Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec.

2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 1 of 11

Art. III, Sec. 2 people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
Who can invoke? for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said
right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary
1. People vs. Chua Ho San, 307 SCRA 43 principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional
Facts: Accused-appellant (Chua Ho San) prayed for his acquittal and the
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizure does not, of course,
reversal of the judgment finding him guilty of transporting, without legal
forestall reasonable searches and seizure. What constitutes a reasonable or
authority, the regulated substance methamphetamine hydrochloride, in
even an unreasonable search in any particular case is purely a judicial
violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known
question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved.
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by R.A. 7659. The
Verily, the rule is, the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person’s body,
trial court sentenced him to die by lethal injection. In view thereof, the
personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search
judgment was brought to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution
Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine and reiterated in the Rules of Court; “otherwise such search and seizure
hydrochloride before the RTC. However, pursuant to the recommendation of become ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of the aforementioned
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the charge constitutional provision.” This interdiction against warrantless searches and
was amended for illegal transport of a regulated drug, to which he was seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and
convicted. The RTC found the prosecution successfully discharged its burden seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of
of proving the charge. It characterized the search as incidentals to a valid in (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches,
flagrante delicto arrest, hence, it allowed the admission of the (4) waiver or consent searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search),
methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti. The RTC also noted the and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid
futility of informing Chua of his constitutional right under custodial warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
investigation considering the language barrier, and such irregularity was arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a
rectified when the accused was duly arraigned and actually participated in valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
the trial of the case. arrests, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot
pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
Issue: Can aliens invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure?
2. FCC vs. AT&T, 562 US____ March 1, 2011
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the search made was not incidental to
an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not Facts: The Freedom of Information Act requires federal agencies to make
fall under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. From all indications, records and documents publicly available upon request, subject to several
the search was nothing like a fishing expedition. Indeed, the likelihood of statutory exemptions. One of those exemptions, Exemption 7(C), covers law
Chua having actually transported the items cannot be quickly dispelled. But enforcement records the disclosure of which “could reasonably be expected
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
cannot be so carelessly disregarded. The decision of the trial court was
One of those exemptions, Exemption 7(C), covers law enforcement records
reversed and set aside and the accused-appellant was acquitted of the crime
the disclosure of which “could reasonably be expected to constitute an
charged.
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”. CompTel, a trade association,
NOTES TO PONDER AND HEADBANG ON: submitted a FOIA request for documents AT&T had provided to the Federal
Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau during an investigation of
POLITICAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRIVACY; SEARCHES AND that company. The Bureau found that Exemption 7(C) applied to individuals
SEIZURES; THE CONSTITUTION BARS STATE INTRUSIONS TO A PERSON’S identified in AT&T’s submissions but not to the company itself, concluding
BODY, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR RESIDENCE EXCEPT IF CONDUCTED BY VIRTUE that corporations do not have “personal privacy” interests as required by the
OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT; EXCEPTIONS. – Enshrined in the Constitution exemption. The FCC agreed with the Bureau, but the Court of Appeals for the
is the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It explicitly ordains that Third Circuit did not. It held that Exemption 7(C) extends to the “personal
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 2 of 11

privacy” of corporations, reasoning that “personal” is the adjective form of picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
the term “person,” which Congress has defined, as applicable here, to committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
include corporations. against their will. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a
blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
Issue: Do corporations have “personal privacy?” contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would
violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Ruling: No, the US Supreme Court rejected the argument that because Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
“person” is defined for purposes of FOIA to include a corporation, the incriminate themselves.
phrase“personal privacy” in Exemption 7(C) reaches corporations as well.
The protection in FOIA against disclosure of law enforcement information on
the ground that it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy does not extend to corporations. 4. Lucas vs Lucas, GR 190710, 6 June 2011

