Plain Meaning Rule – Estrada v. Sandiganbayan – GR 148560, 11/19/01 – Bellosillo, J.

Facts: Erap is under prosecution under RA 7080 (Plunder Law) as amended by RA 7659. He denies the constitutionality of
the law on the grounds:

- It suffers from the vice of vagueness

- It dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions
- It abolishes the mens rea elemen in crimes already punishable under RPC

He claims these grounds lead to violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against him. He specifically attacked the constitutionality of Secs 1(d), 2 and 4 of the
Plunder Law. Erap claims that the terms “combination” and “series” in the phrase “a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts” are vaguely defined in the law.

On 04/11/01, Erap filed an Omnibus Motion to remand the criminal case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation.
The grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The allegations of vagueness of the law and charges were never raised in the
Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.

On 04/25, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution that a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of warrants for Erap’s
arrest. On 06/21, Erap moved to quash the information in the case asserting that the facts alleged didn’t constitute and
indictable offense since the law it was based on was void for vagueness and that the amended information for plunder
charged more than 1 offense; this motion was denied. Erap then petitions SC for certiorari.

Issue:

1. Whether RA 7080 (Plunder Law) is unconstitutional for vagueness

2. Whether the Plunder law requires less evidence for proving the crimes of plunder and violates the rights of the
accused to due process
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, if so, whether Congress has the power to classify
it

Held:

1. No, the Plunder Law has well-defined standards that allow the accused to determine the nature of his violation.
Sec 2 is explicit in its description of the acts, conduct, and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the
elements of the crime with certainty. The Plunder Law provides a comprehensive guide to inform the ones subject
to its penalties as well as the nature and elements of the crime itself. The law may be understood with little
difficulty and ambiguity. Thus, it’s valid and Erap can’t rightly invoke the void for vagueness doctrine.

Whenever a law’s validity is challenged, courts look to the principle of the presumption of constitutionality. If
there’s reasonable basis for the law, courts assume that the legislature is aware of the scope of its plenary power
and has passed a law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and good for
the majority. In determining the validity of the acts of the legislature, courts must proceed with judicial restraint
and act with caution and forbearance. In construing the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether
an interpretation is possible to avoid the question of constitutionality. Thus, when a law is challenged the burden
of proof is on the assailant.

Erap asserted that the terms “combination” and “series” in the phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts” are vaguely defined in the law, thus it’s supposed invalidity. However, a statute is not rendered void merely
due to the general terms used therein or because of the employment of terms without defining them. There is no
constitutional or statutory requirement in defining every word that Congress uses in enacted laws; Congress isn’t
restricted in the form of expression of its will. So long as the legislative intent is clear, or may be determined in
the law, the Plunder Law is valid.
 Plain Meaning Rule – Estrada v. Sandiganbayan – GR 148560, 11/19/01 – Bellosillo, J.
It’s a principle that the words of the statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain, and ordinary acceptation
and signification, unless it’s evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words. Thus, the Court defines the contended terms using Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, which contains
the plain and commonly accepted definitions:

Combination – the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into
such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.

Series – a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal
succession.

Congress intended to use these words in their ordinary and popular meanings as evident in the Bicameral
Committee’s deliberations. When the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it refers to at least 2 acts falling under
different categories of enumeration provided in Sec 1(d). “Series,” refers to 2 or more overt or criminal acts falling
under the same category of enumeration found in Sec 1(d). As for “pattern” it was well defined in Sec 4 in relation
to Sec 1(d) and Sec 2.

A statute may be considered vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.

A statute may be repugnant to the Constitution in 2 respects:

o Violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid
o It leaves law enforces unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle

A statute may be saved from unconstitutionality by proper construction. The test in determining whether a
criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms. Both doctrines can’t apply to this case; this rationale also doesn’t apply to penal
statutes. The void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines have a special application only to free speech cases.

2. No, the standard of guilty beyond reasonable doubt is not disposed by the Plunder Law as the pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy of plunder must still be proven. What the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or
series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least Php50M. There’s no need to prove
each and every other act alleged in the information. Furthermore, Sec 4 dictates the rules on evidence of plunder
and is not an element of the crime. This was already explained in the 09/10/90 deliberations of the HOR on RA
7080.
 Plain Meaning Rule – Estrada v. Sandiganbayan – GR 148560, 11/19/01 – Bellosillo, J.
3. No, plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent as stated in the Plunder Law itself. The
application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances of the RPC to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law
indicates that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined
by his criminal intent. Sec 2 of RA 7080 clearly provides for the elements and the nature of the crime of plunder.

