G.R. No.

147148 - January 13, 2003

PILAR Y. GOYENA, Petitioner, v. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO, respondent.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

From the Court of Appeals June 19, 2000 Decision which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 149 in
Special Proceeding No. N-4375 appointing herein respondent Amparo Ledesma Gustilo as guardian over the person and property of
her sister Julieta Ledesma, Pilar Y. Goyena, Julieta's close friend and companion of more than 60 years, comes to this Court on
petition for review on certiorari.

On July 8, 1996, respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a "PETITION FOR LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP"1 over the person and
properties of her sister Julieta, the pertinent allegations of which read:

2. That for the most part during the year 1995 and 1996, Julieta Ledesma has been a patient in the Makati Medical Center where she is
under medical attention for old age, general debility, and a "mini"-stroke which she suffered in the United States in early 1995;

3. That Julieta Ledesma is confined to her bed and can not get up from bed without outside assistance, and she has to be moved by
wheel chair;

4. That Julieta Ledesma owns real estate and personal properties in Metro Manila and in Western Visayas, with an aggregate
estimated assessed and par value of P1 Million Pesos[;]

5. That Julieta Ledesma is not in a position to care for herself, and that she needs the assistance of a guardian to manage her interests
in on-going corporate and agricultural enterprises;

6. That the nearest of kin of Julieta Ledesma are her sisters of the full blood, namely, petitioner Amparo Ledesma Gustilo, Teresa
Ledesma (aka. Sister Cristina of the Religious of the Assumption, and Loreto Ledesma Mapa, all of whom have given their consent to
the filing of this petition as shown by their signatures at the bottom of this petition[;]

7. That petitioner has extensive experience in business management of commercial, agricultural and corporate enterprises, many of
which are in the same entities where Julieta Ledesma holds an interest, and that she is in a position to monitor and supervise the
delivery of vitally needed medical services to Julieta Ledesma whether in the Metro Manila area, or elsewhere.

Petitioner filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship. She later filed an Amended Opposition on August 15, 1996
reading in part:

2.03 The petition lacked factual and legal basis in that Julieta Ledesma is competent and sane and there is absolutely no need to
appoint a guardian to take charge of her person/property. She is very able to take charge of her affairs, and this is clearly evident from
her letters to the petitioner. Copies of her recent letters are herewith attached as Annexes "A" to "E."

xxx - xxx - xxx

2.05 Petitioner is not fit to be appointed as the guardian of Julieta Ledesma since their interests are antagonistic (Sudler v. Sudler, 121
Md. 46. 49 L.R.A. 800, as cited in vol. V-B Francisco Revised Rules of Court, Rule 93, Section 4, p. 414).

xxx - xxx - xxx

3.01 The above captioned petition should be dismissed for utter lack of legal and/or factual basis.

3.02 In the remote event that this Honorable Court should find that Julieta Ledesma is incompetent and resolve that there is need to
appoint a guardian over her person and property, this Honorable Court should appoint as such guardian:

1. Oppositor Goyena;
2. Bart Lacson;

3. Fely Montelibano;

4. Jose T. Revilla; or

5. a qualified and reputable person as may be determined fit by this Honorable Court.

By Decision2 of October 4, 1996, the trial court found Julieta "incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property" and
appointed respondent as guardian of her person and properties, ratiocinating as follows:

A perusal of the records shows that petitioner (Amparo) is 72 years of age, the youngest sister of Julieta. Admittedly, the Oppositor
Pilar Goyena, 90 years of age has been the close friend and companion of Julieta for 61 years. Julieta was with Oppositor when she
suffered her first stroke in Makati in 1991 which was the reason why Julieta had to give up the management of their hacienda in
Bacolod. It is also not disputed that Julieta was with Pilar when she had her second stroke in the U.S. In short, the special bond of
friendship existing between Julieta and the Oppositor cannot be denied. Now that Julieta is unable to manage her personal life and
business concerns due to senility and "vascular dementia," the oppositor wants to be appointed her guardian or else Bart Lacson, Fely
Montelibano and Jose T. Revilla.

It is interesting to note that the oppositor has interposed her objection to the appointment of Amparo as guardian because she thinks
that the latter dislikes her. She further added that there were a number of letters allegedly written by Julieta to Amparo which showed
Julieta's sentiments regarding certain matters. Nevertheless, not one of the nearest of kin of Julieta opposed the petition. As a matter of
fact, her sisters signified their conformity thereto. Thus, Ms. Goyena's mere conjecture that Amparo dislikes her is no sufficient reason
why the petition should be denied. Neither does it make Amparo unsuitable and unfit to perform the duties of a guardian. On the
contrary, it is Ms. Goyena who could be considered as to have an adverse interest to that of Julieta if it is true that 50% of Julieta's
holdings at the Makati Medical Center has been transferred to her as alleged in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit A.

By and large, the qualification of Amparo to act as guardian over the person and properties of Julieta has been duly established. As a
sister, she can best take care of Julieta's concerns and well being. Now that Julieta is in the twilight of her life, her family should be
given the opportunity to show their love and affection for her without however denying Pilar Goyena access to her considering the
special bond of friendship between the two. Needless to say, the oppositor at 90 years of age could not be said to be physically fit to
attend to all the needs of Julieta.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Amparo Gustilo, is hereby appointed guardian over the person and property of Julieta Ledesma, an
incompetent with all the powers and duties specified under the law.

