Paramount Vinyl V NLRC

10/14/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 190
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 525

Paramount Vinyl Products Corp. vs. NLRC
*
G.R. No. 81200. October 17, 1990.
PARAMOUNT VINYL PRODUCTS CORPORATION,

petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND PARAMOUNT INDEPENDENT
WORKERS UNION, respondents.
Labor Law; Appeals; Motion for Reconsideration; For

purposes of determining its timeliness, a motion for
reconsideration may be properly treated as an appeal and
therefore, must likewise be filed within the ten-day reglementary
period.—An appeal from a decision, award or order of the labor
arbiter must be brought to the NLRC within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such decision, award, or order, otherwise, the
same becomes final and executory [Article 223 of the Labor Code].
And for purposes of determining its timeliness, a motion for
reconsideration may be properly treated as an appeal and
therefore must likewise be filed within the ten-day reglementary
period [The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 74191, December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 740; See also Camacho
v. CA, G.R. No. L-21850, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 531].
Same; Same; Perfection of an appeal within the statutory
period is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional.—Well-settled is
the rule that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or
reglementary period is not only mandatory, but also
jurisdictional. Failure to interpose a timely appeal (or a motion for
reconsideration) renders the assailed decision, order or award
final and executory that deprives the appellate body of any
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment [Cruz v. WCC, G.R. No. L-
42739, January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 445; Volkshel Labor Union v.
NLRC, G.R. No. L-39686, June 28,1980,98 SCRA 314; Acda v.
Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 51607, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA
306; Rizal Empire Insurance Group v. NLRC, G.R. No. 73140,
May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 565; MAI Philippines Inc. v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 73662, June 18, 1987,151 SCRA 196; Narag v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 69628, October 28, 1987, 155 SCRA 199; John Clement
Consultants, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 72096, January 29, 1988, 157
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016dc997609b2ed93e36003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/15
SCRA 635; Bongay v. Martinez, G.R. No. 77188, March 14, 1988,
158 SCRA 552; Manuel L. Quezon University v. Manuel L.
Quezon Educational Institution, G.R. No. 82312, April 19, 1989,
172 SCRA 597]. This rule "is applicable indiscriminately to one
and all since the rule is grounded on funda-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
526
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
mental consideration of public policy and sound practice that at

the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and award of
quasijudicial agencies must become final at some definite date
fixed by law" [Volkschel Labor Union v. NLRC, supra, at p. 322].
Although, in a few instances, the Court has disregarded
procedural lapses so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond
the reglementary period (See Flexo Manufacturing Corporation v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 55971, February 28, 1985,135 SCRA 145;
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Lariosa, G.R. No. 70479, February
27, 1989, 148 SCRA 187; Chong Guan Trading v. NLRC, G.R. No.
81471, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 831], the Court did so on the
basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends
of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof.
Lawyers; Attorney-Client Relationship; A client is generally
bound by the action of his counsel in the management of the
litigation.—No acceptable reason has been advanced and none
appears on record to excuse the tardiness exhibited by the
UNION. The UNION's claim that its right to seek a review of the
November 27, 1985 order was lost through the inadvertence or
refusal of its counsel of record is, at best, self-serving. The legal
consequences arising out of the failure of the UNION's attorney to
timely file a motion for reconsideration or appeal from the
November 27, 1985 order of the Labor Arbiter are binding upon
petitioner. A client is generally bound by the action of his counsel
in the management of a litigation, as by the attorney's mistake or
negligence in procedural technique [US v. Umali, 15 Phil. 33
(1910); Montes v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 48 Phil. 640
(1926); Inocando v. Inocando, 110 Phil. 266 (1960); Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 63372, June
28, 1983, 123 SCRA 203; Ayllon v. Sevilla, G.R. No. 79244,
December 10, 1987,156 SCRA 257]. Absent a clear showing of
fraud or excusable negligence on the part of the UNION'S counsel,
the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the foregoing
rule.
Labor Standards; Labor Relations; Backwages; An
unqualified award of backwages means that the employee is paid
at the wage rate at the time of his dismissal; the base figure to be
used in the computation of backwages should include not just the
basic salary, but the regular allowances that he has been receiving
such as the emergency living allowances and the 13th month pay
mandated under the law.—But there is merit in the third point
raised by respondents herein. The determination of the salary
base for the computation of backwages requires simply an
application of judicial precedents defining the term "backwages".
Unfortunately, the Labor Arbiter erred in this regard. An
unqualified award of backwages means that the employee is paid
527
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 527
at the wage rate at the time of his dismissal [Davao Free Worker
Front v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-29356, October
27, 1975, 67 SGRA 418; Capital Garments Corporation v. Ople,
G.R. No, 53627, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 473; Durabilt
Recapping Plant & Company v. NLRC, G.R. No. 76746, July 27,
1987, 152 SCRA 328]. And the Court has declared that the base
figure to be used in the computation of backwages due to the
employee should include not just the basic salary, but also.the
regular allowances that he had been receiving, such as the
emergency living allowances and the 13th month pay mandated
under the law [See Pan-Philippine Life Insurance Corporation v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 53721, June 29,1982,144 SCRA 866; Santos v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 76721, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 166;
Soriano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75510, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA
124; Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. NLRC, supra]. In his
computation of the amount of backwages, the Labor Arbiter
without legal basis excluded the ECOLA. It is on this score alone
that the Labor Arbiter's order dated November 27, 1985 should be
set aside. The Court holds that notwithstanding the belated
appeal by the UNION, the assailed order should be modified with
respect to the incorrect salary base used by the Labor Arbiter in
his computation of backwages. Where there is a patently improper
application and interpretation of the law on the part of
administrative officers who are tasked to perform quasi-judicial

