Ravinder Kaur Grewal Vs Manjit Kaur On 7 August, 2019

Ravinder Kaur Grewal vs Manjit Kaur on 7 August, 2019
Supreme Court of India

Author: Arun Mishra
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7764 OF 2014
RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
MANJIT KAUR & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS.8332−8333 OF 2014
RADHAKRISHNA REDDY (D) THROUGH LRS. PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
G. AYYAVOO & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)
JUDG MENT
ARUN MISHRA, J.
1. The question of law involved in the present matters is quite significant. Whether a person
claiming the title by virtue of adverse possession can maintain a suit under Article 65 of Limitation
Act, 1963 (for short, the Act) for declaration of title and for a permanent injunction seeking the
protection of his possession thereby restraining the defendant from interfering in the possession or
for restoration of Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by JAYANT KUMAR ARORA Date:
2019.08.07 17:08:22 IST possession in case of illegal dispossession by a defendant whose title has
Reason:
been extinguished by virtue of the plaintiff remaining in the adverse possession or in case of
dispossession by some other person? In other words, whether Article 65 of the Act only enables a
person to set up a plea of adverse possession as a shield as a defendant and such a plea cannot be
used as a sword by a plaintiff to protect the possession of immovable property or to recover it in case
of dispossession. Whether he is remediless in such a case? In case a person has perfected his title
based on adverse possession and property is sold by the owner after the extinguishment of his title,
what is the remedy of a person to avoid sale and interference in possession or for its restoration in
case of dispossession?
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/199096823/ 1

2. Historically, adverse possession is a pretty old concept of law. It is useful but often criticised
concept on the ground that it protects and confers rights upon wrongdoers. The concept of adverse
possession appeared in the Code of Hammurabi approximately 2000 years before Christ era. Law
30 contained a provision If a chieftain or a man leaves his house, garden, and field . and someone
else takes possession of his house, garden and field and uses it for three years; if the first owner
returns and claims his house, garden, and field, it shall not be given to him, but he who has taken
possession of it and used it shall continue to use it. However, there was an exception to the aforesaid
rule: for a soldier captured or killed in battle and the case of the juvenile son of the owner. In Roman
times, attached to the land, a kind of spirit that was nurtured by the possessor. Possessor or user of
the land was considered to have a greater ownership of the land than the titled owner. We inherited
the Common Law concept, being a part of the erstwhile British colony. William in 1066 consolidated
ownership of land under the Crown. The Statute of Westminster came in 1275 when land records
were very often scarce and literacy was rare, the best evidence of ownership was possession. In 1639,
the Statute of Limitation fixed the period for recovery of possession at 20 years. A line of thought
was also evolved that the person who possesses the land and produces something of ultimate benefit
to the society, must hold the best title to the land. Revenue laws relating to land have been enacted
in the spirit to confer the title on the actual tiller of the land. The Statute of Wills in 1540 allowed
lands to be passed down to heirs. The Statute of Tenures enacted in 1660 ended the feudal system
and created the concept of the title. The adverse possession remained as a part of the law and
continue to exist. The concept of adverse possession has a root in the aspect that it awards
ownership of land to the person who makes the best or highest use of the land. The land, which is
being used is more valuable than idle land, is the concept of utilitarianism. The concept thus, allows
the society as a whole to benefit from the land being held adversely but allows a sufficient period for
the true owner to recover the land. The adverse possession statutes permit rapid development of
wild lands with the weak or indeterminate title. It helps in the Doctrine of Administration also as it
can be an effective and efficient way to remove or cure clouds of title which with memories grow dim
and evidence becomes unclear. The possessor who maintains and improves the land has a more
valid claim to the land than the owner who never visits or cares for the land and uses it, is of no
utility. If a former owner neglects and allows the gradual dissociation between himself and what he
is claiming and he knows that someone else is caring by doing acts, the attachment which one
develops by caring cannot be easily parted with. The bundle of ingredients constitutes adverse
possession.
3. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length and also the Amicus Curiae,
Shri P.S. Patwalia and Shri Huzefa Ahmadi, senior counsel. Various decisions of this Court and
Privy Council and English Courts have been cited in which the suit filed by the plaintiff based on
adverse possession has been held to be maintainable for declaration of title and protection of the
possession or the restoration of possession. Nature of right acquired by adverse possession and even
otherwise as to the right to protect possession against unlawful dispossession of the plaintiff or for
its recovery in case of illegal dispossession.
4. Before dilating upon the issue, it is necessary to refer the decision in Gurudwara Sahab v. Gram
Panchayat Village Sirthala (2014) 1 SCC 669 in which this court has referred to the decision of the
Punjab and Haryana High Court in Gurudwara Sahib Sannauli v. State of Punjab since reported in

(2009) 154 PLR 756, to opine that no declaration of title can be sought by a plaintiff on the basis of
adverse possession inasmuch as adverse possession can be used as a shield by a defendant and not
as a sword by a plaintiff. This Court while deciding the question gave the only reason by simply
observing that there is no quarrel with the proposition to the extent that suit cannot be based by the
plaintiff on adverse possession. Thus, this point was not contested in Gurudwara Sahib v. State
Gram Panchayat Village, Sirthala (supra) when this Court expressed said opinion.
5. It is pertinent to mention here that before the aforesaid decision of this court, there was no such
decision of this court holding that suit cannot be filed by a plaintiff based on adverse possession. The
views to the contrary of larger and coordinate benches were not submitted for consideration of the
Two Judge Bench of this Court which decided the aforesaid matter.
6. A Three−Judge Bench decision in Sarangadeva Periya Matam & Anr. v. Ramaswami Gondar
(Dead) by Lrs. AIR 1966 SC 1603 of this Court in which the decision of Privy Council in Musumut
Chundrabullee Debia v. Luchea Debia Chowdrain 1865 SCC Online PC 7 had been relied on, was not
placed for consideration before the division bench deciding Gurudwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat,
Sirthala.
7. Learned Amicus pointed out that in Sarangadeva Periya Matam & Anr. v. Ramaswami Goundar
(Dead) by Lrs. (supra) the plaintiff was in the possession of the suit land until January 1950 when
the mutt obtained possession of the land. On February 18, 1954, plaintiff instituted the suit against
the mutt for recovery of possession of the suit land o based on an acquisition of title to land by way
of adverse possession. A Three−Judge Bench of this Court has held that the plaintiff acquired the
title by his adverse possession and was entitled to recover the possession. Following is the relevant
discussion:
1. Sri Sarangadevar Periya Matam of Kumbakonam was the inam holder of lands in
Kannibada Zamin, Dindigul Taluk, Madurai District. In 1883, the then
mathadhipathi granted a perpetual lease of the melwaram and kudiwaram interest in
a portion of the inam lands to one Chinna Gopiya Goundar, the grandfather of the
plaintiff−respondent on an annual rent of Rs. 70. The demised lands are the
subject−matter of the present suit. Since 1883 until January 1950 Chinna Gopiya
Goundar and his descendants were in uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the
suit lands. In 1915, the mathadhipathi died without nominating a successor. Since
1915, the descendants of Chinna Gopiya Goundar did not pay any rent to the math.
Between 1915 and 1939 there was no mathadhipathi. One Basavan Chetti was in
management of the math for a period of 20 years from 1915. The present
mathadhipathi was elected by the disciples of the Math in 1939. In 1928, the Collector
of Madurai passed an order resuming the inam lands and directing the full
assessment of the lands and payment of the assessment to the math for its upkeep.
After resumption, the lands were transferred from the "B" Register of inam lands to
the "A"

Register of ryotwari lands and a joint patta was issued in the name of the plaintiff and other persons
in possession of the lands. The plaintiff continued to possess the suit lands until January 1950 when
the math obtained possession of the lands. On February 18, 1954, the plaintiff instituted the suit
against the math represented by its present mathadhipathi and an agent of the math claiming
recovery of possession of the suit lands. The plaintiff claimed that he acquired title to the lands by
adverse possession and by the issue of a ryotwari patta in his favour on the resumption of the inam.
The Subordinate Judge of Dindigul accepted the plaintiff's contention and decreed the suit. On
appeal, the District Judge of Madurai set aside the decree and dismissed the suit. On second appeal,
the High Court of Madras restored the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge. The
defendants now appeal to this Court by special leave. During the pendency of the appeal, the
plaintiff− respondent died and his legal representatives have been substituted in his place.
2. The plaintiff claimed title to the suit lands on the following grounds : (1) Since 1915 he and his
predecessors−in−interest were in adverse possession of the lands, and on the expiry of 12 years in
1927, he acquired prescriptive title to the lands under s. 28 read with Art. 144 of the Indian
Limitation Act, 1908; (2) by the resumption proceedings and the grant of the ryotwari patta a new
tenure was created in his favour and he acquired full ownership in the lands; and (3) in any event,
he was in adverse possession of the lands since 1928, and on the expiry of 12 years in 1940 he
acquired prescriptive title to the lands under s. 28 read with Art. 134−B of the Indian Limitation Act,
1908. We are of the opinion that the first contention of the plaintiff should be accepted, and it is,
therefore, not necessary to consider the other two grounds of his claim.
6. We are inclined to accept the respondents' contention. Under Art. 144 of the Indian Limitation
Act, 1908, limitation for a suit by a math or by any person representing it for possession of
immovable properties belonging to it runs from the time when the possession of the defendant
becomes adverse to the plaintiff. The math is the owner of the endowed property. Like an idol, the
math is a juristic person having the power of acquiring, owning and possessing properties and
having the capacity of suing and being sued. Being an ideal person, it must of necessity act in
relation to its temporal affairs through human agency. See Babajirao v. Laxmandas (1904) ILR 28
Bom 215 (223). It may acquire property by prescription and may likewise lose property by adverse
possession. If the math while in possession of its property is dispossessed or if the possession of a
stranger becomes adverse, it suffers an injury and has the right to sue for the recovery of the
property. If there is a legally appointed mathadhipathi, he may institute the suit on its behalf; if not,
the de facto mathadhipathi may do so, see Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Bharti 62 Ind App 47 at
p.51 and where, necessary, a disciple or other beneficiary of the math may take steps for vindicating
its legal rights by the appointment of a receiver having authority to sue on its behalf, or by the
institution of a suit in its name by a next friend appointed by the Court. With due diligence, the
math or those interested in it may avoid the running of time. The running of limitation against the
math under Art. 144 is not suspended by the absence of a legally appointed mathadhipathi; clearly,
limitation would run against it where it is managed by a de facto mathadhipathi. See Vithalbowa v.
Narayan Daji, (1893) I.L.R 18 Bom 507 at p.511, and we think it would run equally if there is neither
a de jure nor a de facto mathadhipathi.

