(Onati International Series in Law and Society) Eric L. Jensen, Jorgen Jepsen - Juvenile Law Violators, Human Rights, and The Development of New Juvenile Justice Systems - Hart Publishing (2006)
(Onati International Series in Law and Society) Eric L. Jensen, Jorgen Jepsen - Juvenile Law Violators, Human Rights, and The Development of New Juvenile Justice Systems - Hart Publishing (2006)
(Onati International Series in Law and Society) Eric L. Jensen, Jorgen Jepsen - Juvenile Law Violators, Human Rights, and The Development of New Juvenile Justice Systems - Hart Publishing (2006)
General Editors
Poverty and the Law edited by Peter Robson and Asbjørn Kjønstad
After National Democracy: Rights, Law and Power in America and the
New Europe edited by Lars Trägårdh
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Precarious Work, Women, and the New Economy: The Challenge to Legal
Norms edited by Judy Fudge and Rosemary Owens
Juvenile Law Violators, Human
Rights, and the Development of
New Juvenile Justice Systems
Edited by
Eric L Jensen
and
Jørgen Jepsen
The editors and contributors have asserted their rights under the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act 1988, to be identified as the authors of this work.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
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The editors
Preface
The present publication emerges as the product of a conference held in
Oñati, Spain, at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law in June
2003. The editors of this volume organised the conference based on their
experiences and interests in the juvenile justice field. Dr. Eric L. Jensen is
Professor of Sociology at the University of Idaho. Jørgen Jepsen is Associate
Professor Emeritus of Criminology at the University of Aarhus, Denmark,
and has worked for several years as a consultant to the Danish Institute of
Human Rights (DIHR) on juvenile justice reform in Africa, Nepal and other
non-Western countries. The idea behind the conference was to bring
together scholars and practitioners specialising in juvenile justice from the
U.S.A., Western Europe and Poland with colleagues from African countries,
Serbia and Nepal working on human rights issues in developing countries
or countries in transition.
The Danish Institute for Human Rights was one of the contributing
organisations to the conference at Oñati. The DIHR provides human rights
support to a number of developing countries in Africa and Asia, as well as
to countries in the former Eastern Bloc. In addition to three staff members
from DIHR, Penal Reform International (PRI) was represented by its
African section manager, and Defence for Children International (DCI) was
represented by a consultant on juvenile justice. Two of the developing
nations, Malawi and Nepal, were involved in the Juvenile Justice Program
of DIHR. Thus, organisations working with human rights were represented
at the conference.
The idea behind the conference was to bring together the two groups—
academics and practitioners in the human rights field—for the mutual
exchange of knowledge and ideas and to discuss how such knowledge could
be applied in promoting developments in juvenile justice. Discussions about
the application of international human rights instruments, most notably the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), formed an important part of
this exchange and this topic was dealt with in several of the papers presented.
It might be said that the conference was a workshop for the applied sociol-
ogy of law.
It should also be noted that participation in this process was part of an
effort by the DIHR to further developments in juvenile justice in a number
of its partner countries in Africa and Nepal. Later in the year (November
2003) a workshop on juvenile justice and diversion was held in Durban,
South Africa, arranged in co-operation between DIHR, colleagues in the
field of juvenile justice reform in South Africa (again a mix of academics
xii Preface
conference. It was not intended that the papers should use a common tem-
plate. Rather the general ideas behind the conference were outlined for the
presenters and different reactions to these came to the fore. It is therefore
diversity that characterizes the present volume. This diversity demonstrates
that the aims described require such a combination of contributions.
Ultimately, it is hoped that the volume will be useful to both academics and
practitioners and that the latter group will recognize that the sociology of
law is more than an academic discipline: it can be an active force in pro-
moting human rights and juvenile justice reform.
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................ix
Preface .....................................................................................................xi
Contributors ..........................................................................................xvii
Index .....................................................................................................461
Contributors
Bruce Abramson, Consultant, Defence for Children International, Geneva,
Switzerland.
Troy L Armstong, Professor Emeritus, California State University,
Sacramento, California, U.S.A.
José Luis de la Cuesta, Professor of Criminal Law and Director of the
Basque Institute of Criminology, University of the Basque Country, San
Sebastian, Spain.
James Dumesnil, California State Director, National Association of
Forensics Counselors, Mather, California, U.S.A.
Frieder Dünkel, Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology, University of
Greifswald, Germany.
Barry C Feld, Centennial Professor of Law, University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, Minnesota, U.S.A.
Eric L Jensen, Professor of Sociology, University of Idaho, Moscow, Idaho,
U.S.A.
Jørgen Jepsen, Senior Consultant, The Danish Institute for Human Rights,
Associate Professor Emeritus (Criminology), University of Aarhus,
Denmark.
Desmond Kaunda, Capacity Development Manager, Malawi Human
Rights Resource Centre, Lilongwe, Malawi.
Krzysztof Krajewski, Professor of Criminology, Department of
Criminology, Jagiellonian Univeristy, Krakow, Poland.
Barbara Mendenhall, Research Analyst, Mincucci Associates, Sacramento,
California, U.S.A.
Charlotte Flindt Pedersen, Project Manager, Danish Institute for Human
Rights, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Jerzy Sarnecki, Professor of Criminology and Chair, Department of
Criminology, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.
Kishor Silwal, Director, Center for Legal Research and Resource
Developments, Kathmandu School of Law, Kathmandu, Nepal.
xviii Contributors
Ann Skelton, Director, Litigation Project, Centre for Child Law, University
of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa.
Adam Stapleton, Regional Director, Penal Reform International, Lilongwe,
Malawi.
Ivana Stevanovic, Researcher, Yugoslavia Child Rights Centre, Belgrade,
The Republic of Serbia and Montenegro.
Lola Vallés, Researcher, The Police Academy of Catalonia, Barcelona,
Spain.
1
Introduction
ERIC L JENSEN AND JØRGEN JEPSEN
T
HE CHAPTERS IN this book are organised around the themes of the
Oñati conference. One of the major objectives of the conference was
to bring together experts in juvenile justice from nations at various
stages of development or transition, thus allowing for comparison of rather
diverse legal and social systems. We were seeking an exchange of research
findings and cross-cultural comparisons of the societal and political con-
texts from which juvenile justice systems emerge and evolve. In pursuit of
this objective, the authors described the juvenile justice systems in their
nations and several authors discussed the extent and parameters of juvenile
law violation in their countries. These descriptions then opened up discus-
sion of a critical issue: are current reactions and proposals within these
nations’ juvenile justice systems in line with the empirical reality of changes
in youth law violation? This discussion emerged as a frequent theme in the
conference contributions. We will return to this theme in the concluding
chapter.
Another important objective of the conference was to consider the mutual
application of system models and research findings across the juvenile justice
systems or emerging juvenile justice systems in the nations represented. That
is, what can we learn from each other? In addition, we encouraged the partic-
ipants to explore the practical application of the various juvenile justice mod-
els under different social and cultural conditions. For example, a developing
nation which to date has primarily used the adult criminal justice system to
respond to juvenile delinquency may consider the ideas and philosophies of
the Anglo-American juvenile court system, the Scandinavian welfare board
system, or the proposals for a combined juvenile justice and family court sys-
tem in Serbia for potential adoption. Conversely, traditional modes of conflict
resolution in developing nations (e.g. mediation and restorative justice) are
currently being implemented in several Western societies, in part inspired by
examples from New Zealand, South Africa and other African countries (see
Braithwaite 2002). This exchange of ideas and experiences with examples of
attempts at practical implementation of various models of juvenile justice
broadened the horizons of all the participants in the conference.
2 Eric L Jensen and Jørgen Jepsen
Austria 14 18/21 18
Belgium 16**/18 16/18 18
Belarus 14***/16 14/16 18
Bulgaria 14 18 18
Croatia 14/16* 18/21 18
Czech Republic 15 18 18
Denmark 15 15/18 18
England/Wales 10/12/15* 18 18
Estonia 14 18 18
Finland**** 15 15/18 18
France 13 18 18
Germany 14 18/21 18
Greece 13 18/21 18
Hungary 14 18 18
Ireland 7/15* 18 18
Italy 14 18/21 18
Latvia 14 18 18
Lithuania 14***/16 14/16 18
Macedonia 14***/16 14/16 18
Moldova 14***/16 14/16 18
Netherlands 12 18/21 18
Norway**** 15 18 18
Poland 13***** 15/17/18 18
Portugal 16 16/21 18
Romania 16/18 16/18/21 18
Russia 14***/16 14/16 18
Scotland 8/16 16/21 18
Slovakia 15 18 18
Slovenia 14***/16 18 18
Spain 14 18/21 18
Sweden**** 15 15/18 18
Switzerland 7/15* 15/18 18
Turkey 11 15 18
Ukraine 14***/16 14/16 18
Former Yugoslavia 14/16* 18/21 18
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was enacted by the
United Nations in 1989 and has been signed by all but two nations in the
world (the U.S.A. and Somalia). The CRC is used as the major framework
by the Danish Institute for Human Rights and other organizations, includ-
ing UNICEF and Penal Reform International, in assisting nations to
develop humane, human rights-based juvenile justice systems.
The conditions in prisons and remand facilities in many developing
nations are so poor and inhumane that they violate basic human rights
standards when seen from any point of view. Because of this, many
developing nations are currently trying to keep juveniles from being
detained in jail while awaiting trial and from being sent to institutions
for adult offenders. These facilities often subject young offenders to
much hardship and humiliation, such as physical, sexual and psychological
abuse.
In recent years a number of nations and international organizations
have supported developing nations in designing juvenile justice systems
that exempt young offenders from these hardships and divert them into
non-institutional forms of intervention (see also the ‘Tokyo Rules’ on non-
institutional measures and the other instruments mentioned below). Even
in cases where such systems of diversion are badly needed, recommended
by international instruments and supported by foreign donors and
national progressives, they are often met with opposition from the public,
repressive legal systems, and system representatives such as judges, pros-
ecutors and the police.
The basic principles of the CRC (and the related international instru-
ments) as they apply to juvenile justice systems are as follows (United
Nations 2000, 275–300):
Several other international instruments set out and reinforce these human
rights guidelines for establishing and maintaining juvenile justice systems.
These instruments are: the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice 1985 (the Beijing Rules), U.N. Guidelines
for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency 1990 (the Riyadh Guidelines),
U.N. Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty 1990
(Havana Rules), U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for Alternative Penal
Measures 1990 (the Tokyo Rules), and the European Rules on Social
Sanctions and Measures 1992.
6 Eric L Jensen and Jørgen Jepsen
Our basic goal in organizing the Oñati conference was to provide infor-
mation for the participants to review and subsequently to allow us
to consider which models or portions of other nations’ juvenile justice
systems may be the most effective and applicable to our societies. We
were thus offering a variety of options from which the convened experts
could choose. Our intention was to facilitate productive policy choices,
but not dictate to any nation’s representatives what path they should
follow.
The book is divided into three sections, based on our objectives for the
conference. Section One contains papers dealing with the practicality of
human rights-based juvenile justice models for diverse social and cultural
conditions. Section Two of the book contains chapters that provide infor-
mation for the comparison of the juvenile justice systems of various nations.
Section Three contains chapters that focus on what can be learned about
both productive and negative elements of juvenile justice systems from the
nations represented.
The papers in Section One are authored by Abramson, Flindt Pedersen,
Stapleton, and Skelton. These authors represent international or national
organizations directly involved in providing consultation, support and
inspiration to developing countries.
The first paper, by Bruce Abramson, deals with the framework for juve-
nile justice issues set out by the CRC. Mr. Abramson has worked as a con-
sultant to Defense for Children International (DCI) on projects which
attempt to implement the CRC via the Committee on Child Rights. In this
chapter he describes the system of reporting under the CRC, and the advan-
tages and problems of this procedure as a means of promoting children’s
rights.
The chapter by Charlotte Flindt Pedersen, formerly the Project Manager
of the Juvenile Justice project at DIHR, analyzes the experience of the
Institute in providing assistance to developing countries. She has worked
on juvenile justice projects in Africa and Serbia. She has also been on fact-
finding missions for UNICEF to study juvenile justice in Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan.
Ms. Flindt Pedersen discusses the needs to utilize research and monitor-
ing to provide a knowledge base for reform and development, and to locate
partners and stakeholders in the co-operating nations in order to achieve
changes in policies and programs. Her experience attests to the need for a
respect for cultural differences in the nations involved. In addition, she
notes that developed nations can learn from the co-operating developing
nations, particularly in the case of the current trend toward diversion and
restorative justice in developing countries.