functions, the Court will not hesitate to disregard procedural
rules so as to effect faithful adherence to that mandated under the
law.
PETITION for review from the decision and resolution of

the National Labor Relations Commission.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for
petitioner.
Ruben A. Aquino for private respondent.
CORTÉS, J.:
The controversy centers around the execution proceedings

of an action for unfair labor practice filed by private
respondent Paramount Independent Workers Union
(hereinafter referred to as UNION) against petitioner
Paramount Vinyl Products Corporation, docketed as
NLRC-NCR Case No. 5-2328-83.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On September 23, 1983, the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-
NCR Case No. 5-2328-83 declared petitioner guilty of
unfair labor practices for illegally shutting-down operations
at its Valenzuela
528

plant and locking out its workers on January 3, 1983, in

violation of the existing collective bargaining agreement
and Batas Pambansa Blg. 130. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to all of the foregoing, judgment is

hereby rendered declaring the defaulting respondent COMPANY
guilty of unfair labor practices as charged and ordering it to cease
and desist from further committing the same; and to reinstate the
more than 200 members of the complainant UNION to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and to pay them
backwages from January 3, 1983 until actually reinstated less
whatever separation benefits were received by those who were
forced to resign from the COMPANY.
SO ORDERED [Decision of the Labor Arbiter, p. 6, Rollo, p.
29].
Petitioner interposed an appeal to the NLRC, but the Labor

Arbiter's decision was affirmed on August 13, 1984.
Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with
this Court, which was dismissed on December 10,1984 for
lack of merit.
On April 29, 1985, the UNION filed with the Labor
Arbiter an "Urgent Motion and Manifestation", seeking to
expedite the issuance of a writ of execution. The motion
contained a computation of backwages and other
employment benefits due to about two hundred (200) union
members.
Petitioner then filed its comment to the UNION's motion
on June 18, 1985, claiming that fifty (50) of the members
found in the UNION's list have resigned and executed
releases, waivers and quitclaims in favor of the company.
Petitioner also sought the exclusion of fifteen (15) listed
union members who were no longer in its employ prior to
January 3, 1983.
Subsequently, the Acting Chief of the Research and
Information Unit [RIU] of the Ministry (now Department)
of Labor and Employment submitted on October 22, 1985 a
computation of the backwages due to one hundred thirty
seven (137) union members, in the total amount of
P1,977,371.50. The list of union members entitled to
backwages included twenty two (22) members who were
not yet reinstated as of September 20, 1985 and one
hundred fifteen (115) who were reinstated by petitioner
prior to the rendition of the Labor Arbiter's decision of
September 23, 1983.
A conference then was held between the parties on
November
529
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 529

