the failure of Congress to amend the Constitution as a signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC. On the
constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the
the constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition
Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
pursue the same; does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's
proposed changes.
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY
RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the
UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
(ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S
CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the
CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND proposed amendments alleged in the Petition, more specifically,
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the
CONSTITUTION; Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to
correctly reflect their proposed amendments.
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special
meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the Century Park Hotel, The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition
Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied) because the amended petition was what they had shown to the people
during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately
to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed
30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC that they amendment must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative
circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino
sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to,
petition before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris
petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do not Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or
circulated with, the signature sheets. It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed,
circulated, from February to August 2006 during the signature-gathering
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later with
that the Lambino Group first claimed that they circulated the "petition for the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court
initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus: in their belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with the
signature sheets, the petition or amended petition. Nevertheless,
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is even assumingthe Lambino Group circulated the amended petition
not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read the measure during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted
attached to a referendum petition cannot question his circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
signature on the ground that he did not understand the
nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they
S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who printed only 100,000 copies of the draft petition they filed more than
signed the signature sheets circulated together with the six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but
presumed to have understood the proposition contained in the he could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other
petition. (Emphasis supplied) supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of the
printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the these 100,000 copies.
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an
afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October
(Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino
pointed out that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the
proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group petition for initiative x x x."25 This admission binds the Lambino
alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group
mention the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great
finally stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.
draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating received with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100
that "a signer who did not read the measure attached to a referendum percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company
petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000
understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an signature sheets could have circulated with the petition. Each signature
authority that cites a proposed changeattached to the petition signed sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people signed
by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the
that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the
authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
petition itself.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not
impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have have inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading
seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to
the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his
ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they group assured the people during the signature-gathering that the
signed the signature sheets. elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007
local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the local elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.
full text of the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature
sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of such The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as
attachment.Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral found in the amended petition, states:
arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact
is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election
omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed of the members of Parliament, which shall be synchronized
changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non- and held simultaneously with the election of all local
compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment must government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament
initiative clause of the Constitution.
will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local elections. This section
merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be held
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.
signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before
signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the
proposed changes, among which are:
proposed changes, could have easily written the word "next" before the
phrase "election of all local government officials." This would have
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the
lifted and thus members of Parliament can be re-elected next local elections following the ratification of the proposed changes.
indefinitely;26 However, the absence of the word "next" allows the interim Parliament to
schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until with any future local elections.
its members, who are almost all the present members of
Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of
the members of the interim Parliament will determine the their own term of office. This allows incumbent members of the House of
expiration of their own term of office; 27 Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year term of
office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the
changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3 million
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28 people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his
group deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the nation.
Lambino Group's signature sheets. The people who signed the signature
sheets had no idea that they were proposing these amendments. These
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments to avoid electorate cannot know what it is voting on - the amendment's
fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the
signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of
and his group because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x The ballot
the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3 language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness
million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and
would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments
simultaneously with the local elections. embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v.
who signed the signature sheets. The proposed changes mandate the McAlpine,30 the Supreme Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence,
interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory
Provisions, provides: Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the
problems that the single-subject rule was enacted to prevent are
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate
amendments, the interim Parliament shall convene to propose intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's
amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent passage, and there is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth
with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an
strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied) initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised process.
They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing) provisions,
"surplusage" and the Court and the people should simply ignore it. Far when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters
from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino Group's typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to
initiative. potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will never
read the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly,
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system. initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from
American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same
petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can answer only Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further
either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition amendments or revisions to be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a
that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature sheets could
unacceptable. not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
entire proposition and not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus,
in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared: Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4)
to compel the interim Parliament to amend or revise again the
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or
constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial responsibility before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section
is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of 4(4), the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise
again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the initiative
proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of
or revise again the Constitution. the existing House of Representatives.

However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first
amending or revising again so soon the Constitution. The signature showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most
sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions the likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people.
initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly
is a need for such further amendments or revisions. The people are proposed by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people
again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the proposed must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental
people" because the people do not even know the nature and effect of law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot
the proposed changes. be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney
to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's
amended petition of 30 August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose
Transitory Provisions states: amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the
people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a
members of Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment
2010. is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after
they have signed the petition.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as
member of Parliament if the interim Parliament does not schedule In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional
elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2,
no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly
Representatives even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the
present members of the House will remain members of the interim 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Parliament after 30 June 2010. Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an
the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of the President. If the interim amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast,
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments
June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
of the House of Representatives to theexclusion of the present
Senators. ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the
Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
could not have known that their signatures would be used to Constitution may be proposed by:
discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that
their signatures would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or
 (2) A constitutional convention. xxxx

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process
directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment.
supplied) Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in
terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section as
Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote if it were a self-executing provision?
of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional
convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative. MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we
clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision
to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That
Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
"[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as
shown by the following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission: MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting
to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President. to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of
initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the apply to amendments?
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night,
we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7 MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned
which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of in the Committee.
initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the complete
committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam
quote Section 2: President.

The people may, after five years from the date of the last xxxx
plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution
thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's
voters. proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendments."
Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between
Report No. 7. This proposal was suggested on the theory that this the words "amendments" and "revision"?
matter of initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and
the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as
in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments"
initiative should be limited to amendments to the not "revision."
Constitution and should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or
Revision. x x x x
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly.
Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of
"amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed
and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may of adoption, x x x.
propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote,
that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the While differing from that document in material respects, the
Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly measure sponsored by the plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough
withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments. To call it an amendment is a misnomer.

This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a
States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan,32 the Supreme Court of California measure as can be submitted to the people through the initiative.
ruled: If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII,
Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to convention called in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section
the Constitution x x x applies only to the proposing and the 1. x x x x
adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to the
Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's
constitutional revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the
the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no
the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the
called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million
the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed
'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure in the Constitution itself.
became law a substantial revision of our present state
Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No.
properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first
364:34
agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought
by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be
revised or amended in the manner prescribed by the
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a
constitution in a manner other than the one provided in the
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the instrument is almost invariably treated as extra-
manner in which it may be amended or revised, it can be altered constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally
by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have power
through the use of one of the specified means. The constitution to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at will, they
itself recognizes that there is a difference between an must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the
amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination settled principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in
of the measure here in question that it is not an amendment as adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by which the
that term is generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the
Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part on the fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is
revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Constitutional Revision' authorized by the 1961 Legislative
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected
Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath and duty to insure and does not consider the degree of the change.
compliance with the clear command of the Constitution ― that a people's
initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed
change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
amendment or revision of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's governmental plan as to amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an
initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry.
dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes
Constitution. "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its
Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and
a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the the system of check and balances."39
distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the
permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on
therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105
underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the provisions in the entire Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes
substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or
change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution,
improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present
framed.35 (Emphasis supplied) Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers
in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical
system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change in the structure of government.
change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when
the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of
other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a
or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber
generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the
generally affects only the specific provision being amended. legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-
revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition
developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of
The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the
in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily
constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing apparent that the changes will radically alter the framework of
government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, We conclude with the observation that if such proposed
S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes: amendment were adopted by the people at the General Election
and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous
separable provisions. The guiding original intention of an amendment is inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or if after
to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed necessary to submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse
meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have to adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, this State. The same result would obtain from an amendment, for
however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a re- instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme
examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too
which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine numerous to detail. These examples point unerringly to the
how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a answer.
switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system
would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system men and women and many sessions of the Legislature in bringing
to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate inconsistencies
provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied) and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant,
homogenous and up-to-date document. All of this could
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be
the Florida State constitution to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition
legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was defective and here.43 (Emphasis supplied)
unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several
other provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the
striking down the initiative as outside the scope of the initiative clause, present petition. The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift
ruled as follows: from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to merge the
executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 even touch the executive department.
Constitution to provide for a Unicameral Legislature affects not
only many other provisions of the Constitution but provides In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the
for a change in the form of the legislative branch of Florida Constitution that would be affected by the shift from a bicameral
government, which has been in existence in the United States to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present initiative, no
Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based
the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more on the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no
revolutionary change. The concept of a House and a Senate is doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative seeks far more radical
basic in the American form of government. It would not only changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
radically change the whole pattern of government in this
state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment"
would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry and "revision" is only one of procedure, not of substance. The
on government. Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes
changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions"
xxxx because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the
changes. However, the same substantive changes, when proposed
through an initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are
made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation, language.45 Any theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent
profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor. and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory
wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any
in their Memorandum: jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution,
only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change
provisions expressly provide for both "amendment" and "revision" in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while
the same provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in
when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the apparent American jurisdictions have attempted to advance without any success.
distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this
on one hand the common people in general are not expected to theory, thus:
work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because
that is not their occupation, profession or vocation; while on the Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to
other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention changes to the constitution proposed by initiative. His theory is
delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by
because that is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, which the legislature can propose a revision of the
the difference between the words "revision" and constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions
"amendment" pertain only to the process or procedure of initiated by the people.
coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the
constitutional provisions. Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a
wholesale change to the constitution that cannot be enacted
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction
and "revision" cannot reasonably be in the substance or between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the
extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original; scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that
boldfacing supplied) revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the
constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes far
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument,
convention had drafted the same proposed changes that the Lambino including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and
Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a
revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the
the proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a revision proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles
if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the changes. of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it
However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot
proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the without the prior approval of the legislature.
Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of
changing the fundamental law of the land. We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1),
does not prohibit revisions instituted by initiative. In Holmes v.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the
Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the
the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII,
stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
 "From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, branches. These three examples are located at the far green end of the
authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of amending the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the
Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use present petition is located.
as a means of revising the constitution." x x x x
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of
said: "It is the only section of the constitution which provides the the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example,
means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic"
individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure in Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire
before the electorate." x x x x structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the
Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it
section 2, does not apply to constitutional revisions affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of
proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied) checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing
Constitution.
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which
negates the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several
Constitution. provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded
proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles
green for amendments and at the other end red for revisions. Towards with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional
determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions
initiative is indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum where allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable
revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only
existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of amendments and not revisions.
government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and
articles of the Constitution. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the
Transitory Provisions states:
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the
Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent
generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, President and Vice President, with the exception of Sections 1, 2,
a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be
ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and
an amendment and not a revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to
degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary
amendment and not a revision.49 system of government, in which case, they shall be amended
to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being
amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is
or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law prevails. This rule
also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments
this rule of construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable to this Constitution."
inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the 3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended,"
which requires a future separate constitutional amendment. The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the
basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral arguments that the There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA
requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty. 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and
Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An
later provision automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable affirmation or reversal of Santiagowill not change the outcome of the
inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that. present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which
effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the
the Transitory Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI of the Constitution.
1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The
inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a
and the "Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other
shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled
government." doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if
the case can be resolved on some other grounds.51
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the
Lambino Group's proposed changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi, Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will
the few countries withunicameral parliaments? The proposed changes not change the result here because the present petition violates Section
could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present
forms of government ― the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian, initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have even before complying with RA 6735.
all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature
sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which
Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government? requires that the "petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people
revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system
requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or
Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will the amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only
only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution. Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C.
Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the
is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3
million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier
and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes,
the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of RA tomorrow the new dominant political group that comes will demand its
6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid. own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A
revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA country.
6735 stating, "No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall
be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the An overwhelming majority − 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3
Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose percent of the total votes cast53 − approved our Constitution in a
further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the
totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government. Since the present unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's
initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits sovereign will. That approval included the prescribed modes for
submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA amending or revising the Constitution.
6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our Constitution contrary to
Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity, prescribed
when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en constitutional change, which means subverting the people's sovereign
banc merely followed this Court's ruling inSantiago and People's will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the Court cannot
Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this
COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the
discretion is attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of the people.
present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court should
reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA: Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the
people decide" cannot override the specific modes of changing the
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the
of discretion could be attributed to the public respondent Constitution ― the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring
COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it stability to our society ― becomes easily susceptible to manipulative
appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the changes by political groups gathering signatures through false promises.
Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice."
5. Conclusion However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution
No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her
utmost respect and obedience of all the citizens of this nation. No one Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms."
can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an
blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and "unqualified support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change
revision laid down in the Constitution itself. the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of
"people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present initiative.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the
Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and turned by every
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the
Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies the people's sovereign
will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and protect
the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled
by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the
Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To allow such
alteration and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines lacking. It was not until July 29, 1969 that the case was deemed
SUPREME COURT submitted for decision. When the petition for review was filed on January
Manila 2, 1958, the basic issue raised was impressed with an element of
novelty. Four days thereafter, however, on January 6, 1958, it was held
EN BANC by this Court that the aforesaid provision does not require that the
"foreign country" possess an international personality to come within its
terms. 2 Accordingly, we have to affirm.

G.R. No. L-13250 October 29, 1971 The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, now under review, sets forth
the background facts as follows: "This is an appeal interposed by
petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda as administrator of the estate of the
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
deceased Doña Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from the
vs.
decision of the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing
ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, respondent..
against and demanding from the former the sum P161,874.95 as
deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, including interest and penalties,
Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Special Attorney Jose on the transfer of intangible personal properties situated in the
G. Azurin, (O.S.G.) for petitioner. Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de
Cerdeira. Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria Cerdeira
Ramirez and Ortigas for respondent. for short) is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish
citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to her death
on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise she left, among others,
intangible personal properties in the Philippines." 3 Then came this
FERNANDO, J.: portion: "On September 29, 1955, petitioner filed a provisional estate and
inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late Maria Cerdeira. On
The basic issue posed by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue in this the same date, respondent, pending investigation, issued an assessment
appeal from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals as to whether or not for state and inheritance taxes in the respective amounts of P111,592.48
the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be and P157,791.48, or a total of P369,383.96 which tax liabilities were paid
necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be by petitioner ... . On November 17, 1955, an amended return was filed ...
satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 wherein intangible personal properties with the value of P396,308.90
of the National Internal Revenue Code 1 is now ripe for adjudication. The were claimed as exempted from taxes. On November 23, 1955,
Court of Tax Appeals answered the question in the negative, and thus respondent, pending investigation, issued another assessment for estate
reversed the action taken by petitioner Collector, who would hold and inheritance taxes in the amounts of P202,262.40 and P267,402.84,
respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the respectively, or a total of P469,665.24 ... . In a letter dated January 11,
late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the sum of P161,874.95 1956, respondent denied the request for exemption on the ground that
as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal
personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national Revenue Code. Hence, respondent demanded the payment of the sums
having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of of P239,439.49 representing deficiency estate and inheritance taxes
her death in 1955. In an earlier resolution promulgated May 30, 1962, this including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise
Court on the assumption that the need for resolving the principal question penalties ... . In a letter dated February 8, 1956, and received by
would be obviated, referred the matter back to the Court of Tax Appeals respondent on the following day, petitioner requested for the
to determine whether the alleged law of Tangier did grant the reciprocal reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption of the
tax exemption required by the aforesaid Section 122. Then came an intangible personal properties and the imposition of the 25% and 5% ad
order from the Court of Tax Appeals submitting copies of legislation of valorem penalties ... . However, respondent denied request, in his letter
Tangier that would manifest that the element of reciprocity was not dated May 5, 1956 ... and received by petitioner on May 21, 1956.
Respondent premised the denial on the grounds that there was no "the transfers by reason of death of movable properties, corporeal or
reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a incorporeal, including furniture and personal effects as well as of
foreign country. Consequently, respondent demanded the payment of the securities, bonds, shares, ..., were not subject, on that date and in said
sums of P73,851.21 and P88,023.74 respectively, or a total of zone, to the payment of any death tax, whatever might have been the
P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including nationality of the deceased or his heirs and legatees." It was further noted
surcharges, interests and compromise penalties." 4 in an order of such Court referring the matter back to us that such were
duly admitted in evidence during the hearing of the case on September 9,
The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals. As there was 1963. Respondent presented no evidence." 7
no dispute between the parties regarding the values of the properties and
the mathematical correctness of the deficiency assessments, the The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the
principal question as noted dealt with the reciprocity aspect as well as the National Internal Revenue Code. It reads thus: "That no tax shall be
insisting by the Collector of Internal Revenue that Tangier was not a collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if
foreign country within the meaning of Section 122. In ruling against the the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country
contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the appealed decision which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of
states: "In fine, we believe, and so hold, that the expression "foreign any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines
country", used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country
Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a
although not an international person in the sense of international law, similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in
does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the
our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption Philippines not residing in that foreign country." 8 The only obstacle
from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have therefore to a definitive ruling is whether or not as vigorously insisted
been recognized by our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the upon by petitioner the acquisition of internal personality is a
exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code." 5 condition sine qua non to Tangier being considered a "foreign country".
Deference to the De Lara ruling, as was made clear in the opening
Hence appeal to this court by petitioner. The respective briefs of the paragraph of this opinion, calls for an affirmance of the decision of the
parties duly submitted, but as above indicated, instead of ruling definitely Court of Tax Appeals.
on the question, this Court, on May 30, 1962, resolve to inquire further
into the question of reciprocity and sent back the case to the Court of Tax It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a
Appeals for the motion of evidence thereon. The dispositive portion of state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically
such resolution reads as follows: "While section 122 of the Philippine Tax organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by
Code aforequoted speaks of 'intangible personal property' in both penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting
subdivisions (a) and (b); the alleged laws of Tangier refer to 'bienes through a government functioning under a regime of
muebles situados en Tanger', 'bienes muebles radicantes en Tanger', law. 9 It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed
'movables' and 'movable property'. In order that this Court may be able to as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal
determine whether the alleged laws of Tangier grant the reciprocal tax competence to exact obedience to its commands. 10 It has been referred
exemptions required by Section 122 of the Tax Code, and without, for the to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense
time being, going into the merits of the issues raised by the petitioner- and mutual safety and to promote the general welfare. 11 Correctly has it
appellant, the case is [remanded] to the Court of Tax Appeals for the been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification of the
reception of evidence or proof on whether or not the words `bienes nation." 12 This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The
muebles', 'movables' and 'movable properties as used in the Tangier stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory,
laws, include or embrace 'intangible person property', as used in the Tax politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign
Code." 6 In line with the above resolution, the Court of Tax Appeals will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international
admitted evidence submitted by the administrator petitioner Antonio personality. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into
Campos Rueda, consisting of exhibits of laws of Tangier to the effect that government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy
over all other institutions. 13 McIver similarly would point to the power WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals of
entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions October 30, 1957 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs.
of a legal order and to enter into international relations. 14 With the latter
requisite satisfied, international law do not exact independence as a
condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine. 15

Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international

personality, petitioner has not successfully made out a case. It bears
repeating that four days after the filing of this petition on January 6, 1958
in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, 16 it was specifically held by
us: "Considering the State of California as a foreign country in relation to
section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold, as did the Tax Court,
that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled the exemption from the
inheritance tax on the intangible personal property found in the
Philippines." 17 There can be no doubt that California as a state in the
American Union was in the alleged requisite of international personality.
Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of
Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. 18

What is undeniable is that even prior to the De Lara ruling, this Court did
commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of
Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall
under this exempt category. So it appears in an opinion of the Court by
the then Acting Chief Justicem Bengson who thereafter assumed that
position in a permanent capacity, in Kiene v. Collector of Internal
Revenue. 19 As was therein noted: 'The Board found from the documents
submitted to it — proof of the laws of Liechtenstein — that said country
does not impose estate, inheritance and gift taxes on intangible property
of Filipino citizens not residing in that country. Wherefore, the Board
declared that pursuant to the exemption above established, no estate or
inheritance taxes were collectible, Ludwig Kiene being a resident of
Liechtestein when he passed away." 20 Then came this definitive ruling:
"The Collector — hereafter named the respondent — cites decisions of
the United States Supreme Court and of this Court, holding that
intangible personal property in the Philippines belonging to a non-
resident foreigner, who died outside of this country is subject to the
estate tax, in disregard of the principle 'mobilia sequuntur personam'.
Such property is admittedly taxable here. Without the proviso above
quoted, the shares of stock owned here by the Ludwig Kiene would be
concededly subject to estate and inheritance taxes. Nevertheless our
Congress chose to make an exemption where conditions are such that
demand reciprocity — as in this case. And the exemption must be
honored." 21
 epublic of the Philippines The Case
SUPREME COURT
Manila This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221(RA 9522) adjusting the
EN BANC country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of
nearby territories.
G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011
The Antecedents
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA
HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA 3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on
FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS
JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over
BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN DELA their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left
CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of
RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus,
CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades,
KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446])
MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines
PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT around Sabah in North Borneo.
REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA
IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the
MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to
ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations
VELOSO III, Petitioners, Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines
vs. ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States
SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS like the Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. the extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA
ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories,
VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as
NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable
and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS maritime zones.
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their
NATIONS,Respondents. respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,"9 as the
case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal
DECISION grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and
logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation
CARPIO, J.: of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty
of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s
waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and 2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine The Ruling of the Court
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.13
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and
"regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522.
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522
for what it excluded and included – its failure to reference either the On the Threshold Issues
Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s framework of Petitioners Possess Locus
regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Standi as Citizens
Scarborough Shoal.
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither
questioning (1) the petition’s compliance with the case or controversy infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public
requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged lack funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522.
of locus standiand (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as citizens with
prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the
respondents defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance with the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance
terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of
Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing "a
the country’s security, environment and economic interests or relinquish more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of
the Philippines’ claim over Sabah. the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17

Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
of petitioners’ assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the the Constitutionality of Statutes
boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds,
We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ. respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of
certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any
The Issues showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting
The petition raises the following issues: prejudice on the part of petitioners.18

1. Preliminarily – Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When

this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however,
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as
suit; and proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes,19 and
indeed, of acts of other branches of government.20 Issues of
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while
proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such
relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on
constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules
notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law. Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from
to Demarcate the Country’s archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis
Maritime Zones and Continental supplied)
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS
III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
national territory"21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation international community of the scope of the maritime space and
of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights,
successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in
constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and
the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly continental shelf (Article 77).
ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of
Paris’ technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the
extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the
embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22 Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be
drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw
Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us. the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be
drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and
is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over drying reefs of the archipelago."24
maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the
exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory.
continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or
culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of
oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to
States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land
lands along their coasts. features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules
on general international law.26
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by
UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their RA 9522’s Use of the Framework
coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to of Regime of Islands to Determine the
serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent miles)
with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas Internal or
archipelagic
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of waters 166,858 171,435
islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of
the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106
over that area.27 Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough
Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in
Exclusive
the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters,"
Economic Zone 382,669
prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the
configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and
the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a TOTAL 440,994 586,210
reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis-à-
vis the Philippines’ obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this
view.1avvphi1 Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic
zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters
covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of
shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA
opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of
3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30
the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus
comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum length of
baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the
Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind
out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation
of the Philippines’ claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are
relevant for this purpose.

Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of

territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and
law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of
basepoints, increasedthe Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its
internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216
square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:29

Extent of maritime Extent of maritime

area using RA 3046, area using RA 9522,
as amended, taking taking into account
into account the UNCLOS III (in
Treaty of Paris’ square nautical
delimitation (in miles)
square nautical
 SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines
likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined
as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent
with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential

Decree No. 1596 and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

(Emphasis supplied)

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have
ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two
provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that
"[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article
47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not
exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total
number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.31

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the

KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying
areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline
of the Philippine archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped
around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."

The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam

Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the
Senate deliberations:

What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world
call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our
archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we
might be accused of violating the provision of international law which
Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable
territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng
KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang
Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although
and the Scarborough Shoal: we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of the
our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] Philippines consistent with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the
archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt
itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III,
Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the
masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own
tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow applicable maritime zones.37
the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded RA 5446 Retained
UNCLOS III’s limits.1avvphi1 The need to shorten this baseline, and in
addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to
became imperative as discussed by respondents: textualize the Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also
untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the
extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the
[UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Actis without prejudice to the
baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit: delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory
of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis
Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This supplied)
exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the
[UNCLOS III], which states that "The length of such baselines UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not
shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent Incompatible with the Constitution’s
of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may Delineation of Internal Waters
exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical
miles." As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners
contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of
basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system. innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight.
This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose
Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, violation of the Constitution.38
and not established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly,
some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the
down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or Constitution39 or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49
on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
Article 47.35 landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject
archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. – to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does not
place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal States which are
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the
waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of
accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim
all the waters landward of their baselines,regardless of their depth or
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial
archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’
the resources contained therein. archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive
entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under
UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones,
xxxx
placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical
miles beyond the States’ territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.47
this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the
archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by
Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article
the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters
II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies)48 must also fail. Our
and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources
present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as
contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x."49 Article II
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing
municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the
archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful
of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the
consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed
Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to
the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 251 ) and
legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA
innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical 9522.
highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines
codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone.
territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the
conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime
is a customary international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in
accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines.
measures from the international community.
UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space – the exclusive
economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III
grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources
found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III, however,
preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that Associate Justice Associate Justice
attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS
III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners’ reading Associate Justice Associate Justice
plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs
to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this
option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself Associate Justice Associate Justice
devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of
its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a
two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE C. MENDOZA
powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and Associate Justice Associate Justice
submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the
country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime
space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an CERTIFICATION
internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones,
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE

JR. CASTRO
 EN BANC Coconut Corporation is not a government entity within the purview of
section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2)
[G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956.]
that the payments already made by said Defendant to Plaintiffs herein
LEOPOLDO T. BACANI and MATEO A. MATOTO, Plaintiffs- and received by the latter from the former in the total amount of P714, for
Appellees, vs. NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, ET copies of the stenographic transcripts in question, are valid, just and
AL., Defendants, NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION and BOARD legal; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) that Plaintiffs are under no
OF LIQUIDATORS, Defendants-Appellants. obligation whatsoever to make a refund of these payments already
received by them.” This is an appeal from said decision.
Under section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the Government of the
DECISION
Philippines is exempt from paying the legal fees provided for therein, and
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: among these fees are those which stenographers may charge for the
transcript of notes taken by them that may be requested by any
Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the
interested person (section 8). The fees in question are for the transcript
Court of First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No.
of notes taken during the hearing of a case in which the National Coconut
2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut
Corporation is interested, and the transcript was requested by its
Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel
assistant corporate counsel for the use of said corporation.
forDefendant, requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of
the stenographic notes taken by them during the On the other hand, section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines
hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel the scope of the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines” as
Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
submitted to him their bills for the payment of their fees. The National
“‘The Government of the Philippine Islands’ is a term which refers to the
Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacani and
corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government
P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page.
are exercised throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as the
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which
disallowed the payment of these fees and sought the recovery of the political authority is made effective in said Islands, whether pertaining to
amounts paid. On January 19, 1953, the Auditor General required the central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or
the Plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of other form of local government.”
the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that the
The question now to be determined is whether the National Coconut
National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt
Corporation may be considered as included in the term “Government of
from the payment of the fees in question. On February 6, 1954, the
the Republic of the Philippines” for the purposes of the exemption of the
Auditor General issued an order directing the Cashier of the Department
legal fees provided for in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
of Justice to deduct from the salary of Leopoldo T. Bacani the amount of
P25 every payday and from the salary of Mateo A. Matoto the amount of As may be noted, the term “Government of the Republic of the
P10 every payday beginning March 30, 1954. To prevent deduction of Philippines” refers to a government entity through which the functions of
these fees from their salaries and secure a judicial ruling that the National government are exercised, including the various arms through which
Coconut Corporation is not a government entity within the purview of political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining
section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, this action was instituted in to the central government or to the provincial or municipal branches or
the Court of First Instance of Manila. other form of local government. This requires a little digression on the
nature and functions of our government as instituted in our Constitution.
Defendants set up as a defense that the National Coconut Corporation is
a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised To begin with, we state that the term “Government” may be defined as
Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the “that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent
stenographers’ fees under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. After trial, the society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary
court found for the Plaintiffs declaring (1) “that Defendant National to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the
people forming that society by those who possess the power or authority From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions
of prescribing them” (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332). This institution, when which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as
referring to the national government, has reference to what our expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an
Constitution has established composed of three great departments, the attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote
legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers and merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people. To this latter
functions of government are exercised. These functions are class belongs the organization of those corporations owned or controlled
twofold:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary constitute and ministrant. The former by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our
are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we
in nature; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe latter are those that are call government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on the
undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and form of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal
are merely optional. President Wilson enumerates the constituent characteristics of a private corporations under the Corporation Law.
functions as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The question that now arises is:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Does the fact
“‘(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and that these corporation perform certain functions of government make
property from violence and robbery. them a part of the Government of the Philippines?
‘(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between The answer is simple:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary they do not acquire that
parents and children. status for the simple reason that they do not come under the
classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the
‘(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of
National Coconut Corporation. While it was organized with the purpose of
property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
“adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade
‘(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals. preferences in the United States” and of providing “Facilities for the better
curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-
‘(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
products”, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to
‘(6) The administration of justice in civil cases. promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power
separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the
‘(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of
provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and
citizens.
the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
‘(8) Dealings of the state with foreign Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same
powers:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the preservation of the state from manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity
external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its different from our government. As this Court has aptly said, “The mere
international interests.’“ (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine fact that the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not
Islands, p. 19.) make it a public corporation” (National Coal Co. vs. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 46 Phil., 586-587). “By becoming a stockholder in the National
The most important of the ministrant functions
Coal Company, the Government divested itself of its sovereign character
are:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary public works, public education, public
so far as respects the transactions of the corporation cralaw . Unlike the
charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and
Government, the corporation may be sued without its consent, and is
industry. The principles deter mining whether or not a government shall
subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an agency or
exercise certain of these optional functions
instrumentality of government.” (Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
are:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) that a government should do for the
Springer, 50 Phil., 288.)
public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally
undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the
very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than Republic of the Philippines” used in section 2 of the Revised
is any private individual or group of individuals. (Malcolm, The Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which
Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19-20.) the functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of
sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political
authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other As regards the question of procedure raised by Appellants, suffice it to
form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations. say that the same is insubstantial, considering that this case refers not to
They do not include government entities which are given a corporate a money claim disapproved by the Auditor General but to an action of
personality separate and distinct from the government and which are prohibition the purpose of which is to restrain the officials concerned from
governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, duties and liabilities deducting from Plaintiffs’ salaries the amount paid to them as
have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate stenographers’ fees. This case does not come under section 1, Rule 45
charters. They do not therefore come within the exemption clause of the Rules of Court relative to appeals from a decision of the Auditor
prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court. General.
“Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without
a portion of the State.” (Section 3, Republic Act No. 1459, Corporation pronouncement as to costs.
Law).
“‘The generally accepted definition of a municipal corporation would only
include organized cities and towns, and like organizations, with political
and legislative powers for the local, civil government and police
regulations of the inhabitants of the particular district included in the
boundaries of the corporation.’ Heller vs. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309, 312.”
“In its more general sense the phrase ‘municipal corporation’ may include
both towns and counties, and other public corporations created by
government for political purposes. In its more common and limited
signification, it embraces only incorporated villages, towns and cities.
Dunn vs. Court of County Revenues, 85 Ala. 144, 146, 4 So. 661.”
(McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, p. 385.)
“We may, therefore, define a municipal corporation in its historical and
strict sense to be the incorporation, by the authority of the government, of
the inhabitants of a particular place or district, and authorizing them in
their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate specified powers of
legislation and regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns.
This power of local government is the distinctive purpose and the
distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper.” (Dillon,
Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. I, p. 59.)
It is true that under section 8, Rule 130, stenographers may only charge
as fees P0.30 for each page of transcript of not less than 200 words
before the appeal is taken and P0.15 for each page after the filing of the
appeal, but in this case the National Coconut Corporation has agreed
and in fact has paid P1.00 per page for the services rendered by
the Plaintiffs and has not raised any objection to the amount paid until its
propriety was disputed by the Auditor General. The payment of the fees
in question became therefore contractual and as such is valid even if it
goes beyond the limit prescribed in section 8, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
 Republic of the Philippines LEILA GASMENA, CONSUELO GAROLAGA, ALFONSO GOROSPE,
SUPREME COURT CESAR GOROSPE, RICARDO GOROSPE, JR., CARLITO GUZMAN,
Manila ERNESTO DE GUZMAN, THELMA DE GUZMAN, FELIX HERNANDEZ,
SOLIVEN HERNANDO, FRANCISCO HIDALGO, LEONILO INES,
EN BANC SIXTO JAQUIES, TRINIDAD JAVIER, FERMIN LAGUA, GUALBERTO
LAMBINO, ROMAN LANTING, OSCAR LAZO, ROSARIO LAZO,
JOSEFINA DE LARA, AMBROSIO LAZOL, NALIE LIBATIQUE,
LAMBERTO LLAMAS, ANTONIO LLANES, ROMULA LOPEZ,
ADRIANO LORENZANA, ANTONIO MACARAEG, ILDEFONSO
G.R. No. L-32052 July 25, 1975
MAGAT, CECILIO MAGHANOY, ALFONSO MAGSANOC, AVELINA
MALLARE, AUGUSTO MANALO, DOMINADOR MANASAN, BENITO
PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, MANECLANG, JR., TIRSO MANGUMAY, EVELIA MANZANO,
vs. HONORANTE MARIANO, DOMINGO MEDINA, MARTIN MENDOZA,
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, REUEL ABRAHAM, PERFECTO MILANA, EMILIO MILLAN, GREGORIO MONEGAS,
MILAGROS ABUEG, AVELINO ACOSTA, CAROLINA ACOSTA, CONSOLACION NAVALTA, NOLI OCAMPO, VICENTE CLEGARIO,
MARTIN AGSALUD, JOSEFINA AGUINALDO, GLORIA ALBANO, ELPIDIO PALMONES, ARACELI PANGALANGAN, ISIDORO
ANTONIO ALUNING, COSME ALVAREZ, ISABEL ALZATE, AURORA PANLASIGUI, JR., ARTEMIO PARIS, JR., FEDERICO PAYUMO, JR.,
APUSEN, TOMAS ARCANGEL, LOURDES ARJONELLO, MANUEL NELIA PAYUMO, BITUEN PAZ, FRANCISCO PENGSON, OSCAR
AROMIN, DIONISIO ASISTIN, JOSE AURE, NICASIO AZNAR, PERALTA, PROCORRO PERALTA, RAMON PERALTA, MINDA
EUGENIO AZURIN, CLARITA BACUGAN, PIO BALAGOT, HEREDIO PICHAY, MAURO PIMENTEL, PRUDENCIO PIMENTEL, LEOPOLDO
BALMACEDA, ESTHER BANAAG, JOVENCIO BARBERO, MONICO PUNO, REYNALDO RABE, ROLANDO REA, CONSTANTINO REA,
BARBADILLO, HERNANDO BARROZO, FILIPINA BARROZO, CECILIA RICO, CECILIO RILLORAZA, AURORA ROMAN,
REMEDIO BARTOLOME, ANGELINA BASCOS, JOSE BATALLA, MERCEDES RUBIO, URSULA RUPISAN, OLIVIA SABADO,
ALMARIO BAUTISTA, EUGENIO BAUTISTA, JR., HERMALO BERNARDO SACRAMENTO, LUZ SALVADOR, JOSE SAMSON, JR.,
BAUTISTA, JUANITO BAUTISTA, SEVERINO BARBANO, CAPPIA ROMULA DE LOS SANTOS, ANTONIO SAYSON, JR., FLORANTE
BARGONIA, ESMERALDA BERNARDEZ, RUBEN BERNARDEZ, SERIL, MARIO SISON, RUDY SISON, PROCEDIO TABIN, LUCENA
ALFREDO BONGER, TOMAS BOQUIREN, ANGELINA BRAVO, TABISULA, HANNIBAL TAJANO, ENRIQUE TIANGCO, JR.,
VIRGINIA BRINGA, ALBERTO BUNEO, SIMEON CABANAYAN, JUSTINIANO TOBIAS, NYMIA TOLENTINO, CONSTANTE
LUCRECIA CACATIAN, LEONIDES CADAY, ANGELINA CADOTTE, TOLENTINO, TEODORO TOREBIO, FEDERICO TRINIDAD,
IGNACIO CALAYCAY, PACIFICO CALUB, RUFINO CALUZA, CALVIN JOVENCINTO TRINIDAD, LAZARO VALDEZ, LUDRALINA VALDEZ,
CAMBA, ALFREDO CAMPOSENO, BAGUILITA CANTO, ALFREDO MAXIMINA VALDEZ, FRANCISCO VELASCO, JR., ROSITA
CARRERA, PEDRO CASES, CRESCENTE CASIS, ERNESTO VELASCO, SEVERO VANTANILLA, VENANCIO VENTIGAN,
CASTANEDA, HERMINIO CASTILLO, JOSE CASTRO, LEONOR FELICITAS VENUS, NIEVES DE VERA, ELISEO VERSOZA,
CASTRO, MADEO CASTRO, MARIA PINZON CASTRO, PABLO SILVESTRE VILA, GLORIA VILLAMOR, ALEJANDRO VELLANUEVA,
CATURA, RESTITUTO CESPADES, FLORA CHACON, EDMUNDO DAVID VILLANUEVA, CAROLINA VILLASENOR ORLANDO
CORPUZ, ESTHER CRUZ, CELIA CUARESMA, AQUILINO DACAYO, VILLASTIQUE, MAJELLA VILORIN, ROSARIO VILORIA, MAY
DIONISIA DASALLA, SOCORRO DELFIN, ABELARDO DIAZ, VIRATA, FEDERICO VIRAY, MELBA YAMBAO, MARIO ZAMORA,
ARTHUR DIAZ, CYNTHIA DIZON, MARCIA DIZON, ISABELO AUTENOR ABUEG, SOTERO ACEDO, HONRADO ALBERTO, FELIPE
DOMINGO, HONORATA DOZA, CAROLINA DUAD, JUSTINIANO ALIDO, VICENTE ANCHUELO, LIBERTAD APEROCHO, MARIANO
EPISTOLA, ROMEO ENCARNACION, PRIMITIVO ESCANO, ELSA BALBAGO, MARIO BALMACEDA, DAISY BICENIO, SYLVIA
ESPEJO, JUAN ESPEJO, RIZALINA ESQUILLO, YSMAEL FARINAS, BUSTAMANTE, RAYMUNDO GEMERINO, LAZARO CAPURAS,
LORNA FAVIS, DAN FERNANDEZ, JAIME FERNANDEZ, ALFREDO ROGELIO CARUNGCONG, ZACARIAS CAYETANO, JR., LILY CHUA,
FERRER, MODESTO FERRER, JR., EUGENIO FLANDEZ, ANDRES CRUZ, ARTURO CRUZ, BIENVENIDO ESTEBAN, PABLO
GUILLERMO FLORENDO, ALFREDO FLORES, DOMINGA FLORES, JARETA, MANUEL JOSE, NESTORIA KINTANAR, CLEOPATRIA
ROMEO FLORES, LIGAYA FONTANILLA, MELCHOR GASMEN,
LAZEM. MELCHOR LAZO, JESUS LUNA, GASPAR MARINAS, jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection
CESAR MAULSON, MANUEL MEDINA, JESUS PLURAD, LAKAMBINI raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-
RAZON, GLORIA IBANEZ, JOSE SANTOS, ELEAZAR SQUI, JOSE Hour Labor Law persuasive. 5 We cannot then grant the reversal sought.
TAMAYO, FELIPE TENORIO, SILVINO UMALI, VICENTE ZARA, We affirm.
SATURNINO GARCIA, WILLIAM GARCIA, NORMA GARINGARAO,
ROSARIO ANTONIO, RUBEN BAUTISTA, QUIRINO PUESTO, NELIA The facts are undisputed. On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private
M. GOMERI, OSCAR R. LANUZA, AURORA M. LINDAYA, GREGORIO respondents, filed with respondent Court a petition wherein they alleged
MOGSINO, JACRM B. PAPA, GREGORIO R. RIEGO, TERESITA N. their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the
ROZUL, MAGTANGOL SAMALA, PORFIRIO AGOCOLIS, LEONARDO regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them
MONTE, HERMELINO PATI, ALFREDO PAYOYO, PURIFICACION overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.
ROJAS, ODANO TEANO, RICARDO SANTIAGO, and MARCELO Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid to
MANGAHAS, respondents. them and the amount allegedly due them. 6 There was an answer filed by
petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration denying the
Gov't. Corp. Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera, Trial Attorneys Manuel M. allegations and raising the special defenses of lack of a cause of action
Lazaro and Vicente Constantine, Jr., for petitioner. and lack of jurisdiction. 7 The issues were thereafter joined, and the case
set for trial, with both parties presenting their evidence. 8 After the parties
Renato B. Kare and Simeon C. Sato for private respondents. submitted the case for decision, the then Presiding Judge Arsenio T.
Martinez of respondent Court issued an order sustaining the claims of
private respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to
the date the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing
petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid. 9 There was a
FERNANDO, J.:
motion for reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc denied the
same. 10 Hence this petition for certiorari.
The principal issue that calls for resolution in this appeal by certiorari from
an order of respondent Court of Industrial Relations is one of
Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, as had been noted,
constitutional significance. It is concerned with the expanded role of
would predicate its plea for the reversal of the order complained of on the
government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for
basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as
the general welfare. More specifically, it deals with the question of
it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the
whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration,
operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444. 11While, to repeat, its
discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. The landmark
submission as to the governmental character of its operation is to be
opinion of the then Justice, row Chief Justice, Makalintal in Agricultural
given credence, it is not a necessary consequence that respondent Court
Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of
is devoid of jurisdiction. Nor could the challenged order be set aside on
Unions in Government Corporations and offices, points the way to the
the additional argument that the Eight-Hour Labor Law is not applicable
right answer. 1 It interpreted the then fundamental law as hostile to the
to it. So it was, at the outset, made clear.
view of a limited or negative state. It is antithetical to the laissez
faire concept. For as noted in an earlier decision, the welfare state
concept "is not alien to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution." 2 It is 1. A reference to the enactments creating petitioner corporation suffices
much more so under the present Charter, which is impressed with an to demonstrate the merit of petitioner's plea that it performs governmental
even more explicit recognition of social and economic rights. 3 There is and not proprietary functions. As originally established by Republic Act
manifest, to recall Laski, "a definite increase in the profundity of the social No. 2265, 12 its purposes and objectives were set forth thus: "(a) To
conscience," resulting in "a state which seeks to realize more fully the promote the effective merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic
common good of its members." 4 It does not necessarily follow, however, and foreign markets so that those engaged in the industry will be placed
just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than on a basis of economic security; (b) To establish and maintain balanced
proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its manufactured
products, and such marketing conditions as will insure and stabilize the
price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production plus reasonable citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations.
profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create, Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are
establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to
facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling and buying of promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these latter
Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of
secure a fair return of their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and the government." 19 Nonetheless, as he explained so persuasively: "The
regulations governing the grading, classifying, and inspecting of Virginia growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this
tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and economic conditions of the traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic,
people engaged in the tobacco industry." 13 The amendatory statute, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise
Republic Act No. 4155, 14renders even more evident its nature as a and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter
governmental agency. Its first section on the declaration of policy reads: optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the
"It is declared to be the national policy, with respect to the local Virginia public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals",
tobacco industry, to encourage the production of local Virginia tobacco of continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if
foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and economic it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost
basis, and, to create a climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
of the qualities desired by the consuming public, blending imported and socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was
native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself
cigarettes." 15 The objectives are set forth thus: "To attain this national in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social
policy the following objectives are hereby adopted: 1. Financing; 2. justice." 20 Thus was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani v. National
Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit Coconut Corporation,21 based on the Wilsonian classification of the tasks
Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration incumbent on government into constituent and ministrant in accordance
(PVTA) at the best obtainable prices and conditions in order that a with the laissez faire principle. That concept, then dominant in
reinvigorated Virginia tobacco industry may be established on a sound economics, was carried into the governmental sphere, as noted in a
basis; and 4. Improving the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes textbook on political science, 22 the first edition of which was published in
through blending of imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco; such 1898, its author being the then Professor, later American President,
importation with corresponding exportation at a ratio of one kilo of Woodrow Wilson. He took pains to emphasize that what was categorized
imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased by the by him as constituent functions had its basis in a recognition of what was
importer-exporter from the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration." 16 demanded by the "strictest [concept of] laissez faire, [as they] are indeed
the very bonds of society." 23 The other functions he would minimize as
It is thus readily apparent from a cursory perusal of such statutory ministrant or optional.
provisions why petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in
the leading Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration It is a matter of law that in the Philippines, the laissez faire principle
decision 17and why the objection of private respondents with its overtones hardly commanded the authoritative position which at one time it held in
of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of the United States. As early as 1919, Justice Malcolm in Rubi v. Provincial
governments as set forth in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation 18 if Board 24could affirm: "The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted
futile. The irrelevance of such a distinction considering the needs of the freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are
times was clearly pointed out by the present Chief Justice, who took note, of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the
speaking of the reconstituted Agricultural Credit Administration, that amplest possible demonstration of government activity." 25 The 1935
functions of that sort "may not be strictly what President Wilson described Constitution, as was indicated earlier, continued that approach. As noted
as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"),such as those in Edu v. Ericta: 26 "What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional
relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It
regulating property and property rights, those relating to the entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with social and
administration of justice and the determination of political duties of economic problems with the commensurate power of control over
economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote Court, speaking through Justice Padilla, declared: The NARIC was
the general welfare through state action." 27 Nor did the opinion in Edu established by the Government to protect the people against excessive
stop there: "To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased or unreasonable rise in the price of cereals by unscrupulous dealers.
whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy is a With that main objective there is no reason why its function should not be
repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the deemed governmental. The Government owes its very existence to that
Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first President of aim and purpose — to protect the people." 33 In a subsequent case, Naric
the Republic, made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Worker's Union v. Hon. Alvendia, 34 decided four years later, this Court,
Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the "vast extensions in the relying on Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Tan, 35 which
sphere of governmental functions" and the "almost unlimited power to specified the cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as to compete Industrial Relations, included among which is one that involves hours of
with existing business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, ruled that it is precisely
then] current tendencies' in other jurisdictions. He spoke thus: "My respondent Court and not ordinary courts that should pass upon that
answer is that this constitution has a definite and well defined philosophy, particular labor controversy. For Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the ponente, the
not only political but social and economic.... If in this Constitution the fact that there were judicial as well as administrative and executive
gentlemen will find declarations of economic policy they are there pronouncements to the effect that the Naric was performing
because they are necessary to safeguard the interest and welfare of the governmental functions did not suffice to confer competence on the then
Filipino people because we believe that the days have come when in respondent Judge to issue a preliminary injunction and to entertain a
self-defense, a nation may provide in its constitution those safeguards, complaint for damages, which as pointed out by the labor union, was
the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom to develop national connected with an unfair labor practice. This is emphasized by the
aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial dispositive portion of the decision: "Wherefore, the restraining orders
boundaries which a constitutional provision automatically imposes." 28 complained of, dated May 19, 1958 and May 27, 1958, are set aside, and
the complaint is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the National Rice
It would be then to reject what was so emphatically stressed in the and Corn Corporation's seeking whatever remedy it is entitled to in the
Agricultural Credit Administration decision about which the observation Court of Industrial Relations." 36 Then, too, in a case involving petitioner
was earlier made that it reflected the philosophy of the 1935 Constitution itself, Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, 37 where the point in
and is even more in consonance with the expanded role of government dispute was whether it was respondent Court or a court of first instance
accorded recognition in the present Charter if the plea of petitioner that it that is possessed of competence in a declaratory relief petition for the
discharges governmental function were not heeded. That path this Court interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, one that could readily
is not prepared to take. That would be to go backward, to retreat rather be thought of as pertaining to the judiciary, the answer was that "unless
than to advance. Nothing can thus be clearer than that there is no the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice should fall on the
constitutional obstacle to a government pursuing lines of endeavor, Court of Industrial Relations." 38 Reference to a number of decisions
formerly reserved for private enterprise. This is one way, in the language which recognized in the then respondent Court the jurisdiction to
of Laski, by which through such activities, "the harsh contract which determine labor controversies by government-owned or controlled
[does] obtain between the levels of the rich and the poor" may be corporations lends to support to such an approach. 39 Nor could it be
minimized. 29 It is a response to a trend noted by Justice Laurel explained only on the assumption that proprietary rather than
in Calalang v. Williams 30 for the humanization of laws and the promotion governmental functions did call for such a conclusion. It is to be admitted
of the interest of all component elements of society so that man's innate that such a view was not previously bereft of plausibility. With the
aspirations, in what was so felicitously termed by the First Lady as "a aforecited Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration
compassionate society" be attained. 31 decision rendering obsolete the Bacani doctrine, it has, to use a
Wilsonian phrase, now lapsed into "innocuous
2. The success that attended the efforts of petitioner to be adjudged as desuetude." 40 Respondent Court clearly was vested with jurisdiction.
performing governmental rather than proprietary functions cannot militate
against respondent Court assuming jurisdiction over this labor dispute. 3. The contention of petitioner that the Eight-Hour Labor Law 41 does not
So it was mentioned earlier. As far back as Tabora v. Montelibano, 32 this apply to it hardly deserves any extended consideration. There is an air of
casualness in the way such an argument was advanced in its petition for
review as well as in its brief. In both pleadings, it devoted less than a full
page to its discussion. There is much to be said for brevity, but not in this
case. Such a terse and summary treatment appears to be a reflection
more of the inherent weakness of the plea rather than the possession of
an advocate's enviable talent for concision. It did cite Section 2 of the Act,
but its very language leaves no doubt that "it shall apply to all persons
employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private ...
." 42 Nor are private respondents included among the employees who are
thereby barred from enjoying the statutory benefits. It cited Marcelo v.
Philippine National Red Cross 43 and Boy Scouts of the Philippines v.
Araos. 44 Certainly, the activities to which the two above public
corporations devote themselves can easily be distinguished from that
engaged in by petitioner. A reference to the pertinent sections of both
Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 on which it relies to obtain a ruling as to its
governmental character should render clear the differentiation that exists.
If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be
borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required
private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised
that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed
be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an
objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To
repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of March 21, 1970 and the

Resolution of respondent Court en banc of May 8, 1970 denying a motion
for reconsideration are hereby affirmed. The last sentence of the Order of
March 21, 1970 reads as follows: "To find how much each of them
[private respondents] is entitled under this judgment, the Chief of the
Examining Division, or any of his authorized representative, is hereby
directed to make a reexamination of records, papers and documents in
the possession of respondent PVTA pertinent and proper under the
premises and to submit his report of his findings to the Court for further
disposition thereof." Accordingly, as provided by the New Labor Code,
this case is referred to the National Labor Relations Commission for
further proceedings conformably to law. No costs.
 Republic of the Philippines payment of those amounts, the Philippine Islands to bring suit against
SUPREME COURT the Monte de Piedad a recover, "through the Attorney-General and in
Manila representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands," the $80.000,
together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs
EN BANC appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette instituted
on May 3, 1912, by the Government of the Philippine Islands,
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916 represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial, judgment was
entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $80,000 gold or its
equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by
February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause. The defendant appealed
the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands,plaintiff-appellee,
and makes the following assignment of errors:
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE
MANILA, defendant-appellant. 1. The court erred in not finding that the eighty thousand dollars
($80,000), give to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were
so given as a donation subject to one condition, to wit: the return
William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant.
of such sum of money to the Spanish Government of these
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
Islands, within eight days following the day when claimed, in case
the Supreme Government of Spain should not approve the action
taken by the former government.