Accordingly, let letters of guardianship issue to petitioner upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00 to guarantee the
performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's decision was, by Order of November 4, 19963 , denied in this wise:

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Oppositor thru counsel, and finding no merits on the ground stated therein,
considering that petitioner appears to be most qualified and suitable to act as Julieta Ledesma's guardian after taking into consideration
the qualifications of the oppositor and her other recomendees [sic], aside from the fact that petitioner's appointment as such was not
objected to by any of her nearest kin, in contrast to the hostile interest of oppositor, the same is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal of petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the following ratiocination:4

Indeed, oppositor-appellant (Pilar) has not shown the authenticity and due execution of the letters which purport to show the existence
of a rift between Julieta and her family and dissatisfaction as to how the businesses were managed. At any rate, while it is correct to
say that no person should be appointed guardian if his interest conflict with those of the ward (Guerrero vs. Teran, 13 Phil. 212), there
are really no antagonistic interests to speak of between petitioner [Amparo] and Julieta, they being co-owners of certain properties.
There is also no showing that petitioner's business decisions in the past had resulted in the prejudice of Julieta.

While the oppositor may have been very close to Julieta, there is no sufficient showing that petitioner is hostile to the best interests of
the latter. On the contrary, it was the petitioner who, realizing the need for the appointment of a person to guard her sister's interests,
initiated the petition for guardianship. We see no indication that petitioner is animated by a desire to prejudice Julieta's health as
well as financial interests. In point of fact, it was oppositor-appellant who had initially concealed the deteriorating state of
mind of Julieta from the court. Oppositor's advanced age of 90 years also militate against her assuming the guardianship of the
incompetent. The oppositor has declared that she is not interested to be appointed legal guardian (p. 21[,] Appellant's Brief,
Rollo, p. 59). But the persons that she points to as being better choices as Julieta's guardian over the appellee have not acted, nor
even indicated, their desire to act as such. In any case, We see no cogent reason why We should reverse the well-reasoned
disquisition of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision having been denied, she filed the present petition which
proffers that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DATED OCTOBER 4, 1996 AND IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED JUNE 29,
2000 AND FEBRUARY 9, 2001.

The petition fails.

It is well-entrenched doctrine that questions of fact are not proper subjects of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
as this mode of appeal is confined to questions of law.5 The test of whether the question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate
court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a question of law; otherwise, it
is question of fact.6

In the case at bar, the only issue before this Court is whether or not the appellate court and the trial court erred in finding that
respondent is not unsuitable for appointment as guardian of the person and properties of Julieta. In support of an affirmative answer,
petitioner posits as follows:

1. The Court of Appeals' basis for its decision that there are no antagonistic interests between [her] and [respondent] is contrary to the
evidence on record,7

2. The Court of Appeals' erred in holding that there is no showing that [respondent] is hostile to the best interest of Julieta,8 and

3. Julieta Ledesma's appointed representatives are most suitable to be appointed as her guardian.9

Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in support of petitioner's position require a review of the evidence, hence, not proper for
consideration in the petition at bar. This Court cannot thus be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze,
assess, and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and appellate court were correct in according them superior credit. 10

That the issues raised are factual is in fact admitted by petitioner in her Reply dated August 30, 2001:11

Although the general rule is that this Honorable Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing and revising only
errors of law, it is nonetheless subject to the following exceptions which have been laid down in a number of decisions of this
Honorable Court:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) When there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellants and appellee; (7) When the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Emphasis supplied); (Rollo, 350-351)

Petitioner claims that "there is no doubt that the instant petition falls within the above-stated exceptions because the findings of the
Court of Appeals are clearly belied by the evidence on record."12

In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with the parties.13 As this Court said:

As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due consideration
to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it is
made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.14

In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any error.

Petitioner cannot rely on Garchitorena v. Sotelo15 with respect to the existence of antagonistic interests between respondent and
Julieta. In that case, the interest of Perfecto Gabriel as creditor and mortgagee of the minor-wards' properties (a house and lot) is
antagonistic to the interest of the wards as mortgagors, hence, Gabriel's appointment as guardian was erroneous. For while he sought
to foreclose the wards' properties as creditor and mortgagee on one hand, he had to, on the other hand, endeavor to retain them for the
wards as their guardian. Added to that was Gabriel's appointment as guardian without him informing the guardianship court that he held
a mortgage on the properties. Furthermore, he deliberately misinformed the said court that the first mortgagee was the Santa Clara
Monastery when it was him. None of the said circumstances obtain in the present case.

Petitioner can neither rely on certain letters of Julieta to establish her claim that there existed16 a rift between the two which amounts to
antagonistic interests. The first letter17 sent by Julieta to respondent which reads:

x x x So if you (appellee) do not agree with me (Julieta) my decision is right to let us divide as soon as possible, so we will have capital
each of us to work, and keep the Hda, for [sic] generation to generation.

xxx - xxx - xxx

For the last time I will repeat even if I have to kneel before you and Carlos I have no interest anymore in any future investment due to
my age and being single and alone in life. I would like to be able to enjoy whatever monies that correspond to me. I would like to have
enough money as a reserve for any future need that I might have like hospitalization, travel, buying whatever I like, etc. etc. (Letter to
appellee; Exhibit "2")

merely shows Julieta's lack of interest in future investments, not necessarily a business disagreement, and certainly not per se
amounting to antagonistic interests between her and respondent to render the latter unsuitable for appointment as guardian.

