9/2/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOULME 157

VOL. 157, JANUARY 29, 1988 757

De Roy vs. Court of Appeals

*
No. L-80718. January 29, 1988.

FELISA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR.,
GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS
OFMARISSABERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ
BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Habaluyas and

Lacsamana cases, reiterated; Motion for extension of time to file
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
not allowed; Under the Habaluyas and Lacsamana cases, the 15-
day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be ex-tended.—This Court finds that the Court of Appeals
did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their
motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down
in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August
5, 1985, 138 SCRA 46], that the fifteen-day period for appealing or
for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated
on May 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and
clarified the rule. x x x Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases
Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. Nos. 73146-
53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went
further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Prospective application of the
Habaluyas rule.—Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R.
No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986, 144 SCRA 161], stressed the
prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation
of the grace period.

________________

* THIRD DIVISION.

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016cf2073d3aac2b2cd4003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/6
9/2/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOULME 157

758

758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Roy vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Same; Same; Non-publication of the Habaluyas

decision in the Official Gazette; There is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding; Duty of lawyer in active law practice to
keep abreast of Supreme Court decisions.—Petitioners contend
that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be
made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of
the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the
subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
Contrary to petitioners’ view, there is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme
Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
Civil Law; Damages; Petitioner is liable under Article 2190 of
the Civil Code for damages resulting from the total or partial
collapse of a building if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs.—This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals
committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial
court’s decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the
Civil Code, which provides that “the proprietor of a building or
structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs.”

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the

resolutions of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null

and void two (2) resolutions of the Special First Division of
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016cf2073d3aac2b2cd4003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 2/6
9/2/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOULME 157

the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v.

Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The
first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied
petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration and

759

VOL. 157, JANUARY 29, 1988 759

De Roy vs. Court of Appeals

directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case

had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27
October 1987 denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition
outright for not being verified as required by Rule 65
section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant
petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on
procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to
deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a
burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of
private respondents, resulting in injuries to private
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened
wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the
foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial
Region, Branch X X XVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M.
Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of
gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision
promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was
received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September
9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually
denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of
September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for
reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied
in the Resolution of October 27, 1987. This Court finds that
the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners’ motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of
judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016cf2073d3aac2b2cd4003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 3/6
9/2/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOULME 157

correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas

Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5,
1985, 138 SCRA 46], that the fifteen-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot
be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on May 30, 1986 (142 SCRA
208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to
wit:

760

760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De Roy vs. Court of Appeals

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution,

the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial
Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may
be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the
court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant
or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the

Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August
26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went
further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of
appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824,
Sept. 15, 1986, 144 SCRA 161], stressed the prospective
application of said rule, and explained the operation of the
grace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the

promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court’s Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which
the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on
February 27.1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired
on June 30.1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v.

Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28,
1986, 145 SCRA 306].
In the instant case, however, petitioners’ motion for
extension of time was filed on September 9,1987, more than
a year after the expiration of the grace period on June
30,1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016cf2073d3aac2b2cd4003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 4/6
9/2/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOULME 157

grace period. Considering the length of time from the

expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the
decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987,
petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion
for reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the
Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at
bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision
in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of
the Court of Appeals was

761

VOL. 157, JANUARY 29, 1988 761

De Roy vs. Court of Appeals

promulgated. Contrary to petitioners’ view, there is no law

requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a
condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty
of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast
of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published
in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s)
and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals
committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
trial court’s decision holding petitioner liable under Article
2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that “the proprietor
of a building or structure is responsible for the damage
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be
due to the lack of necessary repairs.”
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument
that private respondents had the “last clear chance” to
avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to
vacate the tailoring shop and, therefore, petitioners prior
negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of “last
clear chance,” which has been applied to vehicular
accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and

Bidin, JJ., concur.

Petition denied.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016cf2073d3aac2b2cd4003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 5/6
9/2/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOULME 157

Notes.—The new matters raised on appeal should have

been raised before the trial court, hence, the CA committed
no grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for
reconsideration. (Congressional Commercial Corp. vs. CA,
146 SCRA 90.)
Question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court
cannot be raised on appeal. (Dalman vs. City Court of
Dipolog City, Br. II, 134 SCRA 243.)

——o0o——

762

© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016cf2073d3aac2b2cd4003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 6/6