DNA Testing & Suspicionless Drug Tests Facts: Petitioner filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion
for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before RTC of Valenzuela City.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless,
respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore
3. Pimentel vs Comelec, GR 157870, 3 Nov. 2008, 570 SCRA 410 went to the trial court and obtained a copy of the petition. Petitioner filed
with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on
Facts: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of
September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
substance, issued the Order setting the case for hearing and urging anyone
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing
who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition. After learning of
of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance
personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were
as follows: SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a
be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioner’s father. Moreover,
testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.
quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others,
two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive Issue: Should a court order for DNA testing be considered a “search” which
result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid?
confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing: Students of secondary and tertiary schools, Officers Ruling: Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional
and employees of public and private offices, All persons charged before the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and
prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a
mandatory drug test, all candidates for public office whether appointed or compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding
elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have
drug test. almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a
court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases.
Issue: Are the drugs tests required under RA 9165 suspicionless and valid? We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue
an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that
Ruling: No. A mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. The same condition precedent
The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 3 of 11

harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, fugitive will be on the described premises (3) when the warrant is executed.
the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable It should be noted, however, that where the anticipatory warrant places a
possibility of paternity. Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the condition (other than the mere passage of time) upon its execution, the first
issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The of these determinations goes not merely to what will probably be found if the
court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the condition is met. Rather, the probability determination for a conditioned
DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish anticipatory warrant looks also to the likelihood that the condition will occur,
paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, and thus that a proper object of seizure will be on the described premises.
in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing. Two pre-requisites of probability must be satisfied (1) It must be true that if
the triggering condition occurs “there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place” (2) there is probable
cause to believe that the triggering condition will occur.
Anticipatory Warrants/Service of Warrant/”Media Ride-along”

6. Wilson vs Layne, 526 US 603

5. United States vs Grubbs, 547 US 90 (2007)
Facts: While executing a warrant to arrest petitioners’ son in their home,
Facts: A magistrate judge issued an anticipatory search warrant for Respondents invited a newspaper reporter and a photographer to accompany
respondent Grubbs’ house based on a federal officer’s affidavit. The affidavit them. The warrant made no mention of such a media “ride-along.” The
explained that the warrant would not be executed until a parcel containing a officers’ early morning entry into the home prompted a confrontation with
videotape of child pornography which Grubbs had ordered from an petitioners, and a protective sweep revealed that the son was not in the
undercover postal inspector was received at, and physically taken into, the house. The reporters observed and photographed the incident but were not
residence. The affidavit also referred to two attachments describing the involved in the execution of the warrant. Their newspaper never published
residence and the items to be seized. After the package was delivered and the photographs they took of the incident. Petitioners sued the officers in
the search commenced, Grubbs was given a copy of the warrant, which their personal capacities for money damages contending that the officers’
included the attachments but not the supporting affidavit. When he admitted actions in bringing the media to observe and record the attempted execution
ordering the videotape, he was arrested, and the videotape and other items of the arrest warrant violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The District
were seized. Following his indictment for receiving child pornography, Grubbs Court denied respondents’ motion for summary judgment on the basis of
moved to suppress the seized evidence, arguing, inter alia, that the warrant qualified immunity. In reversing, the Court of Appeals declined to decide
was invalid because it failed to list the triggering condition. The District Court whether the officers’ actions violated the Fourth Amendment, but concluded
denied the motion, and Grubbs pleaded guilty. The Ninth Circuit reversed, that because no court had held at the time of the search that media presence
concluding that the warrant ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment’s during a police entry into a residence constituted such a violation, the right
particularity requirement, which, under Circuit precedent, applied to the allegedly violated was not “clearly established” and thus respondents were
conditions precedent to an anticipatory warrant. entitled to qualified immunity.
Issue: What are anticipatory warrants? What are the requirements/conditions Issue: Is the service of warrant through “media ride along,” valid?
to make anticipatory warrants valid and constitutional?
Ruling: NO, the service of warrant through “media ride along,” is not valid. A
Ruling: The court defined an anticipatory search warrant as “a warrant media “ride-along” in a home violates the Fourth Amendment. However,
based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time because the state of the law was not clearly established at the time the entry
(but not presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at a specified in the case took place; Respondent officers were entitled to qualified
place. The court further held that the probable-cause requirement looks to immunity.
whether evidence will be found when the search is conducted, all warrants
are in a sense, anticipatory. Anticipatory warrants are, therefore, no different Media ride alongs violate the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners for
in principal from ordinary warrants. They require a magistrate to determine police to bring members of the media or other third parties into their home
(1) that it is now probable that (2) contraband, evidence of a crime, or a
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 4 of 11