10. We hold that by the operation of Art. 144 read with s. 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 the
title of the math to the suit lands became extinguished in 1927, and the plaintiff acquired title to the
lands by prescription. He continued in possession of the lands until January 1950. It has been found
that in January 1950 he voluntarily delivered possession of the lands to the math, but such delivery
of possession did not transfer any title to the math. The suit was instituted in 1954 and is well within
time.
(emphasis supplied)
8. In Balkrishan vs. Satyaprakash & Ors., 2001 (2) SCC 498, decided by a Coordinate Bench, the
plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title on the ground of adverse possession and a permanent
injunction. This Court considered the question, whether the plaintiff had perfected his title by
adverse possession. This Court has laid down that the law concerning adverse possession is well
settled, a person claiming adverse possession has to prove three classic requirements i.e. nec nec vi,
nec clam and nec precario. The trial court, as well as the First Appellate Court, decreed the suit while
the High Court dismissed it. This Court restored the decree passed by the trial court decreeing the
plaintiff suit based on adverse possession and observed:
6. The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal is: whether the High
Court erred in holding that the appellant had not perfected his title by adverse
possession on the ground that there was an order of a Tahsildar against him to
deliver possession of the suit land to the auction purchasers.
7. The law with regard to perfecting title by adverse possession is well settled. A
person claiming title by adverse possession has to prove three "neck" − nec vi, nec
clam and nec precario. In other words, he must show that his possession is adequate
in continuity in publicity and in extent. In S.M. Karim vs. Bibi Sakina [1964] 6 SCR
780 speaking for this Court Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) observed thus:
"Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a

plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the
starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found."
14. In Sk. Mukbool Ali vs. Sk. Wajed Hossein, (1876) 25 WR 249 the High Court held:
"Whatever the decree might have been, the defendant's possession could not be
considered as having ceased in consequences of that decree, unless he were actually
dispossessed. The fact that there is a decree against him does not prevent the statute
of limitation from running."
15. In our view, the Madras High Court correctly laid down the law in the
aforementioned cases.

17. From the above discussion, it follows that the judgment and decree of the High
Court under challenge cannot be sustained. They are accordingly set aside and the
judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court confirming the judgment and
decree of the trial court is restored. The appeal is accordingly allowed but in the
circumstances of the case without costs. (emphasis supplied)
9. In Des Raj and Ors. v. Bhagat Ram (Dead) by Lrs. and Ors., (2007) 9 SCC 641, a suit filed by the
plaintiff for declaration of title and also for a permanent injunction based on adverse possession.
The Courts below decreed the suit of the plaintiff on the ground of adverse possession. The same
was affirmed by this Court. This Court considered the change brought about in the Act by Articles 64
and 65 vis−à−vis to Articles 142 and 144. Issue No.1 was framed whether the plaintiff becomes the
owner of the suit property by way of adverse possession? This Court has observed that a plea of
adverse possession was indisputably be governed by Articles 64 and 65 of the Act. This Court has
discussed the matter thus :
20. A plea of adverse possession or a plea of ouster would indisputably be governed

by Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act.
22. The mere assertion of title by itself may not be sufficient unless the plaintiff
proves animus possidendi. But the intention on the part of the plaintiff to possess the
properties in suit exclusively and not for and on behalf of other co−owners also is
evident from the fact that the defendants−appellants themselves had earlier filed two
suits. Such suits were filed for partition. In those suits the defendants−appellants
claimed themselves to be co−owners of the plaintiff. A bare perusal of the judgments
of the courts below clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff had even therein asserted
hostile title claiming ownership in himself. The claim of hostile title by the plaintiff
over the suit land, therefore, was, thus, known to the appellants. They allowed the
first suit to be dismissed in the year 1977. Another suit was filed in the year 1978
which again was dismissed in the year 1984. It may be true, as has been contended on
behalf of the appellants before the courts below, that a co−owner can bring about
successive suits for partition as the cause of action, therefor, would be a continuous
one. But, it is equally well−settled that pendency of a suit does not stop running of
'limitation'. The very fact that the defendants despite the purported entry made in the
revenue settlement record of rights in the year 1953 allowed the plaintiff to possess
the same exclusively and had not succeeded in their attempt to possess the properties
in Village Samleu and/or otherwise enjoy the usufruct thereof, clearly goes to show
that even prior to institution of the said suit the plaintiff−respondent had been in
hostile possession thereof.
24. In any event the plaintiff made his hostile declaration claiming title for the
property at least in his written statement in the suit filed in the year 1968. Thus, at
least from 1968 onwards, the plaintiff continued to exclusively possess the suit land
with a knowledge of the defendants−appellants.

26. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, therefore, would in a case of this nature
have its role to play, if not from 1953, but at least from 1968. If that be so, the finding
of the High Court that the respondent perfected his title by adverse possession and
ouster cannot be said to be vitiated in law.
28. We are also not oblivious of a recent decision of this Court in Govindammal v. R.
Perumal Chettiar and Ors., (2006) 11 SCC 600 wherein it was held: (SCC p. 606, para
8) In order to oust by way of adverse possession, one has to lead definite evidence to
show that to the hostile interest of the party that a person is holding possession and
how that can be proved will depend on facts of each case.
31. We, having regard to the peculiar facts obtaining in the case, are of the opinion
that the plaintiff−respondent had established that he acquired title by ousting the
defendant−appellants by declaring hostile title in himself which was to the knowledge
of his co−sharers. (emphasis supplied)
10. In Kshitish Chandra Bose v. Commissioner of Ranchi, (1981) 2 SCC 103 a three−Judge Bench of
this Court considered the question of adverse possession by a plaintiff. The plaintiff has filed a suit
for declaration of title and recovery of possession based on Hukumnama and adverse possession for
more than 30 years. The trial court decreed the suit on both the grounds, title as well as of adverse
possession. The plaintiff's appeal was allowed by this Court. It has been observed by this Court that
adverse possession had been established by a consistent course of conduct of the plaintiff in the
case, possession was hostile to the full knowledge of the municipality. Thus, the High Court could
not have interfered with the finding as to adverse possession and could not have ordered remand of
the case to the Judicial Commissioner. The order of remand and the proceedings thereafter were
quashed. This court restored decree in favour of plaintiff for declaration of title and recovery of
possession and also for a permanent injunction, has dealt with the matter thus:
2. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of his title and recovery of possession and
also a permanent injunction restraining the defendant municipality from disturbing
the possession of the plaintiff. It appears that prior to the suit, proceedings under
Section 145 were started between the parties in which the Magistrate found that the
plaintiff was not in possession but upheld the possession of the defendant on the land
until evicted in due course of law.
3. In the suit the plaintiff based his claim in respect of plot No. 1735, Ward No. 1 of
Ranchi Municipality on the ground that he had acquired title to the land by virtue of a
hukumnama granted to him by the landlord as far back as April 17, 1912 which is
Ex.18. Apart from the question of title, the plaintiff further pleaded that even if the
land belonged to the defendant municipality, he had acquired title by prescription by
being in possession of the land to the knowledge of the municipality for more than 30
years, that is to say, from 1912 to 1957.

10. Lastly, the High Court thought that as the land in question consisted of a portion
of the tank or a land appurtenant thereto, adverse possession could not be proved.
This view also seems to be wrong. If a person asserts a hostile title even to a tank
which as claimed by the municipality, belonged to it and despite the hostile assertion
of title no steps were taken by the owner, (namely, the municipality in this case), to
evict the trespasser, his title by prescription would be complete after thirty years.
(emphasis supplied)
11. In Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165, the plaintiff filed a suit claiming
to be in possession for over 70 years. The plaintiff claimed possession of the excess land from the
society, its Manager and Defendants Nos.3 to 6. The society denied the rights of the plaintiff to bring
a suit for ejectment or its liability for compensation. Alternatively, the society claimed the value of
improvements. The main controversy decided by the High Court was whether the plaintiff can
maintain a suit for possession without proof of title. This court observed that in case the rightful
owner does not come forward within the period of limitation his right is lost, and the possessory
owner acquires an absolute title. The plaintiff was in de facto possession and was entitled to remain
in possession and only the State could evict him. The State was not impleaded as a party in the case.
The action of the society was a violent invasion of his possession and in the law, as it stands in India,
the plaintiff can maintain a possessory suit under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The
plaintiff has asserted that he had perfected his title by adverse possession but he did not join the
State in a suit to get a declaration. He may be said to have not rested the suit on the acquired title.
The suit was thus limited to recovery of possession from one who had trespassed against him. The
Court observed that for the plaintiff to maintain suit based on adverse possession, it was necessary
to implead the State Government i.e. the owner of the land as a party to the suit. A plaintiff can
maintain a suit based on adverse possession as he acquires absolute title. The Court observed:
(17) In our judgment this involves an incorrect approach to our problem. To express our meaning we
may begin by reading 1907 AC 73 to discover if the principle that possession is good against all but
the true owner has in any way been departed from. 1907 AC 73 reaffirmed the principle by stating
quite clearly: It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of
owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all
the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title
by the process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the statute of Limitation
applicable to the case, his right is forever extinguished, and the possessory owner acquires an
absolute title. Therefore, the plaintiff who was peaceably in possession was entitled to remain in
possession and only the State could evict him. The action of the Society was a violent invasion of his
possession and in the law, as it stands in India the plaintiff could maintain a possessor suit under
the provisions of the Specific Relief Act in which title would be immaterial or a suit for possession
within 12 years in which the question of title could be raised. As this was a suit of latter kind title
could be examined. But whose title? Admittedly neither side could establish title. The plaintiff at
least pleaded the statute of Limitation and asserted that he had perfected his title by adverse
possession. But as he did not join the State in his suit to get a declaration, he may be said to have not
rested his case on an acquired title. His suit was thus limited to recovering possession from one who
had trespassed against him. The enquiry thus narrows to this: did the Society have any title in itself,

was it acting under authority express or implied of the true owner or was it just pleading a title in a
third party? To the first two questions we find no difficulty in furnishing an answer. It is clearly in
the negative. So the only question is whether the defendant could plead that the title was in the
State? Since in every such case between trespassers the title must be outstanding in a third party a
defendant will be placed in a position of dominance. He has only to evict the prior trespasser and sit
pretty pleading that the title is in someone else. As Erle J put it in Burling v. Read (1848) 11 QB 904
parties might imagine that they acquired some right by merely intruding upon land in the night,
running up a hut and occupying it before morning'. This will be subversive of the fundamental
doctrine which was accepted always and was reaffirmed in 1907 AC 73. The law does not, therefore,
countenance the doctrine of 'findings keepings.
(22) The cases of the Judicial Committee are not binding on us but we approve of the dictum in 1907
AC 73. No subsequent case has been brought to our notice departing from that view. No doubt a
great controversy exists over the two cases of (1849) 13 QB 945 and (1865) 1 QB 1 but it must be
taken to be finally resolved by 1907 AC 73. A similar view has been consistently taken in India and
the amendment of the Indian Limitation Act has given approval to the proposition accepted in 1907
AC 73 and may be taken to be declaratory of the law in India. We hold that the suit was
maintainable. (emphasis supplied)
12. In Lallu Yashwant Singh (dead) by his legal representative v. Rao Jagdish Singh & Ors., AIR
1968 SC 620, this Court has observed that taking forcible possession is illegal. In India, persons are
not permitted to take forcible possession. The law respect possession. The landlord has no right to
re−enter by showing force or intimidation. He must have to proceed under the law and taking of
forcible possession is illegal. The Court affirmed the decision of Privy Council in Midnapur
Zamindary Company Ltd. V. Naresh Narayan Roy AIR 1924 PC 144 and other decisions and held:
"10. In Midnapur Zamindary Company Limited v. Naresh Narayan Roy, 51 Ind App
293 = at p. 299 (AIR 1924 PC 144 at p.147), the Privy Council observed:
In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such
possession as they are entitled to through a Court.
11. In K.K. Verma v. Naraindas C. Malkani (AIR 1954 Bom 358 at p.
360) Chagla C.J., stated that the law in India was essentially different from the law in
England. He observed:
Under the Indian law the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is
protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue in possession after
the termination of the tenancy his possession is juridical and that possession is
protected by statute. Under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act a tenant who has
ceased to be a tenant may sue for possession against his landlord if the landlord
deprives him of possession otherwise than in due course of law, but a trespasser who
has been thrown out of possession cannot go to Court under Section 9 and claim