TRENT, J.: 2. The court erred in not having decreed that this donation had
been cleared; said eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) being at
About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the present the exclusive property of the appellant the Monte de
Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of the Piedad y Caja de Ahorros.
relief of those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the
Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto and on October 6 3. That the court erred in stating that the Government of the
of that year, a central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish Government in its
of Spain, to distribute the moneys thus voluntarily contributed. After a rights, as regards an important sum of money resulting from a
thorough investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted national subscription opened by reason of the earthquake of June
$365,703.50 to the various sufferers named in its resolution, dated 3, 1863, in these Island.
September 22, 1866, and, by order of the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, a list of these allotments, together with the names of
4. That the court erred in not declaring that Act Numbered 2109,
those entitled thereto, was published in the Official Gazette of Manila
passed by the Philippine Legislature on January 30, 1912, is
dated April 7, 1870. There was later distributed, inaccordance with the
unconstitutional.
above-mentioned allotments, the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of
S365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of
the Monte de Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine 5. That the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no
Government, by order dated the 1st of that month, directed its treasurer title for the prescription of this suit brought by the Insular
to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of the relief fund Government against the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros for
in installments of $20,000 each. These amounts were received on the the reimbursement of the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) given
following dates: February 15, March 12, April 14, and June 2, 1883, and to it by the late Spanish Government of these Islands.
are still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account of various
petitions of the persons, and heirs of others to whom the above- 6. That the court erred in sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja
mentioned allotments were made by the central relief board for the de Ahorros to reimburse the Philippine Government in the sum of
 eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) gold coin, or the equivalent made by your Excellency relative to the application to the needs
thereof in the present legal tender currency in circulation, with of the Monte de Piedad of a pat of the subscription intended to
legal interest thereon from February 28th, 1912, and the costs of believe the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, or for any
this suit. other reason, the board of directors of the Monte de
Piedad obligates itself to return any sums which it may have
In the royal order of June 29, 1879, the Governor-General of the received on account of the eighty thousand pesos, or the whole
Philippine Islands was directed to inform the home Government in what thereof, should it have received the same, by securing a loan
manner the indemnity might be paid to which, by virtue of the resolutions from whichever bank or banks may lend it the money at the
of the relief board, the persons who suffered damage by the earthquake cheapest rate upon the security of pawned jewelry. — This is an
might be entitled, in order to perform the sacred obligation which the urgent measure to save the Monte de Piedad in the present crisis
Government of Spain had assumed toward the donors. and the board of directors trusts to secure your Excellency's
entire cooperation and that of the other officials who have take
The next pertinent document in order is the defendant's petition, dated part in the transaction.
February 1, 1883, addressed to the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, which reads: The Governor-General's resolution on the foregoing petition is as follows:

Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad of Manila Presidencia. GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
MANILA, February 1, 1883.
Excellency: The Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja
de Ahorros of Manila informs your Excellency, First: That the In view of the foregoing petition addressed to me by the board of
funds which it has up to the present been able to dispose of have directors of the Monte de Piedad of this city, in which it is stated
been exhausted in loans on jewelry, and there only remains the that the funds which the said institution counted upon are nearly
sum of one thousand and odd pesos, which will be expended all invested in loans on jewelry and that the small account
between to-day and day after tomorrow. Second: That, to remaining will scarcely suffice to cover the transactions of the
maintain the credit of the establishment, which would be greatly next two days, for which reason it entreats the general
injured were its operations suspended, it is necessary to procure Government that, in pursuance of its telegraphic advice to H. M.
money. Third: That your Excellency has proposed to His Government, the latter direct that there be turned over to
Majesty's Government to apply to the funds of theMonte de said Monte de Piedad $80,000 out of the funds in the public
Piedad a part of the funds held in the treasury derived form the treasury obtained from the national subscription for the relief of
national subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, said board
earthquake of 1863. Fourth: That in the public treasury there is obligating itself to return this sum should H. M. Government, for
held at the disposal of the central earthquake relief board over any reason, not approve the said proposal, and for this purpose it
$1090,000 which was deposited in the said treasury by order of will procure funds by means of loans raised on pawned jewelry; it
your general Government, it having been transferred thereto from stated further that if the aid so solicited is not furnished, it will be
the Spanish-Filipino Bank where it had been held. fifth: That in compelled to suspend operations, which would seriously injure
the straightened circumstances of the moment, your Excellency the credit of so beneficient an institution; and in view of the report
can, to avert impending disaster to the Monte de Piedad, order upon the matter made by the Intendencia General de Hacienda;
that, out of that sum of one hundred thousand pesos held in the and considering the fact that the public treasury has on hand a
Treasury at the disposal of the central relief board, there be much greater sum from the source mentioned than that solicited;
transferred to the Monte de Piedadthe sum of $80,000, there to and considering that this general Government has submitted for
be held under the same conditions as at present in the Treasury, the determination of H. M. Government that the balance which,
to wit, at the disposal of the Relief Board. Sixth: That should this after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription
transfer not be approved for any reason, either because of the referred to, may remain as a surplus should be delivered to
failure of His Majesty's Government to approve the proposal the Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the
security of the credit of the institution, believing that in so doing papers so that with the least possible delay the payment referred
the wishes of the donors would be faithfully interpreted inasmuch to may be made and the danger that menaces the Monte de
as those wishes were no other than to relieve distress, an act of Piedad of having to suspend its operations may be averted.
charity which is exercised in the highest degree by the Monte de
Piedad, for it liberates needy person from the pernicious effects of H. M. Government shall be advised hereof.lawphi1.net
usury; and (Signed) P. DE RIVERA.

