G.R. No.

18940 April 27, 1922

SHIOJI, petitioner,
vs.
Honorable GEO R. HARVEY, Judge of First Instance of Manila, PACIFIC MAIL
STEAMSHIP CO. and TOYO KISEN KAISHA, respondents.

Thos. D. Aitken for petitioner.

MALCOLM, J.:

Two questions are presented for decisions in this original proceeding by prohibition. The first
question, pressed by petitioner, related to the interference on the part of the lower court with a
judgment of the Supreme Court. The second question, urged by respondents, relates to the
validity of Rule 24 (a) of the Supreme Court. While, in our opinion, a resolution of the first point
is decisive of the case, and any discussion of the other point has no more than academic interest,
yet , having in mind the positions of the court; when one of its owner rules is assailed as
"unconstitutional, null and void," we have decided to give serious consideration to both
questions.

In logical sequence, there follows a statement of the case and the facts, an opinion on the two
points above stated, and the judgment.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS

In cause No. 19471 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, wherein S. Shioji was plaintiff, and
the Toyo Kisen Kaisah and the Pacific Mail Steamship Co., were defendants, judgment was
rendered on October 31, 1920, by Judge Concepcion presiding in the second branch of the court,
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants jointly and severally for the sum of
P19,533.49, with legal interest and costs. Thereafter, the defendants duly perfected an appeal by
way of bill of exceptions, to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, and the case was
docketed as R. G. No. 18592. 1 The date on which the bill of exceptions was filed in the office of
the clerk of the Supreme Court was February 16, 1922, while attorneys for the respective parties
received copies of the same on February 17, 1922.

In accordance with Rule 21 of the Supreme Court, the appellants had thirty days from the receipt
of the printed bill of exceptions within which to serve and file copies of their brief. This period
expired on March 19, 1922, without an extension of time within which to present it.
Accordingly, when on March 22 appellants filed a motion for an additional period, the court, on
March 24, 1922, denied the motion because it was filed out of time, and pursuant to Rule 24 (a)
dismissed the appeal. Subsequent order of the court on motions for reconsideration have
reaffirmed the order of dismissal, and have noted the exception of counsel.

The regular fifteen-day period fixed by the order of the court, of March 24, 1922, for the
issuance of judgment and the return of the records to the lower court, having expired, on April
12, 1922, the records was transmitted to the Court of First Instance of Manila. Execution was
then issued to enforce the judgment but prior to the levy the defendants in the case R. G. No.
18592, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila, docket No. 21905, based
principally on the allegation that the "judgment of the Supreme Court is unconscionable and was
rendered without due process of law, and that the rule (Rule 24 [a]) under which the judgment
was rendered, is unconstitutional, and being in conflict with law is null and void," in which they
prayed that a preliminary injunction forthwith issue enjoining the respondents from levying any
execution under the aforesaid judgment and that after hearing the injunction be made perpetual.
After judge Concepcion had singed and order for the transference of the case to the judge
presiding in Branch III, Judge Harvey issued the preliminary injunction in accordance with the
prayer of the complaint.

The countermove of the respondents in the injunction proceedings pending the Court of First
Instance was to file a complaint in prohibition in the Supreme Court, to compel the respondent
Judge of First Instance to desist from interfering with the execution of the judgment in case No.
19471 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and to issue an order revoking the previously
promulgated by him. The preliminary injunction prayed for as an incident to the complaint in
prohibition was immediately issued by the Supreme Court, and has been complied with by the
respondents herein. Counsel Petitioner herein moves for judgment on the pleadings.

A public hearing has been held and the case has been argued with marked ability by counsel for
both parties. The attorney for respondents was in a particularly delicate position, in that he must
attack the action of the court, but it is only fair to say that he has maintained toward the court the
respectful attitude which the ethics of his profession requires of him. We cannot, however,
follow counsel into the supercritical mazes of his argument, and must perforce our opinion to the
big issues.

OPINION

I. As intimated in the beginning of this decision, the primary question raised by petitioner
concerns the action of the Judge of First Instance in assuming the jurisdiction to interpret and
review judgment and order of the Supreme Court, and to obstruct the enforcement of the
decisions of the appellate court.