possession against the true owner.
12. In Yar Mohammad v. Lakshmi Das (AIR 1959 All 1 at p.4), the Full Bench of the Allahabad High
Court observed:
No question of title either of the plaintiff or of the defendant can be raised or gone into in that case
(under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act). The plaintiff will be entitled to succeed without proving
any title on which he can fall back upon and the defendant cannot succeed even though he may be in
a position to establish the best of all titles. The restoration of possession in such a suit is, however,
always subject to a regular title suit and the person who has the real title or even the better title
cannot, therefore, be prejudiced in any way by a decree in such a suit. It will always be open to him
to establish his title in a regular suit and to recover back possession. The High Court further
observed:
Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take
the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to
a Court. No person can be allowed to become a Judge in his own cause. As observed by Edge C.J., in
Wali Ahmad Khan v. Ayodhya Kundu (1891) ILR 13 All. 537 at p.556:
The object of the section was to drive the persons who wanted to eject a person into the proper Court
and to prevent them from going with a high hand and ejecting such persons.
14. In Hillava Subbava v. Narayanappa, (1911) 13 Bom. LR 1200 it was observed:
No doubt, the true owner of property is entitled to retain possession, even though he has obtained it
from a trespasser by force or other unlawful means: Lillu v. Annaji, (1881) ILR 5 Bom. 387 and
Bandu v. Naba, (1890) ILR 15 Bom 238. We are unable to appreciate how this decision assists the
respondent. It was not a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. In (1881) ILR 5 Bom 387, it
was recognised that "if there is a breach of the peace in attempting to take possession, that affords a
ground for criminal prosecution, and, if the attempt is successful, for a summary suit also for a
restoration to possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act I of 1877− Dadabhai Narsidas v.
The Sub−Collector of Broach, (1870) 7 Bom. HC AC 82. In (1890) ILR 15 Bom 238 it was observed
by Sargent C J., as follows:
The Indian Legislature has, however, provided for the summary removal of anyone who
dispossesses another, whether peaceably or otherwise than by due course of law; but subject to such
provision there is no reason for holding that the rightful owner so dispossessing the other is a
trespasser, and may not rely for the support of his possession on the title vested in him, as he clearly
may do by English law. This would also appear to be the view taken by West J., in (1881) ILR 5 Bom
387.
15. In our opinion, the law on this point has been correctly stated by the Privy Council, by Chagla
C.J., and by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in the cases cited above. (emphasis
supplied) This Court has approved the decision of the Privy Council as well as Full Bench of the

Allahabad High Court in Yar Mohammad v. Laxmi Das AIR 1959 All. 1.
13. In Somnath Berman v. Dr. S.P. Raju & Anr. AIR 1970 SC 846, this Court has recognized the right
of a person having possessory title to obtain a declaration that he was the owner of the land in a suit
and an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession. This Court has
further observed that section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is in no way inconsistent with the
position that as against a wrong− doer, prior possession of the plaintiff, in an action of ejectment is
sufficient title even if the suit is brought more than six months after the act of dispossession
complained of and that the wrong−doer cannot successfully resist the suit by showing that the title
and the right to possession vested in a third party. This Court has observed:
"10. In Narayana Row v. Dharmachar, (1903) ILR 26 Mad 514 a bench of the Madras
High Court consisting of Bhashyam Ayyangar and Moore, JJ. held that possession is,
under the Indian, as under the English law, good title against all but the true owner.
Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act is in no way inconsistent with the position that as
against a wrongdoer, prior possession of the plaintiff, in an action of ejectment, is
sufficient title, even if the suit be brought more than six months after the act of
dispossession complained of and that the wrong−doer cannot successfully resist the
suit by showing that the title and right to possession are in a third person. The same
view was taken by the Bombay High Court in Krishnarao Yashwant v. Vasudev Apaji
Ghotikar, (1884) ILR 8 Bom 871. That was also the view taken by the Allahabad High
Court−see Umrao Singh v. Ramji Das, ILR 36 All 51, Wali Ahmad Khan v. Ahjudhia
Kandu, (1891) ILR 13 All 537. In Subodh Gopal Bose v. Province of Bihar, AIR 1950
Pat 222 the Patna High Court adhered to the view taken by the Madras, Bombay and
Allahabad High Courts. The contrary view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Debi
Churn Boldo v. Issur Chunder Manjee, (1883) ILR 9 Cal 39; Ertaza Hossein v. Bany
Mistry, (1883) ILR 9 Cal 130, Purmeshur Chowdhry v. Brijo Lall Chowdhry, (1890)
ILR 17 Cal 256 and Nisa Chand Gaita v. Kanchiram Bagani, (1899) ILR 26 Cal 579, in
our opinion does not lay down the law correctly."
(emphasis supplied) It is apparent from the aforesaid decision that a person is

entitled to bring a suit of possessory title to obtain possession even though the title
may vest in a third person. A person in the possessory title can get injunction also,
restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession.
14. Given the aforesaid, a question to ponder is when a person having no title, merely on the
strength of possessory title can obtain an injunction and can maintain a suit for ejectment of a
trespasser. Why a person who has perfected his title by way of adverse possession cannot file a suit
for obtaining an injunction protecting possession and for recovery of possession in case his
dispossession is by a third person or by an owner after the extinguishment of his title. In case a
person in adverse possession has perfected his title by adverse possession and after the
extinguishment of the title of the true owner, he cannot be successfully dispossessed by a true owner
as the owner has lost his right, title and interest.

15. In Padminibai v. Tangavva & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1142, a suit was filed by the plaintiff for recovery
of possession on the basis that her husband was in exclusive and open possession of the suit lands
adversely to the defendant for a period exceeding 12 years and his possession was never interrupted
or disturbed. It was held that he acquired ownership by prescription. The suit filed within 12 years of
his death was within limitation. Thus, the plaintiff was given the right to recover possession based
on adverse possession as Tatya has acquired ownership by adverse possession. This Court has
observed thus:
1. Tatya died on February 2, 1955. The respondents, Tangava and Sundra Bai are the
co widows of Tatya. They were co−plaintiffs in the original suit.
11. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding in agreement with the courts below
that Tatya had acquired title by remaining in exclusive and open possession of the
suit lands adversely to Padmini Bai for a period far exceeding 12 years, and this
possession was never interrupted or disturbed. He had thus acquired ownership by
prescriptions. (emphasis supplied)
16. In State of West Bengal v. The Dalhousie Institute Society, AIR 1970 SC 1778, this Court
considered the question of adverse possession of Dalhousie Institute Society based on invalid grant.
It was held by this Court that title was acquired by adverse possession based on invalid grant and
the right was given to the claimant/applicant to claim compensation. This Court held that a person
acquires title by adverse possession and observed:
"16. There is no material placed before us to show that the grant has been made in the
manner required by law though as a fact a grant of the site has been made in favour
of the Institute. The evidence relied on by the Special Land Acquisition Judge and the
High Court also clearly establishes that the respondent has been in open, continuous
and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the site for over 60 years. In this
respect, the material documentary evidence referred to by the High Court clearly
establishes that the respondent has been treated as owner of the site not only by the
Corporation but also by the Government. The possession of the respondent must
have been on the basis of the grant made by the Government, which, no doubt, is
invalid in law. As to what exactly is the legal effect of such possession has been
considered by this Court in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City
of Bombay, [1952] SCR 43 as follows:
...the position of the respondent Corporation and its predecessor in title was that of a
person having no legal title but nevertheless holding possession of the land under
colour of an invalid grant of the land in perpetuity and free from rent for the purpose
of a market. Such possession not being referable to any legal title it was prima facie
adverse to the legal title of the Government as owner of the land from the very
moment the predecessor in title of the respondent Corporation took possession of the
land under the invalid grant. This possession has continued openly, as of right and
uninterruptedly for over 70 years and the respondent Corporation has acquired the

limited title to it and its predecessor in title had been prescribing for during all this
period, that is to say, the right to hold the land in perpetuity free from rent but only
for the purposes of a market in terms of the Government Resolution of 1865....
17. The above extract establishes that a person in such possession clearly acquires
title by adverse possession. In the case before us, there are concurrent findings
recorded by the High Court and the Special Land Acquisition Judge in favour of the
respondent on this point and we agree with those findings."
(emphasis supplied) It is apparent from the aforesaid discussion that title is acquired
by adverse possession.
17. In Mohammed Fateh Nasib v. Swarup Chand Hukum Chand & Anr. AIR 1948 PC 76, Privy
Council considered the question of adverse possession by a plaintiff. In the plaint, his case was
based upon continuous, open, exclusive and undisturbed possession. He averred that he had
acquired an indefeasible title to the suit property by adverse possession against the whole world. In
1928, he was surreptitiously dispossessed from the suit property. The question arose for
consideration whether the plaintiff remained in adverse possession for 12 years and whether it was
adverse to the wakf. The Privy Council agreed with the findings of the High Court that the plaintiff
and his predecessors−in− interest had remained in possession of the suit property for more than 12
years before 1928 to acquire a title under section 28 of the Act and the plaintiff was not a mere
trespasser. The court further held that title by the adverse possession can be established against
wakf property also. The Privy Council observed:− On that basis the first question to be determined is
whether the plaintiff proved continuous, open exclusive and undisturbed possession of the property
in suit for 12 years and upwards before 1928 when he was dispossessed, that being the relevant date
under Article 142 of the Limitation Act. If that question is answered in the affirmative then the
further question arises whether such possession was adverse to the wakf.
Their Lordships agree that this is the correct test to apply and, having examined the evidence, oral
and documentary, they agree with the finding of the High Court that the plaintiff and his
predecessors−in−interest had been in possession of the suit property for more than 12 years prior to
1928 so as to acquire a title under Section 28 of the Limitation Act. It is no doubt true, as the learned
Subordinate Judge held, that the claim of a mere trespasser to title by adverse possession will be
confined strictly to the property of which he has been in actual possession. But that principle has no
application in the present case. The plaintiff is not a mere trespasser; he himself purchased the
property for a large sum and Aberjan, upon whose possession the claim ultimately rests, was put
into possession by an order of the Court, whether or not such order was rightly made. Apart from
this, their Lordships think that the character of the possession established by the plaintiff was
adequate to found title even in a trespasser.
Their Lordships feel no hesitation in agreeing with the High Court that adverse possession by the
plaintiff and his predecessors− in−interest has been proved for the requisite period. The only
question which then remains is whether such possession was adverse to the wakf. It is not disputed
that in law a title by adverse possession can be established against wakf property, but it is clear that