Considering that the lofty purposes that brought about the By the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Governor-General of the
creation of the pious institution referred to would be frustrated, Philippine Islands was ordered to "inform this ministerio what is the total
and that the great and laudable work of its establishment, and sum available at the present time, taking into consideration the sums
that the great and laudable and valuable if the aid it urgently delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your
seeks is not granted, since the suspension of its operations would general Government on February 1, 1883," and after the rights of the
seriously and regrettably damage the ever-growing credit of claimants, whose names were published in the Official Gazette of Manila
the Monte de Piedad; and on April 7, 1870, and their heirs had been established, as therein
provided, as such persons "have an unquestionable right to be paid the
Considering that if such a thing would at any time cause deep donations assigned to them therein, your general Government shall
distress in the public mind, it might be said that at the present convoke them all within a reasonable period and shall pay their shares to
juncture it would assume the nature of a disturbance of public such as shall identify themselves, without regard to their financial status,"
order because of the extreme poverty of the poorer classes and finally "that when all the proceedings and operations herein
resulting from the late calamities, and because it is the only mentioned have been concluded and the Government can consider itself
institution which can mitigate the effects of such poverty; and free from all kinds of claims on the part of those interested in the
distribution of the funds deposited in the vaults of the Treasury, such
Considering that no reasonable objection can be made to action may be taken as the circumstances shall require, after first
granting the request herein contained, for the funds in question consulting the relief board and your general Government and taking
are sufficiently secured in the unlikely event that H> M. account of what sums have been delivered to the Monte de Piedad and
Government does not approve the recommendation mentioned, those that were expended in 1888 to relieve public calamities," and "in
this general Government, in the exercise of the extraordinary order that all the points in connection with the proceedings had as a
powers conferred upon it and in conformity with the report of the result of the earthquake be clearly understood, it is indispensable that the
Intendencia de Hacienda, resolves as follows: offices hereinbefore mentioned comply with the provisions contained in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the royal order of June 25, 1879." On receipt of
First. Authority is hereby given to deliver to the Monte de Piedad, this Finance order by the Governor-General, the Department of Finance
out of the sum held in the public treasury of these Islands was called upon for a report in reference to the $80,000 turned over to
obtained from the national subscription opened by reason of the the defendant, and that Department's report to the Governor-General
earthquakes of 1863, amounts up to the sum $80,000, as its dated June 28, 1893, reads:
needs may require, in installments of $20,000.
Intendencia General de Hacienda de Filipinas (General Treasury
Second. The board of directors of the Monte de Piedad is of the Philippines) — Excellency. — By Royal Order No. 1044 of
solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand, the December 3, last, it is provided that the persons who sustained
sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government does not losses by the earthquakes that occurred in your capital in the year
approve this resolution. 1863 shall be paid the amounts allotted to them out of the sums
sent from Spain for this purpose, with observance of the rules
specified in the said royal order, one of them being that before
Third. The Intendencia General de Hacienda shall forthwith, and
making the payment to the interested parties the assets shall be
in preference to all other work, proceed to prepare the necessary
reduced to money. These assets, during the long period of time
that has elapsed since they were turned over to the Treasury of not received as a loan, but as a donation, this in the opinion of
the Philippine Islands, were used to cover the general needs of this Intendencia, erroneously interpreting both the last royal order
the appropriation, a part besides being invested in the relief of which directed the apportionment of the amount of the
charitable institutions and another part to meet pressing needs subscription raised in the year 1863 and the superior decree
occasioned by public calamities. On January 30, last, your which granted the loan, inasmuch as in this letter no donation is
Excellency was please to order the fulfillment of that sovereign made to the Monte de Piedad of the 80,000 pesos, but simply a
mandate and referred the same to this Intendencia for its loan; besides, no donation whatever could be made of funds
information and the purposes desired (that is, for compliance with derived from a private subscription raised for a specific purpose,
its directions and, as aforesaid, one of these being the liquidation, which funds are already distributed and the names of the
recovery, and deposit with the Treasury of the sums paid out of beneficiaries have been published in the Gaceta, there being
that fund and which were expended in a different way from that lacking only the mere material act of the delivery, which has been
intended by the donors) and this Intendencia believed the unduly delayed. In view of the unexpected reply made by
moment had arrived to claim from the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad, and believing it useless to insist further in
the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros the sum of 80,000 pesos the matter of the claim for the aforementioned loan, or to argue in
which, by decree of your general Government of the date of support thereof, this Intendencia believes the intervention of your
February 1, 1883, was loaned to it out of the said funds, the Excellency necessary in this matter, if the royal Order No. 1044 of
(Monte de Piedad) obligating itself to return the same within the December 3, last, is to be complied with, and for this purpose I
period of eight days if H. M. Government did not approve the beg your Excellency kindly to order the Monte de Piedad to
delivery. On this Intendencia's demanding from the Monte de reimburse within the period of eight days the 80,000 which it
Piedad the eighty thousand pesos, thus complying with the owes, and that you give this Intendencia power to carry out the
provisions of the Royal Order, it was to be supposed that no provisions of the said royal order. I must call to the attention of
objection to its return would be made by the Monte de Piedad for, your Excellency that the said pious establishment, during the last
when it received the loan, it formally engaged itself to return it; few days and after demand was made upon it, has endorsed to
and, besides, it was indisputable that the moment to do so had the Spanish-Filipino Bank nearly the whole of the sum which it
arrived, inasmuch as H. M. Government, in ordering that the had on deposit in the general deposit funds.
assets of the earthquake relief fund should he collected, makes
express mention of the 80,000 pesos loaned to the Monte de The record in the case under consideration fails to disclose any further
Piedad, without doubt considering as sufficient the period of ten definite action taken by either the Philippine Government or the Spanish
years during which it has been using this large sum which lawfully Government in regard to the $80,000 turned over to the Monte de
belongs to their persons. This Intendencia also supposed that Piedad.
the Monte de Piedad no longer needed the amount of that loan,
inasmuch as, far from investing it in beneficient transactions, it In the defendant's general ledger the following entries appear: "Public
had turned the whole amount into the voluntary deposit funds Treasury: February 15, 1883, $20,000; March 12, 1883, $20,000; April
bearing 5 per cent interests, the result of this operation being that 14, 1883, $20,000; June 2, 1883, $20,000, total $80,000." The book entry
the debtor loaned to the creditor on interest what the former had for this total is as follows: "To the public Treasury derived from the
gratuitously received. But the Monte de Piedad, instead of subscription for the earthquake of 1863, $80,000 received from general
fulfilling the promise it made on receiving the sum, after repeated Treasury as a returnable loan, and without interest." The account was
demands refused to return the money on the ground that only carried in this manner until January 1, 1899, when it was closed by
your Excellency, and not the Intendencia (Treasury), is entitled to transferring the amount to an account called "Sagrada Mitra," which latter
order the reimbursement, taking no account of the fact that this account was a loan of $15,000 made to the defendant by the Archbishop
Intendencia was acting in the discharge of a sovereign command, of Manila, without interest, thereby placing the "Sagrada Mitra" account at
the fulfillment of which your Excellency was pleased to order; and $95,000 instead of $15,000. The above-mentioned journal entry for
on the further ground that the sum of 80,000 pesos which it January 1, 1899, reads: "Sagrada Mitra and subscription, balance of
received from the fund intended for the earthquake victims was these two account which on this date are united in accordance with an
order of the Exmo. Sr. Presidente of the Council transmitted verbally to its petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute
the Presidente Gerente of these institutions, $95,000." necessity for more working capital, asked that out of the sum of $100,000
held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the
On March 16, 1902, the Philippine government called upon the defendant central relief board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to be
for information concerning the status of the $80,000 and received the held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the disposal of the relief
following reply: board." The Monte de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds
should not be approved by the Government of Spain, the same would be
MANILA, March 31, 1902. returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a
donation. The Governor-General, after reciting the substance of the
petition, stated that "this general Government has submitted for the
To the Attorney-General of the Department of Justice of
determination of H. M. Government that the balance which, after strictly
the Philippine Islands.
applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may
remain as a surplus, should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either
SIR: In reply to your courteous letter of the 16th inst., in which as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the
you request information from this office as to when and for what institution," and "considering that no reasonable objection can be made to
purpose the Spanish Government delivered to the Monte de granting the request herein contained," directed the transfer of the
Piedad eighty thousand pesos obtained from the subscription $80,000 to be made with the understanding that "the Board of Directors
opened in connection with the earthquake of 1863, as well as any of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return, within eight days
other information that might be useful for the report which your after demand, the sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government
office is called upon to furnish, I must state to your department does not approve this resolution." It will be noted that the first and only
that the books kept in these Pious Institutions, and which have time the word "donation" was used in connection with the $80,000
been consulted for the purpose, show that on the 15th of appears in this resolution of the Governor-General. It may be inferred
February, 1883, they received as a reimbursable loan and without from the royal orders that the Madrid Government did tacitly approve of
interest, twenty thousand pesos, which they deposited with their the transfer of the $80,000 to the Monte de Piedad as a loan without
own funds. On the same account and on each of the dates of interest, but that Government certainly did not approve such transfer as a
March 12, April 14 and June 2 of the said year, 1883, they also donation for the reason that the Governor-General was directed by the
received and turned into their funds a like sum of twenty thousand royal order of December 3, 1892, to inform the Madrid Government of the
pesos, making a total of eighty thousand pesos. — (Signed) total available sum of the earthquake fund, "taking into consideration the
Emilio Moreta. sums delivered to the Monte de Piedadpursuant to the decree issued by
your general Government on February 1, 1883." This language, nothing
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a literal copy of that found in else appearing, might admit of the interpretation that the Madrid
the letter book No. 2 of those Pious Institutions. Government did not intend that the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands should include the $80,000 in the total available sum, but when
Manila, November 19, 1913 considered in connection with the report of the Department of Finance
(Sgd.) EMILIO LAZCANOTEGUI, there can be no doubt that it was so intended. That report refers
Secretary expressly to the royal order of December 3d, and sets forth in detail the
action taken in order to secure the return of the $80,000. The Department
(Sgd.) O. K. EMILIO MORETA, of Finance, acting under the orders of the Governor-General, understood
Managing Director. that the $80,000 was transferred to the Monte de Piedad well knew that it
received this sum as a loan interest." The amount was thus carried in its
The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of the books until January, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the
transactions which took place between the Government of Spain and the "Sagrada Mitra" and was thereafter known as the "Sagrada Mitra and
Philippine Government on the one side and the Monte de Piedad on the subscription account." Furthermore, the Monte de Piedad recognized and
other, concerning the $80,000. The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in considered as late as March 31, 1902, that it received the $80,000 "as a
returnable loan, and without interest." Therefore, there cannot be the that it cannot be believed that it was ever his intention to confide
slightest doubt the fact that the Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 as the exercise thereof to a Government like the American. (U.
a mere loan or deposit and not as a donation. Consequently, the first S. vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet. [U. S.], 711.)
alleged error is entirely without foundation.
It is thus seen that the American Government did not subrogate
Counsel for the defendant, in support of their third assignment of error, the Spanish Government or rather, the King of Spain, in this
say in their principal brief that: regard; and as the condition annexed to the donation was lawful
and possible of fulfillment at the time the contract was made, but
The Spanish nation was professedly Roman Catholic and its King became impossible of fulfillment by the cession made by the
enjoyed the distinction of being deputy ex officio of the Holy See Spanish Government in these Islands, compliance therewith is
and Apostolic Vicar-General of the Indies, and as such it was his excused and the contract has been cleared thereof.
duty to protect all pious works and charitable institutions in his
kingdoms, especially those of the Indies; among the latter was The contention of counsel, as thus stated, in untenable for two reason,
the Monte de Piedad of the Philippines, of which said King and (1) because such contention is based upon the erroneous theory that the
his deputy the Governor-General of the Philippines, as royal vice- sum in question was a donation to the Monte de Piedad and not a loan,
patron, were, in a special and peculiar manner, the protectors; the and (2) because the charity founded by the donations for the earthquake
latter, as a result of the cession of the Philippine Islands, Implicitly sufferers is not and never was intended to be an ecclesiastical pious
renounced this high office and tacitly returned it to the Holy See, work. The first proposition has already been decided adversely to the
now represented by the Archbishop of Manila; the national defendant's contention. As to the second, the record shows clearly that
subscription in question was a kind of foundation or pious work, the fund was given by the donors for a specific and definite purpose —
for a charitable purpose in these Islands; and the entire the relief of the earthquake sufferers — and for no other purpose. The
subscription not being needed for its original purpose, the royal money was turned over to the Spanish Government to be devoted to that
vice-patron, with the consent of the King, gave the surplus thereof purpose. The Spanish Government remitted the money to the Philippine
to an analogous purpose; the fulfillment of all these things Government to be distributed among the suffers. All officials, including
involved, in the majority, if not in all cases, faithful compliance the King of Spain and the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands,
with the duty imposed upon him by the Holy See, when it who took part in the disposal of the fund, acted in their purely civil, official
conferred upon him the royal patronage of the Indies, a thing that capacity, and the fact that they might have belonged to a certain church
touched him very closely in his conscience and religion; the had nothing to do with their acts in this matter. The church, as such, had
cessionary Government though Christian, was not Roman nothing to do with the fund in any way whatever until the $80,000
Catholic and prided itself on its policy of non-interference in reached the coffers of the Monte de Piedad (an institution under the
religious matters, and inveterately maintained a complete control of the church) as a loan or deposit. If the charity in question had
separation between the ecclesiastical and civil powers. been founded as an ecclesiastical pious work, the King of Spain and the
Governor-General, in their capacities as vicar-general of the Indies and
In view of these circumstances it must be quite clear that, even as royal vice-patron, respectively, would have disposed of the fund as
without the express provisions of the Treaty of Paris, which such and not in their civil capacities, and such functions could not have
apparently expressly exclude such an idea, it did not befit the been transferred to the present Philippine Government, because the right
honor of either of the contracting parties to subrogate to the to so act would have arisen out of the special agreement between the
American Government in lieu of the Spanish Government Government of Spain and the Holy See, based on the union of the church
anything respecting the disposition of the funds delivered by the and state which was completely separated with the change of
latter to the Monte de Piedad. The same reasons that induced the sovereignty.
Spanish Government to take over such things would result in
great inconvenience to the American Government in attempting to And in their supplemental brief counsel say:
do so. The question was such a delicate one, for the reason that
it affected the conscience, deeply religious, of the King of Spain,
 By the conceded facts the money in question is part of collected to the end that the will of the donors should be carried out. The
a charitable subscription. The donors were persons in Spain, the relief board had no power whatever to dispose of the funds confided to its
trustee was the Spanish Government, the donees, the cestuis charge for other purposes than to distribute them among the sufferers,
que trustent, were certain persons in the Philippine Islands. The because paragraph 3 of article 11 of the instructions conferred the power
whole matter is one of trusteeship. This is undisputed and upon the secretary of the interior of Spain, and no other, to dispose of the
indisputable. It follows that the Spanish Government at no time surplus funds, should there be any, by assigning them to some other
was the owner of the fund. Not being the owner of the fund charitable purpose or institution. The secretary could not dispose of any
it could not transfer the ownership. Whether or not it could of the funds in this manner so long as they were necessary for the
transfer its trusteeship it certainly never has expressly done so specific purpose for which they were contributed. The secretary had the
and the general terms of property transfer in the Treaty of Paris power, under the law above mentioned to appoint and totally or partially
are wholly insufficient for such a purpose even could Spain have change the personnel of the relief board and to authorize the board to
transferred its trusteeship without the consent of the donors and defend the rights of the charity in the courts. The authority of the board
even could the United States, as a Government, have accepted consisted only in carrying out the will of the donors as directed by the
such a trust under any power granted to it by the thirteen original Government whose duty it was to watch over the acts of the board and to
States in the Constitution, which is more than doubtful. It follows see that the funds were applied to the purposes for which they were
further that this Government is not a proper party to the action. contributed .The secretary of the interior, as the representative of His
The only persons who could claim to be damaged by this Majesty's Government, exercised these powers and duties through the
payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The Governments of Spain
the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. and of the Philippine Islands in complying with their duties conferred
upon them by law, acted in their governmental capacities in attempting to
If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship," and it being true that the carry out the intention of the contributors. It will this be seen that those
Spanish Government could not, as counsel say, transfer the ownership of governments were something more, as we have said, than mere trustees
the fund to the Monte de Piedad, the question arises, who may sue to of the fund.
recover this loan? It needs no argument to show that the Spanish or
Philippine Government, as trustee, could maintain an action for this It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de
purpose had there been no change of sovereignty and if the right of Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even considering it a
action has not prescribed. But those governments were something more loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty, or inn other words, the
than mere common law trustees of the fund. In order to determine their present Philippine Government cannot maintain this action for that
exact status with reference to this fund, it is necessary to examine the law reason. This contention, if true, "must result from settled principles of rigid
in force at the time there transactions took place, which are the law of law," as it cannot rest upon any title to the fund in the Monte de
June 20, 1894, the royal decree of April 27. 1875, and the instructions Piedad acquired prior to such change. While the obligation to return the
promulgated on the latter date. These legal provisions were applicable to $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still pending, war between the
the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34) United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of December
10, 1898, the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to
The funds collected as a result of the national subscription opened in the United States, the latter agreeing to pay Spain the sum of
Spain by royal order of the Spanish Government and which were remitted $20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article, Spain
to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the earthquake relinquished to the United States "all buildings, wharves, barracks, forts,
sufferers by the Central Relief Board constituted, under article 1 of the structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in
law of June 20, 1894, and article 2 of the instructions of April 27, 1875, a conformity with law, belonged to the public domain, and as such
special charity of a temporary nature as distinguished from a permanent belonged to the crown of Spain." As the $80,000 were not included
public charitable institution. As the Spanish Government initiated the therein, it is said that the right to recover this amount did not, therefore,
creation of the fund and as the donors turned their contributions over to pass to the present sovereign. This, in our opinion, does not follow as a
that Government, it became the duty of the latter, under article 7 of the necessary consequence, as the right to recover does not rest upon the
instructions, to exercise supervision and control over the moneys thus proposition that the $80,000 must be "other immovable property"
mentioned in article 8 of the treaty, but upon contractual obligations In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 Hw., 369, 384), Mr. Justice McLean, delivering
incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. the opinion of the court in a charity case, said:
We will not inquire what effect his cession had upon the law of June 20,
1849, the royal decree of April 27, 1875, and the instructions When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of
promulgated on the latter date. In Vilas vs. Manila (220 U. S., 345), the the crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this power
court said: still remains with them except so fact as they have delegated a
portion of it to the Federal Government. The sovereign will is
That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of made known to us by legislative enactment. The State as a
the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws sovereign, is the parens patriae.
theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political
character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, Chancelor Kent says:
lose their force, is also plain. (Alvarez y Sanchez vs. United
States, 216 U. S., 167.) But it is equally settled in the same public In this country, the legislature or government of the State,
law that the great body of municipal law which regulates private as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public
and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the
by the new ruler. public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. (4
Kent Com., 508, note.)
If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political
character, constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, they became The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United
inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to States, supra, after approving also the last quotations, said:
the United States, but if they are among "that great body of municipal law
which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme
are still in force unless they have been repealed by the present
power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal
Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear from their very
person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary
nature and character. They are laws which are not political in any sense
powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs
of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government the right and
to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their
duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and
liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficient functions, and
charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in exempting "provident
often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and
institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of
for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
charitable institutions, from taxation, placed such institutions, in so far as
themselves.
the investment in securities are concerned, under the general supervision
of the Insular Treasurer (paragraph 4 of section 111 of Act No. 1189; see
also Act No. 701). The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General
Hospital (3 Cush., 483, 497), wherein the latter court held that it is
deemed indispensible that there should be a power in the legislature to
Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives
authorize the same of the estates of in facts, idiots, insane persons, and
of he crown of Spain devolved upon he United States. In Magill vs. Brown
persons not known, or not in being, who cannot act for themselves, said:
(16 Fed. Cas., 408), quoted with approval in Mormon Charch vs. United
States (136 U. S.,1, 57), the court said:
These remarks in reference to in facts, insane persons and
person not known, or not in being, apply to the beneficiaries of
The Revolution devolved on the State all the transcendent power
charities, who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and
of Parliament, and the prerogative of the crown, and gave their
justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting
Acts the same force and effect.
as parens patriae. They show that this beneficient functions has
not ceased t exist under the change of government from a
 monarchy to a republic; but that it now resides in the legislative action rests. The true ground is that the money being given to a charity
department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required became, in a measure, public property, only applicable, it is true, to the
for the purposes of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of specific purposes to which it was intended to be devoted, but within those
being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases limits consecrated to the public use, and became part of the public
whatever. resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine
Government. (Mormon Church vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the
In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound
was not the real party in interest; that the Attorney-General had no power public policy, as tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts
to institute the action; and that there must be an allegation and proof of a of humanity and Christian benevolence in like instances in the future.
distinct right of the people as a whole, as distinguished from the rights of
individuals, before an action could be brought by the Attorney-General in As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error relating to the
the name of the people. The court, in overruling these contentions, held constitutionality of Act No. 2109, little need be said for the reason that we
that it was not only the right but the duty of the Attorney-General to have just held that the present Philippine Government is the proper party
prosecute the action, which related to charities, and approved the to the action. The Act is only a manifestation on the part of the Philippine
following quotation from Attorney-General vs. Compton (1 Younge & C. Government to exercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. The
C., 417): Act is not, as contended by counsel, in conflict with the fifth section of the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, because it does not take property
Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the without due process of law. In fact, the defendant is not the owner of the
hands of those who hold it devoted to that trust, it is the privilege $80,000, but holds it as a loan subject to the disposal of the central relief
of the public that the crown should be entitled to intervene by its board. Therefor, there can be nothing in the Act which transcends the
officers for the purpose of asserting, on behalf on the public power of the Philippine Legislature.
generally, the public interest and the public right, which, probably,
no individual could be found effectually to assert, even if the In Vilas vs. Manila, supra, the plaintiff was a creditor of the city of Manila
interest were such as to allow it. (2 Knet's Commentaries, 10th as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United
ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec. 732.) States by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. The action was
brought upon the theory that the city, under its present charter from the
It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could Government of the Philippine Islands, was the same juristic person, and
claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are liable upon the obligations of the old city. This court held that the present
the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. municipality is a totally different corporate entity and in no way liable for
Consequently, the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action." The the debts of the Spanish municipality. The Supreme Court of the United
earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a great number of States, in reversing this judgment and in holding the city liable for the old
small contributions. The names of the contributors do not appear in the debt, said:
record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted with the title to their
respective contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting of the original The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise
sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite affected, and, in law, the present city is, in every legal sense, the
numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers successor of the old. As such it is entitled to the property and
have died, leaving various heirs. It would be impracticable for them to property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law,
institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover subject to all of its liabilities.
the $80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the
Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue
object for which it was originally destined. that as the Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when ordered
to do so by the Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right
The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the of action had prescribed at the time this suit was instituted on May 3,
true ground upon which the right of the Government to maintain the 1912, citing and relying upon article 1961, 1964 and 1969 of the Civil
Code. While on the other hand, the Attorney-General contends that the vested in it as a sovereign government, is not bound by any
right of action had not prescribed (a) because the defense of prescription statute of limitations, unless Congress has clearly manifested its
cannot be set up against the Philippine Government, (b) because the intention that it should be so bound. (Lindsey vs. Miller, 6 Pet.
right of action to recover a deposit or trust funds does not prescribe, and 666; U. S. vs.Knight, 14 Pet., 301; Gibson vs. Chouteau, 13 Wall.,
(c) even if the defense of prescription could be interposed against the 92; U. S. vs. Thompson, 98 U. S., 486; Fink vs. O'Neil, 106 U. S.,
Government and if the action had, in fact, prescribed, the same was 272, 281.)
revived by Act No. 2109.
In Gibson vs. Choteau, supra, the court said:
The material facts relating to this question are these: The Monte de
Piedad received the $80,000 in 1883 "to be held under the same It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do
conditions as at present in the treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the relief not run against the State. That no laches can be imputed to the
board." In compliance with the provisions of the royal order of December King, and that no time can bar his rights, was the maxim of the
3, 1892, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad in common laws, and was founded on the principle of public policy,
June, 1893, to return the $80,000. The Monte declined to comply with that as he was occupied with the cares of government he ought
this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of the not to suffer from the negligence of his officer and servants. The
Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to principle is applicable to all governments, which must necessarily
order the reimbursement. The amount was carried on the books of the act through numerous agents, and is essential to a preservation
Monte as a returnable loan until January 1, 1899, when it was transferred of the interests and property of the public. It is upon this principle
to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra." On March 31, 1902, the Monte, that in this country the statutes of a State prescribing periods
through its legal representative, stated in writing that the amount in within which rights must be prosecuted are not held to embrace
question was received as a reimbursable loan, without interest. Act No. the State itself, unless it is expressly designated or the mischiefs
2109 became effective January 30, 1912, and the action was instituted to be remedied are of such a nature that it must necessarily be
on May 3rd of that year. included. As legislation of a State can only apply to persons and
thing over which the State has jurisdiction, the United States are
Counsel for the defendant treat the question of prescription as if the also necessarily excluded from the operation of such statutes.
action was one between individuals or corporations wherein the plaintiff is
seeking to recover an ordinary loan. Upon this theory June, 1893, cannot In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is stated
be taken as the date when the statute of limitations began to run, for the as follows:
reason that the defendant acknowledged in writing on March 31, 1902,
that the $80,000 were received as a loan, thereby in effect admitting that In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary,
it still owed the amount. (Section 50, Code of Civil Procedure.) But if statute of limitations do not as a general rule run against the
counsels' theory is the correct one the action may have prescribed on sovereign or government, whether state or federal. But the rule is
May 3, 1912, because more than ten full years had elapsed after March otherwise where the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a
31, 1902. (Sections 38 and 43, Code of Civil Procedure.) nature that the state must necessarily be included, where the
state goes into business in concert or in competition with her
Is the Philippine Government bound by the statute of limitations? The citizens, or where a party seeks to enforces his private rights by
Supreme Court of the United States in U. S.vs. Nashville, Chattanooga & suit in the name of the state or government, so that the latter is
St. Louis Railway Co. (118 U. S., 120, 125), said: only a nominal party.