The legislative declaration in RA 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. When such
acts punished are inherently immoral/wrong, they are mala in se and doesn’t matter that such acts are punished
in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are primarily mala in se.

Regarding the constitutionality of RA 7659, the matter was already adjudged in People v. Echegaray. RA 7659 is
constitutionally valid as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution as an
integral part of it.

Wherefore, RA 7080 as amended by RA 7659 is valid. Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
 Strict and Liberal Construction – Francisco v. HOR – GR 160261, 11/10/03 – Carpio-Morales, J.
Facts: Current case: petitioners contend that the 2nd impeachment complaint was unconstitutional for violating Art 11 Sec
5 that impeachment proceedings initiated against the same official cannot occur more than once in one year.

On 07/22/02 HOR adopted a resolution which directed the Committee on Justice (COJ) to conduct an investigation, in aid
of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice regarding the Judiciary Development
Fund. On 06/02/03, Pres. Estrada filed an impeachment case against CJ, Davide and 7 other Justices for a violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes under Art 3 Sec 3(2) Const. This case was ruled by the House
COJ as sufficient but dismissed it for lack of substance.

A 2nd impeachment case was filed by Rep Gibo Teodoro and Rep Fuentebella challenging the alleged results of the first
case; the complaint by Teodoro included a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by 1/3 of all of HOR. This
resulted in the present case with Francisco et al. filing the present case and challenging the 2 nd impeachment’s validity.
Along with the current case, other interveners consisting of attorneys, house representatives, and private citizens filed to
question the validity of the 2nd impeachment case as well; a total of 18 actions of the same nature were filed.

On 10/28/03, HOR attempted to formally transmit the complaint to the Senate but failed for lack of quorum. SC resolved
to consolidate the petitions, require the HOR and Senate to comment, set the petitions for arguments, and appoint legal
experts as amici curiae (advisors). Furthermore, SC enjoined all parties from committing acts that’ll render the petitions
moot. HOR was represented by Speaker Jose De Venecia while the Senate was represented by SenPres Franklin Drilon.

HOR asserted that SC has no jurisdiction over the matter and cannot prohibit HOR for the reason of separation of powers.
The Senate claimed that the petitions were premature and have no legal basis. SC noted that the core issues to be
addressed in this case revolve mainly around HOR. Francisco et al. asked SC to exercise judicial review to determine the
validity of the 2nd impeachment complaint. HOR claims that the impeachment is a political action thus, the issue isn’t
justiciable. Senate, on the other hand, argues that only they have the sole power to try impeachment cases. Both houses
relied heavily on American jurisprudence stating that judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate; that
this measure is the only means of the legislature to check on the judiciary.

Issue:

Procedural:

1. Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and
at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
2. Do the petitioners have locus standi?
3. Is the matter judicially ripe?
4. Are the petitions merely political questions or are they justiciable?
5. Does HOR have exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment?
6. Does Senate have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment?
7. Should SC exercise judicial restraint to allow the Senate to decide the case?

Substantive:

1. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under
the Constitution.
2. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Sec 3(4) Art 11 Const.
3. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an
unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary
4. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
5. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
 Strict and Liberal Construction – Francisco v. HOR – GR 160261, 11/10/03 – Carpio-Morales, J.
Held:

Procedural:

(1) Judicial Review in the Philippines is a power expressly conferred to the Judicial Department in the 1987 Constitution
(Sec 1 Art 8 Const.) unlike the American judicial system which was a power impliedly given. To determine the issues raised,
SC must employ the principles of STATCON in reading the Constitution.

Verbia Legis is employed wherever possible in the Constitution. It gives the words their literal and ordinary meaning. Ratio
legis est anima is concerned with the intent of the Constitution’s authors. Ut magis valeat quam pereat states that the
Constitution must be interpreted as a whole; that it must be interpreted in conjunction with other provisions. However,
when these methods fail, one must resort to other legal aids.

Regarding the arguments of HOR and the Senate, SC can’t recognize the restriction on judicial review on the basis of
American jurisprudence. Such foreign case laws don’t apply to the Philippines anymore as the Philippine Judiciary System
has come unto its own ever since Garcia v. COMELEC. Additionally, their arguments have no constitutional basis in claiming
that judicial review doesn’t apply to impeachment proceedings. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole
and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that ensures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
the Constitution.

