The UK's Defence After Brexit

THE UNITED KINGDOM’S
DEFENCE AFTER BREXIT

Britain’s Alliances,
Coalitions,
& Partnerships
EDITED BY
Rob Johnson and
Janne Haaland Matlary
The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit
Rob Johnson · Janne Haaland Matlary
Editors
The United
Kingdom’s Defence
After Brexit
Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, and Partnerships
Editors
Rob Johnson Janne Haaland Matlary
Changing Character of War Centre Department of Political Science
University of Oxford University of Oslo
Oxford, UK Oslo, Norway
ISBN 978-3-319-97168-1 ISBN 978-3-319-97169-8 (eBook)

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Foreword
The United Kingdom Chief of the Defence Staff

The military cooperation between the United Kingdom, the United
States, and NATO in Europe is fundamental to the future of our Alliance
as it approaches its 70th birthday. There is also no doubt that we live in
an era of profound and far-reaching change. Few of these changes are
in favour of those who support the rules-based international order. It is
imperative that we develop a better understanding of the character of the
changing international climate and of the opportunities that are emerg-
ing. New technologies will give us a chance to enhance our defence and
security, but we also need to pay attention to how we organize ourselves,
our systems, and the ways in which we sustain, maintain, and develop
our cooperation. I am therefore delighted to see this volume, the prod-
uct of academic and military collaboration, with views from across the
Alliance, which explains where the challenges lie and how they are being
approached. The United Kingdom is taking the lead in several aspects of
Europe’s defence, and working closely with all our partners, to ensure
that we can pursue our democratic way of life, free of threat, interference
or attack, throughout this turbulent and uncertain era and beyond.
London, UK Sir Stuart Peach, GBE, KCB, ADC, DL

Air Chief Marshal
v
Preface
This book project grew out of our interest in military integration in

Europe at a time when it faces both conventional risks as well as irreg-
ular threats. It is evident that Western states must cooperate in order
to cope with rising defence costs and the implementation of new tech-
nologies. Interoperability is also a vital component of operational effec-
tiveness. When there is cooperation, the overall strategic impact of the
Western allies is enhanced significantly, especially for smaller states who
find themselves confronted by larger, more aggressive neighbours. We
therefore took particular interest in the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF),
a unique constellation of mostly NATO member states but with the full
participation of Finland and Sweden. This British-led force structure is
flexible and adjustable, it can deploy rapidly, and it can undertake any
type of operation. With a small number of well-integrated armed forces,
drawn from its participating nations, its ability to act quickly provides
considerable strategic advantage.
NATO is undoubtedly led by the United States, so our interest in
Britain may seem surprising. There are several reasons for the emphasis
of the volume. The first is that Britain has designed and developed the
JEF at a time when crisis can escalate quickly. It is organized specifically
to conduct fast-moving operations, including information warfare, as
part of a longer British tradition in its posture of global response. Britain
undoubtedly plays the leading role in Northern European defence and
security, with its maritime interests in the North Atlantic and the free-
dom of the seas, its special relationship with the US and its close
vii
viii Preface
cooperation with France. Indeed, cooperation with France deepened in

the 2010s and took the form of a joint brigade, combined air operations
over Syria, and cooperation in maritime aviation. As its national strategy
makes clear, Britain values and spearheads its partnerships and its coali-
tions.
What was less clear was the impact of Brexit on its role. When added
to the uncertainty surrounding the Trump administration’s foreign and
security policy, and aggressive Russian posturing against NATO, we
decided that it is time to re-examine the key role that Britain plays in
European defence and security policy. That meant not only an examina-
tion of the British position, capability and intentions, but American and
European views of their British allies.
We are very grateful to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence for a research
grant that allowed us to do this as well as to the Department of Political
Science, University of Oslo for providing funds for language-editing. All
Souls College, Oxford University, and the Norwegian Command and Staff
College arranged and two workshops for the research group for which we
thank these institutions.
Oxford, UK Rob Johnson

Oslo, Norway Janne Haaland Matlary
May 2018
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary
Part I Britain’s Partnerships
2 UK Defence Policy: The ‘New Canada’

and ‘International by Design’ 33
Rob Johnson
3 The US–UK Special Relationship and the “Principled

Realism” of the Trump Administration 59
Andrew A. Michta
4 ‘You Don’t Hear the Word Britain Anymore’:

Anglo-American Security Relations in the Era
of Brexit and Trump 75
Jeffrey H. Michaels
5 Franco-British Defence Co-operation in the Context

of Brexit 103
Samuel B. H. Faure
ix
x Contents
6 British-German Defence and Security Relations After

Brexit: Quo Vadis, ‘Silent Alliance’? 127
Håkon Lunde Saxi
7 A Special Partnership? The EU’s Military Ambition

and the Role of Britain 159
Part II Britain’s Coalitions
8 Britain’s Joint Expeditionary Force: A Force of Friends? 189

Tormod Heier
9 Sweden, Finland, and the Defence of the Nordic-Baltic

Region—Ways of British Leadership 215
Joakim Erma Møller and Magnus Petersson
10 The JEF as a Force Multiplier: The Example of Joint

Amphibious Response in the Nordic-Baltic Theatre 245
Richard Cantrill and Eystein Lockwood Meyer
Notes on Contributors
Col. Richard Cantrill, O.B.E., M.C. is a Colonel in the Royal

Marines, currently assigned dual hatted as Chief of Staff to the
Commander UK Amphibious Forces and EU Operation Atalanta. His
early career was focused on reconnaissance and mountain and cold
weather warfare, and after assignments as Company Commander in
Afghanistan and a Military Assistant, to DCDS Military Strategy and
Operations, he served as the Commanding Officer of 42 Commando
Royal Marines. He holds a Master’s degree in Defence Studies from
Kings College London.
Dr. Samuel B. H. Faure is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Nuffield
College at the University of Oxford. He is also an associate mem-
ber at the Maison française d’Oxford (MFO), and a research associate
at the SciencesPo’s Center for International Research (CERI) in Paris.
His first book, entitled Défense européenne: émergence d’une culture
stratégique commune (‘European Defence: The Emergence of a Common
Strategic Culture’) has been published in 2016. He has also published
in European Security, Politique européenne and St Antony’s International
Review.
Dr. Tormod Heier is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Norwegian Army
and holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Oslo. He
has previously served in the Norwegian Intelligence Service and in
the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, and has edited several books on
Norwegian and European security and defence policy.
xi
xii Notes on Contributors
Dr. Rob Johnson is the Director of the Changing Character of War

(CCW) Research Centre at the University of Oxford (www.ccw.ox.ac.uk).
His primary research interests are in the history of strategy and war, and
their contemporary applications, and he is prominent within professional
military education across NATO. He is the author of The Great War and
the Middle East (2016), The Afghan Way of War (2011), and co-editor of
At the End of Military Intervention (2015) and the forthcoming Before
Military Intervention (Palgrave, 2018), as well as several other works on
strategy and armed conflicts in the Middle East, Asia and Europe. His
leadership of CCW emphasizes the value of blending ideas, theory, and
practice in current strategic and security policy, which is exemplified in
this volume.
Dr. Janne Haaland Matlary is a Prof. Dr. Philos in international affairs
at the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo and adjunct
professor at the Norwegian Command and Staff College. Her lat-
est book is Hard Power in Hard Times: Can Europe Act Strategically?
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). She was deputy foreign minister of Norway
1997–2000 and has published extensively as well as been a policy advisor
to governments and international organizations.
Eystein Lockwood Meyer is a Commander Senior Grade in the
Royal Norwegian Navy, currently assigned as Faculty Advisor Maritime
Operations at the Norwegian Command and Staff College. His previous
assignments include several posts within the Norwegian Coastal Ranger
Commando, several staff posts in ISAF PRT Meymaneh, Afghanistan,
ISTAR manager in the Netherlands Maritime Force Amphibious Task
Force, and Intelligence Officer in several staff posts in NATO Force
Command Heidelberg. He is educated from the Royal Norwegian Naval
Academy, the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College, and holds
a Master’s degree in Defence Studies from Kings College London.
Jeffrey H. Michaels is a Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s
College London. He has also held visiting research fellowships at the
Oxford Changing Character of War Centre at Pembroke College and
the Egmont Institute in Brussels. Earlier experience included working as
a Research Associate in the Department of War Studies at King’s. Prior
to joining academia, he worked for the US Defense Department and
NATO.
Notes on Contributors xiii
Dr. Andrew A. Michta is the Dean of the College of International and

Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security
Studies in Germany. He is a regular contributor to The American
Interest, a non-partisan journal devoted to the broad theme of “America
in the world”. He is the author of several books on European Security
and Transatlantic Relations. His most recent book with Paal Hilde, The
Future of NATO: Regional Defense and Global Security was published by
the University of Michigan Press in 2014.
Joakim Erma Møller is a Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute
for Defence Studies (IFS) in Oslo. Møller completed his Master’s
Degree in Political Science at the University of Oslo in 2017, with a
Master’s Thesis on Finland’s security policy following Russia’s annexa-
tion of Crimea. At IFS, he is part of the research programme Security
and Defence in Northern Europe, with a particular focus on cooperation
between the Nordic countries.
Dr. Magnus Petersson is a Professor of Modern History at the
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. Between 1998 and 2008
he was Lecturer, Director of Studies, and Head of Research and
Development at the Swedish Defence University. He has been a Visiting
Scholar at Boston University, George Washington University, Johns
Hopkins University, and Macquarie University. He has published widely
on Nordic and Trans-Atlantic security and defence.
Dr. Håkon Lunde Saxi is a Senior Fellow with the Norwegian Defence
University College (FHS) in Oslo. His research focuses on Northern
European security, including Nordic, German and British defence poli-
cies. His recent publications include “British and German Initiatives for
Defence Cooperation: The Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework
Nations Concept”. Defence Studies 17, no. 2 (2017): 171–197.
List of Figures
Fig. 10.1 Where should the amphibious force be employed? 250

Fig. 10.2 Options for an amphibious force (ATG) in the Baltic Sea area 252
Fig. 10.3 Options for an amphibious force (ATG) in Northern Norway 254
xv
List of Tables
Table 5.1 Detailed model of the UK’s two roles in defence

co-operation with France 107
Table 5.2 Companies involved in building the Taranis and Neuron
UCAV demonstrators 112
Table 5.3 The three main European arms projects under way 113
Table 6.1 British, French, and German military efforts compared, 2015 131
xvii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary
When one looks back into European history, it is logical to pay more
attention to the most significant turning points, rather than the long-
term, almost imperceptible, incremental changes that occurred. It is
easy to overlook the critical relationship in these apparently dichot-
omous forms of change, but they are inextricably linked. Equally, it is
easy to miss the continuities that were not disrupted by those sudden
incidents of history. The British referendum in 2016, where a majority
of the population voted to leave the European Union, caused evident
shock and confusion in the continent’s 27 member states. It appeared,
at the time, to represent one of those pivotal moments in European his-
tory, producing dire warnings of similar separations by other nations. But
the Brexit decision was the result of a much longer development, dat-
ing back to Britain’s membership of the EEC in the 1970s. The shock
was the result of years of complacency among an elite that seemed to
have forgotten, ignored, or deemed irrelevant, the views of working class
voters. Educated figures expressed anxiety about the threat to liberal
R. Johnson (*) 
Changing Character of War Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
e-mail: [email protected]
J. H. Matlary 
Blindern, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
email: [email protected]
© The Author(s) 2019 1

R. Johnson and J. Haaland Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom’s Defence
After Brexit, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97169-8_1
2 R. JOHNSON AND J. H. MATLARY
internationalism, and there were exaggerated references to Brexit as one

of several challenges to the world’s international order, but while most
commentators referred to economic consequences, far fewer exam-
ined the implications for the defence, security and integrity of Europe.
Indeed, the EU and the UK initially assumed these would be unchanged.
There was severe criticism when Theresa May, the British Prime Minister,
seemed to suggest that defence and security would have to be taken into
consideration in Brexit negotiations, a view widely interpreted as Britain
trying to use security, especially counter-terrorism expertise, as a bargain-
ing chip. This tells us much about the degree to which European defence
had been taken for granted over the long sixty years’ peace.
The developing concerns about defence and security occurred amidst
four significant crises facing the European Union. The first was a wave
of migration from Africa and the Middle East, driven in part by con-
flicts, but also by economic motives, which had elicited protests from
European citizens about a lack of integration, threats to wage levels,
housing shortages, cultural differences, and a rise in crime. The second
crisis was the effect of the international banking crash of 2008, which
had crystallised the fiscal crisis of indebted countries like Greece. The
consequence for Athens was a severe austerity programme, limits on
spending, and impositions by the European Central Bank that created
deep resentment. The reason the Greek crisis had such resonance was
that all European countries were affected to some degree and forced to
curtail public spending, but in Britain it resurrected fears that member
states of the EU could be coerced by directives from Brussels.
The third crisis was the greater military assertiveness and rearmament
of Russia, which annexed Crimea by force, deployed troops and arma-
ments into eastern Ukraine’s Donbass region, engaged in cyber-attacks
on European institutions, and made threatening rhetoric about its will-
ingness to use force, including nuclear weapons, in defence of its national
interests. Russian military modernisation appeared all the more threat-
ening when, at the same time, European defence seemed to be in a par-
lous state, and where interoperability, once the significant achievement of
NATO, appeared to have declined.
The fourth crisis was the fractious relationship with Turkey, a coun-
try which linked the other factors together. Turkey had hoped to join
the EU, but the protracted talks and conditions demanded by Brussels
remained unresolved, and the migration crisis reversed Turkey’s
previously weak negotiating stance: it was in a position to control
1 INTRODUCTION 3
the flow of migrants reaching Greece and the rest of the EU. Russian
military intervention in Syria, and the shooting down of a Russian jet,
caused some concern in Europe because of NATO commitments to
Ankara, but within months, after a failed military coup, Turkey appeared
to shift away from its Western NATO partners and towards Russia. The
change was wrought by shared interests over Syria.
Like the United States, Britain had an active air campaign over Syria
to defeat the terror group, Daesh, and it sought to maintain close ties
with Turkey. Britain plays a leading role in European defence and secu-
rity, as evidenced its maritime and air commitments, its leading role in
counter-terrorism and cyber security, in the Joint Expeditionary Force
(which has a strong focus on northern and Eastern Europe), and its
promotion of the Northern Group, a sub-stratum of NATO and its asso-
ciated Scandinavian defence co-operation.
But there have been a number of significant changes in British per-
ceptions of European defence and security in recent years: Russia is
increasingly regarded as a risk, even a threat to European integrity,
and there are doubts about the level of American commitment to the
defence of the European continent. The Nordic, Baltic, and Central
European states are looking to Britain for leadership, but the impact of
cuts makes the capability of Britain’s armed force look very uncertain.
A succession of terrorist attacks in Britain and Europe has pushed polit-
ical leaders towards a more overt counter-terrorism posture, despite the
absence of any existential threat, rather than prioritising national defence.
In addition, Britain is in the process of leaving the EU and this intro-
duces uncertainty about formal cooperation in security and defence with
European states. It raises the possibility that bilateral relationships and ad
hoc coalitions will become increasingly important.
It is often assumed Brexit will play a key role in determining Britain’s
future leadership role in the continent’s security and defence, but it is
not clear where the continuities will be maintained or the changes made.
Alliances are, by their nature, multilateral arrangements, but, in effect,
they represent a national interest for their signatories. Many assume
that Britain will reduce its continental commitment as the EU seeks to
increase its defence role, but it is just as likely that Britain’s position will
continue unchanged or even be enhanced through its NATO member-
ship, its close working relationship with France, and its leadership in
capability. Britain is certain to put major emphasis on strengthening its
role in the alliance and in its partnerships or coalitions as a consequence
of leaving the EU, but the co-operative spirit on which the alliance
depends could be affected. EU states may help and support each other
in NATO and in other international organisations, something which is
not uncommon, and it could be that Britain will reach some new under-
standing with the EU in this regard.
Yet it may, of course, simply be that membership of the EU has lit-
tle significance in European defence: what determines whether a state
is a leading security and defence actor is its military-strategic culture,
operational capability and spending capacity. Practical necessity may be
more important than political alignment: states that train and deploy
together—and fight together—will form partnerships and coalitions as
a threat emerges. Consequently, political statements may not matter
much unless reflected in real implementation in the operational dimen-
sion. Moreover, for the last sixty years, it has been NATO, led by the
United States, not the EEC or EU, that has guaranteed the continent’s
defence.
Brexit: Defence and Security in the Negotiations

The significance of alliances, coalitions, defence and security in the Brexit
negotiations was highly uncertain in 2017–2018: Whereas the British
government envisaged a ‘win-win’ option by offering to collaborate
with the EU in all matters relating to security and defence, the Brexit
negotiations had not clarified the position on either side by 2018.1
The period between the declaration of Article 50 (the ‘exit clause’) in
March 2017 and March 2018, a critical period of negotiations before
the triggering of Brexit (March 2019) was marked by much dissension
between the British and the EU leadership. The EU negotiators insisted
that Britain should pay much more than an initial £20 billion offered by
the British for the transition period. The EU insisted that EU citizens
in Britain should be protected under the European Court of Justice,
rather than British courts, a demand that caused incredulity in Britain,
even amongst so-called ‘remainers’. In addition, the EU insisted that the
border between the UK’s Northern Ireland and the EU’s Eire should be
abolished, with a ‘hard’ frontier starting on the Irish Sea: this proposal
was completely unacceptable to the United Kingdom, since it would
deprive the country of its sovereignty over Northern Ireland, where the
majority wish to remain under British jurisdiction. Indeed, the thirty
years of ‘Troubles’ had been founded entirely on this issue—and the
1 INTRODUCTION 5
EU proposal seemed to raise the possibility of the ugly conflict starting

all over again. Similar EU proposals to hand over Gibraltar to EU, and
therefore satisfy Spanish interests, met with equal levels of ire in London.
These issues were debated vigorously throughout 2017, and, as time
passed, neither side appeared to have any breakthrough suggestions. The
EU argued that businesses would leave Britain because of the uncertainty
of market access to the EU and less favourable market rules in Britain,
but there was no capital flight from the City of London, and Britain
attracted more investment after 2016 partly through a lower pound
sterling and partly through the prospect of more open trade outside of
the EU’s customs regime. It was obvious that market actors wanted pre-
dictability and that the EU calculated that it could benefit from prolon-
gation of the pre-negotiations. As with Greece, it believed the member
state would buckle and concede, but, by 2018, the improving British
economy did not make the British government inclined to make conces-
sions. The main driving force for the British government was the Prime
Minister’s political survival: inclined to compromise, May was confronted
by deeply divided Cabinet colleagues, and a strong lobby of ‘Brexiteers’.
The Florence speech by Theresa May in late September 2017 was
conciliatory towards the EU, arguing for a gradual Brexit and offering
funding for a transition period. The reactions in Brussels were quite
negative. The EU wanted to create maximum uncertainty about mar-
ket rules for market actors in Britain—to draw businesses away from the
United Kingdom—but it was surprising that the EU should ‘stonewall’
in this manner as it self-evidently needed Britain, not only as a market,
but as a net contributor to the EU in financial terms, and, even more
clearly, in security and defence. However, while Britain appealed for a
commonsense and practical approach to the exit negotiations, the EU
seemed satisfied with procrastination and hoped that a weakened British
government would reach a final concessionary arrangement.
Due to the time factor, Britain was under considerable pressure to
agree with the EU on its terms in order to get started with the actual
negotiations about the future relationship in trade and services. It
offered an unknown amount of money (above the much-publicized £20
billion), gave guarantees for European citizens in Britain, seemed to
accept the possibility that the European Court of Justice would continue
to exert legal supremacy in the UK, and appeared to offer an ‘open’
Northern Ireland border. Under these terms, it was thus agreed, in late
December 2017, that trade negotiations could start.2
Yet the troubles for the British government were not over, for at this
stage it became of critical importance to determine which trade model
Britain would want. Essentially there were two options: the ‘Norwegian
model’, whereby the state would have access to the internal market and
pay for this, yet remain, in effect, a ‘passive member’ of the EU (not
having any say over legislation but having to adapt to whatever the EU
decided). The other option was a regular, third-party trade agreement,
often referred to as the ‘Canadian model.’ The British position remained
very unclear. The referendum implied that a ‘Norwegian solution’ of
passive membership was untenable, and Britain assumed that, as a major
power in Europe, it could expect different terms than Norway. This
would mean that the EU would agree to a mutually-beneficial solution.
But it would not accept the supremacy of the European Court of Justice
or free movement of persons, two key items concerning Brexit. The EU,
on its side, argued that the internal market is a ‘package’ which cannot
be unwrapped—one is either fully part of the internal market or not at
all. This sounds logical, but there is no rule that a market must consist of
four elements—goods, services, labour, and finance. One may, of course,
agree trade in goods and not in labour, to mention one option, and all
negotiations necessarily reflect the power of the stakeholders. EU trade
relationships with Canada and the US, for example, did not demand
the same compliance. However, since Britain was so divided over Brexit
and appeared to have no agreed strategy for it, it was very easy for the
EU to exploit the situation. There was major political disagreement in
Britain about the way forward, with an active lobby hoping to reverse
Brexit altogether. One of the activists in this regard was the former
Prime Minister Tony Blair, but interestingly, his influence was coun-
ter-productive since, in the opinion of the majority of British citizens,
Blair was associated with dishonesty over the Iraq War in 2003. The
desire of George Soros, the financier ‘who broke the Bank of England’
in the 2008 banking crash, to fund a campaign for a reversal of Brexit,
met with an equally hostile reaction. The position of Prime Minister May
nevertheless remained increasingly precarious and it was unclear whether
the Labour opposition leader, Jeremy Corbyn, would perhaps allow for a
return to the EU, changing his mind opportunistically in order to benefit
from a possible national election that could result from an unexpected
defeat of the government. All these factors of uncertainty in British poli-
tics amounted to a major weakening of its national negotiating position.
A lack of clarity allowed the EU to capitalize in the short term.
1 INTRODUCTION 7
The EU’s position, however, seemed likely to be counter-productive,

and had all the hallmarks of a zero-sum game. Europe as a whole would
be weakened if Britain was weakened, and the economy on both sides
could be damaged by long-term disagreements over trade. It was there-
fore surprising that the EU leadership continued to negotiate in such a
hard-line fashion, favouring an almost punitive approach, instead of seek-
ing a ‘win-win’ solution. Where there could be a detrimental long-term
effect on business and trade interests, there is also, as we shall see in this
volume, severe implications for security and defence. While Theresa May
spoke of a ‘deep and special’ future relationship with the EU, and while
Poland and the Nordic states applauded continuing British participation
in European defence, France put doubt on any future British leadership
in EU missions, and wanted to keep the British in a bi-lateral posture for
its own interests. Small European states, enjoying the complacent luxury
of defence paid for by other, larger states, like Britain, saw opportunities
to capitalize. For example Cyprus argued that Britain should be kept out
of EU security missions lest it give Turkey an opportunity to argue that
it too could enjoy a ‘partial’ membership of the EU. Guy Verhofstadt,
the former Belgian Prime Minister and a leading figure in the European
Parliament, was another severe critic of Brexit but Belgium is hardly a
major power in defence terms, and was a country itself held accountable
for its failure to tackle terrorism and Islamist extremism in Brussels which
led to multiple attacks in 2015–2016.
It is not only the EU’s own long-term interest to have a rich and
stable—and friendly—Britain, which suggested a different EU negotiat-
ing strategy, but it was also the likely alternatives to the governing party’s
ethos that were not in the EU’s interest. From a strategic perspective one
would conclude that the EU should have sought an early ‘soft’ Brexit
and presented it as a victory for the British administration and the EU.
However, no such intelligent design seemed to be forthcoming from
Brussels, and the stalemate in negotiations in 2018 implied the greatest
of uncertainty about the final settlement or any transition after 2019.
This book examines the role of Britain in the context of security and
defence in light of Brexit, and the implications for its relationship with
its closest strategic partners in the United States and Europe. Limits
on the available space in this work preclude a fuller examination of the
global relationships that Britain regards as important, and which may, or
may not, flourish as a result of Brexit, including those of Australia, New
Zealand, Canada, India and other members of the Commonwealth.
The book is written at the very earliest stages of the debate. It is far too
early to conclude how the Brexit negotiations, or the results for defence
and security, will look in ten or twenty years’ time. The talks between the
UK and the EU to date have been characterized by enormous uncer-
tainty, and it seems likely that many issues will remain unresolved or con-
tested for some time. There are, however, some incontrovertible elements
to consider. Britain is a major power in security and defence in Europe,
possessing an independent nuclear deterrent, being a permanent member
of the UN Security Council, with a global military reach, a wealthy econ-
omy, and a global political ambition. We therefore ask: How will Brexit
affect this status? And how will other major changes in international
politics play a role, such as Russian revisionism and the changes wrought
by the Trump administration? How will Brexit affect British perspectives
on its alliance commitments and its traditional preferences for coalitions?
The EU seeks to develop what it calls an ambitious ‘defence union’
and Britain has signaled a strong interest in participating in all aspects of
this as well as in all EU foreign policy. The EU needs Britain. But this
neat relationship has other implications: How does France act and think
with regard to the bilateral defence partnership with Britain post-Brexit?
Does France seek to ‘replace’ Britain with its own ‘special relationship’
with the US as it emerges as the major defence actor in the EU? How do
the Americans think about these changes? Is defence and security policy
really determined by threats, capability, and risk willingness, i.e. by stra-
tegic cultures instead of top-down political strategy, so that shifting con-
stellations with regard to the EU do not really matter? If so, we could
not expect Brexit to matter at all because in security and defence it is
fighting capability and common strategic culture that count, not politi-
cal declarations. Yet this remains a hypothesis, a conjecture, guiding the
investigation in the following chapters.
How Is Britain’s Defence Role Changing? A Look

at Recent History
Despite the serious problems it faced in the 2010s, the European leaders
continued to espouse confidence, at least publicly, about their position.
The EU imposed sanctions on Russia for its aggression against Ukraine,
continued to insist on certain conditions with Turkey and its member
states, and pushed on with negotiations over a single European armed
force, an EU foreign minister, closer integration of laws and finance,
1 INTRODUCTION 9
and greater authority for the European Commission leadership. Fears of

a European super-state grew in Britain, although its level of integration
in the EU was already very well advanced, a legacy of a succession of
treaties and decisions dating back to the 1970s. The British public were
divided on the issue of their relationship with Brussels, with the minor-
ity in favour of a European, liberal identity, and the majority concerned
about unchecked immigration, the supremacy of European law, a diluted
representation to Europe and the loss of an independent identity.
Despite subsequent arguments over economic and customs arrange-
ments, the British continued to share the European view of defence and
security. For the generation that emerged from the Second World War,
the prevailing concept which bridged a number of ideologies was a faith
in human social advancement. There was a strong desire to leave behind
the catastrophic mass killing of the first half of the twentieth century,
and there was considerable optimism in the establishment of the United
Nations Organisation, its charters on human rights, its agendas on
preventing wars of aggression, and its efforts to tackle global inequality.
The was a willingness in Western Europe to establish economic co-
operation to facilitate progress, a movement that Britain joined in 1973.
Despite the Cold War, which threatened complete destruction, the cre-
ation of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) indicated that,
when led by the United States, Western Europe could co-operate on
vital defence issues. Article V epitomised the commitment to each other:
an attack on one member of the alliance would be considered an attack
on them all.
Nevertheless, the unifying European project was not a smooth one.
Those that joined the European Economic Community (EEC) saw their
membership as the means to improve their trade and service industries.
Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister of the 1980s, made it
very clear that economic co-operation was welcome, but she would not
accept any infringement of national sovereignty. When European leaders
pressed ahead with the creation of a European political union, beyond
an ‘economic community’, subsequent British MPs were either reluc-
tant partners or tended to downplay the importance of the relationship
with Europe in the hope of avoiding popular protest.3 Prime Minister
John Major failed to convince his Conservative colleagues of the mer-
its of the European ERM (exchange rate mechanism) and other meas-
ures, and his tenure was ended after bitter party in-fighting over Europe.
His successor, Tony Blair (Labour), took a strongly pro-EU line, but,
characteristically, he failed to consult the public or colleagues on his pol-

icy decisions, and signed measures of closer union with Brussels without
consent. His Chancellor of the Exchequer, and his successor as Prime
Minister, Gordon Brown (Labour), was staunch in his approach that,
unless the British and European economies met five economic condi-
tions, he would not accept the Euro as British currency, but he remained
pro-EU in office without standing for election and therefore did not
have public backing. At the time, disagreements over Britain’s participa-
tion in the war in Iraq created further distance between the public, the
pro-EU political leadership, and the European member states.
The Conservatives returned to power, initially in coalition with
the Liberal-Democrats, under David Cameron. His approach was to
influence European decision-making from within, a line that Blair
and other Prime Ministers had taken before him. But simmering criti-
cism from backbench MPs about the creeping regulation and jurisdic-
tion of European law, and the growing popularity of Nigel Farage, a
straight-talking sceptic of the EU who appealed to the media and much
of the public, forced Cameron to announce that, for the first time since
1973, Britain would have a referendum on Europe. The vote would be a
simple ‘in-out’ one, which critics believed did not capture the complexity
of the issues. Cameron made a series of visits to European leaders, par-
ticularly the European Commission, to secure a favourable deal on which
the referendum could be based. The EU believed this was little more
than a stunt to acquire concessions, and they argued that they had the
entirety of the membership to consider. Cameron returned to the UK
with no more than window-dressing, and the British public were unim-
pressed. Indeed, in many ways it reinforced their view that Europe was
not prepared to grant any concessions at all and would insist on further
centralisation. Cameron lost the referendum and resigned. Theresa May,
who took over, presented the article 50 letter to signal Britain’s depar-
ture, and the date was set for final exit in March 2019.
The result immediately raised the question of Britain’s relationship
with Europe in terms of defence and security. After 1945, Britain had
been committed to the defence of Europe and was second only to the
United States in terms of military power. British armed forces were
deployed in West Germany, Norway and the North Atlantic as part of
NATO. Britain’s nuclear weaponry, in its air force and the Royal Navy,
its global bases, and its position on the UN Security Council, added
to its status as a significant world power. Throughout the Cold War,
1 INTRODUCTION 11
despite the evident threat of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union,
the ‘delicate balance of terror’ was sustained without war in Europe.
Nuclear deterrence maintained the peace, and Britain was at the heart of
European defence.
Nevertheless, Britain and Europe were forced to reinvest in sizeable
conventional forces because the first use of a nuclear strike was politically
unthinkable and raised too high a risk. The Soviet Union also imagined
the seriousness of the nuclear battlefield and looked to an integrated
conventional and nuclear defence to deter the West, and sought proxies
to undermine and offset Western hegemony in the world. Britain main-
tained an army corps, with air and armoured assets in northern Germany,
and developed the capability to send maritime, air and amphibious forces
to other threatened parts of Europe and the world.
In the 1990s, the long absence of war in Europe led some thinkers
to believe that state wars were in decline. Their cost, risk, and unsatisfac-
tory outcomes were evidently not producing results and policy-makers
were seeking alternatives. Mary Kaldor’s seminal work on New Wars,
where she argued that globalisation was producing low-intensity conflicts
of identity, replacing conventional war, was popular, as was the work
of Steven Pinker, whose Angels of Our Better Nature offered statistical
proof of a long-term decline in armed conflict.4 These ideas were seized
upon because they seemed to explain the post-Cold War era, one which
seemed unfamiliar and uncertain.
The deductions after the Cold War were also based on the European
experience of the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and
Yugoslavia. Europeans were convinced that the relatively peaceful con-
clusion to communism had proven that war, as the solution to unjust
and authoritarian systems, was obsolete. When Yugoslavia broke up,
there was considerably more violence, but this was only in part associ-
ated with state on state warfare. The conflict was instead characterised
by fighting between local groups, defined by religion, ethnicity and
nationalism. General Sir Rupert Smith, who had commanded a peace-
keeping contingent there, associated the conflict with post-modernism in
an influential work entitled The Utility of Force.5 He argued that clearly
defined inter-state war had been replaced with opaque ‘war amongst the
people’. Smith and others believed Britain had a distinct understanding
of how to conduct peace-enforcement missions like those in the Balkans
because of its experience of military counter-terrorism in Northern
Ireland and a long-standing ethos of using the ‘minimum necessary
force’ to keep the peace. The conclusion of the Bosnian War and the
Kosovo conflict was widely regarded as a success by NATO, although the
EU leadership, forgetting the decisive contribution of American military
power, believed that it had been the architect of peace in the Balkans.
Either way, the success in ending the Balkans conflict was regarded as a
significant and positive turning point in European affairs.
The ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks of 2001 were regarded as another pro-
found shift for Britain, Europe, and the West. NATO invoked Article
V for the first time, although the administration in Washington seemed
likely to act unilaterally. Tony Blair believed he was instrumental in per-
suading the United States to bring together a coalition of powers to fight
trans-national terrorism and to intervene in the states that harboured
international terrorist groups. Blair, an advocate of multilateralism who
was eager to remain close to the United States and the EU, saw him-
self as ‘the bridge to Europe’ for the Americans. This was a conceited
view, since the United States already enjoyed good relations with the
EU and the individual European states. But there were concerns about
US–European relations from 2001: when US and British forces made the
initial offensive into Afghanistan to root out Al Qaeda, the perpetrators
of ‘9/11’, there were no European contingents. Later, when the mul-
ti-national mission known as International Security and Assistance Force
(ISAF) was established, and European states sent varying forces to dis-
tinctly demarcated portions of Afghanistan, the command and control of
the United States in Kabul became much more complicated. Privately,
American officers admitted that while they needed the Coalition for
political reasons, many of the European contingents were too small to be
of much value and there was frustration with their lack of co-ordination
and inter-operability.
In contrast, the British and the Canadians sent larger forces to south-
ern Afghanistan in 2006, the heartland of Al Qaeda’s former allies, the
Taliban. While some European forces languished in secure northern and
western parts of Afghanistan, the British and Canadians found them-
selves engaged in the most serious fighting since the Korean War or the
Falklands. While the German government claimed it could not send its
troops on a mission that risked combat because this would contravene
the spirit of its postwar constitution, and Italian forces seemed content
to ignore the violence occurring in its area of responsibility in Herat, the
British felt that the Europeans lacked the will to confront serious threats
and risks. This difference of perception attracted relatively little attention
1 INTRODUCTION 13
at the time, but contributed to the general sense of disagreement over

commitments to defence between Britain and Europe.
When the United States announced its ‘global war on terror’ policy,
critics argued that it was difficult to wage war on a concept, and that
more achievable ends ought to be identified, with a range of approaches
that utilised more levers of national power than just the military instru-
ment. The EU Defence Review of 2003 emphasised the role of funding
over force. The Common Security and Defence Policy (2018) seemed
only to contemplate a future involving peace-keeping, conflict prevention
and state stabilisation.6 The Europeans grew critical of the United States
for its large-scale occupation of Afghanistan, on the assumption that the
future would consist of counter-terrorism missions, involving precise
fires, intelligence-led operations and the periodic combination of local
auxiliaries, Special Forces, and air power.
The administration of George W. Bush had more extensive ambitions.
Bush and his colleagues and partners, including Tony Blair, believed that,
in the spirit of ‘democratic peace theory’, the removal of authoritarian
regimes and the establishment of democracy would end the conditions
which gave rise to terrorist groups. At the same time, investigations into
failed or failing states seemed to indicate that the swift establishment
of democracy, rather than protracted nation-building or aid packages,
would deny safe havens to terrorist organisations.7 Bush announced that
certain regimes needed to be dealt with for sponsoring terror or poten-
tially offering Weapons of Mass Destruction to terrorist groups. These
included Iran, North Korea, Libya and Iraq. Bush did not include
Pakistan, a long-term sponsor of militant Islamic groups, as it was a US
ally. Nor did he mention Saudi Arabia, another ally, even though some
members of Al Qaeda were Saudis and the movement drew its inspira-
tion from the most austere branch of Salafi Wahabism. Bush’s decision
to invade Iraq in 2003, supported by Tony Blair, created a significant rift
with Europe.
What became evident soon after the interventions in Afghanistan and
Iraq was that there was a requirement to stabilise the states with large
numbers of ground forces so that they could be handed back to the local
populations with representative governments. By the 2010s European
critics were arguing that the American led-counter-insurgency campaign
they were engaged in was an operational technique, not a strategy with a
clear end-state, while the Bush and Obama administrations argued that
the Europeans needed to make a greater commitment to the global war
on terror.8 Britain remained close to the United States, maintaining its

commitment in Afghanistan, although Gordon Brown’s premature mil-
itary evacuation of Basra, at a time when the Americans were trying
to surge forces into Iraq, caused considerable dismay in Washington.
Relations between Britain and America were damaged, although their
military co-operation and intelligence-sharing stayed intact.
Worse, public opinion in Britain had turned against the Labour
government over the Iraq War, and there was growing disap-
proval of America. It had become clear that Blair’s haste to remain in
Washington’s favour had led to dishonesty towards parliament. As the
subsequent Iraq Enquiry made clear, Blair had not disclosed Bush’s
intentions towards Iraq, the ambiguity of the intelligence assessments,
or the legal risks of the invasion. Blair had not obtained a specific man-
date from the UN for military intervention, but relied on more general
UNSCR approval for action. Bush and Blair had little faith in further
weapon inspections, which the Europeans favoured. As a result, British
public opinion was divided between anti-American and anti-European
approaches to defence and security. What the British really wanted was
a more independent line in foreign policy. This was reflected in elements
of popular culture. In the film Love Actually (2003), there is a portrayal
of the British Prime Minister surprising the US President at a press con-
ference with the announcement that, from that point on, Britain would
be pursuing an independent foreign policy without the approval of the
United States. This reflected a widely-held desire amongst the British
public in light of Blair’s apparently obsequious behaviour towards
George W. Bush. The legacy of the Iraq War was profound in Britain,
and it seemed less likely there would be public or political support for
armed intervention around the world, alongside the United States.
Under Obama, there was a distinct turn in the United States towards
technological modernisation and major shifts in geo-politics. There was
a determination to develop new high-tech’ capabilities in air, sea and
land warfare which would overmatch any rival state. The United States
announced a ‘pivot to Asia’, specifically East Asia, to focus on a possi-
ble future challenge from China, rather than Al Qaeda and its Jihadist
confederates in the Middle East. That refocus was to some extent inter-
rupted by the emergence of Da’esh, or ‘Islamic State’, a movement
which offered an absurdly optimistic idea of rebuilding an eighth cen-
tury caliphate, imposing a draconian version of Sharia law and declaring
war on all non-Muslims, ‘heretics’ and ‘apostates’. The only reason for
1 INTRODUCTION 15
taking them seriously was their initial success in winning over disgrun-
tled Sunnis who had been repressed by Shia or Allewite minorities in Iraq
and Syria, and their ambition to wage an unrelenting campaign of mass
casualty terrorism around the world. Their high-profile torture and mur-
der of their enemies and the threat they posed to the government of Iraq
compelled the Americans and Britain to offer air cover and to develop a
‘train, advise and assist’ mission to support Iraqi forces.
These developments compelled the British and their NATO partners
to maintain a balanced force, that is, armed forces that could respond
both to high-tech’ state enemies and low-tech’ non-state irregular war-
fare, and the hybrid threats that lay between them. After the long con-
flicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, with sustained air operations over these
theatres, and over Libya and Syria, there were concerns about how to
configure the armed forces for new challenges when European econ-
omies were in recession. Despite the pledges of the NATO summit to
spend a minimum of 2% of GDP on defence, most European countries
were far below that figure. New equipment spending, training and per-
sonnel costs tended to absorb the budgets in their entirety. Britain’s
maintenance of its nuclear deterrent added further costs.
Despite forecasts of more challenging future conflicts and a less favour-
able geopolitical environment for the West, political leaders in Britain
and Europe were still focussed on short term political difficulties in the
2010s. Long term planning in Britain was concerned with infrastructure
development, such as high-speed rail links, housing and e-commerce.
In defence and security, the overriding political consideration was the
management of risk and anxiety about ‘lawfare’, that is, the likelihood
that political decisions in defence and security would incur legal penal-
ties. There was particular anger in Britain over the attempted prose-
cution of military personnel who had served in Iraq, the so-called Iraq
Historic Allegations Team, especially when all the cases brought by the
notorious human rights lawyer, Phil Shiner, collapsed and were proven
to be spurious.9 Political leaders were also aware that, in the 2017 Iraq
Enquiry, Tony Blair had been accused, although never charged formally,
with deliberately misleading parliament.10 More extreme critics argued
that Blair’s actions constituted war crimes, although, more accurately, the
charge would have been crimes against peace. The effect of these legal
issues was to create a more cautious political leadership in Britain, which
manifest itself in heated exchanges in the House of Commons over action
against the terrorist movement Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
In purely technological terms, Britain and other Western countries

currently enjoy some distinct advantages. The Western world leads in
precise munitions, remote systems (especially in the air), surveillance
tools, and automation leading to artificial intelligence, all of which
will enable it to prevail against a range of threats and adversaries. The
search for further technological solutions fits with the Western experi-
ence of war, and investment in research, experimentation and devel-
opment is a wise policy. There were concerns in the early twenty-first
century that rivals were catching up with the West. The United States
led development, leaving the British and Europeans with a dilemma
about how to equip its much smaller and less well-resourced armed
forces. Nevertheless, a technological edge, however fleeting, can create
operational and strategic opportunities, so niche investments were the
favoured solution.
New technologies, particularly in computing and coding, have had
a significant impact on British and NATO defence communications,
command and control, surveillance, sensor-to-fires speeds and accu-
racy, operations in depth, and logistics, not as separated technological
tools, but rather as a more enhanced, integrated system. The expecta-
tion is that these recent technologies and techniques will lower risks to
personnel and better guarantee results. Nevertheless, Western defence
literature assumes better weapon systems in the hands of its enemies,
and a pervasive, hostile information environment. This latter concern
takes four forms: one, the development of cyber and electro-magnetic
activities (CEMA); two, information effects; three, strategic communi-
cations in a democratised and contested information domain; and, four,
the arms race of encryption and decryption promised by big data and
quantum computing. The problem for the West today is that its open
society and inadequate security in the electronic environment has left it
open to political manipulation, espionage, and compromise. It is now
widely known that Russia generates troll factories and bots to create divi-
sion and influence in Europe. Moscow’s remote direction is notorious,
despite frequent denials.11
The second aspect, the information environment, presents its own
problems. The ubiquitous coverage of 24-hour, global news and the
democratised and unregulated social media sphere means that every
military and political action is subject not only to intense scrutiny but
often deliberate misrepresentation. The result is a greater oscillation in
public opinion, and a fast flow of ‘stories’ which ignore or doubt official
1 INTRODUCTION 17
statements. Attempts to conduct long term investigations are left behind

by the haste for the latest ‘breaking news’. Since it possible to manipu-
late text, imagery and video footage, to create entirely false material, to
the uninitiated, appears convincing, then a secondary problem of ‘fake
news’ also becomes clear. There are now information operation thresh-
olds, where a certain number of casualties or destruction, once opposed
in the media, has the potential to dissuade political leaders and conse-
quently halt military operations. The implication of this development is
that adversaries will target Western public sentiments, domestic infra-
structure and civilian populations in order to turn a government’s policy.
Here the West is vulnerable: attempts to protect the public can be inter-
preted as an infringement of liberties they have grown used to in decades
of peace.12 It will take a profound shock to alter the agenda.
The third element which creates anxiety in the Western defence sec-
tor is in the closely-related realm of strategic communications and
‘narratives’. No entity can expect to control a narrative, but generat-
ing sensational and unverified claims to reach a large audience seems
far easier than in previous decades. Audiences are far more diverse and
globalised than in the past, and their news feeds are instantaneous. The
successful information operation cannot expect to release a formal com-
munique and expect adherence to it. Instead, military and political actors
have to be co-ordinated, their messaging synchronised with actions, and
the packets of information have to be rapid and fragmentary, seeking
to tilt, escalate, defuse, and shape for short periods of time. British and
European defence authorities have investigated the phenomenon, but it
was unclear which agencies, civil or military, would take the lead. In the
UK, strategic communications were, in essence, in a civil, political realm,
while tactical information operations remained in the military sphere.
The fourth element is the struggle between encryption and decryp-
tion. Privacy debates in the West have highlighted the public challenges,
but in the military, intelligence and political world there was a contin-
uous effort to protect the secrecy of one’s own systems and penetrate
the adversary. The notion of quantum computing suggests that, in time,
nothing could remain encrypted. Concealment is much harder with elec-
tronic signatures, but its total elimination does not seem likely. New
technologies and systems are likely to evolve, to obscure, distort, and
deny access for short periods. The result of all these developments is the
evolution of the multi-domain battle concept in the United States, and
its equivalents in Britain and Europe.
At the strategic level, Britain and its allies and partners have been con-
fronted by a different geo-political context than that which existed at the
end of the Cold War. The assertiveness of China, Russia, Iran and North
Korea has given cause for concern in the West, and the more strident
policy announcements of President Donald Trump reflected, among
other things, the American concern about the erosion of their global
hegemony. The consequence of greater unilateralism, including that of
the United States, has been the weakening of international institutions
and the rules-based order which has been of tremendous benefit to the
West and to global commerce. It seems very likely that, when interna-
tional organisations and norms appeared diminished, the promotion of
national interests or bilateralism seem yet even more attractive. Britain
and Europe calculate that they must defend themselves in a less cer-
tain, more unstable world. While the Europeans looked to develop their
own EU-centred defence apparatus, Britain still looked primarily to the
United States. To maintain its cohesion with the rest of NATO, however,
it expressed enthusiasm for the Northern Group and for a leading role
in the Joint Expeditionary Force. Overall, European defence seemed far
weaker in the 2010s than it had been in the 1980s, and yet the general
sense was that the world was becoming less secure which would demand
greater attention to defence and increase the likelihood of military obli-
gations to allies and partners.
In this volume, therefore, we examine the changing relationship
between Britain, its allies and partners, and the perspectives of the
British and Europeans on defence, collective security and the national
challenges.
Outline of the Chapters

The Part I of the book, entitled Britain’s Partnerships, deals with
Britain’s various defence relationships—the special relationship with the
US, the partnership with France, and other nations. But first we present
British strategic thinking and policy:
In Chapter 2, Rob Johnson argues that we should not exaggerate the
effect of Brexit, which is a political decision over sovereignty, on Britain’s
commitment to European defence. While significant for the economies
of Britain and Europe, it will have less impact in the long term on the
long-standing defence and security cooperation that both sides need.
1 INTRODUCTION 19
Britain’s strategy has sought consistently to protect its constitution,

commerce and the global commons; it has sought to avoid major, costly
wars; prevent isolation; avert an energy crisis; and deny the European
continent to a hostile power. Its priority has been to remain close to the
United States, although it will work with coalition partners for the pres-
ervation of the international system constructed after 1945 and it was a
staunch defender of Europe throughout the Cold War. None of these
priorities necessarily means membership of the European Union, which
would explain its strategic ambivalence to Brussels and the EU. The ulti-
mate priority for the UK is to protect its national interests, and for that it
must remain closely aligned to the United States. Since 2003, Britain has
faced significant challenges in its relationship with the United States, in
its defence capability in an era of austerity, and in defining the appropri-
ate defence posture against a range of threats across the globe. Johnson
explores these issues from the British perspective, showing how, despite
several serious setbacks, it remains committed to the US, NATO, and its
regional role. Indeed, there are signs that, because of the disputes with
the EU, Britain’s relationships in defence and security, not least in north-
ern Europe, have, in fact, grown stronger.
In Chapter 3 Andrew Michta discusses The US–UK Special Relationship
and the “Principled Realism” of the Trump Administration. Today there
is a growing realization in Washington that the established institutional
formulae framing America’s core alliances have reached an inflexion
point, whereby they need a new strategy for how Washington works
with its allies and partners. Following the election of Trump, the United
States is in the process of redefining how it interacts with the world—
both in terms of how it frames its security and defence policies. The
“principled realism” articulated in the NSS puts a premium on real mili-
tary contributions, and, while eschewing crass transactionalism, seeks to
awaken among the allies a new appreciation that US policy will demand
more than declaratory statements from them. In a departure from the
last administration’s approach, the usable military capabilities brought
by allies and partners are fast becoming the new prism through which
the US administration thinks about its core relationships. The United
Kingdom, together with Germany (as it begins to think seriously about
rebuilding its military capability) and Poland (which has committed
to double it’s the size of its military), is poised to become the lynch-
pin of an emerging strategic triad in Europe. Deepening relationships
with likeminded European powers are the hallmark of America’s new

strategic posture. This chapter examines the principles of the emerging
American security strategy in the Trump era, focusing on what part-
nered states bring to the table. It pays special attention to the role of
the United Kingdom as Europe’s quintessential naval power, seeking
to identify what steps London needs to take to deepen its historical ties
with Washington in the future.
In Chapter 4 Jeffrey Michaels presents an analysis of the Anglo-
American relationship as it evolved after Trump was elected President.
Ahead of the Brexit vote, numerous commentators speculated about
the negative impact this would have on the US–UK “special relation-
ship”, projecting a decline of London’s influence if Britain left the
EU. In the aftermath of the vote, and particularly with the election of
Donald Trump, the context for discussing security relations between the
two countries has shifted considerably. This was due to the fallout both
events have had for the two governments, both internally and externally.
This chapter examines this change in perspective by focusing on three
areas. Firstly, the pre-Brexit assumptions of commentators on the “spe-
cial relationship” and US and UK foreign policy experts more generally
is discussed. Secondly, the views of President Trump and Prime Minister
Theresa May, with respect to the relationship, are examined. These
include their personal interactions and relevant policy priorities since they
took office, seeking to shed light on the commentary of “special rela-
tionship watchers” during this period. Finally, the current state of the
more long-standing bureaucratic relationships, the so-called ‘deep state’
links, especially in the defence and intelligence fields, is highlighted and
contrasted with the day-to-day priorities of the political leadership.
In Chapter 5 Samuel Faure examines the French–British relationship.
The politics of France’s defence co-operation, involving various allies
within different politico-institutional frameworks at different scales of
international public action (bilateral, minilateral, multilateral), can be
called ‘flexilateralism’. The ‘flexilateral’ politics of France in Europe ques-
tions the future of the strategic partnership with the United Kingdom
in the context of the Brexit negotiations. This chapter demonstrates
that Brexit could generate a two-fold effect on Franco-British defence
cooperation: On the one hand, it is likely that Brexit would have only
a limited effect on military policy because the Franco-British bilateral
cooperation is not in competition with other types of European collab-
oration. On the other hand, Brexit’s effect on industrial defence policy
1 INTRODUCTION 21
would be more marked from 2020 onwards in the event of a “hard

