Daleon's Doctrine Is Affirmed Which States That "While An Acquitted Accused May in Appropriate

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G.R. No.

L-30772 October 29, 1971


PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. FELIX R. DOMINGO and JUAN MAFE
Author: Guzman, Diane Joy J.

DOCTRINE:
Daleon’s doctrine is affirmed which states that “While an acquitted accused may in appropriate
cases claim payment of back salaries during the period of his suspension, or reinstatement in
the case of his dismissal, his relief lies not in the same criminal case wherein he is acquitted but
in the proper administrative or civil action prescribed by law.”

Consigna case is only the exception to the general rule, as the acquittal of the accused is not
based on “reasonable doubt”, but on “absolute lack of evidence”. Daleon’s doctrine is not
applicable because in the case of malversation. conviction of the offense charged results
necessarily in a denial of such right to reinstatement in view of the penalty of disqualification
provided by law. Since disqualification follows conviction, reinstatement should also follow
acquittal.

FACTS:
Private respondent Juan Mafe, a mechanic in the employ of the Philippine National
Railways(PNR) was charged in an information for qualified theft filed with respondent court, for
having stolen one brass bearing from his employer's shop.

The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of the Railways' policeman who
apprehended the respondent on his way out with a traveling bag which contained the brass
bearing, which bag, respondent upon being stopped, had alleged to contain just dirty clothes
and rags; of the Manila Police Department patrolman who took down the respondent's
extrajudicial confession; and of the corroborative testimony of the Railways' security guard who
participated in respondent's apprehension; as well as of the said objects taken from respondent,
viz, the bag and brass bearing, and of his extrajudicial confession.

Respondent, on his part, disowned any criminal intent claiming he was on his way to return the
brass bearing and repudiated his extrajudicial confession, asserting that he was coerced into
signing the same without being allowed to read its contents, which were different from what he
stated at the police investigation.

Respondent court, ruled that "the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt" and rendered judgment "acquitting the accused on reasonable
doubt."

After promulgation of the verdict of acquittal, however, Mafe filed a motion for amendment of
respondent court's decision, alleging for the first time that respondent had already been
dismissed from the service of PNR because of the very incident subject matter of the criminal
charge of which respondent court had acquitted him, and praying that respondent court amend
its decision so as to include therein his reinstatement, with payment of back salaries and
restoration of all accrued rights and privileges.

Respondent court set hearing of the motion and ordered that the parties and the general
manager of the Philippine National Railways be notified thereof, and thereafter issued its
"amendatory decision" noting that there was no appearance nor opposition from the Railways at
the hearing and granting respondent's motion, by adding to the dispositive part of its original
decision that the General Manager of the PNR is ordered to reinstate the accused immediately
to his position from which he was dismissed and with payment of back salaries and restoration
of all accrued rights and privileges.

Hence, the present action filed by petitioner Philippine National Railways, after respondent court
had denied its motion to set aside the amendatory decision on grounds of lack of jurisdiction
over it and over the subject matter of reinstatement and back salaries and of lack of due
process.

Respondent court’s contention: It relied its decision based on the People vs. Consigna
wherein Consigna was acquitted of the charge of malversation of public funds "for absolute, lack
of evidence" which amounted to a judicial declaration that he was innocent and did not commit
the act charged.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court in a criminal case, in rendering a judgment of acquittal, may properly
decree the payment of salaries during the period of the accused employee's suspension from
the service, and where the employee was dismissed, order his reinstatement in the service - NO

HELD:
In a criminal proceeding against an accused, the judgment that the law authorizes to be
rendered, is either one of acquittal or of conviction with indemnity and the accessory penalties
provided for by law. The payment of salary of an employee during the period of his suspension
cannot, as a general rule, be properly decreed by the trial court in a judgment of acquittal. The
only civil responsibility that may be imposed by the court is that which arises from the criminal
act. Whether a defendant acquitted of a criminal charge is entitled to his salary during
suspension is not within the power of the court to grant in the criminal case where the defendant
is acquitted. Neither the Revised Penal code nor the Rules of Court on criminal procedure vests
in the court authority to grant such relief.

In People vs. Daleon, while an accused acquitted of malversation may claim payment of back
salaries during the period of his suspension and reinstatement, his relief lies not in the same
criminal case wherein he is acquitted but in the proper administrative or civil action prescribed
by law.

People vs. Consigna, relied upon by respondent court for its challenged amendatory decision,
provided an exceptional case out of the general rule. Consigna clearly had no applicability in the
case at bar, for herein respondent had been acquitted merely "on reasonable doubt" unlike
Consigna who was found innocent of the charge of malversation of public funds "for absolute
lack of evidence".

The Court expressly distinguished Consigna from the doctrine reiterated in Daleon: in that the
Court reiterated adherence to the ruling of Daleon that "the court has no authority to order
payment of the acquitted employee's salaries because his right to the same was not involved in
the case," but because it had been found that Consigna was innocent "for absolute lack of
evidence" and yet had been unfairly dismissed administratively as property clerk for the same
non-existent offense, ruled as an exceptional case that it was but just and equitable that
reinstatement should follow his acquittal, as follows: "This ruling of Daleon does not apply to
defendant's right in case of acquittal — to reinstatement to the position he was occupying at the
time of his suspension, because, as we have said heretofore, this matter would seem to be
involved in the case of malversation — albeit as a mere incident — because conviction of the
offense charged results necessarily in a denial of such right to reinstatement in view of the
penalty of disqualification provided by law. If this is the inevitable result of conviction,
reinstatement should also follow acquittal."

Thus, the rule governing cases of this nature may be restated as follows:

— The Court's jurisprudence uniformly holds that the trial court in the criminal case, has no
authority, in the event of an acquittal of the accused employee, to order payment of back
salaries.

— Daleon's doctrine is hereby reaffirmed. While an acquitted accused may in appropriate


cases claim payment of back salaries during the period of his suspension, or reinstatement in
the case of his dismissal, his relief lies not in the same criminal case wherein he is acquitted but
in the proper administrative or civil action prescribed by law.

— The reason for the rule is that generally acquittal in the criminal case does not carry with it
relief from administrative liability. The administrative case may generally proceed against a
respondent independently of a criminal action for the same act or omission and requires only a
preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the criminal charge, as in the analogous cases provided by Art. 33 of the Civil Code.

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