11, 1985, wherein it appears that the UNION did not pose
any objections to the RIU report, save for its allegation that
three (3) union members had been inadvertently left out of
the report, and its request for the recomputation of the
backwages awarded to two (2) other listed members. On
the other hand, petitioner on November 21, 1985 filed its
formal comment to the RIU report, opposing certain
aspects of the socio-analyst's mode and method of
computation. Petitioner argued that: (1) the salary base for
the computation of backwages refers to the basic salary
only, excluding the ECOLA and 13th month pay; (2) the
period for computation of backwages should be reckoned

with from July 1, 1983 up to November 30, 1984 only, the
day its plant burned down resulting in the temporary lay-
off of several employees; (3) the computation of backwages
be based on actual working days instead of calendar-
working days, and on the basic daily wages then prevailing
at the time; (4) fifty-five (55) of the union members listed in
the RIU report who were reinstated voluntarily by
petitioner within the first six months after the shut-down
were not entitled to the award of backwages; (5) seventeen
(17) union members should be excluded from the RIU
report because they were no longer connected with the
company, or were transferred, or were under indefinite
suspension long before the January 3, 1983 shut-down;
and, (6) the computed backwages of six (6) other union
members should be reduced.
Based on the RIU report, and the parties' comments
thereto, the Labor Arbiter issued an order dated November
27, 1985 directing the petitioner to pay backwages to one
hundred twenty three (123) union members in the total
amount of **
P589,021.00. The list included five (5) union
members who had not yet been recalled*** and reinstated by
petitioner, three (3) union members who had been
recalled but had not yet reported for work, and one
hundred (100) union members who had been reinstated.
The Labor Arbiter found merit in the UNION's request for
the inclusion of three (3) union members who were left out
of
________________
** Antonia Estrella, Cristina Legaspi, Anacorita Hermoso, Myrna

Percel, and Teodora Dimla.
*** Nimfa Ancheta, Larcy Asinas and Perla Paet.
530

the RIU report and for the recomputation of backwages

awarded to two (2) listed members. With respect to the
claims made by petitioner in its comment, the Labor
Arbiter ruled inter alia that: (1) the base for computation of
backwages should consist of the basic salary and 13th
month pay, exclusive of the ECOLA; (2) the period for
computation of backwages should commence from January
3, 1983 the date of the illegal shut-down; and, (3) the
computation of the basic salary should be computed on a

daily basis and on actual working days in accordance with
the rate prevailing at such time. On this last point, the
Labor Arbiter reasoned that for the period of time the
affected union members were deprived of work due to the
illegal shut-down, they should not be awarded more than
what the unaffected employees earned during the same
period. Furthermore, the Labor Arbiter rejected petitioner's
contention for the exclusion of fifty-five (55) union members
from the list, but granted its request for the exclusion of
seventeen (17) other members, finding merit thereto. The
Labor Arbiter also found basis in petitioner's claim that its
plant burned down in November 30, 1984, and accordingly
ruled that for the five (5) union members who had not yet
been recalled by petitioner [See Footnote **], the period for
computation of their backwages should be limited from
January 3, 1983 up to November 30, 1984.
No timely appeal having been taken from the above
order by either party, the Labor Arbiter issued on
December 23, 1985 a writ of execution for the enforcement
of its Order.
However, on January 2,1986, the UNION, through its
president Felix Emen, filed an "Urgent Motion and
Manifestation for Clarification and Recomputation of
Backwages", praying that petitioner be ordered to pay its
union members the full amount of backwages computed in
the RIU report. The UNION contended that the higher
computation of backwages in the RIU report was the
official amount due to its members.
Petitioner filed an opposition and motion to strike out
the UNION's motion asserting, inter alia, that, in view of
the failure of the UNION to appeal from the order dated
November 27, 1985 within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, that order has become final and executory.
Petitioner further alleged that the same had been fully
satisfied.
531
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 531