during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in suspects of a different race were in the residence as well. In ordering
the home was not in aid of the warrant’s execution. The Amendment respondents out of bed, the deputies acted reasonably to ensure their own
embodies centuries-old principles of respect for the privacy of the home, safety, since blankets and bedding can conceal a weapon and since one of
which apply where, as here, police enter a home under the authority of an the suspects was known to own a firearm. There is no allegation that the
arrest warrant in order to take into custody the suspect named in the detention was prolonged or that respondents were prevented from dressing
warrant. It does not necessarily follow from the fact that the officers were any longer than necessary to protect the deputies’ safety.
entitled to enter petitioners’ home that they were entitled to bring a reporter
and a photographer with them. The Fourth Amendment requires that police Personal Determination and Probable Cause
actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion. It is certain that the presence of the reporters, who did 8. Republic vs Eugenio, GR 174629, 14 Feb. 2008
not engage in the execution of the warrant or assist the police in their task,
Facts: Following the promulgation of Agan, a series of investigations
was not related to the objective of the authorized intrusion, the apprehension
concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by
of petitioners’ son. Taken in the entirety, the reasons advanced by
the Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of
respondents to support the reporters’ presence – publicizing the
petitioner Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC). The CIS conducted an
government’s efforts to combat crime, facilitating accurate reporting on law
intelligence database search on the financial transactions of certain
enforcement activities, minimizing police abuses, and protecting suspects
individuals involved in the award, including respondent Pantaleon Alvarez
and the officers – fall short of justifying media ride-alongs. Although the
(Alvarez) who had been the Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee,
presence of third parties during the execution of a warrant may in some
NAIA-IPT3 Project.5 By this time, Alvarez had already been charged by the
circumstances be constitutionally permissible, the presence of these third
Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. No. 3019.6 The search
parties was not.
revealed that Alvarez maintained eight (8) bank accounts with six (6)
7. LA County vs Retelle, 550 US 609 (2007) different banks.7

Facts: Respondents filed a 42 U. S. C. § 1983 suit, alleging that their Fourth Lilia Cheng, wife of the accused, argues that the AMLA, being substantive
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was penal statute has no retroactive effect and the bank inquiry order could not
violated when Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputies, who were apply to deposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act
executing a valid warrant to search a house but were unaware that the No. 9164. Thus, she concludes, her subject bank accounts which she and her
potentially armed suspects being sought had sold the house to respondents husband Pantaleon Alvarez jointly owns, could not be the subject of the bank
and moved out, ordered the unclothed respondents out of bed and required inquiry order lest there be a violation of the constitutional prohibition against
them to stand for a few minutes before allowing them to dress. The District ex post facto laws.
Court granted the defendants summary judgment. In reversing, the Ninth
Issues: 1. Are AMLA bank inquiry orders valid and constitutional? 2. Must a
Circuit found that the deputies violated the Fourth Amendment and were not
bank inquiry order under Sec. 11 of the AMLA comply with the constitutional
entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable deputy would have
requirements on search warrant?
stopped the search upon discovering that respondents were of a different
race than the suspects and would not have ordered respondents from their Ruling: 1. Valid and constitutional, given that the statutory right to privacy
bed. will not prevent the courts from authorizing the inquiry anyway upon the
fulfillment of the requirements set forth under Section 11 of the AMLA or
Issue: Did the deputies violate the Fourth Amendment? In executing a
Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act; at the same time, the owner of the
search warrant, what action may an officer take?
accounts have the right to challenge whether the requirements were indeed
Ruling: The deputies did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Officers complied with.
executing a search warrant may take reasonable action to secure the
2. No. Simply put, a bank inquiry order is not a search warrant or warrant of
premises and to ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search. Upon
arrest as it contemplates a direct object but not the seizure of persons or
encountering respondents, the deputies acted reasonably to secure the
property.
premises. The presence of one race did not eliminate the possibility that
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 5 of 11

A bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the search of Savanna to her
physical seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry underwear.
order authorizes is the examination of the particular deposits or investments
in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The monetary On the liability of the of the school administrators, the Court, however, held
instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions that they were not personally liable because "clearly established law [did] not
are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment." It reasoned that lower
such as the account holder’s record of deposits and transactions. court decisions were disparate enough to have warranted doubt about the
scope of a student's Fourth Amendment right.
9. Safford United School District vs Redding, 557 US__ (2009)
Searching Questions
Facts: Due to a declaration from another student that Savana Redding, an
eighth grader at Safford Middle School, might have ibuprofen with her, which 10. Tabujara vs People, GR 175162, 29 Oct. 2008
was a violation of the school’s policy, a strip-search was conducted by school
officials on Savana. They searched Savana's backpack but found no evidence Facts: The petitioner assails the February 24, 2004 decision of the CA in CA
of drug use, drug possession, or any other illegal or improper conduct. They GR 63280 denying its petition for review and directing the MTC of
then took the girl to the nurse's office and ordered her to undress. Not finding Meycauayan, Bulacan, Br. II to proceed with the trial of criminal cases nos.
any pills in Savana's pants or shirt, the officials ordered the girl to pull out her 99-29031 and 99-29038 as well as the October 23, 2006 Resolution denying
bra and panties and move them to the side. The observation of Savana's the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner insist that the orders of the court
genital area and breasts also failed to reveal any contraband. should be annulled for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
because the finding of probable cause was based solely on the unseen
Savana’s mother then filed suit against the school district and the school statement of Mauro de Lara who never appeared during the preliminary
officials responsible for the search alleging that her daughter’s Fourth investigation.
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated.
However, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary Issue: Can the judge base his findings of probable cause on a statement of a
judgment and dismissed the case. On the initial appeal, the U.S. Court of witness whom he did not personally examine under oath?
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. However, on rehearing before the
Ruling: No. It is constitutionally mandated that a warrant of arrest shall be
entire court, the court of appeals held that Ms. Redding's Fourth Amendment
issued only upon finding of probable cause personally determined by the
right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. It reasoned
judge after the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
that the strip search was not justified nor was the scope of intrusion
the witnesses he/she may produce and particularly describing the person to
reasonably related to the circumstances.
be seized. In the case at bar, Judge Adriatico gravely abused his discretion in
Now the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, hence this petition. issuing the assailed May 2, 2000 and July 4, 2000 orders finding probable
cause to hold petitioner liable for trial and to issue warrant of arrest because
Issue: Can school officials strip-search a 13 year old girl student based on a it was based solely in the statement of witness de Lara whom Judge Adriatico
declaration of a student claiming to have received drugs from the 13 year old did not personally examine and under oath; neither did he asked propound
girl? questions. He merely stated that in the assailed May 2, 2000 Order, he
overlooked that said statements of de Lara, nevertheless, without conducting
Ruling: This depends on the facts. But in this case, the Supreme Court held a personal examination on said witness, Judge Adriatico still found de Lara’s
that Savanna's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when school officials allegations sufficient to establish probable cause. Plainly, this falls short of
searched her underwear for non-prescription painkillers. The Court reiterated the requirement imposed by the Constitution.
that, based on a reasonable suspicion, search measures used by school
officials to root out contraband must be "reasonably related to the objectives Particularity of Description
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the
student and the nature of the infraction." Here, school officials did not have 11. Yao et al vs People, GR 168306, 29 Oct. 2008
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 6 of 11

Facts: Petitioners are incorporators and officers of Masagana Gas restricted to a certain enumeration and the described items are clearly
Corporation which is engaged in the refilling, sale, and distribution of LPG limited only to those which bear direct relation to the offense (violation of
products. Private respondents Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell sec. 155 of RA 8293). Hence, the requirement of particularity of description is
Petroleum Corporation are two of the largest bulk suppliers and producers of satisfied. The indication of the accurate sizes of the Gasul and Shellane LPG
LPG in the Philippines: “GASUL” and “SHELLANE,” respectively. Petron is the cylinders or tanks would be unnecessary.
sole entity in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to
refill, use, sell, and distribute GASUL LPG containers, products, and its Chain of Custody Rule
trademarks while Pilipinas Shell is the only corporation authorized to allow
refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell, and distribute SHELLANE LPG 12. Lopez vs People, GR 184037, 19 June 2007
containers and products. On April 3, 2003, the NBI filed two applications for
Facts: On April 23, 2003, PO2 Atienza, a member of Task Force of the
search warrant against petitioners and other occupants of Masagana
Mandaluyong City Police Station, while conducting a routinary foot patrol saw
compound for violation of sec. 155, in relation to sec. 170 of RA 8293 (“The
petitioner at a distance of seven meters walking in his direction.
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines”) for alleged production, selling,
and distributing LPG products using steel cylinders owned by, and bearing He saw petitioner, walking with head bowed, looking at his hand, which held
the tradenames, trademarks, and devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell a plastic sachet containing a crystalline substance. Thereafter, PO2 Atienza
without authority and in violation of the rights of the said entities. On April introduced himself to petitioner as a member of the Mandaluyong police,
22, 2003, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash the two search arrested him, and informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent
warrants and on April 30, 2003, Masagana, as third party claimant, filed with and to counsel. He then brought petitioner to the Mandaluyong Medical
the RTC a Motion for the Return of Motor Compressor and LPG Refilling Center for a check-up. He also confiscated the plastic sachet and brought it
Machine. Both were denied, including their MRs. CA affirmed the decision of to the police station. He prepared a request and then placed the markings
RTC. “APA”–his initials―on the plastic sachet.

