(Studies of The Americas) Assad Shoman - Belize's Independence and Decolonization in Latin America - Guatemala, Britain, and The UN (Studies of The Americas) - Palgrave Macmillan (2010) PDF
(Studies of The Americas) Assad Shoman - Belize's Independence and Decolonization in Latin America - Guatemala, Britain, and The UN (Studies of The Americas) - Palgrave Macmillan (2010) PDF
(Studies of The Americas) Assad Shoman - Belize's Independence and Decolonization in Latin America - Guatemala, Britain, and The UN (Studies of The Americas) - Palgrave Macmillan (2010) PDF
edited by
Maxine Molyneux
Institute for the Study of the Americas
University of London
School of Advanced Study
Titles in this series are multidisciplinary studies of aspects of the societies of the hemi-
sphere, particularly in the areas of politics, economics, history, anthropology, sociology,
and the environment. The series covers a comparative perspective across the Americas,
including Canada and the Caribbean as well as the United States and Latin America.
Assad Shoman
BELIZE’S INDEPENDENCE AND DECOLONIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA
Copyright © Assad Shoman, 2010.
All rights reserved.
First published in 2010 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world,
this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited,
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies
and has companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN: 978–0–230–62066–7
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Shoman, Assad.
Belize’s independence & decolonization in Latin America : Guatemala,
Britain, and the UN / by Assad Shoman.
p. cm. — (Studies of the Americas)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–0–230–62066–7 (alk. paper)
1. Belize—History—Autonomy and independence movements.
2. Decolonization—Belize—History. 3. Globalization—Belize—
History—20th century. 4. Belize—Foreign relations—Guatemala.
5. Belize—Foreign relations—Great Britain. 6. United Nations—
History—20th century. 7. Guatemala—Foreign relations—Belize.
8. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Belize. I. Title. II. Title: Belize’s
independence and decolonization in Latin America.
F1446.3.S56 2010
972.82—dc22 2009039966
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.
Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.
First edition: April 2010
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America.
Contents
Appendix 199
Notes 203
Select Bibliography 237
Index 243
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Table and Maps
Table
Population of Belize, 1790–1980. 199
Maps
1. Map showing the areas defined by border treaties
affecting Belize. 200
2. Map showing Guatemalan demands during 1975–1981
negotiations. 201
3. Map Showing main UK and U.S. proposals during
1975–1981 negotiations. 202
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Foreword
This was the stalemate that lasted for nearly 20 years until inde-
pendence finally was achieved on September 21, 1981. Yet the basic
dilemma had still not been resolved. Guatemala claimed the territory
and the UK defended it. How independence came about despite these
inauspicious circumstances is the story of this remarkable book writ-
ten by one of the dramatis personae.
The Guatemalan claim rests on the interpretation of the 1859
treaty, the British and Belizeans asserting it was a boundary treaty and
the Guatemalans that it was a treaty of cession that was invalidated by
the failure of the British government to carry through one of the arti-
cles. Although for many people today the right of self-determination
trumps these seemingly arcane issues of international law, it is impos-
sible to understand the complexity of the Belize situation without a
proper understanding of the legal framework. Assad Shoman, who
has worked for years on the dispute for the Belize government, treats
us to a full and dispassionate account of the different interpretations.
If the dispute ends up in the International Court of Justice, as now
seems possible, this part of the book will prove to be indispensable for
all those involved in the judicial proceedings.
The main part of the book, however, deals with the dilemma
referred to above—a dilemma that other countries such as Western
Sahara have signally failed to resolve. That Belize appears to be a
unique case of a country that in recent decades has peacefully achieved
independence despite a major territorial claim requires an elucidation
and we find the answer in this book. The explanation is partly a mat-
ter of asymmetry, partly of hemispheric geopolitics but above all of
individual leadership. However much as social scientists we recognize
the “forces of change” and “drivers of circumstance,” we learn from
this perspicacious book that individuals do matter.
The key individual in the Belize story was George Price, who was
the dominant figure in the nationalist movement up to and beyond
independence. Loathed by the colonial authorities and accused of
being a secret agent for Guatemala, he eventually not only secured
British support but also steered a path to independence that involved
the Commonwealth, CARICOM, Latin America, the nonaligned
countries and the UN. In this he was helped by a dedicated group of
young nationalists including Assad Shoman, the author of this book.
Even today there is no satisfactory biography of George Price, but this
book goes a long way to understand this complicated man.
The support of the UN turned out to be crucial. Guatemala
could dismiss the Commonwealth and even CARICOM as institu-
tions that were prejudiced in Belize’s favor through their connection
FOREWORD xiii
Victor Bulmer-Thomas
Institute for the Study of the Americas
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Preface
• The National Archives, London. The major relevant items were found
at Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and Foreign and Commonwealth
Office files. These are referred to in the notes section as FO, CO
and FCO respectively, followed by the number of the file. At the
time of completing my research in 2007, FCO files were available
only for dates up to 1976. Fortunately, however, there was informa-
tion in the Ministry of Defense files that reproduced material from
the FCO for the period 1977–1978. These are referred to in the
notes as DEFE. There are also some files from the Prime Minister’s
Office and from the Cabinet Office, referred to respectively as
PREM and CAB. It should be noted that certain documents, some
as far back as 1957, well outside the normal 30-year rule, were not
included in the files. Requests to gain access to these documents by
applications under the Freedom of Information Act were, without
exception, refused.
• The National Archives and Records Administration, Washington.
References are in the notes by the number of the file followed by
the acronym NARA.
• Commonwealth Secretariat Library, London. The references to these
are cited by the file number followed by the acronym CSL.
• United Nations documents are written with reference numbers of
documents, followed by the acronym UN.
• The Belize Archives, Belmopan, for the earlier periods, as nothing
in the modern period relating to official correspondence on the
Guatemalan claim is currently available. References to this source
are signified in the notes with the acronym BA. For many of
these records, references in the book are made to earlier works of
the author.
xx NOTE ON SOURCES
Introduction: Decolonization by
Internationalization
Decolonization
“Decolonization” is the established term in scholarly literature and
it is retained here; in this volume, the preferred definition is “the
historical process by which the European powers who had established
empires in the non-European world ceased to rule those regions.”2
The seeds of the post-1945 process of decolonization began to
grow during the First World War and were nourished by the Great
Depression and its effects on standards of living in the colonies. The
British response was to make generally ineffective attempts to improve
living conditions and to concede varying degrees of administrative
autonomy, depending on the circumstances. Also, the British govern-
ment did not decide to end colonialism immediately after the Second
World War. Winston Churchill’s sentiment expressed in his famous
statement that he did “not become the King’s First Minister in order
to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire”3 was shared
by Clement Attlee and even by Harold Wilson,4 because what made
Britain a world power was its empire.5 The war and its consequences,
however, dealt a severe blow to Britain’s imperial ambitions. With
Britain’s expulsion from many Asian countries by Japan, “the myth
of the invincible white man was exploded overnight.”6 Although it
had reclaimed these territories after the war, Britain was in dire finan-
cial straits,7 and was further humiliated by having to accept from the
United States a loan of $3.75 billion with strings attached: the abo-
lition of trade preferences and the free exchange of sterling for the
dollar.8 This struck a serious blow to the “imperial trade preferences
and currency controls which had knitted the empire together as an
economic unit.” 9 Britain’s status as a great power was predicated on
its being an imperial power, the essence of which was precisely the
existence of the sterling area and preferential trade with its empire.
The growth of the global economy after 1945 made the trade policies
of colonialism obsolete and was also one of the root causes of decolo-
nization.10 Furthermore, the revival of the Western economies in the
1950s led Britain to shift its emphasis from its empire to Europe and
North America, where trade in manufactured goods was growing
rapidly. Trade and investment between industrialized countries had
become much more important.11
INTRODUCTION 3
Moreover, the United States was pressing Britain to take up its role
as a leader in Europe and to shed its colonial empire.12 Washington
regarded the UK’s imperial tariffs as inimical to the free trade require-
ments of the fast-growing U.S. economy and its need to control strate-
gic raw materials.13 It also considered the British Empire a hindrance
to uniting the “free world” against Soviet influence.14 But the United
States was quite willing to prop up Britain’s colonial system when it
felt that this was necessary to keep communism from taking hold in a
country.15 Such was the case in Malaya16 and, closer to Belize in many
ways, in Guyana, which will be considered below.
After 1945 the sterling area, of which the colonial empire was the
backbone, was more tightly controlled. It discriminated against trade
with the “hard currency” areas, especially the United States, and
became a device for minimizing dollar expenditure.27 In 1948, the
Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) was created to promote
increased colonial production “whose supply to the UK or sale over-
seas will assist our balance of payments.”28 This led to a significant
expansion in local bureaucracies and “a fresh invasion of British and
Commonwealth personnel to fill expanding technical departments
overseas.” Crucially, too,
Until the late 1950s, British officials and politicians alike believed
that “it was dangerous for smaller territories to nurse illusions of
independent grandeur.”32 The early Labor governments sought to
implement a new approach to the colonies: “they were to be prop-
erly developed and the natives were to learn to govern themselves.
Independence would be granted once the colonies were ready for it,
i.e. after 30 to 40 years at the earliest.”33 After the experiment to
turn the colonies into profitable productive units had failed, however,
most colonies were seen as financial burdens, and the foremost reason
for hanging on to them was “a sense of responsibility as well as the
feeling that to abandon them would damage Britain’s prestige.”34
It would be left to Harold Macmillan, in his second government
(1959–1963), to speed up the pace of decolonization and scuttle the
concept of “viability” and “readiness.” But before that, Britain had to
pass through the trauma of losing its hold on the Suez Canal in 1956,
which “was regarded as central to any postwar revitalisation of impe-
rial power and the preservation of great power status” and important
for securing oil supplies.35 More broadly, it has been argued that
impose direct rule, but Home noted that this would be condemned
in the UN, whose Committee of 24 (see below) had just voted for
Britain to leave at once and in this context, the question would be
why the same could not be done in Rhodesia.59 It was finally agreed,
at Kennedy’s suggestion, that the best solution would be to call an
election and arrange for a coalition government of Burnham’s and
another minority party to win; this was in fact achieved by Britain
imposing the proportional representation system in 1964. Two years
later, Guyana became independent, and at the strong urging of the
United States,60 the UK decided to leave British troops in the terri-
tory until the Guyanese security forces were strong enough to cope
with any attempts at subversion by the PPP.61
The case of Guyana shows clearly that “in the competition in the
American mind between the ‘Special Relationship,’ ‘anti-colonialism’
and ‘anti-communism,’ the last always prevails.”62 It also demonstrates
how far Britain was willing to go to accommodate U.S. wishes affect-
ing countries in its “backyard”; this did not augur well for Belize.
William Rogers, who as Henry Kissinger’s assistant secretary of state
for Latin America until 1977 dealt with British officials on the Belize
question, was brutally blunt on the question:
Rogers displays his own disdain and arrogance when he refers to the
case of Belize:
Defense Matters
Security issues were always at the heart of the relations of coopera-
tion between the United States and the UK; they were also crucially
important for the issue of Belize’s independence: there came a point
when the only thing that stood between Belize and independence
was the fear of a Guatemalan military takeover, and the only feasible
shield against that was British forces. It is, therefore, important to
look briefly at the UK’s defense policy at the crucial times.
Upon taking office in 1964 (by which time Belize had become
self-governing and expected to gain independence within four years),
Prime Minister Harold Wilson (Labor) believed that Britain had to
maintain three defense roles: the strategic nuclear, the defense of
Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and
a global role:
the object of British policy was to transfer power on terms that would
preserve a special link with the British imperial system, minimise the
international and strategic significance of self-rule and encourage
commercial cooperation.72
than give up its republican constitution, and India was too important
a country to lose.73 Another problem was faced with the admission of
Ghana and other black-led states, which precipitated apartheid South
Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth. The British then saw
the efficacy of opening membership in the Commonwealth to all
their former colonies, but they still entertained doubts about the
readiness of subject peoples to throw off the colonial mantle, which
the British regarded as a protective blanket required for people unpre-
pared for self-rule. Even Iain Macleod, Macmillan’s colonial secretary
who put decolonization on fast track, admitted that he never believed
the colonies were “ready” for self-government.74
Still, for British politicians and officials alike, a large part of
the success of Britain’s decolonization project was the creation
of the new Commonwealth, which was seen “as a means of sup-
porting Britain’s role as a great power: independence within the
Commonwealth would enable decolonised states to play a positive
role in Commonwealth defence and the sterling area”;75 in this
sense decolonization could be seen as “the continuation of empire
by other means.” 76 But while the newly independent countries were
happy enough to stay in an organization that provided a useful
international forum, they regarded their Commonwealth links as
only one aspect of their foreign relations, as Britain’s patronage
became less and less important compared to other foci of world
influence and they developed diverging interests and sympathies.
The Commonwealth came to have a more practical advantage
for the newly independent states when, following an initiative by
Kwame Nkrumah, the Commonwealth Secretariat was established
in 1965.77 This instrument was to play a crucial role in the Belize
question.
the East-West conflict, with the crisis in the Congo enveloping the
UN, to which many of the new countries turned for solutions. In
1960, 16 new African states became UN members; they joined the
other Third World countries in getting the General Assembly (GA) to
pass (with both the United States and the UK abstaining) the semi-
nal Resolution 1514 on Decolonization.80 After the April 1961 U.S.-
generated invasion of Cuba, several Afro-Asian states, along with
Europe’s Yugoslavia (whose Josip Broz Tito had become an impor-
tant leader in the budding movement) and Cuba from Latin America
held a preparatory meeting in June for a conference of nonaligned
countries to which they invited the Algerian liberation movement.
This invitation to the provisional government of Algeria “established
a precedent in international relations and became an integral part of
non-alignment.”81 The assumption by the NAM of the right to rec-
ognize the legitimate representatives of a country before indepen-
dence later allowed Belize to be welcomed in the fold of the NAM
while it was still a colony, and facilitated its bid for independence by
internationalization.
The First Summit of the NAM was held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in
September 1961, and it set very broad parameters for membership: a
country should have an independent foreign policy based on peaceful
coexistence of states with different political and social systems, support
national independence movements, and not belong to a multilateral
military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.82
The movement privileged multilateralism and consistently sought to
strengthen the role of the UN in world politics. The NAM came of
age at the Fourth Summit in Algeria in 1973: 75 countries attended,
representing two-thirds of UN membership. Its Political Declaration
emphasized the problems of Latin America (the threats against Cuba
and Salvador Allende’s Chile, the continuance of colonial situations)
and declared that
Internationalization
The Belizean people’s march toward independence was blocked in
the 1960s by the Guatemalan threat to use force to satisfy its territo-
rial claim. Britain sought to settle the dispute by negotiation, but at
the expense of the sovereignty or territory of Belize, whose people
were not prepared to accept this. In theory, they had no standing in
traditional international law; sovereignty of the territory lay in the
UK, not in Belize. At the same time, Britain was constrained from
reaching a settlement with Guatemala against the express wishes of
the Belizean people, first for reasons of prestige and later because of
commitments made as a result of Belize’s internationalization, and a
stalemate ensued.
Under the normal scheme of things, such an intractable dispute
would be submitted to the traditional means of resolving disputes in
accordance with Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, the Pacific Settlement
of Disputes, under which Article 37 gives the Security Council ulti-
mate authority to “decide whether to take action under Article 36 or
16 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
speaks with some real moral authority simply because it is the core
democratic organ of the UN, and, to some extent, the voice of the
community of nations. The Assembly helps to legitimate broad prin-
ciples such as the sovereign equality of nations and the cooperative
settlement of disputes, and can also be used to legitimate positions on
specific issues.97
powers, the interests of the latter would prevail. This is even more
evident when we recall Kenneth Waltz’s claim that the capabilities
of states can be measured in terms of “how they score on all of the
following items: size of population and territory, resource endow-
ment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and
competence.”100 It would be difficult to find a country that, accord-
ing to these criteria, could be ranked lower than Belize. Moreover,
initially Belize was confronted not only with a vastly more power-
ful regional state (Guatemala) but also with two world powers deter-
mined to force it to make unwanted concessions in order to achieve
its independence.
In the event, however, Belizean interests prevailed, suggesting that
Belizean leaders had greater diplomatic and political resources than
should be expected from the “capabilities” of their country. These
resources lay in international institutions (in particular the UN),
and in the ability of Belizean leaders to negotiate and to gain ever-
greater international support. In essence this very small country was
able to build coalitions of support among like-minded states, many
of whom were members of the emerging and increasingly influential
nonaligned movement. As Robert Keohane and others have demon-
strated, institutions can mediate the interests of protagonist states
and give to small states the ability to build coalitions that can act as
bulwarks against great power interests.101
This approach has particular force when the incentives of the small
state are very great and the incentives of the larger state are compara-
tively minor. In this case, Belize’s very survival was at stake, whereas
Britain’s motivation was simply to disengage from its colony in as
decorous a manner as possible and without affecting its relations with
the United States. Keohane refers to this phenomenon as an “asym-
metry of motivation,” which explains discrepancies between power
resources and outcomes:
an imaginary line drawn due north from “Garbutt’s Falls” to the Rio
Hondo on the north and from the same point due south to the River
Sarstoon in the south, should form the extreme line of our claims to
the westward, and that the course of those two rivers from the points
where this imaginary line cuts them to their fall into the sea, should
form our respective boundaries to the north and the south.42
It is agreed . . . that the boundary between the Republic and the British
Settlement and Possessions in the Bay of Honduras, as they existed
previous to and on the 1st day of January, 1850, and have continued
to exist up to the present time, was, and is as follows:
Beginning at the mouth of the River Sarstoon in the Bay of Honduras,
and proceeding up the mid-channel thereof to Gracias a Dios Falls;
then turning right and continuing by a line drawn direct from Gracias
a Dios Falls to Garbutt’s Falls on the River Belize, and from Garbutt’s
Falls due north until it strikes the Mexican frontier.57
His perfunctory manner of dealing with the road, and indeed his
insistence that the road proposal was made after Guatemala had rec-
ognized the current boundaries, suggest that Article 7 was not a
major factor in Guatemala’s decision to conclude the treaty, and that
he was not alleging that the road was a form of compensation for any
supposed cession.