On January 28,1986, the UNION filed its reply to

petitioner's opposition and motion.
Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter issued an order dated
April 16, 1986, noting therein that the UNION'S motion
was filed long after the November 27, 1985 order attained
finality and was fully satisfied by petitioner (as evidenced
by a Sheriffs report dated January 22,1986). The Labor

Arbiter reiterated as well the basis for the reduction of the
computed award of backwages contained in the RIU report,
explaining that the report was not ipso facto final and
binding on him. But, apparently acknowledging an
oversight, the Labor Arbiter ordered the petitioner to
immediately reinstate the eight union members identified
in his earlier order as those who bad not yet been
reinstated [See Footnotes ** and ***].
On May 15, 1986, the UNION, through its new counsel
of record, interposed a partial appeal from the Labor
Arbiter's orders dated November 27, 1985 and April 16,
1986 to the NLRC. This time, the UNION claimed that fifty
(50) individuals who were forced to resign by petitioner
were not included in the list of union members entitled to
backwages. The UNION contended that the Labor Arbiter's
order of November 27, 1985 was not a faithful
implementation of the judgment rendered on September
23, 1983 wherein provision was made for the immediate
reinstatement of those employees who were forced to resign
and the payment of backwages less whatever separation
benefits were received by them. The UNION also argued
that the inexplicable failure of its original counsel of record
to make a timely appeal from the November 27, 1985 order
should not prejudice the interests of Its members. The
petitioner then filed its "Answer Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam and/or Motion to Dismiss" on May 29,1986.
On August 12, 1987, the NLRC promulgated a decision,
the pertinent portion of which reads:
Indeed, the points invoked by the complainant in its appeal

deserve a careful and serious scrutiny. Firstly, there is a gross
and marked disparity between the award of P1 ,977,371.50 as
computed by the Acting Chief, Research and Information Unit of
the National Capital Region, and the amount of P589,021.00 as
eventually arrived at by the Labor Arbiter. This computation
must necessarily be looked into and carefully determined in the
light of the final decision in this
532

case considering that any order or writ should not vary the terms
of the decision being executed. Accordingly, all parties concerned
or involved in the execution of the final decision should be duly
informed or amply notified of all proceedings pertaining to the
execution of aforesaid judgment so that the end of justice may

thus be subserved as in this case. Secondly, the charge that the
Labor Arbiter omitted the fifty (50) complainants who were forced
to resign after 3 January 1983 from his final computation of
P589.201.00 merits sound reexamination in the light of the
disquisition embodied in the final decision of the Labor Arbiter.
And thirdly, the manner of the execution of the final decision of
the Labor Arbiter, as implemented in the impugned orders and
writ of execution, which may be a deviation from the terms and
conditions of the decision can be subject of a proper appeal or
relief [NLRC Decision, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 181-182.]
The NLRC reversed the assailed orders and ordered the

remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter for further
proceedings.
On August 27, 1987, petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of this decision. The NLRC denied
petitioner's motion in a Resolution dated November 11,
1987.
Hence, petitioner interposed the instant petition with
application for a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction. On January 20, 1988, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the NLRC
from enforcing and carrying out its decision dated August
12, 1987.
Public respondent, through the Solicitor General, and
the UNION filed separate comments to the petition.
Petitioner submitted its reply to the Solicitor General's
comment. Thereafter, considering the allegations
contained, issues raised and arguments adduced in the
pleadings, the Court resolved to give due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. In compliance therewith, the petitioner and
UNION filed their memoranda. The Solicitor General, on
the other hand, filed a manifestation adopting his comment
as memorandum.
The issue presented for adjudication in this petition is
whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC in setting aside the orders of the Labor
Arbiter dated November 27, 1985 and April 16,1986, and in
ordering a review of the list of union members entitled to
reinstatement and backwages, and a recomputation of the
amount of backwages
533
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 533