Issue: Did the search warrant satisfy the particularity of description Issues: 1) What is the chain of custody rule on search and seizure? 2) Does
requirement? the presumption of regularity rule apply to chain of custody rule?

Ruling: Yes. The two search warrants satisfied the particularity of description Ruling: 1) As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requirement. requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized
it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while
when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to
in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
the offense for which the warrant is being issued. The law, however, does not
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities;
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for
otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for applicants to obtain a search
someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. Indeed, it is from
warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking
the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a
for. Once described, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not
reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one
be so invariant as to require absolute concordance between those seized and
and the same as that seized from the accused.
those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles
described as a class or specie would suffice. 3) No. The presumption of regularity does not apply to the chain custody rule.
In case at bar, the courts heavily relied on the testimony of PO2 Atienza and,
The items to be seized under the search warrants in question were
in the same way, banked on the presumption of regularity. It bears stressing
sufficiently described with particularity. The articles to be confiscated were
that this presumption only arises in the absence of contradicting details that
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 7 of 11

would raise doubts on the regularity in the performance of official duties. and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist.
Where, as in this case, the police officers failed to comply with the standard The subject firearm was later verified by the Firearms and Explosive Division
procedure prescribed by law, there is no occasion to apply the presumption at Camp Crame and was confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to
of regularity. the petitioner but to another person.

13. People vs Alejandro, GR 176350, 10 Aug. 2011 The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the
boarding house of his children. After serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly
Facts: The RTC the appellant John-John Alejandro for violating RA 9165 or the for kidnapping with ransom), some of the police officers searched the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. It was alleged that he sold boarding house and forcibly opened a locked cabinet where they discovered
shabu to an undercover police on September 1, 2002. The appellant the subject firearm.
appealed the case in the Court of Appeals but the appellate court affirmed
the decision of the lower court stating that the defense already admitted the Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
admissibility of certain evidences against the appellant and further stated under P.D. 1866 and was found liable as charged before the RTC of Quezon
that, in the absence of any motive to do otherwise, the police officers are City. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the same. Valeroso now appeals
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. Thus, the before the Supreme Court for acquittal alleging that his constitutional right
appellant raised the matter to the Supreme Court claiming that the RTC erred against unreasonable search and seizure have been violated by the arresting
in convicting him because the prosecution failed to prove that the integrity of police officers; and if granted would render the confiscated firearm and
the seized item, with police having failed to mark and photograph the seized ammunition inadmissible in evidence against him.
item, therefore, his guilt was not proven to be beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Should the search be considered incident to a valid arrest? How
Issue: Is the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly should “within the area of his immediate control” be construed?
performed by the police officers applicable in the prosecution of RA 9165?
Ruling: Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by
Ruling: No. In convicting the appellant, the RTC and CA relied on the Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
evidentiary presumption that the police officers have performed their duties
in a regular manner. However, this presumption is not conclusive and cannot, SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully arrested may be
by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
presumption of regularity is assumed only when there is no deviation from constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
the regular performance of duty. If there is any official act that is questioned,
the presumption of regularity is no longer applied. In the case at bar, it was The purpose of warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest is to
clear that the officers failed to follow the proper procedures stipulated in protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who
paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Simply put, the Court said might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from
that since they were not able to properly mark the evidence, the integrity of destroying evidence within reach. However there is an exception which is
the evidence has been compromised, therefore we can never be fully certain that the search should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its
that it was still the same item seized on the day of the arrest. The failure to purpose.
follow the procedure is the reason why the accused was acquitted by the
Furthermore, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
Court because his guilt was not established to be beyond reasonable doubt.
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his
Warrantless Searches and Seizures immediate control. The phrase “within the area of his immediate control”
means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
14. Valeroso vs People, GR 164815, 3 Sept. 2009 destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is
arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the
Facts: On July 10, 1996, the Central District Command served a duly issued clothing of the person arrested.
warrant of arrest to Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso in a case of kidnapping for
ransom. Valeroso was found and arrested in INP Central Station in Culiat, In the present case, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked,
Quezon City where he was about to board a tricycle. He was bodily searched from where the officers found the weapon, could no longer be considered as
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 8 of 11