The second letter18 which reads:

My mind is still clear to tell you about Fortuna when I had my stroke I was confined in MMC for one month. If I am not mistaken
you did not visit me. One day Carlos came to visit me and asked me this question. Do you think you will be able to continue
managing the Hda? I answered him I don't know it all depends on my sickness. Carlos said who do you want to take your place? I said
I want Cheling Zabaljauregui. Then Carlos said O.K. He asked Pilar can you contact Cheling? Tell him to call me or see me. The
nephew of Cheling was a resident in MMC through him Pilar was able to contact Cheling and gave him Carlo's message. So I thought
all the time it was agreeable. I left for USA for treatment. To my surprise when I came back from USA it was not Cheling, but you
(appellee) took over the management as you requested. Carlos did not tell me but decided in your favor. . . . (Letter to appellee;
Exhibit "3"; emphasis supplied)
shows that: 1) respondent did not visit Julieta when she was confined at the Makati Medical Center on account of her stroke, 2) there
was disagreement as to who should run the hacienda, with Julieta favoring a certain Cheling Zabaljaurigue, and 3) respondent took
over management of the hacienda with their brother Carlos (Ledesma) supporting her. No inference as to the existence of antagonistic
interests between respondent and Julieta can thus be made.

The third letter19 which reads:

. . . Carlos went to the house before I left and asked from me twenty thousand (20,000) shares of San Carlos Milling which you gave
because I wanted to sell all. . . . If he does not sell or cannot sell, just arrange to send them back to me. Amparing since I came here to
America and Vancouver my requests have been ignored. Everyone is suspecting that Pilar is the one ordering or commanding me that
is not true. What I asked from Julio is just to report to me or send me reports so I can follow up from here. But up to now he has ignored
my requests x x x . (Letter to appellee Exhibit "4")

has no relevance to the issue of whether or not the lower courts erred in finding that respondent is not unsuitable for appointment as
guardian. The letter in fact discloses, that it was Julieta's nephew Julio Ledesma, and not respondent, who ignored the "request."

As for the fourth letter20 which reads:

I want all of you to know that whatever decision now and in the future I want to do nobody can stop me especially regarding my
properties, money, etc. I will be the only one to dispose of it because it is mine. You said to Raul you are going to court, you are most
welcome x x x . (Letter to Connie, Exhibit "5")

it has also no relevance to the issue in the case at bar. The letter is not even addressed to respondent but to a certain Connie (a sister-
in-law of Julieta).

Petitioner's assertion that respondent's intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is to take control of Julieta's properties and
use them for her own benefit21 is purely speculative and finds no support from the records.

The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also lacks merit. That respondent removed Julieta from the Makati
Medical Center where she was confined after she suffered a stroke does not necessarily show her hostility towards Julieta, given the
observation by the trial court, cited in the present petition, that Julieta was still placed under the care of doctors 22 after she checked out
and was returned to the hospital when she suffered another stroke.

Finally, this Court notes two undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit: 1) Petitioner opposed the petition for the appointment of
respondent as guardian before the trial court because, among other reasons, she felt she was disliked by respondent,23 a ground which
does not render respondent unsuitable for appointment as guardian, and 2) Petitioner concealed the deteriorating state of mind of
Julieta before the trial court, 24 which is reflective of a lack of good faith.

Discussion of the third argument is unnecessary, the suitability of Amparo for appointment as guardian not having been successfully
contested.

ACCORDINGLY, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ ., concur.

G.R. No. 110427 February 24, 1997

The Incompetent, CARMEN CAÑIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO EVANGELISTA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:

On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Cañiza, a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former
professor of the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment 1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107,2 in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista.3 She
was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia.
Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.

Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. On September 17, 1990, her guardian Amparo
Evangelista commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City (Branch 35) to eject the spouses Pedro and
Leonora Estrada from said premises.4 The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Cañiza as plaintiff, suing through
her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista.

The amended Complaint5 pertinently alleged that plaintiff Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT
No. 27147; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily
reside in her house, rent-free; that Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so
funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Cañiza had
asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of
unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they . . (were) enriching themselves at the expense of the
incompetent, because, while they . . (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent . . (was) losing much
money as her house could not be rented by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of
of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."

In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been living in Cañiza's house since the 1960's; that in
consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a
holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.

Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Cañiza's favor,6 the Estradas being ordered to vacate the premises and
pay Cañiza P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.

But on appeal,8 the decision was reversed by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 96.9 By judgment rendered on October 21,
1992, 10 the RTC held that the "action by which the issue of defendants' possession should be resolved is accion publiciana, the
obtaining factual and legal situation . . demanding adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of possession cognizable in the first
instance by the Regional Trial Court."

Cañiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of October 21, 1992, but failed in that attempt. In a
decision 11 promulgated on June 2, 1993, the Appellate Court 12 affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto. It ruled that (a) the proper remedy
for Cañiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been
in the subject premises as mere tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen
Cañiza," as evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and until it has passed
probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim to the property, . . it is indicative of intent and desire on the part
of Carmen Cañiza that defendants are to remain and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Cañiza's
supervening incompetency can not be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants out." 13

Through her guardian, Cañiza came to this Court praying for reversal of the Appellate Court's judgment. She contends in the main that
the latter erred in (a) holding that she should have pursued an accion publiciana, and not an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving much
weight to "a xerox copy of an alleged holographic will, which is irrelevant to this case." 14

In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's requirement, 15 the Estradas insist that the case against them was really not
one of unlawful detainer; they argue that since possession of the house had not been obtained by them by any "contract, express or
implied," as contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, their occupancy of the premises could not be deemed one
"terminable upon mere demand (and hence never became unlawful) within the context of the law." Neither could the suit against them
be deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because they had been occupying the property with the prior consent of the "real owner,"
Carmen Cañiza, which "occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the holographic will of petitioner Carmen Cañiza is admitted
to probate." They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Cañiza's legal guardian to oust them from the disputed
premises.