Brexit”. The Franco-British partnership in this respect would be side-
lined in favour of co-operation with Germany and associations with vari-
able combinations of partners within the EU. As a result, the UK would
retain a leading role in military policy and would be simultaneously
confined to a supporting role in industrial policy. This variation can be
explained by the structure of interdependence relations linking defence
actors in Europe: a ‘closed configuration’ in military policy, an ‘open
configuration’ in industrial policy.
In Chapter 6 Håkon Saxi examines the Anglo-German relationship,
which, while not regarded as one that is as prominent or as formal as say
the American, French or Scandinavian partnerships, is nonetheless one
that plays an important role in Britain’s links to the rest of Europe. While
devoid of the great symbolism and institutionalisation which character-
ises post-World War II Anglo-American or Franco-German relations,
there has traditionally been little tension or discord between London and
Berlin on issues of defence and security. Indeed, security relations have
been characterised as generally successful, if quiet and barely publicised,
and a pragmatic cooperation. Today, as counter-terrorism demands more
inter-state co-operation, the UK and German are both important secu-
rity partners in Europe. In defence matters too, the economic potential
of Germany and Britain make them equally vital in Europe. They have a
mutual interest in working together to adapt NATO to address two new
challenges, namely, a resurgent and revisionist Russia in the east, and
unregulated migration and terrorism to the south. This partnership in
NATO will, in all likelihood, continue, irrespective of Brexit. However,
Brexit will, according to Saxi, diminish the UKs stature and influence. If
EU defence cooperation deepens as a result of Brexit, Germany and the
UK will drift further apart. On the other hand, outside of Europe, the
UK is, and will remain, a far more assertive security actor than Germany.
Compared to the UK, Germany’s expeditionary military capabilities are
extremely limited, and its strategic and military cultures are timid. This
will continue to place limits on Anglo-German security and defence
cooperation beyond the continent of Europe.
In Chapter 7 Janne Matlary examines the role of security and defence
policy in the EU. The EU has the ambition of developing more common
security and defence policy, even a defence union, and has taken some
steps towards establishing common procurement policy and creating a
strategic culture. The theme of this chapter is whether this development
will affect Britain’s role after Brexit. The major part of the analysis is
devoted to whether these EU ambitions is likely to result in a common
defence policy of any kind. EU policy statements are surprisingly ambi-
tious given the fact that neither the battle groups nor the procurement
agenda have any substance. Matlary concludes that, although EU politi-
cal rhetoric speaks confidently about strategy and defence union, there is
little material in these narratives. The EU’s role will most likely be in the
area of defence industrial policy, a ‘bottom-up’ pragmatic policy aimed
at saving money and integrating military capacities wherever possible.
This will not lead to a supra-national defence policy, however, although
France’s interests with regard to the EU in the defence field will surely
remain decisive.
In Part II, Britain’s Coalitions, we examine the Northern Group and
the JEF:
In Chapter 9 Møller and Petersson examine Britain’s leading role in
Northern European defence by analysing how the two non-aligned states
Sweden and Finland seek closeness to Britain. The chapter analyses how
the two countries have gradually become more involved in NATO and
other Western partnerships for security political cooperation. The inter-
action between Finland, Sweden and NATO has largely been uncontro-
versial all the time NATO retained its “out-of-area”-focus. However,
increasing Russian belligerence after the Ukraine Crisis in 2014, and
threatening Russian rhetoric, the question has been what kind of role
non-aligned Finland and Sweden can have in the Western defence of the
Nordic-Baltic Region against a revisionist Russia. The decisions indicate
the extent to which nations can choose their security arrangements freely,
and have far these aspirations have to be tempered by the desire not to
deliberately antagonise a neighbouring power that objects. The two
countries new “enhanced opportunities”—a role in NATO, their host
nation agreements with the Alliance, bilateral agreements with the UK
(and the US, Germany and Poland), and agreements on participation in
the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force are thus central elements in our
discussion.
In Chapter 8 Heier analyses the coalition of NATO-states that has
formed around Britain in the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the
Northern Group. Having invited the Netherlands, Demark, Norway, the
three Baltic states, as well as Sweden and Finland into the force, JEF has
been labelled “a Force of Friends”. JEF has thus made Britain’s force
structure more “international by design”. But what are the motives for
1 INTRODUCTION 23
joining JEF, as seen from a UK and partner-state perspective? The analy-

sis is conducted through the lenses of ‘structure’ and ‘process’. Britain’s
motive for JEF may be “gap-filling” because partner-states are needed
to increase resilience and responsiveness in a crisis. Partner-states’ motive
is “networking”. A modest military contribution allows dependent cli-
ents access to decision makers inside a leading power in Europe; this is
crucial in the event of a crisis with Russia. Based on extensive interviews
and document analysis, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter
supports these hypotheses. The conclusion is that Britain builds a JEF
where stakeholders participate for different reasons. Increased reliance on
partnerships nevertheless presents a dilemma for Britain’s leadership role
in Europe. Her Majesty’s forces may become more sustainable through
pooling of partner-state forces, but partner-states’ dependency is likely to
increase, which again may increase the risks of obligation to a sovereign
state which it is not in Britain’s interests to risk a war for.
Chapter 10, written by military professionals Cantrill and Meyer,
investigates how military integration between Britain and smaller states
in the Nordic-Baltic area in one area—amphibious forces—leads to force
multiplication and strategic advantage vis-à-vis a possible threat posed
by Russia. It shows the rationale for such cooperation in terms of mili-
tary utility and explains how it can be strengthened, offering an in-depth
case study of UK-Dutch amphibious force operations in the High North.
The case illustrates how an integrated force like JEF results in strategic
advantage that would not accrue from individual national capacities. The
chapter is a timely one, as Britain’s defence establishment calls for the
retention of an amphibious capability against a Treasury set on further
budgetary savings.
Conclusions
A state’s strategy should be judged by its enduring behaviour, not its
statements and narratives. States that train together, with appropriate
spending and capability, and which operate together, are more likely
to prove resilient when tested. By contrast, public announcements and
speeches mean very little, not least as they change with each adminis-
tration. Defence and security cooperation is a far more practical issue,
which rises above mere statements of cooperation. It would therefore
be wise to judge British defence cooperation by its deeds rather than its
statements.
UK national interests, foreign policy and strategic requirements are

remarkably consistent, and have almost no dependence on the ideo-
logical aspirations of the EU, which explains the British ambivalence to
European political agendas. Britain has a global orientation, is one of the
two leading military powers of Europe, and a critical ally of the United
States, so its interests are world-wide and not purely continental. It also
shares many European values and is an important economic contributor
to Europe. Its proximity and its common interests with Europe make it
an important partner, long after the Brexit imbroglio is forgotten.
The Trump administration in Washington set a far more exclusive
set of parameters on European co-operation than previous presidents.
President Trump expects the Europeans to make significant contribu-
tions to their own defence and, strikingly, make statements of appre-
ciation of US protective security. Trump insists on better military
capabilities and regards Britain, Germany, France and Poland as the
most significant players. The United States is particularly interested in
maintaining its close alliance with Britain in the European and Middle
East theatres: the Americans regard Britain as their primary partner in
these regions. While there was some disappointment at the very small
contribution made by the British in the operations against ISIS, the
link remained intact. In other parts of the world, the Americas, Africa
and Pacific, the Americans do not see the British as a major player,
although its moral backing gives the United States greater legitimacy
in its actions. This is also true of France, currently a close partner of
the Americans, which gives it greater influence in the UN Security
Council.
The chapters in this volume contain within them key insights into the
national and collective implications of Brexit and the important conti-
nuities, beneficial and detrimental, in European defence and security.
Amongst the most significant findings we assess the following to be par-
ticularly noteworthy:
The last few decades have shaped the relationship between Britain, the
United States and its European partners. Thirty years after the end of the
Cold War, NATO remained intact and the bond between the British and
the Americans had survived a number of crises and disagreements. Brexit
represented a culmination of political spats which were a European
responsibility, and occurred at a confluence of other crises, in fiscal
arrangements, economic underperformance, low productivity, migration
and widespread disapproval of the ideological call for ‘ever-closer union’.
1 INTRODUCTION 25
The UK and the European states need each other in defence, secu-
rity and in economic security. Short term decisions and disputes are
counter-productive and can damage cooperation. Brexit is likely to con-
tinue to play out over many years, and the long-term impact on defence
and security is unclear. What is certain, however, is that a stronger EU
defence role necessitates British participation. Only France and Britain are
global and strategic actors in Europe, and any realisation of a ‘defence
union’ based on ‘autonomous military capacity’—the terminology
used by the EU leadership—has to include Britain’s close links to the
United States, its willingness to take risks, and its military capacities.
Germany continues to be reluctant to lead military operations and will
not risk war-fighting, particularly not in the Middle East and North
Africa region, so France would be left alone as a military actor in an
imaginary EU defence union. Smaller capable states would contribute—
perhaps Denmark and the Netherlands—but this would not add up to a
fully-capable defence union, such as the United States. Poland, the other
major state with a military culture in the EU, would, like Britain, prefer
to work for American and therefore NATO primacy. It is only elements
in France and Germany which would like to develop an ambitious
defence role for the EU.
What Brussels does not appreciate is that even France prefers NATO
and the US, according to the French strategic review of November
2017. This review articulates the conditions for military cooperation,
putting clear priority on those relevant military actors that will accept
risk. In effect, this rules out Germany and means that both the partner-
ship with Britain as well as that with the US take precedence over an
EU coalition of states. France would prefer an EU with teeth, acting as
a pole in the state system which can deter, coerce, and do war-fighting.
This is a consistent strategic interest since de Gaulle. When PESCO
ended with 26 states as signatories, France was disappointed, and the
effects are discussed in Faure’s and Matlary’s chapters in this volume.
The French hope that the EDF and PESCO will result in a much bet-
ter security industrial policy and they prefer a strong institutional basis
for such a policy, because the market approach based on voluntarism
does not work. But the most they can achieve in this field is close-knit
industrial cooperation with some common European military capacities.
Such an integrated procurement policy would not, however, produce a
strategic and military culture amongst the states taking part. Thus, the
EU is incapable of creating a defence union capable of deterring and
war-fighting. France instead pursues industrial policy in defence in the

work in the EU, and much can be improved through more dirigiste pol-
icy in this field.
The situation for France and the EU underscores the idea that that
war-fighting is only possible with willing and capable states. The EU
may claim to be able to command a significant budget, but France does
not confuse defence and procurement as Brussels does: these are two
very different types of policy. Using force in deterrence, coercion, and
war-fighting presupposes a military culture in the actors involved, and
the EU lacks that set of criteria.
It is the United States that continues to dominate European defence
capability. The American leadership of NATO is likely to stop any
attempt to duplicate its defence role and is certain to advocate Britain’s
continued importance in the Alliance. Defence secretary James Mattis
demanded a clarification from the EU at the Munich security confer-
ence on 15 February 2018, asking pointedly what was meant by ‘defence
union’ and ‘autonomous military capacity’.13 Central EU states will
never accept any weakening of NATO—such as Poland, Denmark, and
the Netherlands, but, crucially, neither will France. EU attempts to
develop a defence role are therefore limited by these states and would in
all events need British participation, leaving Britain with a kind of ‘veto’
power over this.
In conclusion, the EU is not likely to develop a defence role in strategic
policy terms—even less so without Britain—and NATO will remain the
primary international organisation in this field in the West. Furthermore,
if NATO persists with Article V as the ‘glue’ that keeps it together, we
see an increasing role for partnerships and coalitions within and beyond
NATO. In this book we analyse the British partnership with the US,
with France, but also Britain’s leading role in the JEF and the Northern
Group. The British partnership with France continues, and the impor-
tance of this bilateral relationship is also clear: the fact that the British
ambassador to Paris at the time, Sir Peter Ricketts, contributed le
livre blanc of 2013 testifies to the close relationship between the two
countries.
The British “special relationship” with the US is also set to continue
because Washington regards Britain as its key ally in Europe. It has also
been the historic practice that the US will work with anybody when they
need to. Thus, whilst the American preference has always been to work
with the UK on defence matters, and there is a prevailing image of the
1 INTRODUCTION 27
UK as the most likely partner (in terms of size of commitment) on oper-

ations relative to any other country, this will still be recognized as being
context specific. For instance, there is no expectation on the part of the
US Pacific Command that the UK will be a major partner, or any sort
of partner for that matter, in any conflict dealing with China or North
Korea. The expectation is mainly limited to Middle East and European
operations, perhaps with some peripheral cooperation on Africa. As for
Europe, the US and UK share more similar views on the Russian threat
probably than the US and Germany do. Moreover, in this period of
uncertainty and turbulence there is little motivation on either side for
any radical changes in the special relationship—so no serious realign-
ments away from Britain are likely. Instead, for quite separate reasons the
US will alter its relationships with some other countries, which is to say
they will increase or decrease levels of cooperation, but none of these
other relationships can possibly compare with the US/UK relationship
which is deeply ingrained and interdependent. Moreover, though some
Americans perceive that the UK is becoming weaker, there is no funda-
mental re-assessment of the strength of the relationship taking place in
Washington.
The leading role that Britain plays in the JEF and the Northern
Group has increased in importance, and its is significant that Sweden and
Finland have joined both. The UK has been a leading security actor in
the Nordic-Baltic region since 2016, encouraging and including Finland
and Sweden in a range of military activities without binding them into
mutual security guarantees. The current setting is fundamentally differ-
ent than during the Cold War, when Finland and Sweden were neutral
with ill-defined roles in the event of a crisis. Now their roles in Western
strategic thinking are much more similar and important, as they are
seen as key assets in the region. With its diplomatic skills and initiatives,
Britain has contributed to the current situation in important ways, and
nothing indicates that this will stop in the foreseeable future. JEF repre-
sents a coalition inside NATO, involving several members in its order of
battle. As such, it is the foremost example of the trend towards regional,
state-to-state arrangements in defence matters—be it several states, as a
coalition, or a partnership of two states. Russia is seen as a ‘Northern
Europe’ problem, and the states of the North therefore cooperate to deal
with it. The axis of Washington-London-the Nordics/Baltics/Poland is a
real one: not only is Britain the key European ally of the US, but also
has close partnerships with Norway, Denmark, and Poland. The US is
of pivotal importance in deterring Russia in the Baltics and Poland, (but

sees its role as providing that defence presence across the entire east-
ern sphere of continental Europe) and works in close cooperation with
European allies. In terms of strategic defence policy today, the US is the
primary partner, while France is the key strategic actor in the Maghreb
and the Sahel, and in northern Europe and the High North, Britain is
the key state. It is, like France, backed by the US in its role, but it is the
‘lead power’ in the area. Neither Brussels’ condemnation of Brexit nor
political turbulence in the Trump administration will change this funda-
mental strategic reality.
Notes
1. ‘EU and UK Seek Quick Deal on Defence and Security’, The Financial
Times, 5 February 2018.
2. See the Politico guide at https://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-bill-po-
litico-policy-guides-eu-uk-negotiations/ (Accessed February 2018).
3. See FO 30/1048, April 1971, The National Archives, Kew.
4. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era
(Cambridge: Polity, 1999, reprintd 2012); Mary Kaldor, ‘In Defence of
New Wars,’ Stability: International Journal of Security and Development
2, no. 1 (March 7, 2013); Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our
Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011).
5. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (London: Allen Lane, 2005).
6. The Common Security and Defence Policy, https://eeas.europa.eu/head-
quarters/headquarters-homepage/431/common-security-and-de-
fence-policy-csdp_en (Accessed February 2018).
7. Jonathan di John, ‘Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of
Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature’, London School of
Economics and Politics, Crisis States Research Centre, 2008 at www.
gsdrc.org/document-library/conceptualising-the-causes-and-consequenc-
es-of-failed-states-a-critical-review-of-the-literature/ (Accessed December
2017).
8. See, for example, ‘Obama Says Europe Must Do More in Afghanistan’, 28
February 2008, Reuters, at https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-poli-
tics-obama-afghanistan/obama-says-europe-must-do-more-in-afghani-
stan-idUKN2861811220080229 (Accessed January 2018).
9. ‘Iraq War Claims Unit to Be Shut Down, Says UK Defence Secretary’,
The Guardian, 27 February 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/feb/10/iraq-war-claims-unit-to-be-shut-down-says-uk-de-
fence-secretary (Accessed January 2018).
1 INTRODUCTION 29
10. Report of the Iraq Enquiry, 12 vols, https://www.gov.uk/government/

publications/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry (Accessed February 2018).
11. J. Kirchik, The End of Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017);
R. Coalson, ‘Top Russian General Lays Bare Putin’s Plan for Ukraine’,
Huffington Post, 2 November 2014. Available at http://www.huffington-
post.com/robert-coalson/valery-gerasimov-putinukraine_b_5748480.
html (Accessed January 2018).
12.
S. Bowles and S. Polanía-Reyes, ‘Economic Incentives and Social
Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?’, Journal of Economic
Literature 50 (2012): 368–425.
13.
‘Amerika fordert von EU Klarstellung zur Verteidigungsunion’,
Frankfurter allegemeine Zeitung, 15 February 2018.
PART I
Britain’s Partnerships
CHAPTER 2
UK Defence Policy: The ‘New Canada’

and ‘International by Design’
Rob Johnson
The EU referendum of 2016 was a landmark in Britain’s foreign r elations.

The decision to remain in or exit from the European Union caused a
great deal of debate in the United Kingdom about its spending and aus-
terity, economic policy, immigration, and identity. The result, where a
majority voted in favour of leaving the EU, created uncertainty about the
future. In Europe, many believed the British, who been awkward partners
at best (in the sense that they had never been part of the Schengen agree-
ment, the Euro currency or subscribers to the federal ‘ever-closer union’),
were perhaps not serious about departure. Nevertheless, from a defence
and security perspective, the European states were no longer clear about
Britain’s commitment to European defence.
The paradox was that the two previous UK defence reviews (2010 and
2015) had referred to an ‘age of uncertainty’.1 This was, in fact, a refer-
ence to anticipated state failures in Africa and Asia rather than Britain’s
status with regard to Europe. The paradox was that, despite the claim
that Britain was entering an age of uncertainty, its strategic review
seemed quite confident about the strength of the UK’s position and the
R. Johnson (*) 
Changing Character of War Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

34 R. JOHNSON
nature of the emerging threats. As a result, there had been much more
clarity about the values with which Britain identified, including its
determination to be a member of dependable member of alliances and
coalitions. The British believed they could continue to influence the
globe, being prepared to intervene, militarily if necessary, to uphold
international humanitarian law and the ‘rules-based’ system exem-
plified by institutions such as the UN, Commonwealth, World Trade
Organisation, and G20 group. They would do so, according to the
defence reviews, as a member of multiple partnerships. The only situa-
tion in which Britain anticipated independent action was in defence of its
overseas territories, like the Falklands.
Nevertheless, the sense that the Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya interven-
tions of 2001–2014 had not been successful, and even disastrous, per-
vaded the government and armed forces.2 Public perceptions were even
worse, as it was widely-held that the former Prime Minister Tony Blair
had deliberately misled parliament and the people over the first two con-
flicts, and had been willing to negotiate with the leaders of Libya and
Syria, namely Gadhafi and Assad, both of whom proved themselves to
be murderous dictators. The result was that, although the UK’s armed
forces were still postured for ‘expeditionary’ and global intervention,
the willingness to do so had largely evaporated. The first parliamen-
tary vote on intervention against Syria in 2013, when the government
in Damascus was engaged in much more egregious crimes against civil-
ians than had occurred in Libya, resulted in a government defeat and the
decision not to take action. A subsequent vote in 2016, once the Syrian
regime had evidently attacked the civilian population with a variety of
munitions, and when Daesh, the so-called Islamic State movement,
had emerged to threaten both the Syrian and the Iraqi people, led to
sustained air operations. There were recriminations against the Labour
opposition leader, Jeremy Corbyn, for opposing an evident humanitarian
operation despite the obvious grounds for doing so.3 The situation in
Syria had worsened because of the failure to intervene in 2013.
After the Brexit referendum of 2016, confusion reigned in Europe
about Britain’s defence posture. While leaving the EU, the UK sent a
contingent to the ‘enhanced forward presence’ of the Baltic States and
Poland. Indeed, the British commanded the brigade in Estonia, estab-
lished a ‘Standing Joint Force Headquarters’ with embedded European
units in the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), and encouraged greater
emphasis on the ‘Northern Group’ coalition of the Scandinavian
2 UK DEFENCE POLICY: THE ‘NEW CANADA’ … 35
countries, including Sweden (a non-NATO state). The UK prime

minister, Theresa May, spoke of ‘Global Britain’, looking outwards to
world commerce and cooperation, while maintaining ‘a deep and special
partnership’ with the European Union.4 It looked as if the British were
asserting that leaving the EU did not mean leaving Europe and that its
role in NATO would be emphasised more strongly.
Critics nevertheless noted that there seemed to be multiple contra-
dictions. If the British defence policy was ‘international by design’, as
it claimed, how did London explain ‘Brexit’? Did the British mean they
were staunch members of NATO, and therefore committed to defending
Europe, but unwilling to work with any EU security mission? For the
United States, there were also concerns. The British had declared them-
selves the strongest allies of America and joined the US efforts in Iraq
and Afghanistan, but they had abandoned southern Iraq prematurely
in 2006 and had been unable, on their own, to resolve the conflict in
southern Afghanistan’s Helmand province in 2009.5 The British were
also engaged in building aircraft carriers in 2016–2017, but concurrently
were discussing further defence cuts, particularly in the Royal Marines
and their amphibious capability. The Americans were therefore also con-
fused by their British allies.
The Iraq War of 2003–2009 had an undeniably negative impact on
British policy-making. The Iraq Enquiry, the 2.6 million-word report
published in 2017, had, amongst its many findings, revealed an absence
of strategic education in the UK’s decision-makers of 2003–2006. One
former Defence Minister had admitted that there was too much opti-
mism, and mistakes were made, some wilfully, by members of the gov-
ernment of the day. The conclusion, he confessed, was that: ‘we should
have asked more questions’.6 Cross government co-operation had been
lacking and civil–military relations had been marred by misunderstand-
ings. The enquiry therefore made a number of recommendations, and
Britain established a National Security Council (NSC) to assist with
the development of a whole-of-government approach to making strat-
egy. For the operational decisions, the Cabinet (and in emergencies,
COBRA) is still supreme, but the NSC, with a permanent National
Security Advisor, brings together the Chief of the Defence Staff, the
heads of the intelligence services and selected Cabinet members to
examine the most important concerns. NSC subcommittees man-
age specific issues, and encourage whole-of-government solutions. The
British government also retains its systems of checks and balances, with
36 R. JOHNSON
a parliamentary select committees for defence, intelligence, and procure-

ment, with periodic reviews (such as the NSCR of 2017), and parliamen-
tary debates. While full scale enquiries, like Lord Chilcott’s on Iraq, are
rare, their existence demonstrates that it is subsequently far harder to
make strategy without a robust discussion or scrutiny in the British sys-
tem and certainly this will be the case going forward.
This chapter examines the British view of their defence policy, the
influences on that policy, and the ways in which they justify themselves.
It provides a guide to the key question posed repeatedly in 2016–2017:
what is Britain’s defence policy in an era of Brexit?
National Interests
Strategy (or policy, as it is styled by those who fear the military implica-
tions of the term strategy) starts with the identification of national inter-
ests, which are enduring in nature and not the product of short term
political statements. Strategy can be discerned by long term behaviour
in respect of these national interests more reliably than what is written
about national values and aspirations in defence reviews. The primary
national interest is to protect the United Kingdom, its citizens, its consti-
tution and system of government. It is also about the promotion of com-
merce and the protection of national wealth. But the less often stated,
but self-evident priority concerning foreign affairs and defence, is to
remain close to, and protected by, the United States. A second unstated,
but characteristic, element of national interests is the pragmatic judge-
ment to adapt to changing geo-political and economic circumstances.
This sort of gradualism has been the long-term hallmark of the British in
domestic affairs too, but that does not mean they are not prepared to act
on principle. Indeed, the third element of their national strategy is their
desire to uphold the international rules-based order, since history indi-
cates that the alternatives are far more detrimental to British interests.
There are a number of influences on British strategy, primarily from
the past, which are not always stated clearly but nevertheless exist. The
first of these is the desire to avoid major, costly wars. The sheer losses
and destruction of the two world wars, including the eclipse of the
pound sterling as the world’s currency and the reduction of Britain’s
share of global commerce, is something the British are eager to avoid
a repetition of. The second historical legacy is to avoid isolation. In
1940, Britain was the sole power left fighting Nazism and Fascism,
which placed it in a damaging existential conflict. In 1956, Britain was

again isolated by the Suez Crisis (although strictly it had French back-
ing, the critical factor was the hostility of the United States). The spectre
of Suez, which brought down the British government and affected the
British currency severely, continues to affect British decision-makers. The
third legacy is an anxiety about energy security, which for many years was
offset by the abundance of North Sea oil and gas. In 1973, the ‘energy
crisis’, which put the British on a limited ‘three-day week’, underscored
the need to maintain good relations with the Arab world or diversify
the nation’s energy supplies. The fourth legacy is the desire to avoid the
domination of the neighbouring continent of Europe by a single hostile
power (historically, France or Germany). Each of these elements has a
profound influence without always being articulated by Britain’s political
leaders, but they act as a moral constraint on British strategic planning.
In terms of ‘ways’, the British tend to adopt certain methods for the
fulfilment of their strategy and defence policy. The first line of defence
is diplomacy. The British attach considerable prestige to their diplomatic
corps and regard negotiation, ‘jaw-jaw’, as Winston Churchill put it,
as far more preferable than ‘war-war’. From a defence perspective, the
British have usually favoured maritime (and now air) containment. There
is a preference for an indirect strategy too, although this is based partly
on the myth created by Basil Liddell-Hart after the First World War,
since, contrary to his thesis, Britain did not always seek to get continen-
tal European powers to fight while it sought a peripheral and indirect
route to victory. Indeed, British forces have necessarily been expedition-
ary, since the British occupy islands, but that has not prevented them
from engaging in direct operations against a continental enemy since
the seventeenth century. The British have, however, sought coalitions to
augment their land power strength. They have also sought to develop
an early warning system so as to convert their national wealth, though
mobilisation, into war material as and when required. Finally, Britain
has invariably made use of local partners around the world to project its
power and influence. Today, it promotes defence diplomacy, advisory and
assistance missions or makes use of selected military forces to make direct
interventions against an enemy.
In essence, Britain’s enduring strategic behaviour means that it will
serve its national interests; seek to remain close to the United States;
protect its constitution, commerce and the global commons; and work
with coalition partners for the preservation of the international system.
38 R. JOHNSON
None of these priorities necessarily means membership of the European

Union, which would explain its strategic ambivalence to the EU com-
pared with, say, a country like the Netherlands, which regards its EU
membership as fundamental.
Yet, the bridge between Britain’s national interests and Europe is
NATO. American leadership of that alliance determines Britain’s mem-
bership, which also explains why the notion of an EU armed force evokes
hostility even amongst those who advocate membership of NATO.
The idea that an ‘EU Army’ would be led by Eurocrats rather than the
United States seems absurd to the British. They hope, instead, that the
EU might potentially provide the ‘soft power’ tools to augment NATO’s
‘hard power’ options.
Unfulfilled Expectations
In many ways, the British cannot fulfil the values and expectations they
set out for themselves in their defence reviews. In the early 2000s, the
Labour government emphasised its desire to align Britain’s foreign pol-
icy with the ‘millennium goals’ of eradicating poverty in the Global
South, but, despite its generous aid budget, the scale of the problem and
international trade restrictions made this unlikely. The Labour Foreign
Secretary, Robin Cook, had claimed that Britain would pursue an ‘ethical
foreign policy’ and immediately ran into a diplomatic storm with Israel
when he argued in favour of a Palestinian state and border revisions.7
Britain’s aspiration to see a preservation of the international-rules based
system to preserve the status quo seems increasingly unlikely given the
desire by Russia and China to assert themselves as global powers and
change the world order in their favour. Above all, the decision in 2003
to invade Iraq in order to eradicate a Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) programme and democratise the Middle East turned out to
be an ill-considered strategy. The WMD programme was practically
non-existent, the intelligence was deliberately manipulated to justify
intervention, and the invasion created chaotic destabilisation. Curiously,
when democratising movements emerged in 2011, during the so-called
‘Arab Spring’, Britain only intervened in Libya, as part of a reluctant coa-
lition. The subsequent empowerment of local militias and the collapse
of authority led to protracted violence there and a flood of refugees into
Europe.
The British claim to prioritise their relationship with the United States
has also been problematic.8 The decision to pull out of Iraq, just as the
Americans were trying to orchestrate a surge of forces into the coun-
try, has already been mentioned. But the United Kingdom presence in
Afghanistan too was very small after 2014 and it has not run any of the
‘Train, Advise and Assist’ missions, although it does support the Afghan
National Army Officers Academy. British defence cuts through 2010–
2015 also caused some concerns in the United States, although the rela-
tionship with President Obama could not be described as ‘close’ or truly
‘Special’. Despite the efforts of Prime Minister Theresa May to establish
a better working relationship with President Donald Trump in 2016, the
public outcry against him in Britain meant that an official state visit was
postponed.9
The claim to be ‘international by design’ in defence policy has raised
more questions than it has answered. The phrase implied that small
nations might look to internationalise any dispute in order to obtain
Britain’s, and, by extension, America’s backing. This was certainly the
view in Scandinavia and the Baltic states in 2017.10 The key question
was about Britain’s capability: how could it possibly manage all its global
commitments if more than one was challenged at the same time? Naval
personnel questioned the ability of Britain to ‘do another Falklands’ if it
had no operational aircraft carriers and was speculating about the aboli-
tion of Royal Marine assault ships.11
There were other considerations here too however. One was the evi-
dent power of ‘anti-access, area denial’ (A2AD) weapons, from new gen-
erations of anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles to cyber disruption, which
has shrunk distances and made operations against well-armed adver-
saries infinitely more hazardous than counter-insurgency missions in
Afghanistan. To add to the challenges, there were shortages of personnel
to sustain manning requirements, which is a common problem in peace-
time. If Britain was more dependent on its NATO allies, then the most
worrying development was the steady decline in spending on defence
across Europe (as a percentage of gross domestic product). The mes-
sage this had conveyed to the United States was that the Europeans did
not consider defence to be a priority, which, naturally, led the Americans
to wonder whether they too should continue their vast expenditure on
behalf of Europeans or whether reductions should be made. President
Trump intended to provoke the Europeans by speculating by Twitter
whether NATO was perhaps obsolete, a view he later retracted.12
40 R. JOHNSON
It caused a storm of protest, but an agreement had been concluded at

the NATO summit in Wales in 2014 that each nation should commit to
a minimum of 2% of their GDP on defence, with the majority on new
equipment for modernisation.13 Critics argued that, although Britain was
one of the few countries to meet its target, it had included all defence
spending in the figure. Nevertheless, the UK construction of aircraft car-
riers at least fulfilled the requirement to prioritise new equipment.
Despite this catalogue of unfulfilled expectations, the United
Kingdom had made some progress and by 2018 possessed defence
assets that certainly exceeded those of other European states, includ-
ing Germany, which had a larger economy. The British established the
National Cyber Security Centre to augment the excellent work of its
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). They cre-
ated the Joint Forces Command co-located with the Permanent Joint
Headquarters (PJHQ) which was responsible for managing opera-
tions, and acted as the link between forces in theatre and the Ministry
of Defence in London. The Joint Forces Command established expe-
ditionary forces and deployable headquarters, but also exercised British
forces in joint missions, and engaged with coalition partners. The British
started to set up experimental forces too, to practice the integration of
new technologies and see where practices needed to change. There was
a stronger emphasis on the ‘comprehensive approach’ in all the endeav-
ours of the armed forces, that is to say, a ‘whole of government’ arrange-
ment where different government ministries sent personnel to advise,
co-operate and sometimes direct defence activities. There was a corre-
sponding invitation to the private sector and to academics to assist in the
development of ideas and processes in defence and security.
Yet, inconsistencies and contradictions remained. Of the two major
parties, the Conservatives tend to value defence and argue in favour of
a robust strategy, and yet they will always prioritise the economy, and,
as a result, have presided over several rounds of cuts since the end of the
Cold War. By contrast, the Labour party’s leadership in 2017 was clearly
antagonistic towards defence. The Labour leader was a long-standing
member of the ‘Stop the War’ coalition and a Marxist who had champi-
oned the IRA and other terrorist organisations against the British armed
forces in the 1980s and 1990s.14 He and his colleagues had made public
statements on wanting to reduce severely the size and role of the army,
navy and air force, with the complete abolition of the domestic intelli-
gence service known as MI5.15 The former head of the British Secret
Intelligence Service stated that Mr. Corbyn was unfit to govern as he

represented a security risk to the United Kingdom.16 American and
European allies would certainly be dismayed if any of Labour’s radical
reforms were put into practice. They would mark the end of Britain’s
global influence and its claim to be a significant actor in world affairs.
Indeed, such reforms would lead to a complete change in British for-
eign and defence policy and fundamentally alter the nature of its strategy,
national interests and its status. The immediate concern would be in the
reduction of Britain’s capability.
Capability
Capability can be measured in a number of ways, but the three most sig-
nificant are decision-making; budget; and the forces’ strength in terms
of arms, equipment and readiness. Each of these areas is taken in turn to
assess Britain’s current capability and its near-future prospects.
Britain’s recent record of decision-making in defence has been far
from exemplary. The Iraq Enquiry, published in 2017, revealed a poor
grasp of the design and execution of strategy. British governments have
been guilty of a degree of complacency, perhaps because of a long period
without major conflicts. One government minister claimed, in October
2017, that the armed forces had all that they currently required to meet
existing threats, but off the record conversations across all three ser-
vices revealed a list of problems and concerns which seemed to indicate
that, while Britain could manage low intensity terrorism, was far from
ready to participate in a major conflict against a near-peer adversary. In
decision-making, there was further concern that some MPs, especially the
Labour opposition, were vehemently opposed to the United States and
to NATO. Yet there were concerns about the Conservative government
too. The former Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osbourne, had
championed close economic ties with China which appeared to prioritise
trade deals over security, and the Prime Minister Theresa May was forced
to halt Chinese bidding for the construction of a UK nuclear power sta-
tion at Hinkley Point because of suspicions about espionage.17 A far more
extensive concern about successive governments, regardless of party, has
been the prevalence of ‘politically-correct’ statements over hard choices.
Fearful of negative media coverage, governments have been accused of
concealing defence problems, ‘spin-doctoring’ stories and champion-
ing popular causes regardless of their military merit. It was depressing to
42 R. JOHNSON
hear defence personnel championing LGBTI issues or ‘family-friendly’

employment conditions over military effectiveness. One former Royal
Marine officer noted that his brigade did not accept the blind, deaf or
physically-disabled, or those with extreme political beliefs, simply because
of the missions they were asked to perform.18 Armed forces are not there
to represent the profile of a nation. They are designed for war.
Much has been written on recent government decision-making, but
one example highlights the problems. In 2014, Russian troops, with-
out identification, seized control of Crimea, part of the sovereign state
of Ukraine, and annexed the territory illegally after a rigged referen-
dum. The issue caused considerable concern in Britain, evoking memo-
ries of the 1930s and highlighting how far Vladimir Putin was prepared
to go in terms of strategic risk to fulfil his objectives. Interestingly, a
Franco-German delegation made direct appeals to Moscow, while the
EU debated the issue. The British government issued its condemna-
tion, called for the expulsion of Russia from the G8 and boycotted the
Russian Olympics at Sochi, but there was no maritime response in the
region.19 Sir Malcolm Rifkind, the former Defence Minister, believed:
‘On the basis of the measures announced so far by both the US and the
EU, on visa controls and asset freezes internationally, I say with great
sadness that is a pathetic and feeble response that does not match the
seriousness which those implementing these responses have themselves
acknowledged we face at the present time.’20 Sir William Hague, the
Foreign Secretary, nevertheless believed that a concerted EU and UN
action would convert Russian military success in Crimea into a zero-sum
game, as its international position was weakened.21
Subsequently, there were sanctions against the Russian government,
and an ‘enhanced forward presence’, a deterrent force in the Baltic states,
was agreed by NATO. The United Kingdom despatched ships to the
Baltic Sea, and troops to Estonia and Poland. The reaction fitted with a
longer pattern of antagonised relations which included the Russian sei-
zure of Pristina airport during the Bosnia conflict in 1999, the murder of
Alexander Litvinenko by the Russian secret service using radioactive poi-
son in London in 2006, repeated attempts at Russian military violations
of UK airspace, and the bombing of aid convoys and civilians in Syria in
2015–2016.22 The British responses to these issues has been to agree on
the renewal of the Trident nuclear deterrent, the robust RAF response to
Russian aircraft closing on UK air space, and frequent diplomatic protests.
The second area of capability is in budgeting for defence. Britain has

been consistent in committing 2.2% of its GDP to defence, which rep-
resents £34 billion per annum of which £17.8 billion is for new equip-
ment, or, put another way, £178 billion over the decade 2016–2026.23
This is the equivalent of £532 per person in the United Kingdom per
year. As a benchmark, the UK economy is worth $2.9 trillion per annum
of which 15% comes from the financial services of the City of London.
For the purposes of comparison, it is interesting to note that UK defence
spending is far higher in absolute terms and in proportion to that of
Germany, which spends less of defence despite its larger economy. This
is the cause of some resentment in both the United Kingdom and the
United States which believes Germany makes convenient use of its con-
stitution and its history to avoid shouldering expensive defence commit-
ments. As a whole, NATO has called for 20% of all spending to be on
modernising equipment, and the UK leads on European arms and equip-
ment expenditure.
This leads us to the third area of capability, namely forces, arms,
equipment and readiness. The British are resolute about the nature of
Article 5 of NATO, and believe that, given its significance, Britain
should ensure it is the last resort option. As a result, British forces are
configured for ‘rapid reaction’, with its Very High Readiness Task Force
(VJTF), and provide a ‘trip wire’ defence posture in eastern and north-
ern Europe. The UK is, like other NATO nations, acutely aware of the
challenges of hybrid warfare or nuclear coercion by Russia. Early warn-
ing, rapid reaction and information warfare manoeuvre are now estab-
lished aspects of the British defence systems. Britain is a leading nation
in cyber defence and enjoys close relations with Estonia, which possesses
the NATO Centre of Excellence in this field. Britain’s concerns are that
some other European nations do not take the threats posed by Russia
very seriously, or perhaps use British, American and French military
power as the excuse not to have to spend more of their own resources on
defence. The result is a British concern about European inter-operability,
commitment, and spending. This has made the Brexit debate all the
more bitter for the British public. The majority feel that their sacrifices in
the Second World War and the Cold War have been forgotten, and while
the Europeans complain about the UK not paying more for the ‘divorce
bill’ to leave the EU, the British point to their cemeteries on the conti-
nent as proof that they have paid enough.
44 R. JOHNSON
Each of the UK armed services has a strong case for future enhance-
ment as far as defence requirements are concerned. The Royal Navy
argues that, since most of the country’s needs come by sea and it is the
navy that projects power and influence globally, it should take priority.
Currently, at the time of writing, the Royal Navy possesses 77 vessels,
which is a significant reduction on the 1980s where it could deploy 120
ships. It also seems far smaller than Russia, which can count 280 ships
in its forces.24 Moreover, of the British ships, only 18 can be categorised
as principal vessels, including the two new aircraft carriers. The Royal
Navy can, however, provide a variety of options, which other European
fleets cannot. The UK can offer constabulary missions against piracy,
drugs and smuggling with new Offshore Patrol Vessels. In surveillance
and submarine detection it has invested in 9 Boeing P8 Maritime Patrol
Aircraft. It has a warfighting capability, with its own integral maritime
air force, anti-submarine capacity and mine warfare component. It has
set a course to introduce the Type 26 Global Combat Ships. Its logistics
fleet means it can sustain itself at sea, while the continuous at sea nuclear
deterrent (CASND) provides the fundamental mainstay of UK defence.
The RAF maintain that all conflicts are dependent on air power, and
the air force is able to offer the versatility of strike, lift and surveillance
on a home defence and expeditionary footing. The RAF has had a sig-
nificant footprint at the CENTCOM air operations cell in Qatar for mis-
sions over the Middle East, the Gulf and Afghanistan, and it has gained
considerable experience in precision operations over the last two decades.
It is to be equipped with the F35 strike fighters, a total of 138 aircraft
of this type, and the latest lift aircraft to maintain its leading edge, and
Advanced High Altitude surveillance aircraft, with over 20 Protector
armed remotely piloted aircraft. The RAF will establish 2 additional
Typhoon squadrons and an additional F35 squadron to augment its
strength in 2018. However, it is also noteworthy how small the RAF has
become since the end of the Cold War.
The British Army is keen to assert that, in the final reckoning, wars
are decided on land, and that, as operations between 2001 and 2014
indicated, conflicts are invariably conducted amongst populations where
close engagement is required at ground level. The army is also a flexible
organisation, able to turn its hand to peace-keeping, humanitarian relief
and warfighting in any terrain, with all its integral enablers of command,
surveillance, fires and logistics. The British Army has been reconfigured
to provide a deployable division (3 Div) and a second division (1 Div)
that will be able to conduct persistent engagement (through ‘special-

ised infantry battalions’) or follow up the deployed divisions’ operations.
The army also complement modern joint operations with an airmobile
brigade (alongside an amphibious commando brigade), an ISR brigade
(conducting surveillance) and an amorphous information operations for-
mation known as 77 Brigade. An extra £2 billion was also committed to
Special Forces’ equipment.
The debates within the armed forces themselves are to some extent
unchanged from previous generations. Military professionals continu-
ally assess what type of forces they need, that is, the degree of specialism
or the extent to which they should maintain a ‘balanced force’ able to
conduct any type of operation under all conditions. Military officers and
their civilian counterparts in MOD also reassess the skill sets they need,
how to develop their manpower and the performance of equipment.
Ministry officials work closely with the UK defence industry to ascertain
what research and development direction to take. At the command level,
there has been much debate about the systems of control, the degree of
centralisation or delegation and the requirements of the ‘information
age’.
Continuing Challenges
There are a number of challenges which continue to affect the United
Kingdom’s defence and security.25 The most pressing and visible is the
means with which to protect the public from acts of terrorism, not least
because it is not possible to offer a 100% guarantee of safety. The home-
grown nature of the terrorist threat also makes domestic surveillance and
privacy a contested issue, while sustaining public vigilance, a vital part of
the country’s defence, is difficult. On the other hand, the effects of ter-
rorist attacks, excepting the victims and their families, tend to be short-
lived. Unlike France and Belgium, the British have not committed their
army to the streets of major cities. Transport systems recover quickly,
financial losses are replaced and the British public, who are familiar with
such attacks since the 1970s by Irish terrorists, exhibit a phlegmatic defi-
ance of the perpetrators. The widespread popularity of the pre- Second
World War slogan ‘Keep Calm and Carry On’ in the 2000s is an indi-
cator of the public mood and emulates the expression from that era
that ‘Britain Can Take It’. That is not to diminish the existence of panic
and fear during incidents, or defeatism among certain quarters of the
46 R. JOHNSON
population, but it is remarkable that the British public tend to reach for
icons of defiance and resistance, like Winston Churchill’s rhetoric, when
they are confronted by threats of this nature.
A second challenge is the interconnectedness of the globe, particu-
larly when it comes to the supply chain of sensitive information and
technologies. The private sector undoubtedly plays a key role in the

development of defence and security technologies, from the software of
detection and cyber penetration to the development of platforms of sur-
veillance in space. Private security contractors and military companies are
seen as a necessary element in state stabilisation and logistical support
to Western forces. The squeeze on available government resources, par-
ticularly after the economic crisis of 2008, has added to this pressure to
engage with and subcontract to the private sector for a range of defence
needs, from estates to research. Maintaining the operational security of
future developments will certainly be more challenging for Britain, and,
like many Western countries, it expects that it will possess a leading tech-
nological edge only for a short period even though new breakthroughs
will occur thick and fast over the next few decades.
A third challenge is the development of Britain’s next generation of
nuclear capability. The Dreadnaught class of submarine will be equipped
with the new generation of nuclear weapons but the costs will be prohib-
itive unless the UK can spread the costs and set aside approximately £1
billion a year for their introduction. Here the European Union’s insist-
ence on continued payments by Britain through Brexit reveals Brussels’
rather short-term view of the United Kingdom: wanting bills paid on
its own terms for European integration projects, rather than its strategic
sense of enabling Britain to commit to future nuclear defence costs for
the continent. Europeanists would argue that Britain needs to pay for
pledges already made, but there is no doubt that the EU wanted the UK
to pay for forthcoming projects too, including infrastructural develop-
ment. The British argument was that, as one of the largest contributors
to European defence, in contrast to many EU member states, it already
had paid its share.
Another, fourth, challenge relating to expenditure and defence is that
of the UK’s reserve forces. To reduce costs, the Ministry of Defence
had announced that part time volunteer forces would be more closely
integrated into the regulars, and, in the event of conflict, these reserves
would augment the deployed formations. A Reserve Forces Act in 1996
had provided for reserves that were ‘high-readiness’ and which could be
brought onto the operational tours of Iraq and Afghanistan. Reservists

did so from all three services. The problem was that the Reserves were
not able to maintain the high levels of training efficiency that the regu-
lars could manage, and the high turnover of personnel tended to rein-
force the repetition of basic proficiency levels, even though some had
gained valuable operational experience. Moreover, in the future, a major
conflict would require most of the Reserves to be maintained in the
United Kingdom in home defence and internal security roles, leaving the
regulars with the shortfall they had anticipated.
The fifth challenge is the constant uncertainty of the type of war one
will be expected to fight. While tactical experiences for sailors, airmen,
marines and soldiers are invariably similar, the operational and strate-
gic requirements over the last three decades have been radically differ-
ent. Technological developments can only provide part of the solution.
The British forces undoubtedly enjoyed a technological superiority
over the Taliban of Afghanistan and Jaish al Mahdi of Iraq, for exam-
ple, but this did not make it any easier for the British to conclude the
conflicts in Helmand and Basra satisfactorily. The British, in common
with their NATO allies, have struggled to determine their military pos-
ture towards cyber attacks, hybrid warfare and proxy wars. Herein lay
another issue, namely, the extent to which the European defence sys-
tems are integrated, from the legislation required in the event of con-
flict, to decision-making about the hybrid threats and what constitutes
grounds for an allied military response. To this one might also add the
track record of conventional deterrence, which has hardly been exem-
plary, although, admittedly the methodology for measuring what has
been deterred is far from clear.
The Domains for UK Strategy

The UK has to address threats and opportunities in a number of domains
in the present and the near future. These fall into the categories of
geo-strategic changes, homeland security, persistent foreign engagement,
information warfare, economic warfare, coercive diplomacy with hybrid
operations, urban warfighting, and chemical-biological-radiological
threats.
The geostrategic environment has undoubtedly started to shift since
2000. The United States remains the pre-eminent superpower globally,
but the economic take-off of China has created a significant challenge for
48 R. JOHNSON
the Americans, not only in terms of Chinese aspirations to take part in

global affairs but also in the Chinese view of the exclusive sovereignty of
the South and East China Seas. The first test of Chinese power politics in
this new era is likely to be over the handling of North Korea, a close ally
of Beijing, but also in its ability to manage diplomacy with its regional
neighbours, all of whom view the Chinese claims to world power sta-
tus with suspicion. The United Kingdom is not immune from the rivalry
of America and China, seeing commercial opportunities with the latter
but clearly unwilling to forego its strategic relationship with the former.
It finds itself in a better position than Australia, which has commercial
dependencies on China but which remains an American ally. The same
is true of the British view of the central and eastern European states,
which are dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and consequently reluc-
tant to criticise Moscow. Given this European temptation to give way to
Russia, it is not hard to see why the British would be reluctant to remain
beholden to the EU’s foreign policy.
There are significant opportunities for the United Kingdom amongst
the emerging states of the world. Alongside its close relationship with
the Commonwealth countries, Britain may well be an important part-
ner of a new Atlantic regionalism, which would include the United
States, Canada, Brazil and Nigeria, as well as other countries. Moreover
e-commerce, which Britain champions, may well overcome many of the
geographical restrictions of the past, gradually prising open the authori-
tarian states of Russia and China regardless of their attempts to prevent
it. The economic liberalism which the United Kingdom has championed
in London could prove to be a much more successful model of global
influence for the future.
The British will certainly face ongoing disputes with Europe post-
Brexit, with the most likely issues being, not European defence, but the
status of Gibraltar, military bases on Cyprus, fishing zones and access to
them, agricultural products, financial sector rivalries, and the jurisdic-
tion of the European Court of Justice. It is likely these will be resolved
through the normal course of political dialogue and diplomacy, much
as they have been in the last 40 years. There has been anxiety over the
Northern Ireland border, with the majority of the province hoping to
keep a soft boundary for the sake of lucrative commerce and a guaran-
tee of peace between antagonised communities. The British govern-
ment made it clear that it would preserve the open borders arrangement
but it could not accept the EU proposal that a hard border be asserted
on the Irish Sea coast, which would effectively wrest Northern Ireland
from UK sovereignty and put it under the control of the EU. Loyalists
in Northern Ireland, already angered by a seemingly endless stream of
political concessions to republicans and nationalists, refused to accept
the EU argument and their position in the British parliament (where
their alliance with the governing Conservative Party gave it a majority it
would otherwise lack) made this a ‘red line’ for the UK government.
Homeland security is, however, a quite different matter. The econ-
omy of the early twenty-first century replicated many of the problems
which had existed in previous centuries, and had generated its own forms
of unrest. The blending of overseas security issues and those at home,
largely through large diaspora populations in Britain, produced terror-
ism informed and driven by events far from Britain’s shores. This threat
implied greater security co-operation across the world, not just with
Europe, not least because most of the epicentres of conflict lay in the
Middle East, Africa and South Asia. Another implication was a need for
greater national resilience, in terms of countering extremist ideology that
sought to divide the British people, but also in terms of critical national
infrastructure (CNI). The establishment of cyber security as an integral
part of UK defence and security reflected the sheer financial cost of cyber
crime but also the catastrophic potential of sustained DDOS attacks
and viral infections to CNI and the UK economy. That said, there was
pragmatic recognition that not every attack could be stopped. Other
aspects of resilience, which lie outside the scope of this chapter, are being
addressed as a government-private sector partnerships, including defence
of space assets, communications and transport. Resilience is the ability
to recover from and continue to function during attacks. One reason for
the UK investment in more diverse energy sources is its concern not to
be dependent on single vulnerable sources of supply, such as oil or gas
from the Middle East.
As an island nation, the UK recognised the need for persistent foreign
engagement long before the phrase entered the defence lexicon. Keeping
enemies at arm’s length was the role of the navy and the air force, but
the UK’s global interests mean that it cannot afford to look only to the
protection of its immediate borders. Fighting at home is damaging and
unattractive to policy makers so defence is projected forward, across
the continent of Europe, through its regional allies in the Middle East,
Africa, the Caribbean, South Asia, South-East Asia and the Pacific. This
means that Britain’s partners can anticipate a forward posture from the
50 R. JOHNSON
United Kingdom over the next ten years at least, but probably far longer,
as it constitutes an integral part of its strategic culture.
Information warfare has given the British some cause for concern.
Both state and non-state actors that oppose Britain have made use of
social media to promote negative, divisive and contrary narratives. At
times, the British response has been rather inadequate and slow. The
problems lie in being reactive, insisting on a singular narrative, and, nat-
urally, an adherence to the truth in a world of relativist representations.
The free press and unregulated social media-sphere mean that every gov-
ernment and military decision is scrutinised and challenged. Yet, what
the British authorities had not anticipated was the exploitation of media
systems. Russia infamously created bots to generate mass in the social
media space and to feed the mainstream media with fake stories or mul-
tiple narratives, including denials of attacks that were well-documented
in eastern Ukraine and in Syria. China, North Korea and Iran have all
used espionage and control of their own media to propagate certain
ideas, including anti-British rhetoric. But the least expected manipula-
tion of the media was the Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT) fiasco
within the UK during and after the Iraq War. Phil Shiner, a socialist
human rights lawyer, attempted to exploit the British government’s will-
ingness to pay compensation to any victims of British military aggression
by encouraging false allegations. The result was that millions of pounds
of public money was lost to nefarious cases, not a single one of which
produced a conviction. Shiner was eventually struck off and the inves-
tigations closed in 2017 but many commentators asked why Shiner and
his colleagues had not been challenged sooner.26
The British armed forces are eager to explain their actions and inten-
tions but they do not always get a fair hearing from the media and there
is too much restriction on what can be reported. The result is a vacuum
of information that, given the pressure of time and urgent demands of
24-hour news cycles, the media are keen to fill with their own ‘analysis’
and interpretation. At the start of the Iraq War, the Daily Mirror claimed
it was ‘hoaxed’ when its published stories of vile abuse and atrocity sto-
ries, supposedly perpetrated by British troops, turned out to be false.27
The paper was nevertheless so eager for a negative scoop against the gov-
ernment, it was fully prepared to accept the story it had apparently been
given. The abuses were invented. But where the mainstream media can
be held to account, the social media world seems free of the need for fact
checking, and there have been frequent allegations that it has facilitated
terrorist messaging and extremist recruiting.
In the operational setting, information warfare is part of a domain

the British are taking far more seriously. As noted before, 77 Brigade
has been set up to counter enemy propaganda. The methods are classi-
fied but some idea of operations can be gleaned from comparable forces.
Although the sources are unknown and verification is difficult, there
is some evidence to suggest that Iraqi hackers known as Daeshgram,
have been using ISIS hashtags and narratives to subvert the extrem-
ists’ messaging and misleading them.28 The enhanced capabilities of
ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) platforms, espe-
cially unmanned systems known in Britain as RPAS (Remotely-Piloted
Air Systems), has given British forces much greater access and clarity on
enemy formations, and this has enabled more precise operations, in both
kinetic and informational terms.
The conflict environment has compelled the British to adopt a more
comprehensive approach, using all the instruments of national power, to
conduct its strategy and policy. Information and action have to be syn-
chronised to maximise their effect. It was evident in Afghanistan, Iraq
and Syria that insurgents were eager to blame Western air strikes for
the deaths they themselves had carried out. Arranging the victims bod-
ies and then taking photographs was one method, but Daesh would also
co-locate their defences with civilian ‘human shields’ so that, if attacked,
they could blame the losses on Britain or its allies. Civilian casualties is
such a sensitive subject in Britain’s recent operations that Daesh, and
other enemies, believe that, if a threshold of civilian deaths is reached,
the British will simply conclude their operations altogether. This is an
aspect of ‘fourth generation warfare’, targeting public and political
beliefs to effect a change in policy on the battlefield.
Hybrid warfare is another aspect of this ‘fourth generation’ challenge.
While deterrence and the threat of escalation might help in some cases,
the purpose of a hybrid warfare attack is to assert a line of policy with-
out triggering a full military response. The ambiguity of the situation is
designed to create doubt, and is usually accompanied by a media storm
designed to create division and paralysis. Exploiting the British media’s
desire for sensational stories is relatively easy, while the speed with which
stories are generated leaves less time for fact-checking. The solution is to
create systems of early warning, hence the new British formations, and
to present a rapid, unified response, which in turn explains the British
whole-of-government working generated from the 2010s. Yet British
counter-hybrid strategy is about compelling the enemy to make a choice:
to continue with hybrid operations and face severe consequences, or to
52 R. JOHNSON
desist from the method because it no longer produces results. It is for

this reason that cyber resilience, in the UK and NATO may make DDOS
attacks less effective in the future, although attempts to cyber penetra-
tion and mass propaganda may still appear in their current form.
One domain that it is thought will create significant problems for
British defence in the future is in urban terrorism and insurgency. Lying
at the boundary of civil policing and military effort, major city unrest
would cause major difficulties for government and yet it would be rel-
atively easy to generate protests and to accompanying violence as the
means to discredit the authorities. In many respects, Britain is the best
equipped of any Western country to manage the problem, given the
30 years’ experience it had with the terrorist ‘Troubles’ of Northern
Ireland.
The final domain of threat is the chemical-biological-radiological. The
murder of Alexander Litvinenko on British soil by the Russian secret
service and the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal in 2018 with
Novichok nerve agent, accompanied by a campaign of denial and obfus-
cation by Moscow, indicated that Britain would have to consider a range
of defence measures to protect its citizens and critical infrastructure from
Russian sabotage, or further use of chemical attacks.
Conclusions and a Look Ahead

The British will, on current planning, maintain their defence posture
and express their willingness to operate around the globe. Their mari-
time commitments are clear and this will determine their deployments
for some time to come. The two aircraft carriers and their carrier groups
will mean that Britain will possess the ability to project air power and
this capacity will not be limited only to the European theatre. The
high north, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean will remain the prior-
ity waters but the close American relationship means that the UK could
find its carriers on missions in the Indian Ocean and Pacific too. The
British aspiration to continue to play a global role is not limited to the
carrier deployments, but currently applies to its CASND submarines, and
is set to continue. The British economy, particularly its financial sector,
is also configured to global rather than European trading, so its post-
Brexit transition to a world-wide setting is easy to imagine even if, as
some argue, Britain is taken more seriously in this role because of its sta-
tus within the EU. Regardless of the European connections, the UK is
a member of the P5 at the UN Security Council and a nuclear power.

