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commit the crime was, therefore, no longer necessary to induce the assailant
to commit the crime.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Oriental

Mindoro.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

VOL. 17, JULY 26, 1966 721 Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant and
People vs. Castillo, et al. appellant.
Solicitor General for plaintiff and appellee.
No. L-19238. July 26, 1966. DlZON, J.:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. In an information filed with the Court of First Instance of Oriental
MARINCHO CASTILLO, ET AL., defendants. CARLOS Mindoro Carlos Castillo and his son, Marincho, were charged with
CASTILLO, defendant and appellant. the crime of murder. After trial upon their plea of not guilty, the
court found them guilty as charged and sentenced them accordingly.
Only Carlos Castillo appealed.
Criminal law; No conspiracy where the son attacked the victim while
The prosecution evidence shows the following facts:
the father was talking with the latter.—No conspiracy was proven between
Sometime in the month of October 1959. Marincho Castillo was
appellant and his son, who fatally hacked the victim, because while it is true
slapped in the face by the now deceased Juan Vargas as a result of an
that the appellant’s son attacked the victim f rom behind while the appellant
altercation which arose between them because a cow belonging to
was talking with the latter, this is not sufficient proof of conspiracy between
the former had gone astray and destroyed some plants of the latter.
father and son, it appearing firstly, that the incident in which the son was
Unable to retaliate at that time, Marincho merely uttered these
slapped by the victim occurred some three months before, and secondly, that
words: “You, Manong Juan, will have your own day.”
the fatal incident took place hardly twenty meters away from appellant’s
About 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon of December 28, 1959, in
house, which would in-
barrio Malibago, municipality of Pola, Oriental Mindoro, while
appellant, holding a gun in his right hand,
722
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722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOL. 17, JULY 26, 1966 723
People vs. Castillo, et al. People vs. Castillo, et al.

dicate that, instead of appellant and his son going out in search of the was talking face to face with Juan Vargas, Marincho came from
deceased, it was the latter who had gone to, or who had passed by, the street behind and hacked the latter on the head. As Marincho was about to
near their house on the fatal day. strike the victim a second time, appellant said: “You kill him.”
In the evening of the same day, Marincho, accompanied by
Same; Utterances which chatacterize a person as a co-principal by appellant, surrendered himself to the authorities.
inducement.—In determining whether the utterances of an accused are A post-mortem examination conducted by the municipal health
sufficient to make him guilty as co-principal by inducement, it must appear officer of Pola revealed that the victim died instantaneously as a
that the inducement was of such nature and was made in such a way as to result of severe hemorrhage due to multiple wounds.
become the determining cause of the crime, and that such inducement was With the testimony of Jose Ilagan the prosecution attempted to
uttered with the intention of producing the result. (People vs. Caimbre, No. prove conspiracy between appellant and his son. According to said
L-12087, December 29, 1960). In the present case, although appellant was witness, on the afternoon in question he saw both walking very fast
armed with a revolver while talking with the deceased, the firearm was not towards the poblacion, appellant with a revolver in his hand, and his
pointed at the latter, and he uttered the words “You kill him” only after his son carrying a bolo, both presumably gunning for Juan Vargas.
son had fatally boloed the deceased on the head. The alleged inducement to Very little credibility can be given to this testimony, firstly,
because the incident between Vargas and Marincho had taken place
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in the month of October 1959, while the fatal incident took place on Note.—The situation in the Castillo case is similar to that found
December 28 of the same year; secondly, because the fatal incident in the U.S. vs. Magcomot, 13 Phil. 386 and U.S. vs. Reyes and
took place hardly twenty meters away from appellant’s house—a Javier, 14 Phil. 27. As to principal inducement, the rule is that the
circumstance which would seem to indicate that, instead of appellant inciting words should have a great dominance and a great influence
and his son going out in search of Vargas, it was the latter who had over the person who acts; it is necessary that they be as direct, as
gone or who had passed by the street near appellant’s house on the efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or violence
fatal day. itself” (U.S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203, 208).
The last question to be resolved is whether appellant can be
found guilty of murder by inducement simply because after his son ——————
had already fatally boloed Vargas and was about to strike the latter a
second time, appellant shouted: “You kill him.” The present case is
very similar, if not on all fours, with People vs. Caimbre, et al., G.R.
No. L-12087 decided on December 29, 1960 . where practically the
same words were uttered by one of the defendants but only after the
actual assailant had already boloed his victim several times. It was
there held that in determining whether the utterances of an accused © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

are sufficient to make him guilty as co-principal by inducement, it

must appear that the inducement was of such nature and was made
in such a way as to become the determin-

724

724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., et al. vs. Japa

ing cause of the crime and that such inducement was uttered with the
intention of producing the result. In this case appellant was, of
course, armed with a revolver while talking with the deceased
Vargas, but the firearm was not pointed at the latter. Then he is
alleged to have uttered the words “You kill him” only after his son
had already fatally boloed Vargas on the head. It appears, therefore,
that the alleged inducement to commit the crime was no longer
necessary to induce the assailant to commit the crime. Upon the
principle thus laid down in the Caimbre case—which was merely a
reiteration of the same ruling previously laid down in People vs.
Alvarez, et al., G.R. No. L-10650, July 26, 1960; People vs. Canare,
et al., G.R. No. 10677, September 30, 1959; People vs. Omini, 61
Phil. 609; and United States vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203, We are
constrained to hold that appellant’s guilt has not been established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and appellant is
acquitted, with one-half of the costs de oficio.

Chief Justice Concepcion and Justices J.B.L. Reyes,

Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, J.P. Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, concur.

Judgment reversed.

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