Carmen Cañiza died on March 19, 1994, 16 and her heirs — the aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C.
Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively — were by this Court's leave, substituted for her. 17

Three issues have to be resolved: (a) whether or not an ejectment action is the appropriate judicial remedy for recovery of possession
of the property in dispute; (b) assuming desahucio to be proper, whether or not Evangelista, as Cañiza's legal guardian had authority to
bring said action; and (c) assuming an affirmative answer to both questions, whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent
Cañiza after the latter's death.

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. 18 An inquiry into the averments of the amended complaint in the Court of origin is thus
in order. 19

The amended Complaint alleges: 20

6. That the plaintiff Carmen Cañiza, is the sole and absolute owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Scout Tobias,
Quezon City, which property is now the subject of this complaint;

xxx xxx xxx

9. That the defendants, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law, were allowed to live temporarily in the house
of plaintiff Carmen Cañiza, for free, out of her kindness;

10. That the plaintiff, through her legal guardian, has duly notified the defendants, for them to vacate the said house,
but the two (2) letters of demand were ignored and the defendants refused to vacate the same. . .

11. That the plaintiff, represented by her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista, made another demand on the
defendants for them to vacate the premises, before Barangay Captain Angelina A. Diaz of Barangay Laging Handa,
Quezon City, but after two (2) conferences, the result was negative and no settlement was reached. A photocopy of
the Certification to File Action dated July 4, 1990, issued by said Barangay Captain is attached, marked Annex "D"
and made an integral part hereof;

12. That the plaintiff has given the defendants more than thirty (30) days to vacate the house, but they still refused to
vacate the premises, and they are up to this time residing in the said place;

13. That this complaint is filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990
(Annex "B") sent by the plaintiff to the defendants, by her legal guardian — Amparo Evangelista;

14. By the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving the plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they are
enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent plaintiff because, while they are saving money by not paying
any rent for the house, the plaintiff is losing much money as her house could not be rented by others;

15. That the plaintiff's health is failing and she needs the house urgently, so that funds could be raised to meet her
expenses for her support, maintenance and medical treatment;

16. That because of defendants' refusal to vacate the house at No. 61 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, the
plaintiff, through her legal guardian, was compelled to go to court for justice, and she has to spend P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees.

Its prayer 21 is quoted below:

 WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and the rule of law, plaintiff, Carmen Cañiza, represented by her legal
guardian, Amparo Evangelista, respectfully prays to this Honorable Court, to render judgment in favor of plaintiff and
against the defendants as follows:

1. To order the defendants, their children, grandchildren, sons-in-law and other persons claiming under them, to
vacate the house and premises at No. 6 1 Scout Tobias, Quezon City, so that its possession can be restored to the
plaintiff Carmen Cañiza; and

2. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00;

3. To pay the costs of the suit.

In essence, the amended complaint states:

1) that the Estradas were occupying Cañiza's house by tolerance — having been "allowed to live temporarily . .
(therein) for free, out of . . (Cañiza's) kindness;"

2) that Cañiza needed the house "urgently" because her "health . . (was) failing and she . . (needed) funds . . to meet
her expenses for her support, maintenance and medical treatment;"

3) that through her general guardian, Cañiza requested the Estradas several times, orally and in writing, to give back
possession of the house;

4) that the Estradas refused and continue to refuse to give back the house to Cañiza, to her continuing prejudice; and

5) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate.

Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out. It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices
to allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, 22 and a complaint for unlawful
detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law. 23

The Estradas' first proffered defense derives from a literal construction of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which inter
alia authorizes the institution of an unlawful detainer suit when "the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." They contend that since they did
not acquire possession of the property in question "by virtue of any contract, express or implied" — they having been, to repeat,
"allowed to live temporarily . . (therein) for free, out of . . (Cañiza's) kindness" — in no sense could there be an "expiration or
termination of . . (their) right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied." Nor would an action for forcible entry lie
against them, since there is no claim that they had "deprived (Cañiza) of the possession of . . (her property) by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth.

The argument is arrant sophistry. Cañiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and
indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly require that
that act of liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the Estradas of returning the house to
Cañiza upon her demand. More than once has this Court adjudged that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission without any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. 24 The situation is not much different from that
of a tenant whose lease expires but who continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner, in which case there is deemed to be an
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession as of the date of the demand to vacate. 25 In other words, one whose stay is merely
tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land or property the moment he is required to leave. 26 Thus, in Asset
Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 27 where a company, having lawfully obtained possession of a plant upon its undertaking to buy
the same, refused to return it after failing to fulfill its promise of payment despite demands, this Court held that "(a)fter demand and its
repudiation, . . (its) continuing possession . . became illegal and the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by the
. . (plant's owner) was its proper remedy.
It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had been more than one demand to vacate, the one-year period for
filing the complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last demand, 28the reason being that the lessor has the
option to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. 29 Now, the
complaint filed by Cañiza's guardian alleges that the same was "filed within one (1) year from the date of the first letter of demand
dated February 3, 1990." Although this averment is not in accord with law because there is in fact a second letter of demand to vacate,
dated February 27, 1990, the mistake is inconsequential, since the complaint was actually filed on September 17, 1990, well within one
year from the second (last) written demand to vacate.