awarded.
An appeal from a decision, award or order of the labor
arbiter must be brought to the NLRC within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such decision, award, or
order, otherwise, the same becomes final and executory
[Article 223 of the Labor Code]. And for purposes of
determining its timeliness, a motion for reconsideration
may be properly treated as an appeal and therefore must
likewise be filed within the ten-day reglementary period
[The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 74191, December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 740; See also
Camacho v. CA, G.R. No. L-21850, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA
531].
In the case at bar, the Labor Arbiter's order dated
November 27, 1985 was duly received by the UNION
through its counsel of record on November 29, 1985.
However, the UNION's "Urgent Motion and Manifestation
for Clarification and Recomputation of Backwages", which
in effect was a motion for reconsideration, was filed more
than 30 days thereafter, or on January 2, 1986. By then,
the order of the Labor Arbiter long became final and
executory on account of the failure of the UNION and
petitioner to appeal therefrom within the reglementary
period provided under the law.
Well-settled is the rule that the perfection of an appeal
within the statutory or reglementary period is not only
mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to interpose a
timely appeal (or a motion for reconsideration) renders the
assailed decision, order or award final and executory that
deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter the
final judgment [Cruz v. WCC, G.R. No. L-42739, January
31, 1978, 81 SCRA 445; Volkshel Labor Union v. NLRC,
G.R. No. L-39686, June 28,1980,98 SCRA 314; Acda v.
Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 51607, December 15, 1982, 119
SCRA 306; Rizal Empire Insurance Group v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 73140, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 565; MAI Philippines
Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 73662, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA
196; Narag v. NLRC, G.R. No. 69628, October 28, 1987, 155
SCRA 199; John Clement Consultants, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 72096, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 635; Bongay v.
Martinez, G.R. No. 77188, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 552;
Manuel L. Quezon University v. Manuel L. Quezon
Educational Institution, G.R. No. 82312, April 19, 1989,
172 SCRA 597]. This rule "is appli-
534
cable indiscriminately to one and all since the rule is

grounded on fundamental consideration of public policy
and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the
judgment of courts and award of quasi-judicial agencies
must become final at some definite date fixed by law"
[Volkschel Labor Union v. NLRC, supra, at p. 322].
Although, in a few instances, the Court has disregarded
procedural lapses so as to give due course to appeals filed
beyond the reglementary period (See Flexo Manufacturing
Corporation v, NLRC, G.R. No. 55971, February 28,
1985,135 SCRA 145; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Lariosa, G.R. No. 70479, February 27, 1989, 148 SCRA 187;
Chong Guan Trading v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81471, April 26,
1989, 172 SCRA 831], the Court did so on the basis of
strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of
justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof.
No acceptable reason has been advanced and none
appears on record to excuse the tardiness exhibited by the
UNION. The UNION's claim that its right to seek a review
of the November 27, 1985 order was lost through the
inadvertence or refusal of its counsel of record is, at best,
self-serving. The legal consequences arising out of the
failure of the UNION's attorney to timely file a motion for
reconsideration or appeal from the November 27, 1985
order of the Labor Arbiter are binding upon petitioner. A
client is generally bound by the action of his counsel in the
management of a litigation, as by the attorney's mistake or
negligence in procedural technique [US v. Umali, 15 Phil.
33 (1910); Montes v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 48
Phil. 640 (1926); Inocando v, Inocando, 110 Phil. 266
(1960); Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Dayrit,
G.R. No. 63372, June 28, 1983, 123 SCRA 203; Ayllon v.
Sevilla, G.R. No. 79244, December 10, 1987, 156 SCRA
257]. Absent a clear showing of fraud or excusable
negligence on the part of the UNION'S S counsel, the Court
finds no cogent reason to depart from the foregoing rule.
Respondents, however, take the position that the case at
bar is an exception to the general rule on the finality of
decisions, awards and orders, They contend that the Labor
Arbiter's orders dated November 27, 1985 and April 16,
1986, respectively, varied the tenor of, and failed to
substantially conform to that decreed in, the judgment
rendered against petitioner on
535
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 535