The other means of UK defence reinforces its international outlook. The
creation of deployable army divisions, its airmobile and amphibious capa-
bilities, and its expeditionary air force give it a lift, surveillance and strike
capacity that equals that of France and outmatches any other European
power.
The most unexpected development for Britain was the aggressive pos-
ture of Russia. Around 2008, the exact date is uncertain, the Russian
authorities commenced a concerted campaign to divide and demoral-
ise the Western states through the instruments of information warfare.
Through their programmes of ‘psycho-linguistics’ and ‘zombification’,
the intention was to intimidate, confuse, and thus paralyse the West.
‘Regime change’ was the objective where possible, since the Russians
firmly believed this had been the aim of the West against the Russian
government and its ‘satellites’. These information operations, though
specific media channels, cyber activities, and widespread manipulation
of social media, sought to achieve effects without recourse to physical
actions, although Russia continued to make physical threats to increase
levels of intimidation and coercion. The recklessness of their policies
led to interference in the American elections, assassinations in Ukraine,
indiscriminate bombing campaigns in Syria and the Donbass region, and
the military invasion of Crimea in contravention of international law. For
the British, the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko with radioactive
material and then the attempted assassination of Alexei Skirpal and his
daughter with Novichok nerve agent (a material originating in Russia),
which killed one British citizen, were landmarks in the deterioration of
Anglo-Russian relations. Internationally, the British expulsion of Russian
diplomats was emulated voluntarily by many nations, demonstrating the
unity of the Western bloc. Russia, commanding no equivalent interna-
tional support, was isolated. For the purposes of this volume, it is inter-
esting to reflect that the EU endorsed the British decision.29
The challenge going forward will be Britain’s relationship with
Europe post-Brexit. In 2016, there was considerable controversy in
British politics and society about the result of the referendum, the
future economy, immigration, the powers of the European Court of
Justice, the ‘divorce bill’ payments to secure a trade deal, the nature of
the Irish border and the rights of ex-patriates in the UK and Europe.
The British were suspicious of certain threats, including the warn-
ings of what was labelled ‘project fear’, namely that there would be an
54 R. JOHNSON
immediate economic and financial crisis (in fact, the UK economy grew
above expected levels in FY 2016–2017) and an exodus of talent and
business (there wasn’t in 2016–2018). There was more tangible concern
about the formation of a European armed force under EU command,
because it was unclear whether this would include or exclude Britain,
and, crucially, the United States. After the Brexit controversy has passed,
Britain will be like Canada to Europe. It will share the same values, it will
engage in the missions around the world, it will be essentially an Atlantic
power but with a trade and defence relationship with Europe, and, above
all, it will be closer to the United States, perhaps not geographically like
Canada, but certainly in terms of a defence relationship.
The British exit from the European Union, a political decision over its
sovereignty, while significant for its foreign policy potentially, will have
less impact in the long term on the UK’s view of European defence and
security. British governments have always believed the fate of the conti-
nent is in the national interest. It is therefore hard to imagine Britain end-
ing its link to European defence unless, for other reasons, the EU turns
its back on the relationship with the United States. If there was a straight
choice, the UK would side with the Americans over the Europeans, but
since the choice is unlikely to be that stark, British governments will
certainly seek to cooperate with both the US and the European powers
of NATO, and to influence both. The British require allies for a viable
defence of the UK, but they are more akin to Canada, and, post-Brexit,
they should be regarded this way by both their allies and their rivals.
Notes
1. The National Security Strategy and the Strategic Defence and Security
Review (2015) available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_
NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf (Accessed December 2017).
2. See, for example, Ben Farmer, ‘Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan Were a
“Failure” Costing £29bn’, 28 May 2014, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
uknews/defence/10859545/Wars-in-Iraq-and-Afghanistan-were-a-
failure-costing-29bn.html (Accessed December 2017).
3. Critics.
4. Lancaster House Speech, ‘The Government’s Negotiating Objectives for
Exiting the EU: PM Speech’, 17 January 2017, https://www.gov.uk/
government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exit-
ing-the-eu-pm-speech (Accessed October 2017).
5. Christopher L. Elliott, High Command: British Military Leadership in the

Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (London: Hurst & Co., 2015), p. 116ff.
6. Desmond Browne, ‘The Political–Military Relationship on Operations’,
in Bailey, Strachan, and Iron (eds), British Generals and Blair’s Wars
(London: Routledge, 2014), p. 273.
7. ‘Netanyahu Angrily Cancels Dinner with Visiting Briton’, New York
Times, 18 March 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/18/
world/netanyahu-angrily-cancels-dinner-with-visiting-briton.html
(Accessed December 2017).
8. See the chapter by Dr. Jeff Michaels in this volume.
9. See, for example, ‘Donald Trump Hits Back at Theresa May After Re-tweeting
British Far-Right Group’s Anti-Muslim Videos’, The Telegraph, 30 November
2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/29/trump-shared-
muslim-crimes-videos-tweeted-british-far-right/ (Accessed December 2017).
10. Authors interviews in Sweden (July 2017); Finland (November 2017);
Norway (November 2017) and with the Baltic representatives in Poland
(November 2017).
11. ‘Royal Navy Could Lose “Beach-Landing” Ships in Next Round of
Defence Cuts’, The Telegraph, 6 October 2017, http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/2017/10/06/royalnavy-could-lose-beach-landing-ships-
next-round-defence/ (Accessed December 2017).
12. ‘Trump on NATO: “I Said It Was Obsolete. It’s No Longer Obsolete”’, The
Washington Post, 12 April 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
post-politics/wp/2017/04/12/trump-on-nato-i-said-it-was-obsolete-its-
no-longer-obsolete/?utm_term=.2df496fe3ebe (Accessed December 2017).
13. For details of the Wales Summit, see https://www.gov.uk/government/top-
ical-events/nato-summit-wales-cymru-2014 (Accessed December 2017).
14. ‘Jeremy Corbyn, Friend to Hamas, Iran and Extremists’, The
Telegraph, 18 July 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/
labour/11749043/Andrew-Gilligan-Jeremy-Corbyn-friend-to-Hamas-
Iran-and-extremists.html (Accessed December 2017); The left wing press
were equally unimpressed: ‘Labour’s Defence Policy in Chaos After Jeremy
Corbyn Deleted Key Trident Pledge’, 27 September 2016, http://www.
mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/labours-defence-policy-chaos-after-8919570
(Accessed December 2017); Vernon Coker, the Shadow Defence Secretary,
would only advocate: ‘Britain Has a Leading Role to Play in Keeping Peace’
in a statement with a contradictory title, http://labourlist.org/2014/03/
labour-has-an-ambitious-and-realistic-vision-for-uk-defence/ (Accessed
December 2017); Labour’s Defence Review aspirations, but not a policy,
can be found at https://www.scribd.com/doc/295585960/Labour-s-
Defence-Policy-Review (Accessed December 2017).
56 R. JOHNSON
15. ‘John McDonnell Signed Letter Calling for MI5 and Armed Police to
Be Disbanded’, Daily Telegraph, 19 November 2015, http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/12005431/John-McDonnell-signed-
letter-calling-for-MI5-and-armed-police-to-be-disbanded.html (Accessed
December 2017).
16. Sir Richard Dearlove, ‘Jeremy Corbyn Is a Danger to This Nation.
At MI6, Which I Once Led, He Wouldn’t Clear the Security
Vetting’, The Daily Telegraph, 7 June 2017, http://www.tele-
g r a p h . c o . u k / n e w s / 2 0 1 7 / 0 6 / 0 7 / j e r e m y - c o r b y n - d a n g e r- n a -
tion-mi6-led-wouldnt-clear-security-vetting/ (Accessed December 2017).
17. ‘Security Fears Over China Nuclear Power Deal’, 16 October 2015, BBC
News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-34549478 (Accessed
December 2017).
18. Lt-Col Ewen Southerby-Tailyour, November 2017; see also, Mark
Time, ‘Royal Marines Training Is Gruelling, but It Must Remain So’,
The Telegraph, 1 June 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/men/think-
ing-man/11643558/Royal-Marines-training-is-gruelling-but-it-must-
remain-so.html (Accessed December 2017).
19. Nicholas Watt, ‘Ukraine: UK to Push for Tougher Sanctions Against
Russia Over Crimea’, The Guardian, 18 March 2014, https://www.the-
guardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/ukraine-uk-push-sanctions-russia-
crimea (Accessed November 2017).
20. Ibid.
21.
‘Ukraine: UK to Push for Tougher Sanctions Against Russia Over
Crimea’, The Guardian, 18 March 2014, https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2014/mar/18/ukraine-uk-push-sanctions-russia-crimea
(Accessed December 2017).
22.
On the Pristina Incident, see Mike Jackson, ‘Command of Kosovo
1999’, in Jonathan Bailey, Hew Strachan, and Richard Iron (eds),
Britain’s Generals in Blair’s Wars (London: Ashgate, 2013). On the
Litvinenko case, see the public enquiry at the UK National Archives,
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160613090305/
https://www.litvinenkoinquiry.org/ (Accessed November 2017). The
bombing of one aid convoy was reported by John Borger and Spencer
Akerman of The Guardian on 21 September 2016 at https://www.the-
guardian.com/world/2016/sep/20/un-aid-convoy-attack-syria-us-
russia (Accessed November 2017). Compelling evidence of Russian
missile debris was provided by observers of the Syrian Red Crescent at
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/09/22/russian-
bomb-remains-recovered-syrian-red-crescent-aid-convoy-attack/
(Accessed November 2017).
23. ‘Defence Budget Increases for the First Time in Six Years’, 1 April 2016,
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-budget-increases-for-
the-first-time-in-six-years (Accessed October 2017).
24. For the scale and types of vessels in the Royal Navy, see https://www.roy-
alnavy.mod.uk/the-equipment/ships (Accessed December 2017).
25. Julian Lindley-French, ‘Could Britain Respond Strategically to Russian
Aggression’, in Janne Haaland Matlary and Tormod Heier (eds), Ukraine
and Beyond: Russia’s Strategic Security Challenge to Europe (Basingstoke
and New York: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 112.
26. The British Government’s closure of IHAT at https://www.gov.uk/
government/news/ihat-to-close-at-the-end-of-june (Accessed November
2017); Owen Bowcott, ‘Phil Shiner: Iraq Human Rights Lawyer Struck
Off Over Misconduct’, The Guardian, 2 February 2017, https://www.
theguardian.com/law/2017/feb/02/iraq-human-rights-lawyer-phil-shin-
er-disqualified-for-professional-misconduct (Accessed November 2017).
27. The Daily Mirror, 15 May 2004, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/
uk-news/sorry-we-were-hoaxed-539838 (Accessed November 2017)
28. Tom Cheshire, ‘Meet Daeshgram’, Sky News, 20 November 2017.
29. Countries which supported the UK and expelled Russian diplomats: USA,
Canada, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, France, Germany, Poland,
Italy, Spain, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Croatia, Albania,
Hungary, Netherlands, Ukraine, Australia. Countries in the EU which
did not: Ireland, Belgium, Austria, Portugal, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria,
Greece, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia, Luxembourg.
CHAPTER 3
The US–UK Special Relationship and the

“Principled Realism” of the Trump
Administration
Andrew A. Michta
The election of Donald Trump as the United States’ 45th President

shook up traditional assumptions about how America conceptualizes
its national security priorities and its relationships with its allies. While
many speculated about how far the campaign rhetoric would reflect the
reality of the new American administration, two years into the Trump
presidency it is now apparent that, contrary to initial apprehension in
Europe’s capitals, Washington continues to put a premium on work-
ing with allies and partners. The new US national security team has
refocused on cross-domain state-on-state competition, while making
equitable burden-sharing in NATO its key priority. On defense spend-
ing the message from Washington has been that business as usual, i.e.,
Europe’s unwillingness to properly resource its defense, will no longer
suffice. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s expectation that
Europe step up on defense spending is about more than exhorting allies
A. A. Michta (*) 
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies,
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany

60 A. A. MICHTA
to signal their political intent, but rather part of a larger strategic recon-
figuration of how America works with Europe to bring about equitable
burden-sharing and reciprocity on defense.
Washington is determined to rebuild the Army’s presence on the
Continent, which by the end of the Obama administration had been
reduced to thirty thousand soldiers and officers, with some sixty thou-
sand US personnel in Europe when the Trump administration entered
office. Faced with a resurgent Russia along NATO’s eastern flank, a
gathering challenge in Asia from an increasingly geo-strategically asser-
tive China, and the increasingly real possibility that North Korea would
in fact field nuclear missiles capable of reaching North America, the
United States wants NATO to once again serve as the premier provider
of Western security. Hence the core message from the Trump adminis-
tration to its allies has been that Europe needs to rearm, not as a sym-
bol of political will or message of intent, but as a means to respond to
growing threats both in Europe and across the globe. In addition,
beneath the NATO umbrella, the Trump administration has paid spe-
cial attention to US bilateral relations with allies, recognizing those who
generate real contributions to common defense, while becoming increas-
ingly vocal in its criticism of those allies who seem unable or unwilling
to meet the NATO-agreed 2% of GDP defense spending targets and
to field real capabilities. Here America’s “special relationship” with the
United Kingdom is not just a function of a long-standing security rela-
tionship and close military-to-military cooperation, but it also depends
on the willingness on the part of London to recognize that the United
States will no longer accept the status quo when it comes to Europe’s
continued reluctance to invest in defense. In a sense, the arrival of the
Trump administration with its commitment to rebuilding America’s mil-
itary, coming on the heels of Brexit, marks a moment of decision for the
United Kingdom. London will either commit to sustained military mod-
ernization, and through its example lead other NATO allies to follow
suit; or Europe’s inertia on defense that has been the norm over the past
decade will continue with the attendant negative consequences for trans-
atlantic relations.
Today’s devolving geostrategic environment facing the United States
in Europe requires a NATO buttressed by strong bilateral relationships
across the Atlantic. Three countries could form a potential “strategic
triad” for the Trump administration to anchor a workable NATO strat-
egy going forward: the United Kingdom as the principal naval partner
3 THE US–UK SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP AND THE “PRINCIPLED REALISM” … 61
of the US and one of the few NATO allies capable of projecting power;
Germany as the wealthiest and largest state providing strategic depth
along both the eastern and southern axis and also potentially the pro-
vider of a powerful military (assuming the current downward trend on
defense spending can be reversed); and Poland as the largest “frontier
state” along the eastern flank that has the potential to provide both a
large ground force and the requisite infrastructure to allow NATO to
shift from deterrence to defense if necessary.1
As of this writing the jury is still out as to how these states will
respond to the challenge of becoming the lynchpin strategic triad within
NATO. Their domestic politics track in different directions, with the UK
struggling to come to grips with the aftermath of the Brexit decision
and Germany focused on saving the European federalist project, while
Poland emphasizes its regained national sovereignty. They also represent
different historical experiences and national traditions. Still, the geo-
strategic reconfiguration of Europe, with a resurgent Russia in the East,
accelerating turmoil in MENA and the Balkans, and domestic political
change in Turkey raising fundamental question about NATO’s evolu-
tion going forward, the importance of such a “strategic triad” for Euro-
Atlantic security will continue to grow.
This chapter looks at US national security priorities and the concom-
itant efforts to work closely with its NATO allies and partners, while
also challenging the status quo on defense spending. It then focuses
on the United Kingdom, Germany and Poland as a potential “strategic
triad” whose deepened bilateral relations with the US would enhance
NATO’s effectiveness and address the current and future strategic prior-
ities, with a special emphasis on the United Kingdom’s capabilities and
role in terms of burden-sharing. It concludes by offering a way for the
European allies to work with the US administration in the future.
The New US Strategy and the Wagers of Bilateralism

In addition to the renewed emphasis on equitable burden-sharing, upon
taking office the new US administration also undertook a reassessment of
threats and priorities, which led it to conclude that state-on-state com-
petition ought to be once again at the center of America’s strategy. The
resultant new National Security Strategy2 and National Defense Strategy3
paint a significally different picture from that of the past 15 years.
While the United States will remain committed to countering the Islamic
62 A. A. MICHTA
jihadist threat and dealing with non-state actors—defeating ISIS was

high on candidate Trump’s agenda—the new national security team
has reviewed and modified the pattern established by the succession of
post-9/11 US administrations. The Trump administration has moved
away from the grand re-engineering projects that previously promised
to “build states” and to establish democracy through regime change.
Rather, while the new team remains committed to the core principles of
democracy and American exceptionalism, it also prefers a realist view of
the world. This “principled realism” of the early Trump administration
has offered America’s allies an opportunity to reaffirm democratic princi-
ples while working together with Washington to rethink NATO’s prior-
ities and reach a new consensus on what constitutes their shared threats.
Such a consensus would combine NATO’s traditional Article 5 territorial
defense function with the larger mission of countering jihadist terror-
ism not only as a struggle of values, but also as an expression of clearly
defined geostrategic priorities.
In a decisive departure from the past decade and a half of US national
security priorities, the new approach identified China and Russia as its
two principal peer competitors. The new National Defense Strategy,
whose unclassified twelve-page summary was introduced in January 2018
by Defense Secretary James Mattis, confirmed the need to rebuild the
US military to focus on state-on-state threats, while shifting attention
in the Middle East away from nation-building to a much more modest
and implementable strategic goal of preventing further deterioration and
containing chaos.
The principled realism of the Trump administration requires that
Europe begin to think strategically and not merely reactively about
common security, and that it—together with the United States and
Canada—adapt NATO to the rapidly changing international security
environment.4 At the core, this would require not just a general across-
the-board European commitment to increase defense spending, but also
a larger decision about which European allies would become the hub of
a changing transatlantic security architecture, especially along NATO’s
eastern and southern frontiers. To put it differently, America’s focus on
the deterioration of NATO’s capabilities along its flanks—with NATO’s
Enhanced Forward Presence providing essentially the initial tripwire in
the East—implies that the United States would need to deepen its secu-
rity relationships with key European allies to ensure that the larger objec-
tive to deter Russia, and if need be to defend Europe should deterrence
fail, rests on a credible strategic design buttressed by credible forces.

Another urgent problem for the alliance has been the ever-more compli-
cated security situation along the Southern flank, both on account of the
continued wars in the Middle East and the increasingly complex relation-
ship between Turkey and a number of its NATO allies.
Today the United States is in the process of reversing the defense
spending reductions and force withdrawal from Europe that marked the
eight years of the Obama administration. The Trump administration
defense budget will allow for a dramatic increase in the capabilities of
the US armed forces, including the rebuilding of US presence in Europe
in order to shore up deterrence along the eastern flank and, should
deterrence fail, provide a clear path to the defense of Europe. This will
require close cooperation with the allies, and most of all political will
across Europe to step up on defense. If NATO is to meet the task as it
did in the past, today and going forward the United States will need its
European allies to do their part.
Notwithstanding the continual assertions of NATO’s unity and soli-
darity, the alliance does not seem to share the kind of threat consensus
that kept the Euro-Atlantic alliance glued together during the Cold War.
Rather, today European security is defined by the progressive region-
alization of individual nations’ security optics, with countries along
the Eastern flank viewing Russian military pressure and irredentism in
Ukraine as the preeminent threats, while Southern and Western Europe
look to the Mediterranean, the MENA region, and increasingly deeper
into Africa where war, terrorism, and migration are now a clear and pres-
ent danger for Europe, whose southern border is no longer along the
Mediterranean but reaches deep into the Sahel.
The continued fragmentation of how European NATO members define
and prioritize threats presents a dilemma for Washington, for the United
States remains the lynchpin of NATO and the core security provider for
Europe, notwithstanding the reemergence in Europe of discussions about
how to build a credible European defense capability, with the Permanent
Structured Cooperation (PESCO), Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
(CARD) and the European Defense Fund (EDF) the latest yardsticks in
this debate. Regardless of what the latest round of European defense ini-
tiatives will produce—and if history is any guide, a healthy dose of skepti-
cism is warranted—NATO will remain the umbrella covering all of America
and Europe for years to come, and American military power will remain
indispensable to Europe’s security. Moreover, there seems to be a growing
64 A. A. MICHTA
consensus in Washington that NATO’s institutions need to be buttressed by

a series of deepened bilateral relations to undergird the Euro-Atlantic secu-
rity system. To strengthen the transatlantic link, the United States needs to
prioritize core relationships in Europe to reflect the distribution of threats
across Europe. For starters, the core “European triad” of US strategic
engagement should include London, Berlin, and Warsaw and it should also
reach into France and Italy in the South and Norway in the North.
The United Kingdom

The emphasis placed by the Trump administration on the fundamentals
of defense budgeting has been decried by analysts and Europe’s policy
community as a departure from established practice, with charges that
Washington risks transforming the inherent reciprocity of NATO into a
relationship that smacks of transactionalism. And yet the United States’
deepening concern about unequal burden sharing across the alliance is
not new, nor limited to the Trump administration. In 2010 Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates, speaking at a National Defense University
session devoted to the New Strategic Concept, pointed out that only
5 of 28 NATO allies spent 2% of GDP on defense, and that “despite
the need to spend more on vital equipment for ongoing missions, the
alliance has been unwilling to fundamentally change how it sets priori-
ties and allocates resources.”5 In a similar vein, during the second term
of the Obama administration then Secretary of Defense Ash Carter
pointed out in Berlin in 2015 that an alliance where the United States
provided seventy percent of all defense spending could not be tolerated
in the long run, for Congress would ultimately become the final arbiter
on the skewed transatlantic relationship. As the Secretary put it, “the
transatlantic relationship and transatlantic security is, as ever, a two-
sided affair.”6
The Trump administration’s redefinition of US national security pri-
orities offers the United Kingdom an opportunity to both strengthen
its relations with the United States, and to shape the larger redefinition
of European security, provided London will be prepared to step up its
financial commitment to defense. Indeed, already after Russia’s inva-
sion of Ukraine, London took several important initial steps to reassert
itself as a serious military power. In addition to British investments in the
Royal Navy—including the funding for two new aircraft carriers—British
airpower saw the prospect of a considerable increase in capabilities,
including the acquisition of F-35B fighters (with a target number of 138

F-35 aircraft) with the aim of ensuring that each aircraft carrier would
have at least a squadron of stealthy aircraft by the time they were both
fully operational in 2023.7 From the perspective of the US and NATO,
this planned restoration of British military capabilities highlighted not
just that London understood the strategic imperative of countering the
growing threat from Russia, but more importantly that it understood the
importance of carrier strike capability—an essential development from
the vantage point of the United States and NATO contributions to allied
power projection.
However, the positive outcome of UK defense modernization is
still a work in progress, and it is not yet certain how far it will go. The
United Kingdom, which traditionally maintained 2.5% of GDP or above
throughout the late 1990s and into the first decade of the 2000s, began
to experience a precipitous decline in spending beginning in 2009, and
as of 2011 has fallen below 2.5%.8 In fact, since the Great Recession of
2008 British defense spending has experienced a steady decline, breaking
below 2.4% of GDP by 2016. This is a dramatic reduction when com-
pared to the Cold War years when British defense spending remained
largely constant, standing in the 1970s at between 5.4 and 5.5% of
GDP, peaking in 1982 during the Falklands War at 5.95% of GDP when
it reached percentage levels close to those of the United States. In the
1990s British defense spending dropped to about 3% of GDP, with
2.63% in 2003 and then a further decline that saw the British defense
budget drop below 2.5% of GDP through the 2014. In fact, in 2016,
two years after the Russian seizure of Crimea, some analysts argued that
the government’s claim to have spent 2% of GDP on defense, for which
it provided no specific budget details, required a “reality check.” The
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London contended that
since the UK’s GDP that year was higher than expected, the country’s
defense spending as a percentage of its GDP actually dropped for the
first time below the 2% NATO mandated ceiling, and that the United
Kingdom in fact spent only 1.98% of GDP on defense.9
Even more disturbing data has been provided by UK Defence
Expenditure, a House of Commons Library briefing paper published in
February 2018. According to the brief, UK defense spending has been
reduced over the past five years by about 1 billion pounds in real terms
to 35.3 billion pounds in 2016/17; with the planned increase in defense
allocations by 2020/21 UK defense spending is expected to be at 37.1
66 A. A. MICHTA
billion pounds. The paper posited that despite these cuts the UK was one
of only five NATO countries since 2010 to have met the 2% target.10
Regardless subsequent arguments over how the expenditures were
counted, the fact that America’s principal European ally is either below
the 2% margin and/or barely above it suggests that something funda-
mental has happened over the past decade to change how the British
look at defense spending. Likewise, as of this writing there remains a
considerable degree of uncertainty about the ultimate outcome of the
Modernizing Defense Program (MDP).11 Time will tell whether MDP
will mark a genuine step forward in rebuilding the UK’s defense capabil-
ities, or if it will become a way to explain another round of defense cuts.
As it exits the European Union, the United Kingdom will attempt to
underscore and leverage its relations with the United States, including
the countries’ close military cooperation. Britain’s current reinvestment
in its military, most recently through the purchase of two new Queen
Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers12 aligns well with the planned rearmament
cycle in the United States. More importantly, London has historically
shared with Washington the understanding that military power remains
part of the full spectrum of statecraft, and that the ability to project
power remains central to transatlantic security. Admittedly, the jury is
still out on whether the National Security Capability Review13 will result
in cuts to an already strained UK defense budget, or if the country will
become a full-bore military partner of the United States in NATO. In
the coming months, Washington’s continued engagement with London
on defense issues may prove decisive for the future of the bilateral secu-
rity relationship.
Germany
The second, and arguably the most important, continental pillar of
America’s strategic “European triad” would be Germany. However,
Washington and Berlin do not quite see eye-to-eye on the key issue
of defense spending, with Germany seemingly not yet politically ready
to spend 2% of GDP on defense. Despite being Europe’s largest and
most powerful economy, over the years Germany has reduced its mili-
tary capabilities to the point that some have begun to question whether
the Bundeswehr could actually deploy in sufficient numbers in a major
state-on-state crisis, or even in a limited contingency. While Berlin
has committed to increasing its defense spending in absolute terms to
begin addressing the urgent need to recapitalize the Bundeswehr and

to address readiness and maintenance shortfalls, it will not meet the 2%
NATO target, with only 1.3% of GDP targeted for defense next year.
Berlin plans to increase defense spending from €38.9 billion this
year to €43.9 billion in 2022, which would constitute about a 13%
increase. However, in light of IMF projections for German economic
growth these numbers would put Germany at barely over 1% of GDP on
defense. Given the projected growth of its economy, the German com-
mitment to defense would actually mark a decline in percentage spend-
ing between 2020 and 2022.14 The German government’s decision to
aim for the current marginal increase to 1.3% of GDP could in fact mark
an inflection point in how the Trump administration looks at its bilat-
eral security relations with Germany, especially given Berlin’s emphasis in
recent months on the need for Europe to take greater responsibility for
its security. On the one hand, the country’s traditional commitment to
the Adenauerian vision of Germany, and Europe as a whole, maintaining
the essential US anchor remains strong; on the other hand, Berlin seems
determined at least to explore what some in the German policy com-
munity term “strategic autonomy,” manifest in the European Union’s
PESCO and other initiatives.
As in the British case, the jury on Germany’s role in transatlantic secu-
rity and its deeper bilateral security relationship with the United States
is still out. For the first time since the Cold War, Berlin moved last year
to reverse the progressive reductions in the size of the Bundeswehr,
with the country again poised to expand its military by adding 20,000
soldiers—with the goal being a 200,000-strong army in 2024.15 In 2017
the German government also stood up a new Cyber and Information
Space Command (CIR)16 and made a strong commitment to leveraging
its partnership with industry, while also seeking closer cooperation on
cyber within the alliance. These are important steps, but Germany needs
to do more to rebuild its armed forces.
While the German public remains polarized over the need to expand
the country’s military, overall the government has begun to move to
strengthen the armed forces, though some of its critics have questioned
the speed of modernization and the level of commitment to defense
spending. The larger issue that will impact on US–German relations and
determine the extent to which Germany will deepen its security relations
with the United States and its role in transatlantic security is how the
Germans will come to see their role in Europe. It is precisely because
68 A. A. MICHTA
Germany’s debate about national power is at an inflection point that

Berlin and Washington need to engage in a strategic dialogue about
Germany’s contribution to NATO’s capabilities, as well as the larger
question of how Germany sees its national security priorities going
forward.
The issue of how much military capability Germany will bring to
NATO is far from settled. A growing number of European analysts see
Germany’s strategic choices as tracking increasingly towards a reformed
and redefined EU federalist project, with the aforementioned “strate-
gic autonomy” ever more the goal. However, contrary to the prevailing
skepticism about Germany’s ability to make a contribution to NATO
forces commensurate with the country’s economic might and its popula-
tion, Berlin will likely continue to adapt its military posture to the rapidly
shifting geostrategic landscape around it and beyond. As NATO remains
the premier framework for Euro-Atlantic security Germany, a Central
European great power faced with the pressure along Europe’s eastern
and southern flanks, needs a strong security alliance with the United
States. Conversely, for the United States a strong Germany in NATO is
essential to transatlantic security. Hence, bringing about a greater align-
ment of US and German national security policy optics is as essential
as it has ever been post-1945 both to ensure Germany’s security and
European security writ large. As the main entry point into Europe for
US military forces, Germany is essential to all US and NATO planning
going forward. Hence, for both larger geostrategic and practical reasons,
the US–German bilateral security relationship is central to NATO’s long-
term viability and military effectiveness.
Poland
Like the United Kingdom, Poland is one of five NATO countries that
actually spend 2% of its GDP on national defense. Moreover, it has
pledged to reach 2.5% of GDP on defense by 2030—a defense budget
that at PLN 80 billion ($21.5 billion) would represent a doubling of
its defense spending from current levels.17 Poland aims to provide a
land power anchor for NATO’s eastern flank, with Warsaw intending—
perhaps overly ambitiously—to increase its armed forces by another
100,000. More importantly from the vantage point of NATO and US
strategy, Warsaw’s goal has been to induce Washington to replace the
current “persistent rotational presence” of a US brigade combat team
(BCT) with permanent US bases on Polish territory large enough to

house up to a US Army division.
Poland’s military modernization plans have been greeted with some
criticism both at home and abroad, especially its new Territorial Defense
Forces (WOT) concept to create a number of regionally-based infantry
brigades, drawn from civilians volunteering for periodic training and
exercises. Still, seen from Washington, the commitment demonstrated
by the Poles to expand their military capability is an important var-
iable for NATO strategy and planning, especially given how much the
Bundeswehr has shrunk over the past decade. Warsaw took an impor-
tant step in further deepening its relations with the United States when
in March 2018 it selected the Patriot surface-to-air missile system for its
Wisła AMD system, inking the country’s biggest weapons acquisition
deal in its history.18
Poland’s 2017 Concept of Defense of the Republic of Poland seeks to
maximize Poland’s ability to defend itself in the event of a Russian attack
in order to give NATO forces enough time to assemble and come to the
rescue. Although Poland’s military is unlikely to become self-sufficient,
Warsaw’s efforts to provide meaningful capabilities which, in a crisis,
could buy Washington and its allies time, attest to the importance for
NATO’s posture along the eastern flank of a closer strategic partnership
between Washington and Warsaw. In a sign that Poland’s goal of hav-
ing permanent US military presence on its territory might actually have
a chance of becoming reality, in late spring 2018 the US Senate Armed
Services Committee called upon the “Secretary of Defense to report on
the feasibility and advisability of permanently stationing a US Army BCT
in Poland.”19
A Way Forward
Today the United Kingdom and Poland remain deeply committed to
their strategic relationship with the United States, and from that van-
tage point both London and Warsaw are poised to provide the essential
pillars anchoring US European policy in areas that matter: in the case
of the UK, the strategic transatlantic dimension of a (once more) grow-
ing British naval power; and in the Polish case, through its land power
as the largest country on NATO’s eastern flank. As the dominant eco-
nomic power in Europe sitting at the continent’s geostrategic cross-
roads, Germany is the indispensable part of the larger strategic design to
70 A. A. MICHTA
keep NATO and transatlantic security robust going forward. Hence, a

lot will depend on Berlin’s willingness to make the requisite investments
in defense to become again the essential contributor to NATO’s mili-
tary capabilities that it was during the Cold War. As threats to US secu-
rity commitments in Asia grow, these allies’ capabilities will become an
important part of Washington’s overall strategic calculus when it comes
to the defense of Europe.
The message from the Trump administration to the allies has been
one of unequivocal insistence on the need to invest in defense and to
translate those investments into real usable capabilities. The nascent
strategic “European triad” discussed above, if done right, could be an
important first step in revitalizing NATO, establishing a solid foun-
dation for US bilateral engagement with Europe which in turn would
strengthen NATO and reinforce the overall military capabilities of the
alliance. The next step for Washington would be to buttress the triad
through enhanced security engagement with the states bracketing the
larger NATO space—Norway, France, and Italy—with the latter two
being key to NATO’s southern flank (especially as Turkey’s domestic
politics remains in flux) and Norway serving as the critical entry point for
the High North.
The US–UK relationship has been traditionally considered the core of
America’s Euro-Atlantic strategy, and in the aftermath of Brexit it will
be even more important to the security of the United Kingdom and to
the viability of NATO. Going forward, the United States remains the
core provider of global security and stability, the principal stakeholder
in the liberal international order, and the ultimate guarantor of peace
in Europe. However, these established assumptions cannot be taken
for granted anymore; instead they need to be endowed with a renewed
(and real) sense of shared threat perceptions across the Atlantic, as
well as tangible financial commitments. Today there is a growing real-
ization in Washington that the established institutional formulae fram-
ing America’s core alliances need to be imbued with new commitments
across the alliance, and that NATO needs to be reformed. There is also
an urgent need to rebuild NATO’s logistics in order to make the current
deterrence by trip wire along the eastern flank into a credible strategic
formula.
The shockwaves delivered by the election of Donald J. Trump as the
country’s 45th President continue to reverberate both at home and
abroad. Most importantly, America’s new “Jacksonian moment” means
that the US administration needs to ensure that the electorate sees the
tangible value of alliances and security partnerships. The “principled
realism” articulated in the NSS, which puts a premium on real military
contributions and seeks to awaken among the allies a new appreciation
that US policy going forward means that Washington expects more from
the allies than declaratory statements of support. In a departure from the
last administration’s approach, the usable military capabilities brought by
allies and partners are fast becoming the new prism through which the
United States thinks about its core relationships.
The arrival of a new US administration presents the United Kingdom
both with a challenge and an opportunity to become the key strategic
partner of the United States in an era in which state-on-state conflict
has once again emerged as the principal strategic consideration. The
United Kingdom, together with a Germany that has begun to think seri-
ously about rebuilding its military capability and a Poland committed to
continuing to increase its defense spending and ultimately to doubling
the size of its military, is poised to become the lynchpin of an emerging
strategic triad in Europe. As Washington gears up to confront the surge
of threats in Asia, MENA and along the Northeastern flank of NATO,
deepening relationships with likeminded European powers is fast becom-
ing the hallmark of America’s new strategic posture.
For the United Kingdom, the re-investment in its navy and its power
projection capability will remain essential to this new relationship with
the United States, for the United Kingdom is uniquely positioned by
history and its own national culture to be America’s key partner in
maintaining its global commitments, the more so as France assumes an
ever-greater role in securing NATO’s southern flank and, together with
Italy, dealing with the deepening instability in Africa. The outcome of
the current U.K. defense review will go a long way toward demonstrat-
ing whether London has fully grasped what the United States expects
from its allies and its focus on what likeminded NATO member states
should bring to the table. In this context, British naval, cyber and
intelligence capabilities are going to be increasingly important to the
alliance.
As the Trump administration works with Europe’s governments,
there are five larger strategic issues that the Europeans should address in
order to strengthen the transatlantic alliance and deepen security coop-
eration with the United States. There needs to be a closer alignment of
threat perceptions between the United States and Europe, with a shared
72 A. A. MICHTA
Euro-Atlantic strategy on Russia, renewed seriousness on defense spend-

ing in Europe and an attendant willingness on the part of the European
allies to look at military power as an essential part of statecraft as well as a
larger awareness in Europe’s capitals that with the global challenges fac-
ing the United States, including in Asia, Europe needs to start thinking
strategically about what its role would be if the US-China competition
should one day lead to an all-out conflict.20
In this context, the Trump administration’s firm stance on bur-
den sharing is not, as some observers have argued, an expression of
Washington’s reluctance to assure the Europeans of its commitment to
Article 5 and common defense, but rather a long-overdue corrective that
in fact should have been agreed upon by NATO decades ago. Hence, if
the core issue of Europe’s unequal contributions to allied defense were
to be taken seriously on the continent, it could in fact constitute an
opportunity to set the alliance aright at a time of considerable flux and
deteriorated security environments along Europe’s eastern and south-
ern flanks, as well as globally. The current European defense initiatives,
including the CARD, the PESCO, and the EDF, are being greeted with
a modicum of support by the US administration, but are unlikely to be
seen in Washington as the kind of commitment to common defense the
transatlantic community needs.
NATO needs to reform but adjusting legacy institutions will only take
the alliance so far. It is through enhanced US bilateral relationships with
allies, and especially such key historical partners of the United States
as the United Kingdom, that the alliance will restore its military capa-
bilities, and with them, its ability to deter—and if need be to defend—
against rising threats in the east and south. Today the United Kingdom
is uniquely positioned to set the pace of change in NATO by leading
on defense modernization in Europe and sending a strong message to
Washington that the Europeans remain committed to NATO and to
their core security relationship with the United States.
Notes
1. See Andrew A. Michta, “Re-anchoring NATO: The US Needs to Boost
Bilateral Relations in Europe,” The American Interest, 12 February 2018.
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/02/12/us-needs-boost-
bilateral-relationships-europe/.
2. National Security Strategy of the United States of America: December 2017.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-
Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. Accessed 18 February 2018.
3. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of
America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge. https://
www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-De-
fense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. Accessed 21 February 2018.
4. For my initial assessment of the opportunity for NATO to leverage the change
of US administration see Andrew A. Michta, A Common Threat Assessment
for NATO? Carnegie Strategic Europe, 16 February 2017. http://carneg-
ieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/68017. Accessed 22 March 2018.
5. Secretary of Defense Speech: Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense
Robert M. Gates, National Defense University, Washington, DC, Tuesday,
23 February 2010. http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?-
speechid=1423. Accessed 11 May 2018.
6. Ash Carter, Remarks at Atlantik Brücke: “US, Germany, & NATO Are
Moving Forward Together,” Berlin, Germany, 22 June 2015. https://
www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606684/
remarks-at-atlantik-brcke-us-germany-nato-are-moving-forward-to-
gether/. Accessed 18 March 2018.
7. “Britain Reasserts Itself as a Serious Military Power,” The Economist,
24 November 2015.
8. Paul Cornish, U.K. Hard Power: Strategic Ambivalence (Washington, DC:
The American Enterprise Institute, July 2014), p. 2.
9. “Reality Check: Is the UK Spending 2% of GDP on Defence?” BBC News,
14 February 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-38971624.
Accessed 14 March 2018.
10. Noel Dempsey, UK Defence Expenditure: Briefing Paper Number CPB
8175. London: House of Commons Library, 22 February 2018, p. 3.
11. See John Louth, The UK Modernising Defence Programme: “Get with the
Programme’,” RUSI, 16 February 2018. https://rusi.org/commentary/
uk-modernising-defence-programme-‘get-programme’. Accessed 19 May
2018.
12. “Second Aircraft Carrier HMS Prince of Wales Named by Duchess of
Rothesay,” BBC News, 8 September 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/
uk-scotland-41172440. Accessed 8 May 2018.
13. Corporate Report: National Security Capability Review (NSCR), 28
March 2018. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nation-
al-security-capability-review-nscr. Accessed 3 May 2018.
14. Guy Chazan, “Germany to Miss Nato Defence Spending Pledge,”
The Financial Times, 27 April 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/
542495ae-4a28-11e8-8ee8-cae73aab7ccb. Accessed 3 May 2018.
74 A. A. MICHTA
15. “Germany to Expand Bundeswehr to Almost 200,000 Troops,” Deutsche

Welle, 21 February 2017. http://www.dw.com/en/germany-to-expand-
bundeswehr-to-almost-200000-troops/a-37655018. Accessed 11 March
2018.
16. “German Army Launches New Cyber Command,” Deutsche Welle, 1 April
2017. http://www.dw.com/en/german-army-launches-new-cyber-com-
mand/a-38246517. Accessed 16 April 2018.
17. Lidia Kelly, “Poland Plans Trump-Era Defense Spending Splurge, Critics
Say ‘Unrealistic’,” Reuters, 16 June 2017. https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-nato-poland-defence/poland-plans-trump-era-defense-
spending-splurge-critics-say-unrealistic-idUSKBN1970Y6. Accessed 20
December 2017.
18. “Poland Signs $4.75bn Deal to Buy US Patriot Missiles,” BBC News,
28 March 2018. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43574308.
Accessed 3 April 2018.
19. “John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2019,” United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 24 May 2018.
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FY19%20
NDAA%20Summary.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2018.
20. The concept of Europe’s five strategic priorities while working with the
United States were first developed in my article “Five Priorities for Europe’s
Transatlantic Strategy,” The American Interest, 22 September 2017.
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/09/22/five-priorities-
europes-transatlantic-strategy/.
Andrew A. Michta is the Dean of the College of International and Security

Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. The
views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy
or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the
US Department of Defense, or the US Government.
CHAPTER 4
‘You Don’t Hear the Word Britain

Anymore’: Anglo-American Security
Relations in the Era of Brexit and Trump
Jeffrey H. Michaels
In a July 2017 interview with The Wall Street Journal, President Donald
J. Trump uttered the words ‘you don’t hear the word Britain any-
more’. As the interview transcript demonstrates, Trump was making a
rather random semantic reference to mainstream use of the term ‘UK’
as opposed to ‘Britain’.1 Nevertheless, Trump’s words were repeated
in a number of subsequent headlines in the British press and mock-
ingly used to characterize the current state of US–UK relations in the
era of Brexit and Trump. As one article in The Guardian put it: ‘Brexit-
besieged Downing Street will presumably be hoping that Trump meant
that the term “Britain” has lost out to “the UK” in common usage,
rather than that the country itself has fallen into obscurity’.2 Despite the
jesting quality of much of the commentary, a fundamental concern of
British policymakers was highlighted, namely that Brexit had significantly
reduced Britain’s ability to be a meaningful ally of the United States. On
the other hand, it also reflected a related problem. Whilst Brexit had the
J. H. Michaels (*) 
King’s College, London, UK

76 J. H. MICHAELS
effect of hampering Britain’s relations with its European partners, which

it was widely assumed would naturally oblige London to ‘double down’
on its relations with Washington, this was likely to be more problematic
than might otherwise be the case due to the unusual character of the
Trump presidency.
British concerns about the state of the US–UK ‘special relationship’,
which are typically linked with Britain’s perceived position in the global
hierarchy of influential states, are longstanding. Particularly since the
end of World War II, they have been a regular feature of political debate,
press commentary and academic enquiry.3 At numerous points the ‘spe-
cial relationship’ has been declared ‘dead’ or ‘dying’, or in some cases,
‘revived’.4 Yet regardless of these diagnoses, the continued official use of
the term ‘special relationship’ by both the British and American govern-
ments has remained a constant. In this sense, one can debate the degree
of ‘specialness’ but cannot argue with the fact that the terminology con-
tinues to be important enough for officials in both countries not to alter
it. Beyond this, attempting to ‘take the temperature’ of US–UK relations
at any given moment in time, specifically in the field of security policy,
has usually relied on an examination of random variables in isolation of
one another.5 It is a rarity to find any academic study of the relationship
that examines these variables simultaneously. Furthermore, it is essen-
tially impossible to locate any study that attempts to offer a theoretical
framework that can provide a more meaningful evaluation of the topic—
ideally one that identifies the relevant variables to examine, provides
appropriate historical background, and places this within a broader con-
text of pertinent external issues that impact on the relationship, as well
as comparing it with other forms of analyzing and characterizing inter-
state relations. For example, whereas it is relatively simple to identify
two countries as ‘allies’ or ‘enemies’—ostensibly polar opposites—such
characterizations obscure the degree to which the two countries agree
on every issue or disagree on every issue, versus agree with some and dis-
agree with others. In the case of US–UK relations, the historical record
clearly highlights any number of instances where there have been agree-
ments and disagreements at different levels simultaneously, for instance,
where the leaders dislike each other yet bureaucratic relationships remain
warm. How then to make sense of this? Although the ambition of this
chapter is not to offer a comprehensive remedy to these shortcomings in
the field of ‘special relationship’ studies, it is crucial to draw attention to
4 ‘YOU DON’T HEAR THE WORD BRITAIN ANYMORE’ … 77
them, as well as attempt to offer some potential insights that scholars and
laypersons investigating this topic may find useful.
Just as there have been numerous upheavals in the past decades both in
international relations as well as in the domestic political situations of each
country that have had an impact on bilateral security relations, the more
recent ‘crises’ of the British vote to leave the European Union and the
election of Trump, both occurring within a short space of time, would
not only seem to require some analysis as a matter of course, but such
an examination also provides an opportunity to showcase the necessity
for a more rigorous approach to evaluating the ‘special relationship’. This
chapter takes as its starting point the speculation of numerous commen-
tators prior to the Brexit vote that leaving the EU would have a nega-
tive impact on the ‘special relationship’. In the aftermath of the vote, and
looking ahead from the vantage point of 2018, the conclusion that British
influence vis-à-vis the United States will decline might well be valid, but
as argued here, assigning causation wholly to Brexit is insufficient and
misguided, mainly for three reasons. In the first place, one needs to make
a distinction between the expectations prior to Brexit about what this
process would entail versus the reality after the Brexit vote with respect
to the impact of the process on the UK Government, specifically its ability
or inability to deal with the consequences, including the need to rethink
many aspects and priorities of the country’s foreign policy. Also, with
the election of Trump the context for discussing US–UK security rela-
tions has shifted considerably relative to discussing relations while Obama
remained president, or to offer a counterfactual example, had Hillary
Clinton been elected president. Finally, any analysis of the ‘current state’
of the relationship cannot ignore longer term trends, or at least develop-
ments that transcend the tenure in office of a political leader, especially
those that are directly relevant to ties at the bureaucratic level, nor can
one avoid addressing other external issues, such as shifts in the interna-
tional system as well as the evolving character of security threats. As the
following analysis will highlight, a holistic approach is essential.
The question this chapter addresses is: Has any ‘meaningful change’ in
the US–UK relationship actually occurred since the advent of Brexit and
Trump? To answer this question necessitates defining what is meant by
‘meaningful change’ in this context. Though a subjective term, ‘mean-
ingful change’ refers here to important shifts that occur within each of
three areas: symbolism, leadership interactions, and bureaucratic ties.
78 J. H. MICHAELS
If radical shifts can be identified at all three levels, this would of course
offer the most compelling evidence of ‘meaningful change’, whereas
if a shift occurs only at one level this would not constitute meaningful
change. More specifically, to take the subject of symbolism as an example,
were US officials to stop referring to a ‘special relationship’, replacing it
with some other term denoting a decline in status, this would constitute
an important shift. And if this were combined with a deterioration in the
personal relations between the US President and British Prime Minister,
as well as a breakdown of bureaucratic ties, then the sum total of these
shifts would constitute ‘meaningful change’. By contrast, if there was a
poor personal relationship between the two leaders whilst the symbolism
and bureaucratic ties remained static then it would be difficult to claim
that any ‘meaningful change’ had occurred. This approach, though not
very sophisticated, will hopefully still provide sufficient insight for our
purposes here.
Therefore to answer the question posed above, this chapter is divided
into four sections. The first section discusses the pre-Brexit preferences
and assumptions of political leaders and commentators about the impact
Brexit was likely to have on the ‘special relationship’. Next, recent devel-
opments in the symbolism and official terminology associated with the
‘special relationship’ will be analyzed for evidence of continuity ver-
sus change. The third section will examine the relevant views and per-
sonal interactions of President Trump and Prime Minister Theresa May.
Finally, the more long-standing bureaucratic relationships will be high-
lighted and contrasted with the day-to-day priorities of the leadership.
The chapter concludes that no meaningful changes in the ‘special rela-
tionship’ can be observed, and, ‘ceteris paribus’, nor are any imminent.
Pre-Brexit Preferences and Assumptions

When seeking to establish the extent of continuity versus change in the
‘special relationship’ due to Brexit, especially the negative consequences
that would result from it, a useful starting point is to examine the pre-
Brexit vote assumptions of policymakers and analysts.6 It is also necessary
to account for the differing positions of supporters and opponents of
Brexit in both the UK and US. Generally speaking, the position of Brexit
supporters was that the impact to US–UK relations would either be
beneficial or not meaningfully different, on the assumption that Britain
would be more prosperous, whereas opponents argued that Brexit would
damage the ‘special relationship’. As the purpose of this chapter is to

focus on the consequences of Brexit, the arguments of ‘leavers’ are there-
fore less important than those of ‘remainers’, and will receive less atten-
tion here.
Brexit opponents made several arguments about why US–UK rela-
tions would be undermined. Firstly, they argued Brexit would reduce
British influence in European affairs and diminish Britain’s status as a
world power. Thus, any net loss in power and prestige would automat-
ically reduce the UK’s standing in Washington. More generally, oppo-
nents on both sides of the Atlantic warned that Brexit would lead to a
weakening of the international ‘liberal order’, and that given the strains it
was already facing due to so many other pressures (the rise of China, the
re-emergence of the Russia threat, ongoing conflict in the Middle East,
and so forth), it was important not to ‘rock the boat’ further. Another
argument was that without Britain in the EU, it would be unable to use
its influence to ensure that it did not become a serious competitor to
NATO.
What is notable about these arguments is that, on the one hand they
are abstract, and on the other hand, they do not suggest that the conse-
quences of Brexit would go so far as to lead to the collapse of the ‘special
relationship’. They are abstract in the sense that Brexit would contribute
to making existing negative international trends that much worse albeit
the degree to which it would have any meaningful impact would be dif-
ficult to gauge. Similarly, references to a loss in power and prestige have
often been discussed in relation to any number of other issues, particu-
larly defence cuts. And yet, just as UK defence spending has declined,
more or less steadily since the end of World War II, the crucial ques-
tion not discussed is: at what point would Britain lose enough power and
prestige to deliver a ‘fatal blow’ to the ‘special relationship’? Of course,
as this point has never been reached it is difficult to say. Yet it is pre-
cisely because this is unknown that claims about the negative impact of
a specific policy decision, series of decisions, or general trend, should be
treated with some circumspection.
Under the Obama administration, the US policy preference was for
Britain to remain in the EU. At one point Obama actually weighed into
the pre-vote debate by stating that Britain would be at ‘the back of the
queue’ with respect to a post-Brexit trade deal with the US.7 Hillary
Clinton also indicated her opposition to Brexit.8 In stark contrast,
Trump was highly supportive of Brexit, saying that Britain would be
80 J. H. MICHAELS
‘better off’.9 In theory, in the aftermath of the referendum, a US lead-

ership that had previously opposed Brexit was more likely to maintain a
negative outlook when dealing with the UK than a leadership that sup-
ported Brexit. Alternatively, had the Brexit referendum resulted in a vote
to remain in the EU, but with Trump still being elected, this too might
have undermined relations, in theory. These two counterfactuals help
put the actual developments and their implications for US–UK relations
into some perspective. Not only was the referendum decided in favour of
Brexit, but only months later, the pro-Brexit Trump was elected. Again,
in theory, this development might suggest US policy would take a more
favourable turn with respect to the UK. As will be shown, two factors
ensured that practice would differ somewhat from the theory. First, the
Obama administration’s reaction to the Brexit vote was to provide reas-
surances that the ‘special relationship’ would be maintained rather than
undermined. Second, Trump’s election had its own consequences for the
‘special relationship’ that have since probably overshadowed any Brexit-
related impact.
Symbolism
On the surface, the symbols and terminology associated with the ‘special
relationship’ would seem to have little direct relevance to US–UK secu-
rity relations. However, if there is one aspect of the relationship that has
remained both consistent since the end of World War II, and probably
the most studied for evidence of change, it is this one. Given that fear
of a decline in the relationship has often motivated British policymak-
ers to compensate by accommodating American preferences, the symbol-
ism and terminology constitute an important, if not the most important,
structural variable (as opposed to common threat perceptions that are
typically transitory anyway) motivating particular security-related actions.
Leaving aside the fact that the US considers many of its other bilateral
relationships as being ‘special’, including its ties with Israel, Saudi Arabia,
Japan, Canada, Australia, and so forth, in none of these other relation-
ships has the discursive emphasis on the term ‘special’ played such an
important role.
From the US perspective, the term ‘special relationship’ has long
been recognized as probably the most important structural issue govern-
ing its relations with the United Kingdom and an instrumental neces-
sity. Put another way, US policymakers appreciate that to abandon the
term would have a negative effect on relations with the UK, and that
especially in times where British collaboration is sought, that it is neces-
sary to ‘play up’ both the terminology as well as the shared heritage in
order to secure London’s support. One Obama administration political
appointee attached to the State Department noted that the ‘special rela-
tionship’ was considered a ‘joke’ and yet official use of the term could
not be abandoned.10 On the other hand, when US policymakers intend
to signal their displeasure with the UK, whether to punish or motivate
British behaviour, reference is typically invoked to the damage an action
or lack of action will do to the ‘special relationship’. From the American
side, officials have recognized they need to be careful not to push this
too far. As the US Embassy in London noted in a 2009 cable back to
Washington, ‘in the long run it is not in US interests to have the UK
public concluding the relationship is weakening, on either side. The
UK’s commitment of resources—financial, military, diplomatic—in sup-
port of US global priorities remains unparalleled’.11
Nevertheless, there have been some attempts by British policymakers
to abandon the terminology.12 One of the most prominent examples of
this in recent years was the 2010 House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Committee report on US–UK relations which recommended that:
use of the phrase ‘the special relationship’ in its historical sense, to describe
the totality of the ever-evolving UKUS relationship, is potentially mislead-
ing, and we recommend that its use should be avoided. The overuse of the
phrase by some politicians and many in the media serves simultaneously to
de-value its meaning and to raise unrealistic expectations about the benefits
the relationship can deliver to the UK.13
This recommendation received a great deal of scrutiny in the UK media,

and as with earlier attempts to alter the terminology, it was unsuccessful
in doing so.14 Similarly, UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson said in a
January 2018 interview that he banned himself from using the phrase
‘special relationship’ because it sounds ‘a bit needy’.15 Nevertheless,
apart from any personal ban on the phrase, it continued in circulation
among British officials.
Despite Obama’s opposition to Brexit, his first official response to the
vote was to state: ‘we respect their decision. The special relationship … is
enduring’.16 That Obama should make this reference is noteworthy for
two reasons. First, it reflected the American preference for continuity as
82 J. H. MICHAELS
opposed to change in the relationship. Second, when placed in the con-

text of Obama’s previous chequered history with the terminology and
symbolism of US–UK relations, the referendum might have provided an
opportunity to redefine it to reflect the loss of power and prestige that
Britain was expected to suffer as a result. Instead, Obama chose to pass
up this opportunity.
When Obama came into office in 2009 there was a great deal of spec-
ulation that he would seek to downgrade the ‘special relationship’.17 His
press secretary, Robert Gibbs, referred to a ‘special partnership’, leading
one commentator to warn that in London ‘a quiet fear is calcifying’.18
According to another observer, use of the term ‘partner’ was a deliberate
choice that was meant to signal Obama’s distinctive approach to foreign
policy. Whereas Obama was a ‘transactional leader’, concerned with what
benefits would derive from a foreign relationship, thereby preferring the
term ‘partnership’, with its connotations of a business arrangement, he
rejected the term ‘relationship’ as this implied a ‘marriage’ that survives
‘through thick and thin’. Evidence of the extent of British anxiety, and
the concerns expressed by US officials about the negative implications of
this anxiety, can be found in the cable referred to earlier that was drafted
less than two months after Obama’s inauguration. The cable noted there
had been:
a stronger than usual outbreak of British political and media anxiety about
the future of US-UK relations … debate … is louder than at any time since
the fallout from the ‘passport-gate’ affair sent shivers through the UK
chattering classes about the relationship between newly-elected President
Clinton and Prime Minister John Major … This over-reading would often
be humorous, if it were not so corrosive.19
This ‘over-reading’ was attributed to a community of commentators on,

and analysts of, US–UK relations, both inside and outside government—
a community that I have termed the ‘special relationship watchers’. Akin
to Kremlinologists, these ‘watchers’ closely observe changes to the termi-
nology and symbolism for signs of Washington’s approval or disapproval.
To cite an example from this cable:
Fears about the end of the special relationship were further fuelled by
British over-reading of the new Administration’s initial statements. More
than one HMG senior official asked embassy officers whether President
Obama meant to signal in his inaugural address about US-UK relations

by quoting Washington during the Revolutionary War, while the removal
of the Churchill bust from the Oval Office consumed much UK news-
print … Secretary Clinton’s statement before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee was similarly parsed and much was made of the fact that the
UK was fourth in a recitation of US allies (and it was particularly painful
to those British tea readers that Germany and France were named first).20
The fear that Britain was losing out in American affections to Germany
and France has been an important theme in the UK discourse about the
health of the ‘special relationship’. For example, Obama developed close
links with Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy. And though Trump has
had a more adversarial relationship with Merkel, his relationship with
Emmanuel Macron has been relatively close. For instance, during the
April 2018 US–UK–French missile strikes on Syria, France was seen to
have upstaged Britain by firing more missiles, attributed in large part
to the ‘bromance’ between Trump and Macron.21 Moreover, whereas
Trump visited Paris to attend the 2017 Bastille Day ceremony, as well
as visited several other European countries, he did not make a visit to
Britain in his first year as president. Obama, by contrast, made Britain
his first European stop, and Prime Minister Gordon Brown was ‘the first
European leader to speak with the new President following his inaugu-
ration’, a fact that was released to the British press as it was perceived as
significant for reasons of national pride and no doubt to compensate for
the fact that it was the Japanese prime minister who was the first foreign
leader to be invited to Obama’s White House.22
Regardless of any possible intention to downgrade the ‘special rela-
tionship’ to a ‘special partnership’, Obama remained faithful to the
former term. Shortly after the inauguration, during Obama’s January
26, 2009 phone call with Brown, the new president mentioned look-
ing ‘forward to continuing and strengthening the special relation-
ship’. In the course of his two terms as president, in which he dealt
with prime ministers Brown, David Cameron, and briefly with Theresa
May, Obama made repeated public references to the ‘special relation-
ship’. For instance, when Brown visited Washington in March 2009,
Obama responded to reports of his downgrading US–UK ties by stating:
‘the special relationship … is one that is not just important to me, it’s
important to the American people … So I think this notion that some-
how there is any lessening of that special relationship is misguided’.23
84 J. H. MICHAELS
A month later in London he added, ‘The United States and the UK

have stood together through thick and thin, war and peace, through
hard times and prosperity, and we’ve always emerged stronger by stand-
ing together. So I’m pleased that my first meeting overseas as President
is with Gordon Brown’.24 A year later when Cameron replaced Brown,
Obama co-authored an op-ed in which they stated, ‘Ours is not just a
special relationship, it is an essential relationship’. Even after the Brexit
vote, both Obama and other administration officials continued to pub-
licly emphasize the importance of the ‘special relationship’ to the US.
Notably, US Defense Secretary Ash Carter stated: ‘even with all the
change in the world, the inherent logic of our countries’ special relation-
ship still stands. That was true the day before the Brexit vote and it’s true
today after the Brexit vote’.25
Since his January 2017 inauguration, Trump has also made repeated
references to the ‘special relationship’. Among the most notable of these
were his January 2018 comments at a press conference in Davos when he
stated: ‘we are very much joined at the hip when it comes to the military.
We have the same ideas, the same ideals, and there’s nothing that would
happen to you that we won’t be there to fight for you’.26 Indeed, even
as president-elect, in a post-election phone call with Theresa May on
November 10, 2016, they agreed that the US–UK relationship was very
important and very special and Trump said he was ‘confident the “special
relationship” would go from strength to strength’. May was also the first
foreign leader to be invited to the White House. On the other hand, the
November phone call with May followed Trump’s calls with the lead-
ers of nine other countries (India, Japan, Australia, Egypt, South Korea,
Ireland, Mexico, Israel and Turkey). As president-elect, Trump met with
numerous foreign leaders, including the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo
Abe, and also met with former UK Independence Party leader Nigel
Farage, later tweeting that he would make a great UK ambassador to the
US.27
As for the fate of the bust of Winston Churchill, Obama’s decision to
remove it from the Oval Office and replace it with Martin Luther King
Jr. created a great deal of controversy both in the British and American
media. Eight years later, one of Trump’s first actions upon being inaugu-
rated, reportedly at the behest of Farage, was to replace the bust of King
with that of Churchill, an act that was widely interpreted as a signal that
the new administration intended to strengthen US–UK ties.28
Political Interactions
Since World War II the image of British prime ministers and American
presidents standing side-by-side has been a central one in the mythol-
ogy of the ‘special relationship’. The most well-known of these images
are the relationships between Churchill and Roosevelt, Macmillan
and Kennedy, Thatcher and Reagan, and Blair and Bush. In their deal-
ings with one another, contemporary British and American leaders will
often make reference to this mythology denoting the close ties the two
countries have historically enjoyed. For instance, Theresa May, prior to
her first meeting with Donald Trump in January 2017, gave a speech
in Philadelphia to leaders of the Republican Party. In the course of her
remarks, she made five references to Ronald Reagan and four to Winston
Churchill.29 In addition, Trump reportedly referred to May as ‘my
Maggie’, and after watching the film The Darkest Hour, told her ‘You
could be this generation’s Churchill’.30 That these sorts of references to
the ‘high points’ of the ‘special relationship’ are invoked is unsurpris-
ing, but can be quite misleading. Beyond the relationships noted above,
there were many other relationships that have received much less notice,
including ones that have been known for their disagreeable aspects,
such as Eisenhower and Eden, Nixon and Heath, Clinton and Major,
and Brown and Bush.31 Regardless whether the relationships are gener-
ally viewed as positive or negative, a more historically accurate descrip-
tion would be to say these relationships were ‘mixed’. Roosevelt and
Churchill had numerous disagreements as did Reagan and Thatcher. In
none of these cases did relations between a Prime Minister and President
deteriorate to the point where the ‘special relationship’ was fundamen-
tally at risk. From a British perspective, perhaps the worst moment
in Anglo-American relations was Eisenhower’s opposition to Eden’s
Suez ‘adventure’ in 1956. Yet even during this tense period there was
no suggestion that the close US–UK security ties would be completely
undermined—among other things, despite the disagreement over Suez
there remained a common approach to dealing with the Soviet threat
that neither side was willing to abandon.
This mixed record of British and American leadership interactions is
important to keep in mind when attempting to evaluate these relation-
ships in the post-Brexit period. The main focus of this section will there-
fore be on the Trump-May relationship rather than on Obama-Cameron
or Obama-May as the former had existed since 2010 and the latter
86 J. H. MICHAELS
existed only for a matter of months before Obama left office. Perhaps
more importantly, as there is a widespread recognition, including by
leading political scientists, that Trump represents an ‘outlier’ president,
this is a more useful case to study when seeking to determine continuity
versus change.32
Building bridges with the new president was a key priority for May.
As the UK Ambassador in Washington, Sir Kim Darroch, wrote in
a memo, ‘The president-elect is above all an outsider and unknown
quantity, whose campaign pronouncements may reveal his instincts,
but will surely evolve and, particularly, be open to outside influence
if itched right’.33 Weeks later, in an opinion piece published in the
Washington Post, Darroch claimed: ‘In their phone calls so far, Trump
and British Prime Minister Theresa May have made clear that the spe-
cial relationship between Britain and the United States is stronger than
ever. They will work together closely, building on the legacy of previ-
ous leaders such as President Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher’.34 One month afterwards, in her Philadelphia speech, May
told Republican leaders, ‘as you renew your nation just as we renew
ours—we have the opportunity—indeed the responsibility—to renew
the special relationship for this new age’.35 The shift from previously
anti-Trump rhetoric was immediately noticeable. For instance, Foreign
Secretary Boris Johnson, who had once referred to Trump as ‘clearly
out of his mind’, quickly shifted to making praiseworthy remarks about
the new president.
Arguably May’s most important effort to strengthen relations with
Trump was to offer him a state visit in the summer 2017. This decision
was unusual as it broke the normal convention of waiting until a pres-
ident’s second term before issuing an invitation. It also quickly turned
into a public relations fiasco. Details of Trump’s demand for a grander
state visit than had previously been arranged for a US president included
golf at Balmoral with the Queen, a dinner at Blenheim palace, an address
to both houses of parliament, and tea at Buckingham palace. The pros-
pect of the visit provoked a number of calls for it to be cancelled and
raised the prospect of large-scale protests. In reaction to this, Trump
reportedly told May ‘When I know I’m going to get a better reception,
I’ll come and not before’.36 Shortly thereafter, the state visit was post-
poned until the autumn and later downgraded to a ‘working visit’ in
2018.37 Trump would later avoid travelling to Britain on the occasion of
the opening of the new US Embassy in London.38
Like his position on so many other topics, Trump’s views of Britain