an “area within his immediate control” because there was no way for The forensic report admitted that only “the existence but not the sources” of
Valeroso to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used the two sachets was admitted.
against him. Hence, the warrantless search in this case could not be justified
as an incident to a lawful arrest. Issues: 1) Was the warrantless arrest of the accused valid? 2) Was the
prosecution able to establish the chain of custody?
15. Arizona vs Gant, 556 US 2009
Ruling: 1) No. PO1 Busico only saw that Gadiana was placing two plastic
Facts: The case involved Rodney J. Gant, who was arrested by Tucson, sachets into his pocket. This, in itself, does not meet any of the requirements
Arizona, police and charged with driving on a suspended driver’s license. under the rules for warrantless arrests as provided in Section 5 of Rule 113 of
Police arrested Gant in a friend's yard after he had parked his vehicle and the Rules of Court:
was walking away. Gant and all other suspects on the scene were then
secured in police patrol cars. The officers then searched Gant's vehicle. After A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
finding a weapon and a bag of cocaine, they also charged him with (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
possession of a narcotic for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia. actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
Issue: Up to what extent may a warrantless search on cars be allowed? on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a
Ruling: Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
to a recent occupant’s arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Warrantless searches “are
per se unreasonable,” subject only to a few specifically established and well- In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
delineated exceptions. The exception for a search incident to a lawful arrest without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or
applies only to “the area from within which (an arrestee) might gain jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”
2) The Court said, “Except for the charge sheet prepared against appellant
Warrantless Arrests which stated that evidence consisted of "two (2) heat-sealed clear plastic
sachets containing shabu with markings ‘JGR-1’ and ‘JGR-2,’" …nowhere in
16. People vs Gadiana, GR 184761, 8 Sept. 2010 the record is a showing that the marking was done in the presence of
appellant or his representatives or that a physical inventory and photograph
Facts: Julius Gadiana was convicted by the lower court of possessing 0.09 of the seized items were taken as required under paragraph 1, Section 21,
grams of shabu in 2 heat-sealed transparent plastic packets. Article II of R.A. No. 9165 reading:
The prosecution’s version of events says that about 3:40pm on 7 Feb., 2004,
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
PO1 Busico, PO3 Dinauanao, and PO2 Ferrer and three others were
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
conducting a saturation drive when they chanced upon Gadiana holding the
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
two plastic bags. Thereafter, they approached Gadiana , identified
accused or the person/s from whom such items were
themselves as policemen, and confiscated the sachets. According to Busico’s
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
testimony, it was Ferrer who prepared and brought the request-letter for lab
counsel, a representative from the media and the
examination.
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
Gadiana’s version: He denied ever holding two plastic bags. According to
be given a copy thereof.”
him, what happened was that three of the policemen only passed by him,
after which, PO1 Busico uttered, "This is the one, this is the one. This is very
The police’s failure to comply with this requirement essentially makes it so
obvious," held appellant’s arms and dipped into his pocket.
that they failed in establishing the chain of custody. There are exceptions to
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 9 of 11

this requirement, but prosecution failed to establish justifiable grounds for Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
such exceptions. precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at
the outset of the search.
Art. III, Sec. 3
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is
17. People vs Racho, GR 186529, 3 Aug. 2010 not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition,
that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has
Facts: On May 20, 2003, appellant was caught possessing a suspected drug committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
during a police operation. He was charged for violation of Section 5 of R.A.
9165, for transporting or delivering; and, of Section 11 for possessing Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police
dangerous drugs. During the arraignment, he denied liability and pleaded officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts
"Not Guilty" to both charges. On July 8, 2004, the RTC convicted him on the indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or
first charge but acquitted him of the second. Hence, he appealed and averred about to commit an offense. He was not acting in any suspicious manner that
that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and
because of the team’s failure to mark the specimen immediately after conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not
seizure. He assailed the legality of his arrest and the validity of the for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been
subsequent warrantless search. He questioned the admissibility of the apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the
confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree. sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. Neither were the arresting
officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the
Issue: Should the confiscated items be considered “fruits of the poisonous requisite warrant.
tree” and, thus, admissible in evidence?
18. People vs De la Cruz, GR 185717, 8 June 2011
Ruling: The case is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Facts: This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated June 30, 2008 of the Court
Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727, which affirmed in toto the
violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any February 8, 2007 Decision2 in Criminal Case No. Q-03-117814 of the Regional
purpose in any proceeding." Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 in Quezon City. The RTC found accused Garry de
la Cruz y dela Cruz (Garry) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The accused denied selling shabu to PO2
any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any Ibasco. In short, the accused used the defense of denial and alleged a frame-
proceeding. Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely: up by the arresting officers which was supported by some witnesses.
(a)Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (b) Search of evidence in
"plain view;" (c) Search of a moving vehicle; (d) Consented warrantless Issue: Is the non-compliance with said Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, fatal and
search; (e) Customs search; (f) Stop and Frisk; and, (g) Exigent and renders and accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
emergency circumstances. inadmissible? Was the prosecution able to establish the chain of custody?