September 23, 1983. Respondents conclude that the NLRC

had appellate jurisdiction to set aside these void orders and
to require a comprehensive review of the union members
entitled to reinstatement and backwages, and a
recomputation of the amount of backwages due them.
In support of their position, respondents challenge three
principal features of the Labor Arbiter's order. First of all,
respondents charge that the order failed to direct petitioner
to reinstate and pay backwages to fifty (50) union members
claimed by petitioner to have resigned and executed
quitclaims or releases in favor of the company. They argue
that the order thereby contravened the final judgment
against the company which ordered the reinstatement of
those union members who were forced to resign. (This
charge, incidentally, was the sole basis of the UNION's
appeal before the NLRC.) The Solicitor General further
argues that the Labor Arbiter failed to rule on the matter
of whether these individuals were forced, or voluntarily,
resigned from their employment. Secondly, the respondents
assail the ruling of the Labor Arbiter which limited the
period for the computation of backwages until November
30, 1984 for five (5) union members [See Footnote **.] They
dispute the veracity of petitioner's claim that its plant
burned down on said date and resulted in the temporary
lay-off of employees. Thirdly, respondents claim error in
the salary base used by the Labor Arbiter in his
computation of backwages.
The first and second points raised by respondents are
addressed to the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter in
the proceedings below. Based on a review of the records of
the execution proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, the
Court finds substantial basis for these findings.
After the submission of the UNION's "Urgent Motion
and Manifestation" dated April 28, 1985 containing the list
of over two hundred (200) union members claimed to be
entitled to reinstatement and/or backwages, and the
petitioner's comment thereto claiming, on the other hand,
that fifty (50) of the individuals listed in the UNION's list
had resigned and executed quitclaims or waivers, the
Research and Information Unit of the DOLE submitted its
own list of affected union members. The RlU list did not
contain the names of the fifty (50) members. It is
noteworthy that the UNION raised no objection to the RIU
536

report except for its request that three (3) other union
members be included in the list. Working initially from the
official RIU list of union members, the Labor Arbiter
rendered his order of November 27, 1985, incorporating the
points raised by both parties in their respective comments
to the RIU report which he found to be meritorious. Again,
no timely opposition was raised by the UNION before the
Labor Arbiter regarding the exclusion of the fifty (50) union
members from the Labor Arbiter's order. In fact, in the
UNION's "Urgent Motion and Manifestation for
Clarification and Recomputation of Backwages" belatedly
filed by the UNION's president, Felix Emen, on January
2,1986, the UNION did not dispute the non-inclusion of the
fifty (50) union members, but, instead, insisted that the
Labor Arbiter adopt the RIU list.
Neither does it appear that the UNION was deprived of
the opportunity to assert and substantiate before the Labor
Arbiter its claim that the fifty (50) union members had
been forced or coerced to resign and execute quitclaims in
favor of petitioner. It simply failed to do so.
The same could be said with respect to the fixing of the
period of the computation of backwages until November 30,
1984 for five (5) union members who had not yet been
recalled by petitioner. November 30, 1984 was allegedly the
date petitioner's plant burned down, resulting in the
temporary lay-off of employees. It appears that this
particular claim was not disputed by the UNION during
the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC. It is
in its comment filed before the Court that the UNION
attacks for the first time the veracity of petitioner's claim.
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds no legal
infirmity tainting the Labor Arbiter's order of November
27, 1985 which excluded the names of the fifty (50) union
members from the list of employees entitled to backwages
and reinstatement, and which limited the period for
computing the backwages due to the five (5) union
members. It bears emphasizing that the execution
proceedings below were undertaken precisely to facilitate
the identification of each union member entitled, under the
decision, to backwages and reinstatement, the computation
of the exact amount due to these members, and the
consideration of supervening events which affect the
manner and extent
537
VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 537