(2) Yes, they have standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, and legislators. When suing as a citizen, the interest in
challenging the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. As a taxpayer, he must claim that public funds
were illegally disbursed or deflected to an improper purpose, or that funds are wasted through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. As a legislator, he must claim that the unconstitutional action infringes his prerogatives as
a legislator.

Regarding the meaning of transcendental importance, it has no doctrinal definition. However, there are 3 determinants:

1. the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;

2. the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and
3. the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised

Thus, this case is of transcendental importance. However, only respondent Jaime Soriano is denied for lack of standing for
the mere fact he failed to even allege that the act of the petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds.

(3) Yes, the only requisite for ripeness for adjudication that something had by then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture. The issue itself is of the validity of the filing of a 2nd impeachment
case against the CJ in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules.

(4) In this case, the question is justiciable for it being not a truly political question. Judicial power isn’t merely power, but
also a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere presence of political questions. There are 2 kinds of political questions:

 Truly political questions

 “Not” truly political questions

Truly political questions are beyond judicial review; reason being is respect for separation of powers. Sec 1 Art 8 Const.
allows courts to review questions not truly political in nature. This provision, however, doesn’t define what are justiciable
political questions and non-justiciable ones; there’s no standard.

(5) Yes (refer to substantive issue 4), Sec 3(1) Art 11 Const. does not equate impeachment cases with impeachment
proceedings. However, HOR’s rules run contrary to this in a misreading of the Constitution on part of HOR.

(6) No, American jurisprudence can’t support this statement (see issue 1).
 Strict and Liberal Construction – Francisco v. HOR – GR 160261, 11/10/03 – Carpio-Morales, J.
(7) No, the exercise of judicial restraint over the present justiciable cases is not an option for SC. SC is duty bound to
adjudicate. SC’s jurisdiction cannot be renounced as there’s no other tribunal to which the case may be referred; hence,
the SC is the court of last resort. To do this would violate SC’s constitutional mandate in Sec 1(2) Art 8 Const.

Substantive:

(1) This is a political question; therefore, SC will not address it. This issue goes into the merits of the 2nd impeachment
complaint over which SC has no jurisdiction. Any discussion of this issue requires the court to make a determination of
what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is best left to the discretion of Congress.

(2&3) Both issues raised are not the lis mota of the case; therefore, SC will not address it. The issue of the constitutionality
of HOR’s resolution and the resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the primary issue of the validity of the 2nd
impeachment complaint. If SC addressed this issue, it would be required to form a rule of constitutional law touching on
the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general.

(4) Yes, HOR argued that Secs 16-17 Rule 5 of the House Impeachment Rules don’t violate Sec 3(5) Art 11 Const. that the
term “initiate” doesn’t meant “to file,” that Sec 3(1) Art 11 is clear that it’s HOR, who has exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment; that initiate can’t mean “to file” because filing can be accomplished in 3 ways via Sec 3(2) Art 11
Const:

- By a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of HOR

- By any citizen upon resolution of endorsement by any member
- By at least 1/3 of all members of the house

This issue hinges on the term “initiate.” SC must resort to STATCON. Con-Com Regalado asserted that the meaning of
“initiate” means “to file.” This includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint. By dictionary terms “initiate,”
means to begin or to commence. Language clearly puts this meaning as “to perform or facilitate the first action.” The
Constitutional framers clearly intended “initiation” to start with the filing of the complaint.

This means that initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint. The vote of 1/3 of HOR in a
resolution of impeachment doesn’t count as initiation of impeachment proceedings. Initiation takes place by the act of
filling and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House COJ, or by the filing by at least 1/3 of HOR
with the Secretary General. This means that once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another similar complaint
can’t be filed within a one-year period.

Sec 3(1) Art 11 Const. does not equate impeachment cases with impeachment proceedings. However, HOR’s rules run
contrary to this in a misreading of the Constitution on part of HOR because they assert that “initiate” means to proceed
with impeachment and not to file. Secs 16-17 of Rule 5 House Impeachment Rules perceiving that impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated runs contrary to Sec 3(5) Art 11 of the Constitution. Despite the Constitution allowing
HOR to make its own rules, it mustn’t be contrary to the Constitution.

(5) Yes, having established that initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House COJ, once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another may not be filed against the same official within
the same year as per Sec 3(5) Art 11 Const.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved
by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is
barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.