a trustee for a charity entering into possession of property belonging to the charity cannot, whilst
remaining a trustee, change the character of his possession, and assert that he is in possession as a
beneficial owner. (emphasis supplied) The plaintiff's title was declared based on adverse possession.
18. The question of perfecting title by adverse possession again came to be considered by the Privy
Council in Gunga Govind Mundul & Ors. v. The Collector of the Twenty−Four Pergunnahs & Ors. 11
M.I.A. 212, it observed that there is an extinguishment of title by the law of limitation. The practical
effect is the extinction of the title of the owner in favour of the party in possession and this right is
an absolute interest. The Privy Council has observed thus:
4.The title to sue for dispossession of the lands belongs, in such a case, to the owner
whose property is encroached upon ; and if he suffers his right to be barred by the
Law of Limitation, the practical effect is the extinction of his title in favour of the
party in possession; see Sel. Rep., vol. vi., p. 139, cited in Macpherson, Civil
Procedure, p. 81 (3rd ed.). Now, in this case, the family represented by the Appellants
is proved to have been upwards of thirty years in possession. The High Court has
decided that the Prince's title is barred, and the effect of that bar must operate in
favour of the party in possession.
Supposing that, on the extinction of the title of a person having a limited interest, a
right to enter might arise in favour of a remainderman or a reversioner, the present
case has no resemblance to that.
8. It is of the utmost consequence in India that the security which long possession
efforts should not be weakened. Disputes are constantly arising about boundaries and
about the identity of lands, −− contiguous owners are apt to charge one another with
encroachment. If twelve years peaceable and uninterrupted possession of lands,
alleged to have been enjoyed by encroachment on the adjoining lands, can be proved,
a purchaser may taken that title in safety; but, if the party out of possession could set
up a sixty years law of limitation, merely by making common cause with a Collector,
who could enjoy security against interruption? The true answer to such a contrivance
is; the legal right of the Government is to its rent; the lands owned by others; as
between private owners contesting inter see the title of the lands, the law has
established a limitation of twelve years; after that time, it declares not simply that the
remedy is barred, but that that the title is extinct in favour of the possessor. The
Government has no title to intervene in such contests, as its title to its rent in the
nature of jumma is unaffected by transfer simply of proprietary right in the lands.
The liability of the lands of Jumma is not affected by a transfer of proprietary right,
whether such transfer is affected simply by transfer of title, or less directly by adverse
occupation and the law of limitation. (emphasis supplied)
19. In S.M. Karim v. Mst. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254, a question arose under section 66 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which provides that no suit shall be maintained against a certified
purchaser. The question arose for consideration that in case possession is disturbed whether a

plaintiff can take the alternative plea that the title of the person purchasing benami in court auction
was extinguished by long and uninterrupted adverse possession of the real owner. If the possession
of the real owner ripens into title under the Act and he is dispossessed, he can sue to obtain
possession. This Court has held that in such a case it would be open for the plaintiff to take such a
plea but with full particulars so that the starting point of limitation can be found. A mere suggestion
in the relief clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for several 12 years or that the
plaintiff had acquired an absolute title was not enough to raise such a plea. Long possession was not
necessarily an adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a substitute for a plea of adverse
possession. The opinion expressed is that plaintiff can take a plea of adverse possession but with full
particulars. The Court has observed:
5. As an alternative, it was contended before us that the title of Hakir Alam was
extinguished by long and uninterrupted adverse possession of Syed Aulad Ali and
after him of the plaintiff. The High Court did not accept this case. Such a case is, of
course, open to a plaintiff to make if his possession is disturbed. If the possession of
the real owner ripens into title under the Limitation Act and he is dispossessed, he
can sue to obtain possession, for he does not then rely on the benami nature of the
transaction. But the alternative claim must be clearly made and proved. The High
Court held that the plea of adverse possession was not raised in the suit and reversed
the decision of the two courts below. The plea of adverse possession is raised here.
Reliance is placed before us on Sukhan Das v. Krishanand, ILR 32 Pat 353 and Sri
Bhagwan Singh v. Ram Basi Kuer, AIR 1957 Pat 157, to submit that such a plea is not
necessary and alternatively, that if a plea is required, what can be considered a proper
plea. But these two cases can hardly help the appellant. No doubt, the plaint sets out
the fact that after the purchase by Syed Aulad Ali, benami in the name of his
son−in−law Hakir Alam, Syed Aulad Ali continued in possession of the property but
it does not say that this possession was at any time adverse to that of the certified
purchaser. Hakir Alam was the son−in−law of Syed Aulad Ali and was living with
him. There is no suggestion that Syed Aulad Ali ever asserted any hostile title against
him or that a dispute with regard to ownership and possession had ever arisen.
Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea
is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting
point of limitation against the party affected can be found. There is no evidence here
when possession became adverse if it at all did, and a mere suggestion in the relief
clause that there was an uninterrupted possession for "several 12 years" or that the
plaintiff had acquired "an absolute title" was not enough to raise such a plea. Long
possession is not necessarily adverse possession and the prayer clause is not a
substitute for a plea. The cited cases need hardly be considered because each case
must be determined upon the allegations in the plaint in that case. It is sufficient to
point out that in Bishun Dayal v. Kesho Prasad, AIR 1940 PC 202 the Judicial
Committee did not accept an alternative case based on possession after purchase
without a proper plea."
(emphasis supplied)

20. There is an acquisition of title by adverse possession as such, such a person in the
capacity of a plaintiff can always use the plea in case any of his rights are infringed
including in case of dispossession. In Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah &
Anr., (2010) 2 SCC 461 this Court has referred to the decision in State of Rajasthan v.
Harphool Singh (2000) 5 SCC 652 in which the suit was filed by the plaintiff based on
acquisition of title by adverse possession. This Court has referred to other decisions
also in Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam (2007) 14 SCC 308 and P.T. Munichikkanna
Reddy v. Revamma (2007) 6 SCC 59. It has been observed that there can be an
acquisition of title by adverse possession.
It has also been observed that adverse possession effectively shifts the title already distanced from
the paper owner to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of the adverse possessor.
This Court has considered the matter thus:
"48. In State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh, 2000 (5) SCC 652, this Court
considered the question whether the respondents had acquired title by adverse
possession over the suit land situated at Nohar−Bhadra Road at Nohar within the
State of Rajasthan. The suit filed by the respondent against his threatened
dispossession was decreed by the trial court with the finding that he had acquired
title by adverse possession. The first and second appeals preferred by the State
Government were dismissed by the lower appellate court and the High Court
respectively. This Court reversed the judgments and decrees of the courts below as
also of the High Court and held that the plaintiff−respondent could not substantiate
his claim of perfection of title by adverse possession. Some of the observations made
on the issue of acquisition of title by adverse possession which have bearing on this
case are extracted below: (SCC p. 660, para 12) 12. So far as the question of perfection
of title by adverse possession and that too in respect of public property is concerned,
the question requires to be considered more seriously and effectively for the reason
that it ultimately involves destruction of right/title of the State to immovable
property and conferring upon a third−party encroacher title where he had none. The
decision in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314, adverted to the
ordinary classical requirement − that it should be nec vi, nec clam, nec precario − that
is the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity, and in extent
to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor. It was also observed therein
that whatever may be the animus or intention of a person wanting to acquire title by
adverse possession, his adverse possession cannot commence until he obtains actual
possession with the required animus.
50. Before concluding, we may notice two recent judgments in which law on the
question of acquisition of title by adverse possession has been considered and
reiterated. In Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam, 2007 (14) SCC 308, the Court observed as
under: (SCC p. 316, para 24) 24. Claim by adverse possession has two elements: (1)
the possession of the defendant should become adverse to the plaintiff; and (2) the
defendant must continue to remain in possession for a period of 12 years thereafter.

Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. It

is now a well−settled principle of law that mere possession of the land would not
ripen into possessory title for the said purpose. Possessor must have animus
possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. For the said
purpose, not only animus possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same must be
shown to exist at the commencement of the possession. He must continue in the said
capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere long possession, it
is trite, for a period of more than 12 years without anything more does not ripen into
a title.
51. In P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, 2007 (6) SCC 59, the Court
considered various facets of the law of adverse possession and laid down various
propositions including the following: (SCC pp. 66 & 68, paras 5 & 8) xxx
8. to assess a claim of adverse possession, two−pronged enquiry is required:
1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially "wilful neglect"

element on part of the owner established. Successful application in this regard
distances the title of the land from the paper−owner.
2. Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor

effectively shifts the title already distanced from the paper−owner, to the adverse
possessor. Right thereby accrues in favour of adverse possessor as intent to
dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention in the upkeep of the
property. (emphasis in original) (emphasis supplied)
21. In P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59, this Court has observed as under:
2. The defendant−respondents in their written statement denied and disputed the

aforementioned assertion of the plaintiffs and pleaded their own right, title and
interest as also possession in or over the said 1 acre 21 guntas of land. The learned
trial Judge decreed the suit inter alia holding that the plaintiff−appellants have
acquired title by adverse possession as they have been in possession of the lands in
question for a period of more than 50 years. On an appeal having been preferred
thereagainst by the respondents before the High Court, the said judgment of the trial
court was reversed holding:
(i) The important averments of adverse possession are twofold. One is to recognise the title of the
person against whom adverse possession is claimed. Another is to enjoy the property adverse to the
title−holders interest after making him known that such enjoyment is against his own interest.
These two averments are basically absent in this case both in the pleadings as well as in the
evidence.