It is settled beyond doubt or controversy — upon the foundation In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party
of the great principle of public policy, applicable to all because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is exercising its
governments alike, which forbids that the public interests should sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust
be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United
care they are confided — that the United States, asserting rights
States. The United States having in 1852, purchased as trustee for the
Chickasaw Indians under treaty with that tribe, certain bonds of the State
of Tennessee, the right of action of the Government on the coupons of
such bonds could not be barred by the statute of limitations of
Tennessee, either while it held them in trust for the Indians, or since it
became the owner of such coupons. (U. S.vs. Nashville, etc., R.
Co., supra.) So where lands are held in trust by the state and the
beneficiaries have no right to sue, a statute does not run against the
State's right of action for trespass on the trust lands. (Greene
Tp. vs.Campbell, 16 Ohio St., 11; see also Atty.-Gen. vs. Midland R. Co.,
3 Ont., 511 [following Reg. vs. Williams, 39 U. C. Q. B., 397].)

These principles being based "upon the foundation of the great principle
of public policy" are, in the very nature of things, applicable to the
Philippine Government.

Counsel in their argument in support of the sixth and last assignments of

error do not question the amount of the judgment nor do they question
the correctness of the judgment in so far as it allows interest, and directs
its payment in gold coin or in the equivalent in Philippine currency.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against the appellant. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines Administration permits, all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth,
SUPREME COURT as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective
Manila for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in
their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."
EN BANC
A civil government or central administration organization under the name
G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945 of "Philippine Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1
issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner, Forces in the Philippines, and Jorge B. Vargas, who was appointed
vs. Chairman thereof, was instructed to proceed to the immediate
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First coordination of the existing central administrative organs and judicial
Instance of Manila, respondents.1 courts, based upon what had existed therefore, with approval of the said
Commander in Chief, who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.
Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.
P. A. Revilla for respondent Valdez Tan Keh. The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central
Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf. administrative organization, issued Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4, dated
January 30 and February 5, 1942, respectively, in which the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the justices of the
FERIA, J.:
peace and municipal courts under the Commonwealth were continued
with the same jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions given to the
This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent said Chairman of the Executive Commission by the Commander in Chief
judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil of Japanese Forces in the Philippines in the latter's Order No. 3 of
case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the February 20, 1942, concerning basic principles to be observed by the
so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese Philippine Executive Commission in exercising legislative, executive and
military occupation of these Islands. judicial powers. Section 1 of said Order provided that "activities of the
administration organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs. . . ."
proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued on
October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was
invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of the inaugurated, but no substantial change was effected thereby in the
court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during
the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they administered
occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to and enforced.
take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the
courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an
On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte,
enabling law granting such authority. And the same respondent, in his
General Douglas MacArthur issued a proclamation to the People of the
answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the
Philippines which declared:
government established in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation were no de facto governments.
1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines
is, subject to the supreme authority of the Government of the
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of
United States, the sole and only government having legal and
Manila, and on the next day their Commander in Chief proclaimed "the
valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of
Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by the Army."
enemy occupation and control;
In said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as the Military
 2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the remained good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.
promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and
legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of 1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and
enemy occupation and control; and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de
facto government are good and valid. The question to be determined is
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other whether or not the governments established in these Islands under the
government in the Philippines than that of the said names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de
of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control. facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of
those governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or
On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and on reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
February 27, 1945, General MacArthur, on behalf of the Government of
the United States, solemnly declared "the full powers and responsibilities There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or
under the Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets
established as provided by law." possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the
majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the
In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the
principal questions to be resolved in the present case may be reduced to Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector.
the following:(1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces
existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and
and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of
even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of
States and Filipino forces; (2)Whether the proclamation issued on 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the
October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief troops of the United States. And the third is that established as an
of the United States Army, in which he declared "that all laws, regulations independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the
the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in Southern Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present case with
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de
invalidated all judgements and judicial acts and proceedings of the said factogovernments.
courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been
invalidated by said proclamation, whether the present courts of the Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the Supreme
Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and Court of the United States, in the case of Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall.,
continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, 1), said: "But there is another description of government, called also by
may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more
Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing
Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were characteristics are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military
reestablished in the Islands. power with the territories, and against the rightful authority of an
established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it
We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether or necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of
not under the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become
of the courts established in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are
established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They
are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work
administered, also, civil authority, supported more or less directly by on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The right of one belligerent to
military force. . . . One example of this sort of government is found in the occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military
case of Castine, in Mine, reduced to British possession in the war of 1812 possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the
. . . U. S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A like example is found in the case right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political
of Tampico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for
United States . . . Fleming vs. Page (9 Howard, 614). These were cases the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation,
of temporary possessions of territory by lawfull and regular governments nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated
at war with the country of which the territory so possessed was part." and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the
laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed
The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the
regulated in Section III of the Hague Conventions of 1907, which is a law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the
revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military
subject of said Section III provides "the authority of the legislative power occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts
having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de
take steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing
public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, laws or make new ones."
the laws in force in the country."
And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an
According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupied territory, which were later embodied in the said Hague
occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty to insure public Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the Secretary
order and safety during his military occupation, he possesses all the of War of May 19,1898, relating to the occupation of the Philippines by
powers of a de facto government, and he can suspended the old laws United States forces, said in part: "Though the powers of the military
and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the
see fit, but he is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered
circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory, the municipal laws in territory, such as affect private rights of person and property and provide
force in the country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far
regulate social and commercial life of the country. On the other hand, as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are
laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice
others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to
press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were
considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation. before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to
Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials
matter of course as soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is not usual connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the
for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. In authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of
practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue the land as between man and man under the supervision of the American
administering justice; and judges and other judicial officers are kept in Commander in Chief." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of President,
their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are X, p. 209.)
required to continue in their positions under the supervision of the military
or civil authorities appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. As to "de facto" government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of the
These principles and practice have the sanction of all publicists who have United States, in the same case of Thorington vs. Smith, supra,
considered the subject, and have been asserted by the Supreme Court recognized the government set up by the Confederate States as a de
and applied by the President of the United States. factogovernment. In that case, it was held that "the central government
established for the insurgent States differed from the temporary
governments at Castine and Tampico in the circumstance that its were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority
authority did no originate in lawful acts of regular war; but it was not, on of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens
the account, less actual or less supreme. And we think that it must be under the Constitution."
classed among the governments of which these are examples. . . .
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive
In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme Court Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23,
of the United States, discussing the validity of the acts of the Confederate 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government
States, said: "The same general form of government, the same general established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de
laws for the administration of justice and protection of private rights, facto government of the second kind. It was not different from the
which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United
continuance and afterwards. As far as the Acts of the States do not States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "The government
impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may
just rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over
treated as valid and binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall., the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes.
570; 21 Law. ed., 657): "The existence of a state of insurrection and war It is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or
did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority
the regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war,
regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts and so far it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the
enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and world, those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts."
descent of property regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No one, (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a
that we are aware of, seriously questions the validity of judicial or civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by
legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States touching these and kindered Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. In 1806, when Napoleon
subjects, where they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of occupied the greater part of Prussia, he retained the existing
enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not administration under the general direction of a french official (Langfrey
impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution'. The same doctrine History of Napoleon, 1, IV, 25); and, in the same way, the Duke of
has been asserted in numerous other cases." Willington, on invading France, authorized the local authorities to
continue the exercise of their functions, apparently without appointing an
And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388, English superior. (Wellington Despatches, XI, 307.). The Germans, on
400), held: "That what occured or was done in respect of such matters the other hand, when they invaded France in 1870, appointed their own
under the authority of the laws of these local de facto governments officials, at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in every department of
should not be disregarded or held to be invalid merely because those administration and of every rank. (Calvo, pars. 2186-93; Hall,
governments were organized in hostility to the Union established by the International Law, 7th ed., p. 505, note 2.)
national Constitution; this, because the existence of war between the
United States and the Confederate States did not relieve those who are The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and
within the insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government
destroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil government or the by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established
regular administration of the laws, and because transactions in the by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was
ordinary course of civil society as organized within the enemy's territory of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the
although they may have indirectly or remotely promoted the ends of ultimate source of its authority was the same — the Japanese military
the de facto or unlawful government organized to effect a dissolution of authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his
the Union, were without blame 'except when proved to have been proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already
entered intowith actual intent to further invasion or insurrection:'" and quoted, "under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the
"That judicial and legislative acts in the respective states composing the 'Republic of the Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943, based
so-called Confederate States should be respected by the courts if they upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of
the Government of the United States." Japan had no legal power to grant February 22, 1898. And the said Supreme Court held in that case that
independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United "such government was of the class of de facto governments described in
States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, I Moore's International Law Digest, S 20, . . . 'called also by publicists a
before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly
into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of denominated a government of paramount force . . '." That is to say, that
peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well- the government of a country in possession of belligerent forces in
established doctrine in International Law, recognized in Article 45 of the insurrection or rebellion against the parent state, rests upon the same
Hauge Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile army of an enemy
population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile at regular war with the legitimate power.
power), the belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional, does not
serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the
jure government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation
to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts
Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs.Page, 9 and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are
Howard, 603; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the
Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived by Japan to delude well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law,
the Filipino people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Japanese gesture of transferring or turning over the rights of government Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of
into the hands of Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken belief General Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in
that by doing so, Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an
neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States and enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of
other allied nations. sovereignty, "does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of
acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his
Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they
the free will of the Filipino who, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the
American forces from the Islands, and the occupation thereof by the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the
Japanese forces of invasion, had organized an independent government various acts done during the same time by private persons under the
under the name with the support and backing of Japan, such government sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole
would have been considered as one established by the Filipinos in social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as
insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or the Unite States. And between the state and the individuals the evil would be scarcely less, — it
as such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress
organized by the confederate states during the war of secession and should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that
recognized as such by the by the Supreme Court of the United States in the sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the
numerous cases, notably those of Thorington vs. Smith, disappearance of the intrusive government ." (Hall, International Law, 7th
Williams vs.Bruffy, and Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted; and similar to the ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have been
short-lived government established by the Filipino insurgents in the Island each an incident of the same war as in the present case, postliminy
of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the
facto government by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case time substituted his own sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do
of McCleod vs. United States (299 U. S., 416). According to the facts in apparently in granting independence to the Philippines and establishing
the last-named case, the Spanish forces evacuated the Island of Cebu on the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p.
December 25, 1898, having first appointed a provisional government, and 615.)
shortly afterwards, the Filipinos, formerly in insurrection against Spain,
took possession of the Islands and established a republic, governing the That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments,
Islands until possession thereof was surrendered to the United States on which are not of a political complexion, are and remain valid after
reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, is (although the exigencies of military reoccupation are evidently less than
confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on those of occupation), it is to be presumed that General Douglas
October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the
processes of the governments established in the Philippines during the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional
Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said commander in chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act
proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio. against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme
Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied
2. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase by the Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague
"processes of any other government" as used in the above-quoted Conventions of 1907, as above indicated. It is not to be presumed that
proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944 — that General Douglas MacArthur, who enjoined in the same proclamation of
is, whether it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the October 23, 1944, "upon the loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect
American Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the
proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the Philippines," should not only reverse the international policy and practice
Japanese military occupation. of his own government, but also disregard in the same breath the
provisions of section 3, Article II, of our Constitution, which provides that
The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and
not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or the law of the Nation."
other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the
Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public
indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all hardship would result, and great public interests would be endangered
judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be
complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military again settled accrued or vested rights nullified, sentences passed on
occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the criminals set aside, and criminals might easily become immune for
occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, evidence against them may have already disappeared or be no longer
it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the available, especially now that almost all court records in the Philippines
intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes have been destroyed by fire as a consequence of the war. And it is
of any other government" in said proclamation, to refer to judicial another well-established rule of statutory construction that where great
processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The only inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public
reasonable construction of the said phrase is that it refers to interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such
governmental processes other than judicial processes of court construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such
proceedings, for according to a well-known rule of statutory construction, construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required
set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to be construed to by clear and unequivocal words. (25 R. C. L., pp. 1025, 1027.)
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."
The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular sovereign or
It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of his representatives who reoccupies a territory occupied by an enemy,
occupation, as an agent of his government, may not unlawfully suspend may set aside or annul all the judicial acts or proceedings of the tribunals
existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied territory, if and which the belligerent occupant had the right and duty to establish in order
when the exigencies of the military occupation demand such action. But to insure public order and safety during military occupation, would be
even assuming that, under the law of nations, the legislative power of a sufficient to paralyze the social life of the country or occupied territory, for
commander in chief of military forces who liberates or reoccupies his own it would have to be expected that litigants would not willingly submit their
territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military and litigation to courts whose judgements or decisions may afterwards be
before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the annulled, and criminals would not be deterred from committing crimes or
commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation
offenses in the expectancy that they may escaped the penalty if There is doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate
judgments rendered against them may be afterwards set aside. most of the acts of the occupier, such as the laws, regulations and
processes other than judicial of the government established by the
That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgements and belligerent occupant. But in view of the fact that the proclamation uses
proceedings of the courts of justice during the Japanese regime, is the words "processes of any other government" and not "judicial
impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of processes" prisely, it is not necessary to determine whether or not
law, issued by the President of the Philippines on March 10, 1945, by General Douglas MacArthur had power to annul and set aside all
virtue of the emergency legislative power vested in him by the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese
Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Said occupation. The question to be determined is whether or not it was his
Executive order abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided "that all intention, as representative of the President of the United States, to avoid
case which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals or nullify them. If the proclamation had, expressly or by necessary
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court final decision." This provision implication, declared null and void the judicial processes of any other
impliedly recognizes that the judgments and proceedings of the courts government, it would be necessary for this court to decide in the present
during the Japanese military occupation have not been invalidated by the case whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had authority to declare
proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, because the said them null and void. But the proclamation did not so provide, undoubtedly
Order does not say or refer to cases which have been duly appealed to because the author thereof was fully aware of the limitations of his
said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases which had powers as Commander in Chief of Military Forces of liberation or
therefore, that is, up to March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to the Court subsequent conqueror.
of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed
cases pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of international
occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of by the law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations,
latter before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public of conscience,
while almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending on March 10, 1945, in constitute or from the law of nations. (Preamble of the Hague
the Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of First Conventions; Westlake, International Law, 2d ed., Part II, p. 61.) Article
Instance during the Japanese regime. 43, section III, of the Hague Regulations or Conventions which we have
already quoted in discussing the first question, imposes upon the
The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International Law occupant the obligation to establish courts; and Article 23 (h), section II,
which say: "Moreover when it is said that an occupier's acts are valid and of the same Conventions, which prohibits the belligerent occupant "to
under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent declare . . . suspended . . . in a Court of Law the rights and action of the
conqueror, it must be remembered that no crucial instances exist to show nationals of the hostile party," forbids him to make any declaration
that if his acts should be reversed, any international wrong would be preventing the inhabitants from using their courts to assert or enforce
committed. What does happen is that most matters are allowed to stand their civil rights. (Decision of the Court of Appeals of England in the case
by the restored government, but the matter can hardly be put further than of Porter vs. Fruedenburg, L.R. [1915], 1 K.B., 857.) If a belligerent
this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p. occupant is required to establish courts of justice in the territory occupied,
245.) And from this quotion the respondent judge "draws the conclusion and forbidden to prevent the nationals thereof from asserting or enforcing
that whether the acts of the occupant should be considered valid or not, therein their civil rights, by necessary implication, the military commander
is a question that is up to the restored government to decide; that there is of the forces of liberation or the restored government is restrained from
no rule of international law that denies to the restored government to nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendered by said courts in their
decide; that there is no rule of international law that denies to the litigation during the period of occupation. Otherwise, the purpose of these
restored government the right of exercise its discretion on the matter, precepts of the Hague Conventions would be thwarted, for to declare
imposing upon it in its stead the obligation of recognizing and enforcing them null and void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts the
the acts of the overthrown government." right and action of the nationals of the territory during the military
occupation thereof by the enemy. It goes without saying that a law that
enjoins a person to do something will not at the same time empower
another to undo the same. Although the question whether the President reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino
or commanding officer of the United States Army has violated restraints forces.
imposed by the constitution and laws of his country is obviously of a
domestic nature, yet, in construing and applying limitations imposed on 3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the
the executive authority, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Commonwealth, which are the same as those existing prior to, and
case of Ochoa, vs. Hernandez (230 U.S., 139), has declared that they continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine
"arise from general rules of international law and from fundamental Executive Commission and by the so-called Republic of the Philippines,
principles known wherever the American flag flies." have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending in
said courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated
In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U.S., 712), a special order by the American and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth Government
issued by the officer in command of the forces of the United States in was restored.
South Carolina after the end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a decree
rendered by a court of chancery in that state in a case within its Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial
jurisdiction, was declared void, and not warranted by the acts approved administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military
respectively March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 428), and July 19 of the same year occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the
(15 id., 14), which defined the powers and duties of military officers in administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary
command of the several states then lately in rebellion. In the course of its courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is
decision the court said; "We have looked carefully through the acts of enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. As stated in the above-
March 2, 1867 and July 19, 1867. They give very large governmental quoted Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War on
powers to the military commanders designated, within the States May 19, 1898, "in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually
committed respectively to their jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by
warrant the order here in question. . . . The clearest language would be the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation.
necessary to satisfy us that Congress intended that the power given by This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the
these acts should be so exercised. . . . It was an arbitrary stretch of present occasion." And Taylor in this connection says: "From a
authority, needful to no good end that can be imagined. Whether theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with
Congress could have conferred the power to do such an act is a question the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of
we are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law that the government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of
exercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are concerned, actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law
shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires. of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and
(Mithell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey, 4 Taunt., 67; institution so far as military necessity will permit." (Taylor, International
Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1 Cowp., 161; s.c., 1 Smith's L.C., pt. 2, p. 934.) Public Law, p.596.) Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order
Viewing the subject before us from the standpoint indicated, we hold that that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be
the order was void." unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is
essentially provisional, and the government established by the occupant
It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of of transient character.
October 23, 1944, which declared that "all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, Commander
said Commonwealth are null and void without legal effect in areas of the in Chief of the Japanese Forces proclaimed on January 3, 1942, when
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has not invalidated the Manila was occupied, the military administration under martial law over
judicial acts and proceedings, which are not a political complexion, of the the territory occupied by the army, and ordered that "all the laws now in
courts of justice in the Philippines that were continued by the Philippine force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions,
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the shall continue to be affective for the time being as in the past," and "all
Japanese military occupation, and that said judicial acts and proceedings public officials shall remain in their present post and carry on faithfully
were good and valid before and now good and valid after the their duties as before." When the Philippine Executive Commission was
organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on The court in the said case of U.S. vs. Reiter did not and could not say
January 23, 1942, the Chairman of the Executive Commission, by that the laws and institutions of the country occupied if continued by the
Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and February 5, conqueror or occupant, become the laws and the courts, by adoption, of
respectively, continued the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court of the sovereign nation that is militarily occupying the territory. Because, as
First Instance, and justices of the peace of courts, with the same already shown, belligerent or military occupation is essentially provisional
jurisdiction in conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in and does not serve to transfer the sovereignty over the occupied territory
Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army in Order No. 3 of February 20, to the occupant. What the court said was that, if such laws and
1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called Republic of the institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and
Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts were continued with no derive their force from him, in the sense that he may continue or set them
substantial change in organization and jurisdiction thereof. aside. The laws and institution or courts so continued remain the laws
and institutions or courts of the occupied territory. The laws and the
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to courts of the Philippines, therefore, did not become, by being continued
the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. The
Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, provision of Article 45, section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907
and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the which prohibits any compulsion of the population of occupied territory to
same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as swear allegiance to the hostile power, "extends to prohibit everything
having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the which would assert or imply a change made by the invader in the
Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, legitimate sovereignty. This duty is neither to innovate in the political life
7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in of the occupied districts, nor needlessly to break the continuity of their
said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction legal life. Hence, so far as the courts of justice are allowed to continue
upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out administering the territorial laws, they must be allowed to give their
in speaking of said principles "a state or other governmental entity, upon sentences in the name of the legitimate sovereign " (Westlake, Int. Law,
the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right Part II, second ed., p. 102). According to Wheaton, however, the victor
and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the need not allow the use of that of the legitimate government. When in
result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain 1870, the Germans in France attempted to violate that rule by ordering,
their original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon, the courts of Nancy to administer
the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and justice in the name of the "High German Powers occupying Alsace and
content." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 615.) Lorraine," upon the ground that the exercise of their powers in the name
of French people and government was at least an implied recognition of
The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in the Republic, the courts refused to obey and suspended their sitting.
support in his conclusion that the Court of First Instance of Manila Germany originally ordered the use of the name of "High German Powers
presided over by him "has no authority to take cognizance of, and occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but later offered to allow use of the
continue said proceedings (of this case) to final judgment until and unless name of the Emperor or a compromise. (Wheaton, International Law,
the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . shall have War, 7th English ed. 1944, p. 244.)
provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts of the now
defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the cases commenced and the Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature,
left pending therein," is "that said courts were a government alien to the "Law once established continues until changed by the some competent
Commonwealth Government. The laws they enforced were, true enough, legislative power. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty."
laws of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but they had (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary Section 9,
become the laws — and the courts had become the institutions — of citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author
Japan by adoption (U.S. vs. Reiter. 27 F. Cases, No. 16146), as they says, in his Treatise on the Conflict on Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section
became later on the laws and institutions of the Philippine Executive 131): "There can no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines." comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people
it must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created,
it persists until a change take place, and when changed it continues in On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of Act
such changed condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest No. 136 was enacted abolishing the civil jurisdiction of the provost courts
or colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of created by the military government of occupation in the Philippines during
constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by the Spanish-American War of 1898, the same section 78 provided for the
legislative acts creates a change." transfer of all civil actions then pending in the provost courts to the proper
tribunals, that is, to the justices of the peace courts, Court of First
As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence defends upon that Instance, or Supreme Court having jurisdiction over them according to
of the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction, it is law. And later on, when the criminal jurisdiction of provost courts in the
evident that such laws, not being a political nature, are not abrogated by City of Manila was abolished by section 3 of Act No. 186, the same
a change of sovereignty, and continue in force "ex proprio vigore" unless section provided that criminal cases pending therein within the jurisdiction
and until repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and of the municipal court created by Act No. 183 were transferred to the
courts are expressly continued is not necessary in order that they may latter.
continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the
intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. Therefore, even That the present courts as the same courts which had been functioning
assuming that Japan had legally acquired sovereignty over these Islands, during the Japanese regime and, therefore, can continue the proceedings
which she had afterwards transferred to the so-called Republic of the in cases pending therein prior to the restoration of the Commonwealth of
Philippines, and that the laws and the courts of these Islands had the Philippines, is confirmed by Executive Order No. 37 which we have
become the courts of Japan, as the said courts of the laws creating and already quoted in support of our conclusion in connection with the second
conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it question. Said Executive Order provides"(1) that the Court of Appeals
necessarily follows that the same courts may continue exercising the created and established under Commonwealth Act No. 3 as amended, be
same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the abolished, as it is hereby abolished," and "(2) that all cases which have
Commonwealth Government, unless and until they are abolished or the heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be
laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. . . ." In so providing,
said government. As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that the said Order considers that the Court of Appeals abolished was the
proceedings pending in one court be continued by or transferred to same that existed prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the
another court, are not required by the mere change of government or Commonwealth Government; for, as we have stated in discussing the
sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the former courts are previous question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending therein, or
abolished or their jurisdiction so change that they can no longer continue which had theretofore (that is, up to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed
taking cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in to said court, must have been cases coming from the Courts of First
order that the new courts or the courts having jurisdiction over said cases Instance during the so-called Republic of the Philippines. If the Court of
may continue the proceedings. When the Spanish sovereignty in the Appeals abolished by the said Executive Order was not the same one
Philippine Islands ceased and the Islands came into the possession of which had been functioning during the Republic, but that which had
the United States, the "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was continued and existed up to the time of the Japanese occupation, it would have provided
did not cease to exist, and proceeded to take cognizance of the actions that all the cases which had, prior to and up to that occupation on
pending therein upon the cessation of the Spanish sovereignty until the January 2, 1942, been dully appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall
said "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was abolished, and the Supreme be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision.
Court created in Chapter II of Act No. 136 was substituted in lieu thereof.
And the Courts of First Instance of the Islands during the Spanish regime It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to
continued taking cognizance of cases pending therein upon the change continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of political
of sovereignty, until section 65 of the same Act No. 136 abolished them complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the
and created in its Chapter IV the present Courts of First Instance in Commonwealth Government.
substitution of the former. Similarly, no enabling acts were enacted during
the Japanese occupation, but a mere proclamation or order that the Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of First
courts in the Island were continued. Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to continue to final judgment the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves civil rights of the
parties under the laws of the Commonwealth Government, pending in
said court at the time of the restoration of the said Government; and that
the respondent judge of the court, having refused to act and continue him
does a duty resulting from his office as presiding judge of that
court, mandamus is the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, especially taking into consideration the fact that the
question of jurisdiction herein involved does affect not only this particular
case, but many other cases now pending in all the courts of these
Islands.