Wyke, however, affirmed in 1861 that
the wording of the Article having reference to the road was purposely
left very vague, in order to prevent the United States Government from
asserting that by this clause we had bribed that of Guatemala to cede
their right to the 500 square leagues of territory to which we gained a
legal title by this Convention.60
This was at variance with the position of the Foreign Office, which
was that title preceded the treaty. In any case, despite differing inter-
pretations as to the precise responsibilities of the two countries with
regard to the building of the road, both countries collaborated in
completing a survey of the road in November 1861. It later turned
out, however, that the cost was seriously underestimated, and that the
road might in fact be harmful to the British settlement. The Colonial
Office strongly objected to “the apparently impracticable Article
about the road.”61 Belize Superintendent Frederick Seymour, how-
ever, argued that to repudiate the treaty would damage Britain’s repu-
tation for good faith and put in doubt her sovereignty over Belize,
although he conceded that to comply with Article 7, given the greater
cost, could cause the United States to question the consistency of the
payment of so large a sum with the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer
32 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
Article 7 was the compensation for the cession and Britain’s failure
to comply with it caused the entire treaty to fall; and that the terri-
tory of Belize, therefore, reverted to Guatemala, which inherited it
from Spain in accordance with the international law principle of uti
possidetis.70
knew that the days of colonialism were numbered. At first they thought
that the people who inhabited the territory, who were suffering under
British colonialism, would jump at the prospect of becoming part of
Guatemala. When that proved to be an erroneous calculation, they
decided to try to wrest the territory from the British against the wishes
of the inhabitants and with the assistance of the United States, and on
occasion they even contemplated a military solution. Both Britain and
Guatemala were willing to refer the matter to the major power of the
hemisphere: in 1937 Guatemala proposed arbitration by the president
of the United States with power to decide “in justice and equity,”
and in 1940 Britain proposed arbitration with respect to Article 7
“both in its legal and equitable aspects” before a tribunal composed
of one member appointed by each party and an umpire appointed by
the president of the United States.84 Eventually, in 1965, the dispute
was submitted to the U.S. government for mediation, and the parties
would likely have agreed to the solution proposed, but the people of
Belize rejected it. By that time, it had become clear that the inhabit-
ants of the colony had a predominant voice in the outcome of the
conflict, and the Guatemalan government had begun to establish a
pattern of stirring up the controversy as a means of diverting attention
from difficulties with its own population.
The Belize question then became a battleground that also involved
Mexico, which feared Guatemalan expansionism, and the U.S. gov-
ernment, preoccupied with Cold War considerations. And the issue
had evolved from one of settling a nineteenth-century territorial dis-
pute to one of respecting the right of the population of Belize to
self-determination.
to come and dividing the population into those who believed the
charge or used it for political purposes and those, the majority, who
believed it was a colonial ploy to detract from Price’s true purpose of
leading Belize to independence. It merits further consideration.
In early 1957 a meeting of Foreign Office and Colonial Office
officials agreed that they could consider “an alteration of a minor char-
acter” of the frontier as a final trump card to clinch an agreement, pro-
vided it had the support of the Belizeans.113 The British then proposed
to Guatemalan that talks be held in London, including representatives
of the newly constituted government of Belize.114 On 20 March there
were preliminary talks between UK and Guatemalan officials, in which
the Guatemalans revealed that a major concern was the fear of Belize
joining the West Indies Federation, but the British reassured them
that there was no strong reason to suppose that the people would opt
for such a course.115 British officials discussed among themselves other
possible solutions, including “some form of closer association with any
one or all of the Central American Republics”116 and “a minor recti-
fication of the frontier,” if the area involved were uninhabited.117 This
last idea, however, “is not one that ought to be mentioned to George
Price at this juncture. It is potentially too explosive.”118
The projected meeting between the British and the Guatemalans
that would include Belizean representatives was finally set for
November in London. While there, Price accepted an invitation for his
delegation (which included two members of his party and a nominated
member to the Legislative Council) to meet with the Guatemalan rep-
resentative Jorge Granados in London to consider the proposal he was
to put to the British, which involved some sort of association of Belize
with Guatemala. Price listened and encouraged his colleagues to ask
questions, and undertook to consider the proposal.119 Two of his col-
leagues told the governor about the meeting, and when challenged
by Secretary of State Lennox Boyd, Price said he wanted more time
to discuss the matter with his colleagues. He later told the governor
that he and his colleagues had agreed to keep the discussions with
Granados private for the time being for political reasons, and Colin
Thornley replied that he “could conceive of no sort of political reason
for considering for one moment [the] proposal that relations between
their country and the British Crown should be severed.”120
This was rather disingenuous, given the fact that severing the
ties of Belize with the British was precisely the entire raison d’être
of the PUP’s struggle for independence. Governor Thornley him-
self had reported in May that “I did not myself believe that either
George Price or any of the present PUP leaders were in favor of the
G UAT E M A L A N C L A I M A N D D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N 41
British finally came to accept that the PUP had overwhelming pop-
ular support and that the people wanted independence. The British
were also consoled by the changed attitude of Price. When he was
called upon to form a government with some degree of authority in
development matters, he realized that the party needed more than
just mass support—it needed to deliver on its promises for social and
economic improvements, which would require the cooperation of
the British. Price accepted the British scheme of step-by-step con-
stitutional decolonization, and the embrace tightened when—after
a hurricane in 1961 devastated the country and destroyed Belize
City—the British provided unprecedented amounts of aid, includ-
ing the building of Belmopan, the new capital city, long a cher-
ished Price dream. In 1964 a “self-government” constitution came
into effect, and Guatemala broke diplomatic relations with Britain
in protest; it was not to renew those relations, despite Britain’s per-
sistent attempts to do so, for 22 years, 5 years after Belize attained
independence.
In 1965, the PUP won the first elections under self-government,
with a reduced but still substantial majority (57.8 percent).129 The
PUP leaders expected that within four or five years Belize would
become independent, but they knew that something had to be done
about the Guatemalan claim if an independent Belize was to have a
modicum of security. Price, therefore, agreed to mediation by the
United States, which dragged on until 1968, when the mediator’s
proposals were rejected by Belizeans. Immediately thereafter, Price
tried to force the pace and secure independence without a settle-
ment; the British appeared to go along with this, but then claimed
that the PUP’s mandate had run out, that the opposition had gained
popular support and that an election would have to be held before a
constitutional conference could be called. The PUP again won the
general elections in 1969, with 57.6 percent of the votes,130 but the
British then insisted that another effort must be made to resolve
the dispute by negotiation, and stated categorically that they would
not provide a defense guarantee for an independent Belize. In 1974
national elections resulted in another victory for the PUP, but with
a reduced proportion of the vote (51.3 percent),131 gaining 12 seats
and the United Democratic Party (UDP) 6, the most any opposi-
tion party had won since adult suffrage, and Dean Lindo became the
leader of the UDP.132
Despite Lindo’s greater emphasis on economic and social issues,
the UDP continued to exploit the suspicions harbored by a still sig-
nificant minority that Price and the PUP were soft on Guatemala; he
G UAT E M A L A N C L A I M A N D D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N 43
also made more of the “communist” charges against the PUP. And
although he participated in talks with the British and Guatemalans in
search of a settlement, he was clearly motivated by the determination
that the PUP should not be the party to lead Belize into independence.
This meant that as Price fought the battles on the international arena
to gain independence for Belize, he had to be constantly looking over
his shoulders to secure his home front. This affected the efficacy of the
internationalization campaign, especially in negotiations with the UK.
In May 1954, when the United States was preparing the invasion of
Guatemala and determined to detain and search any ship to prevent
arms reaching Guatemala, Britain agreed to support the embargo,
even though they considered it a violation of international law.140
After the invasion began and Guatemala appealed to the UN
Security Council (UNSC) to send observers, Washington leaned on
Britain to support its position that Guatemala had violated the intent
of the United Nations (UN) Charter by appealing to the UNSC rather
than to the Organization of American States (OAS). With British and
French support, after a first resolution had been vetoed by the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the UNSC refused to recon-
sider the Guatemalan crisis by a vote of four to five.141 The British
later persuaded Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold not to publish
his legal determination that the United States had been “completely
at variance with the Charter” when it argued that Guatemala was
wrong to appeal to the UNSC rather than the OAS. Although the
British government defended its position against very strong attacks
in Parliament and the press, it told the United States that “it was
never comfortable for the Government to defend a line at home which
it did not really believe.” And when the British government published
a White Paper on the issue, it was “specifically targeted to allay U.S.
anxieties,” and ensured that it was sufficiently “anticommunist” in
tone. Years later, the author of the White Paper admitted that “Jacobo
Arbenz was no more a threat to his country than Harold Wilson was
to ours.” Meers refers to the dire consequences for the Guatemalan
people of the 1954 coup, and concludes that
the legacy of the Arbenz coup has been no more pleasant for London. In
need of some rallying point for their demoralized nation, Guatemalan
rightists have vigorously pursued their country’s claim to Belize and
ultimately broke relations with London in 1963 over the matter.142
force.”144 In 1960, when the Cold War was particularly tense, with
the Cuban revolution making the United States especially anxious to
guard its backyard, Fuentes allowed the United States to prepare the
forces for the Bay of Pigs invasion in Guatemala; he also hoped that by
so doing the United States would assist him in the claim to Belize.145
On November 13, 1960, a group of young officers staged a coup; it
was put down with the help of the anti-Castro air force in training
there, and some of the coup officers began a guerrilla struggle that,
in different groupings and manifestations, was to last 36 years, over
which time the “counterinsurgency” war claimed 200,000 lives.146 In
1963 Defense Minister Coronel Enrique Peralta Azurdia overthrew
Fuentes and began to establish the system of open control of the state
by the armed forces.147
U.S. President Kennedy had instituted the Alliance for Progress in
1961 in an attempt to create a vibrant middle class in Latin America
and so help to forestall Cuban-style revolutions in the continent.
Soon, military governments were established in most of those coun-
tries. Between 1964 and 1966, the Peralta regime in Guatemala
received $24 million in military aid from Washington, and Peralta
promoted the formation of the Consejo de Defensa Centroamericano
(CONDECA). Faced with growing social unrest and diversified guer-
rilla activity, the army established new bases all over the country. In
preparation for elections in March 1966, the regime suppressed politi-
cal parties and exiled many of their leaders. Still, the only civilian can-
didate in the elections, Méndez Montenegro, who was associated with
the Arévalo regime, won and proclaimed the “Third Government of
the Revolution.”148 But the armed forces were concerned about the
rising level of guerrilla activity, and conditioned their allowing him
to assume the presidency: he had to sign a pact that gave the army
carte blanche to prosecute the anti-insurgency war, and forbade any
negotiations with the guerrilla leaders. Three major consequences of
the pact were (1) a regime of impunity was established by assuring
that the armed forces would not face judicial sanctions for any abuses
committed in the counterinsurgency; (2) civilian presidents, even
if democratically elected, would be subservient to the military; and
(3) by prohibiting negotiations with the insurgents, the country was
condemned to a prolonged war.149
The army unleashed a campaign of terror that engulfed the civilian
population. A guerrilla front had been established in Zacapa, and in
1967 Coronel Carlos Arana Osorio commanded an operation there
that was particularly brutal in its effects on the civilian population,
earning him the sobriquet of “Butcher of Zacapa.”150 The economic
46 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
situation was also affected by the war over disputed territory that
broke out between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969, which frac-
tured the fragile Central American Common Market (CACM) and
affected its potential for promoting economic growth in Guatemala.151
For the next several years, Guatemalan governments would divert
considerable attention to attempts to resolve that territorial conflict
and allow the CACM to resume its normal functions.
In the run-up to the elections in March 1970, the guerrillas kid-
napped Foreign Minister Alberto Fuentes Mohr (who was actively
engaged in negotiations with Britain over Belize). The general cli-
mate of insecurity favored a “hard hand” candidate who promised to
end the war and bring peace and stability: Arana Osorio won the elec-
tions and assumed office on July 1, not long after the guerrillas had
exchanged a kidnapped U.S. diplomat for some of its militants held
prisoners.152 The army felt that the experiment with a civilian presi-
dent, albeit with hands tied by the army, had not been productive.
Until the democratization process began in earnest in 1985, it resolved
not to make the same mistake again: henceforth all presidents would
come from the military. Guatemala was not alone: throughout much
of Latin America military governments were installed; in Central
America only Costa Rica maintained democratic governments.
Under President Arana Osorio there was a legal strengthening of
the repressive state apparatus, working along with illegal death squads.
The counterinsurgency state was consolidated. In the elections called
for March 1, 1974, which effectively excluded all antisystem politics,
the contending parties presented military candidates; the Christian
Democrats (DC) put forward General Ríos Montt as their presiden-
tial candidate with civilian Alberto Fuentes Mohr as vice presidential
candidate. On the day of elections, when the government realized
that the DC candidate was ahead at the polls, it suspended all infor-
mation regarding the elections and there was a power outage that
lasted until the following day, when the government announced that
General Kjell Laugerud García, who had been Arana’s defense minis-
ter and handpicked by him as the official candidate, had won.153 With
Laugerud, as with previous and following leaders, the Belize issue
was used to divert attention from the grave internal problems the
governments were unable to resolve.
States has used every strategy available to ensure that its governing
definition of national interest is upheld. After the overthrow of the
Arbenz government, Secretary Dulles proclaimed that “this intrusion
of Soviet despotism in Guatemala was, of course, a direct challenge to
our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most fundamental of our foreign
policies.”154
When the Belize issue appeared on the radar of U.S. policy ana-
lysts in the 1960s, their vision of the region was heavily tinged by
the effects of the Cuban revolution and the debacle of the failed
Bay of Pigs invasion. The U.S. government facilitated the first tri-
partite talks (UK-Guatemala-Belize) in Puerto Rico in 1962, which
President Ydígoras Fuentes later claimed resulted from pressure by
the United States on Britain, as part of a deal in return for the use of
Guatemalan territory to train members of the force for the invasion of
Cuba.155 Whether or not this was true, it was clear that Washington
fully supported the Guatemalan dictatorships as a bulwark against
any communist influence. On the other hand, there was the “special
relationship” between the United States and the UK, which made
the former reluctant to take positions completely at variance with the
latter. It had no such qualms with regard to the local Belize gov-
ernment, and indeed would feel more comfortable with Guatemala
controlling the foreign affairs and defense of a country that, in the
view of the United States, could easily come under the influence of
communism.
The United States certainly saw it as an important national secu-
rity goal to remove or curtail any perceived communist threat to its
hegemony in the hemisphere, and was not shy to act accordingly. In
the 1960s, the Panama Canal Zone became the focus of its coun-
terinsurgency training for armed forces of the hemisphere; in 1961
a CIA-backed coup overthrew President Velasco Ibarra of Ecuador
for being too friendly to Cuba; in 1962 the CIA began a campaign
in Brazil against Janio Quadros, and supported his ouster in 1964;
in 1963 the CIA backed the coup that overthrew the elected social
democrat, Juan Bosch, in the Dominican Republic, and the U.S.
army invaded the country in 1965 to prevent his reinstatement; and
in 1973 Washington supported the coup that ended in the death of
elected president Salvador Allende and the installation of the bloody
Augusto Pinochet regime, and also backed the military coup that
seized power in Uruguay.
Given this record of U.S. intervention in the hemisphere, and the
fact that there was an active U.S. counterinsurgency training unit in
Guatemala during this time, it was to be expected that it would take
48 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
They felt there was “no visible prospect of the territory becoming
economically viable, unless incorporated within some larger economic
framework,” but admitted that it was tacitly accepted in Belize that
independence was the goal. What was needed was a formula that satis-
fied certain requirements: that the UK “be relieved as soon as possible
of their expensive and embarrassing commitment to defend and give
full financial support” to Belize; that Guatemala’s aspirations to see
Belize “associated closely with Central America and so with her are
satisfied far enough to enable our relations to return to normal”; that
Belize be given adequate protection against any Guatemalan attempt
to annex the territory; that alternative sources of finance be found,
and that Mexican susceptibilities be satisfied. The secretaries believed
that all these objectives could be achieved by granting Belize full
internal self-government and by Belize’s entry into the Organización
de Estados Centroamericanos (ODECA) and the Organization of
American States (OAS) on attaining independence. When the British
put these thoughts to the U.S. State Department, the officials were
N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N 51
Just how wrong this assessment was, certainly in terms of the future atti-
tude of the United States, will become clear in the following pages.