range from his embracing it in general, to embracing its political right in
particular, to making negative references about it that would have been
unthinkable with any other president. His affinity for Britain appears to
stem from his Scottish mother. As he stated in his first press conference
with May, ‘my mother was born in Scotland, Stornoway, which is serious
Scotland’. In a separate interview he said, ‘I love Britain. My mother was
crazy about the Queen’.39 Trump maintained especially close links with the
political right, most notably with Farage and has made numerous state-
ments in support of Brexit, which he described as a ‘wonderful thing’.40
In November 2017, Trump went so far as to re-tweet anti-Muslim videos
posted by the far right ‘Britain First’.41 This action drew a rebuke from
May and threatened to further derail his visit to the UK.42 Earlier in his
administration, Trump failed to publicly deny claims that Britain’s signals
intelligence service, GCHQ, had wiretapped Trump Tower at the request
of the Obama administration, despite being denied by US officials.
It is important to note that it is precisely because of his ‘non-
establishment’ views on so many issues, as well as the atypical nature
of the Trump presidency, that the British Government will hold similar
views to those of the US bureaucracy, as well as large parts of the admin-
istration, but because of Trump’s personality, he will reject any views he
disagrees with. This is reflected in two of the UK’s most important secu-
rity priorities (not including other issues such as Trump’s travel ban and
climate change) in 2017: strengthening NATO and retaining the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran.
May first discussed NATO with Trump in a November 29, 2016
phone call with him. The importance of this issue reflected concerns
that Trump’s public disparagement of the Alliance during the elec-
tion campaign indicated he intended to reduce the American commit-
ment to it—a position that ran contrary not only to UK policy but also
to mainstream American preferences. During her January 2017 visit to
the White House, May stated that Trump had told her he was ‘100%
behind NATO’ and that they were ‘united in our recognition of NATO
as the bulwark of our collective defense’.43 This statement seemed to
ring hollow months later when Trump delivered a speech at NATO HQ
in which he deliberately failed to reiterate the American commitment to
Article 5—despite his advisers placing this in his speech. In a later visit
to Warsaw, Trump reversed his position and stated that the US would
‘stand firmly behind Article 5’.44
88 J. H. MICHAELS
The second major issue was Trump’s opposition to the Iran nuclear
deal and his decision in October 2017 not to recertify it. During the
election campaign he claimed on numerous occasions that the JCPOA
was ‘the worst deal in the world’, although he was unclear whether he
intended to unilaterally withdraw from the deal or attempt to renegoti-
ate its terms.45 Trump’s decision to decertify the deal came after signif-
icant lobbying by British officials, most notably by Darroch, in support
of the JCPOA.46 Only weeks earlier when they met in New York, Trump
and May had devoted nearly half their discussion to Iran, and she also
later used a phone call to convince him to recertify the JCPOA. Given
that Trump’s own Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, had already stated
publicly that Iran was in compliance with the terms of the agreement,
it is probably unfair to claim Trump’s decision to decertify the deal
demonstrated a decline in US–UK relations. When Trump’s own polit-
ical appointees and bureaucracy were unable to influence the president’s
decisions, one cannot expect a foreign government to be able to have
more success—after all, the friendship of two countries, and specifically
its leaders, has never been a guarantee of influence.47 In any event, fol-
lowing Trump’s decision, British officials switched their lobbying efforts
on this issue away from the White House towards trying to persuade
members of Congress to uphold the JCPOA.48
Bureaucratic Ties
Amidst high points and low points in the relations between presidents
and prime ministers, the close bureaucratic ties between the US and
UK in the security field have remained a constant and have often been
described as the substructure of the ‘special relationship’.49 Baylis and
Wirtz describe this aspect of the relationship by referring to the ‘myriad
bilateral committees, working groups, and liaison officers who coordi-
nate common approaches to policy, procurement, research and develop-
ment, and operations across an array of issues and programs’.50 And as
one ‘senior MP’ explained to an American embassy official in 2009 in
reaction to press coverage that called into question the future of the ‘spe-
cial relationship’, ‘the people who really matter in all this, those who do
the serious business, know that where it matters—over defence, security
issues, intelligence-sharing—the relationship is deep, ongoing and abid-
ing’.51 Precisely because of the permanency that characterizes bureau-
cratic relationships, they tend not to be affected by the day-to-day crises
of international politics. To the extent significant change can be identi-

fied this usually occurs over the long term or in reaction to a major crisis.
For our purposes here, Brexit and Trump’s election will be considered
‘major crises’, to be considered alongside several longer-term trends.
In terms of the latter, there have been a number of trends that have
affected US–UK bureaucratic ties, or at least the perception of these ties.
Some of these emanate from developments in American priorities, oth-
ers from shifting British priorities. For example, in the aftermath of the
2011 announcement of an American ‘pivot’ to Asia, there were increas-
ing concerns that the US would de-emphasize its interest in European
security affairs and downgrade its bureaucratic relationships with its
European allies, to include the UK. These concerns were almost certainly
overblown, especially given the lack of any major shifts in US defence
commitments that might otherwise be associated with a ‘pivot’, or as
later re-labelled, a ‘rebalancing’ to Asia. Moreover, the re-emergence
of Russia as the ‘top threat’ following the 2014 Crimea annexation has
had the effect of raising the profile of European security issues within
Washington, to include increasing US military interaction with European
allies.52
Two additional trends often discussed in relation to bilateral defence
ties are the decline in UK military capabilities and the growing percep-
tion of an unwillingness to employ them. Both of these trends require
some qualification. With respect to military capabilities, often referred to
in the same breath as budget cuts, this has been an ongoing problem
since the end of World War II, with American officials regularly com-
plaining. To take one example, British defence cuts in the 1970s were
strongly opposed by Washington—yet despite this opposition, cuts still
occurred, the British military continued to provide significant military
support to the US, and as close ties have existed in the decades since,
clearly there was no permanent effect on the relationship.53 The same
phenomenon is also observable in relation to American complaints
about the quality of British military performance during the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq.54 Despite the relatively high level of British
commitment—in both cases the UK provided the most military forces
of any US ally—US officials were highly critical on numerous occasions.
Nevertheless, there has been little interest on the part of the US or the
UK to weaken these links. On the contrary, the American position has
been to strengthen defence ties by putting pressure on the British gov-
ernment not to cut defence expenditure and to continue to request
90 J. H. MICHAELS
British military participation in ongoing operations. In November 2017,

for instance, the head of US Army Europe, General Ben Hodges, pub-
licly warned about the consequences of further defence cuts. In his
words, if the UK was unable to ‘maintain and sustain the level of com-
mitments it’s fulfilling right now, then I think it risks kind of going into
a different sort of category’.55 What Hodges meant by ‘a different sort
of category’ is unclear, but perhaps the most useful analogy might be
the defence relationships the US maintains with Australia and Canada,
both of whom possess considerably smaller defence establishments than
the UK, yet have nonetheless retained close ties with the American mil-
itary. The second trend relates to the unwillingness of Britain to con-
tinue to offer support to US military operations. This concern is typified
by the Cameron government’s inability in 2013 to secure parliamentary
approval for air strikes against Syria. Subsequent British military opera-
tions against the Islamic State, as well as the Assad regime in Syria, com-
bined with its post-2014 deployments on NATO’s ‘eastern flank’, may
have ameliorated this concern somewhat, although references to the
2013 analogy continue to be made.
Since the Brexit vote and the election of Trump, there has been lit-
tle immediate effect on military capabilities or the willingness to use
them. Most discussion of the impact of Brexit on capabilities is limited
to reduced UK defence expenditure due to lower tax revenue asso-
ciated with a post-Brexit poor economic climate, the need for the UK
Government to divert funds to pay a Brexit fee, and the poor exchange
rate for Sterling.56 As of 2018, the implications of Brexit for defence
expenditure remain speculative, with some reductions almost certain
but no expectation of drastic cuts. A second Brexit-related impact has
to do with the willingness to pursue additional military interventions in
the immediate future. This impact is related to the so-called ‘bandwidth’
problem—i.e. with the UK Government so preoccupied by Brexit there
is little interest in taking on any major new commitments. As for the
impact of Trump, this has less to do with effects on military capabilities
and more to do with other countries, including the UK, being willing
to enter into military interventions alongside the United States during
his presidency. This is perhaps best analogized to the ‘toxic’ effect of
the Bush presidency. However, this concern requires contextualization.
Even with the unpopularity of the Iraq war, many countries still contrib-
uted to US-led operations elsewhere, especially in Afghanistan, and fol-
lowing the fall of Baghdad, in Iraq itself. By contrast, not even the more
‘acceptable’ Obama presidency was sufficient to persuade British policy-

makers to intervene in Syria in 2013.
Additional bureaucratic ties that are relevant to this discussion are
those having to do with intelligence and nuclear cooperation. The trend
for the former, though difficult to gauge, is probably one of increasing
cooperation rather than decreasing. Several arguments can be made to
support this claim. In the first instance, as a result of the ‘war on ter-
ror’, intelligence relations grew ‘exponentially’.57 This is probably also
reflected in the post-9/11 trend to increase funding for the intelligence
services in both countries. Apart from the ever-present ‘terrorism’ threat,
the re-emergence of Russia combined with growing fears of ‘cyber
attacks’, is almost certain to result in continued high levels of intelligence
expenditures as well as close intelligence ties. Historically, US–UK intelli-
gence ties have remained close despite numerous scandals, ranging from
the ‘Cambridge Five’ to the controversies surrounding the CIA’s rendi-
tion programme to the revelations of Edward Snowden. To the extent
relations have been disrupted, these have been partial and short-term dis-
ruptions.58 As for nuclear cooperation, the British Government’s deci-
sion to renew Trident and the US Government’s decision to modernize
its nuclear forces over the next 30 years has effectively confirmed further
cooperation for the next generation. The only possible disruption to this
might result from a Scottish independence vote combined with a deci-
sion to force UK nuclear submarines to leave their Scottish bases.59
Finally, judging by the rhetoric of senior British and American offi-
cials, bureaucratic ties have not been undermined by the ‘twin crises’ of
Brexit and Trump. The following examples are worth citing as evidence
of this. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson told American Embassy staff
in London that the ‘special relationship is ‘as special today as it has ever
been. The ties between our two countries are very, very close … across
all the really critical issues that we’re dealing with today, the UK and the
leadership here have been just terrific for us’.60 US Defense Secretary
James Mattis has made similarly positive comments. For instance, he has
referred to Britain as an example to other states and emphasized that its
‘global leadership is needed today as much as at any time in history’.61 In
a separate statement he said ‘The UK and US maintain an unmatched,
enduring special relationship that is not an artificial or historical arte-
fact. In fact, it’s a pathway for our future’.62 Mattis also referred to the
British armed forces as ‘a treasure – a national treasure to the UK, but
one we respect greatly’.63 British officials have reciprocated in their
92 J. H. MICHAELS
public statements. British Defence Secretary Michael Fallon stated, ‘Our

defence relationship … is unprecedented in its depth and scope’ and
referred to the UK policy of ‘enhancing our cooperation and investing
more in our joint F-35 fast jet programme’.64 Fallon also addressed the
impact of Brexit, stating that ‘we see Brexit as an opportunity not to step
back from European defence but to step up to strengthen Euro-Atlantic
security. In particular, we’re bolstering our bonds with NATO’.65 These
and countless other examples of US and British officials praising US–
UK defence relations during the post-Brexit vote period can be cited,
whereas those that are critical of these relations are few and far between.
Therefore, at least at the level of official rhetoric, no discernible negative
impact on US–UK security ties can be observed—indeed if the rhetoric
is reflective of actual policy then these ties may grow closer rather than
moving further apart.
Conclusion
In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, the doyen of strategic studies in
Britain, Sir Michael Howard, was asked in an interview about its effect
on US–UK relations. He replied: ‘Ah, the special relationship … It was
a necessary myth, a bit like Christianity. But now where do we go?’.66
As this chapter has argued, the answer to this question is: not much fur-
ther beyond where we’ve always been. Having examined three central
aspects of the US–UK ‘special relationship’—symbolism, political inter-
actions and bureaucratic ties—set these within the context of the pre-
Brexit assumptions about the impact of a Brexit vote on the relationship,
and also accounted for the other most (if not more) significant politi-
cal event, namely the election of Trump, this chapter concludes that no
‘meaningful change’ is observable. In each of the three categories it was
possible to find evidence of both a strengthening and weakening of bilat-
eral ties, yet there were no important shifts that stood out either indi-
vidually much less collectively. This is not to suggest that the ‘special
relationship’ won’t be abandoned at some future date, but instead to
make the point that should this happen then Brexit will likely be one of a
large number of underlying factors rather than an immediate cause.
That being said, even if considered in isolation, it is almost cer-
tainly too early to tell how Brexit will affect US–UK security relations
in the future because as of 2018, Britain remains a member of the EU.
Assuming the break proceeds in 2019, or at some point thereafter, then

Britain’s future is likely to follow one of three paths: decline, prosper-
ity, or no major change. From an American perspective, the ideal would
be for Britain to emerge from Brexit more prosperous and therefore
able to make a greater security contribution. Even if unlikely, at least in
the immediate term, this possibility cannot automatically be excluded.
At the other end of the spectrum, Brexit could herald a significant
British decline, with the UK having fewer and fewer resources to ded-
icate to a global policy, and therefore it would be a much less valuable
ally. Unfortunately, it is difficult to speculate the extent of this decline.
Would it, for instance, mean that Britain still dedicates more resources
to defence and intelligence than other US allies, such as Australia and
Canada, and therefore still maintains its primus inter pares position
relative to other US allies within the ‘five eyes’ community, and with it, a
legitimate claim of ‘specialness’?
Without wishing to speculate too far, it is merely worth re-iterating
that as of this writing, Britain is still in the early stages of Brexit. In the
longer term, the impact on the ‘special relationship’ may be positive or
negative depending on whether Britain prospers or declines. Meanwhile,
as the evidence presented here demonstrates, the impact up to this point
has not been significant, or to put it another way, it has not been incon-
sistent compared with other tenuous periods in the history of the rela-
tionship. This may be due to a ‘wait-and-see’ approach, as both British
and American policymakers prefer to minimize any negative Brexit impact
to ensure continuity in a period when they contending with a large num-
ber of other security challenges. It may also be the case that within a
matter of months, Brexit was overtaken by Trump’s election. One can,
of course, assume the ‘specialness’ of the relationship, and then to argue
about matters of degree. This analytical approach has deliberately not
been attempted here on the grounds that the large number of conflicting
variables make it highly problematic, and as the history of the relation-
ship indicates, positive or negative impressions are often held temporar-
ily, often in response to specific events. Instead, the focus has remained
centred on the underlying structure of the relationship and the extent
to which the ‘twin crises’ of Brexit and Trump have had any substantive
impact. When examined from this perspective, it can be concluded that
neither crisis, alone or in combination, have thus far proved sufficient to
alter the relationship, positively or negatively, in any fundamental way.
94 J. H. MICHAELS
Notes
1. Josh Dawsey and Hadas Gold, ‘Full Transcript: Trump’s Wall Street
Journal Interview’, Politico, August 1, 2017. Available at https://www.
politico.eu/article/full-transcript-trumps-wall-street-journal-interview/.
2. David Smith, ‘Trump Interview: Golf, Brexit and Why You Don’t
Hear About Britain Any More’, The Guardian, August 2, 2017. Other
examples include: Harry Cockburn, ‘Donald Trump Promises “Big
and Exciting” Trade Deal with UK Because “You Don’t Hear the
Word Britain Anymore”’, The Independent, August 2, 2017; Barney
Henderson, ‘Donald Trump Says He Wants to Be Very Involved with UK
“Because You Don’t Hear the Word Britain Anymore”’, The Telegraph,
August 1, 2017.
3. A few examples consulted in preparation of this chapter include:
David Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and
the International Order Since the Second World War’, International
Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1985–1986, pp. 1–20; John Dumbrell and
Axel R. Schäfer, eds. America’s “Special Relationships”: Foreign and
Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance (London: Routledge, 2009);
Alex Danchev, ‘On Specialness’, International Affairs, Vol. 72,
No. 4, 1996, pp. 737–750; Guy Arnold, America and Britain: Was
There Ever a Special Relationship (London: Hurst, 2014). A useful over-
view of the literature is: David Hastings Dunn and Edward Avenell,
‘US–UK Special Relationship’, Oxford Bibliographies, September 28,
2016. Available at http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/docu-
ment/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0189.xml. Also use-
ful are: House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘Oral Evidence: The
Indispensable Ally? US, NATO and UK Defence Relations’, HC 387,
October 10, 2017; House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee,
‘Government Foreign Policy Towards the United States: Eighth Report
of Session 2013–2014’, HC 695, April 3, 2014.
4. For instance, see Dov S. Zakheim, ‘Whither the Special Relationship?’
Round Table, Vol. 85, No. 337, 1996, pp. 73–82.
5. John Dumbrell, ‘The US–UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st-
Century Temperature’, The British Journal of Politics and International
Relations, Vol. 11, 2009, pp. 64–78.
6.
See for instance: Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Charlotte Galpin, and Ben
Rosamond, ‘Performing Brexit: How a Post-Brexit World Is Imagined
Outside the United Kingdom’, The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2017, pp. 573–591; Tim Oliver
and Michael John Williams, ‘Special Relationship in Flux: Brexit and the
Future of the US–EU and US–UK Relationships’, International Affairs,
Vol. 2, No. 3, 2016, pp. 547–567; Jeremy Ghez, Magdalena Kirchner,

Michael Shurkin, Anna Knack, Alex Hall, and James Black, ‘Defence and
Security After Brexit: A Snapshot of International Perspectives on the
Implications of the UK’s Decision to Leave the EU’, RAND Europe, 2017.
7. Krishnadev Calamur, ‘Obama’s “Brexit” Plea’, The Atlantic, April 22,
2016.
8. Nicola Harley, ‘Hillary Clinton Warns Against Brexit Vote’, The Telegraph,
April 23, 2016.
9. Sam Levin, ‘Donald Trump Backs Brexit, Saying UK Would be “Better
Off” Without EU’, The Guardian, May 6, 2016.
10. Eleanor Hayward and Jack Doyle, ‘“Special Relationship” Was Seen as a
Joke by US Diplomats, Claims Former Presidential Adviser’, The Daily
Mail, October 9, 2017.
11. US Embassy London, Cable: ‘The British Ask, Is Our Special Relationship
Still Special in Washington?’ February 9, 2009. Available at https://
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09LONDON348_a.html.
12. For some earlier examples, see John Baylis and James J. Wirtz, ‘The
US–UK “Special Military Relationship”: Resetting the Partnership’,
Comparative Strategy, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2012, p. 253.
13. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Global Security: UK–
US Relations Sixth Report of Session 2009–10 Report’, March 18, 2010.
14. Steve Marsh, ‘“Global Security: US–UK Relations”: Lessons for the
Special Relationship?’ Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2,
2012, pp. 182–199.
15. Heather Stewart and Anushka Asthana, ‘Boris Johnson: “Let Us Have a
Grown Up Conversation with Our American Friends”’, The Guardian,
January 15, 2018.
16. The White House, ‘Statement by the President on the UK Referendum’,
Office of the Press Secretary, June 24, 2016.
17. Tim Shipman, ‘Will Barack Obama End Britain’s Special Relationship
with America?’ The Times, February 28, 2009.
18. Ibid.
19. US Embassy London, 2009.
20. Ibid.
21. Jamie Dettmer, ‘Who Is America’s Best European Ally?’ Voice of America
News, April 16, 2018.
23. Remarks Following a Meeting with Prime Minister Gordon Brown of
the United Kingdom and an Exchange with Reporters, March 3, 2009.
Available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85814.
24. The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Gordon Brown of
the United Kingdom in London, England, April 1, 2009.
96 J. H. MICHAELS
25. US Department of Defense, ‘Remarks by Secretary Carter at the

University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of Government in Oxford,
England’, September 7, 2016.
26. White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister May
of the United Kingdom After Bilateral Meeting, Davos, Switzerland’,
January 25, 2018.
27. Nicky Woolf and Jessica Elgot, ‘Nigel Farage Would Be Great UK
Ambassador to US, Says Donald Trump’, The Guardian, November 22,
2016.
28. Barney Henderson, ‘Winston Churchill Bust Set for Oval Office Return
by Donald Trump’, The Telegraph, January 7, 2017.
29. Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, ‘Prime Minister’s Speech to
the Republican Party Conference 2017’, January 26, 2017.
30. Ben Riley-Smith, ‘Exclusive: Donald Trump Told Theresa May She Could
Become the New Churchill’, The Telegraph, January 24, 2018.
31. David Hastings Dunn, ‘The Double Interregnum: UK–US Relations
Beyond Blair and Bush’, International Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6, 2008,
pp. 1131–1143; John Dumbrell, ‘Personal Diplomacy: Relations
Between Prime Ministers and Presidents’, in Alan P. Dobson and Steve
Marsh, eds. Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives
(London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 179–207.
32. Robert Jervis, ‘President Trump and IR Theory’, ISSF Policy Series,
January 2, 2017. Available at https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/
discussions/159072/issf-policy-series-president-trump-and-ir-theory.
33. R yan Wilkinson, ‘Leaked Memo Reveals UK Planning to Exploit Donald
Trump’s Inexperience’, The Independent, November 13, 2016.
34. Kim Darroch, ‘After a Seismic Year, America and Britain Must Move
Forward Together’, The Washington Post, December 27, 2016.
35. Prime Minister’s Office, January 26, 2017.
36. David Wooding, ‘Trump Cower’, The Sun, July 15, 2017.
37. Ben Riley-Smith and Kate McCann, ‘Donald Trump’s “Working Visit”
to UK Dropped as Tensions with Theresa May Grow Over President’s
Far-Right Retweets’, The Telegraph, December 1, 2017; Joe Murphy,
‘Donald Trump Set to Come to the UK Next Year—But It Won’t Be the
Formal State Visit He Was Promised’, Evening Standard, October 11,
2017.
38. Stephen Castle and Austin Ramzy, ‘Trump Won’t Visit London to Open
Embassy: His U.K. Critics Say He Got the Message’, The New York
Times, January 12, 2018.
39. Ben Hoyle, ‘Trump Interview’, The Times, January 16, 2017.
40. Graham K. Wilson, ‘Brexit, Trump and the Special Relationship’, The
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3,
2017, pp. 543–557.
41. James Blitz, ‘Trump’s Tweets Raise Fresh Brexit Questions’, Financial

Times, November 30, 2017.
42. Martin Pengelly and Rowena Mason, ‘Theresa May Rebukes Donald
Trump Over Tube Bombing Tweets’, The Guardian, September 15,
2017.
43. Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, ‘PM Press Conference with
US President Trump’, January 27, 2017.
44. The White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump to the People of Poland,
Krasiński Square, Warsaw, Poland’, Office of the Press Secretary, July 6,
2017.
45. James Landale, ‘What Do Trump’s Words on Iran Mean for US/UK
Relations?’ BBC, October 13, 2017.
46. Patricia Zengerle, ‘European Ambassadors to US Back Iran Nuclear Pact’,
Reuters, September 25, 2017.
47. In relation to this point, see Kelly McHugh, ‘Bush, Blair, and the War
in Iraq: Alliance Politics and the Limits of Influence’, Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 125, No. 3, 2010, pp. 465–491.
48. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Foreign Secretary Visiting
Washington to Reaffirm UK Commitment to the Iran Nuclear Deal’,
November 8, 2017.
49. Jay Jakub, ‘The Anglo‐American “Special Relationship” in the Post-
Cold War World: Much More Than Meets the Eye”, Defense Analysis,
Vol. 11, No. 3, 1995, pp. 318–321; Baylis and Wirtz, 2012; Steve Marsh,
‘The Anglo-American Defence Relationship’, in Alan P. Dobson and
Steve Marsh, eds. Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives
50. Baylis and Wirtz, p. 253.
52. For instance, funding for the European Reassurance Initiative which
began during the Obama administration has been increasing every year
since 2015—from $985 million in 2015 to $789 million in 2016 to $3.4
billion in 2017. In 2017, the Trump administration announced this fig-
ure would be supplemented by an additional $1.4 billion.
53. Thomas Robb, ‘The “Limit of What Is Tolerable”: British Defence Cuts
and the “Special Relationship”, 1974–1976’, Diplomacy and Statecraft,
Vol. 22, No. 2, 2011, pp. 321–337.
54. Patrick Porter, ‘Last Charge of the Knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the
Special Relationship’, International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2, 2010,
pp. 355–375.
55. Cited in Jonathan Beale, ‘General Ben Hodges Warns Britain Over Armed
Forces Cuts’, BBC, November 8, 2017.
56. Michael Savage, ‘PM’s Former Security Adviser Warns of Brexit Defence
Cuts’, The Guardian, October 14, 2017.
98 J. H. MICHAELS
57. Adam Svendsen, ‘“Strained” Relations? Evaluating Contemporary Anglo-

American Intelligence and Security Cooperation’, in Alan P. Dobson and
58. Anthony Zurcher, ‘Will Intelligence Leaks Sink US–UK Relationship’,
BBC, May 25, 2017; Vikram Dodd, Ewen MacAskill, Rowena Mason,
and Jessica Elgot, ‘UK Police Stop Passing Manchester Bombing
Information to US Over Leaks’, The Guardian, May 25, 2017.
59. For an overview of nuclear cooperation, see Jenifer Mackby and Paul
Cornish, US–UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50 Years. Washington, DC:
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2008.
60. US Department of State, ‘Rex W. Tillerson—Remarks to the Staff and
Families of US Embassy London’, September 14, 2017.
61. Cited in: ‘Fallon and Mattis Discuss NATO Spending’, BBC, March 31,
2017.
62. US Department of Defense, ‘Remarks by Secretary Mattis and Secretary
Williamson in London, UK’, November 10, 2017.
63. Ibid.
64. Cited in: Ewen MacAskill, ‘UK Defence Role Lies with US, Not EU Says
Michael Fallon’, The Guardian, March 31, 2017.
65. UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Defence Secretary Reaffirms Leadership in
NATO on Washington Trip’, July 7, 2017.
66. Howard cited in: Ian Buruma, ‘The End of the Anglo-American Order’,
The New York Times Magazine, November 29, 2016.
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CHAPTER 5
Franco-British Defence Co-operation

in the Context of Brexit
Samuel B. H. Faure
“Our goal of seeking closer co-operation with Germany as well as with

those European countries that have the capacity and will to move for-
ward, while also maintaining a solid bilateral relationship with the UK,
should allow significant progress to be made”.1 Thus writes Florence
Parly, the French minister for the armed forces, in the preface to the
“Revue stratégique” [strategic review] drawn up at the request of
France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, and published in October 2017.
These words embody the head of state’s political philosophy, influ-
enced by the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, whose research assis-
tant he once was. It can be summed up by the formula “et en même
temps” [“and at the same time”], which occurred frequently in his
speeches. Implementing France’s defence policy requires co-operation
with the United Kingdom (UK) and at the same time with Germany—
co-operation that is on a bilateral, and at the same time minilateral,
and at the same time multilateral levels. This French politics, which
brings together different allies (Germany, Spain, Italy, UK) within dif-
ferent institutional frameworks or “instruments”—the Lancaster House
S. B. H. Faure (*) 
Nuffield College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

104 S. B. H. FAURE
treaties, the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation (OCCAR),

the European Union (EU)—and on different levels of public action
(bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral) goes by the name of “flexilater-
alism”.2 The politics of flexilateralism in Europe is not a recent inter-
national phenomenon but is reinforced continuously from the 1990s.
France’s “flexilateral” politics questions, in the context of the Brexit
negotiations, the interplay between the allies taking part in them, and
between the various levels on which that policy is implemented. The aim
is to suggest what the future of the strategic partnership with the UK
might be. Does France see defence co-operation with the UK as a major
or a peripheral vehicle for France’s flexilateral politics compared to other
types of European co-operation? And consequently, is it more likely that
the UK will remain a primary ally of France, despite Brexit, or that it will
be relegated to a “supporting role”? The high degree of unpredictability
of the political negotiations between the UK and the EU, in an unsta-
ble international context (North Korea, Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump,
2018 Italian elections), suggests we should be cautious in forecasting the
outcome (see Chapters 3 and 4).3 This chapter is divided into three sec-
tions. First, the theoretical explanation of the possibility of a dual role
for the UK in the future of its strategic partnership with France is out-
lined. Second, the likely political status quo of its military “leading role”
is demonstrated by a “closed” configuration. Third, the likely political
shift of its industrial “supporting role” is explained through an “open”
configuration.4 This shift would be driven by a “bottom-up” approach
(economic motives) rather than a “top-down” one (strategic motives)
(see Matlary and Johnson introduction).
Explaining the UK’s Dual Role in Its Partnership

with France
From London to Paris, the most widely held assumption among British
and French political actors and experts in 2017–2018 is that Brexit would
permanently weaken co-operation with the UK in most areas of the pub-
lic sphere—such as culture, trade in goods and services, and higher
education—but with the exception of defence (see Chapter 2). It is

thought Brexit would have a limited effect on Franco-British co-operation
on defence policy for two reasons. First, the most strategic military involve-
ments, such as “high-intensity” military operations, are not implemented at
5 FRANCO-BRITISH DEFENCE CO-OPERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF BREXIT 105
a multilateral level under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy
(CSDP), but under Franco-British co-operation at a bilateral level. Second,
the UK and France are the only European states that possess nuclear weap-
ons and are members of the United Nations security council.5 The UK’s
withdrawal from the EU would not affect its military capacity and insti-
tutional resources, which enable it to be the leading military power in
Europe. In this chapter, this supposition that the UK would remain a pri-
mary strategic ally of France because Brexit would not have a significant
effect on Franco-British co-operation is qualified.
It develops the argument that there is a distinction to be drawn
between the effect of Brexit on the future of the partnership with the
UK as regards military policy and industrial policy which constitute
European defence co-operation, regardless of the allies that take part in
that co-operation and the levels at which it is deployed. It is expected,
the dominant theory runs, that the UK’s departure from the EU would
have only a limited effect on military policy. Since it is not in competi-
tion with other types of European co-operation, the partnership with the
UK would, it is believed, remain a major vehicle for the development
of France’s flexilateral politics in Europe. On the other hand, it is likely
that its effect on industrial policy would be more marked from 2020
onwards. The Franco-British partnership would be sidelined in favour of
co-operation with Germany and associations with variable combinations
of partners within the EU, which would necessarily become the deter-
minant vehicles for formulating France’s flexilateral politics in Europe.6
The UK thus plays, in its future strategic partnership with France, two
roles: a military “leading role” and, simultaneously, an industrial “sup-
porting role”. The UK’s two roles, which embody the uncertain future
of Franco-British defence co-operation, are revealed by the “relational”
approach of France’s flexilateral politics—which consists of taking seri-
ously the relations of interdependence that exist between the various
(main) defence actors in Europe. This approach fits within the “prac-
tice turn” described by theories of international relations7 and European
integration.8 The development of the UK’s strategic position in the con-
text of Brexit, as envisaged by France, is determined by the interplay of
different “practices”9 of European co-operation.10 These practices go to
make up France’s flexilateral politics and are a result of the structure of
the “configuration”11 formed by actors.
The concept of a practice is that of a type of routinised action (iter-
ation) that fits within a given social context, which leads a actor to
106 S. B. H. FAURE
“do something”12 (for example, to co-operate). A practice is generated

by the aptitudes of the actor (internalised knowledge) and generates an
effect on the world (performance): “[…] practices have causal power in
the sense that they make other things happen. Practices are the genera-
tive force thanks to which society and politics take shape; they produce
very concrete effects in and on the world”.13 France’s flexilateral poli-
tics in Europe is the result of four practices: (1) the practice of bilateral
Franco-British co-operation, (2) the practice of bilateral Franco-German
co-operation, (3) the practice of minilateral co-operation which fits
within multiple political and institutional frameworks (for example,
the Weimar Triangle and OCCAR), and (4) the practice of multilateral
co-operation within the EU and NATO (see Chapters 7 and 9). The
effect of these four practices varies, depending on the historical context
and the public sphere in which they operate. One practice—Franco-
British co-operation, for example—can strongly influence the formu-
lation of flexilateralism in certain cases, and have only a marginal effect
in others. In order to explain this variation in the effect of the practices
European co-operation on the formulation of the politics of flexilateral-
ism, the concept of configuration is called upon.
The concept of configuration refers to an asymmetrical and fluid
arrangement of relations of interdependence between a group of heter-
ogeneous actors with unequal resources at their disposal.14 A configu-
ration is not confined to a specific area of interdependences, but takes
into account the relationships of mutual dependency between the state
and the “economic sphere”,15 embodied here by the arms industry, on
a national scale, and between states on an international scale.16 A config-
uration can therefore associate state actors (the British defence ministry)
with industrial ones (BAE Systems), as well as actors on a national scale
(the French minister of Armies) and international scale (the European
Defence Agency). The aim is to identify the structure of the config-
uration that is most likely to favour (“open” configuration) or, on the
contrary, to block (“closed” configuration), the effect of the practice
of Franco-British co-operation on the formulation of France’s flexilat-
eral politics in Europe. In order to do this, two indicators inspired by
social network analysis are used. On the one hand, the degree of cen-
trality of the British and French “nodes” represents actors: is the con-
figuration slightly or strongly structured by the positions of the British
and French nodes (or actors)? On the other hand, the degree of exclu-
sivity of the “ties” between the British and French nodes represents their
relationships: is the configuration structured exclusively or only partially

by the tie of interdependence (or relationships) connecting the British
and French nodes? The model of the “closed” configuration is charac-
terised by a central position for the British and French nodes, which are
connected by an exclusive tie of interdependence. By contrast, the model
of the “open” configuration is defined by a position of the British and
French nodes that may be central but whose tie is not exclusive.
According to this relational approach to European co-operation, the
UK could, in its strategic partnership with France, retain its military
“leading role” and simultaneously be limited to an industrial “supporting
role”, because these two public spheres of defence action are not shaped
in the same way by the practices of European co-operation (Table 5.1).
The Franco-British practice is only slightly in competition with the
other European practices in the military sphere. On the other hand,
the Franco-British practice faces strong competition from the other
European practices in the industrial sphere. This variation in the effect
of the Franco-British practice on military policy and industrial policy can
be explained by two different configuration structures. In the case of
military policy, the low level of competition between the Franco-British
practice and the other European practices is explained by the “closed”
structure of the configuration. The British and French nodes (govern-
mental and industrial actors) occupy a central position and, moreover,
are connected by an exclusive tie: no other tie (such as Germany, for
example) occupies an analogous relational position. In the case of indus-
trial policy, the competition between the Franco-British practice and the
other European practices can be explained by the configuration’s “open”
structure. The British and French nodes also occupy a central position.
But their tie is not exclusive—it includes other European nodes.
Table 5.1 Detailed model of the UK’s two roles in defence co-operation with
France
Military policy Industrial policy
Detailed model Degree of openness – +

of the configuration structure
Competition between practices – +
of European co-operation
Results Franco-British partnership Status quo Change
UK role “Leading role” “Supporting role”
108 S. B. H. FAURE
Status Quo of the Military “Leading Role”

by a “Closed” Configuration
In the military policy, the UK is the sole European state, together with
France, that possesses nuclear weapons, is a permanent member of the
United Nations security council, and has a strategic culture that enables
it to take part in a “high intensity” external operation.17 These politi-
cal, military, and institutional resources confer on the UK and France a
central relational position within the configuration of European actors
that take part in military involvements constituting defence policy.
Moreover, neither Germany, Norway, Poland, nor any other European
state can count on these resources that are specific to defence policy.
Consequently, the tie of interdependence linking the UK and France is
an exclusive one. Structurally, France cannot initiate, in the sphere of
defence policy, an analogous relationship with Germany, Norway, or
Poland (see Chapter 6). The density of the relationship between the
British and French nodes (or actors) is reinforced by the institutional-
isation of the Lancaster House treaties, though this does not rule out
sometimes difficult relations.18 This “closed” configuration explains the
status quo of the Franco-British practice as the main vehicle for France’s
flexilateral politics. This assumption seems reasonable, in the absence
of any exogenous change. If Germany obtained a permanent seat on
the United Nations security council, acquired a nuclear deterrent, or
changed its strategic culture enough to enable it to conduct “high inten-
sity” external operations with France (apart from an EU or NATO mis-
sion), this assumption could become invalid. However, none of these
major changes seems a realistic prospect in the context of Brexit.19
As a consequence, the other European practices are not alternatives
to the Franco-British practice. Most of the civil and military actors in
the French defence ministry subscribe to the idea that they do not com-
pete with, but rather complement, the Franco-British practice through
a division of functions. Franco-British co-operation embodies the prac-
tice adapted for conducting military missions (warfare) and at the same
time multilateral co-operation within the EU is the practice used to
carry out peacekeeping missions.20 This analysis is not always shared by
French political actors. Since his election in May 2017, France’s presi-
dent, Emmanuel Macron has insisted on a strengthening of European
defence. Following Angela Merkel’s re-election as German chancellor, on
September 2017, Macron gave a talk at La Sorbonne University in Paris.
In his “Initiative pour l’Europe”21 [“Initiative for Europe”] talk,

the French president described defence as “the great challenge of our
time” and at the same time as the “first key” for building a “European
sovereignty”—that is, a “capacity for autonomous action by Europe,
complementing NATO”. For the French head of state, reinforcing
defence co-operation lies at the heart of the EU through the develop-
ment of two instruments: the creation of a common strategic culture and
a “multi-speed” defence policy. While the activation of these instruments
could, in the medium term, consolidate the multilateral practice, the
“closed” structure of the configuration makes it less likely to compete
with the Franco-British practice.
Firstly, the French president emphasised the difficulty of getting
national strategic cultures to converge into a common strategic cul-
ture (“we will not be able to change that overnight”). However, he did
not specify the methods for achieving this (“the European intervention
initiative”), and repeated the institutionalist logic according to which cre-
ating common institutions (“a common intervention force, a common
defence budget, and a common doctrine for action”) produces a higher
degree of integration. But the effects of this institutionalist logic have
already shown their limits in the defence sphere, which remains strongly
shaped by the national actors.22 Beyond this, for the French president the
EU’s differentiated politics in the defence sphere is through the imple-
mentation of the mechanism of “permanent structured co-operation”
(PESCO).23 PESCO was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009:
“Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher crite-
ria and which have made more binding commitments to one another
in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish
permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such
cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the
provisions of Article 43”24 (article 42.6 of the EU treaty, TEU). Article
1 of protocol 10 attached to the treaties explains that PESCO “shall be
open to any Member State which undertakes […] proceed more inten-
sively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its
national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multina-
tional forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the
activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development,
research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency)”.25
On November 2017,26 PESCO was adopted by a joint notification signed
by 23 EU Member States in Brussels.27 These included Poland28 but not
110 S. B. H. FAURE
the UK (which is leaving the EU), Denmark (which opted out of CSDP),
Malta, Portugal, or Ireland. This notification is endorsed by a decision of
the Foreign Affairs Council in December 2017. Ireland and Portugal join
PESCO, which finally counts twenty-five states (see Chapter 7).
However, two observations could be made about this decision.
First, there has been a wait of almost a decade for this mechanism to
be activated, even though the Lisbon Treaty provided for its immedi-
ate implementation.29 Second, almost all EU Member States take part
in PESCO (meaning this is multilateralism)—far from the “hard core”
of a few states (which would have been minilateralism) as envisaged by
the French president.30 From a French perspective, this inclusive format
for PESCO, backed by Germany, is not considered very effective at tak-
ing decisions, because certain states, such as Poland, could act as a “veto
actor”.31 Indeed, PESCO decisions, taken within the council, must be
unanimous (article 46.6 TUE), with the exception of the decision taken
by qualified majority voting to allow a state to rejoin PESCO (article
46.3 TUE), to allow it to leave (article 46.5 TUE), or to be suspended
(article 46.4 TUE). In all cases, qualified majority voting is not auto-
matic within an institution (in the EU, and in the Council in particular)
that is characterised by a strong culture of consensus. Seen from Paris, it
is difficult therefore to see this decision as a “historic achievement”—the
description given by Federica Mogherini, the High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: the multilateral practice has prevailed
over the minilateral practice.
In the final analysis, reinforcement of the multilateral practice within
the EU is not inconceivable. However, it is likely that the effects of
this political change will not only take time, but also will not be in any
greater competition with the Franco-British practice, because of the
“closed” structure of the configuration in the military sphere. The UK
should retain its military “leading role” in its strategic partnership with
France.
An Industrial “Supporting Role” Through

an “Open” Configuration
The situation is different in the industrial sphere, because the struc-

ture of the configuration of European defence actors is not “closed”.
The British and French nodes (governmental and industrial actors) are
centrally positioned, but they are not the only ones. They do not have
specific resources at their disposal that would set them apart from the
German nodes (or actors)—with the exception of nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, this configuration does not represent only states as being
in the military sphere: it also includes arms manufacturers which, by
definition, broadens it. As for the tie of interdependence that connects
the British and French actors (or nodes), it is not an exclusive one. Not
only do the British and French nodes (or actors) maintain ties with
other nodes, but the French actors (or nodes) are connected by denser
ties to German actors than to British actors in several industrial sectors.
This configuration is thus described as “open” for three main reasons.
First, it is made up of more numerous, and heterogeneous, nodes than
in the military sphere. Second, the British and French nodes are not the
only ones to be situated at its centre. Third, the French nodes are more
closely tied to the German nodes than to the British. This “open” con-
figuration explains why the Franco-British practice is in competition with
the other European practices. The high level of uncertainty generated by
this competition suggests that there would probably be political change
in the industrial sphere. Consequently, it is expected that the Franco-
British practice would have a marginal impact on the development of
France’s flexilateral politics from 2020 onwards. In the counterfactual
situation of the UK getting a “good deal” (a “soft Brexit”), it is plausible
that this assumption may be proved wrong.32 To validate it, the inter-
play of the various practices that generate France’s flexilateral politics in
the industrial sphere is more crucial than in the military sphere. There
are four types of practices that are shared between the French actors to
respond to industrial involvement in defence in the context of Brexit:
the Franco-British practice, the Franco-German practice, the minilateral
practice, and the multilateral practice.
The most convincing effect of the Franco-British practice, which was
significantly strengthened from 2010 by the Lancaster House treaties,
was the creation of the European company One MBDA in 2015. One
MBDA is a joint subsidiary of Airbus (37.5%), BAE Systems (37.5%),
and Leonardo (25%), and is an industry leader in the missile sector.
The future of One MBDA is especially difficult to predict because the
company embodies a minilateral partnership that straddles the Channel
(Germany, UK, France, and Italy). Subsequently, the Future Combat
Air System (FCAS) unmanned air combat vehicle (UCAV) project was
112 S. B. H. FAURE
begun in 2014 (Table 5.3). In 2016, the UK and France decided to allo-
cate a budget of EUR 2 billions to the construction of a joint demon-
strator.33 At the governmental level, the project is run by Defence
Equipment and Support (DE&S), part of the British defence ministry,
and the French defence ministry’s Délégation générale de l’armement
(DGA). On the industrial level, BAE Systems and Dassault Aviation
are designated as the leading partners. The bilateral governance seen in
the FCAS project is replicated in the area of engines (Rolls-Royce and
Safran) and electrical components (Selex UK and Thales). However,
the momentum of the FCAS project may be vulnerable because of its
history. In the early 2010s, BAE Systems and Dassault Aviation simul-
taneously built two competing demonstrators: the British Taranis and
the French Neuron.34 The Taranis programme brought together British
and US companies, whereas the Neuron programme involved exclusively
European companies (Table 5.2).
Aside from the projects that were born of the Lancaster House trea-
ties, the case of the Thales group’s industrial strategy involves compe-
tition between the Franco-British practice and the multilateral practice
shared by the French industrial actors. Since 2000, Thales, a French
company, has pursued a strategy of internationalisation, building up its
industrial activities in a “multinational” manner. In Europe, its inter-
national presence is strongest in the UK. However, Thales has a pres-
ence in six other European countries (Norway, the Netherlands, Austria,
Germany, Portugal, and Spain), and its shareholder structure is French
majority-owned: 26.4% of the share capital is held by the French state
and 25.3% by Dassault Aviation. To sum up, these three cases—One
Table 5.2 Companies involved in building the Taranis and Neuron UCAV

demonstrators
Companies Taranis (UK) Neuron (France)
American GE Aviation
British BAE Systems, Qinetiq, Rolls-Royce
Spanish Airbus Defence and Space
French Dassault Aviation
Greek HAI
Italian Leonardo
Swedish Saab
Swiss Ruag
Table 5.3 The three main European arms projects under waya
Product Project Start Practice States Companies

(leading
partners)
Combat FCAS 2014 Bilateral France, BAE Systems,

drone (Lancaster UK Dassault
House treaties) Aviation
MALE RPAS 2016 Minilateral France, Airbus
drone (OCCAR) Germany, Defence
Italy, Spain and Space,
Dassault
Aviation,
Leonardo
Combat Franco- 2018 Bilateral France, Airbus
aircraft German Germany Defence and
Space and/
or Dassault
Aviation
aFor a complete table: Alessandro Marrone, Olivier de France, et Daniele Fattibene, “Defence Budgets
and Cooperation in Europe: Trends and Investments” (Paris, Rome: ELIAMEP, FOI, IAI, IRIS, PISM,
RUSI, SWP, 2016)
MBDA, FCAS, and Thales—all ended in the same way as far as the
development of France’s flexilateral politics in the industrial sphere is
concerned: the Franco-British practice was consolidated from 2000
onwards, as was the minilateral practice. If the UK leaves the single
market, France may have a preference for the minilateral practice over
the bilateral practice, if it is forced to choose for political or budgetary
reasons. This assumption finds an echo in the trajectory of the Franco-
German, minilateral, and multilateral practices.
Since the end of the 1990s, the Franco-German practice has been
the main vehicle for France’s flexilateral politics in the defence indus-
try.35 This bilateral practice has shaped the creation of Eurocopter,
then EADS, and finally Airbus, the leading European company in the
civil and military aeronautics field. Although three states have a stake
(France 11.11%, Germany 11.09%, and Spain 4.18%), the French and
Germans hold all management posts. More recently, there has been a
rapprochement in the land-based defence systems segment between
the French company Nexter and the German company Krauss-Maffei
Wegmann, which had previously been competitors. The result has been
114 S. B. H. FAURE
the creation in 2015 of the Franco-German group KNDS, the leading

European company in land-based weapons systems, in which France has
a 50% stake and the German Bode-Wegmann family 50%. The main pro-
grammes in the military aeronautic sector in Europe since the 1990s,
such as the A400M transport aircraft, the NH90 transport helicop-
ter, and the Tiger attack helicopter, have been the result of the inter-
play between the Franco-German practice and the minilateral practice.
Germany has taken part in all these European programmes, and Airbus
has taken the role of leading partner. As for France, it does not figure
on one programme—the Eurofighter Typhoon. Moreover, Spain has
taken part in all the programmes mentioned, as has Italy, with the excep-
tion of the Tiger. Both these states are mentioned in the 2017 “Revue
stratégique”, which deals with the interplay between the bilateral prac-
tice and the minilateral practice: “These two major bilateral relations in
the defence sphere [Franco-British and Franco-German] must be com-
plemented by France paying increased attention to its other European
partners […] France also has with these two countries [Spain and Italy],
which have significant military capability, industrial and arms indus-
try co-operation (drones, frigates, the NH90, ground-to-air missiles,
space, etc.) that is structurally important for us and for Europe”.36
For all that, we cannot overestimate the political effect of these indus-
trial projects that are born of the Franco-German and minilateral prac-
tices. In this regard, it would be remembered that the UK took part
in the A400 M and Eurofighter Typhoon programmes. On the other
hand, 80% of European arms programmes were not the result of a
co-operation practice—whether Franco-British, Franco-German, bilat-
eral, or minilateral—but of the practice of self-sufficiency (meaning this
is unilateralism).37
Beyond the industrial projects of the 1990s and 2000s, the years
from 2010 saw the emergence, apart from the FCAS project mentioned
above, of two large arms projects: the MALE RPAS (Medium-Altitude
Long-Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System) drone, and a future
combat aircraft. The MALE RPAS drone project was born of the minilat-
eral practice, and the Franco-German combat aircraft was the result of
the bilateral practice.38 In both cases, the absence of the UK is noticea-
ble (Table 5.3). The RPAS project of the MALE drone, covering intel-
ligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR)
missions, brought together Germany, Spain, France, and Italy within
OCCAR. The Franco-German combat aircraft project was announced, to
widespread surprise, by the French president, Emmanuel Macron, and

the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, on July 2017 in Paris, during a
bilateral meeting. There are three potential problems that could compro-
mise this project, about which few details have been released. The first is
military: the combat aircraft is a vehicle for France’s nuclear deterrent,
but this does not apply to Germany. The French armed forces therefore
have an operational need that is not shared by their German counter-
parts. The second problem is industrial: there is the prospect of a conflict
between Dassault Aviation and Airbus Defence and Space over leader-
ship of the project. Dassault Aviation showcases the technical expertise
of its research department, gained through long experience in the field of
combat aircraft. Meanwhile, the CEO of Airbus Defence and Space, Dirk
Hoke, reminds the German government that most of the factories of
the Airbus defence division are in Germany.39 If an agreement has been
reached between Airbus and Dassault Aviation in April 2018, the diffi-
culty of its implementation must not be underestimated.40 Finally, there
is a political problem: Germany has an urgent capability need to replace
its Tornado aircraft (by around 2025), which is not the case with France.
This mismatch in political timescales led Chancellor Merkel, before
the declaration of intent in July 2017, to contact the US companies
Lockheed-Martin (which produces the F-35) and Boeing (which man-
ufactures the F-18). Against this background, two assumptions could be
put forward. If Germany decides, for military, industrial, or political rea-
sons, to buy “off the shelf” combat aircraft from the US, this is likely
to trigger a defiant reaction by France, which could abandon this pro-
ject in favour of its partnership with the UK via the Franco-British drone
project (FCAS). On the other hand, if Germany stays with the project
in partnership with France, this decision would probably contribute to
marginalising the UK’s industrial role. The cases of the Rafale combat
aircraft and Tiger attack helicopter demonstrated that the support (that
is to say taking a decision)41 or lack of it (a non-decision)42 on the part
of the head of state or the government for a given option carries consid-
erable weight.
These co-operative European industrial projects should not be seen as
isolated actions but, rather, as part of the same “process”,43 the result of
different types of European practice, which determines France’s flexilat-
eral politics. The dynamic at work is an interplay between the Franco-
German and minilateral practices on the one hand, and on the other
the multilateral practice that takes shape within the EU. The risk for the
116 S. B. H. FAURE
UK—more the British state than British companies which are strongly
turned towards the American market—is that it would suffer the effects
of the multilateral practice, which has produced three instruments for
action in the public sphere since the end of the 2000s: the “defence
package”, the European Defence Fund (EDF), and PESCO. Their goal
is to consolidate what is commonly known as the “European Defence
Technological and Industrial Base” (EDTIB).44 The “defence pack-
age” is the result of two directives that regulate the arms industry: the
directive on intra-EU-transfers of defence-related products and the EU
defence and security procurement directive.45 The aim of the “defence
package”, which came into force in 2011, is to create an internal defence
market by means of a “market-making”46 mechanism, that is, the liberal-
isation of national regulations.
Moreover, the EDF, ratified in June 2017, aims to encourage
Member States to conduct arms programmes through European
co-operation, by financing research and development (R&D).47 To this
end, the European Commission has allocated EUR 25 million in 2017,
EUR 90 million in 2018, and the same sum again in 2019 to finance
research. The EU’s plan is to bring its annual research budget up to
EUR 500 million from 2020, making it the fourth largest in Europe after
those of France, the UK, and Germany.48 This annual budget of EUR
500 million for research should be complemented by a budget of EUR 1
billion from 2020 (EUR 500 million from 2019) devoted to the indus-
trial development of arms programmes.49 This fund would be used to
co-finance, to the tune of 20%, the development phase of a c o-operative
European project comprising at least three companies from two different
Member States. A total of EUR 1.5 billion could therefore be allocated
to the defence R&D budget—or almost 1% of the total EU budget.50
If this increase in the European defence budget were to be confirmed,
it would be a radical change that could have major effects. Within the
MALE RPAS drone project, Germany, Spain, France, and Italy want
to be able to take advantage of the EDF.51 It is likely that the UK and
British companies would not be able to take advantage of this fund.52
It would tend to favour the UK’s relegation to a “supporting” indus-
trial role. The question regarding the UK’s status is, therefore: would
it be considered a “third country”, in the same way as Canada, Japan
or Norway, or would it secure special status in the future trade treaty
it hopes to agree with the EU? As for PESCO, its effect is likely to be
less limited in the industrial than in the military field, because the
configuration that structures it is more “open” to interplay between

types of European practice, including the multinational type.
Despite the high degree of unpredictability of the political negotia-
tions between the UK and the EU, this chapter brings two conclusions.
First, the mainstream supposition that the UK would remain a leading
strategic ally of France because Brexit would not have a significant effect
on Franco-British co-operation has been qualified. In other words, Brexit
matters for the future of Franco-British defence co-operation. Second,
this chapter has argued that the lack of Brexit’s effect is more likely to
happen in the domain of military policy than in the domain of industrial
policy as regards Franco-British co-operation. As a result, Brexit might
determine a dual role for the UK: a leading military role and at the same
time a supporting industrial role. The industrial policy of Franco-British
co-operation could be strongly impacted from 2020.
Notes
1. Italics added: Ministère des Armées, “Revue stratégique de défense et de
sécurité nationale 2017”, 2017.
2. Samuel B. H. Faure, “La ‘politique du flexilatéralisme’. Le cas de la poli-
tique française d’armement dans le contexte du Brexit”, Les Champs de
Mars 30 (2018): 73–102.
3. Lawrence Freedman, “Brexit and the Law of Unintended Consequences”,
Survival 58, no. 3 (2016): 7–12; Olivier de France et al., “The Impact of
Brexit on the European Armament Industry”, Report (Paris: Armament
Industry European Research Group (ARES), 2017); Matthew R. H.
Uttley et Benedict Wilkinson, “Contingent Choices: The Future of United
Kingdom Defence Procurement and Defence Industries in the Post-Brexit
Era”, Global Affairs 2, no. 5 (2017): 491–502; Alice Pannier, “The Anglo-
French Defence Partnership After the ‘Brexit’ Vote: New Incentives and
New Dilemmas”, Global Affairs 2, no. 5 (2017): 481–90.
4. I thank Janne Haaland Matlary and Rob Jonhson for their comments on
the first draft of this chapter presented during a workshop which took
place in Olso in November 2017. It also benefited from the remarks
of Andy Smith, as well as Nicolas Fescharek, Miriam Hartlapp, Stefano
Palestini and Thomas Risse at the research seminar (KFG) on “The
Transformative Power of Europe” at the Berlin Free University where
I exposed a second draft in January 2018.
5. Alice Pannier, “From One Exceptionalism to Another: France’s Strategic
Relations with the United States and the United Kingdom in the Post-
Cold War Era”, Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 4 (2017): 475–504.
118 S. B. H. FAURE
6. François Heisbourg, “Brexit and European Security”, Survival 58, no. 3

(2016): 13–22.
7. Vincent Pouliot, International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice
of Multilateral Diplomacy (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2016).
8. Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Towards a Practice Turn in EU Studies: The
Everyday of European Integration”, Journal of Common Market Studies
54, no. 1 (2016): 87–103.
9. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1990).
10. Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Charlotte Galpin, and Ben Rosamond, “Performing
Brexit: How a Post-Brexit World Is Imagined Outside the United
Kingdom”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19,
no. 3 (2017): 573–91.
11. Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process, 2nd edition (New York: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2010).
12. Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, “International Practices”,
International Theory 3, no. 1 (2011): 1–36.
13. Vincent Pouliot, “Practice Tracing”, in Process Tracing in the Social Sciences:
From Metaphor to Analytical Tool, éd. par Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey
T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 237–59.
14. Norbert Elias, Qu’est-ce que la sociologie? Agora (Paris: Pocket, 1993);
Norbert Elias, “Les pêcheurs dans le Maelström”, in Engagement et distan-
ciation (Paris: Fayard, 1993), 69–174; Pierre Bourdieu, Sur l’État: Cours
au Collège de France (1989–1992), Raisons d’agir (Paris: Le Seuil, 2012).
15. Norbert Elias, La dynamique de l’Occident, Agora (Paris: Pocket, 1975),
303.
16. Elias, “Les pêcheurs dans le Maelström”, 71, 140.
17. Point 197: Ministère des Armées, “Revue stratégique de défense et de
sécurité nationale 2017”.
18. Alice Pannier, “Understanding the Workings of Interstate Cooperation
in Defence: An Exploration into Franco-British Cooperation After the
Signing of the Lancaster House Treaty”, European Security 22, no. 4
(2013): 540–58.
19. Germany’s decision not to participate in the targeted strikes in Syria against
Bashar al-Assad’s chemical weapons in April 2018 by the United States,
France and the United Kingdom embodies the persistent gap in strategic
culture https://edition.cnn.com/2018/04/13/politics/trump-us-syria/
index.html [accessed 15 May 2018].
20. Anne Bazin and Charles Tenenbaum, éd., L’Union européenne et la
paix (Paris: Presses de SciencesPo, 2017); Antoine Rayroux, L’Union
européenne et le maintien de la paix en Afrique (Montréal: Presses de
l’Université de Montréal, 2017).
21. Emmanuel Macron, “Initiative for Europe. A Sovereign, United,

Democratic Europe”, 26 septembre 2017, http://www.elysee.fr/assets/
Initiative-for-Europe-a-sovereign-united-democratic-Europe-Emmanuel-
Macron.pdf [accessed 15 May 2018].
22. Samuel B. H. Faure, “The Nation, the Profession and EU Institutions:
Three Socialization Worlds of CSDP Actors”, Saint Antony’s
International Review 12, no. 2 (2017): 190–206.
23. Sven Biscop, Differentiated Integration in Defence: A Plea for PESCO
(Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2017); Sven Biscop, “European
Defence: What’s in the CARDs for PESCO?” Security Policy Brief
(Brussels: Egmont, 2017); Daniel Fiott, Antonio Missiroli, and Thierry
Tardy, “Permanent Structured Cooperation: What’s in a Name?” Chaillot
Papers (Paris: EUISS, 2017).
24. European Union, “Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union” (2009),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%
3A12008M042 [accessed 15 May 2018].
25. European Union, “Protocol (No. 10) On Permanent Structured Cooperation
Established by Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union” (2009),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%
3A12008M%2FPRO%2F10 [accessed 15 May 2018].
26. Two years to the day after the terrorist attacks on the Bataclan and several
restaurant terraces in Paris that killed 130 people. On 15 November
2015, the mutual assistance clause was activated for the first time at
France’s request (article 42.7 TEU).
27. EU Member States, “Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation
(PESCO) to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” (2017), http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/media/31511/171113-pesco-notification.pdf [accessed 15
May 2018].
28. The day after the signing of the joint notification, on 14 November 2017,
Poland informed the other EU member states that it was requesting that
PESCO should not lead to the creation of an integrated EU military
command and headquarters.
29. “The permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6) of
the Treaty on European Union shall be open to any Member State which
undertakes, from the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon” (italics
added): European Union, “Protocol (No. 10) On Permanent Structured
Cooperation Established by Article 42 of the Treaty on European
Union”.
30. Nick Witney, “EU Defence Efforts Miss the Open Goal Again”, ECFR
(blog), 15 novembre 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_
eu_defence_efforts_miss_the_open_goal_again [accessed 15 May 2018].
120 S. B. H. FAURE
31. Josef Janning, Christel Zunneberg, and Christoph Klavehn, “Exploring