In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ

of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to
final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court. No
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the decision of the lower court:
SUPREME COURT "The accused bought a house and lot located inside the United States
Manila Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She
demolished the house and built another one in its place, without a
EN BANC building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City, because she was
told by one Ernesto Evalle, an assistant in the City Mayor's office, as well
as by her neighbors in the area, that such building permit was not
necessary for the construction of the house. On December 29, 1966,
Juan Malones, a building and lot inspector of the City Engineer's Office,
G.R. No. L-36409 October 26, 1973
Olongapo City, together with Patrolman Ramon Macahilas of the
Olongapo City police force apprehended four carpenters working on the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, house of the accused and they brought the carpenters to the Olongapo
vs. City police headquarters for interrogation. ... After due investigation,
LORETA GOZO, defendant-appellant. Loreta Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14,
S. of 1964 with the City Fiscal's Office." 3 The City Court of Olongapo City
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor found her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1964
General Jaime M. Lantin and Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo for plaintiff- and sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as well as to pay the
appellee. costs. The Court of Instance of Zambales, on appeal, found her guilty on
the above facts of violating such municipal ordinance but would sentence
Jose T. Nery for defendant-appellant. her merely to pay a fine of P200.00 and to demolish the house thus
erected. She elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but in her brief,
she would put in issue the validity of such an ordinance on constitutional
ground or at the very least its applicability to her in view of the location of
FERNANDO, J.: her dwelling within the naval base. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, in a
resolution of January 29, 1973, noting the constitutional question raised,
certified the case to this Court.
Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo,
Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor for the There is, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this petition, no
construction or erection of a building, as well as any modification, support in law for the stand taken by appellant.
alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its validity, or at the
very least, its applicability to her, by invoking due process, 1 a contention 1. It would be fruitless for her to assert that local government units are
she would premise on what for her is the teaching of People v. devoid of authority to require building permits. This Court, from Switzer v.
Fajardo. 2 If such a ground were far from being impressed with solidity, Municipality of
she stands on quicksand when she would deny the applicability of the Cebu, 4 decided in 1911, has sanctioned the validity of such measures. It
ordinance to her, on the pretext that her house was constructed within is much too late in the day to contend that such a requirement cannot be
the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While yielding to validly imposed. Even appellant, justifiably concerned about the
the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine unfavorable impression that could be created if she were to deny that
territory, she would, in effect, seek to emasculate our sovereign rights by such competence is vested in municipal corporations and chartered
the assertion that we cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction. cities, had to concede in her brief: "If, at all; the questioned ordinance
To state the proposition is to make patent how much it is tinged with may be predicated under the general welfare clause ... ." 5 Its scope is
unorthodoxy. Clearly then, the lower court decision must be affirmed with wide, well-nigh all embracing, covering every aspect of public health,
the sole modification that she is given thirty days from the finality of a public morals, public safety, and the well being and good order of the
judgment to obtain a permit, failing which, she is required to demolish the community. 6
same.
It goes without saying that such a power is subject to limitations. the same would not have been granted. To require the accused to obtain
Certainly, if its exercise is violative of any constitutional right, then its a permit before constructing her house would be an exercise in futility.
validity could be impugned, or at the very least, its applicability to the The law will not require anyone to perform an impossibility, neither in law
person adversely affected could be questioned. So much is settled law. or in fact: ... ." 9 It would be from her own version, at the very least then,
Apparently, appellant has adopted the view that a due process question premature to anticipate such an adverse result, and thus to condemn an
may indeed be raised in view of what for her is its oppressive character. ordinance which certainly lends itself to an interpretation that is neither
She is led to such a conclusion, relying on People v. Fajardo. 7 A more oppressive, unfair, or unreasonable. That kind of interpretation suffices to
careful scrutiny of such a decision would not have led her astray, for that remove any possible question of its validity, as was expressly announced
case is easily distinguishable. The facts as set forth in the opinion follow: in Primicias v. Fugoso. 10 So it appears from this portion of the opinion of
"It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant- Justice Feria, speaking for the Court: "Said provision is susceptible of two
appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with
Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding of
providing as follows: "... 1. Any person or persons who will construct or a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and
repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written other public places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the
permit from the Municipal Mayor. ... 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor,
should be charged for each building permit and P1.00 for each repair subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify
permit issued. ... 3. [Penalty]-Any violation of the provisions of the above, the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with a view to
this ordinance, shall make the violator liable to pay a fine of not less than prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets
P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing
more than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building to minimize the risk of disorder. After a mature deliberation, we have
destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second construction,
shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. ... that is, construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does
." Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but
expired, he and his son-in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written request only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the
with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the
adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in meeting may be held." 11 If, in a case affecting such a preferred freedom
Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from as the right to assembly, this Court could construe an ordinance of the
the public plaza by a creek ... . On January 16, 1954, the request was City of Manila so as to avoid offending against a constitutional provision,
denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would there is nothing to preclude it from a similar mode of approach in order to
destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza ... . On January 18, 1954, show the lack of merit of an attack against an ordinance requiring a
defendants reiterated their request for a building permit ..., but again the permit. Appellant cannot therefore take comfort from any broad statement
request was turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants in the Fajardo opinion, which incidentally is taken out of context,
proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because considering the admitted oppressive application of the challenged
they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having measure in that litigation. So much then for the contention that she could
been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased not have been validly convicted for a violation of such ordinance. Nor
property." 8 should it be forgotten that she did suffer the same fate twice, once from
the City Court and thereafter from the Court of First Instance. The reason
Clearly then, the application of such an ordinance to Fajardo was is obvious.Such ordinance applies to her.
oppressive. A conviction therefore for a violation thereof both in the
justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur as well as in the Court 2. Much less is a reversal indicated because of the alleged absence of
of First Instance could not be sustained. In this case, on the contrary, the rather novel concept of administrative jurisdiction on the part of
appellant never bothered to comply with the ordinance. Perhaps aware of Olongapo City. Nor is novelty the only thing that may be said against it.
such a crucial distinction, she would assert in her brief: "The evidence Far worse is the assumption at war with controlling and authoritative
showed that even if the accused were to secure a permit from the Mayor, doctrines that the mere existence of military or naval bases of a foreign
country cuts deeply into the power to govern. Two leading cases may be Can there be anything clearer, therefore, than that only a turnabout,
cited to show how offensive is such thinking to the juristic concept of unwarranted and unjustified, from what is settled and orthodox law can
sovereignty, People v. Acierto, 12 and Reagan v. Commissioner of lend the slightest degree of plausibility to the contention of absence of
Internal Revenue. 13 As was so emphatically set forth by Justice Tuason administrative jurisdiction. If it were otherwise, what was aptly referred to
in Acierto: "By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine by Justice Tuason "as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency"
Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction becomes one of obeisance and submission. If on a concern purely
in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, domestic in its implications, devoid of any connection with national
courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government has not abdicated security, the Military-Bases Agreement could be thus interpreted, then
its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or sovereignty indeed becomes a mockery and an illusion. Nor does
divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. appellant's thesis rest on less shaky foundation by the mere fact that
Under the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or Acierto and Reagan dealt with the competence of the national
preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine government, while what is sought to be emasculated in this case is the
Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all so-called administrative jurisdiction of a municipal corporation. Within the
such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon it may be
their own decline to make use of. The first proposition is implied from the validly exercised. Any residual authority and therein conferred, whether
fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the second from the expressly or impliedly, belongs to the national government, not to an
express provisions of the treaty." 14 There was a reiteration of such a alien country. What is even more to be deplored in this stand of appellant
view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines is that no such claim is made by the American naval authorities, not that
being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its it would do them any good if it were so asserted. To quote from Acierto
entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within anew: "The carrying out of the provisions of the Bases Agreement is the
its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws concern of the contracting parties alone. Whether, therefore, a given
govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. case which by the treaty comes within the United States jurisdiction
That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. should be transferred to the Philippine authorities is a matter about which
Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a the accused has nothing to do or say. In other words, the rights granted
diminution of sovereignty." 15 Then came this paragraph dealing with the to the United States by the treaty insure solely to that country and can not
principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted any state may, by its be raised by the offender." 18 If an accused would suffer from such
consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. disability, even if the American armed forces were the beneficiary of a
There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in treaty privilege, what is there for appellant to take hold of when there is
character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in absolutely no showing of any alleged grant of what is quaintly referred to
the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to as administrative jurisdiction? That is all, and it is more than enough, to
which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self- make manifest the futility of seeking a reversal.
restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of
what otherwise is illimitable competence." 16 The opinion was at pains to WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed
point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of insofar as it found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable
jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance. The words employed follow: doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 and
"Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing case of insolvency, and modified insofar as she is required to demolish
another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over the house that is the subject matter of the case, she being given a period
certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that of thirty days from the finality of this decision within which to obtain the
such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their required permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the
status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction appealed decision requiringdemolition be enforced. Costs against the
may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases accused.
under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases
agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory." 17
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the
SUPREME COURT inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
Manila government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the
enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
EN BANC sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we
have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947 Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75
Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the
vs.
supreme power which governs a body politic or society which
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
constitute the state) must be distinguished from the exercise of
the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed and
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner. transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it
respondent. out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during
the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended
RESOLUTION is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the
Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied
Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the
to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over
Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of them" is one of the "rules of international law of our times"; (II
treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by
Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague
government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy
(2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate
upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic: government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such
thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance, which
consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United
government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent State was suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the
allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and case of United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co Kim Cham
or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as he vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of
remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of
consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereignty, but of the existence of a government de facto therein
sovereign. (Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the occupied
of State Webster Report to the President of the United States in territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted
the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526); subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military
occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty
to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty" hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the
used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and
rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in
legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez
cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they
divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government,
that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension they are inoperative or not applicable to the government
of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption established by the occupant; that the crimes against national
of the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war,
applied to the present case; correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as
well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of political
allegiance," repudiated by Oppenheim and other publicists, as complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by
descriptive of the relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate
occupied by the enemy toward the military government government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as
established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be against the occupant, because they can not be committed against
considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner the latter (Peralta vs.Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while
owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he the offenses against public order to be preserved by the
resides in return for the protection he receives as above legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the
described, and does not do away with the absolute and invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were
permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign also inoperative as against the ousted government for the latter
country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the
citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code,
prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign was applicable to treason committed against the national security
country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by of the legitimate government, because the inhabitants of the
the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter
own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the during the enemy occupation;
enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if
the allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to
sovereign is nothing more than obedience to its laws in return for respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the
the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate
citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one the social and commercial life of the country, he has,
hand, ipso facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at
enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life, his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones
in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other when the exigencies of the military service demand such action,
hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the
bound to obey most of the laws of his own government or control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to
sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations,
protection he is entitled to in his own; the usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity
and the requirements of public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76,
of the rights of sovereignty by the legitimate government in the 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant
territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the
authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them, and the
laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said
as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict government as then organized by authority of the sovereign
with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as people of the United States, exercised through their authorized
suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants; representative, the Congress and the President of the United
States, was made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the
obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his Philippines established by authority of the people of the
government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section
action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the
the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All
no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless
or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall
legitimate government, or compel them to adhere and give aid be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government
and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not and corresponding officials under this constitution;
demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not
necessary for the control of the inhabitants and the safety and Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a
protection of his army, and because it is tantamount to practically sovereign government, though not absolute but subject to certain
transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as
government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of Ordinance appended to our Constitution, was recognized not only
the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United States in
occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and approving the Independence Law above quoted and the
comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a Constitution of the Philippines, which contains the declaration that
hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor; "Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them" (section 1, Article II), but also by the
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended Executive Department of the United States; that the late
allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and President Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said,
weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of among others, "As I stated on August 12, 1943, the United States
humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would in practice regards the Philippines as having now the status as a
allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants government of other independent nations — in fact all the
of the occupied territory to fight against their own government attributes of complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional
without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle
treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases,
military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S.,
completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a
deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty — purely political question, the determination of which by the
such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the legislative and executive departments of any government
people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens
nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and and subjects of the country.
independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own
sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide; Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution which provides that pending the final and complete
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States "All citizens of
of the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United States", was
one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people
retained by the United States, but these limitations do not away or
are not inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that
the people of each State of the Union preserves its own
sovereignty although limited by that of the United States
conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may
be committed against the Federal as well as against the State
Government, in the same way treason may have been committed
during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the
United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine
Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government
from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution
of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the
Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same
government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of
our Constitution provides that "The government established by
this constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of
Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines
shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines";

