EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Scope of equality
1) Economic
2) Political- The Constitution, as a general rule, places the civil rights of aliens on an equal footing
with those of citizens; but their political rights do not enjoy the same protection
3) Social

Q: Are aliens entitled to the protection of equal protection clause?

A: GR: It applies to all persons, both citizens and aliens. The Constitution places the civil rights of aliens on equal
footing with those of the citizens.
XPN: Statutes may validly limit exclusively to citizens the enjoyment of rights or privileges connected with public
domain, the public works, or the natural resources of the State (e.g., Ichong case)
NOTE: The rights and interests of the State in these things are not simply political but also proprietary in nature and
so citizens may lawfully be given preference over aliens in their use or enjoyment.

Requisites for judicial review

1) Actual case or Controversy– It involves a conflict of legal rights, assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of legal resolution. It must be both ripe for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination,
and that which is not conjectural or anticipatory, or that which seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned
constitutional problems.
2) Proper party– One must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3) Earliest opportunity– Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.
4) Issue of constitutionality must be the very lismota of the case – As long as there are other bases which
courts can use for decision, constitutionality of the law will not be touched, thus, courts should refrain from
resolving any constitutional issue "unless the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case."
Lis mota means "the cause of the suit or action." Given the presumed validity of an executive act, the
petitioner who claims otherwise has the burden of showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the
constitutional question he raised is determined by the Court.

Principle of Stare Decisis

Deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within
the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent
authority.

People vs Vera

The instant petition stems from the application for bail filed by Co Unjieng. He claims that he is
innocent of the crime charged against him, that he has no existing criminal record and that he would
observe proper conduct in the future if his application for bail is granted. The application was referred
to the Insular Probation Office, but was consequently denied. The denial was premised on the ground
that Act No. 4221 provides probation only to those provinces with available funds for the salary of
probation officers, and the province referred to has no sufficient funds. Petitioner assails the
constitutionality of the Act for being violative of the equal protection clause.

This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the three grand departments
of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions thereof, and on many
constitutional powers, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of the
laws "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."

Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a
reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to
be reasonable must:
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 1) be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
2) be germane to the purposes of the law;
3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and
4) apply equally to each member of the class.

In the case at bar, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation
officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be
in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise coming
within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while
another person similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is
obnoxious discrimination.

Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the
salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would result.
These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the application of
the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is not in all cases the
necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that section 11 of the Probation Act creates a
situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed. We see no difference
between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may
appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.

Ichong vs Hernandez

The mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the national as a
trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay
here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of
stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty
and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of
regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking
advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien
go back to his beloved country and his beloved kin and country men. The experience of the country is
that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he
makes his profit.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the
gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy and
increase national wealth.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none

the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country.

The nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except
those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from
engaging in the retail trade.
Note: the case was decided under the 1935 Constitution wherein PARITY RIGHTS were
granted to U.S. Citizens.

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The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already
been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States.
Legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding
and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the
police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality

Villegas vs Hiu Chiong

City ordinance No 6537, prohibits aliens from being employed or engaged or participate in any position
or association or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 is being
questioned by the private respondent for allegedly in violation of the equal protection guarantee.

While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from
the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or
disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second
part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue
measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for
employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of
regulation.

The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid
substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the
equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the
classification, should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the
subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every
employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly
employee or a highly paid executive.

Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of
his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to
set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by
requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus
conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building
permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or
prevent an activity per se lawful.

The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines
to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process
of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due
process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

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People vs Cayat

Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Christian
tribes, was found guilty for having acquired and possessed one bottle of gin, an intoxicating liquor,
which is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member
of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or
drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called
native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the
passage of the law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an
improper exercise of police power.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of birth or parentage, but upon the
degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but,
in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low
grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." This
distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions
existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present
have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the
reasonableness of the classification thus established.

The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or
intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members
of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act," is
unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been
the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly
intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby
hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

Dumlao vs COMELEC

Petitioner Dumlao (former Governor) questions the constitutionality of section 4 of BP Blg. 52 as

discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said
Section 4 provides:
"Sec. 4. Special Disqualification - Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official
1) who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and
2) who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he
seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired."
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the
classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.