The Guatemalans, meanwhile, concluded that any further talks in
Washington would be fruitless, and asked Britain to send a “top flight
diplomatist” to Guatemala for negotiations; Britain agreed on condi-
tion that Belizean representatives be present.25 In September Britain
sent Ambassador Sir Douglas Busk to Guatemala with the message
that federation was unacceptable to the Belizeans and, therefore, to
Britain. He proposed that Price join the meeting, but the Guatemalans
would not receive him unless he came prepared to discuss the federa-
tion proposal; Price refused, and a quick visit by Busk to Belize on a
U.S.-provided aircraft did not budge him.26 Busk concluded that “the
major factor in all our talks was very intense mistrust of Mr. Price
(only equaled by his mistrust of them),” that the Guatemalans were
most preoccupied by the “vacuum” in Belize after Britain left, and
that what they feared most was Mexico filling that vacuum.27 When
the Guatemalans realized that their federation idea would go nowhere,
they proposed either arbitration or that the UK and Guatemala jointly
ask the U.S. government to mediate.28 The U.S. government told the
British that they did not want to mediate, and preferred that the mat-
ter be submitted to arbitration. They added that “they have serious
worries about the wisdom of British Honduras proceeding to inde-
pendence with the dispute with Guatemala unresolved; they also
54 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
he was frankly horrified, and said . . . that he imagined the U.S. would
prefer to prop up an unviable independent Belize rather than see the
Guatemalans upset . . . it does show up U.S. thinking on Mexico whom
they appear ready to ignore, as opposed to Guatemala which they
evidently consider to be the lynch-pin of their apparatus to control
Central America.30
case would not prevent Guatemala from “reasserting its claim when-
ever it chooses.”56 The FO prepared a redraft of Webster’s propos-
als, softening some provisions, limiting internal security provisions to
exchange of information and removing from the Authority the power
to make regulations and to have enforcement responsibility, but main-
taining Guatemala’s authority to participate in the defense of Belize.57
The British were apprehensive about showing the draft to Price—“his
reaction might be so adverse that it may prejudice our chances of dis-
pelling suspicions that he may well form”58 —and decided to bring
the Belizeans to London for talks prior to going to New York to meet
the mediator. The governor felt there was no chance that either Price
or Goldson would find the proposals acceptable, since they envisaged
“substantial diminution of sovereignty with Guatemala put in domi-
nant role and no reciprocal benefits for Belize.”59 Meanwhile, account
had to be taken of Mexican sensibilities:
This last point, of course, would apply with even greater force to the
Belizeans themselves. Still, Secretary of State Michael Stewart told the
Cabinet that “there are no difficulties from a purely United Kingdom
point of view” in Webster’s proposals, but that it would be difficult to
sell to the Belizeans. He concentrated on the Joint Authority, eschew-
ing any mention of its limitation on Belize’s sovereignty and stating that
most of the Authority’s economic development projects would benefit
Belize. Stewart acknowledged that “our obligations under Article VII
of the treaty are still unfulfilled” and asked Cabinet to approve a grant
of two million pounds over the next four years for setting up the
Authority. Stewart asked Cabinet to approve the mediator’s proposals,
which would result in Guatemala recognizing an independent Belize,
allow the removal of the British garrison, give Belize an assured eco-
nomic future, and represent “the final fulfillment of a commitment
undertaken by the United Kingdom under the Treaty of 1859.”61
Two million pounds must have appeared to Cabinet as an incredibly
cheap price to pay for all these benefits, and the grant was approved.62
N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N 59
The Belize delegation (five from the PUP led by Price and two from
the National Independence Party [NIP] led by Goldson) met with the
British in London on June 1–3, 1966 and saw the drafts for the first
time. They argued for, and won, several changes to both the Webster
draft and the redraft that the British undertook to put to the media-
tor. A crucial gain was a new paragraph on defense stating that “the
Government of Belize shall be free to negotiate such regional or
other Defense Assistance Agreements as it considers necessary.”63
On the issue of representation abroad, the agreed article read: “The
Government of Guatemala and/or the Government of the United
Kingdom, if requested, shall afford assistance to the Government
of Belize in its international relations.” On the question of the Joint
Authority, the Belizeans were assured that it “would have no say in
the control of the internal economy” of Belize. The NIP representa-
tives went along with these proposals, insisting, as did the PUP del-
egates, that they were not accepting the Webster proposals but only,
as Mr. Goldson put it, indicating “agreement in principle as a basis for
the conclusion of a treaty,” and with the amendments they were sug-
gesting.64 Where the NIP did differ totally from the PUP was in their
insistence that the name “Belize” was unacceptable, as was early inde-
pendence, since “it would take at least ten years” for Belize to become
viable. The British and Belizean delegations moved on to New York,
where they met with Webster on June 6–7, argued forcibly for changes
in Webster’s draft, and succeeded in winning his approval for most of
them, pending his meeting with the Guatemalans a few days later.65
There was never any real prospect of the Guatemalans agreeing to
the alternative proposals put forward by the Belizeans; indeed, as they
made clear in subsequent meetings with the mediator, they desired
to strengthen some of Webster’s proposals in their favor. Meanwhile,
developments in Belize put a spanner in the works. The FO had said
of Goldson that on June 3, “he was seen in London briefing the Daily
Mirror Overseas Group Caribbean correspondent. A few days later
a distorted account of the talks appeared in the Trinidad Mirror.”66
When Goldson returned from New York he reprinted that account,
which alleged that “Britain wants to quit British Honduras and in
effect hand the colony over to Guatemala as soon as possible,”67 and
later published the original Webster proposals, without the changes
Webster had agreed to in New York.68 The subsequent public denun-
ciations69 motivated Price to make a statement to the House of
Representatives on June 17, 1966, in which he explained that at the
meetings in London the British had shared the mediator’s proposals
with the Belizean delegation, assuring them that the proposals were
60 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
not final, and that whenever the mediator presented his final propos-
als the government of Belize would be consulted. Price denied the
allegations made by the Trinidad newspaper, and asserted that the
policy of his government was to attain full sovereignty and indepen-
dence for Belize within the Commonwealth. He said that the British
government had given a solemn undertaking not to impose a solution
unacceptable to the people of Belize.70
On July 1, 1966 Méndez Montenegro was sworn in as president of
Guatemala, and Emilio Arenales became foreign minister. The three
parties met with the mediator in September and November; Webster
presented amended proposals that in the view of Guatemala consider-
ably watered down the proposals he had made in April.71 Accordingly,
the Guatemalans asked Webster not to present any further suggestions
until Guatemala had responded to the new proposals.72 Meetings in
January and March 1967 were equally frustrating for the Guatemalans,
who felt that they were being accused of being inflexible when in their
view it was the British who were being intransigent by insisting on an
independent Belize within the Commonwealth. They attempted to
bring Webster back to his proposals of April 1966, which they alleged
had been accepted by both Britain and Guatemala, but Webster said
that there was no possibility of agreement along those lines.
With Webster’s approval, Guatemala then undertook direct nego-
tiations with Britain, and Arenales hammered out an agreed text with
Foreign Secretary George Brown in London in July 1967; this was
to be signed by the parties in September in New York.73 The July
draft, according to Herrarte, declared that after a designated date the
UK would transfer supreme authority over the territory to Belize,
which would exercise its powers in accordance with the stipulations
of the treaty. The 18 articles of the draft dealt with the free tran-
sit of goods, vehicles, and persons; free ports; rights of Guatemalans
to work in Belize and vice versa; and cooperation in transport and
communications, education, and cultural and scientific exchanges.
An authority composed as in previous drafts would be established
to deal with those matters. There was also provision for Belize to
become a party to the CACM. On internal security, the two police
forces would consult and cooperate with one another. By Article 14,
Guatemala and the UK were to enter into special agreements with
regard to Belize’s international relations, which would serve as mod-
els for similar arrangements between Belize and Guatemala after the
designated date (i.e., when Belize was to become “independent”). In
the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, Belize was to con-
sult and coordinate with Guatemala in those matters requested by
N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N 61
he was not disposed to put his name, or the name of the United States
Government, to the sort of provisions which appeared in Article 14 of
the July text, because some of them were offensive to British Honduras
and he could not foresee their being accepted there.78
not provide. The Guatemalan delegate insisted that it could not agree
to “unrestricted independence,” as this would affect peace and stabil-
ity in the area; there had to be a complete arrangement dealing with
all relevant aspects.79
Webster then vacillated, stating that he had been asked by
Mr. Richard Frank (his State Department assistant) to make it clear
that he was not in favor of unrestricted sovereignty. They agreed to
meet again a few days later to try to resolve the remaining differences
over the July text. There were further meetings in November, with
the Guatemalans insisting that no changes be made to the text agreed
to by ministers and the British protesting that they had made clear
that Belize would have to be consulted; it had, and objected to many
of the articles agreed to.80
What occurred between July and November that caused Britain to
pull back from an agreement reached by its foreign secretary? For one
thing, the British press had accused the British government of bow-
ing to U.S. pressure and selling out the country to Guatemala,81 and
for another Goldson had appeared before the United Nations (UN)
Fourth Committee on August 30, 1967 to denounce the mediation
process. He alleged that the nefarious plans to subjugate his country
to Guatemala continued, and accused Price of working in favor of
Guatemala’s ambitions. He denounced the Brown-Arenales talks and
asked that the UN administer a referendum to determine the wishes
of the people of Belize.82
On December 4, 1967, after two further meetings had taken place
between the parties and the mediator, Belize’s minister C. L. B. Rogers
addressed the Fourth Committee, stating that “absorption of the
people of Belize by Guatemala would amount to the extinction of
Belizean society and the denial of the human rights of the Belizean
people.” He took some time to refute Goldson’s allegations against
Mr. Price and the PUP, and called on the UK government “to fulfill
its obligations to the people of Belize and lead them to absolute inde-
pendence in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations
Charter.” He put the onus on the UK for any recommendation the
mediator might make:
The draft treaty88 did not differ much from the 1966 proposals.
There was still to be a Joint Authority with wide powers, with three
members appointed by each government and the chairman appointed
by those six; if unable to agree, they would ask the U.S. government
to make the appointment. The article on external affairs required
Guatemala to assist Belize in the conduct of its international relations
when requested, and they were to conclude arrangements concern-
ing matters of external defense of mutual concern, but again there
was a need for a request from Belize to trigger action on the part of
Guatemala. There was also a suggestion that the defense of Belize
should be handled through the Rio Treaty, and that Belize would not
need bilateral defense arrangements with other countries.
The Guatemalans were shocked at both the timing and the con-
tent of the terms of the treaty—not only because Webster had said
in December that he would present “semi-final” recommendations,
but also because Foreign Secretary Brown had invited Guatemala to
64 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
anxious to ensure that its actions fall in line with U.S. policy in a region
that it clearly recognized as within the U.S. sphere of influence.
U.S. strategic views on Guatemala were clearly defined by the State
Department in Country Analysis and Strategy Papers, which during
the 1960s determined that
became a reality, and that the study might be done by the Sistema de
Integración Económica Centroamericana (SIECA) or by ECLA.140
Invasion Scare
In mid-January 1972, the UK received intelligence reports of an
impending Guatemalan invasion of Belize.141 The Costa Rican foreign
minister informed the British that the Guatemalans had asked him how
Costa Rica would react if Guatemala and El Salvador occupied Belize,
perhaps in February or March.142 Nicaragua’s Anastacio Somoza
also spoke to the British about this plan, and he agreed to tell the
Guatemalans that the British were aware of the threat and were ready to
meet it, and that they had informed the United States.143 The Mexicans
asked the UK ambassador about the alleged plan, and told him that
if the Guatemalans invaded Belize “the Mexican army would also
enter . . . so as to preserve from Guatemala their now dormant rights to
the northern part of the territory.”144 The U.S. State Department also
knew about this beforehand, through a report of the Office for Latin
American Affairs of the Pentagon, which noted that the Guatemalan
invasion would have ended in failure because of the immediate arrival
of British troops.145 Indeed, the U.S. government could not have been
in the least surprised at Guatemalan intentions, having noted as far
back as 1969 that “Roberto Herrera Ibarguen of the MLN continues
to urge a military solution to the Belize problem.”146
Fabio Castillo, a former member of a Salvadoran Junta, later affirmed
that Salvadoran President Fidel Sánchez made a deal with President
Arana to join in an invasion of Belize and that the quid pro quo for the
deal was to send El Salvador’s “surplus population” to Belize.147
Britain reinforced its garrison in Belize, and the Guatemalans pro-
tested that there had been no plans to invade Belize and denounced
the British build-up as an intolerable threat of aggression. Guatemalan
Congressmen called for a declaration of war against Britain. Price
used the occasion to again demand a defense guarantee after inde-
pendence.148 Two days later, the Guatemalan government headed off
the declaration of war debate in Congress by announcing that it had
brought about the withdrawal of British naval units from Central
American waters.149 In the House of Commons Joseph Godber, ques-
tioned about the troop movements, declared that they “were part of
a long planned exercise in the Caribbean area.”150 The Guatemalan
government was still being pressured at home to react more strongly
to the British build-up, and it decided to take its case to the OAS,
where it felt it had majority support.
N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N 75
* * *
impression that you can expect British defense assistance after Britain
withdraws from the territory.”155
For the Guatemalans, the pace of decolonization after 1960
was a clear signal that the clock was ticking against them, and that
they could either gain some control over the territory while Britain
exercised sovereignty or lose it all to an independent Belize. The
Guatemalan policy was, therefore, consistently to demand that there
should be no change of status unless Guatemala was consulted. The
Guatemalans did not so much mind the British remaining in Belize,
so long as Belize remained a colony. The Guatemalan consul in Belize
told the British troop commander there that “the present status quo
including the maintenance of British presence and garrison here was
infinitely preferable to any form of agreement.”156
The United States, for its part, emerged from its attempt at media-
tion with some degree of frustration, having failed to bring about
a peaceful solution that would be acceptable to the Guatemalan
regime, which was its bulwark against the threat of communist infil-
tration in Central America. Although it would have been happy to see
Guatemala exercise control over Belize’s defense and foreign policy,
its special relationship with Britain restrained its policy choices, and
it thereafter assumed the attitude of not interfering too openly in the
dispute, having allies on both sides to satisfy.
The situation in 1972 was that Britain was prepared to compro-
mise Belize’s sovereignty in order to rid itself of this nagging century-
old problem, although it was committed to not impose an unwanted
settlement on Belize. Guatemala, on the other hand, would not
reduce its demands to a point that would be acceptable to the people
of Belize. As a result, both negotiations and mediation failed, and
there matters stood until 1975, when negotiations resumed, but in
a context where, as we shall see, the Belize government had already
decided that negotiations would get nowhere, that Belize could not
count on either Britain or the United States to safeguard its interests,
and that a new strategy must be devised in order to achieve its goals.
Chapter 4
The historical ties that bind us, the ever more friendly relations and
the observance of the principles of international coexistence that
H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G 81
[t]he PUP will send a delegation to the United Nations to make known
to the whole world the Belizean unbreakable will to self-determine its
independence on the Central American mainland.27
Canal issue, and Price decided to attend the meeting and promote
the Belize cause.36 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
was against making an issue of Belize at the UNSC; it feared that
Guatemala would be offended and delay talks even further, and wor-
ried about irritating the Latin Americans at a time that the UK was
trying to gain permanent observer status at the OAS. At the meet-
ing in Panama, however, Guyana’s Foreign Minister37 spoke force-
fully against Guatemala’s claim and invited the Security Council to
“take note of the fear which [Belizeans] felt and to consider what
steps could be taken to safeguard their right to self determination.”38
In April Price told the ECLA meeting in Quito that Belize must
become an independent state soon and be admitted as a full member.
Jamaica’s minister of foreign affairs, Dudley Thompson, suggested
that Belize’s independence could be guaranteed by a Commonwealth
commitment, especially of Caribbean countries and Canada, and
that this may be raised at the Commonwealth Heads of Government
meeting (CHOGM) due to be held in Jamaica in 1975.39
Beginning in 1973 and until 1975, when the final decision was
made to take the Belize case to the UN for a resolution, Governor
Posnett kept up a running battle with other British officials in
London, in New York and in Guatemala, attempting to convince
them that Price was right in insisting on international action. Those
officials had expressed grave doubts about the UN supporting Belize,
and cited the cases of the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar to show that
no favorable resolution could be expected to pass at the UN. Posnett
reminded them that “in those territories the people (as I understand
it) wish to remain British. Here the majority (I think) do not. There
the governments are not seeking independence. Here they are.”40
He added that while there was no international lobby for the people
of Gibraltar or the Falkland Islands, there was a strong and grow-
ing lobby for Belize. He asked that there be “careful examination
before we lump Belize into the same basket with other dependencies
for United Nations purposes.” He noted that talks with Guatemala
had led nowhere, and that only by introducing a new element into
the situation would Guatemalan complacency with the status quo be
stirred, and concluded that “it does seem to me rather sanguine to
pin all our hopes on bilateral talks.”41
[Price] has in the past, and is now I suspect once again conducting
negotiations in foreign relations which he keeps secret from us. (I read
him a lecture about this). He may embroil us in difficulties with Latin
America and the independent Caribbean. I am pretty certain he will
sabotage our bilateral talks by some action at the UN.48
H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G 85
The meeting with Arenales was held in July 1973, with Julian
Amery leading for Britain. Arenales said he had a “plan” for a solu-
tion of the dispute, but nothing could be revealed until after the
elections in Guatemala in March 1974. The next president, General
Laugerud, knew the thinking of President Arana and was in agree-
ment; between the elections in March and the swearing in of the new
president in July, his side would have considerable freedom of action,
and an agreement could be reached in that period. In the meantime,
the British should restrain Price and ensure that the matter was not
brought up at the UN. It would also help if they reduced the gar-
rison.49 Amery informed Arenales that Belize planned to join the
Caribbean Community in May 1974, but assured him that there was
no question of Belize advancing to independence before March. The
British tried very hard to get Arenales to reveal something about the
“plan,” so that they could argue with Price to keep the matter out
of the UN, but he absolutely refused, and argued that the plan was
one to be discussed between Britain and Guatemala only; if agree-
ment were reached, Price “or his successor” would have to accept
whether he liked it or not. There was no future in negotiating with
Price; he must be told that if he took matters too far at the UN, “the
Guatemalan government might be driven to take steps which the
Belizeans would have reason to regret as would the Guatemalans
themselves.”50
When he received a report of the meeting, Price simply asked
Hankey to tell Amery that the policy of talks was useless and that
a new approach must be found.51 But the British waited for another
year to hear the “plan” of Arenales; they would try to get some hint
of its content by talking to the United States, by prodding officials
in the Guatemalan foreign ministry (Arenales had told them that he
might send a “leak”) and through other diplomats, but to no avail.