(ii) The finding of the court below that the possession of the plaintiffs became adverse to the
defendants between 1934−36 is again an error apparent on the face of the record. As it is now
clarified before me by the learned counsel for the appellants that the plaintiffs claim in respect of the
other land of the defendants is based on the subsequent sale deed dated 5−7−1936.
It is settled law that mere possession even if it is true for any number of years will not clothe the
person in enjoyment with the title by adverse possession. As indicated supra, the important
ingredients of adverse possession should have been satisfied.
6. Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depends on strong limitation statutes by
operation of which right to access the court expires through efflux of time. As against rights of the
paper−owner, in the context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour
of the adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as
against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. Modern statutes of limitation
operate, as a rule, not only to cut off ones right to bring an action for the recovery of property that
has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time but also to vest the possessor with
title. The intention of such statutes is not to punish one who neglects to assert rights, but to protect
those who have maintained the possession of property for the time specified by the statute under
claim of right or colour of title. (See American Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 2d, p. 81.) It is important to
keep in mind while studying the American notion of adverse possession, especially in the backdrop
of limitation statutes, that the intention to dispossess cannot be given a complete go−by. Simple
application of limitation shall not be enough by itself for the success of an adverse possession claim.
8. Therefore, to assess a claim of adverse possession, two−pronged enquiry is required:
1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially wilful neglect element on part of the
owner established. Successful application in this regard distances the title of the land from the
paper−owner.
2. Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor effectively shifts the
title already distanced from the paper−owner, to the adverse possessor. Right thereby accrues in
favour of adverse possessor as intent to dispossess is an express statement of urgency and intention
in the upkeep of the property.
30. In Karnataka Wakf Board the law was stated, thus: (SCC p. 785, para 11) 11. In the eye of the law,
an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion.
Non−use of the property by the owner even for a long time wont affect his title. But the position will
be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse
possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true
owner. It is a well− settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his
possession is nec vi, nec clam, nec precario, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession
must be adequate in continuity, in publicity, and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to
the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible,
exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. (See S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina, Parsinni

v. Sukhi and D.N. Venkatarayappa v. State of Karnataka.) Physical fact of exclusive possession and
the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important
factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure
question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse
possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his
possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party,
(d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A
person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the
rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his
adverse possession.
22. In State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar & Ors., (2011) 10 SCC 404, the court considered the
question whether the plaintiff had become the owner of the disputed property by way of adverse
possession and in that context considered the decisions in Revamma (supra) and Fairweather v. St.
Marylebone Property Co. Ltd. (1962) 2 AER 288 (HL) and Taylor v. Twinberrow 1930 All ER Rep
342 (DC) and observed that adverse possession confers negative and consequential right effected
only as somebody else's positive right to access the court is barred by operation of law. Right of the
paper owner is extinguished and that competing rights evolve in favour of adverse possessor as he
cared for the land, developed it as against the owner of the property who had ignored the property.
This Court has observed thus:
32. This Court in Revamma (2007) 6 SCC 59 observed that to understand the true
nature of adverse possession, Fairweather v. St Marylebone Property Co. Ltd. (1962)
2 All ER 288 (HL) can be considered where the House of Lords referring to Taylor v.
Twinberrow (1930) 2 K.B. 16 termed adverse possession as a negative and
consequential right effected only because somebody else's positive right to access the
court is barred by operation of law. As against the rights of the paper−owner, in the
context of adverse possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the
adverse possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it,
as against the owner of the property who has ignored the property. (emphasis
supplied)
23. In Krishnamurthy S. Setlur (dead) by LRs. v. O.V. Narasimha Setty & Ors., (2007) 3 SCC 569,
the Court pointed out that the duty of the plaintiff while claiming title based on adverse possession.
The suit was filed by the plaintiff on 11.12.1981. The trial court held that the plaintiff has perfected
the title in the suit lands based on adverse possession, and decreed the suit. This Court has observed
that the plaintiff must plead and prove the date on and from which he claims to be in exclusive,
continuous and undisturbed possession. The question arose for consideration whether tenant's
possession could be treated as possession of the owner for computation of the period of 12 years
under the provisions of the Act. What is the nature of pleading required in the plaint to constitute a
plea of adverse possession has been emphasised by this Court and another question also arose
whether the plaintiff was entitled to get back the possession from the defendants? This Court has
observed thus:

"12. Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 operates to extinguish the right to property
of a person who does not sue for its possession within the time allowed by law. The
right extinguished is the right which the lawful owner has and against whom a claim
for adverse possession is made, therefore, the plaintiff who makes a claim for adverse
possession has to plead and prove the date on and from which he claims to be in
exclusive, continuous and undisturbed possession. The question whether possession
is adverse or not is often one of simple fact but it may also be a conclusion of law or a
mixed question of law and fact. The facts found must be accepted, but the conclusion
drawn from them, namely, ouster or adverse possession is a question of law and has
to be considered by the court.
13. As stated, this civil appeal arises from the judgment of the High Court in RFA No.
672 of 1996 filed by the original defendants under Section 96 CPC. The impugned
judgment, to say the least, is a bundle of confusion. It quotes depositions of witnesses
as findings. It quotes findings of the courts below which have been set aside by the
High Court in the earlier round. It criticizes the findings given by the coordinate
Bench of the High Court in the earlier round of litigation. It does not answer the
question of law which arises for determination in this case. To quote an example, one
of the main questions which arises for determination, in this case, is whether the
tenant's possession could be treated as possession of the owner in computation of the
period of twelve years under Article 64 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Similarly, as an
example, the impugned judgment does not answer the question as to whether the
decision of the High Court dated 14.8.1981 in RSA No. 545 of 1973 was at all binding
on the LRs. of Iyengar/their alienees. Similarly, the impugned judgment does not
consider the effect of the judgment dated 10.11.1961 rendered by the trial court in Suit
No. 94 of 1956 filed by K.S. Setlur against Iyengar inter alia for reconveyance in
which the court below did not accept the contention of K.S. Setlur that the
conveyance executed by Kalyana Sundram Iyer in favour of Iyengar was a benami
transaction. Similarly, the impugned judgment has failed to consider the effect of the
observations made by the civil court in the suit filed by Iyengar for permanent
injunction bearing Suit No. 79 of 1949 to the effect that though Shyamala Raju was in
possession and cultivation, whether he was a tenant under Iyengar or under K.S.
Setlur was not conclusively proved. Similarly, the impugned judgment has not at all
considered the effect of Iyengar or his LRs. not filing a suit on title despite being
liberty given to them in the earlier Suit No. 79 of 1949. In the matter of adverse
possession, the courts have to find out the plea taken by the plaintiff in the plaint. In
the plaint, the plaintiff who claims to be owner by adverse possession has to plead
actual possession. He has to plead the period and the date from which he claims to be
in possession. The plaintiff has to plead and prove that his possession was
continuous, exclusive and undisturbed to the knowledge of the real owner of the land.
He has to show a hostile title. He has to communicate his hostility to the real owner.
None of these aspects have been considered by the High Court in its impugned
judgment. As stated above, the impugned judgment is under Section 96 CPC, it is not
a judgment under Section 100 CPC. As stated above, adverse possession or ouster is

an inference to be drawn from the facts proved (sic) that work is of the first appellate
court. (emphasis supplied)
24. In P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy v. Revamma, (2007) 6 SCC 59, the plaintiff claimed the title based
on adverse possession. The court observed:
5. Adverse possession in one sense is based on the theory or presumption that the
owner has abandoned the property to the adverse possessor on the acquiescence of
the owner to the hostile acts and claims of the person in possession. It follows that
sound qualities of a typical adverse possession lie in it being open, continuous and
hostile. [See Downing v. Bird 100 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958); Arkansas Commemorative
Commission v. City of Little Rock 227 Ark. 1085: 303 S.W. 2d 569 (1957); Monnot v.
Murphy 207 N.Y. 240 100 N.E. 742 (1913); City of Rock Springs v. Sturm 39 Wyo.
494: 273 P. 908: 97 A.L.R. 1 (1929).
6. Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depend on strong

limitation statutes by operation of which right to access the court expires through
efflux of time. As against rights of the paper−owner, in the context of adverse
possession, there evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse possessor
who has, for a long period of time, cared for the land, developed it, as against the
owner of the property who has ignored the property. Modern statutes of limitation
operate, as a rule, not only to cut off one's right to bring an action for the recovery of
property that has been in the adverse possession of another for a specified time but
also to vest the possessor with title. The intention of such statutes is not to punish
one who neglects to assert rights but to protect those who have maintained the
possession of property for the time specified by the statute under claim of right or
colour of title. (See American Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 2d, Page 81). It is important to
keep in mind while studying the American notion of Adverse Possession, especially in
the backdrop of Limitation Statutes, that the intention to dispossess cannot be given
a complete go by. Simple application of limitation shall not be enough by itself for the
success of an adverse possession claim. (emphasis supplied)
25. In Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para 777 positions of person in adverse
possession has been discussed and it has been observed on the basis of various decisions that a
person in possession has a transmissible interest in the property and after expiration of the statutory
period, it ripens as good a right to possession. Para 777 is as under:
777. Position of person in adverse possession: While a person who is in possession of

land without title continues in possession, then, before the statutory period has
elapsed, he has a transmissible interest in the property which is good against all the
world except the rightful owner, but an interest which is liable at any moment to be
defeated by the entry of the rightful owner; and, if that person is succeeded in
possession by one claiming through him who holds until the expiration of the
statutory period, the successor has then as good a right to the possession as if he

himself had occupied for the whole period. (emphasis supplied)
26. In Halsbury's Laws of England, extinction of title by the effect of the expiration of the period of
limitation has also been discussed in Para 783 and once right is lost to recover the possession, the
same cannot be re− vested by any re−entry or by a subsequent acknowledgment of title. Para 783 is
extracted hereunder:
783. Extinction of title: At the expiration of the periods prescribed by the Limitation
Act 1939 for any person to bring an action to recover land (including a redemption
action) or an action to enforce an advowson, the title of that person to the land or
advowson is extinguished. This is subject to the special provisions relating to settled
land and land held on trust and the provisions for constituting the proprietor of
registered land a trustee for the person who has acquired title against him. The
extinguished title cannot afterward be revested either by re−entry or by a subsequent
payment or acknowledgment of title. A rent−charge is extinguished when the remedy
to recover it is barred."
(emphasis supplied)
27. Nature of title acquired by adverse possession has also been discussed in the
Halsburys Laws of England in Para 785. It has been observed that adverse possession
leaves the occupant with a title gained by the fact of possession and resting on the
infirmity of the rights of others to eject him. Same is a good title, both at law and in
equity. Para 785 is also extracted hereunder:
785. Nature of title acquired: The operation of the statutory provision for the
extinction of title is merely negative; it extinguishes the right and title of the
dispossessed owner and leaves the occupant with a title gained by the fact of
possession and resting on the infirmity of the right of others to eject him.
A title gained by the operation of the statute is a good title, both at law and in equity,
and will be forced by the court on a reluctant purchaser. Proof, however, that a
vendor and those through whom he claims have had independent possession of an
estate for twelve years will not be sufficient to establish a saleable title without
evidence to show the state of the title at the time that possession commenced. If the
contract for purchase is an open one, possession for twelve years is not sufficient, and
a full length of the title is required. Although possession of land is prima facie
evidence of seisin in fee, it does not follow that a person who has gained a title to land
from the fact of certain persons being barred of their rights has the fee simple vested
in himself; for, although he may have gained an indefeasible title against those who
had an estate in possession, there may be persons entitled in reversion or remainder
whose rights are quite unaffected by the statute. (emphasis supplied)