The Estradas' possession of the house stemmed from the owner's express permission. That permission was subsequently withdrawn
by the owner, as was her right; and it is immaterial that the withdrawal was made through her judicial guardian, the latter being
indisputably clothed with authority to do so. Nor is it of any consequence that Carmen Cañiza had executed a will bequeathing the
disputed property to the Estradas; that circumstance did not give them the right to stay in the premises after demand to vacate on the
theory that they might in future become owners thereof, that right of ownership being at best inchoate, no transfer of ownership being
possible unless and until the will is duly probated.

Thus, at the time of the institution of the action of desahucio, the Estradas had no legal right to the property, whether as possessors by
tolerance or sufferance, or as owners. They could not claim the right of possession by sufferance; that had been legally ended. They
could not assert any right of possession flowing from their ownership of the house; their status as owners is dependent on the probate
of the holographic will by which the property had allegedly been bequeathed to them — an event which still has to take place; in other
words, prior to the probate of the will, any assertion of possession by them would be premature and inefficacious.

In any case, the only issue that could legitimately be raised under the circumstances was that involving the Estradas' possession by
tolerance, i.e., possession de facto, not de jure. It is therefore incorrect to postulate that the proper remedy for Cañiza is not ejectment
but accion publiciana, a plenary action in the RTC or an action that is one for recovery of the right to possession de jure.

II

The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof,
and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be
inconsistent with the ward's will.

A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; 30 and until admitted to probate,
it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). 31 An owner's intention to confer title in
the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime
for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent:
she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.

Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen
Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship 32 dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed her as the "guardian over the person and
properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any
province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties . .
" 33 By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to
assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and friends. 34 It also became her right and duty to
get possession of, and exercise control over, Cañiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has
no right to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. 35 That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the
right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, 36 and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for
this purpose. 37

Actually, in bringing the action of desahucio, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to attend to "the comfortable and suitable
maintenance of the ward" explicitly imposed on her by Section 4, Rule 96 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Sec. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to maintenance of ward. — A guardian must manage
the estate of his ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits thereof, so far as maybe
necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his family, if there be any; and if such
 income and profits be insufficient for that purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real estate, upon being
authorized by order to do so, and apply to such of the proceeds as may be necessary to such maintenance.

Finally, it may be pointed out in relation to the Estradas's defenses in the ejectment action, that as the law now stands, even when, in
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve "the issue of ownership . . only to determine the
issue of possession." 38

III

As already stated, Carmen Cañiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the
petition, arguing that Cañiza's death automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial
guardian, and ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit.

While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the
guardian or the ward, 39 the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of the
latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this
Court 40 of June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased, in accordance with
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, viz.: 41

Sec. 18. Death of a party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within a period
of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time,
the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a
time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of
the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litemfor the minor heirs.

To be sure, an ejectment case survives the death of a party. Cañiza's demise did not extinguish the desahucio suit instituted by her
through her guardian. 42 That action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death; her heirs have taken her place and now
represent her interests in the appeal at bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on June 2, 1993 — affirming the Regional
Trial Court's judgment and dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari — is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April
13, 1992 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 3410 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs
against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012

NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D.

NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners Napoleon D. Neri (Napoleon), Alicia D. Neri-
Mondejar (Alicia), Visminda D. Neri-Chambers (Visminda), Rosa D. Neri-Millan (Rosa), Douglas D. Neri (Douglas), Eutropia D. Illut-
Cockinos (Eutropia), and Victoria D. Illut-Piala (Victoria) seek to reverse and set aside the April 27, 2010 Decision2 and October 18,
2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01031-MIN which annulled the October 25, 2004 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo City, Davao del Norte and instead, entered a new one dismissing petitioners’ complaint for
annulment of sale, damages and attorney’s feesagainst herein respondents heirs of spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy
(heirs of Uy).

The Facts

During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo),
namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda,
Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties with a
total area of 296,555 square meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte, embraced by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. (P-7998)
P-21285 , (P-14608) P-51536and P-20551 (P-8348)7 issued on February 15, 1957, August 27, 1962 and July 7, 1967, respectively.

On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his
minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Vismindaexecuted an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate
with Absolute Deed of Sale8 on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying
themto the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy)for a consideration of ₱ 80,000.00.

On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of saleof the said homestead properties against spouses Uy
(later substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold
within the prohibited period. Thecomplaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoriaas additional plaintiffs for having been
excluded and deprived of their legitimes as childrenof Anunciacion from her first marriage.

In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year prohibitory period
from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s exclusionfrom the extrajudicial
settlement and sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of prescription and laches.

The RTC Ruling

On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering, among others, the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still void
because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his
minor children, Rosa and Douglas.

Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and prescription raised by spouses Uy, who claimed possession of the subject
properties for 17 years, holding that co-ownership rights are imprescriptible.

The CA Ruling

On appeal, the CAreversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April 27, 2010 Decision and dismissed the complaint of the
petitioners. It held that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties
and as such, were not bound by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit the annulment of the sale considering spouses Uy’s
possession thereof for 17 years, and thatEutropia and Victoriabelatedlyfiled their actionin 1997, ormore than two years fromknowledge
of their exclusion as heirs in 1994 when their stepfather died. It, however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their
legitimes from their co-heirs.

Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent saleas valid and binding with respect to Enrique and
hischildren, holding that as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their respective shares as they consider necessary or fit.While
recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale whenthey failed to question it upon
reaching the age of majority.Italso found laches to have set in because of their inaction for a long period of time.

The Issues
In this petition, petitioners imputeto the CA the following errors:

I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF
SALE" AS FAR AS THE SHARES OF EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE CONCERNED, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR
INHERITANCE;

II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE "EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF
SALE" WITH RESPECT TO THE SHARESOF ROSA AND DOUGLAS, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR INHERITANCE; and

III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN.

