THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. NO. 7399 : August 25, 2009]

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant, v. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-

SANTIAGO, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with

enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Court's attention to the
following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago's speech
delivered on the Senate floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am

homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I
am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face
of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I
was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on

the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted
direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment
proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady
senator.

In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator

Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted
statements. She, however, explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity,
being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as
member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech,
according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial
anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation.
She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an
unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending
out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated
position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that
only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for
nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an
advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her,
would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the

provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which
provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or
in any committee thereof." Explaining the import of the
underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v.
Pendatun, said:

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a

fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the
democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge
his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that
he should be protected from resentment of every one, however,
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion
offense."1

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is

founded upon long experience and arises as a means of
perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative
department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its
equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating
forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence,
but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they
could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of
a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a
judgment against them based upon a judge's speculation as to the
motives.2

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront
in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and
promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the
Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into
every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies,
and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served.
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the
manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in
committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the
falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of
the Congress does not destroy the privilege.3 The disciplinary
authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can
properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name
of parliamentary immunity.5

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the
dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is
well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally
or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt,
however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language
Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its
effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady
senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good
professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in
question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To
reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on the
face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots."
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her
attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have
taken to heart in the first place:

x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and

integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result. ςηαñrοb lεš νι r† υαl lαω l ιbrαrÿ

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the
courts should be allowed to erode the people's faith in the judiciary.
In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01
and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,

use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her

achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional
Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on
constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law
textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress,
Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court,
like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in
public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the
higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their
brethren in private practice.7 Senator Santiago should have known,
as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make
on the people's faith in the integrity of the courts.

As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a

prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation
strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of
what she said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded.
And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on
the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in
another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
(Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her

statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at
not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense,
therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official
parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be
allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the
reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for
personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that
parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the
individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal
benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the
institution that represents them.

To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger

without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.

Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago's outburst was directly

traceable to what she considered as an "unjust act" the JBC had
taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief
Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Court's supervision,
its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits
as the JBC's ex-officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to
nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief
Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator
Santiago's wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of
the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all
of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of
Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the
Constitution that provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)

The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning

pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific
authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the
end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself

except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self
interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity,
impartiality and independence;

xxx

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,10 we

reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v.
Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the
judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote
in Rheem of the Philippines:

x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces

that "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust
criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds
him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity x x x to the
courts."

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral

Reservation Board v. Cloribel12 that:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an

instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice."
Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people."
Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it
is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice."13

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the

exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that
profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of
justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said
misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.14

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their

private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of
probity or good demeanor,15 a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for
continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of "conduct" or
"misconduct," the reference is not confined to one's behavior
exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers'
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which albeit
unrelated to the actual practice of their profession would show them
to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their
license and the law invest in them.16
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people's faith in
courts and trust in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its
disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or
personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of
justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse,
malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in
the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of
Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B.
Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17 who repeatedly insulted and threatened
the Court in a most insolent manner.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary

sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have
constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court
and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case,
however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of
remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this
kind of disposition.

We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator's

offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to
denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-
instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice,
especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary
non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to
protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to
enable them, as the people's representatives, to perform the
functions of their office without fear of being made responsible
before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.18 It
is intended to protect members of Congress against government
pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making
prerogatives of Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision

on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from
using, under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language
against another Senator or against any public institution."19 But
as to Senator Santiago's unparliamentary remarks, the Senate
President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred
the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate
disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her
own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and
avoided imposing their own rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre's motives in filing his

complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken
solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We
cannot overstress that the senator's use of intemperate language to
demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear
violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.21

Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to

prove that she in fact made the statements in question. Suffice it to
say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied
making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them
as part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good
enough for the Court.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against

Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI,
Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

* Additional member as per August 3, 2009 raffle.

1 109 Phil. 863 (1960); cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 643 (1996).

2 Tenney v. Brandhove, 34 US 367, 71 S. Ct. 783786.

3 Id.

4 Osmena, Jr., supra.

5 Tenney, supra note 2.

6
82 Phil. 595, 602 (1949).

7 Ali v. Bubong, A.C. No. 4018, March 8, 2005, 453 SCRA 1, 13.
8
Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 8.

9 In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, January 9, 1973, 49 SCRA 22, 26-27.

10 A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 43.

11 No. L-22979, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 441, 444.

12 No. L-27072, January 9, 1970, 31 SCRA 1, 16-17.

13Id.; citing People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851,855; Sotto, supra note 6; Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 160
(1949); and People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946).

14 Vitriolo v. Dasig, A.C. No. 4984, April 1, 2003, 400 SCRA 172, 178.

15 Gacias v. Balauitan, A.C. No. 7280, November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 11, 12.

16 Id.

17 G.R. No. 159286, April 5, 2005 (En Banc Resolution).

18 Osmeña, Jr., supra.

19 Rule XXXIV, Sec. 93.

20 Id., Secs. 95 & 97.

21 Tiongco v. Savillo, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1719, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 48, 63.