EU Coalitions” (London: ECFR, 2017); Frédéric Mauro and Federico
Santopinto, La coopération structurée permanente: perspectives nationales et
état d’avancement (Bruxelles: Parlement européen, 2017).
32. James Black et al., Defence and Security After Brexit. Understanding the
Possible Implications of the UK’s Decision to Leave the EU (Santa Monica:
Rand Corporation, 2017).
33. Emmanuel Huberdeau, “FCAS: un budget franco-britannique de 2 mil-
liards d’euros pour un prototype”, Air & Cosmos, 3 mars 2016, http://
www.air-cosmos.com/fcas-un-budget-franco-britannique-de-2-milliards-
d-euros-pour-un-prototype-64921 [accessed 15 May 2018].
34. This competition is reminiscent of the birth of the Eurofighter, Typhoon,
and Rafale programmes at the start of the 1980s: Marc DeVore and
Moritz Weiss, “Who’s in the Cockpit? The Political Economy of
Collaborative Aircraft Decisions”, Review of International Political
Economy 21, no. 2 (2014): 497–533.
35. In the 2017 Strategic Review, it is significant that the footnote to point
196, specifying “all areas” of Franco-German co-operation, refers exclu-
sively to industrial projects: Ministère des Armées, “Revue stratégique de
défense et de sécurité nationale 2017”.
36. Points 199 et 200: Ministère des Armées.
37. Guillaume De la Brosse, “Deploying Financial Tools in Support of
European Defence Cooperation”, Comment (Armament Industry
European Research Group (ARES), 2017).
38. Italie, via a declaration from its army and air force chief of general staff,
expressed its interest in this project: Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Le
projet d’avion de combat franco-allemand finalement européen?” 11
novembre 2017, http://www.lopinion.fr/edition/international/pro-
jet-d-avion-combat-franco-allemand-finalement-europeen-137613
[accessed 15 May 2018].
39. Laurent Lagneau, “Airbus veut diriger le programme d’avion de combat
franco-allemand”, Opex 360 (blog), 6 novembre 2017, http://www.
opex360.com/2017/11/06/airbus-veut-diriger-le-programme-davion-
de-combat-franco-allemand/ [accessed 15 May 2018].
40. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-43895648 [accessed 15 May 2018].
41. Ulrich Krotz, Flying Tiger: International Relations Theory, and the Politics
of Advanced Weapons Production (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
42. Samy Cohen, La défaite des généraux: le pouvoir politique et l’armée sous la
Ve République (Paris: Fayard, 1994).
43. Elias, The Civilizing Process.
44. Matthew R. H. Uttley and Benedict Wilkinson, “A Spin of the Wheel?
Defence Procurement and Defence Industries in the Brexit Debates”,
International Affairs 92, no. 3 (2016): 569–86.
45. Chantal Lavallée, “The European Commission’s Position in the Field of

Security and Defence. An Unconventional Actor at a Meeting Point”,
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 12, no. 4 (2011): 371–89;
Catherine Hoeffler, “European Armament Co-operation and the Renewal
of Industrial Policy Motive”, Journal of European Public Policy 19, no.
3 (2012): 435–51; Michael Blauberger and Moritz Weiss, “If You Can’t
Beat Me, Join Me! How the Commission Pushed and Pulled Member
States into Legislating Defence Procurement”, Journal of European
Public Policy 20, no. 8 (2013): 1120–38; Julia Muravska, “The
Institutionalisation of the European Defence Equipment Market” (LSE,
2014).
46. Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999).
47. Vincenzo Camporini et al., “European Preference, Strategic Autonomy
and European Defence Fund”, Report (Paris: Armament Industry
European Research Group (ARES), 2017).
48. Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, “EU Initiatives for Defence Industry: Breaking
the Curse of the ‘juste retour’?” IISS (blog), 6 septembre 2017, https://
www.iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2017-edcc/septem-
ber-0f6f/european-defence-31e8 [accessed 15 May 2018].
49. Nicole Koenig and Marie Walter-Franke, “France and Germany:
Spearheading a European Security and Defence Union?” Policy Paper
(Berlin: Jacques Delors Institut, 2017).
50. Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, “L’Europe met 40 milliards pour la défense à par-
tir de 2021? Halte au feu”, Bruxelles 2 (blog), 13 juin 2017, https://
www.bruxelles2.eu/2017/06/13/40-milliards-pour-la-defense-apres-
2021-halte-au-feu/ [accessed 15 May 2018].
51. Justine Bocquet, “Drone MALE RPAS: le premier programme à bénéfi-
cier du fonds européen de la Défense?” Air & Cosmos, 31 juillet 2017,
http://www.air-cosmos.com/drone-male-rpas-le-premier-programme-a-
beneficier-du-fonds-europeen-de-la-defense-98289.
52. Olivier de France et al., “The Impact of Brexit on the European
Armament Industry”, Report (Paris: Armament Industry European
Research Group (ARES), 2017), 4.
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efforts_miss_the_open_goal_again.
CHAPTER 6
British-German Defence and Security

Relations After Brexit: Quo Vadis, ‘Silent
Alliance’?
Håkon Lunde Saxi
Among the key Atlanticist and European security partnerships,

Anglo-German relations are rarely given pride of place. Relations between
the two countries clearly lack the centrality of both countries’ relationships
with the United States (US). The relationship is also devoid of the great
historical symbolism and high-level institutionalisation that characterise
the post-World War II Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ or Franco-
German rapprochement. Nevertheless, there has traditionally been little ten-
sion or discord between London and Berlin on issues of military security.
For much of the post-World War II era, security relations have been charac-
terised by generally successful, but quiet and sparsely publicised, pragmatic
cooperation on a range of issues. The British-German defence and secu-
rity relationship has therefore famously been described as the ‘silent alli-
ance’ (Die Stille Allianz).1 It accordingly came as no surprise that when the
results of the Brexit referendum became clear on 24 June 2016, Chancellor
Angela Merkel greeted the news that the United Kingdom (UK) would be
leaving the European Union (EU) with genuine ‘deep regret’.2
H. L. Saxi (*) 
The Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway

128 H. L. SAXI
Today, the UK and Germany are important security partners in

Europe, where they work closely together and with the rest of their
NATO and EU partners. Their priority is adapting to the challenges
posed by a resurgent and revisionist Russia in the east, and the pressure
of unregulated migration, terrorism, and instability to the south. This
partnership in Europe will most likely continue, irrespective of Brexit,
driven by shared strategic interests. London and Berlin will remain com-
mitted to reassuring their allies and making NATO’s deterrence posture
credible. Beyond Europe, the ‘silent alliance’ will remain of marginal
importance, mainly because the UK is, and will remain, a far more asser-
tive security actor than Germany. The vital Anglo-American ‘special
relationship’ and the Anglo-French military partnership will therefore
continue to carry more weight on the world stage beyond Europe than
the less crucial Anglo-German partnership. The former relationships are
built around these countries’ similarly assertive strategic cultures, as well
as a deep mutual respect for each other’s expeditionary military capabili-
ties and warfighting-oriented military culture. Germany, a far more care-
ful and reluctant security actor, whose military capabilities and military
culture appear more limited and timid by comparison, remains first and
foremost a European power.
This chapter will start by examining the German perspective on
Brexit, arguing that Berlin’s first priority is to protect the cohesion of
the EU, while building a privileged trading and security partnership
with a post-Brexit UK comes second. It then goes on to examine why
Germany, mainly due to its demographic and economic size, is of crucial
importance for British, European, and transatlantic security. The extent
to which the UK and Germany work together or side by side towards
common objectives is then discussed with emphasis on two geographical
areas: NATO’s eastern flank vis-à-vis Russia; and NATO’s southern flank
vis-à-vis the Middle East and Northern Africa. The chapter ends with a
discussion of the future of the ‘silent alliance’ after Brexit.
German Perspectives on Brexit: Dashed Hopes

and Present Realities
Among Brexit supporters in the UK (‘Brexiteers’) it was widely argued—

once it became clear that the UK was in fact leaving the EU—that
Germany would become Britain’s key ally in Brussels, particularly on
6 BRITISH-GERMAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY RELATIONS AFTER BREXIT … 129
crucial issues such as trade policy. Berlin, so the argument went, would
push the EU to provide Britain with a satisfactory trade deal, since
this would be in Germany’s own interest. The importance of Anglo-
German trade in general, and Germany’s very large trade surplus with
the UK in particular, would ensure German support for UK demands.3
On first examination, this argument appeared to have some merit. In
2015, the UK was Germany’s third most important export destination,
after the US and France, absorbing more than 7% of German exports.
Key German goods shipped to the UK were cars and industrial goods.
Significantly, Germany ran a €51 billion trade surplus with the UK.4
There was also a similar sounding, if less prominent, argument related
to security. Germany—sometimes exaggeratedly regarded as the quintes-
sential ‘economic giant but political dwarf’5—was argued to be depend-
ent on allies, essentially the US, UK, and France, for its security. Berlin
would therefore not risk alienating a key ally who, alongside France, was
considered one of only two serious defence actors in Western Europe.
The UK could therefore use its considerable ‘security surplus’ to obtain
concessions on trade and other issues during the Brexit negotiations.6
As it turned out, Brexiteers seem to have badly overestimated the
economic importance of the UK to Germany—including to the vital
German car industry.7 Far from being indispensable to Germany and
the other EU member states, the UK–EU relationship was far more
marked by British dependence on the latter. In 2016, the EU as a
whole was the UK’s largest trading partner by far, absorbing 44% of
British exports.8 Brexit supporters also underestimated the value that
Germany places on maintaining the political, economic, and security
cohesion of the EU. German political leaders consider the political and
economic unity of the EU to be of paramount importance.9 Berlin’s
priority on the issue of Brexit was neatly summarised in Chancellor
Merkel’s frequently used phrase that there would be no ‘cherry-pick-
ing’ (Rosinenpickerei) by the UK. Before the German Bundestag, the
Chancellor stressed that there had to be ‘palpable differences between
those countries who want to be member of the European family and
those who don’t’, and that ‘whoever wants to leave this family cannot
expect to shed all its responsibilities but keep the privileges’.10 The sub-
text was clear: if Brexit resulted in a new ‘British model’ which was too
attractive, other countries could chose to follow the UK, leading to a
further unravelling of the EU.
130 H. L. SAXI
Brexiteers also overestimated the opportunities for overtly using

security as a bargaining chip. German political leaders, including
Minister of Defence Ursula von der Leyen, outright rejected the idea
that the UK’s ‘security surplus’ provided it with a bargaining chip,
arguing that cooperation on security and defence was in each county’s
mutual interest.11 Prime Minister Theresa May’s implied threat when
triggering Article 50, that intelligence sharing ‘in the fight against crime
and terrorism’ might be weakened if no Brexit deal was secured, was
widely regarded in Germany and elsewhere as both reckless and lacking
in credibility.12
Germany’s Importance for British, European,

and Transatlantic Security
Irrespective of how the ongoing Brexit negotiations eventually con-

clude, Germany will remain a country of key importance to Britain, to
its European allies and partners, and to the United States. This is mainly
due to Germany’s considerable demographic and economic size, which
generate both its great political power and military potential.
Germany is NATO Europe and the EU’s most populous state and
largest economy. Its military potential is thus larger than that of any
other European NATO or EU state. Germany’s material powerbase is
such that the country is sometimes identified as a ‘potential hegemon’
in Europe,13 and the preponderance of its economic power and politi-
cal influence in the EU is only thinly masked by the ‘fiction of Franco-
German equality’.14 Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had
little doubt that the German Chancellor is ‘the most powerful leader in
Europe’.15
At the same time, in the security and defence field, Germany
punches considerably below its weight. Among the ‘Big Three’ (the
UK, France, Germany) who collectively make up more than half of
NATO Europe’s military spending, Germany contributes the least to
the common security and defence efforts, both relatively and absolutely
(see Table 6.1).
Germany’s modest defence spending level is all the more noticeable
due to the fact that not only is the German economy Europe’s largest,
but, among the major NATO countries, Germany has also maintained
the healthiest public finances in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.16
Table 6.1 British, French, and German military efforts compared, 2015
Country Population GDP Defence spending % of GDP Active troops

(million) (trillion) (billion)
UK 64.4 $2.7 $55.8 2.08 163,000

France 66.8 $2.8 $49.9 1.80 207,000
Germany 80.7 $3.7 $43.8 1.18 175,000
Source IISS, The Military Balance 2017 (London: Routledge, 2016), 110, 116, 170; NATO, The
Secretary General’s Annual Report 2017 (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2018), 109–115
To add insult to injury, Germany has also been reluctant to deploy

its military forces in harm’s way. During NATO’s decade-long inter-
vention in Afghanistan, German forces were deployed with consider-
able geographical and operational ‘caveats’, limiting their usefulness.
Furthermore, during the 2011 NATO-led military intervention in Libya,
Berlin chose to abstain altogether.17 Low defence spending and reluc-
tance to become involved in warfighting produced resentment towards
Germany, for example in the US and UK.18 Many European and US
leaders came to regard Germany’s military weakness as ‘NATO’s most
significant problem’.19 By early 2012, some senior allied officials were
labelling Germany a ‘lost nation’ for NATO,20 and German diplomats in
Washington, DC considered that ‘the USA no longer [took Germany]
seriously as a security policy player’.21
In June 2011, in an unusually blunt public speech in Brussels, US
Secretary of Defence Robert Gates warned that NATO risked turning
into a ‘two-tiered alliance’, split between those members who did only
‘soft’ humanitarian missions and those conducting ‘hard’ combat mis-
sions. While not mentioning Germany by name, Gates criticised those
nations ‘who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership…but don’t
want to share the risks and the costs’. Should this continue, he warned,
‘future US political leaders…may not consider the return on America’s
investment in NATO worth the cost’.22 The widespread calls for greater
German involvement and leadership even came from countries that had
historically been wary of German power, such as Poland. In November
2011, before the German Bundestag, the polish minister of foreign
affairs declared that he now feared ‘German power less than … German
inactivity’.23
132 H. L. SAXI
The UK was also among the countries strongly calling for Germany
to do more on defence. Visiting Berlin in May 2012, Defence Secretary
Philip Hammond argued that Germany had ‘probably a greater capac-
ity than any other European NATO partner to contribute to short-term
enhancement of the Alliance’s capabilities’.24 Hammond also called on
German leaders to develop ‘the political will…to allow the projection of
power, including military force, to confront threats to our security’.25
Germany’s efforts to repair and improve its international reputation as
a reluctant and status quo-oriented power began in 2013, when Berlin
proposed the so-called Framework Nations Concept within NATO.
The initiative was presented a response to the dual challenge of wan-
ing resources and waxing security challenges, as well as a way for the
European allies to assume more responsibility for their own security.26
The initiative was to be a highly visible German deliverable to the 2014
NATO summit.27 The proposal was widely welcomed within the transat-
lantic security community, particularly by the UK.28 At a NATO defence
ministers meeting in October 2013, Hammond made it clear that the
UK was enthusiastic, stating, ‘We very much support the initiative the
Germans have proposed’.29
Moreover, the UK and others welcomed German leaders’ pub-
lic announcement at the January 2014 Munich Security Conference
that the country was now willing to ‘assume greater responsibility’ in
the security field. Germany was now to make ‘a more substantial con-
tribution’, both earlier and more decisively. From a German point of
view, this statement was intended to dispel any erroneous notion that
Germany was the ‘shirker in the international community’.30
Germany’s willingness and capability to deliver on the expectations
created by these declarations were to be sorely tested by two major secu-
rity policy crises in the following years. First, by Russian revisionism,
as demonstrated in the Ukrainian crisis on NATOs eastern flank, and
second, by political instability, uncontrolled migration, and transnational
terrorism emanating from North Africa and the Middle East on Europe’s
southern flank. Driven by a strong mutual interest to demonstrate
NATO’s inviolability, the Anglo-German ‘silent alliance’ worked well
on the eastern flank. While the two actors did not necessarily coordinate
their efforts, working side-by-side rather than together, strong mutual
interest nevertheless produced a more or less symmetrical response to
Moscow’s challenge to the post-Cold War order in Europe. However,
there was greater asymmetry in how London and Berlin responded on

Europe’s southern flank. Both countries shared a mutual interest in sta-
bilising the region, curbing uncontrolled migration, and combating
international terrorist groups. However, Germany’s enduring ‘culture
of restraint’ regarding the use of military force continued to place limits
upon the country’s involvement in the region.31
Working Side by Side on NATO’s Eastern Flank

The original concept of the ‘silent alliance’ referred primarily to the
close, practical cooperation that developed between Britain and West
Germany on NATO’s Central Front during the Cold War.32 Between
the late 1950s and 1990 British and West German troops served liter-
ally side-by-side on the front line along the 1400 km long inner German
border, their national corps and air groups covering their assigned slices
of NATO’s interlocking ‘layer cake’ defence system.33 British defence
policy document stressed the importance of this mission, arguing that
‘the forward defence of the Federal Republic of Germany is the forward
defence of the United Kingdom itself’.34 For the British Army in
particular Germany was pivotal. As one British general latter described
the era: ‘The Army’s focus was on Germany … if you wanted a career,
you rely had to go to Germany’.35
In the post-Cold War era ‘expeditionary’ or ‘out-of-area’ missions
replaced ‘in-area’ collective defence as the strategic raison d’etre for
most Western armed forces.36 ‘Deterrence’ became overtaken by ‘com-
pellence’ in Western strategy. This shift removed much of the basis for
close, day-to-day operational Anglo-German military cooperation.
Germany’s political inhibitions about utilizing military force meant that
British and German troops were rarely deployed alongside one another
in expeditionary operations. France, which, like Britain, took pride in
its military traditions, supplanted Germany as the UK’s most important
European ally.37 In the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review the
UK’s security and defence relationship with the US and France were
again highlighted as the key strategic partnerships. The UK simultane-
ously made the decision to withdraw its residual military presence from
Germany—20,000 troops—by 2020 since there was ‘no longer any
operational requirement for UK forces to be based there’.38 It seemed
the end of an era in Anglo-German relations.
134 H. L. SAXI
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014, and contin-

uing military intervention in eastern Ukraine, caused both the UK and
Germany to place renewed emphasis on reassuring their European allies
and deterring Russia. In the UK, Russia’s behaviour was described as
driving ‘the resurgence of state-based threats’.39 In Germany, Russian
actions were seen as a key reason for the ongoing ‘renaissance of tradi-
tional power politics’ in and around Europe.40 There emerged a commu-
nality of interest between London and Berlin when it came to meeting
Moscow’s challenge to the post-Cold War rules-based international
order in Europe. The defence policy ‘pendulum’, which since 1990 had
swung unidirectionally towards expeditionary missions beyond Europe,
was now beginning to swing the other way.
Following the Wales Summit in September 2014, and acting along-
side and in close coordination with the US and the UK, Germany took
on a leading role in implementing the ‘assurance and adaptation meas-
ures’ outlined in the Readiness Action Plan (RAP).41 A centrepiece of
the RAP was the decision to ‘significantly enhance the responsiveness’
of the existing NATO Reponse Force (NRF) by developing a Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). The VJTF was to be able to rein-
force threatened allies ‘within a few days’.42 Germany, alongside the
Netherlands and Norway, now agreed to provide the interim VJTF in
2015. Germany was to provide 2700 out of the approximately 5000
troops for the brigade-sized force.43 The UK in turn, along with several
smaller allies, agreed to provide the VJTF in 2017 pledging 3000 British
troops.44 Both the UK and Germany also contributed to maintaining
NATOs continued air, land, and maritime presence on the eastern front
of the Alliance by substantially increasing their participation in exer-
cises throughout Central Eastern Europe.45 The US, Germany, and the
UK also sought to coordinate the allied efforts in the Baltic Sea region
through the trilateral Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training
(TACET) Initiative.46
In part for domestic German reasons, these efforts had to be car-
ried out in a measured and balanced manner. Chancellor Merkel’s
Conservative CDU/CSU-led ‘grand coalition’ government also included
the Social Democratic Party (SPD). SPD politicians, such as Minister
for Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier, were strong adherents of
the party’s tradition of trying to ease tensions with Moscow through
dialogue and engagement—the so-called Ostpolitik.47 Opinion polls
also found that a clear majority of the German public opposed using
military force to defend its eastern allies against Russia.48 In June

2016, as NATO exercises were taking place in Poland and the Baltic
states, Steinmeier publically cautioned against ‘further aggravating the
situation by loud saber-rattling’. He instead called for more dialogue and
cooperation with Russia.49 Coming about a year before federal elections
were due to be held in Germany, such statements were undoubtedly
popular with voters. The German government therefore had to walk a
fine line between ensuring European security and antagonizing the
German public.
In part for this reason, and in spite of Moscow’s belligerent actions,
Chancellor Merkel insisted that the Alliance should continue to adhere
to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. In the document, NATO reit-
erated its earlier commitment to forswear the ‘permanent stationing of
substantial combat forces’ in the new NATO member states. However,
while ‘respecting the NATO-Russian act’ she argued that the alliance
would ‘adopt a series of measures…that will improve the ability of NATO
to react quickly in this region’.50 The Leitmotiv of Germany’s policy was
along the lines of the 1967 Harmel Report, which by now had become
part of Germany’s DNA: a dual-track policy of deterrence and defence,
on the one hand, and détente and dialogue, on the other hand.51
Strengthening NATO’s deterrence posture was one of four ‘pil-
lars’ in Berlin’s response to Moscow’s aggression. The other three were
(non-military) support for Ukraine, punitive sanctions against Russia,
and simultaneous attempts at engagement with Moscow.52 As part of this
engagement, Germany took the lead in attempting to find a diplomatic
solution to the Ukraine crisis. Since June 2014 the so-called Normandy
format—consisting of Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia—was the
focal point of international negotiations leading up to the Minsk cease-
fire agreements. The high-level shuttle diplomacy placed Germany centre
stage in world politics.53 This followed an already elevated leadership
position in Europe in the wake of the European debt crisis.54 By way
of contrast, at the time, the UK was perceived to be notoriously absent
from the world stage. British confidence and resources were seen as hav-
ing been sapped by unsuccessful expeditionary wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq, as well as by post-financial crisis austerity measures.55 However, the
UK nevertheless stressed that it welcomed Germany’s ‘growing influence
on international security’ in general, and its central role in managing the
Ukrainian crisis in particular. London also made clear its aim of strength-
ening defence ties with Berlin, deeming Germany an ‘essential partner’.56
136 H. L. SAXI
While Germany quickly gained a prominent diplomatic role on the

eastern flank, its military contributions were shakier. In order to contrib-
ute effectively to NATO’s deterrence posture, Germany’s armed forces—
the Bundeswehr—had to be credible. However, the Ukrainian crisis soon
revealed that years of post-Cold War underinvestment in defence had
taken their toll.
In terms of size, the Bundeswehr was more or less comparable to
the British and French militaries; its main weapon systems were seen as
modern and capable; and German soldiers were commonly described as
‘competent and disciplined’.57 Nevertheless, due to underfunding, the
serviceability of its equipment and the readiness of its formations were
highly deficient. In September 2014, a leaked report submitted to the
German Bundestag revealed that much of the Bundeswehr’s equipment
was in a disastrous state.58 Less than half its equipment was described
as ‘operationally available’ (Einsatzbereit).59 While conditions were by no
means perfect in the British or French armed forces, the widespread per-
ception was that the Bundeswehr was in a state of severe disrepair. This
impression was reinforced by reports of missions abroad being cancelled
due to the grounding of aging aircraft, and deployed equipment only
being kept working through ‘cannibalization’.60 Minister of Defence
von der Leyen readily admitted that rectifying the problem would take
years.61
Efforts to improve the state of the Bundeswehr, and redirect it
towards collective defence missions in Europe, began soon after the
Wales summit. In September 2014, Germany, together with Poland
and Denmark, agreed to reinforce and upgrade the predominantly tri-
lateral Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, Poland. It was now
to become a high readiness headquarters focused on NATO Article 5
collective defence missions in northeastern Europe. The six newly estab-
lished NATO Force Integration Units (NIFUs) in the eastern member
states were assigned to the HQ.62 In February 2015, Germany took
another small but significant step. It was decided to reverse an earlier
decision, made in 2011, that ground-combat units in Germany needed
only possess 70% of their normal compliment of heavy weapons. It was
also decided to return one of the Bundeswehr’s two inactive armoured
battalions to active service.63 Overnight, 100 older Leopard 2 main bat-
tle tanks, which had been sold to the defence industry, were repurchased
to be modernised and put back into service.64
In 2016, Germany announced plans to increase defence spending year

by year from 2016 to 2020. The funds were to be used for increasing
troop numbers and modernising the Bundeswehr, with priority given
to the German Army. This included planned increases in the number of
armoured personnel carriers, reconnaissance vehicles, and self-propelled
howitzers possessed by the Army. The growth in active troop numbers
was also significant; this was the first increase since the end of the Cold
War.65 What these changes amounted to was made clear in a new White
Paper, published in July 2016. While continuing to provide forces for
international crisis management missions overseas, the Bundeswehr was
now to ‘reorient itself towards its most comprehensive tasks, namely
national and collective defence’.66
The election and inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the
US during 2016–2017 added considerably to the pressure on Germany
to contribute more toward Alliance burdens sharing, and, together with
Brexit, created some uncertainty about old alliances. In May 2017, on
the campaign trail before federal elections, Chancellor Merkel stated that
‘the times in which we could rely fully on other – they are somewhat
over’.67 The sum total of Putin, Brexit and Trump was effective at giving
defence a higher priority in Berlin. In 2016–2017, globally, only China
increased real defence spending more than Germany.68
At the July 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, mutual interest again
made the UK and Germany work side by side to meet the revisionist
challenge from Russia. The Alliance announced its intention to further
strengthen its deterrence and defence posture by establishing an enhanced
forward presence (eFP) in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland by early
2017. One battalion-sized eFP battle group would be stationed in each
of the countries. The UK and Germany offered to serve as framework
nations for the eFP battle groups in Estonia and Lithuania respectively.69
By May 2017, the UK and Germany had each taken the lead in the
deployment of 1000-strong combat-ready multinational armoured infan-
try battalions, supported by main battle tanks and self-propelled artillery,
to their respective countries.70 These British and German troops made up
a considerable proportion of the 4500 Alliance troops which now made
up a tripwire along its eastern flank.71 German Minister of Defence von
Der Leyen made it clear that the eFP battle groups send a ‘proportion-
ate’ and ‘defensive’ but ‘also a clear signal that an attack on one [NATO]
country means an attack on all 28 NATO countries’.72
138 H. L. SAXI
For Germany, the renewed emphasis on Alliance collective defence in

Europe meant reverting to a more traditional role for the Bundeswehr,
a role for which it appeared more suited and comfortable than expedi-
tionary warfare missions. While the Bundeswehr had since 2003 been
focused towards crisis management missions abroad,73 it had for most
of its history prior to this provided the ‘the conventional cornerstone of
NATO’s deterrence concept in…Europe’.74 Now the Bundeswehr again
sought to occupy this role, assuming lead nation responsibility for pro-
viding ‘larger formations’—combat-capable German-led multinational
divisions—to act as ‘follow-on forces’. Their primary task would be to
act as second-wave reinforcements on the eastern flank for NATOs small
eFP tripwire forces and first-waive reinforcements, such as the NRF.75
Due to its long history of contributing substantially to collective defence
in the past, the Bundeswehr enjoyed widespread credibility within the
alliance regarding its ability to successfully carry out such a function.76
However—as the Ukrainian crisis painfully revealed—after more than
twenty-five years of gross underinvestment in defense and fifteen years of
focusing on crisis management missions overseas, even the Bundeswehr
now struggles to relearn and reacquire capabilities and skills it once
mastered. A RAND study from 2017 argues that the German Army of
today—but also the British Army—would be at pains to put together a
single armored brigade within 30 days for a collective defence mission in
the Baltic States.77 Given time, focus, and increased funding, this situa-
tion is likely to improve in the coming years.
Dissimilar and Unequal Allies on NATO’s

Southern Flank
As demonstrated above, since 2014 Britain and Germany have worked
side by-side—but not necessarily together—towards meeting Russia’s
revisionist challenge in the east, largely using symmetrical means to
achieve similar ends. However, on NATO’s southern front, broadly sim-
ilar objectives have not resulted in symmetrical responses. While the ‘Big
Three’ have all worked to curb illegal migration, combat transnational
terrorism, and stabilise Europe’s southern neighbourhood, Britain and
France have been far more militarily active.
While military forces have an obvious role on the eastern flank as
a deterrence force, it is less obvious how they can be utilised to curb
the flow of illegal migrants across the Mediterranean. Both the EU

and NATO have nevertheless launched maritime operations to try to
address the problem, known respectively as Operations Sophia and
Sea Guardian. The key effort is towards targeting human trafficking
in order to reduce migration. Germany and the UK have taken lead-
ing roles in promoting these police-like missions, providing naval vessels
and political support for EU-NATO cooperation.78 The m igration
challenge is particularly salient in Berlin. Germany is the primary
destination for asylum seekers in Europe, taking in close to half of the
1.3 million migrants who applied for asylum in the EU, Norway, and
Switzerland in 2015.79 However, while Germany supported and pushed
for the quasi police-like EU and NATO maritime operations in the
Mediterranean, it remained hesitant about more combative missions in
the Middle East and Africa.
The US-led anti-Islamic State (IS) coalition in the Middle East is a
case in point. Following the battlefield successes of the so-called IS in
Syria and Iraq during the summer of 2014, the US organised a military
coalition to target IS and bolster anti-IS forces in those two countries.
The UK and France promptly joined this international effort.80 By early
2017, the UK and France remained committed with more than 1000
troops to their respective operations, Shader and Chammal, includ-
ing with combat aircraft, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) aircraft, and airborne tankers. British and French pilots have flown
3–4000 sorties and carried out hundreds of airstrikes against IS tar-
gets. In 2015 and 2016 France also temporarily reinforced the coalition
with its carrier strike group, led by the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle
embarking 24 Rafael M combat aircraft. British and French ground
troops have trained Iraqi and Syrian forces, sometimes mentoring them
on the frontlines.81
Germany’s military involvement has been far more lacklustre. Hesitant
to get involved in more combative operations, Berlin’s effort was initially
limited to equipping and training local forces. The Bundeswehr deployed
up to 150 military trainers to Iraq in 2014,82 and Germany also pro-
vided sufficient weaponry from the Bundeswehr’s stocks to equip a
4000-strong force of Kurdish Peshmerga fighters.83 The historic decision
to provide arms to a conflict zone was controversial in Germany. Vice-
Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel (SPD) characterised it as ‘the most difficult
decision that I have had to make in my career’.84
140 H. L. SAXI
It took the November 2015 IS terrorist attack in Paris that left 130
people dead, as well as a French plea for German aid and the activation
of the EU’s Article 42(7) mutual assistance clause, to bring about more
direct German military involvement.85 The German Bundestag then
mandated up to 1200 German troops for support missions. Tornado
reconnaissance aircraft and A310 tanker aircraft would provide target-
ing data and aerial refuelling to the coalition from the Incirlik air base
in Turkey. A German frigate would also act as an escort for the Charles
de Gaulle in the Mediterranean as it carried out anti-IS airstrikes.86
Nevertheless, in early 2017, the German support forces acting as part of
the anti-IS coalition numbered no more than 350 troops, six reconnais-
sance aircraft, and one aerial refuelling aircraft.87
German wariness about taking military action was again highlighted
in April 2018. As punishment for the Syrian government’s recent use of
chemical weapons, the US, France and Britain launched air and missile
strikes against several Syrian targets. Chancellor Merkel supported the
action by Germany’s allies as ‘necessary and appropriate’ and condemned
the use of chemical weapons as ‘unacceptable’, but Germany nevertheless
refused to take part in the strikes.88
German military involvement in Northern Africa and the Sahel proved
equally circumspect. France has long led among the ‘Big Three’ in the
stabilisation and anti-terrorist effort in this region. In January 2013,
France intervened in Mali to prevent radical Islamist insurgents with
links to transnational Islamic terrorists groups from seizing power.89
Paris argued that France was protecting Europe’s interests in the region
by preventing it from turning ‘into a hotbed of international terror-
ism’.90 By early 2017, about 3500 French troops remain engaged in
Operation Barkhane, the French anti-terrorism mission in the Sahel,
supported by helicopters, combat aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs). Their main effort remains stabilising Mali. The strain on the
French military from these operations and the domestic anti-terrorism
mission was such that France could only muster a limited involvement in
eFP.91
As in the Middle East, Germany was initially reluctant to become
directly engaged militarily alongside its allies in Africa. Following the
November 2015 attack, Germany agreed to become more involved, with
Minister of Defence von Der Leyen arguing that Germany ‘will and must
stand firmly by France’s side’. Germany already had about 200 military
trainers as part of an EU mission in the country, but the Bundeswehr
would now also deploy up to 650 troops as part of the UN mission in

Mali (MINUSMA) in order to relieve and reinforce French forces.92 In
January 2017, this effort was enlarged to encompass up to 1000 UN
troops, including attack and transport helicopters.93 Germany’s military
involvement in Mali thus surpassed Afghanistan as the Bundeswehr’s
largest foreign mission.94
The dissimilar involvement of Britain, Germany, and France in the
Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Sahel, is partially explained by
variations in interests. For years, both the UK and France have encour-
aged Germany to play a bigger military role outside Europe, but with
limited results. Germany did not have the same post-colonial ties as the
UK and France, nor the same strategic and economic interests. Berlin
therefore remained wary about the risks and costs of being ‘entrapped’
into supporting British and French objectives.95 But Germany’s reluc-
tance was to an even greater extent due to the country’s post-World War
II ‘culture of military restraint’.96 A deep-seated ‘culture of antimilita-
rism’ continues to impair Germany’s use of military power in foreign
policy.97
As a substitute for direct military interventions in the Middle East and
Africa, the German government has since 2011 promoted an Enable &
Enhance Initiative, both nationally and through the EU. The main idea
is to enable local and regional actors to provide security and to stabi-
lise fragile regions by providing education, training, and equipment.98
At one point labelled the ‘Merkel Doctrine’, the approach arguably
also involved easing restrictions on exporting high-tech German weap-
ons to partner countries in conflict regions.99 The UK’s 2010 defence
review had a similar focus on non-operational capacity building (‘defence
engagement’) in partner countries beyond Europe, but it also had a con-
current emphasis on using British forces to project military power and
carry out overseas military intervention.100
Germany’s military reluctance is the key reason why—among its
European allies—the UK today favours France over Germany as a part-
ner outside Europe. As Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once put it:
‘the French were the only European country, apart from ourselves, with
the stomach for a fight’.101 The 2010 Anglo-French Lancaster House
Agreement was driven by the conviction that the two countries were
‘natural partners’102 since they were the only ‘European nations with
the full range of military capabilities and the political will to protect our
interests globally’.103 The UK’s 2015 Strategic Defence and Security
142 H. L. SAXI
Review pointedly identifies the US and France, but not Germany, as

allies ‘we would normally expect [our Armed Forces] to deploy with’.104
This speaks volumes of the limitations placed on any Anglo-German
‘silent alliance’ dealing with defence and security issues beyond Europe.
Conclusions
The Anglo-German security partnership is an important one.
Nevertheless, while it is growing in relative importance, in both coun-
tries it continues to come second to relations with the US and France.105
Brexit need not necessarily weaken the relationship, but if Brexit turns
into an acrimonious divorce because of disagreements over money and
trade, this will most likely also have consequences for security coopera-
tion. However, even in a best-case scenario, both the UK and Germany
seem likely to be damaged by Brexit. Therefore, from a German point
of view, Brexit appears very much as an act of geopolitical vandalism and
self-harm.106
As a ‘third country’ from March 2019 the UK seems destined to
lose its place among the ‘Big Three’ at the heart of EU decision-mak-
ing.107 It was suggestive that Chancellor Merkel’s immediate response
to Brexit was to call a German, French, and Italian summit in Berlin.108
The UK will almost certainly maintain its position as part of NATO’s
‘Quad’,109 but it might lose influence and some important posts in
NATO’s command structure.110 While the UK’s key operational mil-
itary partnerships—with the US and France especially—will remain
mostly unchanged, it seem likely that the UK will be relegated to a more
reduced role in European military industrial cooperation.111
The departure of Eurosceptic Britain’s may in turn allow for more
European integration, but is highly unlikely to result in a defence union
with an ‘autonomous military capability’.112 It may also strengthen the
Franco-German axis at the heart of the EU. Paradoxically, this need not
be entirely in Germany’s interest. More Franco-German domination
risks further alienating smaller neighbours that are already dissatisfied
with a perceived German hegemony in the EU.113 Germany’s position
on the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), launched in
November 2017 to strengthen EU defense cooperation in the wake of
Brexit and Trump, was typically to demand that it be as inclusive as pos-
sible so as not to alienate any member states.114
The post-Cold War shift in NATO, from collective ‘in-area’ defense

to expeditionary ‘out-of-area’ operations, critically weakened the basis
for the ‘silent alliance’. Anglo-German defence relations were often char-
acterised by mutual incomprehension and the lack of common ground
during the years of expeditionary warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq.115 So
how will the ‘silent alliance’ fare in a post-Brexit world?
One the one hand, the 2014 Ukraine crisis, with its resulting re-
emphasis on collective defence and deterrence in Europe, has rekindled
some of yesterday’s shared strategic focus in London and Berlin. This
seems likely to endure after Brexit. It will again give Britain and Germany
a common defense focus, making more room for increased military coop-
eration and more mutual strategic understanding. It is indicative that the
National Security Capability Review, published in March 2018, again
made clear the UK’s intention to deepen relations with Germany, ‘includ-
ing on capabilities for our air and ground forces’.116 On the other hand,
the differences in strategic and military culture, which led the UK and
Germany to drift apart during the years of ‘strategic timeout’ from 1990
to 2014, persists. Even if Germany shares many of the strategic interests
of the US, the UK and France, Berlin is much less willing and able to take
part in expeditionary warfighting overseas. This is likely to continue to
limit the scope of Anglo-German military cooperation beyond Europe.
Notes
1. Karl Kaiser and John Roper, eds., Die Stille Allianz: deutsch-britische
Sicherheitskooperation (Bonn: Europa Union, 1987). The book was
translated and published in English the following year, under the slightly
different title British-German Defence Co-operation: Partners within the
Alliance (London: Jane’s, 1988). The term ‘silent alliance’ was coined
in the 1980s, but was still being used day-to-day in the mid-1990s. See
e.g. the interview with Peter Craine, British Embassy in Bonn, in WT,
‘Stille Allianz’, Wehrtechnik 27, no. 11 (November 1995): 18.
2. Caroline Copley, ‘Brexit Vote Marks a Watershed Moment for Europe:
Merkel’, Reuters, 24 June 2016.
3. David Davids, since July 2016 Secretary of State for Exiting the
European Union, was one Brexiteer who had argued that an amica-
ble UK-German deal could be arrived at relatively quickly. Jon Stone,
‘Minister for Brexit David Davis Appeared Unaware of How EU Trade
Deals Actually Work’, The Independent, 14 July 2016.
144 H. L. SAXI
4. Statistisches Bundesamt [German Federal Statistical Office], Statistisches

Jahrbuch 2016 [Statistical Yearbook 2016] (Wiesbaden: German Federal
Statistical Office, 2016), 415, 420.
5. The expression was frequently employed and popularized by Chancellor
(1974–1982) Helmut Schmidt. Hartmut Palmer and Gerhard Spörl,
‘The Last of His Kind: What Helmut Schmidt Meant to Germany and
the World’, Spiegel Online, 12 November 2015; See also Mark Allinson
et al., Contemporary Germany: Essays and Texts on Politics, Economics &
Society (London: Routledge, 2000), 147.
6. Malcolm Chalmers, UK Foreign and Security Policy After Brexit, RUSI
Briefing Paper (London: Royal United Services Institute, January
2017), 4–5.
7. David Hughes, ‘Brexit: German Business Warns May Its Priority Is
to Protect Single Market, Not a Good Trade Deal with UK’, The
Independent, 8 July 2017.
8. Matthew Ward, Statistics on UK-EU Trade, Briefing Paper Number
7851 (London: House of Commons Library, 17 August 2017).
9. Sophia Besch and Christian Odendahl, Berlin to the Rescue? A Closer
Look at Germany’s Position on Brexit (London: The Centre for European
Reform, 2017).
10. SZ, ‘Merkel will keine “Rosinenpickerei” bei Brexit-Verhandlungen
zulassen’ [Merkel Will Not Allow “Cherry Picking” in Brexit
Negotiations], Süddeutsche Zeitung, 28 June 2016; Kate Connolly et al.,
‘Angela Merkel: No Special Favours for UK over Single Market’, The
Guardian, 28 June 2016.
11. BBC, ‘Security Is Not Brexit Bargaining Chip, Says German Defence
Chief’. London: BBC, 31 March 2017; Stefan Wagstyl, ‘German
Lawmakers Hit at May’s EU Security Stance in Brexit Talks’, Financial
Times, 31 March 2017.
12. Ewen MacAskill, ‘Using Security as Brexit Bargaining Chip Is Reckless
and Lacks Credibility’, The Guardian, 30 March 2017; Daniel Boffey,
‘UK Military “Must Not Be Used as Bargaining Chip” in Brexit Talks’,
The Guardian, 1 April 2017.
13. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York:
W. W. Norton, 2001), 392–393.
14. Desmond Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union, 2 ed.
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 348.
15. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices (London: Simon & Schuster,
2014), 209.
16. ‘Healthy’ defined as having the lowest debt-to-GDP ratio. See Richard
Dobbs et al., Debt and (Not Much) Deleveraging (McKinsey Global
Institute, February 2015), 106.
17. Benjamin Schreer, ‘The Reluctant Ally? Germany, NATO and the Use
of Force’, in NATO’s European Allies: Military Capability and Political
Will, ed. Janne Haaland Matlarty and Magnus Petersson (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); On Libya, see Sarah Brockmeier, ‘Germany
and the Intervention in Libya’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55,
no. 6 (2013).
18. See the chapter on UK defence policy by Dr. Robert Johnson in this
volume.
19. R. Nicholas Burns, Damon M. Wilson, and Jeff Lightfoot, Anchoring the
Alliance (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2012), vi, 4–5.
20. Ibid., 4.
21. Ulrike Demmer and Christoph Schult, ‘Rache für Libyen’, Der Spiegel,
14 May 2012, 100.
22. Robert M. Gates, ‘The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of
NATO)’. Speech delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gateson,
11 June, 2011 in Brussels, Belgium (Washington, DC: US Department
of Defense, 11 June, 2011).
23. Radoslaw Sikorski, ‘Poland and the Future of the European Union’.
Speech delivered to the German Bundestag, Berlin, on 28 November
2011 (Warsaw: Polish MFA, 28 November 2011).
24. Philip Hammond, ‘Shared Security: Transforming Defence to Face
the Future’. Speech delivered by Secretary of State for Defence at the
British Embassy, Berlin (London: UK Ministry of Defence, 2 May
2012).
25. Ibid.
26. German Federal Ministry of Defence, Food for Thought. Framework
Nations Concept (Berlin: German MoD, 2013).
27. Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, The Framework Nations Concept,
SWP Comments 52 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik,
December 2014), 2.
28. Håkon Lunde Saxi, ‘British and German Initiatives for Defence
Cooperation: The Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework
Nations Concept’, Defence Studies 17, no. 2 (2017): 185–187.
29. EDD, ‘NATO/Ministerial: Germany Tables New Framework Nation
Concept’, Europe Diplomacy & Defence: The Agence Europe Bulletin on
ESDP and NATO, no. 647 (24 October 2013): 2.
30. Joachim Gauck, ‘Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt: Anmerkungen zu
Verantwortung, Normen und Bündnissen’ [Germany’s Role in the
World: Reflections on Responsibility, Norms and Alliances]. Speech by
Federal President Joachim Gauck at the opening of the Munich Security
Conference, 31 January 2014, Munich (Berlin: Office of the Federal
President).
146 H. L. SAXI
31. Minister for Foreign Affairs Klaus Kinkel, ‘Peacekeeping Missions:

Germany Can Now Play Its Part’, NATO Review 42, no. 5 (October
1994); See interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs Guido
Westerwelle in Matthias Nass, ‘Der Anti-Interventionist’, Die Zeit, 9
February 2013.
32. Alister Miskimmon and John Roper, ‘The Stille Allianz Revisited’, in
Rethinking Germany and Europe: Democracy and Diplomacy in a Semi-
Sovereign State, ed. Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery, and Stephen Padgett
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 188–191.
33. David Miller, The Cold War: A Military History (London: Pimlico,
2001), 231–249, 295–301.
34. Secretary of State for Defence, Cm. 101-I. Statement on the Defence
Estimates 1987 (London: HMSO, 1987), 29.
35. General (ret.) David Richards, Taking Command (London: Headline,
2014), 35.
36. See e.g. Anthony King, The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces:
From the Rhine to Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011), 20–45.
37. Anthony Forster and William Wallace, ‘Common Foreign and Security
Policy from Shadow to Substance?’, in Policy-Making in the European
Union, ed. Helen Wallace and William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 467–487.
38. HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic
Defence and Security Review (London: TSO, October 2010), 28.
39. HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence
and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom
(London: TSO, November 2015), 18.
40. German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 2016 on German
Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Berlin: German MoD,
13 July 2016), 38.
41. NATO, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2014 (Brussels: NATO
Public Diplomacy Division, 2015), 6.
42. NATO Heads of State and Government, Wales Summit Declaration
(Brussels: NATO, 2014), paragraph 8.
43. Claudia Major, NATO’s Strategic Adaptation: Germany Is the Backbone
for the Alliance’s Military Reorganisation, SWP Comments 16 (Berlin:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2015), 2–3; Note that the
the three countries had already been slated to provide the 2015 NATO
Reponses Force (NRF) since 2013.
44. Secretary of State for Defence Michael Fallon, ‘Additional UK
Contributions to NATO Assurance and Deterrence Efforts’. Written
Statement made on 24 June 2015 (London: House of Commons, 2015).
45. Between 4–5000 British and German troops participated in exercised

in Central Eastern Europe annually. Ben Farmer, ‘Britain Announces
1,000 More Troops for Eastern Europe Exercises’, The Telegraph,
16 January 2015; Reuters Staff, ʻVon der Leyen - 2016 üben 5000
Bundeswehr-Soldaten in Osteuropaʼ, Reuters, 14 April 2015.
46. Permanent Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO,
‘Press Release: Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training
(TACET) Initiative’ (Brussels: German MFA, 10 February 2016).
47. See e.g. Allison Smale, ‘Germany’s Man in the Middle’, International
New York Times, 20 November 2014.
48. Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, NATO Publics Blame
Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid
(Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 10 June 2015), 5.
49. FAZ, ʻSteinmeier kritisiert Nato-Manöver in Osteuropa’, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 June 2016.
50. Slk/Sb, ‘No Permanent NATO Troop Presence in Eastern Europe,
Merkel Says’, Deutsche Welle, 3 September 2014.
51. German officials, such as NATO Ambassador Hans-Dieter Lucas, would
mention the Harmel formula of ‘deterrence and dialog’ in nearly every
public speech following the Wales Summit.
52. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, ‘Save Our Trans-Atlantic Order’, The New York
Times, 11 March 2015.
53. The Economist, ‘German Foreign Policy: A Lurch onto the World
Stage’, The Economist, 28 February 2015.
54. See e.g. Franz-Josef Meiers, Germany’s Role in the Euro Crisis: Berlin’s
Quest for a More Perfect Monetary Union (Cham (ZG): Springer, 2015).
Introduction: Europe’s Powerhouse.
55. The Economist, ‘Little Britain’, The Economist, 4 April 2015.
56. HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and
Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom: 52–53.
57. Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General (ret.)
Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of
Combat (Oxford: Public Affairs, 2001), XXVIII.
58. An Air Force report also leaked in August 2014. See Peter Müller et al.,
ʻSchein und Seinʼ, Der Spiegel, 25 August 2014, 18–20.
59. See e.g. FAZ, ʻBedingt abwehrbereit: Einsatzbereitschaft der
Waffensysteme der Bundeswehrʼ, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27
September 2014, Wirtschaft 17.
60. Daniel Brössler and Nico Fried, ʻAusgedientʼ, Süddeutsche Zeitung,
30 September 2014; Der Spiegel, ‘Ramshackle Military at Odds with
Global Aspirations’, Spiegel Online, 30 September 2014.
61. Quoted in Brössler and Fried, ʻAusgedientʼ.
148 H. L. SAXI
62. German Federal Ministry of Defence, Gemeinsame Erklärung der deutschen,

dänischen und polnischen Verteidigungsminister zur Weiterentwicklung
des Multinationalen Korps Nordost in Stettin (Berlin: German MoD,
4 September 2014); NATO, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015
(Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2016), 17.
63. The newly activated armored battalion would have 700 soldiers and be
equipped with 44 Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks. Der Spiegel, ʻBun-
deswehr: Von der Leyen setzt wieder auf Panzerʼ, Spiegel Online, 27
February 2015; Christoph Hickmann, ʻPanzer und Psychologie Die
Regierung muss entscheiden, was die Armee können sollʼ, Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 27 February 2015.
64. Deanne Corbett, ʻGermany To Buy Back Tanks Amid Russia Threatʼ,
Defense News, 18 April 2015.
65. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
2017: 63, 72.
66. German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 2016 on German
Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr: 138.
67. Alison Smale and Steven Erlanger, ‘Merkel, After Discordant G-7
Meeting, Is Looking Past Trump’, The New York Times, 28 May 2017.
2018 (London: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 2018), 20.
69. NATO Heads of State and Government, Warsaw Summit Communiqué
(Brussels: NATO, 9 July 2016), paragraph 40.
70. NATO, ʻFactsheet: NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presenceʼ (Brussels:
NATO Public Diplomacy Division, May 2017).
71. NATO, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2017 (Brussels: NATO
Public Diplomacy Division, 2018), 13–14.
72. Quoted in Holger Romann. ʻHunderte Bundeswehrsoldaten nach
Osteuropaʼ. Tagesschau.de, 2016.
73. See German Federal Ministry of Defence, Verteidigungspolitische
Richtlinien für den Geschäftsbereich des Bundesministers der Verteidigung
[Defence Policy Guidelines for the Area of Responsibility of the Federal
Minister of Defence] [2003] (Berlin: German MoD, 21 May 2003).
Part II, chapters 1 and 2.
74. Martin Rink, ʻDas Heer der Bundeswehr in Wandel 1950–2005ʼ, in
Entschieden für Frieden: 50 Jahre Bundeswehr 1955–2005, ed. Klaus-
Jürgen Bremm, Hans-Hubertaus Mack, and Martin Rink (Freiburg im
Breisgau: Rombach Verlag, 2005), 147.
75. Rainer L. Glatz and Martin Zapfe, Ambitious Framework Nation:
Germany in Nato, SWP Comments 35 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik, 2017); the so-called Bühler-Paper from March 2017
drew up these ambitions, which were made public by the newspaper

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in April 2017. See Johannes Leithäuser
and Marco Seliger, ‘Bis Zu Den Sternen’ [To the Stars], Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 April 2017.
76. Franklin D. Kramer, NATO’s Framework Nations: Capabilities for an
Unpredictable World (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, April 2014).
77. Michael Shurkin, The Abilities of the British, French, and German Armies
to Generate and Sustain Armored Brigades in the Baltics (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 2017).
78. NATO, The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2016: 52–53.
79. Phillip Connor, Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3
Million in 2015 (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2 August
2016), 4–5.
2015 (London: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 2015), 304–306.
81. The Military Balance 2017: 78–79, 83, 115, 174–175.
82. The Federal Goverment, ʻBundeswehr to Continue Training the
Peshmergaʼ (Berlin: The Federal Goverment, 26 January 2017).
83. Spencer Kimball, ʻGerman Weapons Deliveries to Iraq’s Kurdish
Regionʼ. Berlin: Deutsche Welle, 1 September 2014.
84. DW, ʻGermany to Arm Kurdish Forces Fighting Islamic State in Iraqʼ.
Berlin: Deutsche Welle, 31 August 2014.
85. BBC, ʻParis Attacks: What Happened on the Nightʼ. London: BBC, 9
December 2015.
86. German Bundestag, 18. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 18/9960 - Antrag der
Bundesregierung (Bonn: German Bundestag, 13 October 2016).
2017: 119.
88. Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, and Ben Hubbard, ‘U.S.,
Britain and France Strike Syria Over Suspected Chemical Weapons
Attack’, The New York Times, 13 April 2018; Reuters Staff, ‘Germany’s
Merkel Backs Air Strikes on Syria as “Necessary and Appropriate”’,
Reuters, 14 April 2018.
89. On Operation Serval, see e.g. Michael Shurkin, France’s War in
Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2014).
90. French Ministry of Defence, French White Paper: Defence and National
Security (Paris: French MoD, 2013), 54.
2017: 79, 115–116.
150 H. L. SAXI
92. BBC, ʻGermany to Send 650 Soldiers to Maliʼ. London: BBC, 25

November 2015.
93. DW, ʻGerman Parliament Votes to Expand Military Presence in Maliʼ.
Berlin: Deutsche Welle, 26 January 2017.
94. Figures on the strength of deployed German troop contingents,
13 November 2017, accessed at https://www.bundeswehr.de [20
November 2017].
95. Pierre Haroche, ʻInterdependence, Asymmetric Crises, and European
Defence Cooperationʼ, European Security 26, no. 2 (2017): 14–20.
96. German Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Guido Westerwelle, quoted
in Nass, ʻDer Anti-Interventionistʼ.
97. See e.g. Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National
Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, MD and London: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Kerry Longhurst, Germany
and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1990–2003
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); Anja Dalgaard-
Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2006).
98. Originally known as the Ertüchtigungsinitiative, it was relabelled
Enable & Enhance in 2013. See Jana Puglierin, Germany’s Enable &
Enhance Initiative What Is It About? Security Policy Working Paper No.
1/2016 (Berlin: Federal Academy for Security Policy, 2016); Claudia
Major, Christian Mölling, and Judith Vorrath, Train + Equip = Peace?
SWP Comments 4 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February
2015).
99. Konstantin von Hammerstein et al., ‘Die Merkel-Doktrin’, Der Spiegel, 3
December 2012.
100. HM Government, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The
Strategic Defence and Security Review.
101. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins,
1995), 819.
102. UK Ministry of Defence, ‘UK–France Summit 2010 Declaration on
Defence and Security Co-operation’. (London: UK MoD, 2010).
103. HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and
Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom: 52.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid., 51–52; German Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paper 2016 on
German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr: 80.
106. Sophia Besch and Christian Odendahl, Berlin to the Rescue? 1, 10.
107. See e.g. Stefan Lehne, The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace: Washington, DC, July 2012),
3–5; Klaus Brummer, ed. The Big 3 and ESDP: France, Germany and
the United Kingdom (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006); Note

that in the late 1990s Rome was able to gain partial entry into the two
circles, occasionally making it the so-called NATO Quint and the EU
‘Big Four’. See Catherine Gegout, ‘The Quint: Acknowledging the
Existence of a Big Four–US Directoire at the Heart of the European
Union’s Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process’, Journal of Common
Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002).
108. Copley, ‘Brexit Vote Marks a Watershed Moment for Europe: Merkel’;
Note that the EU institutions were also present, represented by the EU
Council President, Donald Tusk.
109. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the
Architect of Germany’s Reunification (New York: Broadway Books, 1998),
65–66; See also Sherard Cowper-Coles, Ever the Diplomat: Confessions of a
Foreign Office Mandarin (London: Harper Press, 2013), 72.
110. Chalmers, UK Foreign and Security Policy After Brexit: 6.
111. See the chapter on Franco-British defence co-operation by Dr. Samuel
B.H. Faure, as well as the chapter on the EUs military ambition by
Professor Janne Haaland Matlary, in this volume.
112. See the chapter on the EUs military ambition by Professor Janne
Haaland Matlary in this volume.
113. Dinan, Europe Recast: A History of European Union: 336–349.
114. Jacopo Barigazzi, ‘Mogherini Hails “Historic” EU Defense Pact’.
Brussels: Politico, 13 November 2017; Alice Billon-Galland and Martin
Quencez, ‘Can France and Germany Make PESCO Work as a Process
Toward EU Defense?’, in Policy Brief No. 033 (Washington, DC: The
German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2017), 2.
115. Alister Miskimmon and John Roper, ‘The Stille Allianz Revisited’, in
sovereign State, ed. Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery, and Stephen Padgett
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 188–191.
116. HM Government, National Security Capability Review (London: TSO,
2018), 16.
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CHAPTER 7
A Special Partnership? The EU’s Military

Ambition and the Role of Britain
The field of defence policy is one where only nation-states are

responsible actors in the sense of owning military assets and risking the
lives of their own citizens. The soldier is always serving a state, despite
almost always being deployed under the auspices of NATO, the UN,
or the EU or a coalition of states. It is noteworthy that in the age of
the nation-state there has never been any supranational military force.
Indeed, the very hallmark of state sovereignty is the famous Weberian
monopoly on the powers of violence on the part of the state—the police
on the inside of the state border, the military defending the border and
the sovereignty of the state as such.
States do not want to integrate their military capacities and thereby
depend on others if they can avoid it because their military forces are
This chapter (the discussion of EU policy and the discussion of France) contains
some excerpts from my chapters on the EU, Britain, and France in my book
Hard Power in Hard Times: Can Europe Act Strategically? Palgrave Macmillan,
2018, UK.
J. H. Matlary (*) 
Blindern, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

160 J. H. MATLARY
the ultimate guarantor of the state’s sovereignty. When the UN was

founded there was a plan for a UN intervention force which never saw
the light of day because states refused to give up sovereignty over mil-
itary power. The UN must always ask for national military contribu-
tions to the operations it mandates. Likewise, the EU does not own the
battle-groups that are on rotation and they can only deploy with unani-
mous support although the decision rule in this area allows some states
to go ahead and deploy when permission is granted, so-called Permanent
Structured Cooperation (PSC). In NATO, nation-states make sovereign
decisions on contributions although there are some common capacities,
such as AWACS planes, HQs, as well as an integrated military command
structure.
However, the main rule is that the relevant actor in security and defence
policy remains the state. There is still no political will to move beyond
this level in forging supra-national actors that own and command mil-
itary capacities. It is therefore not very likely that the EU will have its
own autonomous military force or defence union, as it is called by EU
leaders. As stated, not even NATO, the world’s foremost military alli-
ance, has its own forces. However, also in the EU we may envisage some
kind of pooled military force and a solidarity clause like that of art 5 in
the Washington treaty—in fact, the EU’s Lisbon treaty has such a clause,
art 42.6 which entails such an obligation.
Given this, the expectation is that Brexit will not matter very much
regarding the British leadership role in security and defence in Europe.
One may assume that the loss of general political influence that leaving
the EU entails will make Britain intensify its efforts to enhance its already
impressive role in this policy field by increasing efforts to make NATO
even more important and by stressing the key role of the so-called ‘spe-
cial relationship’ with the US. This is normal and natural as a policy
strategy in such a situation, known from e.g. the case of Norway when
a referendum opted for “no” to membership in the EU in 1994. The
Foreign Office then did everything within its reach to strengthen bilat-
eral ties with major European capitals as well as enhance one’s role in
other international organizations (IOs).1 In addition, for Britain the
choice is always Atlantic, given that a choice between Europe and the US
must be made, as Johnson points out in his chapter.
Thus, a sound assumption is that post-Brexit Britain will seek to max-
imize its international influence in areas where it plays a vital role; in par-
ticular everything to do with security and defence. Paul Cornish argues
7 A SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP? THE EU’S MILITARY … 161
that “While it is not clear at this stage how the UK’s key strategic part-
nerships might evolve, there are nevertheless several features of the UK
strategic outlook that seem likely to endure. Security policy and defence
policy will be ‘business as usual’ whenever possible”.2 He adds that the
Defence Review’s dictum “International by design” had been become
even more important than before and points to the ‘platform’ character
of NATO, as a basis for coalitions of the like-interested, able, and will-
ing as something that “the UK is now more willing to see”—“NATO
as something of a holding company, allowing the development of, and
participation in, ‘clubs within clubs’ such as the Northern Group.”, he
wrote (my emphasis).3 Indeed, as Heier’s analysis brings out very clearly,
the UK is systematicaløly designing such a ‘club’ consisting of likeminded
states in Northerrn Europe, the JEF. The British thinking is that states
that may fight together must train together and act in common command
structures, especially given the need for rapid decision-making and reac-
tion. The JEF is the foremost example of such coalition-based military
force today, initiated and led by the British. The other main integrative
partnership is the French–British brigade which has shared command. In
the JEF, however, the British lead and spearhead the new type of military
force that is necessitated by cost factors and rapid reaction imperatives.
Thus, while NATO, the UN, and even the EU remain as key IOs for mil-
itary force generation and deployment, the development is clearly in the
direction of forces that are able to react quickly and do war-fighting in a
seamless manner. Moreover, there is the major problem of decision-mak-
ing that Heier discusses—can large IOs be relies upon to act quickly and
adequately? The answer is a clear no—when 27 or 28 states or an often
stalled UN Security Council must act, efficiency is not what one expects.
For instance, Norwegian experts fear a stalled NATO council (NAC)
in a given situation, as Heier outlines, and therefore seek military inte-
gration in structures where decisions on deployment will be made when
needed. The interest in the JEF on the part of the smaller member states
is motivated not only by versatile and rapidly deployable fighting power,
but also by the need for timely decision-making, something which is also
brought out in Petersson and Møller’s chapter on Sweden and Finland.
It is also known that Poland and other states deliberately seek parnter-
ships with the US, as ‘alliances inside the alliance’. I wish to underline
this point: Even NATO is a platform for such coalitions of the willing,
able, and like-minded today, as pointed out by Cornish. This implies that
a serious EU role in defence will need to overcome what we can call the
162 J. H. MATLARY
decision-making problem as well as generate rapid reaction forces that

can deploy within days with war-fighting capacities. If this is not possible,
states in the EU and NATO as well as outside will continue to develop
coalitions to meet their security needs.
Does the EU need Britain? Does Britain need the EU? These are the
salient questions with regard to the role that Brexit may play for Britain’s
defence role.
With regard to the EU, there is a need for British intelligence, as
Britain is a leading international actor in this field, both with regard to
the US and the “Five Eyes”. The EU itself has no intelligence capac-
ity. In addition, British military assets are essential to any major military
operation in Europe. In a bargaining perspective, there are thus British
advantages in the security and defence field that the EU must take into
consideration in the negotiations.
The major question that this chapter asks, is the following: Is Brexit
likely to diminish Britain’s leading role in security and defence policy?
Thus, we are not investigating whether this role will be enhanced, but
the contrary. Moreover, we do not analyze the other possible question;
viz. that Britain’s general economic situation may become so adversely
affected by Brexit that this impacts on its ability to spend on defence.
Whether Brexit will lead to major economic loss for Britain and whether
this in turn will lead to major cuts to defence, remain at the speculative
stage at the time of writing and will therefore not be dealt with in this
chapter.
Other factors that remain important yet without much empirical
basis for assessment so far, are these: Will Brexit mean that France will
become the key security and defence actor in Europe and therefore able
to forge a ‘special relationship’ with the US as it can then offer ‘access’
to the EU? In order words, will France replace Britain as the key trans-
atlantic actor? Moreover, will France regulate and indeed determine
Britain’s access to the EU’s security and defence policy after Brexit? Or
will France continue to be the closest ally of Britain in this field? All these
questions revolve around the importance that EU membership has for
the general balance of power in Europe.
Our main concern in this chapter is the particular question of whether
the EU plays a role in the security and defence sector is important
enough to warrant a loss of influence for a member state that leaves the
union. Phrased differently; does the EU play a serious role in security
and defence today and/or it is likely to play such a role? The question
about the significance of Brexit for Britain’s defence role depends on two
factors: One, will the EU develop a serious actor role in hard military
power, and second, will it want Britain to play a key role in its security
and defence policy? Logically there is also the connection between these
two questions: When Britain leaves and if it does not retain a major role
in the EU’s security and defence designs, can the EU play any role in this
field?
In the following I first analyse the EU’s role in security and defence
policy, paying special attention to its present defence plans. Thereafter
I discuss the current state of affairs regarding Brexit and Britain’s defence
role in this process, and finally I offer a conclusion.
The EU: Moving Towards a Defence Union?