In the following months British officials kept sending reports indi-
cating how difficult and uncertain any action at the UN would be.
They speculated on the probable outcomes of different types of reso-
lution that might be put forward for Belize, and concluded that the
Belizeans should “go straight for a Falkland Islands type consensus
resolution,” which would merely ask Britain and Guatemala to con-
tinue negotiations.52 They preferred, however, that Belize abandon
plans to float a resolution and simply ask its friends to refer to the
matter in their UN speeches.53
Deputy Premier Rogers went to the UN in July 1973 and spoke to
ambassadors from African and Arab countries, who all pledged sup-
port for Belize. In August, the government of Trinidad and Tobago
86 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
For the present they have no need to police this frontier: we do it for
them. But the removal of British forces at independence would cre-
ate for them new hazards . . . Looked at in this way their reluctance to
H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G 87
He stated that there was little popular interest in Belize for inde-
pendence, since it would mean throwing off the blanket of British
protection; and in calling for a continued British presence after inde-
pendence, Price “may have been seeking just the thing to alleviate
Guatemala’s own worries over her security against Cuba. Now, like a
chained dog, Mr. Price can bark for the bone of independence know-
ing that he cannot bite it.”60 Nick Larmour, an undersecretary at the
FCO, suggested that no one was “particularly optimistic about the
proposed Guatemalan plan to be revealed in the next few months,
and the probability is that we shall be left with the same situation
as before, but with a much more frustrated Mr. Price.”61 After the
Guatemalan elections in March 1974, Weymes sought to calm any
concerns London might have over the stability of the government,
and, therefore, of Arenales’ plan. He said that the government had
been in real difficulties over the elections, but that things were nor-
malizing; “sections of the army are thought to be unhappy about the
election fraud and to support Ríos Montt, the opposition candidate,
but he is said to be opposed to military intervention.”62
On May 1, 1974, Belize acceded to membership of the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM), and the Guatemalans submitted a for-
mal protest against this “unilateral” decision.63 But the Guatemalans
told Weymes that this was only a formality, and that the Arenales
plan was still alive, although incoming president Laugerud would
want to consult with his new foreign minister before presenting it;
the meeting could, therefore, not be held until July. It must have
struck Weymes then that Arenales’s plan had been to seal the deal
between the election in March and the accession of the new gov-
ernment in July, for he asked plaintively: “could this be a delaying
tactic?”64
In June 1974, Price visited Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Honduras.
In Caracas Price was able, “by his own devices,” to meet with the
minister of finance and other advisers and officials. In San José, he
met with President Daniel Oduber and Foreign Minister Gonzalo
Facio.65 The press reported Facio as saying that Costa Rica con-
sidered Belize as Central American territory, “which doesn’t mean
Guatemalan territory,” and that peoples’ right to self-determination
had “priority over the element of territorial possessiveness,”66 In
Honduras, Price met with President López Arellano, who told him
he would put in a word for Belize when next he met President Arana.
88 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
has again shown his talent for making contacts at a usefully high
level notwithstanding protocolaire problems which would have
obstructed a more formal approach and might have daunted a less
determined man. 68
The FCO agreed with Richard, considering that not only would
Cuba’s influence exasperate Guatemala, but also encourage the other
Caribbean countries to turn to Cuba for advice or support, “maybe
even on sugar”; Britain would be encouraging Cuba, by analogy, “to
meddle with the Falklands.” 94
The Belize government was keen to have a visiting mission in
Belize in 1975 while Salim was Chairman, because it felt that inter-
national pressure needed to be remorselessly applied, regardless of
whether there were talks or how they were going.95 The FCO con-
ceded that “there is little hope of meaningful negotiations unless we
can apply some pressure,” and felt that they could tell Guatemala that
the Belizeans were “wholly disenchanted by the history of bilateral
negotiations and insist on pursuing their own diplomacy.”96
with another country. Apart from the issues of fishing rights and nat-
ural resources, Guatemala’s prime concern was security: an indepen-
dent Belize would be subject to Cuban or other foreign influences.
Guatemala had only limited access to her ports in the Caribbean;
there must, therefore, be a territorial arrangement. The proposal was
that the area of Belize below 16 degrees 30 minutes (just south of
Placencia) be incorporated into Guatemala “at once”; this was the line
that closed off the Gulf of Honduras, which was the decisive factor
for Guatemala.97 The UK would simply have to tell Price that this
was not his territory. A deal could be struck with the transfer of that
territory and parts of the two-treaty package. They insisted that some
elements in Guatemala wanted to take over the entire territory, and
the army was “champing at the bit.” 98
Richard felt that this was Guatemala’s opening bid, and that the
proposals formed a possible basis for discussion.99 Posnett, however,
warned that the chance of Belize accepting any land cession was nil,
and reminded the FCO of Price’s long-standing declaration that he
would never relinquish “one inch of Belizean territory.”100 In Belize,
Price told Richard that the new proposals were “a ruse to keep us all
talking another five years,” and that their discussion should focus on
the internationalization of the dispute.101 Richard, however, insisted
on probing the Guatemalan offer further; he thought less territory
could be offered. Price was willing to consider the possibility of des-
ignating an area of three miles on either side of the Sarstoon for joint
exploitation, but with sovereignty unchanged. Also, he intended to
abide by his party’s manifesto, which had laid out the policy of claim-
ing 12 miles of territorial sea and 200 miles of Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ). Price argued that it was the exposure at the UN in 1974
that had brought the Guatemalans back to the negotiating table,
although they had said they would not negotiate until the garrison
was reduced; now, further pressure at the UN was needed to force
them to present more reasonable proposals.102
Price told the British team that if a solution were not found soon,
there could be a change of government in Belize, and the new gov-
ernment would want Belize to remain a colony, which would be “a
ridiculous anomaly.”103 Larmour asked whether the Moho River
could be an acceptable border,104 and Price protested that some Maya
villages and Barranco, a Garifuna village, lay to the south of the
Moho. He was, however, prepared to consider “a symbolic and token
concession.”105 He had in mind the rectification of the western bor-
der from Garbutt’s Falls northward to make it accord with the terms
of the 1859 Treaty.106
H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G 93
the sea, an outlet for the resources of the Petén and trade arrange-
ments.110 But the British had brought quite specific ideas for terri-
torial cession, complete with maps illustrating them: cession of the
Sapodilla Cays; of territorial sea and continental shelf; of parts of
the western frontier involving “fairly substantial cession of territory,”
including several villages; and cession of territory in the south up
to the Moho.111 Richard warned that a promise from Guatemala of
independence for Belize in exchange for cession up the Moho “could
not be dismissed by the British government out of hand.”112 Price
retorted that “the price for independence must be otherwise than
territory. You would not cede British territory, and Britain must pay
the price, you created the problem.”113
Richard confirmed the UK’s commitment that Belize would not
be forced to accept any negotiated solution, but insisted that he “could
not accept a Belizean veto.” Belize was not willing to go to indepen-
dence without a defense guarantee and Britain would not provide it,
so a settlement must be reached.114 When he asked Price whether “a
ladder of negotiating positions” could be put to the Guatemalans,
Price said that the “Belizean ladder excluded land cession.”115
The meetings with Guatemala were held in New Orleans on
April 21, 1975, with Aycinena leading for Guatemala and Richard
for the UK; Courtenay represented Belize. Richard explained that
Belize rejected territorial cession, but Britain was prepared to discuss
any proposal from Guatemala; the UK was under increasing pressure
to grant independence to Belize and it could not resist this pressure
indefinitely. Aycinena replied that once a territorial arrangement had
been achieved and something added to regulate relations between
Belize and Guatemala, the achievement of independence was obvious.
Richard floated the idea of “a formal cession of sovereignty from Belize
of an area of territory, with a lease-back arrangement of that territory to
Belize,” but the Guatemalans rejected this out of hand.116 The Belize
side stood firm on no land cession, and the Guatemalans repeated that
territory was an absolute necessity for any settlement.
The British met separately with Courtenay, who said that he had
become convinced, unlike Price, that territory was essential to the
Guatemalans, and that he believed that cession up to the Moho
River would be acceptable with straight independence.117 In the
resumed session in the afternoon, Richard formally proposed that
the border be the Moho rather than the Sarstoon. Aycinena immedi-
ately said that this would not give Guatemala the full control of the
Bay of Amatique that it required, and offered to accept that part of
Belize south of a line on the Monkey River, and Belize could have
H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G 95
Price himself, as well as his other colleagues, clearly did not think
so.120 At the CHOGM in Jamaica, he was “declaring loudly that
not one inch of Belizean soil would be ceded.”121 Secretary of State
James Callaghan told Price that Britain could not accept defense
responsibilities for countries over whose internal affairs she had no
control, but that perhaps arrangements in Oman might provide an
example for consideration: British officers were seconded on con-
tract to the Omani government to help train local forces. On the
question of Belize’s international campaign, Callaghan warned that
“internationalising a matter did not always help. The current prob-
lems in Cyprus were an example.”122 He proposed instead a package
involving first that Belize make “some border adjustments”; sec-
ond, that the United States put pressure on Guatemala and provide
or secure guarantees that Guatemala would not engage in military
adventures; third, that Britain provide a military training mission
after independence. Price said he thought Callaghan’s idea offered
possibilities.123
not yet; he would speak to President Gerald Ford shortly about the
matter.124 There was some inconclusive discussion about the possibility
of a peace-keeping force for Belize.125
Callaghan then asked that negotiations be given a chance; and
under pressure agreed that September might be the right time to go
to the UN if talks failed. At the request of Manley, who was chair-
man of the conference, Callaghan, Barrow, Pindling, and Price pre-
pared a draft passage for the communiqué that emphasized support
for Belize’s independence and territorial integrity.126 However, by
the time it reached the floor Callaghan had deleted the reference to
territorial integrity, arguing that this could endanger the talks with
Guatemala, and that his proposed alternative, while not explicit,
gave tacit recognition to the principle of maintaining the country’s
territorial integrity. The agreed paragraph read:
The Heads of Government offered their full support for the aspira-
tions of the people of Belize for early independence. Noting that talks
had recently been resumed with Guatemala, and bearing in mind
the special responsibilities of Britain as the administering power, the
Heads of Government urged the parties to take all necessary action
for a speedy solution to the problem, which could be endorsed by the
international community through the United Nations, in accordance
with the principle of the self-determination of peoples as enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations.
his position after his experience with Price at the CHOGM; he told
Richard at the British embassy in Washington that
The latter course was what Price had been pushing for years, but he
was forced to go through the motions of negotiations in order to keep
the British on side, knowing full well that it was in their power to sim-
ply abandon the defense of Belize, which would make a Guatemalan
occupation inevitable. And so he continued the talks with the British
and the Guatemalans. He sent Courtenay and Attorney General
Assad Shoman to London in June to tell the British that he did not
regard land cession as a possibility, and that preparations should
get underway to take the matter to the UN in September.134 The
British reported that Callaghan had spoken to Kissinger, but that the
United States regarded itself as very much on the sidelines. Richard
emphasized that in his view no amount of pressure, whether from
98 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
we shall first have to make one more effort to convince Price that
he cannot have his independence and the whole of his territory too;
and indeed I think we might have to tell him that if the Guatemalans
accept the outcome of any such mediation and if we ourselves think it
is a fair settlement in all the circumstances, then he should not count
upon our acquiescing in a Belizean rejection of the terms.139
Fortunately for Belize, however, there were others in the FCO who
held a different view. FCO officer Patrick Duff 140 argued that it was
difficult to see how a “neutral” resolution would improve the nego-
tiating position of Britain and Belize. He advised that it would be
fruitless to try to persuade Price to agree to cession of territory, and
that Britain should assist in promoting a resolution in the UN giving
maximum support for Belizean self-determination and independence.
And while Courtenay, in his report to Price after the London talks
in June, had suggested that “a number of sweeteners should be con-
sidered” to propose to the Guatemalans, including “Richard’s Moho
proposal,”141 the line adopted by Price and his team was presented by
Courtenay to the House of Representatives after the July talks:
The Conference expresses full support for the people of Belize whose
aspirations for independence continue to be frustrated by territorial
claims. In affirming the territorial integrity of Belize and the right of
its people to independence, the Conference agreed to lend its support
to all efforts directed to those ends.144
When the Puerto Rico talks were held in 1962, President Adolfo
López Mateos reaffirmed Mexico’s position:
any change in the status of Belize cannot be legitimately carried out with-
out the participation of Mexico and without taking into account first and
foremost the right of the people of Belize to obtain full independence if
they so wish, through the free exercise of their sovereign will.5
At the same time, Mexican officials had to take into account not
only Guatemalan, but also more general Central American resent-
ment against Mexico. In 1969, Mexican Foreign Minister Carrillo
Flores said that Central American countries feared Mexico, and
reported that the Salvadoran ambassador in Washington had been
“consulting his CA colleagues expressing concern lest BH inde-
pendence lead to BH opening Bay of Chetumal to Mexican naval
vessels,” arguing that if in addition to its naval base in Acapulco
Mexico had another in Chetumal Bay, it would dominate all Central
America.6
President Díaz Ordaz, in February 1970, affirmed that Mexico
would always support Belize’s right of independence and that the
independent Belize could be sure of the warmest welcome and
assistance from Mexico.7 In April 1974, Mexico’s Foreign Minister
Emilio Rabasa told Price that Mexico supported Belize’s right to
self-determination and would officially recognize Belizean sov-
ereignty one hour after independence. In return, Mexico wanted
such strips of land as were necessary to guarantee her ships access to
Chetumal Bay through Mexican waters.8 When the British learned
in February 1975 that the Guatemalans were insisting on territo-
rial cession, they immediately became concerned that Mexico might
“be tempted to take the wrappings off their own claim.” Yet when
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Minister David Ennals
met with Rabasa in Mexico City, Rabasa expressed Mexico’s main
practical concern: access for all Mexican ships to Chetumal.9 Ennals
assured Rabasa that Mexican concerns over access to Chetumal were
I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N E M E R G E N T 103
fully noted, but did not tell Rabasa about Guatemala’s recent and
implacable demand for significant land cession.10
Later that year, Mexico’s position was more formally defined
by Manuel Tello, then a director at the Foreign Ministry and later
himself the foreign minister:
[i]t seems to me that your questions are not put with goodwill, sympa-
thy or good faith, but rather that they are venomous and unhelpful. I
am unable to reply to your lack of courtesy, of hospitality and respect.
I have no more to say to you.28
its independence by putting the whole issue in cold storage for several
years. It would appease one of our customers but would stir up the
rest of them.49
The United States and Britain had failed to see eye to eye on the
critical political issues involved. One consequence would be that in
1975 and for the next four years the U.S. government would not sup-
port the pro-Belize UN resolutions.
The Belize government was delighted with this new policy, which
reduced U.S. military aid to Guatemala and raised hopes of U.S. sup-
port for Belize’s objectives. When Carter addressed the Organization
of American States (OAS) General Assembly in Washington in con-
nection with the Panama treaties, he encouraged the leaders to
tackle the outstanding territorial disputes in the hemisphere and
pledged “to join in the effort to find peaceful and just solutions
to other problems.”54 By the following year, however, the Carter
110 BELIZE’S IND EPEND ENC E
essential for Belize to have Britain fully on board, because Britain was
crucial to the defense of Belize and influenced the votes of European
Community countries.
Britain, although aware of the importance of these factors, could
not simply ram any resolution down Belize’s throat. For one thing,
the broad support Belize had gained from so many countries dur-
ing the previous months forced Britain to show respect for Belize’s
position. Britain also had to pay special heed to the sentiments of the
Commonwealth countries. An important factor that enabled Belize
to get the resolution it did was its enlisting of Rashleigh Jackson of
Guyana, Frank Abdullah of Trinidad and Tobago, and Don Mills of
Jamaica to join the Belize delegates in backroom negotiations with
Britain over the wording of the resolution.56 These men had tremen-
dous prestige at the UN, not only because of the high standing of the
leaders of their countries in the Third World, but also because of their
own diplomatic skills and their finesse in negotiating accords.
Richard wanted to have a fairly mild resolution, even one that
could achieve consensus, since “we didn’t think we could get much
support for a strong resolution, and if we did get a strong resolution
it would affect the negotiation.”57 Britain was anxious to avoid riling
Guatemala, especially for security reasons, and so as not to appear
to the other Latin Americans as an old-style colonial power. In this
context, Britain’s skeleton in the closet was the Falkland Islands (Islas
Malvinas). But Britain had a hidden agenda: it had come to the firm
conclusion that the best way to get out of the situation would be for
Belize to agree to give up some of its territory in the south, and so
it did not want “territorial integrity” mentioned in the resolution.
Britain’s priority was to achieve a negotiated solution with Guatemala,
which would allow it to withdraw its defense responsibility, not only
because it was costly and potentially dangerous, but also because
the British thought it did not sit well with Latin Americans that a
European power maintained troops on the American mainland. For
Belize, on the other hand, the priority was not a negotiated solution,
but the achievement of independence with security. However, as this
security could realistically be supplied only by Britain, the situation
was fraught with interconnections and potential conflicts, where each
side felt it might lose if it gave in too much to the other.