The Ruling of the Court

The petitionis meritorious.

It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages
with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and
980 of the Civil Code which read:

ART. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from different marriages.

xxx

ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her children and Enrique acquired their respective
inheritances,9 entitling them to their pro indiviso shares in her whole estate, as follows:

Enrique 9/16 (1/2 of the conjugal assets + 1/16)

Eutropia 1/16
Victoria 1/16
Napoleon 1/16
Alicia 1/16
Visminda 1/16
Rosa 1/16
Douglas 1/16

Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of
Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and
Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding uponthem and consequently, a total nullity.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – x x x

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof. (Underscoring added)

The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further elucidated in Segura v. Segura,10 thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were
concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs
who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded
heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its
execution…

However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject propertiesmade by Enrique and his
children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents isvalid but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein.It
cannot be denied that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her
death11 and that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell their undivided share in the estate.12

With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and
father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely
clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother,
Anunciacion.

Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, provide:

ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the
Court of First Instance.

ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall be considered a guardian
of the child’s property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court.

Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:

SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. – When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the
father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth
more than two thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be considered guardian of the child’s property, with the duties and
obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court may,
however, appoint another suitable persons.

Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the
thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of
administration.13 Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to
dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even
then only with courts’ prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.14

Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless
ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority,15 is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code
which provide:

ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter or unless he has by law a right to
represent him.

A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his
powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before
it is revoked by the other contracting party.

ART. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted
beyond his powers;
xxx

Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding,
which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of
what was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification.16 Once ratified, expressly or
impliedly such as when the person knowingly received benefits from it, the contract is cleansed from all its defects from the moment it
was constituted,17 as it has a retroactive effect.

Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and
Rosa’s Manifestation18 before the RTC dated July 11, 1997,they stated:

"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique Neri concurred in and conformed to by us and our other two
sisters and brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja Julpa Uy on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed
that the same was voluntary and freely made by all of us and therefore the sale was absolutely valid and enforceable as far as we all
plaintiffs in this case are concerned;" (Underscoring supplied)

In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit,19 Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:

"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we do not have any intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop
Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy and their family and we respect and acknowledge the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate
with Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, the foregoing statements constitutedratification of the settlement of the estate and the subsequent sale, thus, purging all the
defects existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in the estate of Anunciacion to
spouses Uy. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.

Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only
the shares ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties have effectivelybeen disposed in favor of
spouses Uy. "A person can only sell what he owns, or is authorized to sell and the buyer can as a consequence acquire no more than
what the sellercan legally transfer."20 On this score, Article 493 of the Civil Codeis relevant, which provides:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso co-owners of the homestead properties with Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas, who retained title to their respective 1/16 shares. They were deemed to be holding the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas under an implied constructive trust for the latter’s benefit, conformably with Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states:"if
property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes." As such, it is only fair, just and equitable that the amount paid for their shares
equivalent to ₱ 5,000.0021 each or a total of ₱ 15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy with legal interest.

On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the present action has not prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul
the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule
74 of the Rules of

Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who
were deprived of their lawful participation in the subject estate. Besides, an "action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a
contract does not prescribe" in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.

However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10 years from the time the cause of action accrues,22 which is from
the time of actual notice in case of unregistered deed.23 In this case, Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas claimed to have knowledge of the
extrajudicial settlement with sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in 1994 which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence, the
complaint filed in 1997 was well within the prescriptive period of 10 years.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The April 27, 2010 Decision and October 18, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is entered:

1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Anunciacion Neri NULL and VOID;

2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards the
13/16 total shares of the late Enrique Neri, Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D.
Neri-Millan VALID;

3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas D. Neri as the LAWFUL OWNERSof the 3/16
portions of the subject homestead properties, covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. (P-7998) P-2128, (P-14608) P-5153
and P-20551 (P-8348); and

4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers
and Rosa D. Neri-Millan to return to the respondents jointly and solidarily the amount paid corresponding to the 3/16 shares of
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in the total amount of ₱ 15,000.00, with legal interest at 6% per annum computed from the
time of payment until finality of this decision and 12% per annum thereafter until fully paid.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012

NILO OROPESA, Petitioner,

vs.
CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the Decision1 dated February 29, 2008,
as well as the Resolution2 dated September 16, 2008, both rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled "NILO
OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA." The Court of Appeals’ issuances affirmed the Order3 dated September 27, 2006 and the
Order4 dated November 14, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-
0016, which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesa’s petition for guardianship over the properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a
widower), and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively.

The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow:

On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie
Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP
Proc. No. 04-0016 and raffled off to Branch 260.

In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for
over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired
and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in
memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot,
without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him,
particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.

In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set the case for hearing, and directed the court social
worker to conduct a social case study and submit a report thereon.
Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his
witnesses. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report but without any finding on the (respondent) who refused to see
and talk to the social worker.

On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his
Supplemental Opposition.

Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and
the (respondent’s) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.

After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his
written formal offer of evidence.

Thus, the (respondent) filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits
and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from
the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.

In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondent’s) Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his
Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006.5 (Citations omitted.)

The trial court granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated September 27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is
incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties, Oppositor’s Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case
is DISMISSED.6

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in an Order dated November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion
of which states:

WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-movant has failed to provide sufficient documentary and
testimonial evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his properties,
the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order dated 27 September 2006.

Accordingly, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.7

Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed through the now assailed Decision
dated February 29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the court a quo dated September 27,
2006 and November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.8

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in the similarly assailed Resolution
dated September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition was filed.

Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court:

WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN "INCOMPETENT" PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE
RULES OF COURT WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP9

After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to be without merit.

Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly
committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the trial court which purportedly disregarded the
overwhelming evidence presented by him showing respondent’s incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,10 we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in the following wise:

A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the
"ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not
that of the guardian. It is intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward may personally
require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those
responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.11

In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an
incompetent.

A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease,
weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are considered as
incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads:

Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." – Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound
mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey
for deceit and exploitation.

We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence."12 We
consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.

In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore, should be placed in guardianship, petitioner raises in his
Memorandum13 the following factual matters:

a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already;

b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St. Luke’s Medical Center after his stroke, he purportedly requested
one of his former colleagues who was visiting him to file a loan application with the Armed Forces of the Philippines Savings
and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his hospital bills, when, as far as his children knew, he had substantial
amounts of money in various banks sufficient to cover his medical expenses;

c. Respondent’s residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due to lack of care and management;

d. The realty taxes for respondent’s various properties remain unpaid and therefore petitioner and his sister were supposedly
compelled to pay the necessary taxes;

e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan Exalta car for the reason that the former would be purchasing
another vehicle, but when the car had been sold, respondent did not procure another vehicle and refused to account for the
money earned from the sale of the old car;

f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account under his name and his daughter’s without the latter’s
knowledge or consent;

g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a kitchen knife to stab himself upon the "orders" of his girlfriend
during one of their fights;

h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his house of groceries and furniture, despite protests from his
children.14

Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioner’s lack of material evidence to support his claims. According
to respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his
assertion that respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental condition. In fact, respondent
points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed competent to run his personal affairs and
administer his properties. Portions of the said document, entitled "Report of Neuropsychological Screening,"15 were quoted by
respondent in his Memorandum16 to illustrate that said report in fact favored respondent’s claim of competence, to wit:

General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated meaningfully in conversations and could be quite
elaborate in his responses on many of the test items. He spoke in a clear voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible. x x
x.

xxxx

General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains that were tested. He was able to correctly perform mental
calculations and keep track of number sequences on a task of attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had to
copy geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x x x.

xxxx

x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest effective solutions to problem situations. x x x. 17

With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his father’s incompetence consisted purely of
testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their father’s real and personal properties) and their father’s
former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any expert medical
testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioner’s cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to
evidence that was filed by respondent.

Even if we were to overlook petitioner’s procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were
comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his father’s and his sister’s names as co-owners, tax
declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way relate to his
father’s alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned "Report of
Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered
as evidence. In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings
regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average
was indeed competent.

In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that
"where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the observations of the trial judge coupled with
evidence establishing the person’s state of mental sanity will suffice."18

Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the trial court’s
unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that petitioner’s own documentary evidence played in
disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondent’s physical and mental state, to wit:

The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental,
emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological
Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is
capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa
possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation
of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.19 (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)

It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, "only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not
a trier of facts."20 We only take cognizance of questions of fact in certain exceptional circumstances;21 however, we find them to be
absent in the instant case. It is also long settled that "factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not
be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed final
and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record."22 We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court
and the Court of Appeals and rule that the grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence was proper under the circumstances obtaining in
the case at bar.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. – After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have
the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue."23 We have also held that a
demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as
he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought."24 1âwphi1

There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition for guardianship without first requiring respondent to
present his evidence precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a cause of action is,
evidently, to preclude a defendant from presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008 as well as the
Resolution dated September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012

EDUARDO T. ABAD, Petitioner,

vs.
LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision 1 dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution2 dated April 19, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No; 90145.

The facts show that on March 19, 2007, petitioner Eduardo Abad (Abad) filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties
of Maura B. Abad (Maura) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Dagupan City, Branch 42, which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2007-
0050-D. In support thereof, Abad alleged that he maintains residence at No. 14 B St. Paul Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City and
that he is Maura’s nephew. He averred that Maura, who is single, more than ninety (90) years old and a resident of Rizal Street,
Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. Due to her advanced
age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take care of herself and her properties unassisted thus becoming an easy
prey of deceit and exploitation.3

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC gave due course to the same and scheduled it for hearing. When the
petition was called for hearing on April 27, 2007, nobody entered an opposition and Abad was allowed to present evidence ex parte.
After Abad formally offered his evidence and the case was submitted for decision, Atty. Gabriel Magno filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene, together with an Oppositionin- Intervention. Subsequently, on June 14, 2007, Leonardo Biason (Biason) filed a Motion for
Leave to File Opposition to the Petition and attached therewith his Opposition to the Appointment of Eduardo Abad as Guardian of the
Person and Properties of Maura B. Abad. Specifically, Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and that he was not notified of
the pendency of the petition for the appointment of the latter’s guardian. He vehemently opposed the appointment of Abad as Maura’s
guardian as he cannot possibly perform his duties as such since he resides in Quezon City while Maura maintains her abode in
Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be appointed as Maura’s guardian since he was previously granted by the latter with a
power of attorney to manage her properties.4
On September 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision,5 denying Abad’s petition and appointing Biason as Maura’s guardian. The RTC
disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied. Petitioner Eduardo T. Abad is found to be disqualified to act as guardian of incompetent
Maura B. Abad. Oppositor Leonardo A. Biason is established by this Court to be in a better position to be the guardian of said
incompetent Maura B. Abad.