28. In an article published in Harvard Law Review on "Title by Adverse Possession"

by Henry W. Ballantine, as to the question of adverse possession and acquisition of
title it has been observed on strength of various decisions that adverse possession
vests the possessor with the complete title as effectually as if there had been a
conveyance by the former owner. As held in Toltec Ranch Co. v. Cook, 191 U.S. 532,
542 (1903). But the title is independent, not derivative, and relates back to the
inception of the adverse possession, as observed. (see Field v.
Peoples, 180 Ill. 376, 383, 54 N.E. 304 (1899); Bellefontaine Co. v. Niedringhaus, 181 Ill. 426, 55
N.E. 184 (1899). Cf. La Salle v. Sanitary District, 260 Ill. 423, 429, 103 N.E. 175 (1913); AMES,
LECTURES ON LEGAL HIST. 197; 3 ANGLO−AMERICAN ESSAYS, 567). The adverse possessor
does not derive his title from the former owner, but from a new source of title, his possession. The
"investitive fact is the disseisin and exercise of possession as observed in Camp v. Camp, 5 Conn. 291
(1824); Price v. Lyon, 14 Conn. Conn. 279, 290 (1841); Coal Creek, etc. Co. v. East Tenn. I. & C. Co.,
105 Tenn. 563; 59 S.W. 634, 636 (1900). It has also been observed that titles to property should not
remain uncertain and in dispute, but that continued de facto exercise and assertion of a right should
be conclusive evidence of the de jure existence of the right.
29. In Lala Hem Chand v. Lala Pearey Lal & Ors., AIR 1942 PC 64, the question arose of the adverse
possession where a trustee had been in possession for more than 12 years under a trust which is void
under the law, the Privy Council observed that if the right of a defendant owner is extinguished the
plaintiff acquires it by adverse possession. In case the owner suffers his right to be barred by the law
of limitation, the practical effect is the extinction of his title in favour of the party in possession. The
relevant portion is extracted hereunder:
. The inference from the evidence as a whole is irresistible that it was with his
knowledge and implied consent that the building was consecrated as a Dharmasala
and used as such for charitable and religious purposes and that Lala Janaki Das, and
after him, Ramchand, was in possession of the property till 1931. As forcibly pointed
out by the High Court in considering the merits of the case, "during the course of
more than 20 years that this building remained in the charge of Janaki Das, and on
his death in that of his son, Ramchand, the defendant had never once claimed the
property as his own or objected to its being treated as dedicated property." This
Board held in ('66) 11 M.I.A. 345: 7 W.R. 21: 1 Suther. 676: 2 Sar. 284 (P.C.), Gunga
Gobindas Mundal v. The Collector of the Twenty Four Pergunnahs, at page 361, that
if the owner whose property is encroached upon suffers his right to be barred by the
law of limitation the practical effect is the extinction of his title in favour of the party
in possession." Section 28, Limitation Act, says:
At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit
for possession of any property his right to such property shall be extinguished." Lala
Janaki Das and Ramchand having held the property adversely for upwards of 12
years on behalf of the charity for which it was dedicated, it follows that the title to it,
acquired by prescription, has become vested in the charity and that of the defendant,

if he had any, has become extinguished by operation of S. 28, Limitation Act. Their
Lordships have no doubt that the Subordinate Judge would also have come to the
conclusion that the title of the defendant has become barred by limitation, had he not
been of the view that Lala Janaki Das retained possession of the suit property as
trustee for the benefit of the author of the trust and his legal representatives, and that
presumably S. 10, Limitation Act, would apply to the case, though he does not
specifically refer to the section. For the above reasons, their Lordships hold that the
plaintiffs have established their title to the suit property by adverse possession for
upwards of 12 years before the defendant obtained possession of it; and since the suit
was brought in January 1933, within so short a time as two years of dispossession,
the plaintiffs are entitled to recover it from the defendant, whose title to hold it if he
had any has become extinct by limitation, in whichever manner he may have
obtained possession permissively or by trespass. (emphasis supplied)
30. In Tichborne v. Weir, (1892) 67 LT 735, it has been observed that considering the effect of
limitation is not that the right of one person is conveyed to another, but that the right is
extinguished and destroyed. As the mode of conveying the title is not prescribed in the Act, the Act
does not confer it. But at the same time, it has been observed that yet his title under the Act is
acquired solely by the extinction of the right of the prior rightful owner; not by any statutory
transfer of the estate. In the said case question arose for transfer of the lease formerly held by Baxter
to Giraud who for over 20 years had been in possession of the land without any acknowledgment to
Baxter who had equitably mortgaged the lease to him. The question arose whether the statute
transferred the lease to Giraud and he became the tenant of the landlord. In that context, the
aforesaid observations have been made. It has been held what is acquired would depend upon what
right person has against whom he has prescribed and acquisition of title by adverse possession
would not more be than that. The lease is not transferred under a statute but by the extinguishment
of rights. The other person ripens the right. Thus, the decision does not run counter to the various
decisions which have been discussed above and deals with the nature of title conferred by adverse
possession.
31. The decision in Taylor v. Twinberrow, (1930) 2 K.B. 16 has also been referred to submit to the
contrary. In that case, also it was a case of a dispute between the tenant and sub−tenant. The Kings
Bench considered the effect of the expiration of 12 years' adverse possession under section 7 of the
Act of 1833 and observed that that does confer a title, whereas its effect is merely negative to destroy
the power of the then tenant Taylor to claim as a landlord against the sub−tenant in possession. It
would not destroy the right of the freeholder, if Taylor's tenancy was determined, by the freeholder,
he could eject the sub− tenant. Thus, Taylor's right would be defeated and not that of the freeholder
who was the owner and gave the land on the tenancy to Taylor. In our opinion, the view is in
consonance with the law of adverse possession as administered in India. As the basic principle is
that if a person is having a limited right, a person against him can prescribe only to acquire that
limited right which is extinguished and not beyond that. There is a series of decisions laying down
this proposition of law as to the effect of adverse possession as against limited owner if
extinguishing title of the limited owner not that of reversion or having some other title. Thus, the
decision in Taylor v. Twinberrow (supra) does not negate the acquisition of title by way of adverse

possession but rather affirms it.
32. The operation of the statute of limitation in giving a title is merely negative; it extinguishes the
right and title of the dispossessed owner and leaves the occupant with a title gained by the fact of
possession and resting on the infirmity of the right of others to eject him. Perry v. Clissold (1907) AC
73 has been referred to in Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander (supra) in which it has been
observed that it cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of
owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all
the world but the original owner, and if the original owner does not come forward and assert his title
by the process of law within the period prescribed under the statute of limitation applicable to the
case, his right is forever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title. In Ram
Daan (Dead) through LRs. v. Urban Improvement Trust, (2014) 8 SCC 902, this Court has observed
thus:
11. It is settled position of law laid down by the Privy Council in Perry v. Clissold 1907
AC 73 (PC) (AC p. 79) It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the
assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of
ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And
if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by the process of law
within the period prescribed by the provisions of the Statute of Limitations applicable
to the case, his right is forever extinguished, and the possessory owner acquires an
absolute title. The above statement was quoted with the approval by this Court in
Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165. Their Lordships at
para 22 emphatically stated: (AIR p. 1175) 22. The cases of the Judicial Committee
are not binding on us but we approve of the dictum in Perry v. Clissold 1907 AC 73
(PC).
33. The decision in Fairweather v. St. Marylebone Property Co. Ltd. (1962) 2 AER 288 (HL) has also
been referred, to submit that adverse possession is a negative concept where the possession had
been taken against the tenant, its operation was only to bar his right against men in possession. As
already discussed above, it was a case of limited right possessed by the tenant and a sub−tenant
could only perfect his right against the tenant who inducted him as sub−tenant prescribed against
the tenant and not against the freeholder. The decision does not run counter to any other decision
discussed and is no help to hold that plaintiff cannot take such a plea or hold that no right is
conferred by adverse possession. It may be a negative right but an absolute one. It confers title as
owner in case extinguishment is of the right of ownership.
34. The plaintiffs right to raise the plea of adverse possession has been recognized in several
decisions of the High Court also. If such a case arises on the facts stated in the plaint and the
defendant is not taken by surprise as held in Nepen Bala Debi v. Siti Kanta Banerjee, (1910) 8 Ind
Cas 41 (DB) (Cal), Ngasepam Ibotombi Singh v. Wahengbam Ibohal Singh & Anr., AIR 1960
Manipur 16, Aboobucker s/o Shakhi Mahomed Laloo v. Sahibkhatoon, AIR 1949 Sindh 12, Bata
Krista Pramanick v. Shebaits of Thakur Jogendra Nath Maity & Ors., AIR 1919 Cal. 339, Ram
Chandra Sil & Ors. v. Ramanmani Dasi & Ors. AIR 1917 Cal. 469, Shiromani Gurdwara

Parbhandhak Committee, Khosakotla & Anr. v. Prem Das & Ors., AIR 1933 Lah 25, Rangappa
Nayakar v. Rangaswami Nayakar, AIR 1925 Mad. 1005; Shaikh Alimuddin v. Shaikh Salim, 1928 IC
81 (PC).
35. In Pannalal Bhagirath Marwadi v. Bhaiyalal Bindraban Pardeshi Teli, AIR 1937 Nagpur 281, it
has been observed that in−between two trespassers, one who is wrongly dispossessed by the other
trespasser, can sue and recover possession. A person in possession cannot be dispossessed
otherwise than in due course of law and can sue for injunction for protecting the possession as
observed in Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by L.Rs v. Shobha Venkat Rao, (1989) 4 SCC 131, State of
U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 505.
36. In Radhamoni Debi v. The Collector of Khulna & Ors. (1900) ILR 27 Cal. 943 it was observed
that to constitute a possessory title by adverse possession, the possession required to be proved
must be adequate in continuity in publicity, and in the extent to show for a period of 12 years.
37. In Somnath Burman v. S.P. Raju, (1969) 3 SCC 129, the Court recognized the right of the plaintiff
to such declaration of title and for an injunction. Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act is in no way
inconsistent, the wrongdoer cannot resist suit on the ground that title and right are in a third
person. Right to sue is available to the plaintiff against owners as well as others by taking the plea of
adverse possession in the plaint.
38. In Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan & Ors., (2009) 16 SCC 517, relying on
T. Anjanappa v. Somalingappa (2006) 7 SCC 570, observed that title can be based on adverse
possession. This Court has observed thus:
23. This Court had an occasion to examine the concept of adverse possession in T.
Anjanappa v. Somalingappa, 2006 (7) SCC 570.
The court observed that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and
unequivocal evidence that his title was hostile to the real owner and amounted to denial of his title
to the property claimed. The court further observed that: (SCC p.577, para 20) 20. The classical
requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the
true owner's title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile
enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not
necessary that should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the
former's hostile action. At the same time, this Court has also observed that the law of adverse
possession is harsh and Legislature may consider a change in the law as to adverse possession.
39. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, when we consider the decision in Gurdwara Sahib v.
Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala & Anr., (2014) 1 SCC 669 decided by two−Judge Bench wherein a
question arose whether the plaintiff is in adverse possession of the suit land this Court referred to
the Punjab & Haryana High Court decision on Gurdwara Sahib Sannauli v. State of Punjab (2009)
154 PLR 756 and observed that there cannot be any quarrel to the extent that the judgments of
courts below are correct and without any blemish. Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse

possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into
ownership. The discussion made is confined to para 8 only. The same is extracted hereunder:
4. In so far as the first issue is concerned, it was decided in favour of the plaintiff
returning the findings that the appellant was in adverse possession of the suit
property since 13.4.1952 as this fact had been proved by a plethora of documentary
evidence produced by the appellant. However, while deciding the second issue, the
court opined that no declaration can be sought on the basis of adverse possession
inasmuch as adverse possession can be used as a shield and not as a sword. The
learned Civil Judge relied upon the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
in Gurdwara Sahib Sannuali v. State of Punjab (2009) 154 PLR 756 and thus, decided
the issue against the plaintiff. Issue 3 was also, in the same vein, decided against the
appellant.
8. There cannot be any quarrel to this extent that the judgments of the courts below are correct and
without any blemish. Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a
declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only if
proceedings are filed against the appellant and the appellant is arrayed as defendant that it can use
this adverse possession as a shield/defence. (emphasis supplied) It is apparent that the point
whether the plaintiff can take the plea of adverse possession was not contested in the aforesaid
decision and none out of the plethora of the aforesaid decisions including of the larger Bench were
placed for consideration before this Court. The judgment is based upon the proposition of law not
being questioned as the point was not disputed. There no reason is given, only observation has been
recorded in one line.
40. It is also pertinent to mention that the decision of this court in Gurudwara Sahib v. Gram
Panchayat Village, Sirthala (supra) has been relied upon in State of Uttarakhand v. Mandir Sri
Laxman Sidh Maharaj, (2017) 9 SCC 579. In the said case, no plea of adverse possession was taken
nor issue was framed as such this Court held that in the absence of pleading, issue and evidence of
adverse possession suit could not have been decreed on that basis. Given the aforesaid, it was not
necessary to go into the question of whether the plaintiff could have taken the plea of adverse
possession. Nonetheless, a passing observation has been made without any discussion of the aspect
that the court below should have seen that declaration of ownership rights over the suit property
could be granted to the plaintiff on strength of adverse possession (see: Gurudwara Sahib v. Gram
Panchayat, Sirthala). The Court observed:
24. By no stretch of imagination, in our view, such a declaration of ownership over

the suit property and right of easement over a well could be granted by the trial court
in the plaintiffs favour because even the plaintiff did not claim title in the suit
property on the strength of adverse possession. Neither were there any pleadings nor
any issue much less evidence to prove the adverse possession on land and for grant of
any easementary right over the well. The courts below should have seen that no
declaration of ownership rights over the suit property could be granted to the plaintiff
on the strength of adverse possession (see Gurdwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat

Village Sirthala, (2014) 1 SCC 669. The courts below also should have seen that courts
can grant only that relief which is claimed by the plaintiff in the plaint and such relief
can be granted only on the pleadings but not beyond it. In other words, courts cannot
travel beyond the pleadings for granting any relief. This principle is fully applied to
the facts of this case against the plaintiff. (emphasis supplied)
41. Again in Dharampal (Dead) through LRs v. Punjab Wakf Board, (2018) 11 SCC 449, the court
found the averments in counterclaim by the defendant do not constitute plea of adverse possession
as the point of start of adverse possession was not pleaded and Wakf Board has filed a suit in the
year 1971 as such perfecting title by adverse possession did not arise at the same time without any
discussion on the aspect that whether plaintiff can take plea of adverse possession. The Court held
that in the counterclaim the defendant cannot raise this plea of adverse possession. This Court at the
same relied upon to observe that it was bound by the decision in Gurdwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat
Village Sirthala (supra), and logic was applied to the counterclaim also. The Court observed:
28. In the first place, we find that this Court in Gurdwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat
Village Sirthala, (2014) 1 SCC 669 has held in para 8 that a plea of adverse possession
cannot be set up by the plaintiff to claim ownership over the suit property but such
plea can be raised by the defendant by way of defence in his written statement in
answer to the plaintiffs claim. We are bound by this view.
34. Applying the aforementioned principle of law to the facts of the case on hand, we
find absolutely no merit in this plea of Defendant 1 for the following reasons:
34.1. First, Defendant 1 has only averred in his plaint (counterclaim) that he, through
his father, was in possession of the suit land since 1953. Such averments, in our
opinion, do not constitute the plea of adverse possession in the light of law laid down
by this Court quoted supra.
34.2. Second, it was not pleaded as to from which date, Defendant 1s possession
became adverse to the plaintiff (the Wakf Board).
34.3. Third, it was also not pleaded that when his adverse possession was completed
and ripened into the full ownership in his favour.
34.4. Fourth, it could not be so for the simple reason that the plaintiff (Wakf Board)
had filed a suit in the year 1971 against Defendant 1's father in relation to the suit
land. Therefore, till the year 1971, the question of Defendant 1 perfecting his title by
"adverse possession" qua the plaintiff (Wakf Board) did not arise. The plaintiff then
filed present suit in the year 1991 and, therefore, again the question of perfecting the
title up to 1991 qua the plaintiff did not arise. (emphasis supplied)
42. In State of Uttarakhand v. Mandir Shri Lakshmi Siddh Maharaj (supra) and Dharampal (dead)
through LRs v. Punjab Wakf Board (supra), there is no discussion on the aspect whether the plaintiff

can later take the plea of adverse possession. It does not appear that proposition was contested and
earlier binding decisions were also not placed for consideration of the Court. As there is no
independent consideration of the question, we have to examine mainly the decision in Gurdwara
Sahib v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala (supra).
43. When we consider the decision rendered by Punjab & Haryana High Court in Gurdwara Sahib
Sannauli (supra), which has been referred by this Court in Gurudwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat,
Sirthala (supra), the following is the discussion made by the High Court in the said decision:
10. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record of the appeal.
I find force in the contentions raised by learned counsel for the respondents. In
Bachhaj Nahar v. Nillima Mandal and Anr. J.T. 2008 (13) S.C. 255 the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has authoritatively laid down that if an argument has been given up
or has not been raised, same cannot be taken up in the Regular Second Appeal. It is
also relevant to mention here that in Bhim Singh and Ors. v. Zile Singh and Ors.,
(2006) 3 RCR Civil 97, this Court has held that no declaration can be sought by a
plaintiff about ownership based on adverse possession as such plea is available only
to a defendant against the plaintiff. Similarly, in R.S.A. No. 3909 of 2008 titled as
State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar and Ors. (2009) 154 P.L.R. 753, decided on
17.03.2009 this Court has also taken the same view as aforesaid in Bhim Singh's case
(supra). There is no independent consideration. Only the decision of the same High
Court in Bhim Singh & Ors. v. Zila Singh & Ors. AIR 2006 P&H 195 has been relied
upon to hold that no declaration can be sought by the plaintiff based on adverse
possession.
44. In Bhim Singh & Ors. (supra) the plaintiffs had filed a suit for declaration and injunction
claiming ownership based on adverse possession. Defendants contended that plaintiffs were not in
possession. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Bhim Singh & Ors. v. Zila Singh & Ors. (supra) has
assigned the reasons and observed thus:
"11. Under Article 64 of the Limitation Act, as suit for possession of immovable
property by a plaintiff, who while in possession of the property had been
dispossessed from such possession, when such suit is based on previous possession
and not based on title, can be filed within 12 years from the date of dispossession.
Under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, a suit for possession of immovable property or
any interest therein, based on title, can be filed by a person claiming title within 12
years. The limitation under this Article commences from the date when the
possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. In these circumstances,
it is apparent that to contest a suit for possession, filed by a person on the basis of his
title, a plea of adverse possession can be taken by a defendant who is in hostile,
continuous and open possession, to the knowledge of the true owner, if such a person
has remained in possession for a period of 12 years. It, thus, naturally has to be
inferred that plea of adverse possession is a defence available only to a defendant.
This conclusion of mine is further strengthened from the language used in Article 65,

wherein, in column 3 it has been specifically mentioned: "when the possession of the
defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff." Thus, a perusal of the aforesaid Article
65 shows that the plea is available only to a defendant against a plaintiff. In these
circumstances, natural inference must follow that when such a plea of adverse
possession is only available to a defendant, then no declaration can be sought by a
plaintiff with regard to his ownership on the basis of an adverse possession.
12. I am supported by a judgment of Delhi High Court in 1993 3 105 PLR (Delhi
Section) 70, Prem Nath Wadhawan v. Inder Rai Wadhawan.
13. The following observations made in the Prem Nath Wadhawan's case (supra) may
be noticed:
I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the
parties and have also perused the record. I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned
Counsel for the plaintiff that the plaintiff has become absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of
adverse possession as the plea of adverse possession can be raised in defence in a suit for recovery of
possession but the relief for declaration that the plaintiff has become absolute owner, cannot be
granted on the basis of adverse possession. (emphasis supplied) The Punjab & Haryana High Court
has proceeded on the basis that as per Article 65, the plea of adverse possession is available as a
defence to a defendant.
45. Article 65 of the Act is extracted hereunder:
Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run
65. For possession of Twelve years. When the possession immovable property or of
the defendant any interest therein becomes adverse to based on title. the plaintiff.
Explanation. For the

purposes of this article
(a) where the suit is by a

remainderman, a
reversioner (other than a
landlord) or a devisee,
the possession of the
defendant shall be
deemed to become
adverse only when the
estate of the
remainderman,
reversioner or devisee, as
the case may be, falls
into possession;
(b) where the suit is by a