The most difficult issue that the Belizeans had with the British on
the wording of the resolution was that relating to territorial integrity,
not just because Britain wanted to maintain land cession as a pos-
sible element in a negotiated settlement, but also because Resolution
1514 appeared to be ambiguous on the issue, and Guatemala had
112 BELIZE’S IND EPEND ENC E
struck the first blow by arguing that its own territorial integrity was
at stake. But the Belize delegation had come to the UN prepared to
argue the point in Belize’s favor, and it did so to all delegations in
written form as well as in verbal presentations. The Belizeans argued
that although Article 6 of Resolution 1514 rules out “any attempt
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the
territorial integrity of a country,” what the principle proclaims is that
existing international borders should not be violated by force. The
principle protects the status quo against forceful violation, whereas
the principle of self-determination privileges change in colonial situ-
ations. Furthermore, Resolution 2625 of 1970, the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States, reaffirms “the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples,” and declares the following:
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which
deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of their right to self determination and
freedom and independence.58
The territory of a colony . . . has, under the Charter, a status separate and
distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such sepa-
rate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of
the colony . . . have exercised their right of self-determination . . . Nothing
in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign independent
States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus pos-
sessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.59
* * *
In the first year of its campaign at the UN, the Belize mission relied
very heavily on the argument that the Belizean people had been forced
to wait too long for a right that had been won many years before in
international law. Ironically, the delay also played in favor of Belize,
since with every passing year as more countries became independent
and members of the UN, there was a greater number of states sup-
porting the Belize case and greater sympathy in the face of the intol-
erable delay that the Belizean people continued to be subjected to
before exercising their inalienable right to independence. The Belize
case was also helped by the perceived threat of a Guatemalan invasion
and the British decision to reinforce the garrison, propelling Belize
into the international spotlight just at the time when the moment
120 BELIZE’S IND EPEND ENC E
of decision was approaching at the UN. And the success Belize had
achieved with garnering the support of international organizations,
and particularly the NAM, assured it a significant victory at the UN.
Its one weakness, which was significant, was its failure to win sup-
port for its position among the Latin American countries, although
this was tempered by the fact that the majority of them did not vote
against the Caribbean resolution, but rather abstained.
Guatemala, meanwhile, refused to recognize the validity of the
UN resolution and publicly declared its determination to stop a “uni-
lateral” independence of Belize by force if necessary. Britain persisted
in its refusal of a defense guarantee, insisting that a negotiated settle-
ment was necessary and that this could be achieved only with some
territorial adjustment, despite their support for the resolution that
clearly forbade it. Indeed, Rowlands had perverted the meaning of
the resolution, indicating to Laugerud that it did not necessarily mean
what it said. This British attitude bedeviled relations with Belize for
the next six years. The Belize government concentrated its efforts on
getting Latin American countries to support its bid for independence
with all its territory and on pressing Britain to change its policy with
regard to a military guarantee, while seeking other means of achiev-
ing the security of an independent Belize. But it was forced to spend
much time and effort on negotiations with Guatemala.
Chapter 6
Internationalization Ascendant
(1976–1977)
Talks had been scheduled to take place in February, but the earthquake
that devastated Guatemala on February 5, 1976 forced their postpone-
ment until the end of April. The British used the time to reflect on
their policy options and to devise proposals that would be sufficiently
attractive to the Guatemalans and still be acceptable to the Belizeans,
while the latter concentrated their efforts on gaining Latin American
support and firming up some sort of defense guarantee. There were
serious misunderstandings between London and Belmopan, as British
negotiators drifted further and further from the mandates of the United
Nations (UN) resolutions and the Belizeans opened up more fronts in
the international arena to bolster their position.
Negotiating Options
In February the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) Patrick
Duff prepared a discussion paper on British policy, taking account of
Callaghan’s desire for a settlement by the end of 1976.1 He wondered
whether
Getting Torrijos
Although the Belizean ministers in the External Affairs Committee
(EAC) were fully immersed in the negotiations, what was foremost
in their minds was how to expand their support base, particularly
in Latin America, which was essential for the strategy of interna-
tionalization to succeed. In Central America, guerrilla movements
were struggling against massive odds that included U.S. support
for the repressive regimes, and there seemed to be no prospect of
immediate victory. In Latin America, authoritarian regimes and mil-
itary dictatorships predominated. The only major Latin American
cause that appeared to have a resonance on the Belizean struggle
for sovereignty and territorial integrity was that of the efforts of the
Panamanian people, led by General Omar Torrijos, to regain the
Panama Canal territories from the United States. Price had been to
Panama several times attempting to meet Torrijos, but had never
succeeded in doing so.
Then in May 1976 a small Nicaraguan delegation came to Belize
clandestinely, headed by Catholic poet-priest Ernesto Cardenal,
seeking support and arms for the revolution. Although all that
Price could offer was quiet solidarity, he and Cardenal struck
up a friendship, and Cardenal came away with a commitment to
Belize’s struggle for independence. He thought highly of Price:
“apart from being a great leader and statesman he is also a saint,
which is something very unusual in a statesman.”15 Cardenal felt
that international solidarity for Belize would make a Guatemalan
attack impossible, and in his future solidarity work for Nicaragua
in Europe, he would always mention the Belize cause, convinced
that a democratic independent state in Central America would aid
the cause of democracy in Nicaragua and elsewhere in the isth-
mus.16 Cardenal was close to Torrijos, and after he spoke to him
about Belize, Price could see Torrijos whenever he wanted to; they
became fast friends.17 Torrijos, whose government had the year
before supported a declaration affirming Guatemala’s rights to
Belize, became a total convert to the Belize cause, and with the
convert’s zeal he did everything he could to further that cause,
including putting his resources at the disposal of Belize for lob-
bying Latin American governments and offering to send troops to
defend Belize. He had a team of collaborators that he put to work
on the Belize case, urging them on with statements like “Price is
the José Martí of Belize.”18 Torrijos’ support turned out to be a
critical factor in Belize’s internationalization strategy.
I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T 125
before the talks, Molina told Rowlands that Guatemala was demand-
ing an even larger territorial cession than before: the border must be
just below Dangriga. They agreed not to discuss territory in the ple-
nary meetings, in order to avoid breakdown.50 Rowlands said nothing
to Price about the Guatemalan demand,51 but Price must have sus-
pected something, for he made a special declaration at the close of the
plenary affirming that Belize would not accept any proposal involving
the cession of land.52 The Guatemalans replied that Price’s statement
had “distorted the situation”; it was Guatemala that was giving up
territory, and Guatemala’s national honor, security and integrity were
involved.53
In another private meeting after the talks, Molina handed Rowlands
a map showing the Guatemalan claim to the rivers Riachuelo,
Chiquibul, and Sittee.54 Rowlands told him that his proposal was
quite impossible, and tabled the British proposal for a seabed conces-
sion, but “Molina was appalled at how little we were offering and said
he would have expected at least the Sapodilla Cays to be included.”55
A copy of the map was sent to Governor Peter McEntee, but with
instructions not to show Price.56 Rowlands described the Panama
talks to his secretary of state as
The Mission also warned that “we must clearly do all we can to
avoid a situation in which future UN resolutions are directed as much
against ourselves as against Guatemala,” and concluded that “from
the evidence we have, [Price] is playing for a breakdown and for a
defence guarantee from HMG.”82 Despite British opposition, Belize
was able to strengthen the resolution; it repeated the fundamental
principles of the 1975 resolution and added three elements: early
independence; the call for states to refrain from any action that would
I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T 133
threaten the territorial integrity of Belize; and the request that Britain
and Guatemala report at the next session of the General Assembly
on such agreements as may have been reached in the negotiations.
The second and third elements were aimed at Britain as much as at
Guatemala: Britain should not compromise Belize’s territory, and
there should be transparency as well as speed in the negotiations.83
The debates in the Fourth Committee were less intense than the
year before, with little new ground covered. Rogers addressed the
Fourth Committee and charged that Guatemala was interfering in
the internal affairs of Belize and increasing its military capacity near
the border. He denounced Guatemala’s “preposterous proposal that
Belize should surrender a substantial part of its territory as the price for
independence.”84 Guatemala’s Skinner-Klee warned that the proposed
Caribbean resolution would harden the position of the parties, inflame
public opinion, and undo the real progress that had been made.85
Peru floated a proposed consensus draft resolution in the Fourth
Committee that reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of
Belize to self-determination,86 but the Belizeans and their allies
rejected it as being far too weak and in effect retrograde.
The Caribbean draft resolution had 53 cosponsors, and the vote,
taken on November 17, 1976, was 111 in favor, 9 against, and 15
abstentions. The most important addition to the “yes” votes was that
of Panama, which had voted against in 1975. The Philippines, which
had abstained in the General Assembly vote in 1975, also voted in
favor.87 At the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the resolu-
tion was adopted by 115 votes to 8, with 15 abstentions. The reduc-
tion in the “no” votes was due to Guatemala’s nonparticipation in the
vote at the General Assembly.88
As the year came to a close, the British struggled to determine
what to do with the land issue. Despite their cosponsoring two UN
resolutions that specifically excluded land cession, they continued to
promote it as a solution. When Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés
Pérez visited London in December, Prime Minister Callaghan and
Mr. Rowlands told him that they believed that a minor “frontier rec-
tification” might be acceptable as part of a settlement on Belize.89
FCO officials were concerned about the effect on Price if he should
hear of this from the Venezuelans, since he would probably “suspect
that we have reverted to the ideas . . . for cession of territory up to the
Moho River . . . [although] we have again co-sponsored a UN resolu-
tion which endorses Belize’s territorial integrity.” 90 They accordingly
instructed the governor to tell Price that it was the Venezuelans who
suggested that frontier rectification might be necessary in order to
134 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
obtain a settlement and that the British had replied that they would
be prepared to consider that.91
In November 1976 the FCO prepared a paper setting out future
possible actions on Belize that the MOD found “quite acceptable.”92 At
his meeting with Molina in January, Rowlands would seek to establish
the minimum Guatemalan requirements for a negotiated settlement:
The paper suggested that option b) “could well be the only way to
put a term to our commitment to defend Belize and end the present
cycle of tension and reinforcement.” 94 The Cabinet Office, however,
felt that a more promising approach would be “to offer a more dura-
ble bribe” such as an oil pipeline, and came out against independence
without an agreement.95 The British government was profoundly con-
fused and divided about what Guatemala’s intentions were, whether
they seriously posed a military threat to Belize or not, what sort of
settlement might be achievable, or what should be Britain’s preferred
option for bringing Belize to early independence. This did not augur
well for the meeting between Rowlands and Molina.
Molina met Rowlands in New York on January 9, 1977 and told him
that cession up to the Monkey River was essential. Rowlands rejected
that idea and urged Molina, unsuccessfully, to settle for a smaller slice
of territory. Still, the British reported that the atmosphere at the meet-
ing was good and that negotiations would continue.96 The British were
convinced that once negotiations broke down and Guatemala assumed
that Belize would go to independence “unilaterally,” the likelihood of a
Guatemalan invasion of Belize would be bordering on certainty; hence
the need to pretend that negotiations were fruitful and to agree on
continuing them. The Belizeans, who had long ago concluded that no
agreement could ever be reached with Guatemala, kept busy expanding
the scope and size of their international support.
Price kept in close contact with regional leaders in the greater
Caribbean, especially Manley, Burnham, Williams, Tom Adams of
Barbados, Torrijos, Pérez, and the new Mexican president, José López
Portillo, who was publicly taking a stand in favor of Belize. Price and
I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T 135
other members of his team also kept up contacts with leaders in Africa
and Asia. The lobbying efforts were not limited to members of gov-
ernments in power; especially in Central America, lobbying included
political parties in and out of power, civil society, the press, trade
unions, students, and etcetera. Often these efforts had a ripple effect,
with one set of contacts leading to others.
In May 1977 the government of Guatemala formally broke dip-
lomatic ties with Panama, a belated response to Panama’s vote in
the UN and its very active support for the Belize cause thereafter.
President Laugerud made very bitter and personal attacks against
Torrijos, and accused him of being the bridge for Fidel Castro to have
a foothold in Belize.97
The General Assembly of the Organization of American States
(OAS) was held in Grenada in June 1977; Belizean representatives
were present at the invitation of the government of Grenada. All the
CARICOM delegates referred to the Belize question during their
addresses, and Panama, Barbados, Grenada, Jamaica, and Trinidad and
Tobago issued a Joint Communiqué in support of Belize’s indepen-
dence and territorial integrity, expressing their “grave concern at the
threat of aggression against Belize.”98 No country spoke out in favor
of Guatemala’s claim. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said that “the
question of Belize is of great importance and we observe it with great
care. We have discussed it with our friends and colleagues during this
Assembly.”99 There were indeed many private discussions in the corri-
dors that advanced the cause of Belize. For example, Costa Rica’s Facio
expressed the view that the issue could not be settled by negotiation,
and that Guatemala should be faced with a fait accompli: Belize should
proceed to independence and British forces should remain for a period
of about six months. He believed that “the Guatemalans, though they
will demonstrate outrage, will in the end accept such a situation in light
of the overwhelming international support for Belize.”100
One of the most important events for the Belize cause was the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) held
in London in June 1977. Belize had lobbied heavily with African
and Asian members of the Commonwealth, as well as with Canada,
with whose Premier Trudeau Price had a special relationship. The
Belizeans felt that Britain was not telling Belize everything it was
doing to reach a settlement with Guatemala, and that more effective
pressure could be brought to bear by the Commonwealth. Adams of
Barbados expressed concern that Britain seemed to be considering
land cession, asked that Britain not make any concession on behalf of
Belize without its consent, and urged Britain to press the UN for a
136 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
The paper set out “the essential clauses” of the treaty, including rec-
ognition of the independence of Belize within the boundaries defined
in the Anglo-Guatemalan and Anglo-Mexican treaties, the neutrality
140 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
Owen claimed that “even Premier Price had accepted that they
might have to discuss [land cession], although he had raised all the
objections that were bound to be raised on any cession of territory.”
That was too much for Price, who, overcoming his natural civility
and his hesitation to openly defy Britain in public, took the floor
to state that although he did not have the power to prevent Britain
and Guatemala from discussing territorial cession, Belize had made
its stand very clear: discussions of Belize’s territorial integrity must be
in accordance with UN resolutions. Owen sought to paper over the
difference by saying that “obviously, at this juncture, Belize should
hold on to their position. It was right tactically as well as in every
other way.” He also said that Britain would do nothing that Belize or
the committee were not aware of.141
Price asked the committee to consider setting up a multinational
peace-keeping force for Belize made up of forces from Commonwealth
countries as well as some Latin American countries. He got support
for this from Caribbean and African members, but the Asians sided
with Canadian Foreign Minister Jamieson, who advised caution.
Tanzania said it would not support any settlement that proceeded on
the basis of cession of territory, no matter how small; India, Jamaica,
and Malaysia concurred. The committee agreed to make a concerted
diplomatic approach to the U.S. government; to work diligently in
Latin America to further isolate Guatemala; and to explore, within
the framework of the UN, the possibility of an international arrange-
ment for guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of
Belize.142
of the extent to which Britain was breaking its word about keeping
it, and Belize, informed of its discussions with Guatemala. Belize had
made it clear that it would not budge on the land issue, and that the
committee’s task was to find a way to guarantee the independence
of Belize against Guatemala’s wishes. It had become obvious that
Belize meant to use the committee as a means of pressuring Britain
to respect the Belize positions.
it is criminal hypocrisy for nations to utter pieties about the right of all
peoples to live in security and at the same time surreptitiously to pro-
vide weapons to aggressive countries for the purpose of extinguishing
that same right. Barbados calls upon all those countries which supply
Guatemala with arms to desist from supporting it in its evil intention
of invading Belize.166
13 abstentions. The yes votes this time included Argentina and Peru.
The no votes were reduced to the core Central American countries
except Guatemala, which did not participate in the voting.
Torrijos, meanwhile, remained true to his word to do everything
possible to support Belize; he was in close contact with Price, visited
Belize in 1977 and took every opportunity to promote the Belize
cause. He agreed with Price that the Guatemalans would never settle
on terms acceptable to Belize, and that is why he had taken the initia-
tive to propose establishing a force to defend Belize; until his death
on August 1, 1981, he kept alive his offer to send 1,000 men with
the appropriate weapons to defend Belize. He was aware of the high
value Price placed on maintaining British troops in Belize after inde-
pendence, and in October 1977 when he called on Prime Minister
Callaghan in London he brought up the question of Belize and said
that it would be impossible to give Belize its independence without an
assurance that it would not be invaded. He told Callaghan that he had
visited the advance posts of the British army in Belize and knew that
“they were posts of dignity and not of occupation.”169 Torrijos helped
to promote a special meeting in December in Jamaica, attended by
foreign ministers and other representatives of Barbados, Grenada,
Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Surinam, and Venezuela, with a represen-
tative of Mexico as observer. The meeting issued a strong declaration
of support for Belize’s early and secure independence with territorial
integrity; insisted that the government of Belize be fully involved in
all consultations and negotiations aimed at achieving a solution (this
was obviously targeted at Britain); and pledged continued support, by
diplomatic and other methods as appropriate, to secure a solution.170
Britain still needed a lot of encouragement if it were to agree to
maintain troops in Belize after independence, although its own offi-
cials and even ministers had sometimes advised that this might be
the only, and also the cheapest, way to get out of Belize. Although
the Cabinet had agreed in July 1976 to provide a defense guarantee,
this was conditioned on their being a settlement; the task for Belize
was to convince the British to provide a defense guarantee because
there was no settlement, which would not be an easy task, since the
British, against all evidence, kept interpreting Guatemalan responses
as hopeful signs that they really wanted to reach agreement.
The panorama in 1977 was totally different from what it had
been at the beginning of 1975. The Belizeans had accomplished a
great deal since they had decided to fully internationalize their case,
against British advice. With each passing year they were not only able
to achieve stronger resolutions, but also to increase the number of
148 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
countries voting in favor. Since from the outset the main obstacle
to complete international support was the Latin American vote,
Torrijos’ enthusiastic adherence to the cause was critical. By 1977
four major Latin American countries supported the Belize resolution,
and there was cause for hope that the following year others would
follow suit and that as a consequence the vote of the United States
would change.
The biggest challenge for Belize remained the British insistence,
fanned by pressure from the United States, that Belize must give up
territory. Even though Secretary of State Crosland stated in 1976 that
“it is becoming increasingly clear that we shall be unable to offer
territory as part of the price of a settlement”171—a sentiment echoed
at various times by Callaghan, Owen, Rowlands, and others—the
British kept trying to reach agreement with Guatemala based on land
cession. This led them to break their promises about keeping the
Belizeans informed of their various consultations and to engage in
acts of perfidy. The Belizeans, who understood this, began to include
in declarations the responsibility of Britain to keep them informed
and not to make any offers without their consent.
As 1977 came to an end, the Belizeans knew that they faced an
uphill struggle, but there were also signs of hope and comfort: the
CMCB was playing a pivotal role, the Latin American countries,
pushed by Torrijos, were beginning to openly adhere to the Belize
cause, and the Carter administration’s campaign for human rights
held out the hope, despite the State Department’s insistence on ter-
ritorial cession, that the United States would eventually support the
secure independence of Belize with its territory intact in spite of
Guatemalan objections.
Chapter 7
Internationalization Triumphant
(1978–1981)
The deal had been accepted by the Guatemalans.2 Price was told about
this but sworn to secrecy, although he expressed his opposition.
Price was put under extreme pressure by both Britain and the
United States to accept the November proposals. He was made to
understand that rejection would annoy the U.S. government and even
endanger Belize’s security, and he felt constrained to not appear to
be intransigent. The British records are, therefore, contradictory, in
some places stating that Price was willing to consider territorial cession
from the Temash river, at others making it clear that he rejected any
cession at all. And while appearing, especially to U.S. representatives,
to be conciliatory, he colluded with his CARICOM colleagues, and
increasingly with Mexico, to ensure that his real position against any
cession or diminution of sovereignty was maintained, and also made
public statements in Belize that would bind him to that position.
In January 1978 Price met with Rowlands in Kingston, and told
him that he could not accept the proposals, thanked him for his
efforts, and said he would go on a new offensive to win over more
Latin American States. Rowlands reported that “it looks as if we
have come to the end of the road on the present negotiations.”3
He later added that “the whole tenor of his [Price’s] remarks was
along the line ‘not one inch,’ ” but lamented that “I felt that I could
not open up this issue because it would be reneging on the Vance
meeting.”4
Price was very worried about U.S. reaction to his rejection of their
proposals, and asked to meet Terence Todman, the U.S. assistant
secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, in Miami on his way
back from Kingston on January 19. Todman reported that Price was
against the “mediation” idea, but that “he did not rule out acceptance
of a territorial concession up to a line below the Moho River (pre-
sumably the Temash) if it were accompanied by aid and if the treaty
concessions were put aside.”5 Price has forcefully denied that he ever
gave Todman such an understanding,6 and subsequent events tend to
bear him out.
It is clear that Price had been working very closely with the Mexicans
to help him maintain his position. For what it considered its own
national interest, Mexico was against Belize giving up any land or sover-
eignty to Guatemala, and provided Belize “with maximum diplomatic
support, viewing such support as a necessary counter-balance to what
it considers to be US support for Guatemala.”7 When Todman met
President Lopez Portillo on January 21, the president told him that
Mexico would insist that any solution be based on basic international
principles; he also made it clear that he was against a U.S. mediator,
I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T 151
He then stated that the British had been discussing land cession
with Guatemala:
A week later, when Rowlands met with Vance and Molina, he told
them about his meetings with Price and other Caribbean leaders,
which once more revealed their total opposition to land cession, and
about Price’s “internal political problems” and the buildup of opin-
ion in Britain itself against any form of territorial change.20 Both the
United States and Guatemala said they could reconsider the November
proposals, although Molina rejected the idea of a cession only up to
the Temash. Rowlands felt he had succeeded in “the limited aim of
ensuring that negotiations continue without our having made any
specific commitments.”21
Todman later reported that Molina told Vance that he was “dis-
turbed that after two years of lengthy discussions an agreement was
finally reached on security aspects and then all the effort seems to be
wasted.” He emphasized that Guatemala was very concerned about
security, since Belize was its boundary with the Caribbean, and “once
Britain leaves there will be a vacuum which they felt others would fill,
possibly Cubans.”22
In Belize the UDP continued to accuse Price of compromising
Belize’s sovereignty and territorial integrity because of his “mad rush”
to independence. As usual in Belize, such allegations were believed
by many and caused concern to all. The PUP had lost the Belize
City Council elections in December 1977; elections for the other
municipalities were due in 1978, and the UDP appeared to be in the
ascendancy. Price worried about the charges of “sell-out” and was
determined to keep the record straight. He wrote to Owen reminding
him that “I stood firm on territorial integrity.”23
At Rowland’s request, the U.S. State Department presented two
documents to Britain on February 10, 1978: one suggesting pos-
sible ways of meeting security concerns, and a “draft agreement of
amity and mutual security between Belize, Guatemala, Honduras
and Mexico.”24 On the security issues, as the British themselves
pointed out, the U.S. government went further to meet the concerns
of Guatemala than those of Belize.25
Meanwhile, Price was drumming up support, not only for a mul-
tilateral force but also for territorial integrity, in a manner that tried
154 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
London should not have been surprised, therefore, that Price took
that comment to mean that if a credible multilateral force could be
assembled, Britain would take part in it.34 In any case, the British
were incensed, and Rowlands sent a message to Price saying that
“we are now seriously out of step on the question of an international
defence guarantee,” and added that
the strength of my feeling about his recent activities and deny firmly
that we have been dealing with the Guatemalans behind his back . . . I
am fed up with Price’s behaviour and intend to do a little plain speaking.
He must decide whether to go fishing or simply to cut bait.41
Owen asked for a meeting with Price and with Dean Lindo, the
leader of the Opposition, in New York in early June.
series of talks have come to an end and the parties are not bound by
any previous proposals”; the attendance of the three parties at future
talks would be “without prejudice to their respective positions or to
the rights and responsibilities of the British government.” The final
article of the MOU was rich with the seeds of controversy:
For the Belize government, this meant that Guatemala could not
be allowed to hold a veto over Belize’s independence, since the solu-
tion of the dispute, being a separate issue, need not be consummated
before independence; the Opposition, on the other hand, claimed
that it meant that there must be an election before independence, and
touted the MOU as a major victory.44 The British were concerned
that Guatemala and the United States not interpret that clause to
mean that independence would precede a settlement, since this would
disturb Guatemala in particular, smacking of “unilateral indepen-
dence.” To that extent, on this issue, the Opposition, the British,
the Guatemalans, and the United States were on the same page. In
describing that paragraph to the U.S. government, Owen said that it
was devised
all options remain open, including those that have been discussed
so far . . . As far as territory is concerned I have made it clear to the
158 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
that the territory was British before 1859; that the 1859 Treaty is,
therefore, not a treaty of cession; that it is arguable that Britain may
have been in breach of Article 7 of the 1859 Treaty, but that any such
breach can in no way establish a title to Belize in Guatemala; and,
finally, that in any event contemporary international law requires
regard to be had to the principle of self-determination—the effect of
which is emphatically to exclude the Guatemalan claim.63
to lose the advantages offered by the UK.89 Shoman laid out Belize’s
position:
In August 1980 Ridley once again visited Belize and said that
“in New York the Guatemalans put forward some positions which
were not so unreasonable.” He urged Belize to bear in mind “the
balance between the concessions we need to make and going ahead
unilaterally . . . a settlement is better than the risk of going it alone.” 96
Price retorted that
[t]he proposals do not square with the UN resolution for they include
land cession of the Sapodilla and Ranguana Cays and the propos-
als involve a violation of the sovereignty of Belize . . . It was therefore
important to plan for alternative routes to independence.97
reiterated its unconditional support for the early and secure indepen-
dence of Belize with all its territory. It was agreed that the indepen-
dence of Belize should no longer be delayed and that the Non-Aligned
Movement will give its full support to an early time-table for the inde-
pendence of Belize.102
This was exactly the position that Price had been advancing for years,
which he called “parallel roads”; he stated that he “endorsed” Ridley’s
suggestion.104
Castillo replied that the proposal of parallel roads would be a trag-
edy if negotiations failed to reach a satisfactory solution.105 Ridley
then put forward a set of 17 proposals he had prepared.106 Price
agreed to cooperate on those points, but noted that Belize’s rela-
tions with Central America would be without prejudice to its rela-
tions with CARICOM. The following day Castillo replied that two
things remained critical for Guatemala: territory had to be part of the
solution and Guatemala would not accept unilateral independence,
so that the only road forward was negotiations.107 Premier Price had
the last word:
cays.” Skinner-Klee said that apart from the Sapodilla cays, the
Ranguana cays and a part of the mainland had to be part of the
lease. Courtenay replied that the concept of a lease was Belize’s
attempt to go as far as possible to meet the Guatemalan demand
for territory, but that it could never include part of the mainland.
Skinner-Klee insisted that Guatemala wanted sovereignty over the
Ranguana and Sapodilla cays, and that they would be willing to
consider any mechanism that gave them some presence on the main-
land. Day put on record that territorial cession had already been
discussed by ministers and was not considered feasible. When Price
was informed that the discussions had broadened to include the
Ranguana cays, which he had not authorized, he directed that the
talks be suspended for consultations.
The talks resumed the following week, with Rogers and Shoman
added to the Belizean team. Rogers had written instructions from
Price, with 14 proposals, all variations on Ridley’s. The delegates con-
centrated on the lease idea. The Belize offer was for one of the cays on
the Sapodilla range, Lime Cay, to be leased to the UK, with authority
to sublet to Guatemala at an economical rent for 20 years. The cay
must not be used for military purposes, and any development must
be agreed by both parties. On the following day, Skinner-Klee com-
plained that the week before “the British side said it was prepared to
consider the lease of certain cays; now it turns into a sub-lease of one
cay because that cay is pretty. Such a proposal is absolutely frivolous,
tinged with insolence and arrogance.” He said the talks were over,
rose along with his delegation and left. He later agreed not to declare
that the negotiations had broken down, and to fix an early date for a
ministerial meeting in London. The stage was set for what was to lead
to the Heads of Agreement.120
decades and the memories of the Webster mediation, the very ambi-
guity of the document, which for the Belizean negotiators was of
positive value, allowing them to ensure that none of Belize’s positions
would be diluted, provided ammunition for those who interpreted it
to mean that Belize was to be made subordinate to Guatemala and
its southern cays turned over to the enemy. It is also true that the
Belizean leaders were less effective in gaining the understanding and
support of the Belizean people for the Heads of Agreement than
they were in garnering international support. This had the unfortu-
nate effect of Belize moving to independence with its people deeply
divided.
This is not to suggest, however, that the majority of the people
of Belize did not support the government’s move toward indepen-
dence; this had been clearly demonstrated by the results of the 1979
elections. Indeed, it could be asserted that the majority accepted
government’s assurances with respect to the Heads themselves,
especially after it declared that any agreement would be put to a
national referendum. Those who opposed the Heads and indeed
the move to independence at that time were a minority, but a very
strong minority, for three important reasons. First, because the
Opposition was still to a great extent a one-issue party and all its
resources were directed at mobilizing opposition to the Heads and
at stopping the march to independence. Among the resources at its
disposal was a pamphlet published by the Guatemalan government,
which, in an effort to placate its own constituency, interpreted the
Heads as making significant concessions to Guatemala, including
the virtual cession of the cays. Over the years, the Opposition had
conditioned its followers to distrust Price on the Guatemalan issue,
and its constituency had always represented more than 40 percent
of the population, so that the Opposition could count on automatic
significant support on any issue related to Guatemala that it went all
out to denounce. On the government side, on the other hand, the
ministers directly involved in the internationalization process, and
who could convincingly speak to the Belizean people on the issues,
were also in charge of important ministries that took up much of
their time. In addition, their diplomatic activity in 1981 was neces-
sarily at a high pitch, and they were unable to dedicate the time and
effort needed to effectively counter the Opposition’s spin on the
Heads.
Second, opposition to the Heads appeared more significant than
it was because the public officers called a strike that succeeded in
paralyzing virtually all government offices. The civil service had been
I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T 177
for them to have the use of the cays as if for all practical purposes they
belonged to Guatemala. Free port rights and the oil pipelines were
to be given in perpetuity and Guatemala would have rights to police
them, as well as rights to the use of Belizean roads. In particular, they
would be able to use the cays and waters for defense purposes. On
those matters it was impossible to reach agreement; agreed texts were
achieved in relation to other Heads. It was agreed to meet again in
London in mid-June.
In early June, Shoman and Musa were dispatched to Central
American and CARICOM countries respectively. Torrijos agreed
with Belize’s position on the cays, but advised that Belize should have
several alternatives to keep throwing out in negotiations, so that the
ball would be in the Guatemalan court when the whistle blew.140
Musa’s visits to Trinidad, Guyana, Barbados, and Jamaica consoli-
dated support for Belize’s positions, and the foreign ministers prof-
fered advice as well as practical technical assistance in several areas.141
V. H. Courtenay, who had been dispatched to Washington, met with
Thomas Enders, undersecretary of state elect in the State Department,
who told him that Belize must be more flexible in the negotiations;
in particular it should seek to meet Guatemala’s complaint that Belize
was not prepared to give anything of value on the sea passage, and
that Belize’s offer was a ridiculous one-mile passageway, thus reduc-
ing what Guatemala was already enjoying. He suggested that Belize
limit its territorial seas in the south to three miles. Enders also pressed
Belize to allow Guatemalan coast guard or police patrols in the cays.
He said that the U.S. government was prepared to offer Belize bilat-
eral economic and military aid when it became independent if there
was a settlement. Courtenay told him that Belize was willing to be
more flexible on the territorial seas, but that it could not agree to any
military use of the cays.142
In London, however, the British government was vacillating on
that and other issues, fearful of precipitating a Guatemalan military
reaction if Belize were to become independent without a settlement.
Although Ridley had declared in the House on June 30 that the UK
intended “to make arrangements for the security of Belize which will
be appropriate in the circumstances, whatever they may be,”143 the
British still planned to push for a settlement with Guatemala before
independence. Ridley summoned the CMCB ambassadors in London
to a meeting at the FCO in July, and told them that progress in the
talks over the past 18 months “had surpassed the British govern-
ment’s most sanguine expectations. Guatemala had made conces-
sion after concession in the negotiations leading up to the Heads of
182 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
Ridley added that the United States had been very supportive, but
its attitude might be different if the treaty negotiations failed. He
opined that Belize should agree to give Guatemala a wider sea cor-
ridor and allow quasimilitary use of the cays. When pressed, he said
Britain would be prepared to proceed with independence even if the
treaty talks broke down, but added that “if the Treaty was wrecked by
Belize either through the Treaty talks or through the referendum . . . it
should not be taken for granted that the British army would defend
Belize.”145 On the other hand, if the talks failed because Guatemala
was “palpably at fault,” Britain would honor security undertakings to
see Belize through. But he then repeated that Britain would not be
able to defend Belize if the treaty were rejected by referendum, and
appealed to the members of the CMCB to exercise whatever influence
they could on Belize.
When the Belizeans received the report of this meeting, they knew
they had to conduct themselves in the negotiations in such a way as
to appear to be making concessions, but in the end ensure that the
talks failed and that the Guatemalans be held responsible, by their
intransigence, for that failure.
The second session of the Joint Commission was held on July 6,
1981 in New York. Ridley, Castillo, and Price attended, but no meet-
ing of the Joint Commission took place. In private meetings, under
very heavy pressure from the British, the Belize delegation agreed
to offer to maintain its existing three-mile limit in the south, but
with the clear understanding that all the seas between the islands
and the shore were internal waters. It did not budge on the question
of the sovereignty or use of the cays. Guatemala, on the other hand,
I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T 183
It was agreed that British forces would remain in Belize after indepen-
dence for an appropriate period . . . It was further agreed that certain
I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T 185
[i]t is a sobering thought that 16 years ago the British Government sacked
Price from the Executive and Legislative Councils for having the disloyal
temerity to talk to the Guatemalans about a possible settlement, and not
perhaps surprising if he takes it less than kindly when now pressed to
expose himself to political risk by giving them a slice of his territory!1
188 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
feared that they would be given a pounding not only by the Latin
Americans but by the Africans as well who had consistently pilloried
them for their policies and actions in Africa. They anticipated a poor
reception at the Fourth Committee, expecting parallels to be drawn
with the Falklands and Gibraltar, which would have resulted in little
support for Belize and much embarrassment for the UK. They were
wrong, and Price refused to be swayed by their arguments. Instead
he opted for the UN route despite Britain’s doubts, and with the help
of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries. Only when it was
realized that Britain would look even worse if Belize went to the UN
and lobbied against it as well as Guatemala did the British govern-
ment reconsider and agree to support Belize’s strategy.
But Britain’s conduct of the negotiations and especially the tactic
of having private talks with Guatemalan leaders and sidelining formal
talks, haggling with them about how much territory should be the
price for peace, made it much harder for Belize to achieve its goals.
British ministers encouraged the Guatemalans to ignore the provisions
of the UN resolutions, gave them assurances that “there would be no
UDI,” that the UK would not give Belize a defense guarantee and
even that Belize would not go to independence without a settlement.
For many years, under Labor as well as Conservative governments,
the UK had consistently held that its defense policy did not allow it to
provide a military guarantee for an independent Belize, but in 1980 it
changed its position and so enabled Belize to accede to independence.
Why did this occur? Clearly the support for Belize at the UN created
immense pressure on any British government, but the fact is that the
decision to reverse the policy was taken by a Conservative government
only a few months after it assumed office. This may have happened
anyhow, because of how the issue had developed after years of intense
diplomatic activity at the UN. But there does seem to have been a mate-
rial difference in the approach of the two parties with regard to their
willingness to commit British forces. Callaghan had been unwilling to
do so in order to bring an end to the Rhodesian crisis, but Thatcher
did not hesitate. And many have wondered whether Labor would have
gone to war in the Falklands. There are indeed good grounds for spec-
ulating that the divergence in approach of the two parties did make a
difference, and this has been reluctantly admitted by two of the key
Labor players in the negotiations. Rowlands notes that
Richard admits that “in a sense, yes, we lost five years, and we
have to give the Conservatives credit for biting that particular bullet.”
He referred to the case of Cyprus “where the UK was technically a
guarantor of territorial integrity,” but where “Wilson and Callaghan
were not keen to use military force.” He concludes that “the Tories
are more inclined to use the defence card.”4
But there may have been more to it than the Conservatives’ bravado.
It is likely that in 1980 the U.S. government had decided to seek a
speedy end to the dispute, which was causing it unnecessary embarrass-
ment and diversion in the region at a time when guerrilla movements
were in power (in Nicaragua) and in the ascendancy (in El Salvador).
Washington probably indicated to London that the UK should assume
the responsibility for defending an independent Belize, thinking also
that it would prevent Cuba from using the territory for subversive pur-
poses. When Ridley told Price in May 1980 that Britain was ultimately
prepared to grant independence without an agreement with Guatemala,
he confided that he had been working closely with the United States
and that he expected more help from them in the future; their only real
concern, he warned, was the possibility of Cuban influence.
In July 1981, then, it was not surprising that the U.S. government
assured Price that it would provide security as well as economic assis-
tance and support Belize’s territorial integrity. Moreover, just four
months after Belize’s independence, when the British defense blanket
presumably had just about another five months to run, the United
States made it clear to Britain that it wanted British troops to stay in
Belize. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had sent officials to the
United States to discuss Trident, but she notes that the U.S. govern-
ment “also pressed for an extension of our armed forces’ engagement in
Belize, which has now become a virtually permanent commitment.”5
And in 1984, it was reported that “a nervous American government
is virtually begging Britain to postpone, indefinitely, its eventual
withdrawal of the 1,800 British forces now based in Belize.”6
The United States was certainly a most important influence on
events throughout the period. Although Washington kept insisting
that it was impartial in the dispute, the United States clearly favored
Guatemala’s positions, as is evident from the proposals they promoted
from Webster to Vance. They made it clear that Guatemala had a
CONCLUSIONS 191
strategic importance for them, while Belize was seen as another pro-
spective unviable small state in the region that would be susceptible to
Cuban influence. And although the U.S. government kept protesting
that they were not in the business of providing solutions to the dis-
pute, neither Kissinger nor Vance was shy about making quite specific
recommendations to Britain for its resolution, recommendations that
took greater account of Guatemalan “interests” than Belizean rights.
What turned out to be extremely fortunate for Belize, however,
was that Carter appointed Andrew Young as his ambassador to the
UN, and he
In addition, and despite the Cold War, U.S. policy and the style
of negotiations during the Carter presidency were “much more sensi-
tive to the international community and to the UN than any other
administration before or after,” so that it was a difficult moment for
the extreme right in Latin America, since the official representation of
the United States at the UN did not correspond with the traditional
U.S. position of supporting authoritarian regimes in Latin America.8
When Reagan assumed the presidency in 1981, major changes were
expected, and the Caribbean allies of Belize worried that time was
running out, as they indicated at their meeting in Belmopan after the
Heads of Agreement. It was the luck of Belize’s independence move-
ment that it was able to take advantage of the policy inertia during
the brief period after Carter and while the Reagan policies had not yet
taken root. One year later Reagan’s policies were firmly established,
his obsession with communism in Central America and the Caribbean
was paramount, and he would most likely have not supported Belize’s
unfettered independence in defiance of Guatemala.
Part of the reason why Belize was successful at the UN was that
Guatemala’s diplomacy was ineffective. Guatemala’s ambassador at the
UN in 1975 has said that his country’s positions were excessively legal
and formalistic, ignoring the essential social and political factors of
Belize, Guatemala, and the region.9 At that time, he notes, Guatemalan
politics was dominated by ultranationalist values, which affected not
only the political leaders but also the press, and favored radical posi-
tions and intransigent attitudes. The Guatemalan discourse was obso-
lete; it maintained prewar positions that clashed with the new currents
192 B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E
while the Belize issue gave a certain frisson to saber-rattling, the esca-
lation of stentorian claims and intermittent incursions over the border
into a full-scale invasion was not a compelling proposition for any but
the wilder elements of the officer corps who believed that they should
act as boldly as they talked.13
[y]ou guys, you were fantastic; you weren’t supposed to have diplo-
macy or a foreign policy, but you did. The Commonwealth was a
very important pressure point on us. You were obviously interested
in opening several fronts. We didn’t want that; there was a difference,
because we didn’t know how it would play, how it would affect the
negotiations, or the U.S. They were useful pressure points, but we
didn’t want them to get out of hand; it wasn’t in our interest to have
the issue opened up on too many fronts. 23
[t]oday the situation is such that the British basically swim along with
the international current. They naturally enjoy being identified with
the mainstream. 26
* * *
neoliberal school, although Walt notes that “the core claims of institu-
tionalist theory have become more modest over time. Institutions are
now said to facilitate cooperation when it is in each state’s interest to
do so, but it is widely agreed that they cannot force states to behave in
ways that are contrary to the states’ own selfish interests.”28 A strong
argument can be made, however, to show that Britain’s selfish interests
in 1981 would not have led it to provide a costly and antipolicy mili-
tary guarantee to Belize, and that it did so precisely as a result of the
persuasive power of international institutions and because its govern-
ment was influenced by the power of ideas.And this is where construc-
tivism’s approach has a strong appeal in explaining at least part of the
reasons why certain outcomes prevail in international relations:
Year Population
1790 2,656
1803 3,959
1823 4,107
1832 3,794
1835 2,543
1845 9,809
1861 25,635
1901 37,479
1931 51,347
1946 59,220
1960 90,505
1970 119,645
1980 145,353
200 A PP ENDIX
Chetumal
r y Treaty of 1893
Area in green 1783 convention da
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Area in red 1786 convention
edi
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A
Orange Walk
Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1783 Ambergris
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MEXICO
Booth’s River
2 (Lat. 17˚ 49')
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Treaty of 188
alao Boundary
o Bra
Mexican-Guatem
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r
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Stann Sam Creek
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EL PETEN
Rio de la pasión Deep Mo
nke
River
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iver
Rio
d e la p
as
Rio
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lin Sarsto
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Lago Rio Moc
GU AT E MAL A
Rio Polochia
HONDURAS
Chetumal
Corozal
Orange Walk
Ambergris
cay
MEXICO
s River
Booth
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rav
B
Rio
St.George’s
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Beliz
Ri
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s
Sapodilla
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EL PETÉN (1975)
16°30 (1975)
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Rio d
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Rio
Pa
Mo
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sió
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Sapodilla Cays
(1977) Punta Gorda
Orange Point
s Cabo de
li na Tres Puntas Puerto Cortés
Sa toon River
o Sars
Ri Omoa
Livingston
VERAPAZ Puerto Barrios
l Santo Tomás
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Lag
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Chetumal
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ran
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75) Punta Gorda
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Ri Cabo de
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as r Tres Puntas Puerto Cortés
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GUATEMALA
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HONDURAS
22. John Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire,
Cambridge, 1982, p. 144.
23. Hyam, p. 131.
24. White, p. 11. Darwin suggests that “well before the war ended the idea
that Britain could only match the power of her two mighty partners in
the Grand Alliance by welding the Commonwealth into a ‘third force’
had exercised a considerable attraction for British leaders”; Darwin,
Britain and Decolonisation, pp. 147–148.
25. Thorn, p. 42.
26. White, p. 49.
27. Ibid., p. 7.
28. Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones to Prime Minister Atlee, cited
in J. Kent, The British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War,
Leicester, 1993, p. 132.
29. White, p. 9.
30. Gallagher, p. 148.
31. White, p. 20.
32. Frank Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945–1963:
Scrutinising the Official Mind, London, 2002, p. 59.
33. Ibid., p. 62.
34. Ibid.
35. White, p. 77.
36. R. F. Holland, European Decolonization, 1918–1981, London, 1985, p. 192.
37. Ibid.
38. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, pp. 237, 304–305.
39. Cited in Boyce, p. 178.
40. Ibid., p. 181.
41. Hyam, pp. 251–252.
42. Ibid.
43. Sir Michael Howard, “Afterword: The ‘Special Relationship,’ ” in
W. Roger Luis and Hedley Bull (eds.), The “Special Relationship”: Anglo-
American Relations since 1945, London, 1986, p. 387.
44. Ibid., p. 225.
45. Hyam, pp. 302–303.
46. Boyce, p. 114.
47. “Internal Security in the Colonies,” December 29, 1954, CAB 129/72.
48. Boyce, p. 114.
49. Although the country was officially called British Guiana until its indepen-
dence, it will be referred to as Guyana, unless the name appears in a quote.
50. S. R. Ashton and David Killingray (eds.), BDEE, The West Indies, Series B
Volume 6, London, 1999, p. 675.
51. Intelligence Report for April 1953, by Commissioner of Police Orrett,
May 5, 1953, CO 1031/128.
52. Ibid.
53. Minute by J. W. Vernon, WIAD, September 16, 1953, CO 1031/119.
54. Ibid.
55. Nigel Bolland, The Politics of Labour in the British Caribbean: The Social
Origins of Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Labour Movement,
Kingston, 2001, p. 601.
NOTES 205
86. U.S. embassy Guatemala to Secretary of State, April 19, 1968, RG59, POL
32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A.
87. Rusk to U.S. embassy Guatemala, April 20, 1968, U.S. embassy
Guatemala to Secretary of State, April 3, 1968, RG59, POL 32–1
Guat-UK, NAR A.
88. For text, see enclosure in Oliver Covey to Acting Secretary, March 29,
1968, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A.
89. Herrarte, p. 302.
90. Ibid., pp. 302–305.
91. “Memorandum of Conversation,” State Department, May 7, 1968, RG59,
POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A.
92. John Paul to FCO, May 7, 1968, FCO 7/482.
93. “Address to the Nation by Premier George Price,” May 8, 1968,
FCO 7/483.
94. Ibid.
95. Reports of the House of Representatives, Belmopan, May 14, 1968.
96. U.S. Note, September 20, 1968, RG59, POL 31 Guat-UK, NAR A;
FCO 7/483.
97. PUP and Guatemala: Report on the Recent Enquiry, Belize, 1954.
98. Country Analysis and Strategy Paper, Guatemala, FY 1971, February 23,
1969, RG59, POL 17 Guat-U.S., NAR A.
99. Ibid.
100. A/AC.109/PV.548, August 30, 1968, UN.
101. “Memorandum of Conversation,” State Department, May 23, 1968,
RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A.
102. Ibid.
103. “Memorandum of Conversation,” State Department, July 15, 1968,
RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A.
104. Smith to State Department, July 12, 1968, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK,
NAR A.
105. Brighty to Pallister, January 8, 1969, FCO 44/228.
106. Bruce to State Department, January 28, 1969, RG59, POL 19 Br. Hond.,
NAR A.
107. Tepper to State Department, March 8, 1969, RG59, POL 32–1
Guat-UK, NAR A.
108. Tepper to State Department, March 22, 1969, RG59, POL 32–1
Guat-UK, NAR A.
109. Lord Shepherd to Price, August 19, in Cabinet Memorandum of
September 5, 1969, FCO 44/232, Annex F.
110. Price to Shepherd, August 25, 1969, ibid., Annex G.
111. Price to Shepherd, October 5, 1969, FCO 44/233.
112. Record of meeting in New York, at 11:30 a.m. on October 23, 1969,
FCO 44/233.
113. “Record of meeting in New York at 9:30 a.m. on October 24, 1969”,
FCO 44/233.
114. Notes by V. H. Courtenay in file of New York meetings, PF.
115. “Statement by Belizean Government to UN Members,” in John Paul to
FCO, October 17, 1969, FCO 44/233.
216 NOTES
12. Miguel Ángel Cospín, Ydígoras Fuentes ante la Faz de sus Contemporáneos,
México, 1970, p. 73.
13. Carpio Nicolle, Hacia, p. 92.
14. Rogers to Atkinson, January 4, 1964, CO 1031/4937.
15. Recomendaciones e Informes del Comité Jurídico Interamericano,
Documentos Oficiales, vol. 11, 1974–1977, Secretaría General de la
OEA, 1981.
16. Price to Secretary General UN, August 16, 1958, PF.
17. Shoman, Party Politics, p. 27.
18. The PUP Government and the Guatemalan Claim, Belize City,
1961, p. 3.
19. Legislative Assembly debate, June 27, 1961.
20. The PUP Government and the Guatemalan Claim, Belize City,
1961, p. 6.
21. “Report on the Goodwill Tour of Central America,” Belize, 1964.
22. Ibid.
23. “Tacitly, the Independence of Belize Is Already Recognized”: “Report
on the Goodwill Tour of Mexico,” Belize, 1964.
24. Díaz Ordaz to Price, August 13, 1964, ibid. Author’s translation.
25. Press conference in Mexico City on August 12, 1964, ibid.
26. Atkinson to Rogers, August 20, 1964, CO 1031/4935.
27. PUP Manifesto, 1965.
28. Interview with Price.
29. As early as 1961, Ernesto “Ché” Guevara, Cuba’s delegate to the fifth
plenary session of the Consejo Interamericano Económico y Social in Punta
del Este, declared: “aceptamos el hecho de Belice independiente” (we accept
the fact of an independent Belize), before even the Belize government
articulated this as fact.
30. Assad Shoman, who accompanied Minister Florencio Marin.
31. Resolution of the VI Congress of Latin American Workers, PF. Author’s
translation.
32. McQuillan to Johns, June 16, 1975, FCO 7/2848.
33. Posnett to FCO, January 25, 1973, FCO 7/2454.
34. Posnett to British Embassy Panama, February 1, 1973, FCO 7/2454.
35. Posnett to Hankey, January 25, 1973, FCO 7/2454.
36. Posnett to FCO, January 25, 1973, FCO 7/2454.
37. Shridath Ramphal, who later became the Secretary General of the
Commonwealth and played a critical role in the issue.
38. Malcolm to FCO, tels #45 and #56 of March 16, 1973, FCO 7/2454.
39. Hinchcliffe to Matthews, April 17, 1973, FCO 7/2454.
40. Posnett to Hankey, March 23, 1973, FCO 7/2454.
41. Ibid.
42. Record of a meeting between Mr. Kershaw and the EAC of Belize,
June 5, 1973, FCO 7/2456.
43. Ibid.
44. His judgment was not subsequently vindicated.
45. Record of a meeting between Mr. Kershaw and the EAC of Belize,
June 5, 1973, FCO 7/2456.
46. Kershaw to Secretary of State, June 1973, FCO 7/2455.
NOTES 219
145. Indeed Guatemala, who had been present as an “invited country,” offi-
cially withdrew in a huff after the Belize paragraph had been adopted.
146. Rogers and Shoman to Price, August 31, 1975, PF.
14. Ibid.
15. Cardenal interview in Gombay, Belize, February 1979.
16. Ibid.
17. Interview with Price. See also Robert Leslie, “Price Takes on the World,”
in George Price Father of the Nation Belize, ION Media, Belize, 2000,
pp. 49–56.
18. Interview with Aristides Royo.
19. Record of meetings on June 15–17, 1976, FCO 44/1363.
20. Richard to FCO, June 16, 1976, FCO 44/1363.
21. Record of meetings on June 15–17, 1976, FCO 44/1363.
22. Richard to FCO, June 17, 1976, FCO 44/1363.
23. Richard to FCO, June 16, 1976, FCO 44/1363.
24. McEntee to FCO, July 16, 1976, FCO 44/1364.
25. Record of a meeting on July 21, 1976, July 30, 1976, FCO 44/1365.
26. The placing of a bilateral treaty between two countries in the constitu-
tion of a third may indeed be without precedent in the annals of modern
constitutional history.
27. In fact, Rowlands had acted against the clear terms of the UN resolution,
which demanded respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.
28. Rafael Fonseca and Shoman.
29. Record of meeting at 4:30 p.m. on July 21, 1976, FCO 44/1365.
30. Record of meeting at 12 noon on July 22, 1976, FCO 44/1365.
31. Record of meeting at 10:30 a.m. on July 22, 1976, FCO 44/1365.
32. Ibid.
33. The record would seem to belie this.
34. The readiness to consider “ceding” maritime areas was based on the fact
that Britain had traditionally claimed only a three-mile territorial sea, so
that the 12-mile limit and the 200-mile exclusive economic zone that the
UNCLOS had established was not part of Belize’s historic territory.