This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more

extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby
denied, for the reasons above set forth and for others to be stated
in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion
therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in
a separate opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate
opinion.
 Republic of the Philippines official capacity. They are presumed to be authentic, as we have no
SUPREME COURT doubt they are.
Manila
It appears that at the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941, Ramon
EN BANC Ruffy was the Provincial Commander, Prudente M. Francisco, a junior
officer, and Andres Fortus, a corporal, all of the Philippine Constabulary
G.R. No. L-533 August 20, 1946 garrison stationed in Mindoro. When, on February 27, 1942, the
Japanese forces landed in Mindoro, Major Ruffy retreated to the
RAMON RUFFY, ET AL., petitioners, mountains instead of surrendering to the enemy, disbanded his company,
vs. and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as Bolo Combat team of
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARMY, ET AL., respondents. Bolo Area. Lieutenant Francisco, Corporal Fortus and Jose L. Garcia, the
last then a civilian joined Major Ruffy's organization towards the latter
part of 1942, while Dominador Adeva and Victoriano Dinglasan, then
Placido C. Ramos for petitioners.
likewise civilians, became its members some time in 1943..
Lt. Col. Fred Ruiz Castro and Capt. Ramon V. Diaz, JAGS, PA., for
respondents.
Meanwhile, Brigadier General Macario Peralta, Jr., then a lieutenant
colonel of the Philippine Army, also took to the hills of Panay and led the
TUASON, J.:
operation of the 6th Military District, one of the districts into which the
Philippine Army had been divided before the war. About November,
This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the Chief 1942, Colonel Peralta succeeded in contacting the General Headquarters
of Staff and the General Court Martial of the Philippine Army, be of General MacArthur in Australia as the result of which on February 13,
commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of petitioners 1943, the 6th Military District was recognized by the Headquarters of the
before that body. Preliminary injunction having been denied by us and Southwest Pacific Area as a military unit and part of its command.
the General Court Martial having gone ahead with the trial, which
eventually resulted in the acquittal of one of the defendants, Ramon
Even before General MacArthur's recognition of the 6th Military District
Ruffy, the dismissal of the case as to another, Victoriano Dinglasan, and
Colonel Peralta had extended its sphere of operation to comprise
the conviction of Jose L. Garcia, Prudente M. Francisco, Dominador
Mindoro and Marinduque, and had, on January 2, 1943, named Major
Adeva and Andres Fortus, the last-named four petitioners now seek in
Ruffy as Acting Commander for those two provinces and Commanding
their memorandum to convert the petition into one for certiorari, with the
Officer of the 3rd Battalion, 66 Infantry 61st Division, Philippine Corps.
prayer that the records of the proceedings before the General Court
After the recognition, 2d Lieut. Prudente M. Francisco, by virtue of
Martial be ordered certified to this court for review.
Special Orders No. 99, dated November 2, 1943, and signed by Enrique
L. Jurado, Major, OSE, Commanding, was assigned as S-3 in the Bolo
The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to Area. Major, later Lieut. Col., Jurado, it should be noted, had been
military law at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial dispatched by the 6th Military District to Mindoro to assume operational
was committed. In their memorandum they have raised an additional control supervision over the Bolo Area unit and to make and direct the
question of law — that the 93d Article of War is unconstitutional. necessary report to the Headquarters, 6th Military District, in Panay. On
April 26, 1944, by General Orders No. 40 of the 6th Military District, 2d
An outline of the petitioner's previous connection with the Philippine Lieutenant Francisco was promoted to the rank of 1st Lieutenant
Army, the Philippine Constabulary, and/or with guerrilla organizations will (Brevet), effective April 15, 1944, subject to approval by the President of
presently be made. This outline is based on allegations in the petition and the Philippines, and was re-assigned to the Bolo Area. As to Andres
the answer, and on exhibits attached thereto and to the parties' Fortus he was assigned to the same Bolo Area as probationary 3d
memoranda, exhibits which were offered in the course of the oral lieutenant for two-month probationary training, by the Headquarters of the
argument and admitted without objection. The said exhibits are public 6th Military District, as per Special Orders No. 70, dated May 15, 1944.
documents certified by the officials who had them in custody in their
According to a memorandum of the Chief of Staff, 6th Military District, and all laws and regulations creating and governing the existence of the
dated January 1943, and signed by L.R. Relunia, Lieut. Col., CE, Chief of Philippine Army including the Articles of War, were suspended and in
Staff, Jose L. Garcia and Dominador Adeva were appointed 3d abeyance during such belligerent occupation."
lieutenants, infantry as of December 31, 1942. Garcia later was promoted
to the rank of captain, effective March 15, 1943, as per Special Orders The paragraph quoted in the petitioner's memorandum from Winthrop's
No. 82, issued in the field, 6th Military District, and dated August 28, Military Law and Precedents and the subsequent paragraph which has
1943. On May 24, 1943, Jose L. Garcia took his oath before Captain been omitted furnish a complete answer to petitioner's contention of the
Esteban P. Beloncio, then Acting Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 66th Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men of the Philippine
Infantry Regiment, 61st Division, 6th Military District. Army did not cease to be fully in the service, though in a measure,' only
in a measure, they were not subject to the military jurisdiction, if they
As has been said, the 6th Military District sent Lieut. Col. Enrique L. were not active duty. In the latter case, like officers and soldiers on leave
Jurado to be Commanding Officer of the Bolo Combat Team in Mindoro of absence or held as prisoners of war, they could not be held guilty of a
and to undertake other missions of Military character. Pursuant to breach of the discipline of the command or of a neglect of duty, or
instructions, Colonel Jurado on November 2, 1943, assigned Major Ruffy disobedience of orders, or mutiny, or subject to a military trial therefor;
as Commanding Officer of the Bolo Area with 3d Lieut. Dominador Adeva but for an act unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, or an act which
and 2d Lieut. Prudente M. Francisco as members of his staff and constitutes an offense of the class specified in the 95th Article of War,
Victoriano Dinglasan as Finance Officer, as per Special Orders No. 99 they may in general be legally held subject to military jurisdiction and trial.
dated November 2, 1943. In a memorandum of Colonel Jurado for Major "So a prisoner of war, though not subject, while held by the enemy, to the
Ruffy bearing date 25 June, 1944, it was stated that Captain Garcia had discipline of his own army, would, when exchanged of paroled, be not
been given P5,000 for palay and Lieut. Francisco P9,000, P5,000 for exempt from liability for such offenses as criminal acts or injuriuos
palay and P4,000 for salary of the personnel B. Company. conduct committed during his captivity against other officers or soldiers in
the same status." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition,
A change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected by Colonel pp. 91, 92.)
Jurado on June 8, 1944: Major Ruffy was relieved of his assignment as
Commanding Officer, Bolo Battalion, and Capt. Esteban P. Beloncio was The rule invoked by counsel, namely, that laws of political nature or
put in Ruffy's place. On October 19, 1944, Lieut. Col. Jurado was slain affecting political relations are considered superseded or in abeyance
allegedly by the petitioners. After the commission of this crime, the during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of the civil
petitioners, it is alleged, seceded from the 6th Military District. It was this inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not
murder which gave rise to petitioner's trial, the legality of which is now bind the enemies in arms. This is self-evident from the very nature of
being contested. things. The paradox of a contrary ruling should readily manifest itself.
Under the petitioner's theory the forces of resistance operating in an
On July 26, 1941, the President of the Untied States issued a military occupied territory would have to abide by the outlawing of their own
order the pertinent paragraph of which stated: ". . . as Commander in existence. They would be stripped of the very life-blood of an army, the
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, I hereby call and order right and the ability to maintain order and discipline within the
into the service of the armed forces of the United States Army, for the organization and to try the men guilty of breach thereof.
period of the existing emergency, and place under the command of the
general officer, United States Army, to be designated by the Secretary of The surrender by General Wainright of the Fil-American Forces does not
War, from time to time, all of the organized military forces of the profit the petitioner's who were former members of the Philippine
Government of the Commonwealth." Following the issuance of President Constabulary any more than does the rule of war or international law they
Roosevelt's order General Douglas MacArthur was appointed cite. The fall of Bataan and Corregidor did not end the war. It did not,
Commanding General of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East. legally or otherwise, keep the United States and the Commonwealth of
the Philippines from organizing a new army, regular or irregular, out of
It is contended, in behalf of Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus, that new men and men in the old service who had refused to surrender or
"by the enemy occupation of the Philippines, the National Defense Act who having surrendered, had decided to carry on the fight through other
diverse means and methods. The fall of Corregidor and Bataan just War. The Bolo Area, as has been seen, was a contigent of the 6th
marked the beginning of the gigantic preparation for the gigantic drive Military District which, as has also been pointed out, had been
that was to fight its way to and beyond the Philippines in fulfillment of recognized by and placed under the operational control of the United
General MacArthur's classic promise, "I shall return." The heroic role States Army in the Southwest Pacific. The Bolo Area received supplies
which the guerrillas played in that preparation and in the subsequent and funds for the salaries of its officers and men from the Southwest
liberation of the Philippines is now history. Pacific Command. As officers in the Bolo Area and the 6th Military
District, the petitioners operated under the orders of duly established and
Independently of their previous connection with the Philippine Army and duly appointed commanders of the United States Army.
the Philippine Constabulary, Captain Francisco and Lieutenant Fortus as
well as Major Garcia and Lieutenant Adeva were subject to military The attitude of the enemy toward underground movements did not affect
jurisdiction. the military status of guerrillas who had been called into the service of the
Philippine Army. If the invaders refused to look upon guerrillas, without
The 2d Article of War defines and enumerates the persons subject to distinctions, as legitimate troops, that did not stop the guerillas who had
military law as follows: been inducted into the service of the Philippine Army from being
component parts thereof, bound to obey military status of guerrillas was
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. — The following persons to be judged not by the concept of the army of the country for which they
are subject to these articles and shall be understood as included fought.
in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons
subject to military law," whenever used in these articles: The constitutionality of the 93d Article of War is assailed. This article
ordains "that any person subject to military law who commits murder in
(a) All officers, members of the Nurse Corps and soldiers time of was shall suffer death or imprisonment for life, as the court martial
belonging to the Regular Force of the Philippine Army; all may direct." It is argued that since "no review is provided by that law to
reservists, from the dates of their call to active duty and while on be made by the Supreme Court, irrespective of whether the punishment
such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and is for life imprisonment or death", it violates Article VIII, section 2,
all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or order to obey the paragraph 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines which provides that
same; "the National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original
jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death
or life imprisonment."
(b) Cadets, flying cadets, and probationary third lieutenants;
We think the petitioners are in error. This error arose from failure to
(c) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or
perceive the nature of courts martial and the sources of the authority for
serving with the Army of the Philippines in the field in time of war
their creation.
or when martial law is declared though not otherwise subject to
these articles;
Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the
authorities "for the ordering of courts martial has been held to be
(d) All persons under sentences adjudged by courts-martial.
attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in
Chief, independently of legislation." (Winthrop's Military Law and
It is our opinion that the petitioners come within the general application of Precedents, 2d Edition, p. 49.) Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion
the clause in sub-paragraph (a); "and all other persons lawfully called, of the judiciary. "The Supreme Court of the United States referring to the
drafted, or ordered into, or to duty for training in, the said service, from provisions of the Constitution authorizing Congress to provide for the
the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey government of the army, excepting military offenses from the civil
the same." By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo jurisdiction, and making the President Commander in Chief, observes as
Area from the General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they follows: "These provisions show that Congress has the power to provide
became members of the Philippine Army amendable to the Articles of for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner
then and now practiced by civilized nations, and that the power to do so
is given without any connection between it and the 3d Article of the
United States; indeed that the two powers are entirely independent of
each other."

"Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that

courts-martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in
fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly
commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and
utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives." (Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2d Edition, p.
49.) Of equal interest Clode, 2 M. F., 361, says of these courts in the
British law: "It must never be lost sight of that the only legitimate object of
military tribunals is to aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and
government of the Army." (Footnote No. 24, p. 49, Winthrop's Military
Law and Precedents, 2d Edition.)

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the petition has no merit and that it
should be dismissed with costs. It is so ordered.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones and Padilla,
JJ., concur.