Lengthy elucidation of the proposition that he only function of a lower court, when the judgment
of a high court is returned to its, is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution, and that
lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the
higher court, would seem to be superfluous. A judge of a lower court cannot enforce different
decrees than those rendered by the superior court. If each and every Court of First Instance could
enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to
litigation, and judicial chaos would result. Appellate jurisdiction would be a farce if the Supreme
Court did not have the power of preventing inferior courts from meddling with decisions when
sent to them for compliance. Where a cause has been appealed from the Court of First Instance to
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, and a judgment rendered by the latter, no
interference therewith by the lower court can be tolerated through any proceedings other than
such as are directed by the appellate court. Until revoked by the Supreme Court of the United
States, the decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands must stand and be enforced.

The inferior court is bound by the decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into
execution according to the mandate. They cannot vary its, or examine it for any other
purpose than execution, or give any other or further relief, or review it upon any matter
decided on appeal for error apparent, or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much
as has been remanded. These are the words of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the early case of Sibbald vs. United States ([1838], 12 Pet., 488).

When a district court attempted to grant a new trial subsequent to the return of the mandate of the
United States Supreme Court, the trite but emphatic rule of the higher court was that "The district
court had no power to set aside the judgment of the Supreme Court, its authority extending only
to executing the mandate." (Ex parte Dubuque & Pacific Railroad [1864], 1 Wall., 69 See,
further, State ex rel. vs. Superior Court [1894] 8 Wash., 591; State ex. rel. Heirs of Gee vs. Drew
and Thompson [1886], 38 La. Ann., 274; In re Alexander [1911], 127 La., 854.)

What has been said is in justification of the preliminary injunction heretofore granted ordering
Judge of First Instance Harvey to desist from interfering with the execution of the judgment in
the case of S. Shioji vs. Toyo Kisen Kaisha, et al., and requiring him to revoke the injunction
order previously issued. We ought properly to stop here, because an attack on the validity of the
rules of the Supreme Court should not be initiated by collateral proceedings in a lower court, but
as before explained, we waive this phase of the case so as to do full justice the complainant and
so as to make a definite ruling on the point which he raises.

II. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Island is expressly authorized by statute to make rules
for regulation of its practice and the conduct of its business. Section 28 of the Judiciary Act (No.
136), grants to the members of the Supreme Court the power to "make all necessary rules for
orderly procedure in Supreme Court . . . in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which rules shall be . . . binding upon the several courts." The Code of Civil
Procedure, in turn, provides in its section 6, as follows:

The judges of the Supreme Court shall prepared rules regulating the conduct of business
in the Supreme Court and in the Courts of First Instance. The rules shall be uniform for
all Courts of First Instance throughout the Islands. Such rules, when duly made and
promulgated and not in conflict with the laws of the United States or of the Philippine
Islands, shall be binding and must be observed, but no judgement shall be reversed by
reason of a failure of the court to comply with such rules unless the substantial rights of a
party have been impaired by such failure.

The rules of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, drafted principally by Mr. Justice Willard,
were promulgated soon after the organization of the court of American occupation of the
Philippines. Amendments of the rules were announced from time to time. In 1981, a special
committee of three members of the Supreme Court was appointed by the court, to compile and
revise the rules of court, and the after long study, and after a number of public hearings, a craft
was presented, which was adopted by the court on October 2, 1918. These are rules which, with
a few minor amendments, are now in force.