35. Duff to McEntee, July 28, 1976, FCO 44/1365.
36. Ibid.
37. Record of meeting at 10:30 a.m. on July 22, 1976, FCO 44/1365.
38. Duff to McEntee, July 30, 1976, FCO 44/1371 and FCO 44/1359.
39. Duff to Larmour, July 30, 1976, FCO 44/1359.
40. Richard to FCO, August 6, 1976, FCO 44/1365.
41. Ibid.
42. See, for example, “Commentary on Revised Draft Treaty in Light of
Discussions in New York 3–5 August 1976,” August 1976, FCO
44/1365.
43. Cited in “Belize: The Address to the Fourth Committee of Deputy
Premier Rogers in November 1976,” Belize, 1976. The resolution
referred to was the Caribbean one passed in 1975.
44. See below.
45. Crosland to McEntee, August 27, 1976, FCO 44/1359.
46. See, for example, Richard to FCO, September 1, 1976 and Willson to
Stanley, September 6, 1976, FCO 44/1359.
47. “Note of an Office Meeting Held by Mr Rowlands on 26 August 1976,”
WIAD, September 2, 1976, FCO 44/1359.
226 NOTES
115. Interview with Rowlands. Callaghan said that “it’s not the President of
the United States’ head on the block if something happens. It’s mine—
and yours.”
116. Owen to Belmopan, July 4, 1977, DEFE 24/1300.
117. Interview with Rowlands. Emphasis in original.
118. Moreton to FCO, July 5, 1977, DEFE 24/1300.
119. Callaghan to Laugerud, July 7, 1977, DEFE 24/1300.
120. Vance to Owen, in London to Belmopan, July 1, 1977, DEFE 24/1300.
Emphasis added.
121. At least in the plenary sessions; see below.
122. Interview with Rowlands.
123. Ibid.
124. “Confidential Annex, Chief of Staff Committee 20th Meeting/77, held
on Friday 8 July 1977 at 3.00 p.m.,” DEFE 24/1300.
125. Rowlands to FCO, July 8, 1977, DEFE 24/1300.
126. As with the other threatened invasions, it continues to be a matter of
speculation whether the Guatemalans would have invaded or not if the
British had not reinforced. Richard did not really think so at the time,
feeling that “they were making noises for internal political purposes and
to affect the negotiations,” but he draws the parallel with what happened
in the Falklands, and concludes that “looking back, if we had done noth-
ing they may have invaded”: Interview with Richard.
127. Owen to Callaghan, August 11, 1977, DEFE 13/1131.
128. “An Information Paper on Belize Submitted by the British Government”
to the CMCB, September 1977, CMCB/77/2, CSL.
129. Price to Ramphal, August 23, 1977, enclosing a memorandum of the
meeting with Roel and a translation of the Mexican paper on a defense
guarantee, File I 33–2/2 Part A, CMCB, CSL.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Articles in La Nación and El Gráfico, quoted in Carpio Nicole, Belice
Punto y Aparte, p. 30.
133. Carpio Nicole, Belice Punto y Aparte, p. 30.
134. Murray to FCO, July 13, 1977, DEFE 13/1131.
135. Ibid. Emphasis added.
136. Vance message to Owen, June 22, 1977, in Owen to Callaghan, June 30,
1977, DEFE 24/1300.
137. Owen to Callaghan, August 11, 1977, DEFE 13/1131.
138. Ibid.
139. “Records of Meetings of the CMCB, 1977–1980,” Commonwealth
Secretariat, undated, CSL.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid.
143. Stanley to FCO, tel #263 of September 15, 1977, DEFE 13/1131.
144. Ibid. There is no evidence to support this assertion about “Latin
Americans.”
145. Private Secretary, Downing Street to Fergusson, FCO, September 19,
1977, DEFE 13/1131.
NOTES 229
146. Stanley to FCO, tel #264 of September 15, 1977, DEFE 13/1131.
147. Stanley to FCO, tel #263 of September 15, 1977, DEFE 13/1131.
148. Stanley to FCO, tel #264 of September 15, 1977, DEFE 13/1131.
149. Richard to FCO, tel #1440 of September 28, 1977, DEFE 13/1131.
150. Richard to FCO, tel #1450 of September 28, 1977, DEFE 13/1131.
151. Owen had indeed mentioned this meeting of officials to the CMCB,
without giving any details, saying he had talked to Mr. Price about it,
but that there was still a big gap between what was possible and what
Guatemala had demanded. See “Records of Meetings of the CMCB,
1977–1980,” Commonwealth Secretariat, undated, CSL.
152. Richard to FCO, tel #1450 of September 28, 1977, DEFE 13/1131.
153. “Records of Meetings of the CMCB, 1977–1980,” Commonwealth
Secretariat, undated, CSL.
154. Ibid.
155. Richard to FCO, October 25, 1977, DEFE 13/1131.
156. A/C.4/32/L.24, November 11, 1977, UN.
157. A/C.4/32/L.23, November 10, 1977, UN.
158. A/C.4/32/L.23/Rev. 1, November 14, 1977, UN.
159. A/C.4/32/SR.20, November 9, 1977, UN.
160. A/C.4/32/SR.22, November 11, 1977, UN.
161. A/C.4/32/SR22, November 11, 1977, UN.
162. A/C.4/32/SR.25, November 15, 1977, UN.
163. Ibid.
164. A/C.4/32/SR.26, November 17, 1977, UN.
165. Ibid.
166. UNGA Plenary Sessions, 19th meeting, October 5, 1977, p. 385.
167. UNGA Plenary Sessions, 19th meeting, October 4, 1977, p. 353.
168. UNGA Plenary Sessions, 20th meeting, October 5, 1977, p. 400.
169. Private Secretary, Downing Street, to Wall, FCO, October 13, 1977,
DEFE 13/1131.
170. Declaration of the meeting, PF.
171. Crosland to McEntee, August 27, 1976, FCO 44/1359.
133. Ibid.
134. “One should not compromise the dawn of the twenty-first century.”
135. “The people are hungry for history. A political moment has to be filled
with the participation of the people.”
136. “History is like a missile—it does not pass you twice”: Record of Torrijos/
Shoman meeting, PF.
137. “Statement by Hon. George Price, Premier, House of Representatives,
27 March 1981,” PF.
138. The interim report is in Patterson to Ramphal, June 11, 1981, File SG/
CF/BEL, CSL.
139. Ibid., pp. 5–12.
140. “Record of Torrijos/Shoman Meeting,” PF.
141. “Report on Brief to Caribbean Governments,” Said Musa, June 15,
1981, PF.
142. “Report by V. H. Courtenay to Hon. Premier on Washington Meeting,”
June 15, 1981, PF.
143. “British Parliament House of Commons Debate 30th June 1981,”
Belize, 1981.
144. Malhoutra, “Brief Given by Mr. Ridley to Members of the CMCB on
19 June at the FCO,” June 24, 1981, File SG/CF/BEL, CSL.
145. Ibid.
146. Interim report, meetings in New York, July 5–10, 1981, P. J. Patterson,
July 16, 1981, PF.
147. Joint Communiqué, July 13, 1981, PF.
148. This could be regarded as a bold bluff by Price, who felt sure he would
not be called upon to deliver on that promise, since he believed that
the Guatemalans would not regard that as sufficient, and no agreement
would be reached.
149. Hansard, June 30, 1981.
150. “Statement of Premier George Price on the Future of Belize, Broadcast
by Radio Belize on 14th July 1981,” Belize.
151. “Radio Statement on Independence and the Future Security of Belize by
Premier George Price, 26 July 1981, City Centre, Belize City,” Belize,
1981.
152. Ibid.
153. Although the sense of a threat still hung in the air. On Independence
Day, the British commander in Belize was in a helicopter carrying Ridley
and the royal representative to Belmopan when he received a message
from the captain that an air attack from the Guatemalans was imminent.
He had the Harriers in the air, and nothing came of it: Interview with
Brigadier Anthony Vivian.
154. Belizean Independence Secretariat paper, PF.
155. Brukdown, no 5, Belize, 1981, p. 11.
156. Cited by Ambassador Santizo, Permanent Representative of Guatemala
to the OAS, at the meeting of the Permanent Council of the OAS on
September 23, 1981, transcript of tapes of session, PF.
157. Paper by the International Affairs Division of the Commonwealth
Secretariat, November 11, 1982-, File I 33–2/4, E/22, CSL.
NOTES 235
Government Publications
Belize
“Report of the Constitutional Commissioner (Sir Hilary Blood) 10 October
1959,” Belize, 1959.
“The PUP Government and the Guatemalan Claim,” Government Information
Service, Belize City, 1961.
“Report on the Goodwill Tour of Central America,” Government Information
Service, Belize, 1964.
“Report on the Goodwill Tour of Mexico,” The Government Printer, Belize, 1964.
Lauterpacht, Mr. E., and Bowett, Dr. D. W., Belize—Joint Opinion, Government
Printery, Belmopan, 1978.
Reports of the House of Representatives, National Assembly, 1966, 1968, 1975,
1980, 1981, Belmopan.
Guatemala
The White Book: Controversy between Guatemala and Great Britain Relative to
the Convention of 1859 on Territorial Matters: Belize Question, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Guatemala, 1938.
Constitution of the Republic, Guatemala, 1945, 1965.
United Kingdom
Wood, E. F. L., West Indies and British Guiana, HMSO, Cmd. 1679, London,
1922.
“Exchange of Notes between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom
and the Government of Guatemala respecting the Boundary between British
Honduras and Guatemala,” HMSO, Cmd. 4050, London, 1932.
“Report of an Inquiry held by Sir Reginald Sharpe Q. C. into allegations of con-
tacts between the People’s United Party and Guatemala,” London, HMSO,
Cmd. 1939, 1954.
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1957, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1978,
1981 (Hansard).
United Nations
Documents cited in the notes section.
Fourth Committee (of the UN), 15, guerrillas, 45, 46, 54, 86, 124, 190,
19, 62, 66, 86, 89, 90, 159, 160, 196, 235 n. 24
189, 193 Gulf of Honduras, 34, 91, 92, 93,
debates: (1975), 115–118, 193; 108, 173
(1976), 133; (1977), 145–146; Guyana, 3, 7–9, 38, 83, 89, 99, 111,
(1978), 161–162; (1980), 170–171 116, 132, 136, 141, 147, 154, 168,
Goldson addresses, 62, 66 181, 194, 203 n. 1
Rogers addresses, 62, 66, 90, 133,
161–162, 170 Habib, Phillip, 138, 142, 143
voting on Belize: (1975), 117–118; Haig, Alexander, 178
(1976), 133; (1977), 146; (1978), Hammarskjold, Dag, 44
162; (1979), 163; (1980), 170–171 Hankey, Henry, 73, 85
see also General Assembly, resolutions harriers, 137, 185, 234 n. 153
in Fourth Committee Heads of Agreement, 171–184, 191
Fuentes, Ydigoras, 44, 45, 47, 49, 52, Heath, Edward, 10
78, 80 Herrarte, Alberto, 52, 55, 57, 60
Fuentes Mohr, Albert, 46, 69, 70 Herrera, Roberto, 73, 74, 83
Home, Douglas (Lord), 8, 9
Galsworthy, John, 103, 104 Honduras, 23, 26, 28, 29, 46, 80, 82,
Garbutt’s Falls, 28, 30, 32, 33, 92 87, 93, 145, 146, 153, 162, 163,
García Granados, Jorge, 40, 41, 78, 171, 179
217 n. 8 Honduras Independence Party, 39
Garinagu, 36, 92 House of Commons, 67, 74, 152,
General Assembly (of the UN), 13, 181, 184
18–19, 73, 79, 86, 89, 90, 91, 101, House of Representatives, 59, 64, 98,
128, 132, 143, 145 164, 167, 179
debates on Belize: (1974), 89; (1975), Hudson, Manley O., 34
118; (1977), 146 Hunter, Alexander, 69,
voting on Belize: (1975), 118; 216 n. 118
(1976), 133; (1977), 146–147; hurricanes, 35, 36, 42
(1978), 162; (1979), 163–164;
(1980), 171 India, 3, 11, 12, 136, 142
see also Fourth Committee, Inter-American Conference, 78
resolutions in Fourth Committee Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal
Ghana, 12 Assistance (the Rio Treaty), 61, 63,
Godber, Joseph, 71, 72, 74 70, 108, 167
Goldson, Phillip, 38, 39, 41, 58, 59 International Court of Justice, 16,
reveals Webster proposals, 59, 62, 34, 108
64, 66 international relations theory,
Gracias a Dios Falls, 30, 32, 33 197–198
Grenada, 135, 147 internationalization, 13, 15–22, 43, 77,
Guatemala, 43–46 79, 89, 92, 93, 96, 110, 124, 141,
arms purchases, 137 149, 176, 186, 187, 188, 194, 195,
and CIA-supported coup, 44 197, 198
declares 1859 treaty void, 33 invasion threats
diplomatic campaign, 77–79 (1948), 33, 43
and Mexico, 50, 53, 72, 88 (1972), 74
and migration to Belize, 36 (1975), 107–108, 114
prefers status quo, 76, 88 (1977), 136–138, 192, 228 n. 126
and U.S., 8, 9, 35, 45–48, Israel, 117, 118, 146, 192
52, 101 arms sales to Guatemala, 107, 137,
Guatemalan claim, 1, 3, 6, 16, 17, 23, 146, 223 n. 39
27–29, 30–35
U.S. attitude to, 49–50, 53, 54, 66, 106 Jackson, Rashleigh, 111, 116, 144,
Guatemalan consul in Belize, 29, 52, 168, 196
76, 185, 214 n. 69 Jagan, Cheddi, 7–8
INDEX 247
Jamaica, 25, 26, 72, 83, 86, 89, 93, 95, Logwood, 23–26
111, 131, 135, 136, 139, 142, 147, López Mateos, Adolfo, 80, 102
154, 181, 194, 206 n. 8 Lucas García, Fernando Romeo, 159, 183
Jamieson (Canadian FM), 142 Lyttelton, Oliver, 38
Japan, 2, 118
Joint Authority, 56, 58, 59, 63 McEntee, Peter, 129, 131, 154,
Joint Commission, 55, 180–181, 182 155, 156
Joint Defense Council, 123, 125 Macleod, Ian, 12
Joint Development Fund, 123 Macmillan, Harold, 5, 6, 8, 12
Joint Opinion, 161 mahogany, 23, 25, 26, 27
Malaya, 3
Kennedy, John, 8, 9, 45 Malaysia, 10, 136, 142
Keohane, Robert, 20 Maldonado Aguirre, Alejandro, 193
Kershaw, Anthony, 84 Malvinas, see Falkland Islands
Kissinger, Henry, 9, 97, 125, 192 Manley, Michael, 93, 96, 132, 134, 136
and proposals to resolve dispute, 48, maritime areas, 92, 94, 108, 123, 143,
108–109, 123, 191 149, 159, 166, 167, 173, 180, 181,
183, 225 n. 34
Labor Party (UK), 5, 10, 11, 14, 67, Maya, 36, 92, 115, 194, 209 n. 85
184, 189, 195 mediation, 17, 65–67, 98, 150, 151
Lancaster House, 172, 173 by U.S. (Webster) (1965–1968), 35,
land cession 42, 49, 52, 54–67, 72, 75, 76, 176,
Belize rejects, 92–98, 126, 128, 138, 177, 188
142, 144, 150–154, 160, 166–167, Meers, Sharon, 44
168, 180–181, 229 n. 4 Melchor de Mencos, 107
British urge, 41, 50, 93–98, 106, Memorandum of Understanding,
111, 119, 120, 122, 123, 127, 130, 156–159, 166, 231 n. 44
133–134, 143, 148, 152, 156, 158, Méndez Montenegro, Julio César, 45,
164, 192, 220 n. 104, 225 n. 27 57, 60
Guatemala demands, 91–95, 102, mestizo, 36, 115
103, 119, 129, 138, 139, 145, 169, Mexico, 2, 9, 23, 26, 32, 54, 69, 101–106
171, 173 and Central America, 102
U.S. commitment to, 128, 138, and dormant claim to Belize territory,
141–144, 148, 149, 152, 158, 159, 74, 77, 78, 101, 103
192, 220 n. 104 proposals to resolve dispute, 139–140
Larmour, Nick, 87, 92, 93 resolution in Fourth Committee, 104,
Latin America, 38, 96, 99 105, 106, 114, 117
as Belizean concern, 82, 121, 124 supports Belize, 20, 58, 80–81, 102,
and Britain, 50, 83, 111, 189 103, 139, 146, 150–151, 185
as Cold War battlefield, 51 supports Guatemala, 77, 103–106
in Non-aligned movement, 12, 13 Middle East, 3, 86, 223 n. 39
and support for Belize, 21–22, 84, Mills, Don, 111
88–89, 117, 139, 148, 160, 164 Ministry of Defense (UK), 107, 122,
and support for Guatemala, 21, 130, 134, 137
77–79, 84, 117–118 Molina Orantes, Adolfo, 52, 88, 93,
and the U.S., 9, 45, 46, 101, 109, 119, 123, 127, 129, 130, 131, 134,
123, 191 138, 140, 143, 153, 157, 158, 188
Laugerud García, Kjell, 46, 84, 85, 87, Monroe Doctrine, 28, 47
103, 104, 118, 119, 120, 135, 137, Morocco, 117, 118, 163, 171, 224 n. 79
138, 139, 142, 143 Mosquito Shore, 25, 28, 29
lease of cays, 171–175, 232–233 n. 106 Mulley, Fred, 130, 137
Legislative Council, 35, 37, 40, 187 multilateralism, 13, 19, 21
Lennox Boyd, Alan, 39, 40
Liberación Nacional (Costa Rica), 82 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 12
Lime Cay, 172 National Independence Party, 41, 59,
Lindo, Dean, 42, 156, 157, 161, 232 n. 85 80, 210 n. 132
248 INDEX