of the execution. And inasmuch as the UNION failed to

interpose a timely opposition to, or appeal from, the Labor
Arbiter's order, re-examination of the correctness of the
Labor Arbiter's findings of fact is accordingly foreclosed.
But there is merit in the third point raised by
respondents herein. The determination of the salary base
for the computation of backwages requires simply an
application of judicial precedents defining the term
"backwages". Unfortunately, the Labor Arbiter erred in
this regard. An unqualified award of backwages means
that the employee is paid at the wage rate at the time of
his dismissal [Davao Free Worker Front v. Court of
Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-29356, October 27, 1975,
67 SCRA 418; Capital Garments Corporation v. Ople, G.R.
No. 53627, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 473; Durabilt
Recapping Plant & Company v. NLRC, G.R. No. 76746,
July 27, 1987, 152 SCRA 328]. And the Court has declared
that the base figure to be used in the computation of
backwages due to the employee should include not just the
basic salary, but also the regular allowances that he had
been receiving, such as the emergency living allowances
and the 13th month pay mandated under the law [See Pan-
Philippine Life Insurance Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No.
53721, June 29,1982,144 SCRA 866; Santos v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 76721, September 21, 1987, 154 SCRA 166; Soriano v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 75510, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 124;
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. NLRC, supra.] In his
computation of the amount of backwages, the Labor Arbiter
without legal basis excluded the ECOLA. It is on this score
alone that the Labor Arbiter's order dated November 27,
1985 should be set aside. The Court holds that
notwithstanding the belated appeal by the UNION, the
assailed order should be modified with respect to the
incorrect salary base used by the Labor Arbiter in his
computation of backwages. Where there is a patently
improper application and interpretation of the law on the
part of administrative officers who are tasked to perform
quasi-judicial functions, the Court will not hesitate to
disregard procedural rules so as to effect faithful adherence
to that mandated under the law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
GRANTED and the NLRC decision dated August 12, 1987
and resolution dated November 11, 1987 are hereby SET
ASIDE, for
538

People vs. Cendana
having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion. The

temporary restraining order issued by this Court is made
PERMANENT. However, the case is ordered REMANDED
to the Labor Arbiter for the recomputation of the amount of
backwages awarded to the union members listed in his
order dated November 27, 1985, by including in the base
figure, their basic salary, 13th month pay and ECOLA, and
for the issuance of a writ of execution requiring petitioner
to pay the corresponding difference.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., On leave.
Petition granted. Decision and resolution set aside.
Note—Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or

reglementary period is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional and failure to do so renders the questioned
decision final and executory that deprives the appellate
court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less
entertain the appeal. (Garcia vs. Echeverri, 132 SCRA 631.)
_______________
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10/14/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 190

VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 525

PARAMOUNT VINYL PRODUCTS CORPORATION,

Labor Law; Appeals; Motion for Reconsideration; For

526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paramount Vinyl Products Corp. vs. NLRC

mental consideration of public policy and sound practice that at

VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 527

Paramount Vinyl Products Corp. vs. NLRC

administrative officers who are tasked to perform quasi-judicial

PETITION for review from the decision and resolution of

The controversy centers around the execution proceedings

528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

plant and locking out its workers on January 3, 1983, in

WHEREFORE, pursuant to all of the foregoing, judgment is

Petitioner interposed an appeal to the NLRC, but the Labor

VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 529

period for computation of backwages should be reckoned

** Antonia Estrella, Cristina Legaspi, Anacorita Hermoso, Myrna

530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the RIU report and for the recomputation of backwages

computation of the basic salary should be computed on a

VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 531

On January 28,1986, the UNION filed its reply to

by a Sheriffs report dated January 22,1986). The Labor

Indeed, the points invoked by the complainant in its appeal

532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

execution of aforesaid judgment so that the end of justice may

The NLRC reversed the assailed orders and ordered the

VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 533

534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paramount Vinyl Products Corp. vs. NLRC

cable indiscriminately to one and all since the rule is

VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 535

September 23, 1983. Respondents conclude that the NLRC

536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 190, OCTOBER 17, 1990 537

of the execution. And inasmuch as the UNION failed to

538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion. The

Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Petition granted. Decision and resolution set aside.

Note—Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or

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