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure Ruling: Generally, non-compliance with Secs. 21 and 86 of RA 9165 does not
is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the mean that no buy-bust operation against appellant ever took place. The
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to Sec. 21, Art. II of RA
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the 9165 will not discharge the accused from the crime. Non-compliance with
articles procured. said section is not fatal and will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the
items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed.
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 10 of 11

performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
20. Pollo vs David, GR 181881, 18 Oct. 2011
As the Supreme Court stated; “In sum, considering the multifarious
irregularities and non-compliance with the chain of custody, We cannot but Facts: On January 3, 2007, an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to
acquit accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt”. The law respondent CSC Chairperson David was marked “Confidential” and sent
demands that only proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify a through a courier service from a certain “Alan San Pascual”. The letter-
verdict of guilt. In all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of complaint indicated that a certain attorney of CSC is lawyering people with
the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all pending cases in the Commission. Furthermore, the letter-complaint said that
times upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond the lawyer is from the “Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na” division.
reasonable doubt. As the Court often reiterated, it would be better to set free
ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with
one innocent man for a crime he did not commit background in information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing
them to conduct an investigation and specifically “to back up all the files in
19. Meralco vs Lim, GR 184769, 5 Oct. 2010 the computers found in the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD)
under the Mamamayan Muna division.” Text messages were also sent
Facts: On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the informing the employees of the ongoing copying of computer files.
Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan
Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. Copies of The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal
the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed Affairs (OLA). It was found out that most of the files in the 17 diskettes
about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by
Station of the Philippine National Police. By Memorandum1[3]dated July 4, Briccio “Ricky” A. Pollo were draft pleadings or letters in connection with
2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals.
Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in
Muntinlupa as “A/F OTMS Clerk,” effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt Pollo, filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the
of “… reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] letter-complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer
from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and neither is he “lawyering” for people with cases in the CSC. He accused
and security.” CSC officials of conducting a “fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied
and printed personal files in his computer. He asserted that the files in his
Issue: May an employee invoke the remedies available under the writ of computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and
habeas data where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying,
basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein—imputing to her duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to
disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and
investigated but fails to informs her of the details thereof? seizure.

Ruling: Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with The CSC issued a Resolution finding prima facie case against Pollo and
MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, charged him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the
under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct
petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. the and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He then filed a
petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.2[16] Employment constitutes a motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals but it was denied.
property right under the context of the due process clause of the
Constitution.3[17] It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real Issue: Was the search conducted on Pollo’s office computer and the copying
reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and of his personal files without his knowledge and consent violate his
conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the constitutional right to privacy?
 Constitutional Law II, Art. III, Sec. 2 & 3, Case Digest Compilation|Page 11 of 11

Ruling: No. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. However, the constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all
searches and seizures but only of “unreasonable” searches and seizures.

First, if a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, he can be

protected of “search and seizure”. Justice Harlan of the US Supreme Court
noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-
fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). In the case at bar,
petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained
his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed
office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always
locked and not open to other employees or visitors. He described his office as
“full of people, his friends, unknown people” and that in the past 22 years he
had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is “personally assisting
incoming clients, receiving documents, and drafting cases on appeals”. The
CSC also had a policy regulating the use of office computers.

Second, a search by a government employer of an employee’s office is

justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that
it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in
the practice of “lawyering” for parties with pending cases before the
Commission, then such scenario would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon
the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in
the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial
and objective dispenser of administrative justice.” The fact that these
documents were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the presumption
that he was the author thereof. This is because he had a control of the said
computer. The ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily
be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate
action.