Hindu or Muslim entitled
to the possession of
immovable property on
the death of a Hindu or
Muslim female, the
possession of the
defendant shall be
deemed to become
adverse only when the
female dies;
(c) where the suit is by a

purchaser at a sale in
execution of a decree
when the judgment−
debtor was out of
possession at the date of
the sale, the purchaser
shall be deemed to be a
representative of the
judgment−debtor who
was out of possession.
46. The conclusion reached by the High Court is based on an inferential process
because of the language used in the III rd Column of Article 65. The expression is
used, the limitation of 12 years runs from the date when the possession of the
defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Column No.3 of Schedule of the Act
nowhere suggests that suit cannot be filed by the plaintiff for possession of
immovable property or any interest therein based on title acquired by way of adverse
possession.
There is absolutely no bar for the perfection of title by way of adverse possession whether a person is
suing as the plaintiff or being sued as a defendant. The inferential process of interpretation
employed by the High Court is not at all permissible. It does not follow from the language used in
the statute. The large number of decisions of this Court and various other decisions of Privy Council,
High Courts and of English courts which have been discussed by us and observations made in
Halsbury Laws based on various decisions indicate that suit can be filed by plaintiff on the basis of
title acquired by way of adverse possession or on the basis of possession under Articles 64 and 65.
There is no bar under Article 65 or any of the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 as against a plaintiff
who has perfected his title by virtue of adverse possession to sue to evict a person or to protect his
possession and plethora of decisions are to the effect that by virtue of extinguishment of title of the
owner, the person in possession acquires absolute title and if actual owner dispossesses another
person after extinguishment of his title, he can be evicted by such a person by filing of suit under
Article 65 of the Act. Thus, the decision of Gurudwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat, Sirthala (supra)

and of the Punjab & Haryana High Court cannot be said to be laying down the correct law. More so
because of various decisions of this Court to the contrary.
47. In Gurudwara Sahib v. Gram Panchayat, Sirthala (supra) proposition was not disputed. A
decision based upon concession cannot be treated as precedent as has been held by this Court in
State of Rajasthan v. Mahaveer Oil Industries, (1999) 4 SCC 357, Director of Settlements, A.P. v.
M.R. Apparao, (2002) 4 SCC 638, Uptron India Limited v. Shammi Bhan (1998) 6 SCC 538.
Though, it appears that there was some expression of opinion since the Court observed there cannot
be any quarrel that plea of adverse possession cannot be taken by a plaintiff. The fact remains that
the proposition was not disputed and no argument to the contrary had been raised, as such there
was no decision on the aforesaid aspect only an observation was made as to proposition of law,
which is palpably incorrect.
48. The statute does not define adverse possession, it is a common law concept, the period of which
has been prescribed statutorily under the law of limitation Article 65 as 12 years. Law of limitation
does not define the concept of adverse possession nor anywhere contains a provision that the
plaintiff cannot sue based on adverse possession. It only deals with limitation to sue and
extinguishment of rights. There may be a case where a person who has perfected his title by virtue of
adverse possession is sought to be ousted or has been dispossessed by a forceful entry by the owner
or by some other person, his right to obtain possession can be resisted only when the person who is
seeking to protect his possession, is able to show that he has also perfected his title by adverse
possession for requisite period against such a plaintiff.
49. Under Article 64 also suit can be filed based on the possessory title. Law never intends a person
who has perfected title to be deprived of filing suit under Article 65 to recover possession and to
render him remediless. In case of infringement of any other right attracting any other Article such as
in case the land is sold away by the owner after the extinguishment of his title, the suit can be filed
by a person who has perfected his title by adverse possession to question alienation and attempt of
dispossession.
50. Law of adverse possession does not qualify only a defendant for the acquisition of title by way of
adverse possession, it may be perfected by a person who is filing a suit. It only restricts a right of the
owner to recover possession before the period of limitation fixed for the extinction of his rights
expires. Once right is extinguished another person acquires prescriptive right which cannot be
defeated by re−entry by the owner or subsequent acknowledgment of his rights. In such a case suit
can be filed by a person whose right is sought to be defeated.
51. In India, the law respect possession, persons are not permitted to take law in their hands and
dispossess a person in possession by force as observed in Late Yashwant Singh (supra) by this Court.
The suit can be filed only based on the possessory title for appropriate relief under the Specific
Relief Act by a person in possession. Articles 64 and 65 both are attracted in such cases as held by
this Court in Desh Raj v. Bhagat Ram (supra). In Nair Service Society (supra) held that if rightful
owner does not commence an action to take possession within the period of limitation, his rights are
lost and person in possession acquires an absolute title.

52. In Sarangadeva Periya Matam v. Ramaswami Gounder, (supra), the plaintiffs suit for recovery of
possession was decreed against Math based on the perfection of the title by way of adverse
possession, he could not have been dispossessed by Math. The Court held that under Article 144
read with Section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the title of Math extinguished in 1927 and the
plaintiff acquired title in 1927. In 1950, he delivered possession, but such delivery of possession did
not transfer any title to Math. The suit filed in 1954 was held to be within time and decreed.
53. There is the acquisition of title in favour of plaintiff though it is negative conferral of right on
extinguishment of the right of an owner of the property. The right ripened by prescription by his
adverse possession is absolute and on dispossession, he can sue based on title' as envisaged in the
opening part under Article 65 of Act. Under Article 65, the suit can be filed based on the title for
recovery of possession within 12 years of the start of adverse possession, if any, set up by the
defendant. Otherwise right to recover possession based on the title is absolute irrespective of
limitation in the absence of adverse possession by the defendant for 12 years. The possession as
trespasser is not adverse nor long possession is synonym with adverse possession.
54. In Article 65 in the opening part a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest
therein based on title has been used. Expression title would include the title acquired by the plaintiff
by way of adverse possession. The title is perfected by adverse possession has been held in a catena
of decisions.
55. We are not inclined to accept the submission that there is no conferral of right by adverse
possession. Section 27 of Limitation Act, 1963 provides for extinguishment of right on the lapse of
limitation fixed to institute a suit for possession of any property, the right to such property shall
stand extinguished. The concept of adverse possession as evolved goes beyond it on completion of
period and extinguishment of right confers the same right on the possessor, which has been
extinguished and not more than that. For a person to sue for possession would indicate that right
has accrued to him in presenti to obtain it, not in futuro. Any property in Section 27 would include
corporeal or incorporeal property. Article 65 deals with immovable property.
56. Possession is the root of title and is right like the property. As ownership is also of different
kinds of viz. sole ownership, contingent ownership, corporeal ownership, and legal equitable
ownership. Limited ownership or limited right to property may be enjoyed by a holder. What can be
prescribable against is limited to the rights of the holder. Possession confers enforceable right under
Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. It has to be looked into what kind of possession is enjoyed viz. de
facto i.e., actual, de jure possession, constructive possession, concurrent possession over a small
portion of the property. In case the owner is in symbolic possession, there is no dispossession, there
can be formal, exclusive or joint possession. The joint possessor/co−owner possession is not
presumed to be adverse. Personal law also plays a role to construe nature of possession.
57. The adverse possession requires all the three classic requirements to co−exist at the same time,
namely, nec−vi i.e. adequate in continuity, nec−clam i.e., adequate in publicity and nec−precario i.e.
adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his knowledge. Visible, notorious and peaceful so that
if the owner does not take care to know notorious facts, knowledge is attributed to him on the basis

that but for due diligence he would have known it. Adverse possession cannot be decreed on a title
which is not pleaded. Animus possidendi under hostile colour of title is required. Trespassers long
possession is not synonym with adverse possession. Trespassers possession is construed to be on
behalf of the owner, the casual user does not constitute adverse possession. The owner can take
possession from a trespasser at any point in time. Possessor looks after the property, protects it and
in case of agricultural property by and the large concept is that actual tiller should own the land who
works by dint of his hard labour and makes the land cultivable. The legislature in various States
confers rights based on possession.
58. Adverse possession is heritable and there can be tacking of adverse possession by two or more
persons as the right is transmissible one. In our opinion, it confers a perfected right which cannot be
defeated on reentry except as provided in Article 65 itself. Tacking is based on the fulfillment of
certain conditions, tacking maybe by possession by the purchaser, legatee or assignee, etc. so as to
constitute continuity of possession, that person must be claiming through whom it is sought to be
tacked, and would depend on the identity of the same property under the same right. Two distinct
trespassers cannot tack their possession to constitute conferral of right by adverse possession for the
prescribed period.
59. We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another person except by due
procedure of law and once 12 years' period of adverse possession is over, even owner's right to eject
him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing
person/owner as the case may be against whom he has prescribed. In our opinion, consequence is
that once the right, title or interest is acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as a
shield by the defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any person who has perfected title by
way of adverse possession, can file a suit for restoration of possession in case of dispossession. In
case of dispossession by another person by taking law in his hand a possessory suit can be
maintained under Article 64, even before the ripening of title by way of adverse possession. By
perfection of title on extinguishment of the owners title, a person cannot be remediless. In case he
has been dispossessed by the owner after having lost the right by adverse possession, he can be
evicted by the plaintiff by taking the plea of adverse possession. Similarly, any other person who
might have dispossessed the plaintiff having perfected title by way of adverse possession can also be
evicted until and unless such other person has perfected title against such a plaintiff by adverse
possession. Similarly, under other Articles also in case of infringement of any of his rights, a plaintiff
who has perfected the title by adverse possession, can sue and maintain a suit.
60. When we consider the law of adverse possession as has developed vis−à−vis to property
dedicated to public use, courts have been loath to confer the right by adverse possession. There are
instances when such properties are encroached upon and then a plea of adverse possession is raised.
In Such cases, on the land reserved for public utility, it is desirable that rights should not accrue.
The law of adverse possession may cause harsh consequences, hence, we are constrained to observe
that it would be advisable that concerning such properties dedicated to public cause, it is made clear
in the statute of limitation that no rights can accrue by adverse possession.

61. Resultantly, we hold that decisions of Gurudwara Sahab v. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala
(supra) and decision relying on it in State of Uttarakhand v. Mandir Shri Lakshmi Siddh Maharaj
(supra) and Dharampal (dead) through LRs v. Punjab Wakf Board (supra) cannot be said to be
laying down the law correctly, thus they are hereby overruled. We hold that plea of acquisition of
title by adverse possession can be taken by plaintiff under Article 65 of the Limitation Act and there
is no bar under the Limitation Act, 1963 to sue on aforesaid basis in case of infringement of any
rights of a plaintiff.
62. Let the matters be placed for consideration on merits before the appropriate Bench.
..J.
(Arun Mishra) ..J.
(S. Abdul Nazeer)
New Delhi; ..J.

August 07, 2019. (M.R. Shah)

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Ravinder Kaur Grewal vs Manjit Kaur on 7 August, 2019

Supreme Court of India

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7764 OF 2014

RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL & ORS. APPELLANT(S)

MANJIT KAUR & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS.8332−8333 OF 2014

RADHAKRISHNA REDDY (D) THROUGH LRS. PETITIONER(S)

G. AYYAVOO & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)

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"Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a

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20. A plea of adverse possession or a plea of ouster would indisputably be governed

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11. In K.K. Verma v. Naraindas C. Malkani (AIR 1954 Bom 358 at p.

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possession against the true owner.

14. In Hillava Subbava v. Narayanappa, (1911) 13 Bom. LR 1200 it was observed:

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(emphasis supplied) It is apparent from the aforesaid decision that a person is

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Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. It

8. to assess a claim of adverse possession, two−pronged enquiry is required:

1. Application of limitation provision thereby jurisprudentially "wilful neglect"

2. Specific positive intention to dispossess on the part of the adverse possessor

2. The defendant−respondents in their written statement denied and disputed the

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8. Therefore, to assess a claim of adverse possession, two−pronged enquiry is required:

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6. Efficacy of adverse possession law in most jurisdictions depend on strong

777. Position of person in adverse possession: While a person who is in possession of

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himself had occupied for the whole period. (emphasis supplied)

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28. In an article published in Harvard Law Review on "Title by Adverse Possession"

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possession but rather affirms it.

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24. By no stretch of imagination, in our view, such a declaration of ownership over

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45. Article 65 of the Act is extracted hereunder: