Galang V Reyes
Galang V Reyes
Galang V Reyes
FACTS: Conrado S. Reyes and Fe de Kastro Reyes (The Reyeses) alleged that they owned two properties: (1)
a subdivision project known as Ponderosa Heights Subdivision (Ponderosa), and (2) an adjoining property
covered by TCT No. 185252, with an area of 1,201 sq.m.; that the properties were separated by the
Marigman Creek, which dried up sometime in 1980 when it changed its course and passed through
Ponderosa; that spouses Crispin and Caridad Galang (The Galangs), by employing manipulation and fraud,
were able to obtain a certificate of title over the dried up creek bed from (DENR), through its Provincial
Office (PENRO); that, specifically, the property was denominated as Lot 5735, Cad 29 Ext., Case-1, with an
area of 1,573 sq.m. covered by OCT No. P-928; that they discovered the existence of the certificate of title in
through their caretaker, Federico Enteroso (Enteroso); that prior to such discovery, Enteroso applied for the
titling of the property, as he had been occupying it since 1968 and had built his house on it; that, later, Enteroso
requested the Reyeses to continue the application because of financial constraints on his part; that they
continued the application, but later learned that the application papers were lost in the Assessor’s Office; and
that as the owners of the land where the new course of water passed, they are entitled to the ownership of the
property to compensate them for the loss of the land being occupied by the new creek.
The Galangs in their Answer7 denied that the land subject of the complaint was part of a creek and countered
that OCT No. P-928 was issued to them after they had complied with the free patent requirements of the
DENR, through the PENRO; that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in possession, occupation,
cultivation, and ownership of the land for quite some time; that the property described under TCT No. 185252
belonged to Apolonio Galang, their predecessor-in-interest, under OCT No. 3991; that the property was
transferred in the names of the Reyeses through falsified document; that assuming ex gratia argumenti that the
creek had indeed changed its course and passed through Ponderosa, the Reyeses had already claimed for
themselves the portion of the dried creek which adjoined and co-existed with their property; that Enteroso was
able to occupy a portion of their land by means of force, coercion, machinations, and stealth in 1981; that such
unlawful entry was then the subject of an Accion Publiciana before the RTC of Antipolo City (Branch 72); and
that at the time of the filing of the Complaint, the matter was still subject of an appeal before the CA, under CA-
G.R. CV No. 53509.
On September 1997, the Reyeses filed a case for the annulment of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-928
against spouses the Galangs with the RTC Antipolo. In its Decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack
of cause of action and for being an erroneous remedy. The RTC stated that a title issued upon a patent may be
annulled only on grounds of actual and intrinsic fraud, which much consist of an intentional omission of fact
required by law to be stated in the application or willful statement of a claim against the truth. The RTC added
since the land was presumably public land, only the State can institute an action for the annulment of the title
covering it.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and ordered the cancellation of OCT No. P-928
and the reconveyance of the land to the Reyeses. The CA found that the Reyeses had proven by
preponderance of evidence that the subject land was a portion of the creek bed that was abandoned through
the natural change in the course of the water, which had now traversed a portion of Ponderosa. As owners of
the land occupied by the new course of the creek, the Reyeses had become the owners of the abandoned
creek bed ipso facto. Inasmuch as the subject land had become private, a free patent issued over it was null
and void and produced no legal effect whatsoever. The Galangs moved for a reconsideration, but their motion
was denied in a Resolution dated October 6, 2008.
ISSUES: Whether or not the CA’s decision which deviated from the findings of fact of the Trial Court and
applying Art. 420 in relation of Art. 461 of the NCC can be sustained.
RULING: The CA decision in applying Art. 420 in relation to Article 461 is correct, but it cannot be sustained.
Article 461 of the NCC provides that “River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion
to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same
by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed”. If
such property was the former bed of a creek that changed its course and passed through the property of the
claimant, then, pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of course
was automatically acquired by the claimant by clear and convincing evidence. Before reaching such
conclusion, the claimant must prove three key elements that the creek indeed changed its course without
artificial or man-made intervention. These are: (1) the old course of the creek, (2) the new course of the creek,
and (3) the change of course of the creek from the old location to the new location by natural occurrence. In
this regard, the Reyeses failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the old course, its natural
abandonment and the new course. It is not clear whether or not the Marigman Creek dried-up naturally
back in 1980. Neither did private respondents submit any findings or report from the Bureau of Lands or the
DENR Regional Executive Director, who has the jurisdiction over the subject lot, regarding the nature of
change in the course of the creek’s waters. Worse, what is even uncertain in the present case is the exact
location of the subject matter of dispute. This is evident from the RTC’s decision which failed to specify which
portion of the land is actually being disputed by the contending parties. Since the propriety of the remedy taken
by private respondents in the trial court and their legal personality to file the aforesaid action depends on
whether or not the litigated property in the present case still forms part of the public domain, or had already
been converted into a private land, the identification of the actual portion of the land subject of the controversy
becomes necessary and indispensable in deciding the issues herein involved. Moreover, during cross-
examination, Conrado S. Reyes admitted that the plan surveyed for Fe de Castro Reyes and Jose de Castro,
was prepared by a geodetic engineer without conducting an actual survey on the ground:
The conflicting claims here are (1) the title of the Galangs issued by the DENR, through the PENRO, and (2)
the claim of the Reyeses, based on unsubstantiated testimony, that the land in question is the former bed of a
dried up creek. As between these two claims, this Court is inclined to decide in favor of the Galangs who hold a
valid and subsisting title to the property which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court presumes
to have been issued by the PENRO in the regular performance of its official duty.
The bottom line here is that, fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment
of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, with mere
preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact which must be proved. 22
In this case, the allegations of fraud were never proven. There was no evidence at all specifically showing
actual fraud or misrepresentation. Thus, the Court cannot sustain the findings of the CA.
Hence, the petition is granted. The finding of the CA is reversed and set aside. The case in the RTC is
dismissed for lack of merit.