The rules of the Supreme Court and the rules of the Courts of First Instance alike contain
provisions intended to facilitate the progress of judicial business. Of this nature, and of particular
interest here, are rules 21, 22, 23, and 24 of the Supreme court. The first mentioned rule, 21,
provides in mandatory language that "Within thirty days from the receipt of the printed record on
appeal or bill of exception the appellant shall serve upon the appellee errors and file thirty copies
thereof with the clerk." The following rule assign a similar period of time for the serving and
filing of the briefs of the appelle. Rule 23, likewise in mandatory language, provides that
"Motions for extension of time for filing of briefs must be presented before the expiration of the
time mentioned in rules 21 and 22, or within a time fixed by special order of the court. No such
extension will be allowed except on notice to the opposite party in accordance with Rule 13, and
for good and sufficient cause shown. Extensions may also be granted upon stipulation of counsel,
within reasonable limits." In reality, this was the rule which appellants failed to observe. Then
comes Rule 24 (a) specifically challenged in these proceedings, reading as follows: "If the
appellant, in any civil case, fails to serve his brief within the time prescribed by these rules the
court may, on motion of the appellee and notice to the appellant, or on its own motion, dismiss
the bill of exceptions or the appeal." The later rule, it may be observed, by the use of the word
"may", and in language quite similar to Rule 5, under "Briefs", of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States, confirms the discretionary power of the court to dismiss actions for
want of prosecution.

The practice of the court in the enforcement of its rules has been uniform. The court has gone
upon the assumption that although it retains the power of amendment, nevertheless, its is the
duty of the court to enforce its rules, to the best if its judgment, irrespective of the case, the
parties or the counsel. Extensions of time for the filing of briefs are daily granted. The first
extension ordinarily is for fifteen days, the second for ten days, and the third for five days; but an
unvarying prerequisite is that motions be presented before the expiration of the period. This
means that attorneys can have a full period of sixty days for the preparation of their briefs, and in
extraordinary cases, for good and sufficient reason, even this period will be enlarged. But if the
brief of the appellant is not filed within the thirty-day period, or if a motion for an extensions of
time is not filed before the expiration of this period, then such cases are removed from the
calendar, either on motion of appelle, or on the court's own motion.,

The Supreme Court is, of course, primarily the best judge of its own rules. It is, accordingly, of
interest to note what the court has heretofore said of the rules. In Paterno vs. City of Manila
([1910], 17 Phil., 26), rules 19 and 20 were held valid and the appeal was dismissed. In the
course of the decision, Mr. Justice Trent, speaking for the court, said that "That rules of this court
are few and simple. They are the laws of the court and must be obeyed until repealed, unless it
can be shown that they are in conflict with the laws of the United States or of the Philippine
Islands. . . . These rules mean something, otherwise they would not have been promulgated." Mr.
Justice Fisher, who drafted the new rules of the Supreme Court, in submitting the rules for
consideration, gave as principal change, "the discouragement of dilatory tactics by imposing
upon the moving party the duty of proceeding promptly under penalty of dismissal of the
appeal." In Salaveria vs. Albindo ([1919], 30 Phil., 922), it was said:
 The Rules of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands effective after the first day of
January, nineteen hundred and nineteen, were drafted with the primary object of
expediting justice. . . . On the supposition that the Supreme Court was, as it is a court of
appeal, period of time were fixed within which attorneys must act, not to urge on the
sluggard and the dilatory. If certain provisions of the rules were not followed
automatically the appeal would disappear.

The interpretation of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands is in substantial
accord with the interpretation of corresponding rules by the other courts. Rules of court
prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain held as absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of
business. The number of instances in which courts have, by rule, filled out the terms of the
statutes can be realized on turning to the encyclopedias. The reason for rules of this nature is
because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would
results, without rules governing practice, and designed to expedite the transaction of business.
Such rules are necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial
functions. (See 412 A. S. R., 639, notes.)

In other jurisdictions, there has been no doubt of the validity of such rules, and that failure to
comply with them may deprive the appellant of his right to the judgement of the appellate court.
For example, where the record was not filed by the appellant within the time prescribed by the
Rules of the United States Supreme Court, and the appellee filed a copy of it, the appeal was
dismissed upon his motion (U. S. vs. Fremont [1855], 18 How., 30.) Again, where a rule of the
Supreme Court of Florida limited the time to ten days after the return day of writs of error,
within which a motion to strike the records or a part thereof, can be made, and when a motion
was made after the lapse of such limited time, the court held that it could not entertain or
consider it. (McRae vs. Preston [1907], 54 Fla., 188.