For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently
from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while
those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. In respect of election to provincial, city, or
municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they
assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as
the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of

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younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than
65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a
reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from
government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65,
for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But,
in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal
office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is
present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself
tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he
would like to assume again. It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither
does it permit such denial. Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.

PASEI vs Drilon

There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does
not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before
the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women.
The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases,
physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers,
even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling
motives for urgent Government action. The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. There
is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted
with an identical predicament. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion
that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence
(that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some
fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case.

That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" (but only to Filipina domestic workers) is not an
argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have
been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced.
What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within
an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to
another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but
not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It
would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B."
It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless to state, an
invalid act.

Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as
infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize
its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable
treatment. There would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for

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the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such
be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection." In the case at
bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.

Himagan vs People

Petitioner, a policeman was implicated in the killing of Benjamin and the attempted murder of Bernabe.
After the two information were filed, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the
termination of the case on the basis of R.A. 6975. In response, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order
for his suspension, relying on the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to 90
days. Petitioner posits that as a member of the PNP, he is covered by the Civil Service Law which
limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of
preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of
his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension of the accused
in Layno and Deloso was based is silent with respect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such
that the suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due
process question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal
Code and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under R. A. 6975 which categorically states that his
suspension shall last until the case is terminated. As previously emphasized, nowhere in the law does it
say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for trial, the preventive suspension should be lifted. The
law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies to the trial of the case not to the suspension.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or
intimidate witnesses against them. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense
is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are
obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused
is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under R.A. 6975
does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

Note: The purpose of the preventive suspension is not to punish but to preserve the integrity of the
investigation of the proceedings.

Q: Are public officers one class?

A: No. Appointive or elective, etc.

Quinto vs COMELEC

In preparation for the 2010 elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678 – the Guidelines on
the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered
Political Parties. Sec. 4 of Resolution No. 8678 provides that “Any person holding a public appointive
office or position shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy (automatic resignation) however it exempts those elected officials saying that
“Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.” Petitioners were
appointive officers of the government who were planning to run in the 2010 elections sought the

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nullification of Sec. 4(a) on the ground, among others, that it is discriminatory and violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand,
appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority.
Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure
while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Another substantial distinction between
the two sets of officials is that under the Administrative Code, appointive officials, as officers and
employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or
take part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or
employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and
electoral activities.

Any person who poses an equal protection challenge must convincingly show that the law creates a
classification that is "palpably arbitrary or capricious." He must refute all possible rational bases for
the differing treatment, whether or not the Legislature cited those bases as reasons for the enactment,
such that the constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if the reasonableness of the
classification is "fairly debatable." In the case at bar, the petitioners failed — and in fact did not even
attempt — to discharge this heavy burden.

Note: The test is the character of public office. Elective positions are political in nature. Elected public
officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year round,
even outside of the campaign period . Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political
office, elective positions included . The probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive
officials (whether engaged in partisan activity or not) to remain in office, even as they actively pursue
elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies blocked by
the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute. The law in making appointive
officials deemed resigned, is not shortening their term, the law is only shortening their tenure.

Biraogo vs The Philippine Truth Commission

Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC). PTC is a mere ad
hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft
and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is
not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes.
All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations.
It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as
to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that E.O. No. 1
violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

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Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular
act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is
the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the
laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the
members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will
suffice. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as
that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law
to him." It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been
made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. In order to be accorded with validity,
the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous
to that of former President Arroyo.

The Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness
which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Though
the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past
administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation
to the "previous administration" only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo
administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier
administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not
inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration.

As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
The OSG ventures to opine that "to include other past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily
overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness." The reason given is specious.
Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already prescribed can no longer be the subjects
of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous
administrations, given the body's limited time and resources. "The law does not require the impossible"
(Lex non cogit ad impossibilia). To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of "substantial
distinctions" would only confirm the petitioners' lament that the subject executive order is only an
"adventure in partisan hostility."

Mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection clause.
Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the
evils within its reach." A regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a
rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete. In several instances, the
underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the
purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the "step by step"
process. "With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire
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remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that
might conceivably have been attacked."

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was
picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at
least three times in the assailed executive order. "The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful
and intentional discrimination."

Almonte vs Vazquez

Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB), while Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena
duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous
letter, written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, alleging that funds representing
savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. There were unfilled positions
because one hundred ninety (190) personnel were dismissed, and allegedly, these 190 personnel
continued to receive their salaries as “ghost agents.” Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera
of Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to
Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. Almonte and
Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the
subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.

There is no violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that
"in all forum and tribunals (e.g., employees in the private sector) the aggrieved parties can only hale
respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed,"
while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman (i.e., employees in the public sector)
anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation.

In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution
itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and
in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people
which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. The Office of the Ombudsman is
different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those
subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash,
delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand complainants are more often than
not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.

The general investigation in the Ombudsman' s office is precisely for the purpose of protecting those
against whom a complaint is filed against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution as much as
securing the State from useless and expensive trials. There may also be benefit resulting from such
limited in camera inspection in terms of increased public confidence that the privilege is not being
abused and increased likelihood that no abuse is in fact occurring.

Note: There is no constitutional obstacle to the filing of an anonymous complaints against public
officers. This is in line with the principle of accountability of public officers.

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Ormoc Sugar vs Treasurer of Ormoc City

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing "on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent
to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries." Payments for said tax
were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. It alleged that the ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

A perusal of the requisites for a reasonable classification instantly shows that the questioned ordinance
does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not
be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as
plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot
be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the
entity to be levied upon.

Other Cases:

Mosqueda vs Pilipino Banana

The respondents submit that the ordinance transgresses Equal Protection Clause on two counts, to wit:
(1) by prohibiting aerial spraying per se, regardless of the substance or the level of concentration of the
chemicals to be applied; and (2) by imposing the 30-meter buffer zone in all agricultural lands in Davao
City regardless of the sizes of the landholding.

The guaranty of equal protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the State's duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law
demands that the State governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.

We find for the respondents. The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the justification given
by the Government for its conduct is gauged by using the means-end test. This test requires analysis of:
(1) the interests of the public that generally require its exercise, as distinguished from those of a
particular class; and (2) the means employed that are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and are not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three levels of scrutiny, viz.: the
rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.
1) The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational basis test)
demands that the classification reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. The rational basis
test often applies in cases involving economics or social welfare, or to any other case not
involving a suspect class.
2) To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental
interest and be substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification
must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations. When the classification puts a
quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be treated under intermediate or heightened review.
Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny.
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 3) The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a
suspect class. The Government carries the burden to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest, and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest

The petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein. Under the
rational basis test, we shall:
1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and
2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a substantial
or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons or things similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of the law.

Applying the test, the established classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 is to be viewed in
relation to the group of individuals similarly situated with respect to the avowed purpose. This gives
rise to two classes, namely: (1) the classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 (legislative
classification) ; and (2) the (elimination of the mischief). The legislative classification found in Section
4 of the ordinance refers to "all agricultural entities" within Davao City. Meanwhile, the
classification based on the purpose of the ordinance cannot be easily discerned because the ordinance
does not make any express or implied reference to it. We have to search the voluminous records of this
case to divine the animus behind the action of the Sangguniang Panglungsod in prohibiting aerial
spraying as an agricultural activity.

Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift
causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification,
does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?
We answer in the negative. The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results
from the conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truckmounted boom
spraying produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health
risks to the community and to the environment. A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the
harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve. In the process, the ordinance suffers from being
"underinclusive" because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same
mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect
to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the
intended purpose of the law.

Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be "overinclusive" because
its impending implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the accomplishment of the
legislative purpose. Its implementation will unnecessarily impose a burden on a wider range of
individuals than those included in the intended class based on the purpose of the law. It can be noted
that the imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of the substance to
be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted. The respondents admit
that they aerially treat their plantations not only with pesticides but also vitamins and other substances.
The imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of substances other than fungicides and regardless of
the agricultural activity being performed becomes unreasonable inasmuch as it patently bears no
relation to the purported inconvenience, discomfort, health risk and environmental danger which the
ordinance seeks to address.

