GR NO.

193548
ROSETTE LERIAS V. CA, PROVINCIAL GOVT. OF SO. LEYTE
APRIL 08, 2019

Doctrine of the Case

The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall be issued if it shows a clear legal right to be protected, otherwise, in absence
of such right, issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

Write Up on Facts

 The Sps. Nicanor and Salvacion Yñiges, filed a Civil Case before the RTC a complaint for Quieting
of Title to property with the application of the issuance of TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against the Provincial Government of So. Leyte covered by the TCT no. 1089 of the Registry of
Deeds;
 Province of So. Leyte denied all the allegations stated in the complaint;
 Parties entered into Compromise Agreement which served as basis of the RTC’s decision to rule in
favor of the plaintiff, Sps. Nicanor and Salvacion Yñiges as owners of the said property;
 Eventually, So. Leyte filed an annulment of judgment before the CA which claimed that the
Compromise Agreement has been entered into without the authority of the Provincial Governor
docketed as CA-GR CEB SP No. 03398.;
 Subsequently, the Sps. Yñiges donated the disputed property to the petitioner and Alfredo
Yñigesby virtue of Deed of Donation, as a result TCT 1089 was cancelled and TCT NO. T-9542
was issued in the names of the Petitioner and Alfredo Yñiges.
 While the action for annulment of judgment was pending in the CA, the petitioner filed a Writ of
Execution to execute the judgment of the RTC by Compromise Agreement, which prayed that So.
Leyte should vacate the property and deliver the same the victors in suit.
 In order to thwart the Writ of Execution issued by the RTC, So. Leyte applied for TRO and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the CA enjoining the RTC and its sheriff from enforcing the judgment
by compromise;
 The CA then decided in favor of So. Leyte, which the court held that the former had a clear legal
right to be protected;
 The petitioner has filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied;
 Thus the petitioner files a special civil action before the SC Petition for Certiorari which seeks to
nullify the resolution promulgated by the CA, which court issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
CA- GR SP No. 03398, thus enjoining the RTC of Maasin, So. Leyte whereby implemented the
Writ of Execution in Civil Case No. R-2896, upon which motion that CA has gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE

WETHER OR NOT THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
RULING

The SC held in favor of the Petitioner, under Rule 58, Sec. 3 which enumerates the instances when a Writ of
preliminary Injunction is proper, to wit:

Rule 58, Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be granted when it
is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act
or acts either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

It is necessary for the applicant of the remedy of injunction to prove the following in order to obtain injunctive relief,
namely:

(1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;

The court also said that of utmost importance is the existence of a clear and unmistakable right to be protected on
the part of the applicant. This is because injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or
future rights.
Injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse (not an actual right) and which may never arise, or to restrain an
act which does not give rise to a cause of action. In short, the showing must be made of an existing actual right to be
protected and of the acts against which the writ is to be directed as violative of said right.

Although overwhelming evidence has not been necessary to establish the existence of the right to be protected,
jurisprudence requires mere prima facie evidence of the right to be presented, or such evidence as, in the judgment
of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense
and which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.[14] According to Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI
Bank, the evidence presented must show clearly that the applicant's right exists and that no doubt lingers as to the
existence of such right, thus,
the plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction must further establish that he or she has a present and
unmistakable right to be protected; that the facts against which injunction is directed violate such right; and there is a
special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence of proof of a legal right and
the injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified. Thus,
where the plaintiff's right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not proper.
The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary
injunction.
We find and rule that conformably with the foregoing standards Southern Leyte's right to be protected by injunction
was not established, or was not shown to exist.
Southern Leyte's claim to have owned the property since 1918 was supported only by the tax declaration. In contrast,
the petitioner's ownership was registered under the Torrens system (TCT No. T-9542). The latter should be preferred
because her Torrens certificate was evidence of her indefeasible title to property as the person whose name
appeared thereon.
Indeed, the registration of title under the Torrens system was a quieting of the title to the land in question. Her
ownership was consequently neither doubtful nor disputable, but certain and settled. At any rate, the law expressly
made her certificate of title, being indefeasible, not subject to collateral attack, but only to a direct attack.

It is worthy to note that Southern Leyte itself admitted the petitioner's ownership of the property in the compromise
agreement as well as in Sanggunian Panlalawigan Resolution No. 070, Series of 2003. The admission precluded
Southern Leyte from asserting the contrary, including disputing the right of the petitioner to the enforcement of the
judgment by compromise by the writ of execution. That Southetn Leyte has challenged the compromise agreement in
the CA did not diminish her admitted right.

The CA stated that Southern Leyte's actual possession of the property gave rise to the disputable presumption of
ownership. The statement was inherently fallacious because the presumption of ownership could not arise in the face
of the ownership of the petitioner being already registered under the Torrens system.

Lastly, the CA ratiocinated that Southern Leyte was entitled to the continued occupation of the property despite the
ownership already adjudged in favor of the Spouses Yñiguez. The CA declared that Southern Leyte's right of
occupation must be protected. Such declaration was unwarranted, however, for the occupation of the property by
Southern Leyte, even if it was true, could not prejudice the petitioner's registered ownership unless Southern Leyte's
possession was based on some other right that must be respected, like that of a lessee. Yet, the CA nowhere
mentioned by what right Southern Leyte was entitled to remain in possession. In short, Southern Leyte's right to
remain in possession was either doubtful or non-existent; hence, the issuance of the injunctive relief was improper.

Injunction is the strong arm of equity. This transcendent or extraordinary remedy should not be lightly indulged in but
should be used sparingly and only in a clear and plain case.[20] The power of the courts to issue injunctions should
be exercised sparingly, with utmost care, and with great caution and deliberation. The objective of preliminary
injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be fully heard. The injunction, being a
preliminary remedy, must not resolve the merits of the main case pending the trial, for it is not the function of
preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a case,or to decide controverted facts.

Accordingly, the CA gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of its discretion. Grave abuse of
discretion is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the
whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law.[24] Here, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
without a clear right to be protected amounts to an arbitrary exercise of power that a writ of certiorari can correct.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ANNULS the Resolutions promulgated on July 8, 2009
and June 29, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 03398 for being issued with grave abuse of
discretion; DISSOLVES and LIFTS the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals; INSTRUCTS the
Court of Appeals to act on C.A.-G.R. SP No. 03398 with dispatch; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of
suit.

SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo and Carandang, JJ., concur.
Del Castillo and Jardeleza, JJ., on leave.