Some may ask whether the EU role in security and defence warrants
much analytical attention since it has never been prominent. The answer
to this is that there has been a renewed emphasis on the idea of a mil-
itary capacity for the EU recently. Commission president Jean-Claude
Juncker has called for defence union several times and also the French
president and the German chancellor have supported such an idea. The
EU has also published a strategic document.4 The reasons for a new and
enhanced EU role in defence are cited to be terrorism, Russian revision-
ism, and a need to control borders because of illegal mass migration as
well as terrorism.
The Lisbon treaty opens up the possibility for such, and over the last
two years EU leaders have developed policy proposals along these lines.
The European Parliament (EP) has voted to install a defence union5 and
Commission president Juncker has proposed three scenarios for a new
defence policy, one of them a union; after having stated that “soft power
is not enough” at a meeting in Prague in the summer of 2016.
The backdrop to this rather dramatic turn-around is both the current
crisis in the EU, inter alia due to Brexit; as well as the clear need for
the EU to be able to deal with hard power policy issues. In his so-called
State of the Union address in 2016 Commission President Juncker
stated that: “Europe can no longer afford to piggy-back on the military
might of others. (…) For European defence to be strong, the European
defence industry needs to innovate.” The Commission’s rapporteur
adds: “With a worsening security situation in Europe’s neighbourhood
and a strong economic case for greater cooperation on defence spending
164 J. H. MATLARY
amongst EU countries, the Commission believes now is the time to

make strides towards a Security and Defence Union.”
The EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Mogherini stated
that “Security and defence are priorities for the European Union because
they are priorities for all our citizens. Since last year, we are stepping
up our European defence to be more and more effective as a security
provider within and beyond our borders, investing more resources,

building cooperation among member states and taking forward a closer
cooperation with NATO. The world is changing rapidly around us and
we have to tackle new challenges every day: as the European Union, we
have taken the responsibility to address these challenges.”6
Despite this, fairly little has materialized beyond funds for common
defence procurement projects and calls for a European army, yet the
political ambition remains very high. At the beginning of November
2017 the so-called Pesco agreement materialised—Pesco referring
to Permanent Structured Cooperation. This is the term used for the
decision-making procedure on security and defence issues in the Lisbon
treaty. The term was invented by the French and the British in 2003
when these two states launched the ‘autonomous military capacity of the
EU’ which consisted primarily of some EU military capacity which could
be deployed very quickly (the so-called battle groups), but also included
the EDA (European Defence Agency) which was intended to ‘stream-
line’ EU states’ defence spending. The current PESCO has a wider
membership and is more ambitious, but is designed as a new effort to
make defence spending more rational.
Prior to this the foreign ministers of the EU had agreed to reform and
expand the common foreign and security policy (CSFP) at their meeting
in November 2016 and they also adopted a fund for EU defence cooper-
ation, the European Defence Fund (EDF).
Defence Policy and Strategy vs. Industrial Security Policy

The history of the EU is replete with calls for common defence and
security policy. This has always been a French priority, aimed at making
the EU a ‘pole’ in a multipolar system of states. Indeed it was the main
strategy of general de Gaulle whereby Europe would become a serious
international actor on the global scene and a great power, not depend-
ent on the US. French policy priorities have always been clear and con-
sistent in this field, and France remains the most important factor in
determining the future of the EU’s role in security and defence, some-
thing I will substantiate in the discussion below.
Beyond France few states have invested much in the EU in this field.
The Nordics Finland and Sweden were interested in transcending their
self-imposed neutrality through the development of the CFSP and par-
took more than willingly in the sharpest peace-keeping operations that
came along. Germany had a similar interest in developing legitimacy for
contributing to international operations, but only for as long as these
were labeled ‘crisis management’. Norway had been a participant in all
EU defence initatives, even in the battle groups which are under EU
command. Norway wants to compensate for not being a member and
therefore seeks to be a ‘constructive’ contributor to everything the EU
does.
But EU defence policy is hardly the correct label for the EU’s role.
It is important to distinguish between “top-down” strategic security and
defence policy, typically what a unitary state does and which allows for
deterrence, coercion, and military surprise; and “bottom-up” crisis man-
agement and capacity building, which is what the EU can undertake in
a gradual and piecemeal fashion. In other words, even if the EU speaks
about ‘defence’ policy and ‘defence union, it does necessarily mean that
it develops the corresponding type of strategic and military capabil-
ity. This distinction is very important and Faure makes it in his chapter:
the ability to act militarily as a strategic actor is what we usually asso-
ciate with security and defence policy, and the EU as a large group of
29 member states (absent Britain, 28) consisting of some non-aligned
and neutral states cannot act as one, in a decisive, surprising, and forceful
manner as long as it needs to agree at 29 and have military contributions
from various states in an ad hoc manner. The decision-making structure
‘permanent structured cooperation’ designed initially by the British and
the French in 2003 was intended to remedy this problem, but even if
two or more states were willing to conduct a military operation, they
still needed to acceptance of the other EU member states to do so. To
agree on capacities for crisis management, for research and development,
for common capacities, and for crisis management operations of a softer
kind is something very different from strategic military action. The latter
today demands the ability to deter great powers like Russia.
Thus, it makes sense to distinguish sharply between defence policy
and strategy in the classical, strategic sense, and industrial security policy,
which is what the EU has so far been undertaking.
166 J. H. MATLARY
“So What Do They Contribute?”—Military Contributions Determine

Political Influence
A former Norwegian NATO ambassador told me the story of how he
once sat between the US and the British NATO ambassadors, listen-
ing to Belgium’s ambassador who seemed to take the floor on every
issue. After a while the American leant over to the British ambassador,
saying: “So what do they contribute?”—In NATO as well as in coa-
litions of war-fighting states this is the only relevant question: do you
bring risk-willing, relevant military contributions to the operation?—
The Belgians seldom do and were therefore expected not to pretend
to be a major actor in NATO by taking the floor on every issue. The
point here is simply that security and defence policy is ‘revealing’ in a
way that other policy fields are not because it is very clear who partic-
ipate in war-fighting and who not. The states within the ‘willing and
able’-category are few and well-known,7 and decisions on operations are
always made in capitals, not by IOs. Industrial security policy, however,
resembles ‘normal’ policy in that market rules play a role and that all
Western states may cooperate in this area.
Britain8 has traditionally resisted developing an EU security and
defence policy, seeing it as a competitor to NATO, challenge to the US,
and sometimes as a French strategic move against the US. However, in
the later 90s Britain played a key role in developing what was called an
‘autonomous military capacity’ in the EU. The reason for this was the
calculation that Britain could enhance its power in the EU by inserting
security and defence into the union—as Britain would play a key role
here, it could also ‘trade’ influence in this area for access to other areas.
Whether this was empirically true we do not know, but the fact is that
PM Blair believed that offering to play a constructive and leading role
in security and defence in the EU would imply that Britain’s influence
in other areas in the EU would increase.9 Thus, the main point was not
that the EU should rival NATO in any way, but that security and defence
could aid British policy standing in general at a time when it decided to
remain outside of the monetary union. The result of this policy was the
only tangible military asset that the EU has (but mostly has not used),
viz. the battle groups.10
The implication is twofold: One, Britain was instrumental in mak-
ing the only military capacity that the EU has ever had, viz. the battle
groups; and two, this example shows that state action is key in this policy
field. It was the direct result of British-French cooperation where they

‘added’ Germany afterwards.11
In NATO, the willing and able category basically consists of the US,
Canada, France, Britain, the Dutch, the Danes, Poles, and Norwegians.12
Contributions to war-fighting operations equal influence in NATO.13
In a study of NATO’s bureaucracy Mayer concludes that “treaty-based
international organizations do remain vital sources of legitimacy and val-
uable tools for coordinating multilateral operations. (This is) in agree-
ment with Matlary who contends that post-cold war NATO has been
transformed into a rather loose, yet useful and legitimacy-providing
arena for risk-willing members and partners”.14 To this must be added
that it is a general trend today that multilateral diplomacy carries less
importance than just some years ago, spear-headed by Trump’s ‘trans-
actional’ approach and the return of great power politics. The UN is
side-lined in world politics—to such an extent that presidents of Russia,
India, and China all elected not to address the UN General Assembly in
2017. As in the Cold War, the UN Security Council (UNSC) is largely
incapacitated by vetoes.
In sum, international cooperation, especially in the security and
defence area, is increasingly bilateral or based on coalitions among like-
minded states, outside or inside IOs. This makes it less likely that the
EU will develop a defence union, despite its leaders’ insistence to the
contrary.
EU Policy Proposals
As stated, at present we see a ‘push’ for defence union on the part of EU
leaders.
In terms of defence policy and strategy, the EU does not have ‘auton-
omous military capacity’, as it advocates the need for now. Yet such an
autonomy was announced already in 1998, in the so-called St. Malo dec-
laration by president Chirac and PM Blair (ref). In the EU, 13 battle
groups were decided in a bilateral Anglo-French cooperation scheme,
each with 1500 men and a deployment time of 6 days. They are multi
national and operate on a rotational basis. However, when we look at the
deployment of these battle groups, it came to a standstill in 2006 and
after this time neither France nor Britain seemed willing to ‘use’ the EU
as an arena for operations any longer. The battle groups are the closest
the EU has ever come to such autonomous capacity, and the irony is that
168 J. H. MATLARY
this very concept was a British idea to begin with. Britain and France
decided among themselves that this type of rapid intervention force was
ideal for the EU and proceeded to ‘sell’ the idea to the Germans in order
for them to be included and their support to be had.15 Yet the battle
groups have barely been deployed for all those years—about 15 years
since their inception—and they can therefore not be deemed a success
by any definition of the term. In fact, they must be deemed a failure. The
national interests in not deploying them account for this: the Germans
were politically unable to deploy the German battle group on rotation
in 2006 when it would have been needed in DR Congo and France has
to ‘rescue’ the Germans by executing the operation themselves under
the pro forma command of the German HQ in Potsdam, thereby letting
the Germans save face.16 PM Gordon Brown refused to use the battle
groups when he came into office in 2006 because he was much more
skeptical to the EU than his predecessor.17 Thus, the battle groups were
designed by the major states Britain and France, getting the Germans
onboard after the concept was fully developed.18 Yet the same states in
turn decided not to use them, all of which underlines the intergovern-
mental character of serious military activity and that only France seems to
have maintained a steady interest in the said ‘autonomous military capac-
ity’ of the EU.
However, the EU’s role may develop more in the industrial security
field. The attempt to rationalise spending on defence in Europe is an
old EU idea, stemming from the EDA that was also designed by France
and Britain in 2003 but which has never amounted to very much, given
its voluntary character. At the time there was a clear difference in policy
between the two states; the French favouring a centralised mechanism
that could impose military integration in R&D while the British saw
EDA as kind of a market facilitator where actors could meet and look for
ways to cooperate. What the current policy of a common defence fund
may become depends on national interest, but also on the role of the
Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The Commission
can act against state aids, and has recently struck against three cases of
such in the defence field (source). Defence markets are naturally highly
national and highly political, and should the Commission be able to take
on defence market actors in trying to force more market rules on them,
it would amount to something of a revolution.
On November 13th 23 member states of the EU signed a letter of
intent to form PECSO.19 In December the same year this was adopted
by the Council with 26 signatories. PESCO is intended as a binding

commitment to spend more wisely on defence by also integrating mil-
itary capacities. It is presented as something of a milestone by the
Commission, but when we look at the details, this is less supra-national
than what it appears to be, for national sovereignty is underlined in the
Commission’s description of the policy.20 PECSO is defined as being
about cooperating and investing more in defence:
What we are offering is a platform for joining investments, joining projects

and in this manner, overcoming the fragmentation that is characterizing
currently especially the environment of defence industry in Europe. In this
way, the European industrial framework in the sector of defence will be
enormously enabled to play a major role globally, and the European Union
would then be, I think, really a credible security provider globally.21
Thus, PECSO is not about operational military deployments but basi-

cally investigating whether European states can cooperate in procure-
ment, maintenance, and industrial policy. It defines itself as binding but
as said, underlines that capacities remain national and that sovereignty
is not compromised.22 It is thus clear that although PESCO is to be a
binding treaty it is not a supra-national mechanism. As underlined in the
Commission’s text on PESCO, military capacities remain national and
subject to national sovereignty.
Thus, PESCO is like a stronger version of EDA with more com-
mitment, but it is also similar to force registers in that states put their
national capacities on lists that are made available to NATO, the UN,
and perhaps the EU. PESCO is mainly intended to get ‘more bang for
buck’ in defence spending and hopes to diminish the number of planes,
tanks, etc. in Europe, the number of which is a major problem, especially
at times of increasing cost.
PESCO has been presented with much fanfare by the EU, but it really
contains little that is new or more binding than the old EDA which
was not a success. There are also similar processes in NATO where the
Americans have tried to get the Europeans to spend more but also to
spend more wisely on defence through common projects. The only
new element of the EU’s ‘second coming’ in this field is the money:
There will be an economic incentive in the new fund, EDF, which will
co-finance new products and projects if three or more states agree to
work together on common capacities. Funding for this is secured until
170 J. H. MATLARY
2020 at present, but this fund is not part of the normal EU budget and
will have to be included as a permanent item from this time onwards if it
is to survive. Yet the funds may work as an incentive for military integra-
tion, so this is a new policy that may have real impact.
PESCO is accompanied Co-ordinated Annual Review of Defence
(CARD) which builds on former initiatives in this field, the Capability
Development Mechanism of 1999 and the European Capability Action
Programme (ECAP). As a commentator puts it, “those two initiatives fell
by the wayside, largely because member states balked at the prospect of
revealing gaps in their national defence capacities”.23 This is an indica-
tion of the importance of sovereignty in this field. The CARD will use
the European Defence Agency (EDA) as the hub for annual reporting on
defence gaps—if states decide to open up about this.
In sum, the current EU process reminds the observer of similar pro-
cesses around the turn of the century. At that time the main actors were
France and Britain. At that time the two protagonists wanted military
action capability and designed the battle groups as well as the EDA.
Neither was a success. The battle groups were only used when France
was willing to take the real lead and the real risk, sometimes along with
the British. Operation Artemis in DR Congo in 2003 still stands as the
sharpest operation in EU history, but it is also the only one. When a
German battle group was on rotation some time later and there was a
need for it in Kinshasa, the Germans did24 not want to deploy to Africa
and France effectively took the lead. When Gordon Brown replaced
Tony Blair there was no further interest in an active role in the CSFP.
These examples show two things: One, the EU lacks a strategic-military
culture, and two, without national will nothing happens at the sharp end.
The ‘old’ EDA failed because member states were not willing to
integrate if it meant giving up sovereignty. Here the British model was
one of coordination as in a market place whereas the French was one of
top-down management. Perhaps the new initiatives will fare better, but
it does not bode well for them when we regard how difficult it is for
NATO members—members of a military defence alliance—to procure
wisely. In the NATO context there has been an ongoing process of find-
ing solutions to the ‘critical mass’-problem for smaller states for many
years, but even in NATO this has to be a bottom-up process, not a top-
down one. Yet NATO does not offer co-financing like the new EU fund.
The EDF is the innovative part of current EU proposals, and the
only element that is really new. The battle groups still exist, but are not
used—by 2018 12 years have passed since a battle group was deployed,
and this is such a long time that the policy of retaining these expensive
groups on rotation ought to be reviewed. The EDA has not amounted
to much either. The PESCO treaty is really only a renewed effort to con-
struct EDA, this time with money as an incentive. Perhaps this will work,
but even if so, none of these initiatives amount to a ‘defence union’ They
remain firmly within a ‘bottom-up’ policy, here dubbed ‘industrial’.
The EU’s Global Strategy: Devoid of Serious Strategic Thinking

In June 2016, the EU published its Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign
and Security Policy, its first strategic document since the 2003 European
Security Strategy (EES). The fact that 13 years passed before the
EU renewed its strategy document is significant because it shows that
strategy is not important in the EU. By comparison, NATO’s strate-
gic concepts are re-written with an interval of some few years and they
are structured around security and defence issues. The EU documents
in strategy deal with foreign policy in general terms although they also
emphasize defence issues. But if strategy guided EU policy in any way,
there would have been a need for regular strategy documents in the
organization.
Why, then, an EU strategy? The 2003 strategy was made in response
to the situation after Nine Eleven, in solidarity with the US. The answer
why there is now a need for another strategic document is that there are
new risks and threats in and around Europe that set the political agenda:
‘The purpose, even the existence, of our Union is being questioned…
Our wider union has become more unstable and more insecure…This is
no time for uncertainty: our Union needs a strategy’.25 Russian revision-
ism, Islamic terrorism, and mass migration shocks.
In terms of its style, the document is very general and very rhetorical,
using phrases like ‘this is no time for global policemen or lone warriors’
in the preface. It reads more like a pep talk promoting the virtues of the
EU than a precise analysis of the reasons why the EU should become a
strategic actor. It is not a profound document in terms of strategic inter-
action and it hardly mentions adversaries and how they interact strategi-
cally with the EU or Europe. This document, like its predecessor 13 year
back, is rather glib and superficial and not analytical.
The ter, ‘strategy’ in this document refers to policy, not strategic
interaction with enemies or adversaries; and the term is not primarily
172 J. H. MATLARY
concerned with the use of force. High Representative Mogherini makes

the claim that the EU needs ‘strategic autonomy’, but what this means
is never defined or explained. The scope of the document is general for-
eign policy itself: the EU will promote a secure Europe, foster societal
resilience (which is never defined) in states in the East and South, pro-
mote conflict resolution within all dimensions, develop a cooperative
regional order around Europe and do the same for international govern-
ance. These five policy themes are called the EU’s ‘vision’, and the docu-
ment goes on to say that in order to deliver on them, it must ‘invest in a
credible, responsive, and joined-up Union’. Such terms are usually what
politicians’ talks are full of, but one would expect a more serious and
analytical exercise when the author is the European Commission which
is based on expert knowledge. The strategic concepts in NATO are the
results of political processes and are as such, deeply marked by political
compromise, yet read as vastly superior to the EU strategy in terms of
analytic clarity and cohesion.
Exactly how the very general goals of the EU are to be reached is
never presented in any credible way: there is no presentation of Ways,
Ends, and Means to reach strategic goals. It is asserted that ‘the EU
will…guarantee the security of its citizens and territory’ and enhance its
defence, cyber, counterterrorism, energy, and strategic communications’.
Although the term ‘strategic autonomy’ is used several times in the doc-
ument, it is not explained even if this is the very key to what exactly the
EU’s ambition in this field is.
In addition to ‘joining up’ with other IOs, the EU is also going to
develop military capacity of its own: ‘NATO remains the primary frame-
work for most member states [yet] European security and defence efforts
should enable the EU to act autonomously while also contributing to
and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO’. Here one recog-
nizes that the battlegroups, the only existing autonomous EU capac-
ity, face both ‘procedural, financial, and political obstacles’ to being
deployed. The fact is that these groups have not been deployed since
2006, 13 years ago; as discussed above.
In sum, this strategy document does not amount to a strategy.26 It is
very superficial and styled as a pep-talk or perhaps, as some sort of pub-
lic diplomacy. It is disconcerting that the EU, being such an important
actor in foreign policy and the leading economic actor along with China
and the US in the world, can produce such an unprofessional strategic
document. I say this not because I think the EU will become a major
strategic actor, but because it is dangerous if the EU allows itself to pub-

lish something like this in all seriousness, because this shows how very
far the EU still is from being able to act according to the demands that
strategy imposes.
Compared to NATO’s strategic concepts, or its conclusions after the
2016 Warsaw summit, there is a world of difference in terms of precision
and clarity, although all these documents are the result of diplomatic bar-
gaining processes. The EU documents on strategy do not specify which
military capabilities the EU needs or the decision-making procedure for
deploying military force. There is no mention of deterrence or military
coercion.
The EU’s leadership—Commission President Juncker and for-
eign representative Mogherini—have repeatedly talked about the EU
becoming a ‘strategic actor’, developing a ‘defence union’, and getting
‘autonomous military action capacity’. Yet it is as if the seriousness of
these terms, what they imply, is unknown to these politicians. They never
define their terms: what do they really mean by e.g. ‘autonomous capac-
ity’? One or more brigades that can be deployed quickly? An airforce,
missiles? Sea power? Something that rivals NATO, in which case we
speak about vitally important changes in the transatlantic relationship? It
is the more alarming that such concepts are thrown around with great
ease by leaders in Europe when the latter do not seem to understand the
complexity of directing and using military force. The US defence sec-
retary James Mattis asked the EU for a clarification of what they meant
at the Munich security conference in February 2018.27 He received no
answer.
In conclusion, the EU will not develop a defence union as the term
is normally understood, and its understanding of what strategy entails is
not what is normally understood by that term. The more disconcerting
and confusing it is that its leadership invokes these terms increasingly.
I also listed France as a state that would opt against an EU defence
union that rivals NATO. This is of key importance, for France is the
architect behind what happens in the EU in security and defence policy:
The French Joker in the Deck

In November 2017 France published a major strategic document, the
Revue stratégique de défense et de sécurité nationale.28
174 J. H. MATLARY
On the EU’s role in security and defence, the review offers the fol-
lowing analysis: France wants to intensify the EU’s work in this field,
but describes the need for ‘pragmatic’ progress on this issue, a term
that means ‘whatever is possible’ when used in diplomacy.29 France is
undoubtedly the leading actor in developing the EU’s role in the secu-
rity and defence field, as it always has been. President de Gaulle wanted
European autonomy in hard security, and present-day French strat-
egy uses the same language, referring to ‘une autonomie stratégique
européenne’30 (a European strategic autonomy—my translation).
Importantly, being autonomous here does not mean rivalling NATO,
which is described as the key element of European security’.31
Yet France placed some weight on the defence clause of the Lisbon
Treaty, Article 42.6, which it invoked after the terrorist attacks on Paris
on 13 November, 2015. This little-known article is, in its wording, more
stringent in terms of alliance obligations than NATO’s Article 5 which
plays the pre-eminent role in Western deterrence. It is remarkable that
France invoked the former article and not the latter after it was attacked.
The case is similar to the 9/11 attack on Manhattan which elicited
NATO’s activation of Article 5 the next day; however, the French opted
to invoke the EU article instead. The reason is probably that France
wanted to underline the need for European solidarity in fighting terror-
ism which is not a NATO concern, but more of an EU issue, given that
it deals with domestic policy to a great extent.
France’s plans for the EU, as articulated in the review, are however
basically ‘bottom-up’ and voluntary. But there is a keen insistence that
the EU develop an autonomous strategic culture and the EU’s document
on strategy, adopted in 2016, is recognized.32 In the French strategic
review there is however no suggestion of an integrated defence union, a
‘top-down’ type of creation, but rather a pragmatic approach that allows
for individual participation in projects.
France does not want supra-nationality in EU defence, but rather, as
we have seen, to preserve national strategic autonomy. At the same time,
however, it wants much more streamlining of member states’ defence
policies in order to create a common actor capability in the EU. It is
clear that France is pursuing the old Gaullist vision of an EU that can act
alone and take its own initiatives, but not rivalling NATO. In this under-
standing, EU common action is important; but in this review France
outlines and describes various partnerships that it pursues and does not
challenge the primacy of NATO. Moreover, it underlines that the special
partnership with Britain is vitally important, as Britain is the only other

European state with a nuclear deterrent, a permanent seat on the UNSC,
a global scope, and global interests. Further, the US remains a vital link,
and there are other partners as well.
The key issue is the criterion of military cooperation that France cites:
“Dans la nouvelle Europe qui se dessine, la France doit proposer des partenar-
iats de défense ambitieux à ses partenaires, selon une logique différenciée, et
en priorité aux pays européens volontaires et capables” [In the new Europe
that is being drawn up, France can propose ambitious parternships with
its partners according to a logic of differentiation, prioritizing European
states that are willing and able] (my translation and emphasis).33 It is clear
that France prefers to cooperate with states that bring strategic and military
ability to the table along with interesting military capacities. This is also
discussed in detail in Faure’s chapter in this book.
In terms of military procurement, the EU programmes provide a use-
ful format, and France has developed detailed policy regarding what can
be integrated and shared and what must be kept under national control.
This is impressive, as few other states, if any, have such a clear view of
what sovereignty requires in this age of economic pressure for military
integration. A chart depicting French ambitions for technological and
industrial cooperation shows four different categories—areas that require
sovereign control; areas that involve cooperation with other states; areas
in which there is ‘mutual dependence’; and finally, areas that can be
market-based—and classifies capabilities in all five domains of defence
(land, air, sea, cyber, and space) into this matrix.34
From this analysis, it is very clear that the French place great value
on autonomous strategic ability, both in terms of decision-making inde-
pendence (from public opinion, parliament, and dependence on other
states) and in terms of owning and controlling vital military capabilities.
Moreover, France believes that their partners should match this strategic
autonomy—be able to decide on the use of force quickly and for strate-
gic reasons and have useful capabilities to bring to an operation.
Thus, France is not for a rival defence union to NATO, but wants to
make the Europeans into strategic actors that pay more for and integrate
more in their defence structures. Everything that France stands for in
this review is in conformity with British and American interests, unlike in
the time of de Gaulle. Whether France will rival the British in vying for a
‘special relationship’ with the US, remains to be seen—and to be decided
by the US, not by France.
176 J. H. MATLARY
In sum, France holds the key to the development of an EU defence

union and strategic role, but as we have seen, France distinguishes
between defence as ‘bottom-up’ industrial policy and defence policy as
strategic action. France intends the EU to act as a vehicle for more mil-
itary integration and modernization and the EDF is the major means
to this end. Unlike the Gaullist period, however, France today does not
pursue an EU policy in defence at the expense of NATO and the US. Its
requirements for operational military action are that partners are ‘willing
and able’ which limits the choice of partners to the few states in Europe
in this category. We can therefore conclude that France will continue to
promote military integration in Europe in terms of more rational R&D
and procurement systems, but not that it will seek to ‘beef up’ the battle
groups in order to create an EU intervention force.
Germany and the East-Central Europeans Do Not

Contribute to an EU Defence Union
This is the more likely since its major partner in the EU, Germany, has
made the unprecedented move of announcing that it will not reach the
2% GDP spending target in NATO.35 The defence minister Ursula von
der Leyen frankly admits that “we reached a low point in our defence
expenditure in 2015 with 1.1% of GDP…next year, in 2019, we will
probably reach 1.3%”. The official aim of Germany now is to reach
1.5% in 2025.36 Germany spends about the same amount on defence as
France—around 40 billion euroes per annum. This fact speaks volumes
about the difference in strategic priorities between the two countries—
Germany being the most populous and richest country in Europe
while France struggles economically and has about half the population.
Moreover, the operational readiness of the German armed forces is woe-
fully inadequate: none of sic submarines is combat-ready, only 9 out of
15 frigates were, and only 95 out of 244 tanks could be deployed in
battle, according to reports cited in The Times.37 As Saxi concludes in
his chapter, the main explanation for the lack of priority put on defence
in German politics remains “a deep-seated culture of anti-militarism
(that) continues to impair Germany’s use of military power in foreign
policy”.38 Thus, with regard to Germany, France does not have a like-
minded ally in building an EU defence union in the sense usually attrib-
uted to this concept.
Moreover, the member states in East-Central Europe are very wary

of anything resembling a rivalry of NATO. Poland, the Baltics, and
Romania are all extremely close to the US and rely on it for their security
guarantee, and they forge as close bilateral ties with the US as possible.
Both Poland and Romania are host nations for missile bases in the
NATO ‘shield’, a controversial move with regard to Russian reactions.
Also Denmark remains a very loyal ally of the US and will resist EU
moves in defence not favoured by the EU. In sum, there is no political
basis for a defence union in the EU today—much less so than in 2003
when Britain and France together launched the battle groups. Also, we
can safely assume that the US will not allow any duplication of NATO,
as indicated by defence secretary Mattis’ quest for clarification about EU
plans mentioned above.
Thus, we can conclude that the EU will not seek to replace NATO. Yet
its leaders talk as if they want to do this, and the Lisbon treaty’s art 42.6
is in its formulation even more binding than NATO’s art 5. Yet no state
relies on the 42.6 choice because there is no real security guarantee behind
it. Were it not so, neither Sweden nor Finland would have sought NATO
guarantees so eagerly, as discussed in Møller and Petersson’s chapter.
Criticism of Trump Does Not Lead

to an EU Defence Role
The anti-Trump sentiment in Europe is often assumed to result in a

strong defence role for the EU. Chancellor Merkel certainly talks like
this will happen, and the recent transatlantic disagreements over Iran
and Jerusalem are serious indeed. European states agree among them-
selves on both issues—to retain the Iran agreement and to keep Tel Avis
as Israel’s capital. Britain as well as France and Germany pleaded with
Trump to keep to the policy line pursued on both these issues. These
disagreements will however not result in a break between the US and
Europe in security and defence policy. Europe and the US conduct ‘trade
wars’ from time to time, as may be the case regarding Iran also, but these
interest-based conflicts do not spill over to defence. The same is true
for Middle East foreign policy interests: one may differ, but these issues
are not of existential importance to neither side and certainly not to the
Europeans that play no key role in the region compared to the US.
Given the above, will Brexit matter for Britain’s defence role?
178 J. H. MATLARY
Brexit Does Not Mean Exit? British Positions on EU

Defence
As discussed in the Introduction, the period after Brexit has been marked
by much emotion and lack of appreciation for the democratic choice of
the people, and perhaps also by general confusion on both sides of the
Channel since this is the first time a member state leaves the EU. The
exit-clause was activated by PM May in March 2017, and in the for-
mal letter there was mention of the field of security and defence as one
that may suffer as a result. A debate on this ensued in Britain: was this
a veiled threat? Or an argument in negotiations, a tit-for-tat proposal?
Should one point of how much the EU needs Britain at the outset of the
process?
After some time the British position seemed to have been reversed
regarding this. The PM’s Lancaster House speech on January 17th,
2017, had emphasized the need for future cooperation also in the secu-
rity and defence field, and in September the same year the emphasis in
her much-quoted Florence speech was on cooperation and finding “win-
win” solutions with the EU. She offered a sum of 20 billion pound as
‘down payment’ before negotiations started and full cooperation on
security and defence. A government white paper entitled Foreign policy,
defence and development: A future partnership paper was issued. It stated
that “the UK wants to build a new, deep and special partnership with the
EU” (my emphasis).39
The white paper lists British contributions to the EU’s CFSP, and
they are major ones: commanding operation Atalanta, leading contrib-
utor to Operation Sophia and the training of the Libyan coast guard, key
leadership roles in the EU operation Althea and to missions in Ukraine,
Georgia, Kosovo and Somalia; provision of operational HQs for EU bat-
tle groups and provided HQ at Northwood for an EU military exercise
in 2017, provides strategic airlift, inter alia to the French-led Operation
Barkhane in Mali, and drives progress on NATO-EU cooperation.
It goes on to list British assets in foreign and development policy, and
then to the key theme of what this new and special partnership should
look like:
This should be “deeper” than any such relationship in existence—
here Norway is an example with its participation in the battle groups
and in the EDA—but as said, the British want a deeper relationship than
this. It should also be “unprecedented”,40 defined as “breath-taking in
cooperation on foreign policy, defence and security, and development,

and in the degree of engagement that we envisage”.41 In particular, “the
EU and Britain should have close consultations on foreign and security
policy issues with the option to agree joint positions on foreign policy
issues”.42
On defence, the British want to contribute to the EU’s “Force
Catalogue”—which must be a way of participating in PESCO, dis-
cussed below. It is further suggested to work with the EU “during man-
date development and detailed operational planning”.43 Further, Britain
offers to work on the EU-NATO relationship where a clear division of
work is of paramount importance, as “NATO will continue to be the
cornerstone of our security”.44
On defence industrial development the British suggest that they par-
ticipate in EDA and their projects, the Commission’s EDF, and the
European Defence Research Programme and the European Defence
Industrial Programme. In short, the bid is for British participation to the
fullest in all EU foreign, security, and defence policy.
In the paper’s conclusion it is very clearly spelt out that Britain wants
to continue the existing relationship with the EU and expand it, empha-
sizing the mutual interests of the EU and the British side. “What the
UK is offering will be unprecedented in its breath….45 and in its depth,
in terms of the engagement…the UK’s ambition is to work as closely as
possible with the EU”.
This White Paper is adamant that Britain be involved to the fullest
extent possible in everything that develops in the EU in the security and
defence field. This can be interpreted in three ways: First, as a rather
desperate move by a demandeur in negotiations where the EU is the
stronger party; second, as a negotiating move in the area where the EU
needs Britain the most; and third, as a nice gesture with little real impor-
tance since EU defence policy will not mean much and Britain therefore
has nothing to lose by being conciliatory towards the EU in this field.
The truth is probably a combination of motives one and three: Britain
is the demandeur in the Brexit negotiations but it does not fear that the
EU will all of a sudden compete with NATO and the US’s predominance
in Europe. Therefore, it is ‘risk-free’ to associate itsdel with everything
the EU does, and such association may also entails a possibility to influ-
ence EU developments. The old adage that there should be no dupli-
cation with NATO’s primacy is still of key importance: whatever the
EU does in this field, it must complement and not challenged NATO.
180 J. H. MATLARY
What France thinks about this is very important as it is the main actor on
defence in Europe besides Britain. Britain’s position s crystal-clear: The
transatlantic relationship should continue and prevail—the US through
NATO guarantees Europe’security—in close cooperation with Britain.
Britain has nothing to lose and much to gain by being fully associated
with the EU’s development in security and defence—by being a player,
it can influence, at least indirectly, and by being “willing and able”, gain
positively in the EU. Britain certainly knows that the EU needs it and
not vice versa in this field, and in this respect the situation is similar to
Tony Blair’s ideas back twenty years ago when he inserted Britain in
EU policy in this field. He wanted to gain influence by being willing
to cooperate in the main field of strength for Britain. At that time he
wanted to compensate for the lack of participation in the Euro; now
Britain wants to compensate for leaving the EU as well as to ensure that
EU security and defence policy does not rival that of NATO. In short,
Britain has everything to gain and nothing to lose by being willing to
participate in all aspects of EU security and defence policy.
During the Brexit negotiations that finally started at the end of 2017
and really only got underway in 2018 defence and security played lit-
tle if any role. From the British side the position was extremely open, as
detailed above: Britain offered its full cooperation on all aspects of EU
foreign and security policy. On the EU side, however, the tone was very
different. The Commission’s negotiation stance was marked by a ‘zero-
sum’ strategy, both in economic affairs as well as in the few instances
where security issues were relevant. For instance, the EU’s chief negoti-
ator Michel Barnier even suggested that Britain could not remain part of
the important Galileo satellite programme after leaving the EU.46 This
was a very hostile move by the EU, as the argument was that Britain
could not be trusted with the handling of sensitive data because British
companies bidding for contracts under the space programme would be
outside EU legislative control. “To justify this by claiming that the EU
may not be able to trust Britain with information is obviously absurd”,
writes The Times reporter.47 Britain has contributed 12% of the develop-
ment cost of Galileo but is confronted with a threat to exclude it from all
contracts, many of which were to be awarded in 2018. Britain found this
to be very unreasonable, but Mr. Barnier replied that “the UK decided
unilaterally and autonomously to withdraw from the EU. This implies
leaving its programmes as well”.48 Yet he also wanted Britain to continue
to pay into the EU’s development programmes for overseas aid.49
The British response to this is to aim at developing its own satellite

program with allies like Australia, according to The Times.50 This may
be a response to the EU’s tough negotiating strategy. The ‘tit-for-tat’
response is a logical one, given the unfriendly EU stance.
At the time of writing in mid-2018, the Brexit negotiations are so far
not very promising for Britain. It has offered a ‘win-win’ position from
the very beginning, albeit unsure of what kind of trade regime it wants,
but in the security and defence field the British position has been one of
maximum cooperation with the EU. On the EU side there has been little
interest in this, but it must be added that this policy field has not figured
much in the talks. Yet the Galileo case shows that the EU prefers to play
‘hardball’. This can only imply that Britain seeks alternative arrangements
with partners, and such a position also implies that the EU weakens its
own defence union possibilities.
Moreover, the EU Commission seemed to agree that Britain cannot
participate in the EDF, according to The Telegraph’s reporting on May
28th, 2018.51
Conclusions: EU’s Defence Prospects

Dimmer Than Before
The way to assess the likelihood of whether such lofty proposals as
a defence union in the EU may actually materialize is to look at the
requirements for substance that they entail. Russia cannot be deterred
unless one is able and willing to do so militarily. One cannot control a
border without sensors, police, intelligence, and enough man power on
site.
The EU does not have any record of rapid deployment in sharp oper-
ations, of real control of its outer border (Schengen) or of anti-terror
measures. It is therefore clear that the envisioned defence union is a chi-
mera. Where the EU can harmonise and cooperate is in R&D, procure-
ment, and perhaps common capacities, but there are NATO processes
in this area as well as coalitions like NORDEFCO and the Northern
Group. Thus, the only ‘added value’ of the new EU package of three ini-
tiatives (CARD, EDF, PESCO) is the money for co-financing.
The British show keen interest in participating in all aspects of EU
foreign, defence and security policy, as the White paper discussed above
shows. This keenness could hardly be overstated: one wants a deeper,
broader, and indeed a very special partnership. When analyzing these
182 J. H. MATLARY
recent EU proposals, such cooperation should be feasible and uncon-

troversial on both sides. The EU policies proposed do not contain any
strategy for defence, be it military operations or deterrence or defence of
Europe. They therefore do not challenge the role of NATO and transat-
lantic primacy. The fact that the EU would like to develop what is called
a defence union in the long run remains conjecture, not underpinned by
real military planning or strategy.
The EU can however act as a civilian power, on a logic of market har-
monization: It makes sense to spend more wisely, to integrate in R&D,
to develop common defence capacities. This is a continuation of the
planning processes of the EDA where networked information and the
creation of a semblance of a market place might lead to more rational
economic policy-decisions. If Britain is not part of this work, the EU
loses a lot, as Britain is the leading defence industrial actor in Europe.
And the British would like to participate, probably on the logic that
when leaving the EU, one must compensate as much as possible. This is
what led Norway not only to making the EEA agreement on participa-
tion in the internal market, but also to full participation in EDA and in
the Nordic battle group.
In sum, it would seem very clear that both the EU and Britain would
benefit from a ‘special partnership’ with the EU. For Britain this implies
a possibility of influencing the development of the EU initiatives, not
least making sure that they do not compete with NATO. It also provides
Britain with another arena in which to play a leading role. However, the
greatest advantage accrues to the EU, for Britain is and remains a vital
security and defence actor in Europe: It is among the biggest spenders
on R&D in defence along with France and Germany: together they rep-
resent more than 90% of total spending. Clearly the EU should not want
to lose Britain as it now enhances its role in this area through PESCO,
CARD, and the EDF. The “removal of UK defence capabilities for the
EU inventory..represents a considerable dimunition of collective EU
defence capability that some estimate will be reduced by a quarter”.52
While there is a need to find new modalities for Britain’s participa-
tion in all these defence and security configurations there is little doubt
that the EU needs Britain more than vice versa in this field. This is why
Tony Blair changed British EU policy in this field back in 1998 when he
signed the St. Malo declaration with France on the development of EU
military capacity. He realized that the EU needed Britain in this policy
area and that contributions here would bring influence. Now that Britain
is leaving the EU there is no general influence to be had as a ‘side-effect’

of a strong presence in EU security and defence policy, but I would
argue that such a presence nonetheless brings good-will and influence
beyond EU formal meetings where Britain no longer will be at the table.
As such, the argument of Blair still holds.
The role that Britain can play in influencing the direction of EU secu-
rity and defence policy also matters, in fact it is vital in the sense that
competition NATO-EU must be avoided. The US under Trump has
received major criticism in Europe, especially from the EU’s president
Tusk and German chancellor Angela Merkel. The dismay over Trump is
a direct cause of much of the talk about autonomous EU defence pol-
icy and defence union. Russia revisionism is another cause. The ‘benign’
development of the EU in this policy area is that it complements and
does not challenge NATO in any way: NATO and therefore US primacy
in Europe remains. Germany is in two minds about American security
dependence for the time being. British influence in EU security and
defence policy can ensure that the division of labour between NATO
and the EU remain as it has been so far: NATO is the serious defence
actor based on art 5 solidarity, it does ‘the heavy lifting’; whereas the EU
tries to develop security policy for second order issues such as terrorism,
migration shocks, and procurement improvement. Importantly, France is
likely to side with Britain and the US in this.
The EU is not a unitary actor and cannot mimick one by acting
through a small ‘directoire’. NATO has one actor which is of para-
mount importance and some few others that form an inner core: The
US, Britain, France, Holland, Poland, Norway and Denmark make up
the able and willing in war-fighting. The importance of like-mindedness
and the ability to act quickly and conduct operations together cannot be
underestimated when we talk about strategic action such as deterrence,
coercion, and military operations. This is not the type of security and
defence policy that the EU will be able to conduct and it should not
pretend that it will develop a so-called ‘defence union’ unless that term
means something very different from normal usage.
Britain will have to develop the terms of its role in the various EU
defence initiatives, including Europol, but there is no reason why it
should achieve the special partnership it wishes for as this is in the EU
interest. But as we have seen above, the case of Galileo indicates the
opposite. The EU continues to pursue a ‘zero-sum’ negotiating strategy
over Brexit in general, also in the defence area where it needs Britain.
184 J. H. MATLARY
Notes
1. I know this from my own experience, being deputy foreign minister in the
1990s.
2. Statement at the Leangkollen defence conference, Oslo, February 2017,
reported in Security Brief 2-2017 from the convener, the Norwegian
Atlantic Committee, p. 1.
3. Ibid., p. 2.
4. 2016 find title.
5. Foreign affairs MEPs want the EU to respond faster and more robustly
to real threats, which they say requires European armed forces to work
together better. “Two thirds of EU citizens would like to see greater EU
engagement in matters of security and defence,” says the text, referring to
June 2016 Eurobarometer survey.
6. Commission report on EU defence Union.
7. See e.g. J.H. Matlary and M. Petersson (2013) NATO book.
8. From here onwards this chapter (the discussion of EU policy and the dis-
cussion of France) contain some excerpts from my chapters on the EU,
Britain, and France in my book Hard Power in Hard Times: Can Europe
Act Strategically? Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, UK.
9. See e.g. my book Security Policy in the European Union: In the New
National Interest, Palgrave Macmillan, paperback 2013.
10. J.H. Matlary, In the New National Interest: EU Security Policy Dynamics,
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, paperback edition 2013.
11. See Matlary, op.cit., for details on this political process.
12. A former Norwegian NATO ambassador tells the story of how the
Belgian ambassador always took the floor in debates, opining on this
or that. Belgium is a very small military actor. Once he overheard the
American ambassador say to the British: “So What Do They Contribute?”
13. See the discussion in Matlary and Petersson (2013).
14. “Conclusion: NATO’s Transformed Vision of Security”, Sebastian Mayer,
pp. 309–310, in Mayer (ed) (2014), NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics. The
Changing Provision of Security, Palgrave Macmillan.
15. Matlary, op.cit., 2013.
16. Ibid.
17. Details about this are found in my book European Union Security
Dynamicsi op.cit.
18. Ibid.
19. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/11/13/
defence-cooperation-23-member-states-sign-joint-notification-on-pesco/.
20. Op.cit.
21. Mogherini at a summit in Latvia on September 7th, 2017.
22. Fact Sheet on PESCO, European Commission, November 13th, 2017.

23. R. Beckmann and R. Kempin (2017), “EU Defence Policy Needs a
Strategy”, September, SWP Comment.
24. Matlary, J.H. European Union Security Dynamics: In the New National
Interest, op.cit.
25. Introduction to the 2016 strategy by f. Mogherini, the EU’s High
Representative for External Affairs.
26. “EU-Kommission: Europa kann militarische macht warden”, FAZ, June
12th, 2017.
27. FAZ, February 15th, 2018.
28. This document, which was ordered by the new president, Macron, is
shorter than the white paper, but it presents an updated view of threats
and risk and was ordered by the new president Macron.
29. Ibid., pp. 59–60, numbers 185–189.
30. Ibid., see heading on p. 58: La construction d’une autonomie strategique
europeenne.
31. Ibid., p. 60.
32. “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: Global Action
for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy”, EU Commission,
adopted by the member states in June, 2016.
33. Ibid., p. 63: “In the new security architecture that is developing France
will propose various formats for integration to various states according to
the criterion of the ‘willing and able’”.
34. Ibid., p. 69.
35. “Germany Admits It Will Miss NATO Spending Target”, The Times, May
15th, 2018, David Charter, Berlin correspondent.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid. (No further source is provided for these statistics).
38. Saxi, here, p. 17 (in draft).
39. HM Government, September 2017 (date?).
40. Ibid., p. 18.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid, p. 19.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p. 22.
46. “By Threatening to Exclude Britain from the Galileo Satellite Programme,
Brussels Is Playing Games with European Security”, The Times, May 9th,
2018, and “EU Warns UK ‘Cannot Be Trusted’ with Sensitive Data”,
The Telegraph, April 21st, 2018.
47. Ibid.
48. Reuters, May 14th, 2018.
186 J. H. MATLARY
49. Ibid.
50. The Times, “RAF Takes Control in Space”, May 21st, 2018.
51. The Telegraph, May 28th, 2018, The Commission shuts Britain out of the
defence fund.
52. RAND Europe, Defence and Security After Brexit: Understanding the
Possible Implications of the UK’s Decisions to Leave the EU. Black, J. et al.,
2017, Cambridge, UK.
PART II
Britain’s Coalitions
CHAPTER 8
Britain’s Joint Expeditionary Force:

A Force of Friends?
Tormod Heier
Introduction
This chapter analyses the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) effort to forge closer
ties with smaller states in Northern Europe. The Joint Expeditionary
Force (JEF) manifests UK’s quest for integrating more troops into its
command structure, but partners’ favourable view of this concept may
also have a negative impact on Britain’s leadership role in Europe. The
chapter argues that the JEF is a concept born of economic necessity for
the UK and for its partner states, but for different reasons: While the UK
sees the JEF as a ‘gap-filler’ for independent action, partner states see the
JEF as a key arena for ‘networking,’ in case military reinforcements should
be required on short notice. Russian assertiveness in Europe and beyond
as well as uncertainty on where the US administration under president
Donald Trump may go, underscore these sentiments even more.
At its core, the JEF offers a coherent multinational framework for
exploiting the fruits of political partnership and military jointness. The
small states of the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and the three Baltic
T. Heier (*) 
Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway

190 T. HEIER
countries, as well as Sweden and Finland—a ‘cluster of eight’ trusted

partners that benefit from relations forged diplomatically, historically,
politically and militarily—have been invited into the UK chain of com-
mand.1 The idea behind the JEF, introduced by Chief of Defence Staff
(2009–2013) General Sir David Richards in 2012, is to create ‘a frame-
work into which others fit’.2 Seeking a deeper integration than previ-
ously achieved,3 the JEF exceeds the ambition of the 2010 UK-French
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). While the CJTF has a combined
command structure,4 the JEF partners are to operate ‘embedded’ under
British command.5 This means that the UK and its partner states will
integrate operations across the domains of air, sea and land.
As the key pillar of any UK operation abroad, economic ambitions of
‘doing more with less’ may impact Britain’s independence. This is worth
scrutinising because while such rhetoric is often used to display politi-
cal vigour, strategic vision and statesmanship, it often conceals many
vulnerabilities. Called ‘a force of friends’ by the UK’s Secretary of State
for Defence (2014–2017) Sir Michael Fallon,6 the JEF follows a broader
pattern of British forces gradually becoming more ‘international by
design’.7 The Strategic Defence and Security Review introduced ‘defence
engagement’ as a core military task for the first time in 2015,8 ensuring
that partnerships will become ‘central to all that we do’.9 Britain’s 2016
decision to leave the European Union incentivised bilateral partnerships
even more, a point elaborated in more detail by Haaland Matlary in her
chapter. The UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy, which
was a ‘strategic handrail’ in the initial JEF period,10 makes the point
that ‘strong alliances and partnerships are more important than ever’.11
Unilateral deployments are meant to be the exception rather than the
rule.12 As this chapter argues, this change is not because the UK wants a
more multinational approach, even though shared interests is portrayed
as the primary factor. Due to critical force reductions and chronic eco-
nomical shortcomings within the British Armed Forces, the change is
rather out of necessity.
Using Norway as a case study, this chapter seeks answers to the fol-
lowing two questions: what are the motives for the JEF as seen from
both a UK and a partner state perspective and what impact might differ-
ent motives have on the UK’s leadership role in Europe? It begins with a
categorisation of Britain’s partner states and a short overview of existing
research, moves on to present UK and Norwegian perspectives and ends
with conclusions with regard to the UK’s leadership role in Europe.
8 BRITAIN’S JOINT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE: A FORCE OF FRIENDS? 191
Categorising the JEF’s Cluster of Eight

Using Norway as a case to generalise about JEF partner states’ motives
is not without problems. Indeed, each partner state is unique. Some are
NATO members, others are EU members and some are both. Moreover,
their cooperation will likely be tested by divergent strategic aims as
dictated by geopolitical vulnerabilities to Russia. For example, whilst
Finland, Norway and the Baltic states share a border with Russia, the
geographical position of other states such as Sweden, Denmark and the
Netherlands creates differing strategic imperatives. As another example,
Finland, Sweden and Norway attempt to maintain a nationally balanced
defence force, whilst other countries, such as the Netherlands, Denmark
and the Baltic states, have abandoned this ambition. Finally, Denmark,
Norway and the Netherlands are Atlantic and maritime oriented, whilst
Sweden, Finland and the Baltics are more focused towards the ‘heart-
land’. Geography matters.
As far as the JEF is concerned, three commonalities make the ‘clus-
ter of eight’ a sufficiently homogeneous group. First, in the event of a
bilateral dispute, episode or crisis with Russia, all of the abovemen-
tioned states would suffer from political, diplomatic and military infe-
riority. Their negotiating power, defined as their diplomatic room for
manoeuvre,13 becomes considerably larger once they join a broader
operational framework such as the JEF. Second, these states also suf-
fer from serious shortcomings in their national defence structures. Lack
of resilience makes time a critical factor. Therefore, in the event of a
bilateral crisis with Russia, all of these states will reach out for consul-
tations and prospects for reinforcements among larger powers. These
factors are of particular importance, because neither military assistance
nor serious consultations can be based upon ad hoc considerations. Nor
can they be made on the eve of action, or when a crisis may or may not
turn into a war.14 Credible reinforcements or consultations can neither
be trusted nor expected to be accomplished on a timely basis. Hence,
as in the case of Sweden and Finland, consultations or subtle expecta-
tions of reinforcements from the West cannot even be mentioned for fear
of Russian reactions or domestic turmoil.15 Swedish and Finish charac-
teristics are explored in more detail throughout Møller and Petersson’s
chapter. Nevertheless, no matter how the member of the cluster defines
their national security interests, being part of a British chain of com-
mand extends its room for manoeuvre. Although JEF is a framework for
192 T. HEIER
a rapidly deployable multinational force, capable of conducting the full

spectrum of operations, including conventional deterrence, warfighting,
crisis management, security cooperation and humanitarian assistance,
there is no denying that for Northern Europe Russia is the defining
parameter for the JEF.
Previous Research
A vast amount of literature has been devoted to the broader phenom-
enon of partnerships and defence engagement. In its essence, defence
engagement is about coping with chronic austerity and exploiting scarce
resources more effectively. This is particularly so among like-minded
states that suffer from the same problem. Indeed, the average cost of
sophisticated warfighting materiel increases 3–5% above annual infla-
tion. This means that the UK, like all other states, suffers from a steady
decline in absolute defence spending (unless the inflation is compensated
by an annual growth in the defence budget of 3–5% each year, which in
the case of the UK has been set to 0.5%).16 As a result, partnerships have
become an essential prerequisite for defence funding because national
forces such as logistics, medical services and maintenance, cannot be
scaled down at the same rate as a mechanised division or an aircraft car-
rier group.17 In relative terms, therefore, the overhead costs for the few
remaining combat units increase, which again undermines states’ ability
to maintain a sovereign force.
The wider implications that derive from this logic are often neglected,
particularly when it comes to constraints on independent action. Being
confined to policy, so-called pooling and sharing tends to ignore the
unpredictable dynamics arising from like-minded states going to war or
dealing with a crisis for different reasons. Much research has been done
on national constraints in ‘out-of-area’ operations.18 Important insights
have also been made by a plethora of think-tanks, including numerous
accounts of how to ‘streamline and focus [defence] efforts’, and what
‘the best chance of success will be’.19 But the literature seldom discusses
force integration in a context of national peril. It thereby fails to unveil
the unpredictable and dynamic interaction between sovereign patrons
and dependent clients, all of which face the same dilemma: avoiding cri-
ses that are too big to handle alone, but too small or too serious for a
patron to engage in.
Putting Britain’s defence engagement into a context defined by

states bordering Russia allows us to scrutinise the JEF in a contempo-
rary, authentic and realistic environment. This is a context where part-
ner states’ expectations of British solidarity are pitted against Whitehall’s
demands for flexibility and freedom of action. It is a context where
national priorities become more pressing, and thus more important
than solidarity and collective ideals. Under such circumstances, the JEF
becomes a mechanism by which partner states’ interests are funnelled
through the chain of command to impact British priorities and British
courses of action. This context allows us to challenge the political expec-
tations of like-mindedness, mutual trust and cohesiveness. Such expec-
tations are often used to describe deeper partnerships to the public, but
which often seem to be exercises in political rhetoric rather than to con-
vey any real substance.20
That said, the JEF is designed to complement NATO and if a cri-
sis escalates to collective defence and ‘Article 5,’ the JEF may offer a
‘phase 0’ undertaking with follow-on NATO forces replacing them in
due course. The operational perspective of such an endeavour is scruti-
nised in more detail in Cantrill and Lockwood Meyer’s chapter. But such
operations are not without challenges, because few states welcome other
states’ access to their command structure unless they are forced to. In
the political debate however, this kind of dependence is sometimes por-
trayed as positive. Britain’s pamphlet, Joint Expeditionary Force (2017),
advocates ‘to pack a more powerful punch’ for UK security.21 However,
the substance and reliability of such statements are seldom thoroughly
discussed. Nor are these statements challenged within a context where
British partners are facing an existential crisis and are forced to make
harsh choices ‘here and now’. The extent to which the UK and its part-
ners are able to provide a ‘powerful punch’ under such circumstances
remains an open question.
A viable strategy for any JEF member is therefore to get ‘more out
of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest’.22 For
Britain, this means that each partner in the JEF will regard the British
command structure as a potential ‘force multiplier’ in the event of a
bilateral crisis with Russia. Lawrence Freedman’s definition of strategy
as ‘the art of creating power’ is thus suitable to our case. It allows us
to go beyond the narrow perception borrowed from Clausewitz, where
‘clashes between opposing wills’ mainly occur between friends and
foes.23 On the contrary, as the UK and its partner states have entered
194 T. HEIER
the JEF for different reasons, ‘fog and friction’ will also arise within a
‘force of friends’. As Britain’s Armed Forces have become ‘international
by design’, a point scrutinised even more in Johnson’s chapter, the impli-
cations of deeper partnerships are worth scrutinising.
The ‘Gap-Filling’ Motive

The JEF can be seen as a British ‘gap-filling’ instrument that addresses
the dual pressures of financial austerity and demand for more forces. By
inviting smaller states into the chain of command, Britain can fill short-
ages of personnel, material or critical competence and deploy a cohesive
force on short notice. Showing regional leadership on this issue allows
the UK to maintain unity of command and sustain an independent force,
thereby avoiding a more complicated dual leadership model, as in the
shared UK–French CJTF framework. While the UK–French relationship
is explored in more detail in Faure’s chapter, the ‘gap-filling’ motive in
this chapter can be explained by structural and process-based factors.
Structure refers to the physical presence of land, sea and air forces. By
contrast, process refers to acts by which a force’s physical presence trans-
lates into a tangible political outcome; this rests on skills, competencies
and experiences that are ingrained in the military profession.24
With regard to structure, reductions in forces, the suspension of pro-
curement programmes and the elimination of entire platforms have
created severe capability gaps in Britain’s Armed Forces. Even though
Britain’s 2015 defence budget was the world’s fifth largest,25 and there
was a desire to maintain a full spectrum force, the UK’s sovereign force
for conventional high intensity operations has eroded. In written evi-
dence presented to the House of Commons, the deputy director-general
of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Professor Malcolm
Chalmers, pointed out that Britain’s military capabilities are ‘now pri-
marily designed to be used as contributions to collective operations,
rather than in defence of uniquely national interests’.26 By inviting
‘gap-fillers’ into the command structure, the JEF facilitates higher readi-
ness and better sustainability throughout operations. Additional capacity
from other states not only strengthens Britain’s legitimacy on the eve of
a deployment, but also makes the tactical performance more agile. The
integration of partner-state capabilities at the bottom end of the chain
of command has boosted a force that suffered a 30% reduction in real
defence spending between 1985 and 2015.27 It allows British force com-
manders to better exploit synergy among a broader range of mutually
reinforcing platforms they cannot muster alone.
Hence, whereas during the 1990s and 2000s British forces were cus-
tomised for small-scale operations, today’s force structure faces a larger
and more conventional adversary in a much larger area of operations.28
The reconfiguration towards large-scale conventional operations has
made ‘gap-filling’ more precarious. The fact that approximately 95% of
UK trade is shipped and that the UK has become a net energy importer
from the mid-2000s,29 puts a higher demand on a larger force with more
sustainability in the North Atlantic. There is thus a greater demand for
access to ‘gap-filling’ capabilities that the UK cannot provide itself (i.e.
more personnel, navy vessels, maritime air patrol aircraft or submarines).
The availability of only 19 frigates and destroyers and the expected annual
delivery of only one new frigate every year from 2023, is described by the
Parliamentary Defence Committee as ‘woefully low’ and ‘challenging’.30
With regard to process, the lack of critical expertise, skills and compe-
tence may also explain the UK’s motive for establishing the JEF. By more
systematically pooling other states’ knowledge into a British chain of
command, UK forces get access to regional expertise in potential areas of
operations: for example, how Russian submarines exploit the various lay-
ers of saltwater under ice caps or in Norwegian fjords; how brackish water
affects anti-submarine warfare skills in the Baltic; or how snow and ice
affect soldiers’ combat skills in Sweden and Estonia. Britain’s shortcoming
in these areas, which represent an essential element for UK forces’ sur-
vivability and combat efficiency, became particularly evident during cold
weather training in Norway in the mid-2000s. Following a Royal Marines
exercise in 2004, more than 125 troops were evacuated back to the UK
with frostbite and injuries.31 ‘Gap-filling’ allows British commanders, staff
officers and personnel at all levels to rebuild skills that had been ingrained
during the Cold War. It thus allows a new generation of British officers to
relearn the characteristics of its primary area, which is the North Atlantic
operational space. What is the evidence for this motive?
What Is the Evidence for ‘Gap-Filling’?

Among the most reliable sources are speeches and interviews with the
two Commanding JEF Generals, Sir David Richards (2012) and Major
196 T. HEIER
General Stuart Skeates (2017), as well as a 2013 non-paper from the

UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) and information retrieved from officers
in the JEF Headquarters and in the UK MoD (2017). All sources
seem to resonate with the UK’s International Defence Engagement
Strategy, which considers partnerships increasingly important to sustain
independence.32
A key consideration raised by General Richards (Chief of Defence
Staff 2012–2014) was to retain Britain’s ‘influence and status within
NATO and amongst key allies’.33 Five years later, this imperative had
increased in importance as the UK decided to leave the EU. According
to General Skeates, the UK could now display a clearer leadership role in
Europe and act as a framework nation that—‘in addition to the United
States’—could provide substantial capabilities to Europe and beyond.34
The two generals also argued that the conceptual thinking on how influ-
ence should be gained would have to change. According to General
Richards’ speech from 2012, the 8% defence cut in the Strategic Defence
and Security Review (SDSR) 2010 had made British forces ‘more vulner-
able and less able to respond in a confident and timely manner’.35 The
JEF should therefore be regarded as an instrument to ‘squeeze the most
from resources available’.36 Explaining how the JEF could create synergy,
General Skeates underscored the importance of shared interests in the
North Atlantic and in the Baltic Sea Region. This incentivised a regional
pooling of key platforms, such as medium-range air defence capabil-
ities, strategic lift, joint fires and vessels for command and control.37
Similar sentiments were also echoed in e-mail correspondence with the
UK MoD; as partner states’ staff officers have been embedded in the
Permanent Joint Force Headquarters, ‘military engagement between
partner nations will be considered “business-as-usual”’.38
A more focused approach that goes beyond the UK-French CJTF
can thereby proceed, because—as General Skeates has pointed out—
‘discussions on who is in charge become less contentious; […] it is eas-
ier to work with smaller states in the JEF’.39 This was also confirmed
further down in the chain of command. According to the chief of staff
at the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) at Northwood,
Colonel Richard Cantrill, the CJTF seems to be more politically driven,
more about the bilateral relationships than a combined response to
any particular threat. The JEF, however, seems to be a more ‘bot-
tom-up’ approach based upon military experiences from collaboration in
Afghanistan and elsewhere.40 This is consistent with General Richards’
expectation that like-minded states that had ‘fought with distinction’

under British command in Afghanistan would join.41 Moreover, by
emphasising sustainability, a gradual disintegration of combat efficiency
could be avoided through a more comprehensive pooling of regional
forces. Richards’ admonition that ‘numbers, or mass, still matter’, was
explicitly echoed by General Skeates. In the context of 2017, it was
important that Europe was able to muster a more resilient force, pref-
erably also a non-US coalition: ‘nine nations will obviously bring more
capabilities into the theatre than one nation alone’.42 Thus, as pointed
out by the British defence attaché to Norway and Iceland, Lieutenant
Colonel Andy Walker from the Royal Marines, such a force would also
mean that Russia would have to take nine states into consideration rather
than one.43
According to the two JEF-commanders, more updated ‘regional
expertise’ could also be incorporated into the command structure.44 This
would not only ‘create opportunities for soldiers and officers to progress
their career through linguistic and cultural specialism’,45 it would also,
according to General Skeates, funnel more regional skills and operative
experiences into the planning and execution of operations.46 Real syn-
ergy, therefore, requires British forces to forge deeper links with like-
minded partner states so that they can, in the words of General Richards,
‘act in partnership with us’.47 As Colonel Richard Cantrill points out,
this synergy is exploited on a daily basis through a more ‘common
approach in doctrines, techniques and procedures’.48
An important aspect of synergy was also how the smaller partner states
could be ‘appropriately incorporated’.49 Referring to the CJTF, where
command was shared, the British MoD now revised its ambition for the
JEF. In the quest for more synergetic partnerships, the ‘integration of
allied components’ into the chain of command was a fundamental pre-
requisite for operational success.50 This was also underscored by General
Skeates: ‘our partners’ staff officers are not liaison officers, but truly
embedded in the command structure’.51
Following the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the desire for closer partnerships
increased further. According to Commander Joint Forces Command
(2013–2016) General Richard Barrons, crucial parts of the British force
suffered from shortcomings that were ‘foundational to all major armed
forces’.52 By 2017, the Armed Forces were ‘on the verge of institu-
tional failure’.53 Similar sentiments were also voiced by Commander
Allied Maritime Command (2013–2015) Admiral Peter Hudson and the
198 T. HEIER
director of military sciences at RUSI, Dr. Peter Roberts. Both claimed

that British forces lacked critical resilience and expertise; the Royal Navy,
in particular, was ‘poorly placed to fulfil those subconscious assumptions
of dominance [in the North Atlantic] which shaped the DNA of the ser-
vice for centuries’.54 Protracted counterterrorist and counterinsurgency
operations in the post-Cold War era had been detrimental to specialist
skills and techniques. This had resulted in a steep decline in what used to
be ‘ingrained competence’ in conventional high-intensity warfare.55
Statements made by Sir Michael Fallon upon the signing of the initial
memorandum of understanding for the JEF in 2015 resonate with the
military admonitions. For example, his comment that ‘the JEF enables
us to share knowledge, skills and resources and deploy our joint forces in
a fast, flexible and integrated manner’56 is explicitly tied to the increas-
ing demand for ‘gap-fillers’ that arose throughout 2015 and 2016. By
reinvigorating the maritime patrol cooperation with Norway, Sir Michael
claimed that the partnership would ‘help keep Britain safer and more
secure’. This also meant that Norwegian forces, such as F-35 fighters,
P-8 maritime patrol aircraft or new submarines in the North Atlantic
could ‘further increase the protection of the UK’s nuclear deterrent and
our two new aircraft carriers’.57 This vulnerability had become explicitly
acute in 2015. While searching for a suspected Russian submarine incur-
sion outside the home port of Britain’s nuclear base in Faslane, Scotland,
British forces had to request assistance from US maritime patrol aircraft.
Britain’s anti-submarine capacity had, according to Hudson and Roberts,
deteriorated significantly since the end of the Cold War,58 and the inci-
dent was a clear indication of the fact that Britain had become ‘highly
dependent on cooperation from [its] allies’.59 For the UK, the Russian
Bastion Defence Concept is back on the agenda.
This evidence is also underscored by the House of Lords’ voic-
ing concerns that UK capability gaps could leave British security more
exposed to external risks,60 in part because the Armed Forces are cur-
rently ‘below the number of full-time and reserve personnel specified in
the SDSR 2015’ in most areas,61 and in part because of ‘over-reliance on
a small number of personnel with specialist skills, such as fighter pilots’.62
Similar statements were echoed by the Joint Committee on the National
Security Strategy, which claimed that the ‘manpower fielded to the
Armed Forces [was] inadequate bearing in mind the range, complexity
and potential concurrency of tasks expected of them’.63
The evidence suggests that a more vigorous partner state engage-

ment in the UK’s Armed Forces is not just a policy of choice. As the UK
rebuilds its forces, its reliance on ‘gap-fillers’ higher up in the command
structure is as much a policy of necessity.64
The ‘Network’ Motive

In contrast to the UK as framework nation, the JEF’s partner states are
more inclined to share than to pool their forces. This is not out of pref-
erence but out of necessity due to increased dependency on larger allies’
military capabilities.65 In the event of a crisis, which would be seen as
existential for any Russian rim-state in Northern Europe, sharing allows
access to decision-makers in London. From Whitehall national concerns
and interests can be addressed more rapidly through pre-arranged net-
works and consultations or even reinforcements can be provided. Like
the UK’s gap-filling motive, partner-states’ network motive can also be
explained in terms of structure and process.
With regard to structure, integrating tactical forces into the British
force structure means that even the smallest partner state can contribute
militarily in a meaningful way. By focusing on UK shortages, and paying
attention to their own comparative advantages, partner states can exploit
critical shortcomings in a British operation. The British need to be able
to organize the rapid detachment of a mechanised infantry battalion
from Denmark, or an Estonian cyber unit, is seen as a much-welcomed
‘window of opportunity’. As the British force structure, according to
Britain’s Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, has ‘a low
level of ‘spare capacity’ to provide flexibility and resilience in unexpected
emergencies’,66 partner-states’ commanders, staff officers, liaison officers,
legal advisors and red card holders are able to bond with a common pro-
fessional community in Britain’s armed forces. For partner states that
depend heavily on consultations or military assistance, ‘networking’ with
a leading European power is of paramount importance.
The Netherland’s deployment of a navy vessel and Norway’s deploy-
ment of a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft to the British operation in
Sierra Leone during the 2015 Ebola outbreak are two examples of
the cultivation of such networks. Denmark’s deployment of six F-16
jet fighters to the 2011 Libyan campaign spearheaded by the UK and
France is another,67 while Estonia’s deployment of explosive ordnance
200 T. HEIER
device teams to the British Task Force Helmand in Afghanistan is a

fourth. The structural aspects of the networking motive resemble those
of the British ‘gap-filling’ motive, which by and large emphasised how
structural shortcomings could be addressed through integration, joint-
ness and synergy.
However, as seen from a partner-state perspective, process is more
important than structure. By filling gaps at the lowest level in Britain’s
chain of command, foreign ambassadors, councillors, defence attachés
and civil servants are more intimately tied to UK institutions, deci-
sion-makers and processes that deal with bilateral consultations and rein-
forcement issues. This structure allows even the smallest partner state to
succeed in gaining access to a UK defence minister, a deputy chief of
defence or a senior defence official. Such contacts are crucial for smooth
decision-making and crisis management.
The emphasis on networking is not intuitively evident. Evidence
therefore needs to be put into a larger context, which is the demand for
a ‘safety bridge’ between Europe and the United States. Such arrange-
ments have become more precarious as the number of NATO members
has increased, and unanimous decisions are harder to reach on short
notice. For partner states that have abstained from having a sovereign
force, or suffer from fundamental shortcomings, tardy and indecisive
action will rapidly lead to collapse in those states’ national defence. By
actively supporting bilateral arrangements that include national forces,
the JEF becomes a reliable ‘first responder’ in a crisis. This is partly
because NATO’s command structure has been reduced in scale, from
approximately 30,000 personnel in 27 headquarters in 1990 to a little
over 6500 personnel in six headquarters today. But also, according to
Head of Defence Capability Section in NATO Colonel Andrew Budd,
because the present command structure ‘has not had to exercise com-
mand and control in any traditional sense in that time frame’.68
Thus, according to former Director on Crisis Management in NATO,
Mr. Ilay Ferrier, because of the high turnover of personnel in the Alliance,
there is a ‘continuous risk for erosion of NATO-wide crisis management
experience and misperceptions of Alliance structures and relationships’.69
For smaller states that can no longer sustain even modest crisis manage-
ment operations for more than a few days, rapid access to allied consul-
tations and reinforcements is of the utmost importance. Cultivating a
network of British decision-makers therefore closes a critical gap. This is
not a gap in structure, as described through Britain’s ‘gap-filling’ motive.

On the contrary, it is a gap in process, where JEF partners’ fear of NATO
indecisiveness leads to inconclusive action. This makes the JEF members
more inclined to cultivate bilateral arrangements that lie outside the for-
mal, transparent and familiar NATO arrangements.70
What Is the Evidence for ‘Networking’?

The description of the JEF as an arena for ‘networking’ is underscored
by various sources. Among the most valid are the Norwegian MoD in
Oslo, the Norwegian Embassy in London and the Senior Norwegian
National Representative in the JEF Headquarters at Northwood.
According to several sources in the Norwegian MoD, NATO’s collec-
tive commitments, as enshrined in Article V of the Washington Treaty,
are rather vague. The wording, which allows an individual member
state to take action ‘as it deems necessary’,71 does not provide a suffi-
ciently credible commitment. According to the policy director in the
Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Mr. Svein Efjestad, the daily effort to
enhance bilateral networks throughout Europe has become more impor-
tant than during the Cold War: ‘it allows the individual member states to
increase their flexibility in preparing for the event of a crisis’.72 Following
Efjestad, through the JEF, Norway can pursue two mutually reinforcing
policies: one towards the UK and one towards Europe, with the UK as a
first priority.73
The policy director’s statement suggests that the JEF arrangement
is part of something bigger for Norway, namely a means of increas-
ing Norway’s freedom of action, not only with regard to international
engagements abroad, but also with regard to crisis response operations at
home. As another senior defence official, Mrs. Kristin Mørkestøl, points
out, ‘We foresee that the JEF will be a useful and flexible tool which may
ensure efficient decision-making and effective crisis management in a
variety of crisis situations—complementary to and possibly in support of,
for instance, NATO, the EU, the UN or other actors’.74
However, as all JEF partners suffer from severe shortages within their
national force structures, dependency on reinforcements at home is
increasing, and thus of far greater strategic importance than detachments
overseas. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which, according to
Norway’s minister of defence, was a serious ‘wake-up call’,75 any effort
202 T. HEIER
that can help allied consultations and reinforcements run more smoothly
is now crucial. According to a senior Norwegian MoD official, ‘while
US forces will have to transport themselves between 8000 and 10,000
kilometres, a British amphibious force, a submarine or a few frigates may
geographically be much closer. This may be essential for providing a
credible deterrent component on short notice if a crisis should arise’.76
Claiming that NATO’s ability to provide rapid and timely assis-
tance was severely weakened, Norway’s senior military representative
to NATO, Lieutenant General Robert Mood, criticised the Alliance for
being ‘a club of speakers’. In the event of a bilateral crisis with Russia,
slow decision-making processes in the Alliance would be highly problem-
atic.77 Both the political and military leadership in Norway seem to have
reduced confidence in NATO’s formal consultancy mechanisms when it
comes to effective decision-making. Another challenge, according to the
Norwegian defence attaché to London, Colonel John Andreas Olsen,
is that NATO members have ‘a land-centric focus’ to the Baltic States
and Poland that may be at the expense of ‘the transatlantic maritime
domain’.78
Concerns about the slowness of allied responses became particularly
evident in the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.
According to Mr Efjestad, the initial US deployments to Poland and the
Baltic countries were originally part of a bilateral arrangement between
the United States on the one hand and Poland and the Baltic states on
the other (known as the European Reassurance Initiative).79 Because the
American deployment was channelled through bilateral arrangements
first, it could happen more rapidly. Hence, after some months, the US
contingent could subsequently be transferred to NATO’s Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe.80 As Mrs Mørkestøl pointed out, ‘the JEF is
very much about speeding up processes of consultation, and increasing
prospects for reinforcements in times of crisis’.81
This evidence resonates with statements made by Colonel Olsen, who
claims that to make multilateral arrangements like the JEF run smoothly,
the UK and its partner states have to know and understand each other
well and that ‘the JEF allows their military forces to do exactly that’.82
The JEF enables Norway to build on the long tradition of cooperation,
which includes activities such as the UK’s Royal Marines’ cold-weather
training in Norway. According to Olsen, through the JEF, UK forces can
learn more about partner states’ climatic and geographical conditions;
‘it allows Britain to rebuild a more traditional skill set into a new gen-
eration of troops, particularly in climatic and geographical conditions
that also are important for the UK’.83 This point was also under-
scored by Norway’s Senior National Representative (SNR) to the JEF
Headquarters in Northwood, Commander Erik Hansen: from a military
point of view, deployments become less risky when commanders and staff
officers have reliable contacts with allied colleagues and thus updated
knowledge about the specific climatic and geographical conditions in any
area of operation.84 After all, operations are about people and people are
about trust. Trust is gained by operating together over time.
The JEF is, as such, a concrete example of how partner states can
more systematically circumvent collective indecisiveness. It provides a via-
ble example of how smaller states attain security through networks that
are deemed crucial when rapid and decisive action is required. This point
has gained more clout as crises have become increasingly complex. The
blurred distinction between peace and war and the ambiguity between
civilian and military actors, intentions and capabilities, challenge part-
ner states’ effectiveness. These ‘grey zones’ not only complicate states’
interagency coordination and cross-cutting skills, but also blur the indi-
cators necessary to transfer responsibilities from national to allied defence
arrangements in NATO. In this context, therefore, the JEF arrangement
allows partner states and the UK to operate below the conventional—
or even old-fashioned—NATO threshold.85 JEF allows Nordic partners
to accelerate joint operations and exercises in cold weather operations;
it thereby becomes easier to get the UK’s attention. With investments in
similar jet fighters and maritime patrol aircrafts, this aspect increases even
more.86 At the same time, according to Commander Hansen, the frame-
work also allows Norwegian decision-makers to maintain greater freedom
of action, because ‘there are no binding commitments to join any opera-
tion if we do not want to’.87
The Russian annexation of Crimea made Norwegian networking eas-
ier. According to Colonel Olsen, ‘What we regard as increased Russian
assertiveness in the North Atlantic is today shared by the UK. Norway’s
geography has become more strategically important to Whitehall, and
political and military agencies are looking more towards the North’.88
This point was also underscored by a senior staff officer from one of
the partnering nations, who claimed that Nordic territories had become
more strategically important for a successful JEF entry into the Baltic
Sea Region and the High North.89 These perspectives coincide with the
main message in written evidence provided by the Norwegian Embassy
to the House of Commons. In a 2017 Parliamentary inquiry, the
Embassy stated that:
204 T. HEIER
Norway is especially concerned about the freedom of manoeuvre in the

Norwegian Sea, North Sea and the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap in the
event of a crisis [and] … would particularly welcome a stronger UK mar-
itime posture in the North Atlantic in order to deter a potential adversary
and defend these waters should actions be required.90
These statements corresponds with Olsen’s Whitehall Paper NATO and

the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective Defence.91 Summarising the
findings before the House of Commons, Colonel Olsen argued that
NATO’s command structure does not provide sufficient security in the
North Atlantic, and urged the UK to take a leading role in the North
Atlantic Ocean.92 The JEF can be seen as a long-term investment in
bilateral relations, which may supplement, stir, or accelerate NATO pro-
cedures. In turn, a successful JEF enables like-minded nations to act fast
when necessary under British stewardship.
Conclusion
Where does this leave us regarding the opening question about motives
for the JEF and the UK’s leadership role in Europe? This analysis
shows us that Norway and the UK are attracted to the JEF for differ-
ent reasons. While the UK regards the JEF as a ‘gap-filling’ instrument
for national independence, as a way to cope with economic austerity,
Norway sees it as a ‘first responder’ that needs to be constantly cultivated
at all levels in the chain of command. Increased Russian assertiveness in
the High North, as well as uncertainty as to where the US administration
under President Donald Trump may go in the years ahead, underscore
this conclusion. Motives for the JEF therefore seem to be both contra-
dictory and ambiguous. How may this impact UK’s leadership role in
Europe?
On the one hand, the provision of a framework into which partner
states easily fit is likely to improve Britain’s operational resilience. A more
rigorous framework within which tactical ‘gap-fillers’ can be accessed
keeps the image of ‘Global Britain’ alive. This is key to the UK’s self-
perception, ambition and its credibility vis-à-vis the United States,
NATO and smaller partner states in Northern Europe. It also shows that
the UK is interested in offering leadership in Europe after BREXIT; it is
leaving the EU, not Europe.
On the other hand, Britain’s long-standing independence in the

North Atlantic may also be affected. Britain’s military shortcomings are
of a fundamental character,93 and force commanders will increasingly
have to rely on partner states’ capabilities. No matter how cohesive a
‘force of friends’ may seem to be, incorporating partner nations’ forces
into the chain of command will restrain Britain’s flexibility and freedom
of movement.
The cluster of eight cannot seize national control over their ‘gap-
filling’ forces. Partner states will thereby influence Britain’s command
structure through numerous parallel chains, which for democratic and
constitutional reasons are obliged to control decisions made by UK
force commanders. Military objectives, courses of actions and nomi-
nation of targets will be scrutinised by partner states’ red card holders,
legal advisors and liaison officers. These control mechanisms are neither
under British command nor mandated to underscore UK interests. They
are part of a national control regime that puts national interests before
Britain’s military independence.94 Even one of Britain’s most trusted
partners, Norway, decided to withdraw its forces during the peak of the
2011 Libyan war. Disagreeing with British, French and US generals on
what the target-list should look like, a like-minded ally aborted its’ oper-
ations.95 A more rigorous partnership programme may therefore export
partner states’ domestic problems into UK decision-making processes.
British independence will also be affected by expectations arising from
within the JEF. As ‘gap-fillers’ underscore Britain’s image as a leading
military power, expectations of reciprocity develop—consciously and
unconsciously. In any bilateral crisis between a loyal ‘gap-filler’ and
Russia, British independence is likely to be squeezed between objec-
tives and considerations that can be hard to reconcile. On the one hand,
credible commitments have to be made to sustain British credibility as
a leading power. This is particularly the case with respect to ‘gap-fillers’
that have reallocated scarce defence resources from their national defence
structure to make UK operations more sustainable. On the other hand,
the same expectations may also limit the UK’s freedom of action because
Britain’s Armed Forces rely upon the same ‘gap-fillers’. It is, however,
unlikely that any partner state will provide ‘gap-fillers’ to the UK in such
a situation. As Northern Europe is one of the world’s most integrated
regions, any partner state’s demand for the JEF will mean that other
states in the cluster also have reasons for concern. In times of looming
206 T. HEIER
crisis, therefore, Britain’s ‘force of friends’ will have very few friends left
that are willing to contribute national forces to underpin a UK operation
in any theatre but their own.
Moreover, nearly all JEF partners are Russian border states. This means
that in any bilateral crisis with Russia, a UK partner state will produce
an immediate spill-over effect on decisions made in Whitehall. British
independence may thereby be strained because partner states exploit the
JEF as a tripwire for something bigger. Through formal and informal net-
works, decision-makers in Whitehall and Northwood are exposed to part-
ner states’ expectations of consultations, diplomatic initiatives and military
leadership with expeditionary forces. This is either out of fear of aban-
donment, or out of fear of institutional indecisiveness in NATO. These
expectations may not necessarily resonate with British priorities or threat
assessments, but they may nevertheless increase the sense of urgency that
partner states want to induce to get UK attention and resources.
In conclusion, the JEF is a most welcome initiative. Like-minded
nations are ‘stronger together’ and through training, exercise and oper-
ations their military forces will be more integrated. Trust will be devel-
oped through shared experiences, common mind-sets, and if done well
the sum is greater than the parts. This article demonstrates that ‘a force
of friends’ is beneficial to all parties involved, but that there are plenty of
issues that need care and attention along the way as the JEF is transition-
ing from idea to reality within the coming years.
Notes
1. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, “The United Kingdom Joint
Expeditionary Force”, 5 December 2013, p. 1.
2. Chief of Defence Staff General Sir David Richards, speech at RUSI, 17
December 2012, p. 9. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
chief-of-the-defence-staff-general-sir-david-richards-speech-to-the-royal-
united-services-institute-rusi-17-december-2012.
3. Richards, p. 6.
4. Interview with Major General Stuart Skeates, Standing Joint Force
Commander, All Souls College, Oxford 8 November 2017. See also
DCDC and CiC, “Combined Expeditionary Force (CJEF) User Guide”,
20 November 2012, pp. 4–1.
5. E-mail correspondence with UK Ministry of Defence official, Lieutenant
Colonel Matthew Taylor, European Bilateral relations and EU Exit,
7 November, 2017.
6. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, “Sweden and Finland Join

UK-Led Response Force”, News Story, 30 June. https://www.gov.uk/
government/news/sweden-and-finland-join-uk-led-response-force.
7. UK MoD, “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence Review
2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom”, London: TSO, p. 49.
8. UK MoD, “UK’s Global Role Reinforced in New International Defence
Engagement Strategy”, Press Release, London, 17 February 2017.
9. The Ministry of Defence and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
“UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy”, London, 2017, p. 1.
10. Richards, p. 9.
11. “UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy”, 2017, p. 1.
12. Ibid., p. 4.
13. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1966, p. 7.
14. The term crisis derives from Latin and means a situation that may go
both ways, either towards something that is more stable and predictable
or towards something catastrophic. Here, the term ‘crisis’ is defined as
an unstable situation where there is an inherent tension ‘between “mili-
tary logic” (the need to increase the readiness and reduce the vulnerabil-
ity of the military) and “diplomatic logic” (the need to maintain control
over military forces to avoid unwanted escalation).’ Alexander George,
Avoiding War, Boulder: Westview, 1991, p. 25.
15. For an analysis of Sweden’s problems with neutrality, see Mikael Holmstrøm,
Den dolda alliansen, Sveriges hemliga NATO forbindelser, Stockholm:
Atlantis 2011. See also Sweden’s parliamentary debate on NATO’s Host
Nation Support agreement: Sveriges Riksdag (2016) “Samforstandsavtal om
vardlands stød. Sammensatta utrikes- och forsvarsutskottets betenkande”,
2015/2016: UFøU4. https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/CC7A890D-585C-
4472-94F7-23AA9169A7E8; Hans Wallmark, ‘Sveriges møylighetar at søka
medlemskap i NATO’, interpellation 2016/2017: 6, Riksdagen, Stockholm,
13 October 2016.
16. Malcolm Chalmers, “Osborne’s Summer Surprise for Defence. Guaranteed
Real-Terms Spending Increases”, Briefing Paper London: RUSI, July 2015.
The Conservative Government of 2015 promised to compensate the annual
increase of defence procurements with 0.5% annually until 2020/2021. On:
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201507_bp_osbornes_summer_sur-
prise_for_defence.pdf. See also HM Government, “Summer Budget 2015”,
5 July 2015, pp. 26–27.
17. See e.g. Sverre Diesen (2013), “Towards an Affordable European
Defence and Security Policy? The Case for Extensive European Force
Integration”. In Janne Haaland Matlary and Magnus Petersson
(eds.), NATO’s European Allies: Military Capability and Political
208 T. HEIER
Will, Basingstroke: Palgrave, pp. 57–70; Håkon Lunde Saxi (2017),

“British and German Initiatives for Defence Cooperation: The Joint
Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nation Concept”, Defence
Studies, 17(2), 2017, pp. 171–197.
18. See for example David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO
in Afghanistan: Fighting Together; Fighting Alone, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2014; Beatrice de Graaf, George Dimitriu, and Jens
Ringsmose (eds.), Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War:
Winning Support for Foreign Military Missions, London: Routledge,
2015; Jürgen Schuster and Herbert Maier, “The Rift: Explaining
Europe’s Divergent Iraq Policies in the Run-Up of American-Led War on
Iraq”, Foreign Policy Analysis, 2(3), 2006, pp. 223–244.
19. See e.g. Tomas Valasek, Surviving Austerity. The Case for a New Approach
to EU Military Collaboration, Brussels: Centre for European Reform,
2011; Dick Zandee, Margriet Drent, and Rob Hendriks, “Defence
Cooperation Models—Lessons Learned and Usability”, Clingendael
Report, Netherlands Institute of International Relations (2016). See
also Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, “Transforming European
Forces’, Survival 44(3), 2002, pp. 117–132; Carl Ek, ‘NATO’s Prague
Capabilities Commitments”, CRS Report to the Congress, Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007.
20. Tom Christensen, Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness, and Kjell Arne Røvik
(2007), Organization Theory and the Public Sector. Instrument, Culture
and Myth, London: Routledge.
21. Foreword by sir Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, in “Joint
Expeditionary Force”, London, Ministry of Defence, June 2017, p. 1.
22. Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History Account, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013, p. xii.
23. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, On War, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976, p. 75, 104.
24. Tormod Heier (ed.), Kompetanseforvaltning i Forsvaret [Managing
Military Competence in Norway’s Armed Forces]. Oslo: Fagbokforlaget,
2017.
25. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2016,
February 2016, ‘Top 15 Defence Budgets 2015’.
26. The House of Commons, “Written Evidence from Professor Malcolm
Chalmers, Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security
Studies”, Global Security: UK–US Relations. https://publications.parlia-
ment.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaff/114/114we16.htm#note82.
27. Saxi, “British and German Initiatives …”, p. 6.
28. E-mail correspondence with Taylor, UK Ministry of Defence, November
7, 2017.
29. H M Government, “The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security”,

May 2014, p. 17. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys-
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/310323/National_Strategy_for_
Maritime_Security_2014.pdf. Oxford Research Group, “SDSR 2015:
Continuity, Control and Crisis in UK Defence Policy”, ORG Briefing—
January 2016, p. 5.
30. House of Commons Defence Committee, “Restoring the Fleet: Naval
Procurement and the National Shipbuilding Strategy”, HC 221 of
Session 2016–2017, 21 November 2016, p. 19.
31. BBC, “MoD Hit with More Kit Complaints”, BBS News Channel,
22 February 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3510639.stm.
32. “UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy”, 2017, p. 3.
33. Richards, p. 5.
34. Interview with General Skeates, 8 November 2017.
35. Richards, p. 3.
36. Ibid.
37. Interview with Skeates.
38. E-mail correspondence with Taylor. See also UK MoD 2017, pp. 3, 8.
39. Interview with Skeates. It is worth mentioning that, according to Skeates,
the Anglo-French cooperation at the tactical level was much easier due to
fewer political considerations.
40. Interview with Colonel Richard Cantrill, The Permanent Joint
Headquarters, Northwood, 15 November 2017. See also MoD, “Joint
Expeditionary Force”, 2017, p. 3.
41. Richards, p. 8.
42. Interview with Skeates; the view is consistent with interview of Cantrill.
43. Interview with UK’s Defence Attaché to Norway and Iceland, Lieutenant
Colonel Andy Walker Royal Marines, Oslo, 17 November 2017.
44. Richards, p. 9; interview Skeates.
45. Richards, p. 11.
47. Richards, p. 12.
48. Interview Cantrill.
49. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, “The United Kingdom Joint
Expeditionary Force”, 5 December 2013, p. 1.
50. Ibid., p. 2.
52. Statement by General Sir Richard Barrons in Sam Jones, “Britain’s
Withered Forces Not Fit to Repel All-Out Attack”, Financial Times,
16 September 2016.
53. Statement by General Sir Richard Barrons in David Bond, “Williamson
Takes Helm as Armed Forces Face Budget Squeeze”, Financial Times,
3 November 2017.
210 T. HEIER
54. Peter Hudson, and Peter Roberts (2017), “The UK and the North
Atlantic: A British Maritime Perspective”. In John A. Olsen (ed.), NATO
and the North Atlantic. Revitalising Collective Defence, pp. 75–76.
Similar statements are also found in House of Commons Library, “The
Royal Navy’s New Frigates and the National Shipbuilding Strategy:
December 2016 Update”, 14 December 2016.
55. Hudson and Roberts, pp. 80, 86.
56. The Copenhagen Post, “Denmark Joins International Strike Force”,
30 November 2015. On http://cphpost.dk/news/denmark-joins-inter-
national-strike-force.html.
57. UK MoD (2016), “UK and Norway Agree New Cooperation on
Maritime Patrol Aircraft”, News Story, November 10.
58. Hudson and Roberts, p. 80.
59. Victoria Ward, ‘MoD Forced to Ask US for Help in Tracking Russian
Submarine’, The Telegraph, 9 January 2015. http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11334836/MoD-forced-to-ask-US-for-
help-in-tracking-Russian-submarine.html.
60. House of Lords, p. 1.
61. House of Lords, p. 8.
62. House of Lords, “Future Capability of the UK’s Armed Forces”, Library
Note I, 16 December 2016, p. 3.
63. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, “National Security
Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review”, 10 July 2016, HL
Paper 18, p. 22.
64. UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy, p. 4.
65. Tormod Heier, “Norsk Russland-politikk og norsk alliansepolitikk—to
uforenlige størrelser?”, Vardøger 37 (2018), pp. 129–131.
66. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, p. 22.
67. Peter Viggo Jakobsen (2016), “The Danish Libya Campaign: Out in
Front in Pursuit of Pride, Praise, and Position”. In Dag Henriksen
and Ann Karin Larssen (eds.), Political Rationale and International
Consequences of the War in Libya, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
68. Andrew Budd, “Defence Capabilities”, presentation on the Conference
Military Exercises, Deterrence and Crisis Stability, Brussels, 10 August
2017. It should be mentioned that NATO decided on 8 November 2017
to re-establish a new command for the Atlantic and a new Command for
logistics in order to secure the transatlantic sea lines of communications
and a rapid movement of military forces across Europe (Jens Stoltenberg,
“NATO Announces Major Changes to Its Military Command
Structure”, Atlantic Council, November 8 2017.
69. Ilay Ferrier (2017), “NATO’s CMX Exercises 1992–2012: High-Level
Strategic Pol-Mil Exercising”, presentation on the Conference Military
Exercises, Deterrence and Crisis Stability, Brussels, 10 August 2017.
70. Svein Efjestad, “Norway and the North Atlantic: Defence of the Northern
Flank”. In Olsen (ed.), “NATO and the North Atlantic…”, p. 62.
See also Tormod Heier, “Influence and Marginalization. Norway’s
Adaptation to US Transformation Efforts in NATO, 1998–2004”, Ph.D.
thesis, Oslo: University of Oslo, 2006, pp. 235–238.
71. The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, DC, 4 April 1949, Article 5.
http://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.
72. Interview with Policy Director in the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Mr.
Svein Efjestad, Oslo, 29 August.
73. Ibid.
74. Interview with Senior Advisor of Security and Defence Policy, Mrs. Kristin
Mørkestøl, MoD, Oslo, 29 September 2017.
75. Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide, “Charting NATO’s Future”, speech at
ACUS Conference, 25 September 2015. https://www.regjeringen.no/
no/aktuelt/minister-of-defence-ine-eriksen-soreide-speech-at-acus-
conference-charting-natos-future/id2454050.
76. Interview with senior MoD-official that spoke on conditions of anonym-
ity, Oslo 2017.
77. Robert Mood, “Skal vi fortsette med hodet i sanden?” [“Should We
Continue to Stick Our Heads in the Sand?”], Aftenposten, 23 February
2017.
78. John Andreas Olsen, ‘Introduction: The Quest for Maritime Supremacy’.
In: Olsen, NATO and the North Atlantic…, p. 7.
79. Interview with Efjestad. See also John J. Hamre, and Heather A. Conley
(2017), ‘The Centrality of the North Atlantic to NATO and US Strategic
Interests’. In Olsen (ed.), NATO and the North Atlantic…, pp. 43–58.
80. Interview with Mr. Efjestad.
81. Interview with Mrs. Mørkestøl.
82. Interview with Norway’s Defence Attaché to the United Kingdom and
Ireland, Colonel John Andreas Olsen, London 22 September 2017.
83. Interview with Olsen. Confirmed through interview with Walker.
84. Interview with Norway’s National Senior representative to the JEF
Headquarter, Commander Erik Hansen, Joint Force Command,
Northwood Headquarters, 14 November 2017.
85. Tormod Heier, “The Logic of Asymmetry: Russia’s Approach Towards
NATO”. In Janne H. Matlary and Tormod Heier (eds.), Ukraine and
Beyond. Russia’s Strategic Security Challenge to Europe, London: Palgrave
Macmillan, p. 277.
86. Interview with Hansen. Confirmed through interview with Skeates.
87. Interview with Hansen.
88. Interview with Olsen.
212 T. HEIER
89. Informal conversations with a selected group of embedded staff officers

from JEF partner-states, Northwood Headquarters, 14 November 2017.
90. House of Commons, “Written Evidence Submitted by the Royal
Norwegian Embassy, London”, p. 1.
91. John Andreas Olsen (ed.), NATO and the North Atlantic. Revitalising
Collective Defence, Whitehall Paper no. 87, London: RUSI.
92. John Andreas Olsen, “Written Evidence Submitted by John Andreas
Olsen”, House of Commons, London 21, p. 1, April 2017.
93. Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, p. 26; General Sir
Barron’ statements in Jones 16 September 2016; Jones, “Britain’s
Withered Forces …”, 16 September 2016 and in Bond, ‘Williamson takes
helm …’, 3 November 2017.
94. Tormod Heier, “Is ‘Out-of-Area’ Also ‘Out-of-Control’? Small States in
Large Operations”, RUSI Journal 160 (1), 2015.
95. Heikki Eidsvoll Holmås (2016), “Tiden for evaluering er nå, Ap”,
Aftenposten, 19 May. Mr. Holmås was Minister in the Centre-Left
Government that decided to participate with Norwegian forces in the war
against Libya in 2011.
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Institute of International Relations.
CHAPTER 9
Sweden, Finland, and the Defence of the

Nordic-Baltic Region—Ways of British
Leadership
Joakim Erma Møller and Magnus Petersson
The Baltic Sea has never been a strategic priority for the UK. In British
strategy, the goal has traditionally been to deny Russian and/or German
access to the North Sea (and the North Atlantic) by blocking the sea-
ways out of the Baltic Sea. The British fleet has only occasionally sailed
into the Baltic Sea, for instance during the Crimean War, in order to pro-
ject power. This was also the strategy during the Cold War. There were
plans for massive nuclear strikes by the British Bomber Command and
the US Strategic Air Command in the region, including in Finland, as
well as to close the Danish straits and deny Soviet forces access to the
North Atlantic. Still, it was too dangerous to conduct more extensive
military operations in the Baltic Sea, given that the Soviet Union and its
allies controlled large parts of it.
That did not mean, however, that the UK was uninterested in the
region during the Cold War. Finland, and especially Sweden, played a
role in British and Western strategic thinking. Although Finland was
J. E. Møller (*) · M. Petersson 
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo, Norway

216 J. E. MØLLER AND M. PETERSSON
regarded as part of the Russian sphere of influence, and thus largely

written off in Western strategies, the hope was that it would not meet
the same destiny as the rest of Eastern Europe, in the form of a com-
munist coup and an alliance with the Soviet Union. Militarily, Finland
was weak and viewed as a possible transit area for Soviet troops attacking
Norway, and potentially Sweden. Still, the UK and the West did not give
up Finland on other fronts, such as economic and cultural integration.
Sweden and the UK also exported advanced defence materiel, such as
aircraft, to Finland.
Sweden was, however, a different case. It was considered ‘neutral on
our side’ by the West, and a huge military asset in the region. The UK
therefore tried to integrate Sweden as much as possible in the Western
defence structures, without being a formal ally. Sweden was a key to
denying the Soviet Union and its allies access to the two strategic hot-
spots in the region—the Baltic Straits and Northern Norway—and was
therefore strongly supported by the Western great powers with advanced
technology, intelligence, and information about Western war plans.
Since the end of the Cold War, Finland and Sweden have been polit-
ically, economically and militarily integrated in the West to a degree
that had not been considered possible before. Membership in NATO’s
Partnership for Peace (PfP)-program (1994) and EU membership
(1995) have clearly placed these two countries in the Western camp.
Militarily, Finland and Sweden have contributed to the major post-Cold
War NATO peace operations and been seen as NATO’s most eager part-
ners. The UK supported that development during the 1990s and 2000s,
but it was not until after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War that Britain
started to engage more deeply in the region, for instance through the
establishment of the Northern Group.
Since then, and especially since the Ukraine crisis started in 2013, an
important question from a UK and NATO perspective has been what
kind of role non-aligned Finland and Sweden can have in the Western
defence of the Nordic-Baltic region against a revisionist Russia. In
this chapter, we will try to answer this question through an analysis of
how the cooperation between these two NATO partners and the West
in general, as well as the UK in particular, has evolved. First, we con-
sider the two countries’ interaction with Britain and the West during the
Cold War. Then we briefly present their integration into Western struc-
tures during the two decades after the Cold War, before we move on to
9 SWEDEN, FINLAND, AND THE DEFENCE OF THE NORDIC-BALTIC REGION … 217
discuss the interaction between Finland, Sweden and Britain in what has
been referred to as a ‘New Cold War’.1
Sweden, Finland and the West During the Cold War

During the Cold War, the security situation in the Nordic-Baltic region
was very different compared to now. The Soviet Union occupied the
Baltic States and controlled Poland, Eastern Germany, and, to some
extent, Finland. The 1948 Finno-Soviet pact of Friendship, Cooperation,
and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), and the restrictions on Finland’s
defence forces from the peace treaty, limited Finland’s room for manoeu-
vre. Sweden, on the other hand, was strong, had a lot of room for
manoeuvre, and could consequently cooperate secretly with the West.
Despite these differences, the UK had a role in integrating both Sweden
and Finland as much as possible into Western economic and military
structures.
Sweden—‘Neutral on Our Side’

One of the most important keys to understanding Sweden’s balancing
between the East and the West during the Cold War is the events that
took place during the formative years at the end of the 1940s, and the
action taken at that time by the great powers. Most authors agree that
the Swedish policy that was established and the relations that were cre-
ated with the East and West during those years were more or less contin-
ued until 1989–1991.2
Back in 1948–1949, the UK had a major role in solving the
‘Scandinavian defence dilemma’, that is ‘the idea of associating Sweden
with the North Atlantic security system without its being a formal
member of it’.3 In the late 1940s, Scandinavian defence did not make
much sense without Sweden. At that time, the Swedish Armed Forces
contained the fourth largest air force in the world, considerable mar-
itime forces, and an army that—when fully mobilized—could put
600,000 soldiers in the field. The West needed Sweden for the defence
of Scandinavia, but the Swedish government did not want to abandon its
traditional non-alignment policy.
As Juhana Aunesluoma has shown, the British attitude towards the
negotiations on a neutral Scandinavian defence union was quite nuanced
compared to US policy. While the US ‘cure’ for the ‘stubborn’ Swedes
who did not openly want to join the West was ‘isolation’, ‘the British
sought to achieve their goals with subtler and quieter means in an atmos-
phere of close confidence, trust and consultation’.4
Ironically, just shortly after the breakdown of negotiations for a
Scandinavian defence union and the creation of the North Atlantic
Treaty, the US changed its policy towards the Swedes and adopted a
‘British’ policy, which—in turn—eventually led to an informal, but quite
extensive and intense, Swedish integration in the North Atlantic security
system.5 Eventually, the Scandinavian defence dilemma had been solved
by a more flexible attitude from both Sweden and the US, encouraged
by the British during the whole process, but at the price of a divided
Scandinavia.6
The main reason Sweden had not seriously considered joining the
Atlantic Pact was a combination of neutralist identity and realpolitik.
Sweden had not been involved in a war since the Napoleonic Wars in
1814, and many Swedes, including the government, were of the opin-
ion that the traditional Swedish neutrality policy was a major reason that
Sweden had lived in peace for more than 100 years.7 Among the more
realist arguments for Swedish neutrality policy, the so-called Finland
argument had a prominent position.8
The logic of the Finland argument was, in short, that if Sweden joined
NATO, the Soviet Union would occupy—or at least demand military
bases in—Finland and thereby increase the tensions between the blocs
in the whole Nordic region, which was not in anybody’s interest. It can
be argued that after the blocs had been formed in 1948–1949, the Finland
argument became a component of the wider ‘Nordic Balance’, an analyti-
cal concept used since the 1960s, but in practice a fundamental concept in
Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish security thinking long before that.9
However, the Swedish government was open to quite extensive and
intense secret military integration with the West, which was of benefit
to the West. Military cooperation with Denmark and Norway was most
extensive and concerned all branches (especially the air forces), logistics,
and intelligence. The contact with the UK and the US was less exten-
sive, but more important, and also focused quite heavily on the air force.
Furthermore, for Sweden it was extremely important to get access to
advanced (military) technology, which the Western great powers could
provide, and the UK played an important role in this regard. It can be
argued that Sweden became a reliable military partner for the Western
great powers. It was not imaginable that the Swedish Armed Forces
would be used against the West.10
In sum, it can be argued that the solution found to the Scandinavian
defence dilemma was the next best solution for all states involved,
including the Soviet Union. Of course, the UK and the Western powers
would have preferred to have Sweden in NATO, but Sweden’s ‘friendly’
neutrality policy was better than a rigid one. The Russians would have of
course preferred a Sweden without any ties at all to the West, but as long
as Sweden remained outside NATO, the solution was acceptable.
Finland—Gradual and Cautious Westernization

‘The service rendered by Finland to mankind is magnificent’,11 Winston
Churchill stated in the midst of the Winter War (1939–1940). Plans
were even made to support Finland with British forces. However, for var-
ious reasons, such as Sweden refusing to be used as a transit country,
the plans of assistance fell through.12 In fact, after having fought along-
side Nazi-Germany against the Soviet Union in the early stages of the
Continuation War (1941–1944), Finland rather received a declaration of
war from Britain at the end of 1941.13 Still, this was largely for the sake
of appearances.14 However, it provided Britain with a seat at the negoti-
ating table as the war was coming to an end. By insisting on a resump-
tion of the pre-war imports of timber and paper from Finland, a major
export at the time, Britain managed to avoid total Soviet control over
Finland’s economy.15 This proved to be an important part of the coun-
try’s tightrope walk through the Cold War.
Along with Sweden, Great Britain remained the only foreign hope
for Finland as the Second World War was approaching its final stages.16
However, as Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden stated in August 1944,
‘Russian influence will in any event be predominant in Finland and we
shall not be able, nor would it serve any important British interests,
to contest that influence’.17 Consequently, the British kept a low pro-
file in the Allied Control Commission (ACC) that arrived in Finland
the following month and remained until the Finno-Soviet Peace Treaty
was signed three years later. However, the directive from the Foreign
Office to the British delegation of the ACC indicates an interest in the
fate of Finland: ‘Our ultimate policy is to ensure a free and independent
Finland, but it must always be remembered that Finland is a conquered
country and will have to work her passage home’.18 Still, Britain largely
‘wrote Finland off’ for the rest of the decade, and thus left the country
in the Soviet sphere of influence.
In April 1948, Finland and the Soviet Union signed the bilateral
Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA
treaty), whereby Finland was obligated to repel any attack from the
West, potentially assisted by the Soviet Union. Despite this treaty against
the West, Finland made several military procurements from the West.
Already in 1953, the Finnish Air Force received their first new planes
since the War, in the form of British de Havilland Vampire Mk.52 train-
ing jets. A British radar system was acquired as well.19 In 1956, Finland
also ordered British Folland Gnat F.1 fighter aircraft.20 In fact, despite
having a role in Soviet strategic thinking as a buffer against the West,
most of Finland’s military procurements during the 1950s came from
the West.21
However, in the 60s, the Soviet Union wanted more control over the
defence posture of its ‘buffer state’. ‘We distinctly hear the sabre rat-
tling and the noise of the military preparations of NATO, carried on the
waves of the Baltic Sea from the West to our shores’.22 Despite bearing
resemblance to more recent remarks by Russian officials, these are the
words of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev ahead of the so-called Note
Crisis in 1961, when the Soviet Union deemed military consultations
with Finland necessary due to increased Western presence in the region.
Although Finland’s President, Urho Kekkonen, came to an understand-
ing with Khrushchev that at least deferred the military consultations, the
crisis reinforced the Soviet desire to shape the Finnish defence forces.
A ‘supplementary defence budget’ was therefore set up the follow-
ing month, specifically intended for acquiring Soviet air defence missiles
and MiG-21s, the first of which arrived already the following year.23
However, the delivery was delayed due to British objections. Britain
initially interfered, as the MiGs were equipped with air-to-air missiles
and would therefore represent a breach of the stipulations in the peace
treaty. In the end, a compromise was reached, whereby the procurement
of MiGs was accepted, whereas that of surface-to-air missiles was not.
However, the agreement also included an assurance that Finland would
balance its procurement of defence materiel from the Soviet Union with
similar acquisitions from the West.24 Consequently, British Vigilant anti-
tank missiles were purchased as well.25
Although Soviet MiGs were purchased in the subsequent decades as
well, Finland to a large extent returned to acquiring Western aircraft.
The 1970s were thus characterized by several large orders for Swedish
J-35 Drakens, whereas 50 British Hawk Mk.51s were included in the
Air Force between 1980 and 1985.26 These acquisitions point to a grad-
ual westernization of the Finnish Defence Forces, which in turn might
have facilitated the switch to American F-18 Hornet fighter jets, as well
as more general integration into Western defence structures, as the Cold
War came to an end.
The same gradual westernization is evident in the political and eco-
nomic realms as well. Prime Minister and later President Kekkonen
was successful in steering the nation into the Nordic Council in 1955,
a few years after it had been established.27 Although membership in
the European Economic Community, the predecessor to the European
Union, was unthinkable, Finland approached this Western organization
already during the Cold War. Already in 1961, the so-called FINEFTA
agreement made Finland an associate member of the European Free
Trade Area (EFTA), which Great Britain had joined the preceding year.
In 1973, as Great Britain advanced from being an EFTA member to full
membership in the EEC, Finland landed an association agreement with
the EEC.28 A decade later, as the Cold War was nearing its final stages,
Finland continued its Western economic orientation by becoming a full
member of EFTA, as well as a member of the Council of Europe.29 In
other words, Finland became gradually more associated with the West
both politically and economically.
In general, Finland was thus successful in gradually and cautiously
approaching the West militarily, politically, and economically without
aggravating its eastern neighbour. In the words of the aforementioned
directive from the UK Foreign Office, Finland worked its passage home.
Sweden, Finland, and the West During the 1990s and the

2000s
Despite the significant differences between Sweden and Finland during
the Cold War, the two countries were soon united along the same secu-
rity political path as the Iron Curtain was lifted. Although Finland and
Sweden did not join NATO, an active and dynamic partnership with the
alliance evolved. They also became members of the European Union,
and increased their defence cooperation with the other Nordic countries.
Active Partners of NATO

After the Cold War, Finland and Sweden were among the group of for-
mer or present European ‘neutrals’—Austria, Ireland, and Switzerland—
that did not see NATO membership as a goal. For them, participation
in NATO’s PfP programme rather became a way of modernizing their
defence forces while at the same time maintaining their traditional secu-
rity policies, working for transparency and democratization, and contrib-
uting to UN-mandated peace operations.30
Sweden, together with Finland, joined the PfP programme at its
inception in 1994 and have, since then, been the most active partners
among the former ‘neutrals’, with Sweden commonly referred to as ‘the
number one partner’.31 By December 1994, Finland and Sweden had
also managed to conclude their first Individual Partnership Program
(IPP), which is a bilateral agreement of cooperation between a part-
ner state and NATO. Finland and Sweden joined the PfP Planning and
Review Process (PARP) in 1995, which is an important tool for achiev-
ing interoperability.32
When it comes to troop contributions to UN-mandated and NATO-
led ground operations—Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan—Sweden and
Finland also stand out. Both the quantity and the type of forces sent by
Finland and Sweden reflect their willingness to contribute to NATO’s
operations: Finland and Sweden have sent relatively large, combat (or
combat-like) forces while other NATO partners have sent relatively small
support (or support-like) forces.33 Britain encouraged and supported
these substantial contributions from the two non-aligned Nordic coun-
tries, for instance by playing a critical part when Sweden decided to send
troops to Afghanistan.34
In 2008, Finland and Sweden became the only non-NATO members
participating in the NATO-managed Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC)
initiative.35 In addition, Finland became involved in the NATO Response
Force (NRF).36 The NRF had been established in 2003 with the inten-
tion of increasing NATO’s capability to react swiftly, as the force is able
to deploy in less than five days and be operational for a month without
reinforcements.37 However, Finland’s participation was at the lowest
possible level, which meant that Finland would only join the comple-
mentary pool of the NRF, and thus not commit to any future activities.38
Finally, Sweden, but not Finland, also participated in the
UN-mandated and NATO-led operation in Libya in 2011 with eight
fighter jets. It was the first time that Sweden participated with fighter
jets in a peace operation since the Congo operation in the 1960s. The
planes were, however, not allowed to hit ground targets (except for in
self-defence).39
Active Members of the European Union

Finland’s gradual approach towards the EU, for instance through its
membership in EFTA and association agreement with the EEC, facil-
itated Finnish membership in the Union as the Cold War came to an
end. Consequently, Finland submitted its membership application to the
then European Community (EC) already in March 1992, and became an
EU member in 1995, together with Sweden.40 Since then, Sweden and
Finland have been working to strengthen the EU’s common security and
defence policy (CSDP), for instance by being active in the process lead-
ing up to the Petersberg initiative in 1996. Sweden has also been lead-
ing, whereas Finland has been participating in, the Nordic Battle Group
since 2008. Furthermore, the two countries have been working for closer
cooperation between the EU and NATO.
However, most EU members have also possessed membership in
NATO (11 of 15 in 1995, 22 of 28 in 2013). In other words, NATO
was the main arena for cooperation on security and defence related
issues for most EU members during the two decades after the Cold War
ended. This policy area was thus given lower priority in the EU, leading
to slow progress and only modest results. In other words, the EU did
not become the strong security and defence political cooperative body
that Sweden and Finland envisioned and attempted to develop. Still,
there is no doubt that the two countries’ membership in the Union has
integrated them further into Western structures, including in the area of
security and defence.
Nordic Cooperation on Security and Defence

The end of the Cold War facilitated cooperation between Finland and
Sweden, and more generally between the Nordic countries. Bilaterally,
the initial focus was on cooperation between the two countries’ respec-
tive navies. Considering that both the Finnish and Swedish Coastal
Ranger units already used Swedish as their working language, this was
a natural area where cooperation could be developed.41 With close
maritime cooperation between the two countries, the so-called SEA

Surveillance Cooperation Finland-Sweden (SUCFIS) was established the
following decade, with particular focus on situational awareness, moni-
toring of the Baltic Sea area and interoperability between the two coun-
tries’ navies.42
Together with Denmark and Norway, the two countries also signed
the Nordic Armaments Cooperation (NORDAC)-agreement in
1994, and the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Support
(NORDCAPS) in 1997. The latter was intended as a cooperative body
for coordinating the Nordic contribution to international military oper-
ations. An interesting aspect in this regard, is that a so-called Letter of
Intent was signed between the UK and the NORDCAPS nations a few
years later, which formalized the cooperation between Britain and the
Nordic countries in Peace Support Operations.43 In addition, it stated
that the signatories would ‘Undertake to explore the possibility for joint
training, exercises, courses and other co-operative arrangements in order
to improve inter operability [sic] between UK and Nordicforces [sic]
through NORDCAPS.’44 The Letter of Intent thus indicated that the
UK was supportive of Nordic cooperation. It also demonstrated an inter-
est in cooperating closely with the Nordic nations, including Finland and
Sweden, in order to improve their operational effectiveness.
In order to strengthen their national operative capacities, the Nordic
countries also established the Nordic Supportive Defence Structures
(NORDSUP) in 2008.45 The following year, all three Nordic initia-
tives (NORDAC, NORDCAPS and NORDSUP) were merged in a new
framework called Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). At that
time, the primary driver for the cooperation was cost efficiency rather
than security; the focus was on procuring defence systems together
rather than planning for defending the Nordic-Baltic region together.
Over time, however, NORDEFCO has increased Nordic consultation
and strategic thinking among the Nordic governments and defence
establishments, which has to do with the worsened security situation in
the region since 2013–2014.46 Still, it seems unlikely that NORDEFCO
will develop into anything more than what it is at the moment, namely a
military-political tool.47
Finland and Sweden thus became firmly integrated into Western
structures during the two decades after the Cold War ended. This devel-
opment was encouraged by Britain, who also showed an interest in coop-
erating more closely with the two former ‘neutrals’.
Sweden, Finland and the West in the ‘New Cold War’

Swedish and Finnish integration into the Western defence structures in
general, with the UK in particular, has continued, and in fact has inten-
sified, over the last several years. At the same time, the UK has become
more active in the region, especially since 2010 when it initiated the
Northern Group. ‘We cannot forget that geographically the United
Kingdom is a northern European country. […] For too long Britain has
looked in every direction except its own backyard’, Defence Secretary
Liam Fox stated in November 2010 in conjunction with its establish-
ment.48 The group, or forum as he called it, included the Baltic and
Nordic countries (including Sweden and Finland), as well as Germany,
the Netherlands, and Poland, and has since then had regular meetings at
the ministerial level.49
This initiative was a clear signal that the UK intended to focus more
on Europe, and especially Northern Europe, after almost twenty years
of out-of-area operations. Still, this focus on Northern Europe and the
Baltic Sea did not really gain momentum until the security situation in
the area deteriorated in conjunction with the Ukraine crisis from 2013
onwards. Whereas Ukraine was desperately trying to become associated
with the EU, the opposite process had been initiated earlier that year in
Britain. In his so-called Bloomberg speech in January, Prime Minister
David Cameron had introduced the possibility of an EU referendum for
Britain, given that the Conservative Party would win the following elec-
tions.50 As this initiated the process known as Brexit, it will serve as our
point of departure for considering the development of the cooperation
between Britain, Sweden, and Finland in this new security environment.
What kind of role has Britain had, and what kind of role can it have
in the future in integrating Finland and Sweden into Western defence
structures in general, and the defence of the Nordic-Baltic region in
particular?
Despite their gradual integration into Western defence structures in
the 1990s and the 2000s, as previously presented, neither Finland nor
Sweden had signed bilateral defence- and security-related agreements
with the UK. It is therefore noteworthy that both countries finalized
such bilateral agreements with Britain during 2013. In April, Swedish
Defence Minister Karin Enström, and UK Minister for International
Security Strategy Andrew Morrison signed a comprehensive bilateral
MoU. This agreement concerned both the provision of host nation
support, as well as general principals and responsibilities in conjunction

with training, exercises, testing, and evaluation.51 More specifically, it
defined the legal status of military personnel when invited to participate
in military training with the other, and enabled the mutual participation
in training required to develop interoperability and sharing of knowledge
and experience.52 In other words, the agreement facilitated a more prac-
tical military collaboration between the two countries.
A few months later, a bilateral agreement between Finland and Britain
entered into force as well.53 However, it concerned only the mutual pro-
tection of classified information, and was thus not as comprehensive as
the bilateral agreement between the UK and Sweden. Despite this dif-
ference, the two agreements indicate a mutual interest in more bilateral
cooperation.
In addition to bilateral relationships, we can also identify the devel-
opment of further multinational cooperation. Sweden announced in
October that it would offer its contribution to NATO’s Response
Force (NRF), the high readiness, multinational force that Finland had
been involved in since 2008.54 Finland, Sweden, and the UK were thus
all participating nations in the NRF’s test exercise, Steadfast Jazz, in
November.55 The following year, Britain also chose to participate in the
annual exercise BALTOPS, a maritime military exercise in the Baltic Sea
area.56 This was the first time since 2009 that Britain provided troops to
a BALTOPS exercise, which indicates a renewed interest in the area. This
development created excellent opportunities for Finland and Sweden to
cooperate closely with Britain.
It seems clear that both NATO in general and Britain in particular
considered close cooperation with both Finland and Sweden as impor-
tant in the new, deteriorated security situation. This was especially evi-
dent at the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014, where several
measures were initiated that were intended to enhance cooperation with
NATO partners. Overall, the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII)
was launched in order to improve the operational effectiveness of mul-
tinational forces in NATO-led operations.57 As a prolongation of the
PII, certain partners were granted ‘enhanced opportunities’ for deeper
cooperation, also known as the Enhanced Opportunities Partnership
(EOP) programme. Finland and Sweden were considered the most
able and willing NATO partners, alongside Australia, Georgia, and
Jordan, and consequently deserved this tailor-made partnership.58
Although this was presented as a gesture, it seems evident that NATO

considered certain countries more important to cooperate with due to
regional challenges.59
During the summit, Finland and Sweden also signed so-called Host
Nation Support Agreements with NATO, which clarified policy and
procedures for operational and logistic support sites for NATO forces
operating on Finnish and Swedish territory, upon mutual agreement.60
As host nations, they were also intended to provide host nation support,
which was defined as
the civil and military assistance rendered in peace, emergencies, crisis and
conflict by a Host Nation to allied forces and organisations, which are
located on, operating in or transiting through the Host Nation’s territory,
territorial waters or airspace.61
An interesting aspect of this agreement is the specification that the sup-

port should be provided in the event of a crisis or conflict, as well as
during peace. Although this is not equivalent to a guarantee that NATO
forces would be deployed to these partner countries in the case of a mil-
itary conflict on their territory, the agreement would make it easier for
them to be. With the PII in mind, it seems evident that the intention
of the measures taken at the summit in Wales was to facilitate effective
cooperation with NATO partners Finland and Sweden on their own
territory.
The following year, Britain became a full-fledged member of the
so-called SUCBAS (Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea) arrange-
ment. This was an extension of the bilateral SUCFIS (Surveillance
Cooperation Finland Sweden) arrangement that had been established
already in 2006.62 The new SUCBAS arrangement, which was formed
in 2009, also included the Baltic States, Denmark, Germany, and Poland,
and was therefore a more comprehensive regional collaboration. In line
with the renewed interest in the area, Britain joined this multinational
surveillance cooperation at a SUCBAS seminar in Hamburg in March
2015.63 The idea with this regional surveillance cooperation was to
exchange information between national governmental institutions in the
Baltic Sea area.64 Through this arrangement, Finland, Sweden, and the
UK could thus improve their situational awareness in the Nordic-Baltic
region.
A few months later, the Conservative Party won the general election
in the UK. With Cameron’s pledge from 2013 in mind, the outcome of
the election took the UK one large step closer to Brexit. Although Brexit
was still considered highly unlikely at this point, the election results still
may have created some uncertainty among those cooperating closely
with Britain through the EU. It is therefore interesting to note that
Finland and the UK started planning a bilateral defence agreement later
that year, similar to the one between Sweden and Britain.65 Although the
causal link between these two events is difficult to establish, it is not far-
fetched, as Finland, without a formal NATO membership, has been very
active in strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy. This was
for instance seen in early 2015, when President Sauli Niinistö attended
an EU summit in Brussels, where he urged the Union to prioritize
security.66 With Finland showing a clear desire to strengthen this policy
area in the EU, it is not unthinkable that the potential loss of one of its
strongest military powers instigated discussions on deeper defence coop-
eration on a more bilateral basis.
Despite the initiation of these talks already in 2015, the bilateral
agreement was not signed until July 2016. By that time, the three coun-
tries had put their ability to cooperate closely in the area to the test
through participation in both BALTOPS 15 and BALTOPS 16, the lat-
ter of which was hosted by Finland for the first time. While this major
exercise was underway, Sweden signed bilateral defence agreements with
both the US and the UK. On 8 June, Swedish Defence Minister Peter
Hultqvist and US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter signed a so-called
Statement of Intent, with the intention of increasing and enhancing the
already active defence cooperation between the two countries.67
Three days later, Defence Minister Hultqvist and UK Defence
Secretary Michael Fallon signed a Programme of Defence Cooperation
in London. The aim was to identify new initiatives, develop defence
capabilities, and enhance interoperability. It also included more than 50
specific activities intended to improve the ability of the two countries
to act together.68 Hultqvist and Fallon stated in a joint article that the
agreement opened the door to more cooperation regarding concepts,
doctrines, interoperability, and development of strategic and operational
understanding. They also emphasized cooperation regarding develop-
ment of defence systems.69 More generally, the Swedish government
stated that close cooperation with Britain on defence-related issues was a
priority.70
At this point, bilateral cooperation between Sweden and Britain was

significantly more comprehensive than between the latter and Finland,
which is highlighted by the lack of any references to bilateral cooperation
with Britain in Finland’s foreign and security policy report, which was
published a week later.71 The only reference to the UK in the Finnish
report was under the sub-headline ‘Strengthening the European Union
as a security community’, where it was stated that a longer-term assess-
ment of the impacts of Britain’s referendum on whether or not to stay in
the EU was needed.72 However, following the referendum on 23 June,
Defence Minister Jussi Niinistö seemed clear about the negative effect
this would have, as he stated that Brexit would be a big blow to EU’s
CSDP.73 A few weeks later, the bilateral defence agreement with Britain
that had been planned since 2015 was finalized. This implies a close con-
nection between Brexit and the increased focus on bilateral cooperation
between Finland and the UK.
The so-called Defence Protocol was signed by Defence Minister
Niinistö and his British counterpart Michael Fallon in conjunction with
NATO’s summit in Warsaw in July 2016.74 This agreement was a frame-
work for cooperation on security- and defence related issues, with par-
ticular focus on crisis management, information sharing, standardization,
education, training and exercises.75 Defence Minister Niinistö claimed
that Finland and the UK became close defence partners through this
agreement, and hinted that the partnership would develop in a similar
way as that between the UK and Sweden.76 It therefore seems evident
that the agreement initiated a bilateral defence relationship that was
going to be dynamic and progressive.
As a prolongation of the bilateral agreement signed in July, the British
embassy in Helsinki reopened its defence section in September. General
Sir Gordon Messenger, the UK’s Vice Chief of Defence, stated during
his visit in Helsinki in conjunction with the event that
the only way to achieve the peace and stability we all seek is to work
together with partners, to share our different perspectives and achieve a
better understanding. The UK’s investment in its Defence Attaché net-
work is an important and necessary part of that.77
This indicates the two-way interest in the cooperation between Finland

and the UK. The close bilateral cooperation was not just beneficial
to the small, non-aligned and somewhat exposed Nordic country,
but also for Britain. A few weeks later, Defence Minister Niinistö and
US Deputy Secretary of Defence Robert Work signed a Statement of
Intent similar to the one Hultqvist and Carter had signed a few months
earlier.78 Like Sweden, Finland thus prioritized bilateral defence
cooperation with the UK and the US, as well as to multinational
cooperation.
A particular focus area at the Warsaw summit had been to increase
cooperation with the EU, for example in countering hybrid threats.79
A clear expression of this initiative was the Memorandum of
Understanding that was signed the following year, which would estab-
lish a so-called European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid
Threats in Helsinki.80 The MoU was signed by Finland, Sweden,
and the UK, as well as the US, Germany, France, Poland, Latvia, and
Lithuania. In addition, both EU and NATO representatives were pres-
ent at the signing.81 The hybrid centre was thus intended as a multi-
national NATO/EU centre located in the capital of EU member and
NATO partner Finland.
During the summer of 2017, several initiatives were taken to fur-
ther strengthen the cooperation between the two NATO partners and
members of the alliance. In early June, Finland, Sweden, and the UK
once again trained together in the Baltic Sea area during the annual
BALTOPS exercise.82 Later that month, Finland and Sweden formally
joined the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) when Defence
Secretary Michael Fallon, Swedish Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist
and Finnish Defence Minister Jussi Niinistö met at a signing event in
Stockholm. The JEF has the ability to support NATO, EU, and UN
forces and should be able to mobilize 10,000 troops on short notice as
of 201883 (see also Heier’s chapter in this volume). As Defence Secretary
Fallon stated in conjunction with the signing,
We are like-minded countries and have worked together in the EU.

Unfortunately, that will come to an end in two years. We are leaving the
political union, which is why we are reinforcing our military partnerships.84
In other words, this initiative specifically, and the increased military

cooperation with partners Finland and Sweden more generally, was
regarded as important in light of Britain’s upcoming separation from the
Union.
Defence Secretary Fallon also stated, ‘I hope that the JEF will bring
reassurance to countries like Finland and Sweden. Membership provides
them with groups of friends who are ready to take action and provide
assistance.’85 Although not a guarantee of military assistance in the event
of a crisis, this statement is a strong indication that Britain would take
action if the situation called for it. However, as Cantrill and Meyer point
out in the final chapter in this volume, it is not given where and when
the force will be deployed, and which nations that are able to contribute.
Despite that, the JEF implies that the defence cooperation between the
UK and the two non-aligned Nordic countries has come a long way over
the last few years, and that the UK has succeeded in integrating Finland
and Sweden further into the Western defence of the Nordic-Baltic
Region.
In conjunction with the defence ministers’ meeting on 29 June,
Finland and Sweden also strengthened their bilateral defence cooperation
with another strong European military power, namely Germany. Both
countries signed bilateral framework agreements with dialogue, infor-
mation exchange, capabilities, materiel, research, and cooperation within
international organizations as focus areas.86 In addition, Finland signed a
so-called Letter of Intent on joining the German-led Framework Nations
Concept (FNC), the idea behind which was to coordinate contributions
from smaller nations under a stronger ‘framework nation’.87 In this way,
the FNC resembles the JEF, as both consist of a group of smaller coun-
tries under a major NATO state.88
In light of Defence Secretary Michael Fallon’s statement on pro-
viding assistance through JEF, an interesting legal change entered into
force in Finland on 1 July. The aim of this legislative package was to
strengthen national security by improving the country’s ability to request
and receive assistance from other states.89 Finland was thus facilitating
Western support in the event of a crisis.
These initiatives highlight a tendency in Finnish and Swedish defence
and security policy over the last few years to strengthen cooperation
bilaterally with NATO members important for regional security
(the UK, the US and Germany), in groups of like-minded countries
(JEF, FNC), and multilaterally in larger Western organizations (NATO
and the EU). In other words, cooperation with Britain in several differ-
ent constellations has become an important part of the two non-aligned
countries’ security and defence policy.
In October, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering

Hybrid Threats was officially inaugurated in Helsinki. That this event
was important for both NATO and the EU is highlighted by the pres-
ence of both NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the High
Representative of Foreign Affairs in the EU, Federica Mogherini. ‘The
centre will make an important contribution to our security’, Secretary
General Stoltenberg declared.90 Finland was thus intended to have a cen-
tral role in the Western effort to understand and handle the increasingly
present threat of hybrid warfare. With its coming on board as one of the
now 12 participating nations, it is evident that Britain supported this
development.
Towards the end of 2017, Finland and Sweden also signed up for
the most recent defence initiative in the EU, the Permanent Structured
Cooperation (PESCO), which aims at enhancing member states effec-
tiveness in addressing security issues by strengthening the defence coop-
eration within the Union.91 In light of Brexit, it was not surprising that
the UK was one of three EU members that did not join this cooperation.
However, Finnish and Swedish participation will presumably integrate
their defence forces even more in the West.
More closely related to Britain, is the two countries reaction to the
poisoning of the former Russian military intelligence officer Sergej
Skripal and his daughter Julia in Salisbury in March 2018. Despite hav-
ing to maintain a functioning relationship with Russia, especially Finland
with its 1340 km long Russian border, both Finland and Sweden
expelled one Russian diplomat each, thus showing solidarity with
Britain.92 A similar reaction seems unthinkable during the Cold War.
Finland and Sweden are thus much closer to the West in general, and
the UK in particular, in this ‘new Cold War’. The two countries also
signed a trilateral defence agreement with the US in early May 2018,
thus deepening the defence cooperation with core nations in NATO fur-
ther, despite formally remaining outside the Western alliance.93
Conclusions
In this chapter, we described and analysed the role Britain has had
in integrating Finland and Sweden as much as possible in the Western
defence of the Nordic-Baltic region. During the Cold War, the UK
did much to secretly integrate Sweden into Western defence struc-

tures. Britain also contributed to keep Finland technologically and eco-
nomically anchored in the West. In the 1990s and the 2000s, Britain,
Finland, and Sweden could openly cooperate militarily through the EU
and NATO’s PfP programme, and in NATO-led ground operations in
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. The UK contributed to Sweden and
Finland’s deep integration into NATO’s defence structures.
Since the Russo-Georgian War, NATO’s focus has slowly changed
from out-of-area operations to territorial defence. The UK is no excep-
tion to this trend, as was shown by the Northern Group initiative in
2010 and many other initiatives after that. Since then, and especially
since the Ukraine crisis began, the UK has been a leading security actor
in the Nordic-Baltic region, encouraging and including Finland and
Sweden in all sorts of military activities without binding them to mutual
security guarantees. Although Brexit seemed to potentially draw Britain
further away from Europe, our analysis demonstrates that the defence-
and security policy cooperation with countries like Finland and Sweden
actually has increased. Despite the confusion linked to the effects of
Brexit, as e.g. Johnson presents in his chapter in this volume, our find-
ings indicate that Britain is not distancing itself from Europe militarily.
On the contrary, Brexit seems to have strengthened Britain’s strategic
role in the Nordic-Baltic region.
The current setting is fundamentally different from during the Cold
War, when Finland and Sweden were neutral and in many ways ‘wild
cards’ (especially Finland). Now their roles in Western strategic thinking
are much more similar and important, as they are seen as key assets in the
region. With its diplomatic skills and initiatives, Britain has contributed
to the current situation in important ways, and nothing indicates that
this will stop. Should, however, Brexit lead to a shrinking British econ-
omy, this will also affect the UK’s ability to cooperate on security and
defence related issues. On the one hand, it can lead to less cooperation
due to economic restraints and strategic priorities. On the other hand,
defence and security cooperation is often driven by the potential eco-
nomic advantages of pooling and sharing resources. It therefore seems
more likely that Britain’s cooperation with the two non-aligned Nordic
states will develop further in the future, and that Britain will continue to
have a leading role in the defence of the Nordic-Baltic region.
Notes
1. Medvedev (2016).
2. Kronvall and Petersson (2012).
3. Aunesluoma (2003, p. 80).
4. Ibid., pp. 65, xiv.
5. Silva (1999).
6. Petersson (2012).
7. Johansson (1995).
8. Kronvall (2003).
9. Brundtland (1966).
10. Neutralitetspolitikkommissionen (1994), Petersson (2003),
Säkerhetspolitiska utredningen (2004), Dalsjö (2006), Gribbe (2011),
Holmström (2011).
11. Quoted in Aaltola (2009, p. 23).
12. Vehviläinen (2002, pp. 63–66).
13. Ruotsila (2005, p. 117).
14. Clements (2012, p. 264).
15. Rentola (2012, p. 172).
16. Ibid., p. 171.
17. Quoted in Aunesluoma (2012, p. 231).
18. Quoted in Penttilä (1991, pp. 8–9).
19. Penttilä (1991, p. 57).
20. Ries (1988, p. 185).
21. Penttilä (1991, p. 85).
22. Quoted in Penttilä (1991, p. 96).
23. Ries (1988, p. 191).
24. Ibid.
25. Penttilä (1991, p. 106).
26. Ries (1988, pp. 200–202).
27. Klinge (2003, p. 143).
28. Forsberg and Pesu (2016, p. 480).
29. Penttilä (1991, p. 152).
30. Petersson (2011), Cottey (2013), Dahl (2014).
31. Dahl (2012).
33. Ibid.
34. SOU (2017:16).
36. Karvinen and Puistola (2015, p. 144).
37. Lindley-French (2015, p. 111).
38. Karvinen and Puistola (2015, p. 144).

39. Egnell (2015).
40. Klinge (2003, pp. 161–162).
41. Salonius-Pasternak (2014, pp. 4–5).
42. Ibid., p. 5.
43. Forsvarsdepartementet (2002).
44. Ibid.
45. Regjeringen (2008).
46. Saxi (2016).
47. Forss and Holopainen (2015).
48. Ministry of Defence (2010).
49. Ibid.
50. Cabinet Office (2013).
51. Utrikesdepartementet (2013).
52. Johnston (2013).
53. SopS (49–50/2013).
54. NATO (2013).
55. Wang (2013).
56. US Navy (2014).
57. NATO (2017a).
58. Dahl (2018).
59. Dahl (2017, p. 81).
60. SopS (82/2014).
61. Ibid., § 1.11.
62. SUCBAS (2017).
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Nurmi (2016).
66. Tasavallan Presidentin Kanslia (2015).
67. Regeringen (2016).
68. Regeringskansliet (2016).
69. Fallon and Hultqvist (2016).
70. Regeringskansliet (2016).
71. Valtioneuvoston kanslia (2016).
72. Ibid., p. 19.
73. Orjala (2016).
74. Puolustusministeriö (2016a).
75. Puolustusministeriö (2016b).
76. Nurmi (2016).
77. British Embassy Helsinki (2016).
78. Puolustusministeriö (2016c).
79. NATO (2016).
80. Hybrid CoE (2017).
81. Valtioneuvosto (2017).
82. US Navy (2017).
83. Ministry of Defence (2017).
84. Nurmi (2017).
85. Ibid.
86. Puolustusministeriö (2017).
87. Ibid.
88. Saxi (2017).
89. Ulkoministeriö (2017).
90. NATO (2017b).
91. European Union External Action (2018).
92. Ulkoministeriö (2018), Regeringskansliet (2018).
93. Regeringen (2018).
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CHAPTER 10
The JEF as a Force Multiplier: The Example

of Joint Amphibious Response in the
Nordic-Baltic Theatre
Richard Cantrill and Eystein Lockwood Meyer
Introduction
British leadership in Northern Europe is welcomed by the Nordic-Baltic
states for several reasons, but the common interest in keeping it a stable
and prosperous region based on democratic and liberal values is clearly
the foundation, reflecting the national interests of the United Kingdom
as pointed out by Rob Johnson in Chapter 2. A more revisionistic and
assertive Russia is challenging the stability in the Nordic-Baltic region,
making Russia the major security concern in the Nordic and Baltic coun-
tries. Therefore, security solutions are clearly a key aspect of the current
willingness for increased cooperation and acceptance of British leader-
ship in the region. While bilateral relationships with the United States
are the ultimate strategic deterrence for the region (punishment), the
countries also seek deterrence by denial through hedging strategies using
R. Cantrill 
Royal Marines, London, UK
E. L. Meyer (*) 
Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College, Oslo, Norway

246 R. CANTRILL AND E. L. MEYER
multilateral options. Hence, as mentioned by Joakim Erma Møller and

Magnus Petersson in chapter eight, the Nordic-Baltic countries contrib-
ute to NATO, the EU, and the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)
with the expectation of quid pro quo military support in the event of a
hypothetical Russian aggression1 towards them.
To meet regional expectations, and to be seen as a legitimate military
leader in Northern Europe, the UK must possess credible and available
military capabilities. As Tormod Heier points out in Chapter 9, time is
a critical factor for the Nordic and Baltic states in a bilateral crisis with
Russia, due to lack of resilience. Credible support to the region then
requires timely employment of military forces that can, ideally, pre-empt
and deny a Russian incursion and territorial occupation until US support
arrives.2 Alternatively, the use of force might hamper, disrupt, and delay
Russian forces from reaching their objectives, and thereby deny them the
possibility to change posture from offensive to defensive operations, with
more favourable force ratio calculations. At the same time, it will cre-
ate diplomatic space to negotiate and compromise before the disaster is
complete.3
The availability of British forces at high readiness to provide such
intervention and support varies over time based on rotation plans and
other operational commitments. This chapter will limit itself to the
amphibious forces available, implicitly assuming that naval and air forces
are in place to deploy an amphibious force, with acceptable risk, within
the JEF construct (or a wider NATO/European and American amphib-
ious cooperation).4 In the event of a Russian aggression, the Nordic-
Baltic countries are likely to keep most of their military forces at home,
so the core JEF fighting force will consist of British and Dutch forces.
The landing force available at high readiness is thus likely to consist of 3
Commando Brigade’s Lead Commando Group and one Marine Combat
Group from the Netherlands, at a minimum, with possible additional
European and American support.
This chapter will address where such an amphibious force should be
employed within the Nordic-Baltic theatre of war for an optimal strate-
gic effect from a military perspective; we do not, however, prescribe a
‘Maginot line strategy’, acknowledging instead that in reality the mili-
tary logic will be pitted against political desire for freedom of action. The
conclusion drawn could then be used to inform capability development
and training and exercise priorities of the British, Dutch and other coop-
erating amphibious forces.
10 THE JEF AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER … 247
We first establish the criteria for ‘optimal military strategic effect’, and
then select the two most relevant areas of operations for comparison and
conclusion. Finally, we make some recommendations for host nation
preparations and the development of amphibious capabilities.
Several assertions in this chapter are based on interviews with serv-
ing and retired officers from the UK, the Netherlands, and the Nordic
and Baltic States, many of whom wished to remain anonymous. Other
assertions are the authors’ own opinions, based on their own experi-
ence as serving officers in the Royal Marines and the Royal Norwegian
Navy, respectively. The methodologies used are interviewing5 and
self-reflexivity6,7 and the views contained in this chapter are the sole
responsibility of the authors.
Optimal Military Strategic Effect

Since the Allied strategic ambition is to deny or delay a larger force from
reaching its potential objectives with a smaller force, the strategy must
be based on the philosophy of attrition8 and force ratio calculations to
make the opponent ask himself, ‘Do I have enough troops to attain my
objectives with acceptable risk of failure?’ Therefore, the highest strategic
impact on the opponent in this regard is based on where the use of the
amphibious force will fix the highest number of opposing troops.
The standard heuristic for calculating combat forces is the rule of 3:1
to succeed with an attack and 1:3 to succeed with a defence. Logically,
these should not be rules for success, but rather for stalemates. Of course
most military planners, including Russian ones, recognise this, and there-
fore they have historically used a doctrinal tactical force ratio from 3:1 to
4:1 for main attacks that must break through the defensive lines of the
opponent. In the final year of World War II, the superiority was some-
times as high as 9:1 for a critical breakthrough sector.9 Complicating
factors in force ratio calculations include joint force contributions and
differences in technology and technical and tactical options; therefore,
this chapter cannot draw an exact conclusion, but only indicate a poten-
tial force multiplying effect.
Risk is the result of an undesirable condition multiplied by the likeli-
hood of its occurrence. While every situation has risk attached, not every
situation is worth monitoring. However, situations that are characterised
by a high level of uncertainty clearly carry a high risk if the potential out-
come is unwelcome. This means that increasing the uncertainty for the
opponent will increase risk, which will have to be treated accordingly. In

military operations, risk can be treated through Ends, Ways and Means.
To force an opponent to treat their risk by changing their Ends—in
other words, reducing their ambition—is to achieve deterrence. Risk
can only be treated through adaption of Ways to a certain extent, due
to the capacity of the force allocated to a specific operation. Increasing
the Means will compensate for this, but there is always a limit to how
much capacity any actor has. Ensuring that the opponent’s force ratio
calculations, which are based on the acceptable risk, do not add up to the
available force will coerce a change in the Ends (and achieve deterrence),
or force the opponent to expose weakness that can be exploited. Since
the opponents’ uncertainty increases proportionally with our freedom of
action, it is important to put the amphibious force in a position where it
can maximise its freedom of action. And because the operating environ-
ment can be influenced by the joint functions of fires, manoeuvre, infor-
mation, and civil military cooperation, it is the opportunity for manoeuvre
that represents the largest potential for freedom of action. Manoeuvre is
the only military activity that can put forces in favourable positions and
occupy or regain territory; therefore, it is often the decisive action of a
military force.
The distinctive features of amphibious forces make them extremely
flexible. Exploiting sea, air, and land for mobility, amphibious forces are
able to support combat operations through manoeuvre of light protected
land forces with a combination of strength, protection, range, and speed
that no land force can match.10 The four types of amphibious operations
(demonstration, raid, assault, and withdrawal) can be applied to counter
enemy operations in the rear of the land forces, to strengthen the front
line, to secure a retreat, to support the front line with tactical flanking
manoeuvres, or to move further into the rear of the enemy to raid high-
value targets or assault in support of an operational turning manoeu-
vre.11 In the last case, in particular, it is challenging for the enemy to
know which of the two is the goal, or if the manoeuvre is a feint. In such
a situation, the logic of paradox also applies. If the enemy thinks that a
turning manoeuvre against them would be considered to have to high
risk, and is therefore unlikely, and they choose not to protect the area
with substantial forces, there is an opportunity to manoeuvre with less
risk and therefore manoeuvre may become a more likely option for the
attacking force. Hence, the enemy would have to take the full amphib-
ious force into calculation on all possible fronts (deep, front, and rear)
simultaneously until they know with certainty what the amphibious force
is committed to. It follows that the amphibious force’s freedom of action
to choose between all the different kinds of manoeuvre creates an uncer-
tainty the enemy can only fully compensate for with an increase in own
forces to meet the required force ratios on all fronts simultaneously. This
force-multiplying feature of amphibious forces is only true given a geog-
raphy that allows for the full range of amphibious manoeuvre options.
It is geography that determines what kind of mobility has utility. If
there is no shoreline, the use of landing craft for surface manoeuvres
loses its utility, and the ability to manoeuvre ashore in numbers, “pro-
tected” with light armour, will no longer be available. In this case, the
amphibious force will only have the attributes of light airborne troops
left. But just the presence of a shoreline does not provide the full
range of theoretical options for surface manoeuvre. It is the length of
the shoreline relative to the depth of the battlespace that determines
which options are available. And the distances are relative to the areas
the opposing tactical units cover. There will, for example, be no option
for a turning manoeuvre, unless there is a shoreline behind the enemy’s
tactical front-line troops. On a different scale than a possible scenario in
the Nordic-Baltic region, the historical example of Operation Chromite
with the landing in Inchon in Korea in 1950 illustrates the threat such
a manoeuvre represents to an actor with an exposed shoreline in the
operational rear area. Hence, geography that allows for the full range of
options for amphibious manoeuvres would be favourable to the employ-
ment of the amphibious force from a force-multiplying perspective.
Another factor that influences the space for manoeuvre is the enemy.
The positioning of troops ashore in combination with artificial obstacles
along the shoreline and supported by naval, air and special forces in a
layered Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) defence will of course influ-
ence accessibility for amphibious forces. A break-in battle to get ashore
will not be preferable, as it risks losing too much combat power before
manoeuvre can be converted into an actual effect on the ground, or
indeed threatening the overall endeavour of delivering combat power
from sea to land. The British assessment of Operation Corporate in the
Falklands War in 1982 included a clear statement from General Julian
Thomson, who commanded the landing force during the operation:
‘Landing without achieving air superiority was a risky undertaking, and
should not be repeated in future …’.12 Despite often being cut off by
commanders and staff officers when planning operations, leading them
to discard amphibious options, the quote continues: ‘… unless it is

absolutely unavoidable, as was the case in this operation.’13 Might this
also be the case in the event of a Russian incursion? The Russians clearly
has a vote when it comes to where and when an amphibious manoeuvre
is possible, but this influence goes both ways and is highly dependent on
the risk the Allies is willing to take.
The following factors therefore constitute the criteria for ‘optimal
military strategic effect’ around which different strategic options will
be assessed: access, the area’s importance for Russia, force-multiplying
effect, and the climate in the area and whether or not the amphibious
force is equipped and trained for it.
Strategic Options for Employment

of the Amphibious Force
In the hypothetical event of a Russian attack on the Nordic-Baltic

region, NATO would most likely be involved.14 NATO’s main effort
to regain and restore territory in the Nordic-Baltic region would nec-
essarily involve a train of heavy land forces from continental Europe.
It is in light of this strategy that the strategic options for the employ-
ment of the amphibious force in a time of crisis need to be assessed
(Fig. 10.1).
Fig. 10.1 Where should the amphibious force be employed?

Should the amphibious force be used to secure strategically well-

placed Iceland to support maritime access for American support to
Europe? Should it be used to secure the Danish straits to support fol-
low on access to the Baltic Sea? Should it be used to secure the island
of Gotland, strategically placed for those who want control of the Baltic
Sea region? Should it be used for direct support in a potential delay-
ing operation in the Baltic States or Finland or Sweden? Should it be
used to secure the reception, staging, onward movement, and integra-
tion (RSOMI) of NATO forces in the Baltic or Norway? Should it be
used to secure RSOMI of USMC from the prepositioned storage sites
in Norway?15 Should it be used in direct support of a potential delaying
operation in Northern Norway? Or should it be kept in reserve as a ‘fleet
in being’16 for later employment? This list is not exhaustive, but covers
some of the options most likely to be put on the table should the situa-
tion dictate.
The criteria for optimal military strategic effect suggest an operational
concept that emphasises opportunity for manoeuvre, threatening the full
depth of the battlespace in the operations area. Therefore, seize and hold
missions to secure distinct geographical features like Iceland, the Danish
straits or Gotland will not be further examined. The defensive mission to
support RSOMI will also clearly not exploit the full range of manoeu-
vres, and therefore not be pursued further. This pre-filtering leaves two
primary options for further comparison: the Baltic Sea area, includ-
ing direct support in a potential delaying operation in the Baltic States,
Finland or Sweden; and Northern Norway, including direct support in a
potential delaying operation in Northern Norway.
The Baltic
The Baltic Sea area is a confined space, sheltered from the Atlantic Ocean
by Scandinavia. The only maritime access is through the Danish Straits
and the Kiel Canal, together constituting a chokepoint that demands
vast resources within Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Mine Counter
Measure (MCM) capabilities to be used in a time of crisis. In the event
of war, the chokepoint would represent a very high risk for maritime
access to the Baltic Sea, and in a time of crisis, the attempt to sail forces
through the chokepoint could be the trigger that escalates the situation
to war (Fig. 10.2).
Fig. 10.2 Options for an amphibious force (ATG) in the Baltic Sea area
Russian land in the area consists of the Russian exclave Kaliningrad

and the coastline at the bottom of the Finish Bay near Saint Petersburg.
Russia has made Kaliningrad a fortress for its Baltic fleet, with an airbase
and short-range ballistic missiles (Iskander) capable of carrying nuclear
warheads.17 The exclave is protected by an air defence system, includ-
ing the S-400, which, with its 400-kilometer range, can potentially deny
airspace far into the neighbouring countries. Kaliningrad will act as a
springboard if Russia attempts to activate their A2/AD Bastion in the
Baltic Sea area. Although it is a strongpoint, the exclave has the natu-
ral disadvantage of vulnerable lines of supply. This is why a hypotheti-
cal Russian attack on the Baltic States would have to include the early
securement of an overland line of supply to Kaliningrad: namely the
‘Suwalki Gap’—the border strip separating Kaliningrad from Belarus.
The protection and sustainment of the exclave, and to keep NATO as
far away from Moscow as possible are the main ingredients of the impor-
tance of the region to Russia.
If the amphibious force were to operate in the Baltic Sea, there are a
number of possibilities as to where the landing force could be employed.
However, with the exception of the Finnish Bay, all the options consist of
the reinforcement of a tactical front line fighting against a heavy armoured

land force. This arrangement is not to the advantage of a lightly protected
force in a relatively flat landscape. If the Finnish Bay can be exploited for
surface manoeuvres, it might be possible to land the force ashore near
Hamina in Finland or Narva in Estonia behind the Russian tactical front
line and threaten the overland line of supply. Nevertheless, these options
are few and would require relatively few extra Russian forces to treat the
risk. Moreover, according to a RAND report, it would require approxi-
mately seven brigades, of which three are heavily armoured, with neces-
sary joint support to prevent Russia from reaching the outskirts of Tallin
and Riga within 60 hours.18 That is far from what the Baltic States and
the present NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) forces have avail-
able, and an ill-protected brigade would make little difference in a front-
line battle. Therefore, the force-multiplying effect of employing the
amphibious force in the Baltic Sea region would be minimal.
The brackish water in the Baltic Sea freezes to ice in the shallow parts
near the shoreline during the winter,19 reducing the space for surface
manoeuvres even more. While the landing force is equipped and trained
for all the climatic conditions they could face in the area, the same is
not necessarily true for all the warships forming the amphibious force.
Therefore, there could be times during the winter months that the
amphibious force simply would not be able to operate in the Baltic Sea.
Northern Norway
Maritime access to Northern Norway is possible from the open ocean or
along the Norwegian coastline. While the open ocean makes it possible
to use sensor and weapon systems to their maximum effect, the geogra-
phy of the coastline provides concealment and hampers detection (and
target data). The Russian A2/AD Bastion Defence in the Norwegian
Sea, if activated, would challenge both options (Fig. 10.3).
Russia has common border with Norway and maritime access to the
Barents and Norwegian Seas from the Kola Peninsula and the White Sea.
Russia has established a base for strategic submarines at Kola, which pro-
vides access to the vast ocean areas. The Russian Northern Fleet is there
to protect this strategic deterrent, and is supported with land, air, and
special forces. The Bastion Defence concept would naturally include con-
trol of at least a part of Northern Norway to be effective. The Russian
Bastion would most likely be activated if a crisis were to escalate into war
in the Baltics, linking the two operations areas together and creating a
Fig. 10.3 Options for an amphibious force (ATG) in Northern Norway
potential for spillover effects between them. Since the area provides the
ultimate strategic depth in military options, it is of existential importance
for Russia.
The geography of Northern Norway dictates that an enemy must
advance in parallel to the coastline, and an adequate Russian land grab
would inevitably expose a vulnerable rear area to a potential amphib-
ious manoeuvre. In this area, all types of amphibious operations are
possible against all parts of the battlefield, providing the optimal free-
dom of action for an amphibious force. During the winter months,
however, the presence of some ice in the bottom of the fjords due to
brackish water may hamper or prevent some options. Nevertheless, the
Gulf Stream along the coastline provides water temperatures the larger
ships can endure, and therefore the amphibious force can operate in the
area throughout the year. The marines in the amphibious force are also
equipped and trained for the arduous conditions in the area during the
dark winter months. However, without acclimatisation, the most extreme
conditions likely pose undue risk to the force and could be a temporary
‘show-stopper’ for amphibious operations. Nevertheless, considering all
the various factors, the force-multiplying effect would be close to optimal in
Northern Norway.
Comparing the Baltic and Northern Norway

Access to both areas would be challenging in a time of crisis, but access
to the Baltic through the Danish Straits and Kiel Canal chokepoint
would carry extreme risk in the event of escalation. Therefore, Northern
Norway is considered a more viable option for the deployment of
amphibious forces than the Baltic Sea.
Both areas are of high strategic importance to Russia. Nevertheless,
for Russia to decide between Kaliningrad and the Northern Fleet Bastion
that protects their strategic deterrence would be an obvious choice,
with the strategic deterrent being the priority. Hence, the willingness to
accept risk for the establishment of the Northern Bastion would be less
than for the Baltic Sea Bastion, and the willingness to compromise on
the force ratio calculations would be less in the North.
Even with the Russian A2/AD Bastions, geography and the climate
are still the most important factors for the freedom of action of the
amphibious force. While these factors would only provide a mar-
ginal force-multiplying effect most of the year in the Baltic Sea area,
they would provide a near optimal force-multiplying effect through-
out the year in Northern Norway. Therefore, the presence of the
amphibious force in Northern Norway would have the highest force-
multiplying effect against Russia. The effect would be further
improved with an early deployment that offers little or no opportunity
for Russia to seize territory and consolidate its position to achieve a
more favourable force ratio. The key question, then, is, What should
Norway, with allied support, do to shape the battlespace for an opti-
mal timely employment of the amphibious force? And further, What
should the amphibious force do to improve its utility in Northern
Norway?
Shaping the Battlespace for Early Employment

of the Amphibious Force
Sea control, necessary for access to and within the operations area, is
imperative for the early deployment of the amphibious force. Local
knowledge of the area is important to exploit the best options avail-
able, and Norway should therefore ensure the Commander and the
staff of the amphibious force have access to this knowledge through
at least one embedded staff officer or liaisons. Further, the most
time-consuming tasks related to establishing sea control and shaping

should be carried out mostly by Norway. These tasks include Anti-
Submarine Warfare, Mine Counter Measures, and amphibious recon-
naissance. Command and control and intelligence-sharing arrangements
need to be agreed upon in advance. Certain logistic arrangements, like
Forward Air and Maritime Refuelling Points, and the protection of
those, could also reduce the employment time. And finally, the synchro-
nisation with Norwegian operations in the area would require at least
one embedded staff officer in the Norwegian Joint Headquarters and
liaisons to the tactical service headquarters, all with reliable and secure
ways of communicating with the amphibious force.
The key is shaping to provide freedom of action, which allows for a
choice of time and place of a potential decisive manoeuvre. The final
decision must be made as late as possible, synchronized with other
actions, and timed to exploit opportunities. This requires a capacity for
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) that covers all the-
oretical options, so the commander can weigh the options and pick the
best one at the last possible moment to achieve the most important prin-
ciple of war for offensive action: surprise.
Many people are unaware of the role of amphibious reconnaissance
and its contribution to freedom of action related to time and space.
When a landing beach is in danger of being compromised, reconnais-
sance is conducted in a covert/discreet manner during darkness at
both high and low tide. This is a task normally conducted by Special
Forces, and since 2004 the Norwegian Coastal Rangers have trained
as an integrated part of the British or Dutch amphibious forces dur-
ing their winter exercises in Norway and abroad, improving the overall
amphibious reconnaissance capacity. This has also led to a Norwegian
Amphibious Reconnaissance Unit consisting of Coastal Rangers
and EOD divers participating in the NATO Response Force in 2009
and 2016 as an integrated part of the Dutch amphibious force. This
increased capacity in amphibious reconnaissance increase freedom of
action with regard to simultaneous options for manoeuvre in Northern
Norway, thereby optimizing uncertainty for the enemy. Such a capacity
is also useful to create deception and can delay the enemy’s ability to
react with certainty, while making it possible to choose another option
if the landing site is compromised on very short notice. With all the
options for surface manoeuvre in Northern Norway, the amphibious
reconnaissance capacity should be sustained or increased to provide the

optimal freedom of action for the amphibious force.
How Can the Amphibious Force Improve Its Utility

in Northern Norway?
Freedom of action related to time and space is very much dependent on

the speed and range of surface vessels. The current Landing Craft Utility
(LCU) in service in both the Royal Marines and the Dutch Mariniers has
a maximum speed of 10 knots.20 This is slow compared to the Russian
Dyugon class’ 35 knots21 or the American LCAC’s more than 40 knots.22
The last part of the insertion (Ship-To-Shore/Objective Manoeuvre—
STOM) can actually be done by landing craft that can sustain a speed of
20–50 knots and can theoretically sail a distance of 300–1000 nautical
miles. That means a possible distance of 150 nautical miles between the
amphibious shipping to the landing beach without refueling. By establish-
ing Forward Maritime Refueling Points (FMRP) for the surface vessels
and Forward Air Refueling Points (FARP) for the rotary wings, the range
along a coastline can be extended as far as desired. Hence, it is possible
to conduct amphibious operations towards an operationally deep area
while the large amphibious shipping is kept at a necessary safe distance.
Therefore, the British and Dutch amphibious forces should upgrade their
surface manoeuvre capabilities to modern standards.
The amphibious force could also benefit from more training in the
challenging conditions of Northern Norway. The Royal Marines’ cur-
rent bi-annual training with a small part of the whole force only main-
tains a low level of the competence required for a rapid employment of
the amphibious force. More frequent training with a larger force would
improve the credibility of the force’s rapid response ability. Moreover,
the amphibious forces should familiarise themselves with as many options
for manoeuvre as possible from Kirkenes to Narvik, while simultaneously
demonstrating resolve. The Norwegian policy of balancing reassurance
with deterrence would probably not allow a full-scale demonstration,
but manoeuvres with small units should fall within the range of what is
considered acceptable in the current political climate. During these win-
ter deployments to Norway, further integration and cooperation with
related host nation units should be standard procedure, as it would
reduce the time needed for employment.
Conclusion
In the hypothetical event of a Russian aggression in the Nordic-Baltic
region, the available amphibious force should be deployed to Northern
Norway. The main reasons for this conclusion are the space to exploit supe-
rior ability to manoeuvre with the amphibious force and the proximity of
the strategically most important area for Russia. Of all the options assessed
in this chapter, this one will create the highest strategic force-multiplying
effect against Russia in the Nordic-Baltic theatre. If the deployment of the
amphibious force to Northern Norway made it necessary for Russia to
send an extra division to the front, the spillover effect would be formida-
ble. It would mean potentially one Russian division less in the main front
against a NATO counter offensive to regain the Baltic. Using the force
ratio heuristic of 3:1, this in turn would mean three fewer NATO divi-
sions would be required in the main effort. While this is only indicative,
the numbers are significant with an even smaller force-multiplying effect.
Therefore, to say that one amphibious brigade has the value of three divi-
sions is perhaps a bit tendentious, but not necessarily incorrect. Such a
’Churchillian strategy‘, fixing a larger force with a smaller one in the stra-
tegic flank to weaken the main front, has proven valuable before23 and is
likely to be of great importance in the future. It could be said that rapid
response by a UK-led amphibious force is crucial to an overall allied strat-
egy for dealing with aggression against the Nordic-Baltic region.
Further, to improve the credibility of a strategy like the one described,
it is recommended that landing craft in particular be upgraded to
improve their high-speed and long-range capabilities; that Norway pre-
pare locally, in cooperation with allies, for the rapid establishment of nec-
essary sea control and shaping for the insertion of the amphibious force,
including sustained or increased capacity for amphibious reconnaissance
to provide the optimal freedom of action for the amphibious force; and
that the range of manoeuvres be tested, developed, and demonstrated
during exercises.
Notes
1. Aggression: Hostile or violent behavior or attitudes toward another; readi-
ness to attack or confront, i.e. a crisis that is in danger of escalation.
2. The US will have to move the majority of required troops and equipment
8–10,000 km, expected to take at least 4–5 weeks before they are ready
for combat in Europe.
3. Heier, T., Norges forhold til Russland, Dagens Næringsliv, Oslo, December
18, 2017.
4. The European Amphibious Initiative or the outcome of the Commander
Marine Corps Europe and Africa’s Amphibious Leaders Expeditionary
Symposium could constitute the framework for such an operation as well.
5. Davies, P., Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of
Elite Interview Data in the Study of Intelligence and Security Services,
Politics (Vol. 21, No. 1, 2001), pp. 73–80.
6. See Carreiras, H. et  al. (eds), Researching the Military (London:
Routledge, 2016).
7. Hudson, P., and Roberts, P., “The UK and the North Atlantic: A British
Military Perspective”, in NATO and the North Atlantic Revitalizing
Collective Defence, edited by John Andreas Olsen, RUSI Whitehall Paper
87, London, 2017, p. 76.
8. Milevski, L., “Grand Strategy Is Attrition. The Logic of Integrating
Various Forms of Power in Conflict”, in Forsvarets Stabsskole, Militære
Studier Special Edition 2017, p. 163.
9. Wardak, G. D. et al., The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet
General Staff Academy 3: Issues of Operational Art (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 1992) p. 301.
10. This is only true when embarked. The minute the light force lands, it
looks rather weak, slow and range-limited, compared to an armored
force.
11. A turning manoeuvre cuts off the lines of supply for the opponent and
forces him to retreat or establish a new tactical front to restore control of
the logistical support to the main front.
12. Thomson, J., “Falkland Islands—Operation Corporate”, May–June
1982, in Amphibious Assault—Manoeuvre from the Sea, edited by Tristan
Lovering, Seafarer Books, Suffolk, 2007, p. 465.
13. Thompson, p. 465.
14. Even though Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO, the region
is institutionally and economically intertwined and it is, for all practical
purposes, impossible not to trigger a NATO mobilisation.
15. Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N).
16. A fleet of naval vessels that because of its mere existence is a factor in the
calculations of opposing strategists even though it is inactive or appears
to be immobilized. Merriam Webster Dictionary. https://www.merri-
am-webster.com/dictionary/fleet%20in%20being. Accessed 5 March
2018.
17. BBC, “Kaliningrad: New Russian Missile Deployment Angers Nato”,
BBC News Channel, 22 November 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-38070201. Accessed 22 December 2017.
18. Shlapak, D. A., and Johnson, D. W., Reinforcing Deterrence on

NATO’s Eastern Flank—Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, RAND
Corporation, 2016, pp. 1–2.
19. Finnish Meteorological Institute, Baltic Sea Ice Winters. http://en.ilmati-
eteenlaitos.fi/baltic-sea-ice-winters. Accessed 22 December 2017.
20. Wikipedia, Landing Craft Utility. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Landing_Craft_Utility#LCU_Mk.9. Accessed 22 December 2017.
21. Wikipedia, Dyugon-Class Landing Craft. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Dyugon-class_landing_craft. Accessed 11 January 2018.
22. Wikipedia, Landing Craft Air Cushion. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Landing_Craft_Air_Cushion. Accessed 22 December 2017.
23.
The Mediterranean Strategy and amphibious commando raids against
Norway during World War II drew German forces away from Northern
France and the Eastern Front in the several hundreds of thousands.
Bibliography
BBC. (2016). Kaliningrad: New Russian Missile Deployment Angers Nato, BBC
News Channel, 22 November 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-eu-
rope-38070201. Accessed 22 December 2017.
Carreiras, H. et al. (eds) (2016). Researching the Military. London: Routledge.
Davies, P. (2001). Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of
Elite Interview Data in the Study of Intelligence and Security Services, Politics
(Vol. 21, No. 1, 2001).
Finnish Meteorological Institute. Baltic Sea Ice Winters. http://en.ilmatieteenlai-
tos.fi/baltic-sea-ice-winters. Accessed 22 December 2017.
Heier, T. (2017). Norges forhold til Russland, Dagens Næringsliv, Oslo,
December 18, 2017.
Hudson, P., and Roberts, P. (2017). The UK and the North Atlantic: A British
Military Perspective, in NATO and the North Atlantic Revitalizing Collective
Defence, edited by John Andreas Olsen. London, RUSI Whitehall Paper 87.
Merriam Webster Dictionary. (2018). https://www.merriam-webster.com/dic-
tionary/fleet%20in%20being. Accessed 5 March 2018.
Milevski, L. (2017). Grand Strategy Is Attrition. The Logic of Integrating Various
Forms of Power in Conflict, in Forsvarets Stabsskole, Militære Studier Special
Edition 2017.
Shlapak, D. A., and Johnson, D. W. (2016). Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s
Eastern Flank—Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics, RAND Corporation.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html. Accessed 24
May 2018.
Thomson, J. (2007). Falkland Islands—Operation Corporate, May–June 1982,

in Amphibious Assault—Manoeuvre from the Sea, edited by Tristan Lovering.
Suffolk: Seafarer Books.
Wardak, G. D. et al. (1992). The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet
General Staff Academy 3: Issues of Operational Art. Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press.
Wikipedia. Dyugon-Class Landing Craft. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Dyugon-class_landing_craft. Accessed 11 January 2018.
Wikipedia. Landing Craft Air Cushion. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Landing_Craft_Air_Cushion. Accessed 22 December 2017.
Wikipedia. Landing Craft Utility. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landing_
Craft_Utility#LCU_Mk.9. Accessed 22 December 2017.

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THE UNITED KINGDOM’S

DEFENCE AFTER BREXIT

ISBN 978-3-319-97168-1 ISBN 978-3-319-97169-8 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018950558

Cover credit: Greg Blatchford/Alamy Stock Photo

The United Kingdom Chief of the Defence Staff

London, UK Sir Stuart Peach, GBE, KCB, ADC, DL

This book project grew out of our interest in military integration in

cooperation with France. Indeed, cooperation with France deepened in

Oxford, UK Rob Johnson

Part I Britain’s Partnerships

2 UK Defence Policy: The ‘New Canada’

3 The US–UK Special Relationship and the “Principled

4 ‘You Don’t Hear the Word Britain Anymore’:

5 Franco-British Defence Co-operation in the Context

6 British-German Defence and Security Relations After

7 A Special Partnership? The EU’s Military Ambition

Part II Britain’s Coalitions

8 Britain’s Joint Expeditionary Force: A Force of Friends? 189

9 Sweden, Finland, and the Defence of the Nordic-Baltic

10 The JEF as a Force Multiplier: The Example of Joint

Col. Richard Cantrill, O.B.E., M.C. is a Colonel in the Royal

Dr. Rob Johnson is the Director of the Changing Character of War

Dr. Andrew A. Michta is the Dean of the College of International and

Fig. 10.1 Where should the amphibious force be employed? 250

Table 5.1 Detailed model of the UK’s two roles in defence

Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary

© The Author(s) 2019 1

internationalism, and there were exaggerated references to Brexit as one

Brexit: Defence and Security in the Negotiations

EU proposal seemed to raise the possibility of the ugly conflict starting

The EU’s position, however, seemed likely to be counter-productive,

How Is Britain’s Defence Role Changing? A Look

and greater authority for the European Commission leadership. Fears of

characteristically, he failed to consult the public or colleagues on his pol-

at the time, but contributed to the general sense of disagreement over

on terror.8 Britain remained close to the United States, maintaining its

In purely technological terms, Britain and other Western countries

statements. Attempts to conduct long term investigations are left behind

Outline of the Chapters

Britain’s strategy has sought consistently to protect its constitution,

with likeminded European powers are the hallmark of America’s new

would be more marked from 2020 onwards in the event of a “hard

joining JEF, as seen from a UK and partner-state perspective? The analy-

UK national interests, foreign policy and strategic requirements are

war-fighting. France instead pursues industrial policy in defence in the

UK as the most likely partner (in terms of size of commitment) on oper-

of pivotal importance in deterring Russia in the Baltics and Poland, (but

10. Report of the Iraq Enquiry, 12 vols, https://www.gov.uk/government/

UK Defence Policy: The ‘New Canada’

The EU referendum of 2016 was a landmark in Britain’s foreign r­ elations.

© The Author(s) 2019 33

countries, including Sweden (a non-NATO state). The UK prime

a parliamentary select committees for defence, intelligence, and procure-

which placed it in a damaging existential conflict. In 1956, Britain was

None of these priorities necessarily means membership of the European

It caused a storm of protest, but an agreement had been concluded at

The United Kingdom Chief of the Defence Staff

Fig. 10.1 Where should the amphibious force be employed? 250

Table 5.1 Detailed model of the UK’s two roles in defence

Brexit: Defence and Security in the Negotiations

Outline of the Chapters

10. Report of the Iraq Enquiry, 12 vols, https://www.gov.uk/government/

The EU referendum of 2016 was a landmark in Britain’s foreign r elations.

The Domains for UK Strategy

Conclusions and a Look Ahead

5. Christopher L. Elliott, High Command: British Military Leadership in the

The US–UK Special Relationship and the

The New US Strategy and the Wagers of Bilateralism

2. National Security Strategy of the United States of America: December 2017.

15. “Germany to Expand Bundeswehr to Almost 200,000 Troops,” Deutsche

Pre-Brexit Preferences and Assumptions

25. US Department of Defense, ‘Remarks by Secretary Carter at the

41. James Blitz, ‘Trump’s Tweets Raise Fresh Brexit Questions’, Financial

57. Adam Svendsen, ‘“Strained” Relations? Evaluating Contemporary Anglo-

Explaining the UK’s Dual Role in Its Partnership

Status Quo of the Military “Leading Role”

Table 5.2 Companies involved in building the Taranis and Neuron UCAV

Table 5.3 The three main European arms projects under waya