The rational basis scrutiny is not based on a simple means-purpose correlation; nor does the rational
basis scrutiny automatically result in a presumption of validity of the ordinance or deference to the
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wisdom of the local legislature. To reiterate, aside from ascertaining that the means and purpose of the
ordinance are reasonably related, the classification should be based on a substantial distinction.
However, we do not subscribe to the respondents' position that there must be a distinction based on the
level of concentration or the classification imposed by the FPA on pesticides. This strenuous
requirement cannot be expected from a local government unit that should only be concerned with
general policies in local administration and should not be restricted by technical concerns that are best
left to agencies vested with the appropriate special competencies. The disregard of the pesticide
classification is not an equal protection issue but is more relevant in another aspect of delegated police
power.

The overinclusiveness of Ordinance No. 0309-07 may also be traced to its Section 6 by virtue of its
requirement for the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone. This requirement applies regardless of the
area of the agricultural landholding, geographical location, topography, crops grown and other
distinguishing characteristics that ideally should bear a reasonable relation to the evil sought to be
avoided. As earlier discussed, only large banana plantations could rely on aerial technology because of
the financial capital required therefor.

The establishment and maintenance of the buffer zone will become more burdensome to the small
agricultural landholders because: (1) they have to reserve the 30-meter belt surrounding their property;
(2) that will have to be identified through GPS; (3) the metes and bounds of the buffer zone will have to
be plotted in a survey plan for submission to the local government unit; and (4) will be limited as to the
crops that may be cultivated therein based on the mandate that the zone shall be devoted to. Section 6
also subjects to the 30-meter buffer zone requirement agricultural entities engaging in organic farming,
and do not contribute to the occurrence of pesticide drift. The classification indisputably becomes
arbitrary and whimsical.

Where overinclusiveness is the problem, the vice is that the law has a greater discriminatory or
burdensome effect than necessary. In this light, we strike down Section 5 and Section 6 of Ordinance
No. 0309-07 for carrying an invidious classification, and for thereby violating the Equal Protection
Clause.

Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings that are the only ideal venues for the
investment of machineries and equipment capable of aerial spraying. It effectively denies the affected
individuals the technology aimed at efficient and cost-effective operations and cultivation not only of
banana but of other crops as well. The prohibition against aerial spraying will seriously hamper the
operations of the banana plantations that depend on aerial technology to arrest the spread of the Black
Sigatoka disease and other menaces that threaten their production and harvest. The effect of the ban
will not be limited to Davao City in view of the significant contribution of banana export trading to the
country's economy. The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and
unreasonable in light of the existence and availability of more permissible and practical alternatives
that will not overburden the respondents and those dependent on their operations as well as those who
stand to be affected by the ordinance

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SPARK vs Quezon City

The three (3) levels of analysis that demand careful calibration: the rational basis test, intermediate
review, and strict scrutiny. Each level is typified by the dual considerations of: first, the interest
invoked by the government; and second, the means employed to achieve that interest.

The rational basis test requires only that there be a legitimate government interest and that there is a
reasonable connection between it and the means employed to achieve it.
Intermediate review requires an important government interest. Here, it would suffice if government
is able to demonstrate substantial connection between its interest and the means it employs. It is
enough that the means employed is conceptually the least restrictive mechanism that the government
may apply.
Strict scrutiny applies when what is at stake are fundamental freedoms or what is involved are suspect
classifications. It requires that there be a compelling state interest and that the means employed to
effect it are narrowly-tailored, actually—not only conceptually—being the least restrictive means for
effecting the invoked interest. Here, it does not suffice that the government contemplated on the means
available to it. Rather, it must show an active effort at demonstrating the inefficacy of all possible
alternatives. Here, it is required to not only explore all possible avenues but to even debunk the
viability of alternatives so as to ensure that its chosen course of action is the sole effective means.

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