The Court hereby fixes the guardianship bond at [P]500,000.00 and the letters of guardianship shall be issued only upon the
submission of the bond, conditioned on the following provisions of the Rule 94[,] Section 1, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

a. To make and return to the Court within three (3) months true and complete inventory of all the estate, real and personal, of
his ward which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession or knowledge of any other person for him;

b. To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to manage and dispose of the estate according to these rules for the best
interests of the ward, and to provide for the proper care, custody x x x of the ward;

c. To render a true and just account of all the estate of the ward in his hands, and of all proceeds or interest derived therefrom,
and of the management and disposition of the same, at the time designated by these rules and such other times as the court
directs, and at the expiration of his trust to settle his accounts with the court and deliver and pay over all the estate, effects,
and moneys remaining in his hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the person lawfully entitled thereto;

d. To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.

SO ORDERED.6

Unyielding, Abad filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision but the RTC denied the same in an Order dated December
11, 2007.

Abad filed an appeal to the CA. He argued that the RTC erred in disqualifying him from being appointed as Maura’s guardian despite
the fact that he has all the qualifications stated under the Rules. That he was not a resident of Mangaldan, Pangasinan should not be a
ground for his disqualification as he had actively and efficiently managed the affairs and properties of his aunt even if he is residing in
Metro Manila. Moreover, he was expressly chosen by Maura to be her guardian.7

Abad further averred that no hearing was conducted to determine the qualifications of Biason prior to his appointment as guardian. He
claimed that the RTC also overlooked Maura’s express objection to Biason’s appointment.8

On August 28, 2009, the CA issued a Decision,9 affirming the decision of the RTC, the pertinent portions of which read:

The petitioner-appellant may have been correct in arguing that there is no legal requirement that the guardian must be residing in the
same dwelling place or municipality as that of the ward or incompetent, and that the Vancil vs. Belmes case cited by the court a
quo which held that "courts should not appoint as guardians persons who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts" pertains to
persons who are not residents of the country.

However, we do not find that the court a quo, by deciding to appoint the oppositor-appellee as guardian, has fallen into grievous error.

For one, the oppositor-appellee, like petitioner-appellant, is also a relative, a nephew of the incompetent. There are no vices of
character which have been established as to disqualify him from being appointed as a guardian.

xxxx

Anent the claim of the petitioner-appellant that he has been expressly chosen by her aunt to be her guardian as evidenced by her
testimony, although it could be given weight, the same could not be heavily relied upon, especially considering the alleged mental state
of the incompetent due to her advanced age.

xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, Branch 42 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.[10

Dissatisfied, Abad filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in a Resolution11 dated April 19, 2010, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.12

On June 7, 2010, Abad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court. Subsequently, Maura filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene,13 together with a Petition-in-Intervention.14

The instant petition raises the following assignment of errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE PETITIONER’S APPEAL AND
AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DESPITE VERY CLEAR VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS, DISREGARD OF
THE RULES, AND IRREGULARITIES IN THE APPOINTMENT OF RESPONDENT BIASON AS GUARDIAN;

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE PETITIONER’S APPEAL AND
ERRONEOUSLY UPHELD RESPONDENT BIASON’S APPOINTMENT AS GUARDIAN BASED ON SOLE GROUND OF
RESIDENCE, AND FAILED TO CONSIDER THE REQUIREMENTS AND QUALIFICATIONS PRESCRIBED BY THE
SUPREME COURT FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN.15

Abad contends that that CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision despite the fact that it did not hold any hearing to determine whether
Biason possessed all the qualifications for a guardian as provided by law. Further, he was not given the opportunity to submit evidence
to controvert Biason’s appointment.16

Abad also bewails his disqualification as guardian on the sole basis of his residence. He emphasizes that it is not a requirement for a
guardian to be a resident of the same locality as the ward, or to be living with the latter under the same roof in order to qualify for the
appointment. The more significant considerations are that the person to be appointed must be of good moral character and must have
the capability and sound judgment in order that he may be able to take care of the ward and prudently manage his assets.17

Unfortunately, pending the resolution of the instant petition, Biason died. On May 11, 2012, Maura filed a Manifestation and
Motion,18 informing this Court that Biason passed away on April 3, 2012 at SDS Medical Center, Marikina City due to multiple organ
failure, septic shock, community acquired pneumonia high risk, prostate CA with metastasis, and attached a copy of his Death
Certificate.19 Maura averred that Biason’s death rendered moot and academic the issues raised in the petition. She thus prayed that the
petition be dismissed and the guardianship be terminated.

On June 20, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution,20 requiring Abad to comment on the manifestation filed by Maura. Pursuant to the
Resolution, Abad filed his Comment21 on August 9, 2012 and expressed his acquiescence to Maura’s motion to dismiss the petition. He
asseverated that the issues raised in the petition pertain to the irregularity in the appointment of Biason as guardian which he believed
had been rendered moot and academic by the latter’s death. He also supported Maura’s prayer for the termination of the guardianship
by asseverating that her act of filing of a petition-in-intervention is indicative of the fact that she is of sound mind and that she can
competently manage her business affairs.

We find Maura’s motion meritorious.

An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the
issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be
entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.22

In his petition, Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA Decision dated August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated April 19, 2010, which
dismissed his appeal from the Decision dated September 26, 2007 of the RTC and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Basically, he was challenging Biason’s qualifications and the procedure by which the RTC appointed him as guardian for Maura.
However, with Biason’s demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-
established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the
ward.23 The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie
between him and Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for
that matter, any substantial relief.1âwphi1

Moreover, Abad, in his Comment, shared Maura’s belief that the petition has lost its purpose and even consented to Maura’s prayer for
the dismissal of the petition.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.