Rules of court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law, if not in
conflict with positive law. (Inchausti & Co. vs. De Leon [1913], 24 Phil., 224.) The rule is
subordinate to the statute, and, in case of conflict, the statute will prevail. An instance is where
Congress expressly enabled the courts to make establish all necessary rules for the orderly
conduct of business, provided such rules were not repugnant to the laws of the United States, in
the great case of Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1), made the remark that "these
section give the court full power over all matters of practice. . . ."

Recurring now to section 28 of the Judiciary Law, and section 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which constitute the legislative authority for the promulgation of rules by the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands, it is to be noted, in the first place, that the court is given the power to
make all necessary rules for orderly procedure in the court, and for regulating the conduct of
business in the court. We apprehend that within this language would be included regulations
having to do with the preparation and filing of briefs. The law also provides that such rules shall
be binding and must be observed. The general limitation is, that the rules must not be in conflict
with laws of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The specific limitation is that no
judgment shall be reversed by reason of the failure of the court to comply with such rules, unless
the substantial rights of the party have been impaired buy such failure.
As the specific limitation in section 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not here in question,
since the Supreme Court is affirming and not reversing a judgment, the whole case comes down
to a determination of whether or not Rule 24 (a) is in conflict with any law of the United States
or of the Philippine Islands.

Respondents point out no provision of a federal statute which bears on the issue, and we know of
none. In addition to emphasizing that the rules prepared by the Supreme Court shall be "in
accordance with the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure," counsel specifically relies on
sections 2, 500, 502 and 503 of the Code.

A portion of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure is quoted by respondents, but we prefer to
set forth the entire section. It reads: "The provisions of this Code, and the proceedings under it,
shall be liberally construed, in order to promote its object and assist the parties in obtaining
speedy justice." We can conceive of no direct applicability of this provision of law, unless it be
that rules of court shall be liberally construed, and that the construction shall be such as to assist
the parties in obtaining speedy justice. In reality, it was the latter purpose which the court had in
mind when it laid down definite period for the filing of briefs, and held both the parties and the
court to a compliance therewith.

Portions of sections 500,502 and 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure are also quoted by
respondents. But it will be noticed in this connection, that these various sections speak of the
dismissal of bills of exceptions. There is no such question before us. Respondents undoubtedly
have a perfectly good bill of exceptions. Where they failed was in taking the next step
seasonably, with the result that the judgment of the trial court stands.

It is our holding that Rule 24 (a) is not in conflict with any law of the United States or of the
Philippines, but is a necessary rule for orderly procedure and for regulating the conduct of
business in Supreme Court. It is a rule which relates to a matter of practice and procedure over
which the Legislature has not exercised its power. It is a rule which does not operate to deprive a
party of any statutory right. It is a rule in harmony with judicial practice and procedure over
which the Legislature has not exercised its power. It is a rule which does not operate to deprive a
party of any statutory right. It is a rule in harmony with judicial practice and procedure and
essential to the existence of the courts. And, finally, it is a rule which must be enforced according
to the discretion of the court.

Independent of any statutory provision, we assert that every court has inherent power to do all
things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction.

Any misgivings one might entertain with the reference to the justice of this decision must
disappear when it brought to mind that the respondents herein already have had a day in court;
that the presumption of the Code on which they place so much reliance is always in favor of the
correctness of the judgment of the lower court, that an appeal is neither an inherent right nor a
necessary element of due process or law; that both bench and bar must be held to strict
accountability for the speedy administration of justice; that the stability of the whole judicial
structure would be shaken by the appellate court complacently permitting an inferior court to
reverse the judgment of the former; and that for the Supreme Court to purge counsel of his
negligence and to reinstate his cause would be merely to invite charges of favoritism and would
lead to never-ending confusion.

Counsel for the respondents speaks incidentally of his desire to have the validity of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Although we are aware of no constitutional question involved, in order again to give counsel all
the latitude possible, we will say that , on proper motion, and on presentation of a sufficient
supersedeas bond, the instant proceedings will be stayed in order to allow counsel, if he desire, to
take the case to the Supreme Court of the United States.

In corroboration of the foregoing, the writ prayed for is granted, and the preliminary injunction is
made permanent. Without special findings as to costs, it is so ordered.