Introduction 7
Spain has revised its juvenile justice system in recent years. The chapter
by José Luis de la Cuesta provides an historical account of these develop-
ments, which in some ways are reminiscent of the developments in
Scandinavia. Spain had experienced, to a limited extent, changes in its leg-
islation after the Franco years, but it was not until 2000 that a major act
on juvenile justice was passed. This act increased the procedural safeguards
for juveniles, and provided new options for reactions—some with the goal
of social control and some more welfare-oriented. A number of these
changes have been slow to come to fruition, however, due to a lack of fund-
ing from the autonomous regions.
The chapter by Frieder Dünkel charts the developments in juvenile offenses
and justice reactions to them in Germany. With the advent of reunification,
Germany presents a case study of two systems of juvenile justice coming
together—at least in theory. The former East German system—which was
characterized by a relatively low level of juvenile crime—has gradually
approached the West German system but has so far avoided its more repres-
sive characteristics. In general, the contemporary system in the German
Federal Republic is characterized by a social welfare approach. It has devel-
oped a traditional system of probation and parole, and a number of other
non-punitive reactions to juveniles including mediation and diversion.
The chapter on Poland by Krzysztof Krajewski describes the difficult
process of changing legislation and systems of reaction away from some
hard and fast traditions into a more welfare-oriented system. Polish juvenile
court judges seem receptive to welfare approaches, at least for less serious
offenders. To some extent, this process of development resembles that of
East Germany, but the very process of changing legislation seems more
resistant than in the former East Germany. On the other hand, the treat-
ment-oriented social welfare view of juvenile delinquency seems rather well
entrenched. In spite of a modest rise in violent crime and a related moral
panic, the social welfare approach has preserved its place in Poland.
Scandinavian nations have a long-established social welfare tradition.
Both the chapter on Sweden by Jerzy Sarnecki and the chapter on Denmark
by Jørgen Jepsen deal with systems based on the Scandinavian welfare
boards. While in juvenile court systems the decision-maker is a judge, under
a welfare board model decisions are made by a board of social administra-
tors and local politicians. In cases where involuntary removal from the
home is sought, the board is assisted by a judge, and a psychologist or other
child specialist. The judge deals with procedural issues and the psychologist
assists in fitting the reaction to the personality and circumstances of the
juvenile. A number of issues arise under both systems regarding the protec-
tion of procedural safeguards for the alleged young law violator and the
issue of appropriate reaction(s). Although the variety of reactions utilized in
both systems is similar, the American juvenile court is characterized prima-
rily by a judicial element supplemented by a number of social and other
Introduction 9
The system she describes both allows more effective police work with
juveniles and stimulates more youth-friendly behavior on the part of the
police.
The chapter by Troy Armstrong discusses the issues surrounding an effec-
tive aftercare system for juveniles coming out of institutional settings. The
Intensive Aftercare Project is a theory- and research-based program
designed to aid in the transition of youth from correctional placements back
into the community. Just as the U.S.A. was at the forefront of developing a
juvenile court system in the late 1800s, it has also been a leader in develop-
ing improved services for troubled youth based on the extant research (see
also the chapter by Jensen). The level of resources invested in this aftercare
model is of course far beyond those available in the developing nations, but
it can be hoped that some of the lessons learned from the Intensive
Aftercare Project are generalisable to all societies.
The numerous Native American nations that exist within the borders of
the U.S.A. each have their own traditionally-based forms of justice. These
resemble the systems of (other) developing nations more than those in the
non-Native communities in the U.S.A. Mendenhall and Dumesnil have stud-
ied Native American reactions to youth law breaking. They find these
reactions to be based on restorative ideals and practices. Restoration and
apology are preferred to more repressive formal sanctions. A number of
similarities between these practices and those of indigenous peoples in
Africa, New Zealand and Canada are evident in this chapter. Developed
nations are now learning from these restorative practices.
Desmond Kaunda has written the chapter on the juvenile justice system
in Malawi. The original system of justice in Malawi was characterized by
repressive attitudes and disorganization, combined with a notable lack of
resources. Initiatives from foreign donors, including PRI, have led to co-
ordinated work between various parts of the system. This effort began with
the Juvenile Justice Forum at Zomba in the southern part of the country. A
magistrate in co-operation with a local NGO began by looking at the situ-
ation wherein a large number of juvenile offenders were detained in dismal
conditions in a section of an adult prison. A closer look at their records
indicated that their detention was not legal. In conjunction with a legal aid
organization, several of the juveniles had their cases reviewed and were
released.
This model inspired the creation of a National Juvenile Justice Forum
and juvenile justice forums in other parts of the country (e.g. Lilongwe).
The DIHR has supported these developments and has given support to a
process of monitoring juvenile delinquents and their treatment in the
system.
Kaunda’s chapter describes these developments and points to a need for
further assistance, in relation to the legal system, the judiciary and law
enforcement. Here the CRC and other international instruments have
Introduction 11
REFERENCES
Bernard, T.J. (1992) The Cycle of Juvenile Justice. (New York, Oxford
University Press).
Braithwaite, J. (2002) Restorative Justice and Response Regulation. (New
York, Oxford University Press).
Cunneen, C. and White, R. (1995) Juvenile Justice: An Australian
Perspective. (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Dünkel, F. (2003) ‘Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice in Germany’. In F.
Dünkel and K. Drenkhahn (eds.), Youth Violence: New Patterns and
Local Responses—Experiences in East and West. (Mönchengladbach,
Forum Verlag Godesberg).
Estrada, F. (2001) ‘Juvenile Violence as a Social Problem: Trends, Media
Attention and Societal Response’. British Journal of Criminology 41:
639–55.
Feld, B.C. (1999) Bad Kids: Race and the Transformation of the Juvenile
Court. (New York, Oxford University Press).
Platt, A. (1977) The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency. 2nd edn
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press).
Sørensen, J.J. and Jepsen, J. (2005) Juvenile Justice in Transition: Bringing
the Convention on the Rights of the Child to Work in Africa and
Nepal. (Copenhagen, Danish Institute for Human Rights).
United Nations (2000) Bringing International Human Rights Law Home:
Judicial Colloquium on the Domestic Application of the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. (New York, United
Nations).
Section One
INTRODUCTION
T
HE CONVENTION ON the Rights of the Child is the centerpiece of an
international movement that is aimed at promoting the human dig-
nity of all children and adolescents. Unfortunately, juvenile justice
issues are being marginalized. Moreover, specialists in the field of juvenile
justice have not climbed on board the CRC bandwagon. Sadly, juvenile jus-
tice is the ‘unwanted child’ of the ‘children’s rights movement’. Why is this
so? And more importantly to those of us who work in the area of juvenile
justice, What can we do about the ‘unwantedness’ problem? How can we
juvenile justice professionals—lawyers, judges, sociologists, criminologists,
law professors, and public servants in the field of juvenile justice—harvest
the rich potential of the Convention on the Rights of the Child?
Marginalization is a comparative notion. Part I therefore begins with an
overview of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, discussing the seven
main ways in which the CRC is making an important difference in the lives
of boys and girls throughout the world. Major steps are being taken in all
of the other main areas of concern, such as child labor, sexual exploitation,
and universal education. It is relative to all of the action that is taking place
in these other areas that we can say that juvenile justice is being marginal-
ized, both within the children’s rights movement, and within the broader
human rights movement. Part II then discusses the six principal reasons for
this relative neglect and lack of progress. Part III suggests a way forward.
While this last part is addressed primarily to juvenile justice professionals,
the discussion is also relevant to CRC activists.
16 Bruce Abramson
PART I
Overview
The CRC movement is the social and political campaign that aims to real-
ize all the promises contained in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The Convention is the ‘clockwork’ of the CRC movement, which, despite
the misleading term ‘Child’, encompasses everyone up to the age of 18
years. The CRC therefore covers adolescents, the age group that makes up
the vast majority of the juvenile justice ‘client’ population.1
The CRC movement is a part of the broader international human rights
movement, but, interestingly, there are things about the Convention that
have given it an edge over the other main human rights treaties—the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
For one, the CRC has been far more popular with governments than
other UN treaties. Since 1989 when the Convention was opened for ratifi-
cation, all but two states have joined it, a record that no other human rights
treaty comes close to matching. (The United States and Somalia are the two
hold-outs.) For another, unlike the other treaties, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child is holistic: it combines the so-called ‘civil and political
rights’ with the ‘economic, social and cultural rights’. Moreover, while the
CRC recognizes that the right-holder is the individual boy or girl, it also
recognizes more clearly than the Covenants that each person is also a mem-
ber of a family, a community, and a society.
Not only have nearly all states ratified the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, many have done comprehensive reviews of their laws, institutions,
and social practices, and most of them have taken meaningful steps to bring
themselves into compliance with the treaty’s obligations. Another indication
of the positive response to the CRC is that states are actually turning in com-
pliance reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the body that
monitors the implementation of the treaty. And these reports are usually not
just token gestures; they often provide candid assessments of the problems
that children and adolescents are facing, and concrete information about the
measures that the state is taking to realize their rights.2
1 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, along with all the other UN treaties mentioned
the state’s supplementary report addressing the List of Issues; the Summary Records of the
Committee’s dialogues with the state; and the Committee’s Concluding Observations (or rec-
ommendations). These are available at www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf, under Treaty Body
Database: Documents—by type.
Juvenile Justice: The ‘Unwanted Child’ 17
The situation is far from perfect, needless to say. States are frequently
accused of hypocrisy, of making fancy speeches about respecting the rights
of kids, and then going on with business as usual. But this contradiction
between words and actions is a problem that runs throughout all of life.
While there is indeed a great deal of superficiality in ‘rights-talk’, there have
also been many tangible accomplishments.
The power of the CRC is its catalytic effect in stimulating activism at all
levels of society. In this section, I will outline the seven ways that the
Convention is being put to work to improve the lives of children and ado-
lescents.
1. Coalition building
Perhaps the most dramatic catalytic effect is the networking and coalition
building that is going on, particularly among NGOs, but also with inter-
governmental organizations and states. The CRC movement is a social-
political movement, and the ‘bandwagon’ is precisely the extensive
collaboration that is required to effect change.
Local and national NGOs form coalitions to push their governments to
implement the CRC. For instance, many nation-wide coalitions meet with
government officials who are preparing the state’s implementation report to
the Committee on the Rights of the Child; they write their own ‘alternative
reports’; and they come to Geneva to meet with Committee members to
help ensure that the Committee’s dialogue with the government will address
the priorities. There is an international NGO liaison office that facilitates
this process, even paying the expenses of national NGOs from developing
countries to come to Geneva! And the liaison office follows up by assisting
national NGOs to maintain their coalitions as on-going forces within their
countries (Allen 1999).3
NGOs are teaming up to create a ‘multiplier effect’. They pool resources;
they form partnerships to carry out research and assessments in support of
reform proposals; they conduct training; they share information; they run
projects; and they influence public policy. There are many different types of
coalition. Some are made up of NGOs that specialize in particular areas,
like street children, while others are composed of a wide diversity of human
rights and humanitarian organizations, as in the campaign against under-
aged (or ‘child’) soldiers.
Information Network), at www.crin.org. For information on coalitions, check the menu under
Organizations: NGO Group For CRC: National coalitions.
18 Bruce Abramson
NGOs that specialize in kids’ rights and welfare also join forces with
human rights organizations and humanitarian organizations in many
forums, such as the General Assembly, the UN Commission on Human
Rights, and the Sub-Commission. They have been active in the creation of
the International Criminal Court, and in the negotiations of other human
rights and humanitarian treaties, for instance.
2. Changing attitudes
The CRC movement has also helped to create new governmental struc-
tures to better serve the needs of kids. For instance, some states have cre-
ated omnibus offices for children and adolescents, as well as
intra-departmental co-ordinating mechanisms; they have instituted better
data collection and information sharing procedures on indicators of
well-being (such as disaggregated statistics on school drop-out rates);
they analyze their annual budgets to ensure more equity for children and
their families; and they conduct impact assessments on kids’ welfare
before passing legislation. These are mega-structures in that they are not
specific to any particular category of concern, like education or sexual
abuse; they are institutional changes that affect the overall process of gov-
ernment in order to better realize all of the rights in the CRC (Hodgkin
and Newell 1996; Newell and Holmberg 2000).
Juvenile Justice: The ‘Unwanted Child’ 19
At the international level, I think we can include under this heading some
of the new United Nations treaties, as well as treaties created under other
law-making systems. For instance, we now have two additions to the
CRC—the Optional Protocols On the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution
and Child Pornography, and On the Involvement of Children in Armed
Conflict; the new ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor4; the
European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights5; and the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.6
International forums devoted to the rights of children and adolescents
should also be mentioned here. Some notable examples include: The
General Assembly’s Special Session on Children in 2002, with the resulting
Declaration and Plan of Action; the two World Congresses Against
Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children; the ‘Machel Study’ on chil-
dren and war; and the study on Children and Violence that is just now
getting underway, and which should be of real interest to specialists in juve-
nile justice. These are structural innovations in the sense that they are
frameworks for generating international, national and local actions.7
5. Developmental needs
The CRC movement promotes understanding of the developmental needs of
adolescents and children. What distinguishes youngsters from adults is that
they are in a process of rapid development, physically, mentally, morally, and
socially. This is what entitles them to ‘special care and assistance’, in the
4 ILO Convention No. 182, available at www.ilo.int, buried under Child Labour (IPEC):
Ratification Campaign.
5 ETS No. 160; available at www1.umn.edu/humanrts, under Treaties: Regional
6. Law reform
One of the chief aims of human rights activists is to get states to change
their laws. This is primarily a political process, which is why all the other
NGO activities—changing attitudes and coalition building, in particular—
are so important. While there is a slight trend in courts directly using the
various UN treaties in their decisions (Conforti and Francioni 1997; Cotran
and Sherif 1997; Jayawickrama 2002), for the most part the process of
‘implementing’ the human rights treaties is political, rather than legal
(Heyns and Viljoen 2001; Heyns and Viljoen 2002).
Legislative reform is always a major topic of concern to juvenile justice
specialists. The state implementation reports, together with the CRC
Committee’s recommendations, give a good snapshot of the successes, and
the gaps, in this area.
Governmental budgets are a type of law, to be sure, but they are so differ-
ent from other legislation that they need special mention.
Nearly all human rights are resource-intensive. Just because a piece of
legislation says that such-and-such is to happen does not mean that it will.
The state must spend money to put its programs and policies into effect, so
the actual enjoyment of human rights will largely depend on successful
competition for government spending.
Here, too, is where the other activities that I have mentioned have their
pay-off. Like a rising tide lifting all the boats, elevating the status of children
and adolescents in society, mobilizing societal sentiment against specific
outrages, and ensuring transparency and accountability through better gov-
ernmental structures, all help to ensure fairer allocations to young people.
Juvenile Justice: The ‘Unwanted Child’ 21
While I have separated out these seven types of impacts, what is impor-
tant to emphasize is that all of these activities are going on simultaneously,
and it is the combined effect, the synergistic interaction, that produces the
results (Woll 2000).
PART II
Several years ago, Defence for Children International (2000) made a study
of 140 state implementation reports, and the corresponding recommenda-
tions of the Committee on the Rights of the Child. The study identified a
number of indicators by which to gauge the seriousness of the neglect of
juvenile justice issues.
The first indicator is the frequency with which the Committee has called
for ‘comprehensive reform’ of the juvenile justice system. Of course, states
need to do better in all areas, including education and health, but the need
for ‘comprehensive reform’ of juvenile justice reflects the degree to which
the fundamental obligations of the CRC have not been understood,
accepted, or acted upon by governments. Another indicator is the number
of times that the Committee has had to urge states to end inhumane prac-
tices that constitute per se violations of international law, like using the
death penalty on minors, or flogging and torture. What distinguishes
human rights abuses against minors in the juvenile justice system from
other serious issues, such as sexual abuse and child labor, is that these
youngsters are in the care and custody of the state, so what happens to
them is often a result of conscious choices. For instance, the failure to sep-
arate minors from adults in detention, which is a bedrock requirement of
international law, is the result of a policy decision to not make the invest-
ments necessary for a humane penal system. The picture that emerges is
one of states failing to grasp the reasons for having a special system of jus-
tice for young people who are in trouble with the law. The depth of the
22 Bruce Abramson
8 To fully appreciate this problem, we need to see the matter from the public’s perspective.
Ron Powers’ article, ‘The Apocalypse of Adolescents’ (2002), is a good example of public per-
ceptions in one developed country.
24 Bruce Abramson
systems push back, defeating the reform, or creating new problems. This
is why we must address ‘juvenile justice’ not as a system but as a set of
over-lapping systems.
The two barriers to juvenile justice reform that we have just looked at are
external problems in the sense that they are imposed upon juvenile justice
professionals and CRC activists either by society or by the institutional
structures of government. They are ‘inherent’ problems that will never go
away completely; reformers will always need to take them into account.
The other sources of marginalization, however, are to some extent internal
problems. It is to these internal sources of marginalization that we now
turn.
convention. The delegates agreed to this extension, but the ‘child’ language
remained the same. The enlargement was handled by the technical device of
a legal fiction: CRC article 1 says that ‘[f]or the purposes of the present
Convention’ the term child is to be read to mean everyone under 18 years.
CRC advocates love to say that the Convention ‘defines’ every human
being under the age of 18 as a ‘child’. Which is simply not true. The
Convention does not say that all of these human beings are children, but
only that the word ‘child’ in the treaty is to be translated as everyone under
18. Article 1 is an artificial definition: that’s why it’s a ‘legal fiction’.
There is mental blocking going on here. While CRC advocates talk about
the Convention applying to everyone under 18, they are nearly always think-
ing about children, not children and adolescents. Look at the photos in CRC
promotional materials and you will find that they are exclusively, or over-
whelmingly, of children—usually pictured as innocent, vulnerable, and often
suffering. When you listen to a CRC advocate talk about ‘children’s rights’,
ask yourself: ‘Is this speaker visualizing 16 and 17 year olds?’ I believe you
will nearly always say, ‘Definitely not teenagers!’ Unfortunately, rhetoric like
‘child rights’ and ‘the child’ is making adolescents invisible in the CRC
movement (Abramson 1996).
Human rights are ‘tools’ for promoting respect for the human dignity of
each and every person. All of us who work directly with young offenders
know the importance of respect (Sennett 2003). There is no such thing as
rehabilitation, or reinsertion, or prevention, or even a fair trial, without
deep respect for the young person we are interacting with in the juvenile jus-
tice system. But I have never yet met a sixteen or seventeen year old who
wants to be called a ‘child’.
I cannot explain why CRC advocates find it so important to call older
teenagers—young men and women, really—‘the child’. It must be meeting
the adults’ emotional needs. As always, our greatest stumbling block to
reform is human nature. Whether it’s parents beating their children (‘It’s for
their own good, dammit!’), or the medical profession fighting Semmelweiss
(‘We’re helping these women!’), or countless other issues, we are always
confronted with the gap between our words and our deeds. CRC advocates
say that the Convention covers everyone under 18, but notwithstanding
some exceptions, like the reproductive health of girls, teenagers are margin-
alized. And since the young offenders are overwhelmingly teenagers, juvenile
justice gets sidelined, as compared with other areas covered by the CRC.
many issues, and it will always be a necessary part of human rights work.
But by itself the ‘negative approach’ will not take us all the way to our des-
tination—to achieving full realization of all human rights. We must also
adopt ‘positive approaches’.
The heart of the positive approach is a focus on respecting the human
dignity of children and adolescents, which means, above all, promoting
their healthy development: indeed, this is the essence of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child. It’s vital that we stop cruelty, of course, but our aim
should be to replace cruelty with attitudes and practices that respect human
dignity, which includes promoting the healthy development of young peo-
ple. This objective is especially important in dealing with young offenders
because only this perspective keeps the system focussed on prevention and
rehabilitation. And only the positive approach can recapture the sympa-
thetic understanding that all human beings who are in need are entitled to.
There are times when it is appropriate to argue for reform on the basis of
social utility, such as when we show politicians the research studies proving
that prevention is cost-effective, or when we argue for diversion programs
on the grounds that detention is a scarce resource that is being over-used.
Pragmatic arguments are always necessary, but they are not human rights
arguments. Every kid has a right to an education, a right to family contact,
a right to an adequate standard of living—all of which are ‘social and eco-
nomic rights’, and all of which are critical to the well-being of the young-
sters who are caught up in the juvenile justice system.
Human rights advocacy requires a combination of moral, legal and prag-
matic arguments (Schulz 2002, 1–16). The more a state works towards real-
izing human right across the board, the more progress it will make in
reducing juvenile offending, but this will require a more positive approach
to human rights work than is currently the case.
Under the salami approach, one divides life up into themes, such as edu-
cation or juvenile justice, and then focusses an inquiry within the confines
of the chosen heading. For example, one looks at schools and asks, ‘What
are the state’s obligations with respect to education under the CRC?’ or at
prisons and inquires, ‘What are the state’s juvenile justice obligations?’ By
contrast, the holistic approach looks at people as complete human beings
and asks, ‘With respect to these boys and girls in detention, what are the
obligations with respect to their education, to their health, to due process,
etc., etc.’ Under the holistic approach, virtually every CRC right can be seen
as a juvenile justice right, from the point of view of the boys and girls who
are in conflict with the law. The rights to education, to health, and to fam-
ily contact, for instance, are vitally important to kids in the juvenile justice
system. (Note my relapse into the singular ‘system’.)
‘Holistic’ is all-encompassing. Generally speaking, a significant percentage
of juvenile criminal activity is directed at income-generation. This includes
certain kinds of property crimes (e.g. theft), crimes of violence (e.g. robbery,
mugging), and illegal commerce (e.g. drug dealing, prostitution). If preven-
tion and reintegration programs are to have a significant social impact, they
must address the income-generation problems of teenage boys and girls, and
their families. Unfortunately, the needs of minors who are at risk of offend-
ing, or who are already in trouble, are not taken into account in national
economic development plans. ‘Juvenile justice’ is seen as the administration
of justice to minors who have broken the law, unconnected to the larger
problems of social justice, like poverty and other types of marginalization.
The truly holistic approach that I am talking about is, of course, simply
another aspect of the positive approach: providing adolescents and children
with the ‘special care and assistance’ that they are entitled to under the
CRC. Society—both the state and civil society—must take measures that
will promote healthy development, and this includes education, and the
ability for them or their families to earn a living in a lawful manner.
The holistic approach, in its fullest sense, addresses all of the dimensions
of life.9
6. Boys
Juvenile justice is overwhelmingly about boys. The kids who are being
arrested and imprisoned are boys, ranging from about 85% to 99% of the
total number of inmates in detention, depending on the country. The penal
system, adult and juvenile, is the most heavily gendered institution in soci-
ety, even more so than the military, given current trends. I think that this
9 John Pitts’ extraordinary book, The New Politics of Youth Crime: Discipline or
Solidarity? (2001), compares the holistic strategy of the French government to the fragmented
approach of the United Kingdom.
28 Bruce Abramson
fact is one of the most important reasons for the marginalization of juvenile
justice issues in the human rights movement.
The are a number of areas of life where the indicators of well-being show
that boys are doing worse than girls, but the CRC movement routinely
ignores this, with only modest exceptions. The expression ‘particularly
girls’ appears throughout the CRC literature, but it is very unusual to see
‘especially boys’. Unfortunately, the ‘particularly’ language is exclusionary:
the word particularly focusses people’s attention on girls, with the result
that either the situation of boys is ignored, or boys are reduced to second
class citizens as right-holders under the CRC.
For instance, when a state implementation report says that more boys
than girls are hooked on cigarettes, the CRC movement expresses concern
‘at the high and increasing’ prevalence of tobacco use ‘notably among girls’
(Committee on the Rights of the Child 2002, para. 40). The situation is
worse for the boys, but only the welfare of the girls is focussed on.
Apparently, the rationale for ignoring the boys is that the girls in this par-
ticular state have a higher rate of increase in tobacco usage, even though
more boys smoke, and even though society is only closing the gender gap,
as it makes females more like males in all areas of life not fixed by biology.
The justification here is not only thin, it works in just one direction. When
another state reports that boys are committing suicide two to three hundred
per cent more often than girls, and that the rate of increase for the boys is
greater (Australia 1996, Table F10), the situation still does not call for spe-
cial attention to boys.10 Instead, the CRC establishment merely expresses
‘concern’ at ‘the incidence of suicide among young people’, airbrushing out
the gender issue altogether (Committee on the Rights of the Child 1997,
para. 18) (emphasis added).
The indicators are staring us in the face. Everyone knows that girls are
being severely discriminated against or excluded in education. Right? Well,
the statistics tell us that boys are also being severely discriminated against
and excluded in education.
For instance, boys are under-represented in secondary schools in eighty-
eight countries (UNICEF 2002, 96–9). The pattern of female over-represen-
tation in education gets worse as the youngsters get older, the trend against
boys is increasing with time, and the problem is global. In post-secondary
education in Western states, for instance, males are under-represented in all
10 Table F10 is not reproduced on the UN website. Australia’s report has one short para-
graph on suicide, and it makes no mention of the dramatic gender disparities that are reflect-
ed in Table F10 (Australia 1996, para. 884). In an interesting comparison, the report devotes
eight paragraphs to what the Australian government is doing to combat female genital muti-
lation within its borders (Australia 1996, paras. 872–9). Eight paragraphs to one, with the one
paragraph refusing to mention the greater problems that the boys are facing: that’s a good
summary of the position of boys in the human rights movement.
Juvenile Justice: The ‘Unwanted Child’ 29
11 Compare the presentation of these disparities with other rhetoric in the human rights lit-
erature: ‘Maternal mortality is a reflection of the devaluation of female life and a measure of
the social neglect of women’ (Center for Reproductive Rights 2003, 74). We never see a com-
parable statement about the lower life expectancies of boys and men.
30 Bruce Abramson
In London, our research shows that there are about thirty to forty youths on each
borough who have grown up in [state] care in an environment of physical and
sexual abuse, each and every one . . . had been abused and when they had
reported offences they had been ignored or enquires had not been successful.
These youths have been excluded from school for four or five years and who have
never experienced any form of parental control. Some of them wouldn’t even rec-
ognize their parents if they met them in the street. Is it any wonder they become
desensitised to society’s norms and decencies. Maybe three hundred to four hun-
dred of them are causing a huge upsurge in street crime and the pattern is repeat-
ing itself up and down the country. (Guardian 2002, 2)
What percentage of these ‘thirty to forty youths’ would you guess were
males? Stevens does not give citations for the studies, but I would be will-
ing to bet that ‘youths’ is 100% masculine. Sir John is obviously concerned
about stopping the sexual and other abuses that he mentions; even though
he is talking about hooligans, he has not lost his sympathetic understand-
ing. But rather than say ‘young males’, he has chosen to use de-gendered
language. Why do you think he made this choice?
Compare Sir John’s speech with Amnesty International’s report on juve-
nile justice in the United States. ‘Many girls suffering sexual and physical
abuse at home respond by fighting back or running away,’ which, the report
says, helps to explain why girls end up in the hands of the juvenile justice
system (Amnesty International 1998, 52–3). And what about the history of
sexual and physical abuse suffered by the boys who are in the system?
Amnesty’s report is totally silent about this. The report also decries the
‘massive over-representation of black children’ in the penal system
(Amnesty International 1998, 53, 56–7). Black children? Not black males?
Or just plain teenage boys, without the color coding? The Amnesty report
does not recognize any over-representation of males in the jails of America.
The report calls attention to the ‘distinct link between the over-representa-
tion of black children in the justice system and the social and economic
environment in which they live’, but since males are not over-represented,
nothing needs to be said about the sociological factors that propel boys into
the arms of the law. Apparently, black males are in lock-up because that’s
where they’re supposed to be. That’s the implication, isn’t it?
So much for the flagship of the human rights movement. Are the juvenile
justice professionals doing any better in addressing the over-representation of
boys in the penal system? Let’s check with the International Centre for the
Prevention of Crime. They say that we now have the knowledge and the tools
to effectively prevent juvenile delinquency. They tell us that large-scale studies
have identified the ‘factors . . . associated with’ delinquency, and this allows
us to design effective programs (International Centre for the Prevention of
Juvenile Justice: The ‘Unwanted Child’ 31
Crime 1999, 2–3). They name eight risk factors, such as poverty and dropping
out of school, but the biggest statistical correlater—the sex of the youngster—
is not on their list. Apparently, effective prevention of juvenile delinquency
calls for androgynous measures; we are expected to believe that the young per-
son’s sex is irrelevant, despite the fact that males are grossly over-represented
in the penal system.
Although the United Nations plays a major role in the promotion of
human rights, we find this same exclusion of boys throughout its publica-
tions. For instance, the World Youth Report 2003 has a chapter on ‘Juvenile
Delinquency’ that is excellent in all respects—except when it comes to boys
(United Nations 2004, 188–210). The title page has a large photo of two
pre-teen girls looking out at the reader with beautiful, laughing smiles. The
body of the chapter has three photos, all of smiling girls. Boys are over-
whelming over-represented in jails and prisons of the world, but the chap-
ter on juvenile delinquency does not contain a single photo of a male. The
text of the chapter follows the same pattern of exclusion. For instance, a
long section on ‘Preventing Juvenile Delinquency’ is framed in terms of
‘adolescents’, thereby ensuring that there is no gender analysis. The subject
of gender comes up only a few times, and when it does the text is always
slanted in favor of girls at the expense of boys.
The systematic exclusion of boys exists throughout the CRC movement.
A UNICEF booklet, Sport, Recreation, and Play, illustrates the problem
(UNICEF 2004). The booklet contains twice as many photos of girls than
of boys, and for teenagers the imbalance jumps to a four-to-one ratio
against the males. The exclusion of boys is also seen in the types of activi-
ties that the youngsters are engaged in. Girls are often shown in activities
that require skill and dedication, like gymnastics and karate, but there is
only one photo of a boy—a pre-teen—doing anything that takes compara-
ble skill and that will win the youngster comparable social recognition. To
appreciate the extent of the exclusion, we need to bear in mind that the
booklet was produced in the United States, where, for a generation now,
editors and publishers have been taking great care to ensure that photos
reflect gender and racial or ethnic parity. Moreover, the booklet is a UN
publication, and I know from my own experience in working on a number
of publications that UN agencies are similarly vigilant. It is simply impossi-
ble for a booklet to contain such a gender imbalance by accident. And
finally, let us not forget that the subject is sports, and that sports activities
play an important role in juvenile delinquency prevention and reintegration
programs for boys—the gender that makes up the vast majority of the
inmates in penal detention facilities.
Whether we look at the CRC movement, or at the broader human rights
movement, or at the specialized juvenile justice advocacy, we find the same
pattern of avoiding the gender dimension of juvenile justice. Some adults
are in deep denial of the gender issue when boys are on the losing end of
32 Bruce Abramson
the disparities. But most people recognize that there is a gender issue. The
problem is that no one has found an effective, positive way to address it. I
think that juvenile justice professionals and CRC activists are paying a dear
price in credibility for their failure to address gender: the public knows—at
some level of awareness—that the advocates for reform are not addressing
the problem when they duck the gender dimension of delinquency.
This does not mean to say that no one is ever paying attention to the
needs and rights of boys as boys, but the task here is to account for the dif-
ficulty of juvenile justice reform, and we can’t ignore the fact that there is a
gender dimension within the advocacy itself.
Social marginalization is not a problem of accidental forgetfulness, like
not remembering to turn off the bathroom light. As in any type of social
exclusion, the marginalization of boys is the result of active processes
(Sommers 2002). Sad to say, there is outright sex discrimination against
boys in the CRC movement.
PART III
WHAT TO DO?
I believe that there are two basic things that juvenile justice professionals
can do to counteract the unwantedness problem, and to promote penal
reform for children and adolescents. The first step is to climb on board the
CRC bandwagon. The second is to get juvenile justice reform onto the
international agenda.
The juvenile justice situation is like a gigantic swimming pool where the
water is near freezing, and where the kids are succumbing to hypothermia.
We have a vast array of people bringing cups of hot water to the pool. But
the ‘tea cup brigade’ will not raise the temperature of the water; it can pro-
vide relief to the individual swimmers in the immediate vicinity, but the pool
is too vast for even an army of tea cups to effect a change.
I think that the only way to raise the temperature of the pool is for juve-
nile justice specialists to mainstream themselves in the CRC movement, and
in the broader human rights movement of which it is a part. These move-
ments are aiming at fundamental changes throughout society, and this is
where the criminal-law and juvenile-justice experts need to be putting their
efforts.
For instance, juvenile justice professionals have a lot to gain by teaming
up with CRC advocates in the course of their present work. The techniques
that are being developed to promote young people’s participation has obvi-
ous value to juvenile justice workers, for example. But this is still the tea
cup approach to reform. It will never overcome the attitude barriers that are
keeping juvenile justice marginalized.
Juvenile justice experts can gain more by joining the national CRC coali-
tions. But ‘joining’ is not enough. A bandwagon is not a club that one
becomes a part of by submitting an application. It is a social movement,
which means that it’s a series of alliances or partnerships that people form
to advance their specific objectives. Juvenile justice advocates must be able
to show the CRC advocates how the latter’s aims will be advanced by enlarg-
ing their spheres of interests to include the young people who are in trouble
with the law. Most NGOs have areas of specialization, like street kids, or
education, or caste discrimination, to name a few concerns. Juvenile justice
professionals must re-examine their work in light of these concerns, and then
find ways to build upon the links between juvenile justice issues and the
work of these other NGOs. Prevention, diversion, detention, and rehabilita-
tion are in fact linked to the mandates of the traditional ‘children’s rights’
organizations, but these links are not being made clear, and are not being
capitalized on for their multiplier effects in the promotion of reform.
In other words, juvenile justice specialists must pull CRC specialists into
their own corner of the bandwagon: they must be able to show how main-
streaming juvenile justice will have a pay-off in terms of implementing the
CRC as a whole.
Raising the temperature of the pool will require a global strategy.
Education is a good illustration of how thinking in global terms can change
perceptions and behavior. Education activists have been waging a fierce
campaign for a number of years to get political leaders to accept the notion
that basic education is fundamental to the economic, social and political
development of states. The idea has been planted, and the roots are now
fairly deep. The World Bank, for instance, integrates education-for-all
34 Bruce Abramson
within its developmental plans and its lending packages. The major UN
agencies are now actively supporting education. And governments are mak-
ing real efforts to achieve educational results. As a consequence, we have
seen tremendous progress, and the current rededication to education-for-all
is even more promising. Juvenile justice professionals need to team up with
CRC activists to take similar international action with respect to juvenile
justice reform.
The education-for-all campaign is also a good example of the contribu-
tions that juvenile justice professions can make. Dropping-out and related
problems at school are among the highest risk factors for teenager offend-
ing. So delinquency prevention programs and reintegration programs that
will get offenders back into the educational system are extremely impor-
tant. Moreover, school-based prevention and rehabilitation programs are
cost-effective ways for the state to reduce crime levels. But despite the
importance of these programs, the education-for-all campaign has not inte-
grated the juvenile justice dimension into its activities. Juvenile justice pro-
fessionals therefore have an important role to play in helping the campaign
to overcome this blind spot. The education-for-all people, juvenile justice
professionals, and CRC activists all share a common interest, and they need
to work together to accomplish their reform objectives. My point is that the
CRC movement is the best vehicle for this collaboration.
Step two: get juvenile justice reform onto the international agenda
human rights—are not being integrated within the international aid assis-
tance plans.
It’s the same situation with diversion programs. Governmental officials
can be persuaded that prevention and diversion are cost-effective measures
for reducing delinquency, but they cannot get from where they are to where
they would like to be without outside support. When there’s not enough
money to buy gas or radios for the police cars, and the police officers’
salaries are insufficient to live on, and the state is three months behind in
paying them, then we cannot expect the government to make the juvenile
justice expenditures that are required today in order to reap important
social gains in the future. Major reform will not occur without international
support, and that support will not come in amounts sufficient to raise the
temperature of the pool unless there is a new way of thinking among the
leaders in the world of international aid.
It is not acceptable for inter-governmental bodies or states to promote
multi-million dollar development projects without earmarking a portion for
the progressive upgrading of the penal system, not when we consider the
levels of inhumanity that we find in the juvenile and adult systems through-
out the world. Economic development fuels social disruption, like migra-
tion and changes in family structures, and disruption of the social fabric
will lead to additional crime; that’s the human condition. A holistic, human
rights approach will anticipate these problems, and will ensure that devel-
opmental packages have dedicated a certain portion to the rehabilitation of
the penal system.
The international system has already laid a number of foundations that
juvenile justice professionals, working together with CRC activists, can
build upon. For instance, the Commission on Human Rights appeals to
states to ‘include in their national development plans the administration of
justice as an integral part of the development process . . .’ (Commission on
Human Rights 2002).12 The Commission on Human Rights is a subsidiary
body of the UN General Assembly, and it is made up of states, so this recog-
nition of the link between penal reform and development is an important
step. But the abstract recognition of the link must be followed up by many
concrete initiatives. Juvenile justice professionals have a vital role to play in
showing national governments, donor states, UN agencies, and interna-
tional financial institutions the concrete implications of the link. For exam-
ple, the people who control the purse strings and the architects of
development projects need to understand that juvenile delinquency preven-
tion and rehabilitation programs do work, and that they are cost-effective
ways for the state to reduce crime. But the only way that the gatekeepers of
12 This part of the Commission’s resolution is based on the Beijing Rules, rule 1.4 (‘Juvenile
justice shall be conceived as an integral part of the development process of each country with-
in a comprehensive framework of social justice for all juveniles’).
36 Bruce Abramson
CONCLUSIONS
The Convention on the Rights of the Child has proven itself to be a highly
successful catalyst for promoting the human rights of children and adoles-
cents, with the one principal exception of juvenile justice. Once the unwant-
edness problem is acknowledged, juvenile justice professionals and CRC
activists can join together to create strategies that will counteract each of
the six sources of marginalization. By climbing on board the CRC band-
wagon, and by getting juvenile justice reform on to the international devel-
opment agenda, juvenile justice professionals will help to fulfil the powerful
potential of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION
C
HILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS are the most important resource in a
country’s development. Providing good opportunities for children
and adolescents to develop their potential remains vital in the light
of future prosperity; however, it is not something that is necessarily easily
done. Doing so implies that children have access to a safe environment,
quality education, access to adequate health services, access to fair treat-
ment in the justice system, as well as the right to participate in decision-
making processes at various levels. This will give them the opportunity to
become active partners in a democratic society. However, in most of the
countries that the Danish Institute for Human Rights is working in, neither
the economic foundations nor the professional ability of the government
and its underlying structures are in place to provide these services to the
children of their country.
In December 2001 the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) there-
fore initiated co-operation with NGO partners in four countries (Nepal,
Uganda, Malawi and Tanzania) to establish a small juvenile justice platform
with the purpose of exploring ways of addressing the challenges posed to
the legal and social system in each of the partner countries, specifically tar-
geting the issue of fair treatment of children in the justice system and sup-
port to government structures in improving their justice systems in relation
to the treatment of children.
This article summarizes some of the experiences that can be drawn
from this co-operation and describes the gradual formulation of a strat-
egy on the implementation of humane responses to children in conflict
40 Charlotte Flindt Pedersen
with the law in this forum. Before going any further I would like to
credit our partners, who through their commitment are the primary
forces driving this process in each of their respective countries in formu-
lating and designing strategies which fit their respective legal systems
and social and economic conditions, and creating the possibilities for
dialogue with the state parties needed for the promotion of the cause.
I will be using examples and findings from our partners in my presenta-
tion; however, these should not be accredited to me, but to the Centre
for Youth Children’s Affairs (CEYCA) in Malawi, the Malawi Human
Rights Resource Centre (MHRRC), the Centre for Legal Affairs (CELA),
the Legal Human Rights Centre in Tanzania (LHRC), Ms. Lillian
Tibatemwa-Ekirikubinza, Deputy Vice Chancellor Makarere University
in Uganda, Centre for Legal Research and Development Research
(CeLRD), Kathmandu School of Law (KSL) in Nepal, and the National
Juvenile Justice Forum of Malawi. The role of DIHR is to facilitate
co-operation between the five countries (including Denmark) and to
support bilateral projects in terms of funding and coaching/advice
on specific issues, providing inspiration for further development in
terms of personnel and study tours, and providing the opportunity to
meet and exchange information.
The seminar turned out to be a forum for positive exchange and, based on
this, it was decided to set up a bilateral project of co-operation between each
set of partners in each country on juvenile justice as well as to maintain
regional co-operation in order to secure the exchange of experiences. One of
the main conclusions of the seminar was that the participants had found
more solutions to their endeavours to address their country’s juvenile justice
issues in the exchange with neighbouring countries than in the presentations
providing the Danish perspective (see Pedersen and Jepsen 2001).
It was also established at the seminar that the co-operation would take a
rights-based approach, with the point of departure being the articles of the
Convention of the Rights of the Child as well as trying to apply the mini-
mum standards provided by the Beijing Rules and Riyadh Guidelines,
which thereby provided purpose and direction in our work and gave us the
methodological framework for all our activities.
In the course of the project of co-operation it has become clear that the
challenges facing our partners in terms of achieving compliance with the
international standards in relation to the administration of juvenile jus-
tice are huge. Below is an attempt to compile a list of some of the prob-
lems experienced in the juvenile justice systems of the four countries:
• The numbers of juveniles in detention and the way they are treated are
difficult to monitor in the co-operating countries, as the reporting of
such figures and information is poor. In none of the co-operating coun-
tries is there as yet any system in place that keeps proper track of the
numbers of children involved in the criminal justice system. Therefore
it is currently impossible to assess how well or how poorly the system
is working. In Malawi the national juvenile justice forum is promoting
the establishment of separate registries for juveniles at all levels of the
justice system. And the regional forums are monitoring the number of
children in the penal system and in remand facilities.
• There is no systematized collection of baseline data in the area of
juvenile justice or criminal justice, which impedes the possibility of
assessing the scope and types of juvenile delinquency, in creating
meaningful preventive and reactive responses with regard to efforts
in crime prevention, rehabilitation and improving the administration
of juvenile justice in general. A systematized approach to understand-
ing the system, scope, types and reasons for delinquency will provide
the government and other stakeholders with the basis for developing
strategies, social polices, and legislation.
• Some of the countries’ legislation allows for sanctions such as corporal
punishment and establishes a very low age of criminal responsibility.
42 Charlotte Flindt Pedersen
Seminar recommendations
issue and seek solutions for children in conflict with the law in this sphere
as well (Pedersen and Jepsen 2003).
This pointed towards the need for co-ordination, co-operation and the
involvement of different sectors of society. Therefore a multi-sectored
approach was recommended, promoting co-operation across social affairs,
to the law enforcement agencies, to the courts, and to the youth penal insti-
tutions and prisons in order to successfully provide humane responses to
children in conflict with the law.
Another recommendation stemming from the above was the need to
explore ways of engaging in pre-trial activities so that this period is not
spent in idleness. The pre-trial period can be spent trying to find a solution
outside the justice system. Whilst stating that diversion is important, the
question as to what type of diversions there should be remained unan-
swered. Nevertheless, those designing a juvenile justice system in each of the
countries should take the issue of diversion into consideration.
Finally it was decided to proceed with the task of gathering more knowl-
edge on the situation of children in the justice systems as well as looking
into the provisions of the legislation with regard to children in conflict with
the law and the institutional framework in each country. It seemed neces-
sary to decide on the complexity of the situation in order to define the right
strategy to address the issue properly as well as to promote the issue among
decision makers and government justice agencies.
It was clear from the outset that one of the aims of any intervention would
be to support the establishment of a community-based infrastructure, util-
ising existing resources in the communities to support the justice system in
providing alternatives to incarceration as well as through measures of crime
prevention, diversion, rehabilitation and reintegration of children in con-
flict with the law, thus reducing the need for punitive interventions. A ten-
tative model for such a network was the newly established Juvenile Justice
Forum in Malawi and the Children’s Statute of Uganda.
At the seminar in Copenhagen, specific steps in the implementation
process were outlined:
A year after the forum took place, the organisations and individuals in the
four partner countries constituting the informal juvenile justice network
met again in Nepal. This conference was entitled ‘Juvenile Justice and
Human Rights’. Its purpose was to share information and research findings
among the participating countries which had been elaborated since the last
meeting. Each country was asked to present a situation paper, especially
reflecting the following:
Network terminology
During the meeting of the juvenile justice network the term ‘juvenile’ came
up for discussion. A working group was composed to try to create a com-
mon terminology for the network. Dissatisfaction was rooted in the fact
that the term ‘juvenile’ is usually applied in relation to judicial proceedings
and therefore has negative connotations associated with law breaking.
However, in the common sense the words ‘juvenile’ and ‘child’ can be used
interchangeably, referring to a human being who is not an adult. The work-
ing group appointed by the plenary to develop a working definition for
words that do not carry negative connotations came up with the following
to substitute ‘juvenile’:
B. Minors in conflict with societal norms (this will cover minors who
have not committed offences, runaways, children defined as beyond
control).
C. Minors in need of care and protection (children who are abandoned,
abused, victimized, exploited in e.g. child labour).
As was pointed out during the presentation to the plenary, these definitions
are not unproblematic either: the term ‘minor’ as opposed to ‘adult’ reflects
an element of discrimination as it implies that children are lesser or incom-
plete beings (and thereby maybe do not enjoy the same number of rights as
adults). Another problem is that the term ‘minor’ is often used with respect
to children who are not liable to a charge, and therefore it would seem that
the targeted age group is not encompassed by this term.
Nevertheless, for the time being we settled for the term ‘minor’, because
the age of the child differs from statute to statute in all the co-operating
countries. The working committee decided to retain the term ‘juvenile jus-
tice’ in the statutes and names of the organisation/s but footnoted the work-
ing definitions in all the program documents. The retention of the term
‘juvenile’ is supported by the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the administration of juvenile justice (the Beijing Rules), which give us the
following definition of juvenile: ‘A Juvenile is a child or young person who
under the respective legal system may be dealt with for an offence in a man-
ner which is different from an adult.’
Another issue discussed at the Nepal meeting was the role of legislation.
Based on the experiences of Uganda and Malawi it was stated that laws
are very important in strengthening the juvenile justice system; however,
law reform is not a precondition for implementing more humane
responses to children or initiating diversion programs. What are required
are resources, political will and creative use of the existing legislation.
But improving the law is necessary in order to sustain the results of
improved practices as well as to develop the range of possibilities for
diversion.
Diversion
Another dimension to the methodological toolbox was added and explored
during this conference. Ricardo Mukonda from UNICEF in Mozambique
talked about diversion and provided some principles and considerations for
the application of diversion programs:
The need to divert children in conflict with the law stems from the fact
that the criminal justice system in its present form subjects children to
46 Charlotte Flindt Pedersen
Research and monitoring was another important topic at the Nepal meet-
ing. It was concluded that due to the urgency of the problems it is neces-
sary to carry out continuous formative action research following already
ongoing programs in order to adjust these to the complexity of issues and
problems related to children and adolescents. The research should be car-
ried out by domestic researchers—so that the ownership of the information
obtained during the research is internalized and thereby maintained within
the society in question and with people who have the legitimacy to act and
take responsibility for acting upon the findings they make. This will also
provide for a more exact interpretation of the findings in relation to the
cultural context. A publication providing amongst other things a compila-
tion and extracts of the baseline studies is in the making, which will, as
was emphasized by the participants, provide an important comparative
perspective to the situation of juvenile justice and thereby be useful for the
purpose of promoting increased awareness of the problems involved in the
administration of juvenile justice among decision-makers and justice sector
stakeholders.
One of the aspects which is very important and where we see an impor-
tant role for DIHR is supporting our partners in the collection of statistical
information on children in the justice system. This is, however, extremely
difficult due to a lack of centralized registration of crime and judicial activ-
ities. Ideally registers should contain information about the type of offence,
where and when the offence was committed, former offences, the sanction,
and so on. This is, however, very rarely the case, which makes it virtually
impossible to follow developments in child-related crime or to compare
whether children are more involved in criminal activities than previously
and which type of activities they are involved in.
There is practically no tradition in our co-operating countries of using
statistical information, and therefore this has been the most problematic
part of the exercise. At the same time the partners are often confronted with
problems of gaining access to the relevant authorities, which only partially
are in possession of the required information. In the long run the gathering
of this information should be a government responsibility, but the activities
of the NGO can pilot this and show the way in relation to the usefulness of
statistical information on children in conflict with the law. For example,
answers to common questions could be found: Who commits the crime? Is
it juveniles/adults, men/women, employed/unemployed? Where is the crime
primarily committed? Is it in the city or in the countryside? What is the
most common crime? Is it theft or violence? And what are the reactions of
the formal/informal system to child-related crime? This information could
be used in developing crime prevention strategies and in supporting the
development of humane juvenile justice systems.
48 Charlotte Flindt Pedersen
In both Denmark and the United States we have in recent years seen a trend
towards demands for a more punitive approach when dealing with young
offenders. Despite all our money and different psychological and pedagog-
ical methods we have not been able to find sustainable solutions to the
problems of the most marginalized and often most vulnerable youth/chil-
dren and the problem of their reintegration into society.
I am convinced that some of the elements of a solution to the problems
of Northern crime policies can be found with our partners in the South.
What I see is that they have, forced by the inhumanity and imperfection of
their own justice and penal systems, insufficient social welfare systems, and
insufficient funds, been compelled to move towards finding solutions out-
side such areas, using existing resources in the communities and mobilising
these to take responsibility for children. In Malawi, Uganda, Tanzania and
Nepal there is among the most progressive justice stakeholders an increas-
ing awareness and determination to keep children away from the criminal
justice system.
In countries like Malawi and Tanzania the formal legal system interacts
with informal structures, which must be taken into consideration when
designing strategies for improving juvenile justice practices. Often there
exist in these informal systems traditional, non-codified ways of taking care
of children who lose their family or somehow fall outside societal norms.
However, these informal systems and the values they are based upon are
under influence from modernization and development and are therefore
changing and cannot in the long run be relied upon to cater for the children
of the local community. Sometimes the informal system will not take an
approach that guarantees the best interests of the child, but neither, as can
be seen above, does the formal system. In both instances a change of atti-
tude and a possibility of finding other solutions and instituting other prac-
tices have to be provided: restorative justice, victim-offender mediation,
compensation, community service, supervision and so on, involving a range
of actors taking responsibility for children who fall outside societal norms.
In the North as well as the South we also share some common features.
If we look at marginalized children’s backgrounds in Denmark, Malawi or
Implementation of Humane Responses to Children in Conflict 49
Nepal the majority will come from single parent families, from severe
poverty, be it in a material or spiritual sense, from unemployment, and/or
have a minority background. They live on the brink of society and the chal-
lenge they pose to us is to bring them into the center of society again. The
family has not been able to take care of the child’s integration into society
and therefore the task faced by the system is to support alternative resource
personnel, communities or individuals who can take responsibility and
replace the role of the family with respect to guiding the child into the
womb of society.
One aspect which the network has to explore further is the develop-
ment of ways of promoting children’s participation not only in the
juvenile justice system, but in general in decisions of relevance to their own
lives. Juvenile offending often occurs as a reaction to a lack of influence.
The ability to care, own and take responsibility for one’s own life and
reject a lifestyle connected with offending has to be based on the participa-
tion of the child and the sensation of being able to influence one’s own life
situation.
CONCLUSIONS
DIHR has from the outset of its engagement in juvenile justice aimed at a
cross-sector and cross-regional approach (government, judiciary, civil soci-
ety, social and criminal law enforcement which includes both preventive
and reactive stages).
In order to promote sector-wide thinking on the part of domestic stake-
holders and to ensure domestic ownership in the process, DIHR has applied
a step-wise approach. The first step comprised the development of strong
partnership relations to key actors in all of the co-operating countries.
Together with these partners DIHR has initiated baseline studies on chil-
dren and adolescents in the justice system, situational analysis and revision
of the legislative provisions in the co-operating countries.
The contribution of diversionary methodologies and the development of
diversion schemes suited to the context of each of the participating coun-
tries remains one of the most realistic avenues, and should be a crucial
component in the achievement of a well-functioning juvenile justice system
in poor countries as well as wealthy ones. These efforts should be seen
together with parallel efforts that seek to achieve better national monitor-
ing systems and to develop strong national Juvenile Justice Forums work-
ing for broad-based reform and sector co-ordination.
Up to this moment, the program of co-operation has achieved the initial
part of its potential impact and has fertilized the growth and development
of common understandings in relation to juvenile human rights standards,
monitoring instruments, strategies and policies for diversion.
50 Charlotte Flindt Pedersen
The problems, challenges and objectives that compose our strategy have
been formulated in co-operation with our partners as an ongoing process. I
find this extremely important, as it means that the network belongs not
only to the Danish Institute for Human Rights—it belongs to each and
every member of the network.
REFERENCES
R
EGIONAL CO - OPERATION IS problematic, particularly in Africa with
its range of languages, religions, political and economic groupings,
uncertain lines of communications, and prejudices. Francophones
and Anglophones suspect each of making no attempt to understand the
other. Angola is intimate with Brazil and distant from Namibia. The Sudan
looks over to Saudi Arabia with barely a glance at Uganda. If you want to
travel from west to east Africa, it is still quicker (and cheaper) to take a
plane to Europe and reconnect there.
Co-operation between donor agencies on a regional basis is weak. Country
missions report to desk officers in their capitals. They are neither required
nor, it appears, encouraged to share information with other missions in the
region. Donors still prefer to bring in consultants from their own countries
rather than identify expertise and relevant experience within the region.
NGO ‘networks’ exist but appear to have little impact. Amnesty
International assisted at the birth of the Southern Africa Human Rights
NGO Network (SAHRINGON). After a promising beginning, it has been
riven by internal squabbles and appears to continue in name only. The
Southern Africa Legal Aid Network (SALAN) has active individual member
organizations but lacks coherence of purpose to make it an effective body.
Yet the picture is not all negative. The groundbreaking work of the
South Africa Human Rights Commission has made it a leader in its field.
It has hosted Commissioners from other institutions around the continent
and provided know-how and training. The Conference of Heads of
Correctional Services in Central, Eastern and Southern Africa (CESCA)
meets every two years and includes heads of prisons from 17 African
countries. It provides a useful forum for senior prison officers to meet and
discuss new trends in corrections and invite speakers from within and out-
side the continent to inform improvements in corrections.
52 Adam Stapleton
In the area of penal reform, Penal Reform International (PRI) works around
the world, inter alia, to promote and develop international standards with
regard to law enforcement and prison conditions, to reduce the use of
imprisonment and to increase the use of constructive non-custodial sanc-
tions encouraging social reintegration while taking into account the interest
of the victims.
In Africa, PRI has been working to develop an agenda of reform that is
recognized and shared by African countries up, down and across the conti-
nent. This agenda is aimed at practitioners and informed by a plan of action
that sets out good practices and ‘models’ from all over the globe.1
Conferences provide stepping stones in the process of reform. They pro-
vide a forum for interest groups to come together, exchange ideas, and
chart a way forward. They can exert great moral influence and practical
guidance.
The first Pan-African conference on prison conditions took place in
Kampala, Uganda in September 1996. The conference convened 133 dele-
gates from 47 countries, including 40 African countries. The delegates were
heads of prison services, senior law officers, government ministers and rep-
resentatives from NGOs working in the sector. From the outset, all dele-
gates (from both governmental and non-governmental agencies) realized
they shared common ground, namely that prison conditions were appalling
and something had to be done. The conference issued the Declaration on
Prison Conditions in Africa 1996 which drew particular attention to the
plight of young prisoners, the need to separate them from adults, and the
need for treatment ‘appropriate to their age’.
Conference declarations need to be followed up if they are to enter the
mainstream of current thinking on a given theme. In order to enhance
the authority and visibility of the Kampala Declaration, it was trans-
lated and widely distributed throughout Africa, endorsed by the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and, in 1997, adopted as a
United Nations instrument.2 The result today is that the Kampala
Declaration 1996 is widely recognized as the starting point for penal
reform on the African continent.
Concerned about the conditions of young people in conflict with the
criminal law, PRI convened a regional seminar on juvenile justice in
Lilongwe, Malawi in 1999. The conference (hosted by the Malawi Ministry
of Justice and Constitutional Affairs) focussed considerable attention on a
1 The first Index of Good Practices in a planned series focusses on reducing pre-trial deten-
model of juvenile justice drawn up by the National Institute for Care and
Resettlement of Offenders (NICRO) in South Africa and developed in
Namibia by the Legal Assistance Centre, a national NGO based in
Windhoek. As a result of the recommendations of the meeting, PRI facili-
tated a pilot scheme in the following year in one magisterial area in Malawi
and assisted in drawing up a two-year work program with national roll-out.
The national juvenile justice forum continues to this day, chaired by a judge
of the High Court of Malawi.
In 2002, a second Pan-African conference on prisons and penal reform in
Africa took place in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.3 The conference looked
back over the past six years at what had been achieved as a result of the first
conference held in Kampala. The record was encouraging, as the conference
noted: the appointment of the Special Rapporteur on Prisons and
Conditions of Detention by the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR); the extension of Community Service as an alter-
native to prison based on the Zimbabwe model to 13 new African coun-
tries; the increasing evidence of prison services entering into partnerships
with NGOs to bring about reform; the development of a regional forum for
heads of correctional services through the CESCA annual conference.
The Ouagadougou Declaration on Accelerating Prison and Penal
Reform in Africa also recognized the ‘considerable shortcomings’ in the
treatment of prisoners and issued a forward-looking Declaration set in a
practicable seven-point framework, supported by a plan of action to
address these shortcomings. The Declaration places emphasis on reducing
the prison population, making prisons more self-sufficient, promoting
greater reintegration of offenders into society, applying the rule of law to
prison administration, and encouraging best practice ‘at national, regional
and international levels’ drawing from the ‘rich experience’ from across the
continent.
This is not mere rhetoric. The practice of the law in Africa is often highly
creative and innovative—it has to be, given the constraints within which
justice systems operate in many countries. Over the past ten years the sec-
tor has had to develop its own ways of making justice accessible to ordi-
nary people. Good practices4 have emerged: practices which adhere to
international human rights standards, benefit the poor and vulnerable and
are proven to be effective. A case in point is the Namibian juvenile justice
forum.
begs a number of questions that need not be addressed here (i.e.: who says so, in what con-
text, when, and how much do they cost?).
54 Adam Stapleton
5 ‘Considering that in many countries in Africa the level of overcrowding in prisons is inhu-
within the system. A course that treats judicial and popular attitudes, sen-
tencing principles and practice, access to legal advice and assistance, police
investigation procedures, court administrative procedures and processes,
prison conditions and so on and so forth. All this takes some money, con-
siderable commitment and a great deal of time.
Some ideas (‘access to justice’) or ‘products’ (community service orders)
may appear to work well in country A (i.e. they do what they set out to do;
in a timely, inexpensive way; that can be demonstrated; and if you ask any-
one involved they would be able to give you a clear explanation of what
they are about and how they have assisted them), but on transplanting to
country B, they do not appear to ‘take’. The point of departure and
approach, the institutions, the needs and problems will all differ to a vary-
ing degree such that the idea or product just does not work. The context is
important. So too is timing. It is not much good starting something new in
the middle of a war or 12 months before the next elections.
So, what are the features that should attach to this idea or product if it is
to catch on and spread further afield? It would probably stand a better
chance if it was simple and if the idea had been translated into practice and
tested first. Then it would help gain ground if the idea was unoriginal—in
the marketing sense of being NEW!—but had roots—if dormant—which
people could identify and so claim as their own. Any idea is not much good
if it does not address a widely shared need—and do so in ways which are
sustainable, i.e. not merely affordable but providing ‘sustainability of
impact’.6
This said, the real world is greatly influenced—some might say unreason-
ably so—by the opinions of economists. Notwithstanding the caveat of
Einstein that ‘not all that counts can be counted and not all that can be
counted counts’, where we can ‘count’ and measure the impact of these new
ideas, we need to; where we cannot we need to illustrate in other ways how
they build ‘social capital’, to use the phrase favored by the World Bank.
A case in point concerns the community service orders scheme developed
in Zimbabwe. In 1992, research in Zimbabwe prisons showed that 60% of
prisoners were serving terms of 3 months or less. Data also showed that the
prison population was continuously rising. In 1994 a three-year pilot
scheme on community service began. Almost 17,000 orders were made in
this period and the prison population stabilized. 90% of orders were satis-
factorily completed. The cost of supervising a person on community service
is estimated to be one third of keeping the same person in prison. On sched-
ule, the government took over the scheme from donors in 1997.
6 ‘Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy—the legal empowerment alternative’, Golub (2003). The
author goes on to explain: ‘If a given legal services NGO serves enough people, or builds
enough capacities for the poor to effectively assert their own rights, or affects enough laws—
such impact is sufficient to justify past and future donor investment.’
56 Adam Stapleton
The question becomes, having identified this ‘new idea’ or ‘product’, how
to spread or export it?
In starting up, there is a need to develop clear and attractive literature and
‘visual aids’. Film is particularly useful and provides greater outreach since
not everyone can come and see for themselves. Criteria for the success of the
product provides guidance to those interested in borrowing from it or adapt-
ing it to their own country contexts. Statistics should clearly demonstrate that
the situation today is better than it was yesterday (from baseline data)
because of the introduction of the new product. Key people from elsewhere
may be invited to come and visit and see the product for themselves.
Influential and respected individuals with close links with the establishment
should be approached to sponsor the product’s introduction in their country.
Having started, there is a need to develop momentum (for change). A pre-
liminary visit to the target country would identify effective link persons in
key positions who will promote the product, together with a clear lead
agency. By convening a national conference to introduce the idea (including
all stakeholders and excluding none) with practitioners (from the region) as
resource persons and a tangible outcome in the form of a time-bound action
plan, the way forward becomes clear.
Follow up (sensitization) meetings targeting key groups assist in meeting
objections, fears or criticisms. Emphasis on close co-ordination both
nationally and within the region develops trust and confidence. A budget
for publicity is important to get people talking about the idea or at least to
recognize that others are talking about it. Then there is the task of securing
funding for the period in question.
The next step is national roll-out. Teams will need to be recruited and
trained. Materials will need to be ‘packaged’. Pilot schemes will need to
start and be closely nurtured in the earlier stages. This will require close
support and encouragement from those charged with supervising its imple-
mentation (the High Court judge in Zimbabwe in charge of introducing
community service encouraged every magistrate and volunteer to contact
him directly as and when they felt the need for advice or guidance). Early
wins/gains should be publicized as widely as possible. Once three countries
are applying the product, a regional network could be established so that
those charged with implementation are able to share information, discuss
problems and develop materials jointly and set and agree common stan-
dards—whether through e-mail forums or annual meetings.
The need for flexibility in marketing the product is also key to its success-
ful implementation, particularly in dealing with national rivalries or jeal-
ousy, thus it should be capable of adaptation so that it becomes ‘ours’ and
not something borrowed from ‘them’ with space for ‘local’ creativity and
ingenuity (so long as people do not lose sight of the criteria identified for its
Regional Co-operation and the Spread of New Ideas and Practices 57
‘Between the idea and the reality falls the shadow’—converting the idea
into practice: two case studies
The Juvenile Justice Forum (JJF) in Namibia was established in 1994 and
was made up of nine ministries, criminal justice agents, NGOs and individ-
uals. It ran a successful pre-trial diversion program for children in conflict
with the law.
Members of the JJF visited police cells each week and completed a cell
visit form. They identified young people who were being held unlawfully
and referred the case to a sub-committee of the JJF. Where parents had not
been traced, volunteer tracing agents were employed.
JJF workers screened the children to identify the child’s circumstances, to
determine the nature of the crime, to ensure that children were placed in the
custody of their parents/guardian, to monitor the treatment of arrested chil-
dren, and to make recommendations to the prosecution regarding diversion.
The recommendations were either for prosecution or for diversion to one
of the following: life skills program, prosecutor’s warning, supervision,
counselling, victim-offender mediation, pre-trial community service.
In conducting the screening, the guiding principle was the best interests
of the child. Between 1997 and 2002, only 3% of those diverted to life skills
programs were reported to have re-offended.7
7 The JJF program in Namibia has undergone significant changes since and further infor-
mation can be obtained from the program manager, Celeste Zaahl ([email protected]).
58 Adam Stapleton
The PAS began in December 1999 with a meeting of four NGOs and PRI
to identify an intervention in prisons to facilitate legal advice, assistance
and education to indigent offenders. Following discussions with the prison
service, a 12-month pilot scheme began in May 2000 with eight paralegals
from four national NGOs working in the four main prisons. No one out-
side the prisons expected the pilot to last six months, as NGO access to
prisons was an entirely novel enterprise. The PAS is now in its fifth year,
with 37 paralegals working in 13 prisons, four central police stations and
court centers, and has attracted attention from a number of other countries
in Africa and South Asia.
The type of assistance to be provided was developed over time according
to the needs expressed by prisoners and observed by the paralegals. By the
end of the 12 months a clear work program had been established based on
legal advice and assistance and education. Each team submits a monthly
report which is discussed at monthly meetings by representatives from each
team with the co-ordinators.
In April 2002, after two years of activity, the program was independently
evaluated (Kerrigan 2002). The highly positive report encouraged the
donor agency to extend funding for three years (2003–2006), aimed at
establishing a legal aid delivery service with national outreach on the front-
line of the criminal justice system (in the police stations at interview, in the
courts at first appearance and in the majority of prisons).
Entry into the police stations was initially resisted. This was a key objec-
tive of the program since most abuse takes place in police stations where
‘confession-based’ evidence remains the order of the day, and paralegals
sought admission to police interviews.
Once the team decided to focus their support exclusively on young per-
sons in conflict with the law, the police objections fell away. They readily
agreed to paralegals assisting with parent tracing so that interviews could
go ahead. After further discussion and collaboration with the judiciary,
paralegals developed ‘screening forms’ so that in appropriate cases, young
persons could be interviewed at the police station and promptly be diverted
from the criminal justice process where the individual was a first offender,
the offense charged was not serious and the person admitted his/her guilt.
The paralegals drew heavily on the Namibian model in designing this
approach.
After 12 months, the juvenile program in the police stations was evalu-
ated in the four regions where it was operating. A national meeting was
convened with senior police officers which agreed that paralegals should
extend their activities to include adult accused and attendance at police
interview—the initial goal of the intervention.
60 Adam Stapleton
In 2004, the program was again positively evaluated.8 The program was
replicated in Benin (2002). The Kenyan Prison Service with members of the
judiciary and NGOs sent a delegation to study the program in 2003 and a
pilot started in four prisons around Nairobi in January 2004. In 2005, the
Kenya Prisons Paralegal Project expanded to nine new prisons and three
children remand homes in four provinces. In Uganda, again following a
study visit, a similar pilot started in January 2005 under the aegis of the
Law Society of Uganda. In December 2005, the Paralegal Advisory Service
(Uganda) recruited 24 paralegals to work in prisons in the north, south, east
and west of the country.
Elsewhere in the region, the Principal Commissioner of the Tanzanian
Prison Service has invited PRI to facilitate the introduction of a pilot scheme
in prisons around Dar es Salaam. An NGO in Niger9 has proposed starting
a similar scheme. Interest has been expressed by prisons in Ghana and
Zambia. Beyond Africa, funding has been set aside in Bangladesh (UNDP
and the European Union) for a pilot to begin.
The criteria identified for the success of the scheme to date are:
AFTERTHOUGHT
Yet there are persuasive arguments for moving penal reform up the polit-
ical agenda even if there are no votes in improving prison conditions.
The prison population at any one time hides the real number of people
passing through prisons in the course of a year, which is five or six times
higher than the static population recorded on any given day. The over-
whelming majority of people entering prison will one day leave and return
to society.
Prisons are incubators of disease. The rise of tuberculosis in Russia in the
late 1990s has been traced to the appalling state of the country’s congested
prisons. In most countries in Africa, HIV rates are proportionately higher
in prison populations. The rates of tuberculosis are also on the increase in
the congested closed environment that characterizes most prisons in Africa.
Most people in prison are there because they do not have the means to
retain the services of a lawyer or because of the absence of effective alter-
natives to prison, not because they are dangerous or otherwise a threat to
the community at large. This is especially the case with juveniles who are
picked up for begging in the street (being a rogue or vagabond) or handed
over by a parent (who lack the time, know-how or patience to deal with a
rebellious teenager).
Where conditions are overcrowded, there is little prospect that the juve-
nile offender will receive an education or preferential treatment in accor-
dance with international laws and guidelines on the treatment of young
persons. The likelihood is abuse, criminalization and ultimately social
marginalization.
There is greater sympathy for a young person detained in a police station
or prison: few people would agree that it is in the best interests of the child
to keep him/her in such institutions. However a disproportionate amount
of energy is spent ‘structuring’ a correct response rather than agreeing a
strategy with key players and implementing it. The ad hoc remedies applied
in Nigeria and Malawi (above) were useful in allowing the system to let off
steam. What was lacking was the follow up that would ensure that the head
of steam did not build up again. In Malawi, a start has been made.
It has become almost axiomatic to state that the more people are involved
the greater the chance an activity has of succeeding. Time spent in small
meetings—in Africa at least—rather than in large-scale workshops is useful
to explain the purpose and clarify activities. It is easy to ‘commit’ to activ-
ities in a populous assembly, less so when you are ‘face to face’.
A process approach (proceeding one step at a time) is also useful in ‘build-
ing coalitions’ of partners (both within and without government). The par-
ticipation of all actors is important if the idea is to be able to gain the ‘space’
needed to develop and grow and establish the credibility of the program.
62 Adam Stapleton
The head of the Female section at Zomba Central Prison was totally opposed
to the Paralegal Advisory Service when it first started in 2000. Her advice to
the prisoners was to have nothing to do with ‘these NGO people’ who were
‘well paid’ and ‘do nothing’. Six months later her attitude had completely
changed and she has become one of the strongest advocates within the Prison
Service of the PAS. In 2004, she started her own nursery for the children of
female prisoners in the prison, which the paralegals are assisting her to support.
A little money goes a long way in the justice sector. The Juvenile Justice
Forum and PAS in Malawi arose from an initial investment of $1000.
While many of the ‘institutional’ problems identified by stakeholders are
real—police officers do lack transport, communications equipment, ade-
quate terms and conditions of service and training; prison structures are
dilapidated; the judiciary do need properly equipped courts and registers
and administrative support—the perceived solution, ‘more funds and
resources’, is not going to fix the matter.
A wider (‘sectoral’) approach that involves the participation of all the
actors in the sector may achieve more by simply enhancing communication,
co-operation and co-ordination between them at the local level (a good
example of this is the ‘Chain Link’ project in Uganda and the introduction
of Caseflow Management Committees at the local and regional levels).
These can involve simple measures such as: issuing cost orders against
lawyers who seek unnecessary adjournments; taking account of the remand
period spent in custody when passing sentence; giving credit for an early
plea of guilty; lowering the threshold for bail in appropriate cases, and stat-
ing a general presumption in favour of bail; discharging those cases that
have taken too long to investigate or to come to trial; taking proactive
measures to ensure that the ‘equality of arms’ principle is maintained and
that unrepresented accused persons are not unduly prejudiced; amending
the law to include custody time limits; and so on (PRI 2003).
The reality of many governments is that, even with the best will in the
world, insufficient capital is available to address so many competing prior-
ity needs—not only in the justice sector, but also in health, education, agri-
culture and infrastructure. This is why the Ouagadougou Declaration
emphasizes the need for greater ‘self-sufficiency’ within prison services; and
why PRI looks for relevant, low/no cost practices/models from elsewhere.
Visibility
a short time-frame) help to show what can be done with little when the
actors concerned work together. Publicizing these early gains raises morale,
reassures policy makers, changes (often entrenched) attitudes and encour-
ages confidence in those providing funding that the money is being well
spent.
Public opinion is often ill-informed. In Zimbabwe, the community serv-
ice scheme was initially criticized by the general population as being ‘soft
on crime’. By the end of the pilot scheme, public opinion had moved 180
degrees and demand for ‘placements’ from the courts was exceeding the
number they could supply. Public opinion needs to be engaged through the
dissemination of accurate information, publicizing success stories and
encouragement of public debate (on the radio/television more than in the
print media).
Change is disquieting for many people. In a time of political flux and
financial and personal insecurity the very idea of more change engenders
alarm and a measure of resentment sets in. Change should not be too sud-
den therefore nor too drastic. People need time to adapt gradually to the
ideas tabled and see the practice so that they can observe the benefits for
themselves. In this way the noble aspirations of so many UN instruments
and texts are seen to transform into a living, practical reality.
REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION
A
N IMAGE THAT has echoed again and again in the minds of people
working in the child justice sector in South Africa is that of Nelson
Mandela, as he made his first address to Parliament as the newly
elected President of South Africa in 1994. He promised that ‘the basic prin-
ciple from which we will proceed from now onwards is that we must rescue
the children of the nation and ensure that the system of criminal justice must
be the very last resort in the case of juvenile offenders’ (Mandela 1994).
The impetus for this important commitment by the ANC-led government
was the history of the suffering of children in South Africa’s police cells and
prisons. In the 1970s and 1980s many of these children had been political
detainees, subject to arbitrary arrests, detention without trial, sometimes to
torture (Wilson and Ramphele 1987). By the late 1980s the political deten-
tions had stopped, but many children continued to be swept up into the
criminal justice system because of ‘ordinary’ crimes, the majority of which
were non-violent crimes, mostly theft. Non-governmental organisations and
human rights lawyers did what they could during the apartheid years; there
were detainee’s parents committees and free legal representation during the
years of intense political activity. Later, there was a concerted campaign by
a group of non-governmental organisations to have children released from
prisons and police cells and to call for reform of the way in which the crim-
inal justice system dealt with children. In the early 1990s a strong child
rights movement began to develop in South Africa, and thus children’s rights
became an important theoretical framework underpinning the efforts at law
reform (Sloth-Nielsen 2001). All this history must have been ringing in
Nelson Mandela’s ears as he made his first promises of action.
With a President as a champion for the rights and protection of children
in the criminal justice system, anything and everything seemed possible, and
indeed—at least for a while—sweeping changes to the way that things had
66 Ann Skelton
been done in the past were more than possible, they were expected. In this
chapter I will show that the transition to democracy in South Africa flung
open the door to change, but that the door has been inching back to posi-
tion over the years that have ensued. It is not yet closed, but the gap is nar-
rower, and there is concern that some of the reform initiatives may not
come to fruition.
This chapter examines the efforts of law reformers in South Africa in
relation to children accused of crimes. The efforts have culminated in the
Child Justice Bill, which at the time of writing has been through two rounds
of deliberations of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Justice and
Constitutional Development. The chapter details the background to the law
reform efforts and describes some of the issues relating to concern about
public safety that have influenced the process. Some aspects of the parlia-
mentary debates about the Bill are then explored and analysed.
TRANSFORMATION
competing for resources and for the favourable attention of the legislature,
and consequently progress from research to policy formulation to draft
statute was slow.
Van Zyl Smit then moves on to sketch the reality that, within only a few
years of the new government being established, the pressure of keeping the
electorate happy began to show in some very mixed messages that govern-
ment was sending out with regard to its approach to criminal justice policy.
Quick on the heels of producing a National Crime Prevention Strategy
(1996) which was rooted in ideas of social crime prevention, and whilst still
running a Truth and Reconciliation Commission based on ideas of restitu-
tion and healing, the government began what Van Zyl Smit calls an ‘erratic
flirtation’ with law and order responses to crime. The responses ranged from
‘an almost farcical police undertaking to arrest thousands of known crimi-
nals in a short period …, through the introduction of mandatory minimum
sentences, to the bizarre (and only half-heartedly denied) suggestion that dis-
used mine shafts be used to house dangerous prisoners’ (Van Zyl Smit 1999,
201). He traces the genesis of this swing towards a law and order response
to a sense of ‘popular punitiveness’. The fears of the white minority about
the myriad of societal changes they were experiencing tended to be most
effectively articulated in terms of fear about crime. Thus government was
faced with the reality that keeping the business sector happy and promoting
investor confidence was becoming threatened by what appeared to be a lack
of commitment or ability on their part to deal effectively with crime.
Camerer (1997) defines the tension in a slightly different way. Her view
is that within a few years of coming to power the South African government
found itself doing a balancing act; on the one hand protecting the hard-won
commitment to human rights (including those of suspects and perpetrators),
and on the other hand addressing the angry calls for vengeance and retribu-
tion by many South Africans who have been victimised by crime. Camerer
maintains, however, that the only way that the government can hope to
restore faith in the criminal justice system is by focussing on the needs and
rights of crime victims and providing an adequate response to them.
It is evident from what has happened in criminal justice policy-making in
South Africa during the first ten years of democracy that popular sentiment
does not always remain supportive of vision-based policy. South African pol-
icy analysts Simpson et al (2001) observe that South Africa has experienced
a backlash to the ultimate vision-based policy, namely the Bill of Rights con-
tained within the Constitution. The authors contend that the experiences of
crime and violence, as well as government’s apparent non-delivery of solu-
tions to deal with the problem, has increasingly stimulated a popular back-
lash which is about a resistance to those mechanisms in the Bill of Rights
which are seen as servicing criminals rather than victims. Children who com-
mit crimes have not been immune to this backlash, and the influence that it
has had on the process of drafting legislation is palpable.
68 Ann Skelton
Crime and its control became a pivotal theme in South Africa within
two years of the first democratic government coming to power. South
African policy and law makers have in recent years begun to embrace a
number of ‘law and order’ ideas relating to crime control, primarily bor-
rowed from the United States. The ‘broken window approach to polic-
ing’ championed by the former Commissioner for New York City,
William Bratton, was discussed enthusiastically in the South African
press when Bratton visited South Africa in 1996. In the United States
Bratton had achieved much success by encouraging police to ‘crack-down
on the squeegee boys’—a reference to young (mainly black) males who
washed car windscreens in New York streets (Simpson 1997). This
approach is somewhat at odds with the idea of diversion of children
away from the criminal justice system, which is based on an attitude of
tolerance for the reality that young people often commit minor crimes. If
such children can be diverted away from the criminal justice system
rather than exposed to its brutalising effects, they are more likely to grow
up to be law-abiding citizens than those who are swept into the penal sys-
tem. This is the idea that underpins rule 11 of the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Justice (1985) which
encourages dealing with juvenile offenders, where appropriate, without
resorting to a formal trial.
Swart (2000), a member of the South Africa Parliament, observes that ‘In
South Africa—with the unacceptably high crime rate—what may seem a
desire for retribution is actually a concern for public safety’. Swart believes
that a restorative justice approach can still provide a solution because it can
potentially deliver at least as much public safety as the present system.
‘Therein lies the appeal to policy makers grappling with the demands of
society for safer streets’ (Swart 2000, 2).
The development of the proposed child justice system was strongly influ-
enced by the movements of restorative justice and children’s rights but con-
cerns have been raised about whether these two movements remain
strongly influential, or whether public concern about crime has caused the
mood in South Africa to shift to a point where the crime control impera-
tives are overriding some of the previous policy commitments, and a more
punitive approach is emerging (Skelton, 1999). The government’s
approach to children in the criminal justice system is ambivalent. ‘Criminal
justice responses to young offenders continue to oscillate between the iron
fist and the velvet glove’ is the vivid description offered by Van der Spuy
et al (2004, 177). To illustrate this, the authors note that according to
Muntingh (2001, 6) the number of children under 18 years in prison rose
by 158.7% from January 1995 to July 2000, compared to only a 33.2%
increase in the 18–20 year-old bracket. Sentences of children are also
getting longer. Yet at the same time, diversion has also rapidly increased
during the same period.
The South African Child Justice Bill: Transition as Opportunity 69
The extent to which the law and order approach has dislodged the original
intention of those involved in the development of new policy and legislation
for child offenders needs to be examined by going back to the end of 1996
when the official process of law-making began. In December 1996 the
Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, requested the South African Law
Commission (now called the South African Law Reform Commission) to
include an investigation into juvenile justice in its programme. He
appointed individuals from civil society to be members of the juvenile jus-
tice project committee, whom he knew had been part of the non-govern-
ment lobby group calling for substantial reform to the juvenile justice
system. The juvenile justice project committee of the South African Law
Commission commenced its work in January 1997. The Law Commission
process of law reform is a very consultative one, and there was a high level
of participation by people working in the system, and even by children
themselves who were directly consulted on the Bill in order to obtain their
views and reflect on them in the final report.
The first step taken by the juvenile justice project committee was to pub-
lish an issue paper setting out the general direction that was to be taken. A
quote from the issue paper indicates the broad approach:
The South African Constitution and international instruments give an
outline of what should be included in a future South African juvenile jus-
tice system. In line with these principles the project committee is of the view
that the overall approach should aim to promote the well-being of the child,
and to deal with each child in a individualised way. A key aspect should be
diversion of cases in defined circumstances away from the criminal justice
system as early as possible … The involvement of family and community is
of vital importance, as is sensitivity to culture, tradition and empowerment
of victims. There should be an emphasis on young people being held
accountable for their actions. This should be done in a manner which gives
them an opportunity to turn away from criminal activity. (South African
Law Commission 1997, 5)
In the final report, which was published almost three years later in
2000, the Commission enumerates various factors that influenced the
law reform process, namely the recognition of children’s rights, the the-
ory of restorative justice, fiscal constraints, and public concern about
crime. In relation to the last-mentioned factor, the Commission had the
following to say:
Increasingly, however, during the three year investigation into Juvenile Justice by
the Commission, a further influence has been brought to bear, and that is the deep
concern in South African society about the high levels of crime. The public have
expressed the need for a system of justice which deals effectively with serious
70 Ann Skelton
violent criminals. This factor, too has shaped the process of law reform, and this
is evidenced by provisions in the draft Bill which allow for children charged with
serious, violent offences to be tried in a criminal court at a higher jurisdictional
level, to be imprisoned both during the awaiting trial period and as a sentence
option. It is also recommended that criminal records for serious and violent
offences should not be expunged. These features were not originally envisaged by
the Commission in the early stages of the investigation. Indeed, the Issue Paper
made the assumption that there would be no children in prison awaiting trial in
the proposed new system. The realisation has grown, as the investigation has
unfolded against a backdrop of rising public concern about crime, that in order
to give the majority of children (those charged with petty or non-violent offences)
a chance to make up for their mistakes without being labelled and treated as
criminals, this Bill would need to be very clear about the fact that society will be
protected from the relatively small number of children who commit serious, vio-
lent crimes. (South African Law Commission 2000, 9)
The Commission went on to say that although the draft Bill was pragmatic
and cognisant of the realities of the crime problem in the country, the ini-
tial commitment to children’s rights had not been sacrificed. This demon-
strated that law reformers had committed themselves to what they believed
could realistically be achieved in South Africa, with an eye on the need for
proper implementation.
The ‘pragmatism’ referred to by the Commission also became a recurring
theme in the developing process of child justice law reform as the Bill
moved into Parliamentary discussions. The juvenile justice project commit-
tee had, with a great deal of foresight, predicted that the Bill would not suc-
ceed if questions about implementation could not effectively be answered.
Consequently, the project committee made history at the South African Law
Reform Commission by being the first project committee to undertake a
costing of their proposals (Barberton and Stuart 1999). Following the hand-
over of the South African Law Commission Report on Juvenile Justice to
the Minister of Justice in August 2000, work on implementation planning
began. The Child Justice Project, a United Nations technical assistance proj-
ect of the government of South Africa, followed up on the costing work
already done by assisting government to produce a comprehensive budget
and implementation strategy for the Child Justice Bill. This is an inter-sec-
toral budget developed with the involvement of Treasury, and linked to the
government’s medium term expenditure framework. The Deputy Minister
of Justice and Constitutional Development has described it as a model
according to which all future Bills should be costed and planned for.
Sloth-Nielsen (2003), in her innovative article entitled ‘The Business of Child
Justice’, undertakes an in-depth analysis of the pragmatic approach which was
followed by the project committee and by government. She concedes that chil-
dren’s rights and restorative justice were important influencing factors in the
development of the Child Justice Bill, but she makes the following observation:
The South African Child Justice Bill: Transition as Opportunity 71
The article has described and explained how, in the child justice sphere, a grow-
ing realism about the transition South Africa is facing resulted in a measurable
shift in emphasis from human rights values (as philosophical constructs), and
from a stance based on the righteousness derived from the worthiness of the
cause. The increasing reliance for both law reformers and government’s technical
advisors on arguments and practices related to economic modelling and cost effi-
ciency have been illustrated here in support of the contention that, while provid-
ing a useful backdrop, children’s rights and restorative justice ideology have been
eclipsed by business-speak. This could give the impression that an efficiency
model, along corporatist lines, has supplanted the idealism of the endeavour.
(Sloth-Nielsen 2003, 192)
The Child Justice Bill was introduced into Parliament in November 2002 as
Bill 49 of 2002. South Africa has a participative style of law making, with
every Bill being deliberated on by Portfolio Committees made up of elected
representatives from various political parties. Public hearings were held on
the Bill in February 2003 and the deliberations on the Bill by the Portfolio
Committee on Justice and Constitutional Development (hereafter the port-
folio committee) followed in March 20031.
Although the process of finalising the Bill is not yet complete, there are a
number of observations that can be drawn from the deliberations that have
taken place thus far. A number of themes have emerged from the nature and
content of the debates.
The portfolio committee has continued with the emphasis on the prag-
matic that began earlier in the law-making process. The policy makers’ ear-
lier decisions to focus on practical issues such as budgeting and
implementation were based at least in part on the knowledge that the
Parliament has previously passed laws for which there was no clear imple-
mentation plan or budget, and they have subsequently seen that govern-
ment has struggled to implement such legislation2. In order to demonstrate
that they had learned from these previous experiences and that they were
well prepared for the Child Justice Bill, government handed to the portfo-
lio committee a comprehensive budget and implementation strategy to sup-
port the Bill. The preparatory work that had been supported by the UN
technical assistance project on Child Justice as described above proved
invaluable, as the chairperson of the portfolio committee noted that, had
government been unable to demonstrate their readiness to implement the
Bill, the Bill may not have been debated at all3. The chairperson of the port-
folio committee has also mentioned the possibility of a ‘phased in’ approach
to implementation, and it may be that the final version of the Bill will indi-
cate a ‘staggered’ implementation date, with the Bill perhaps being put into
operation on different dates in the various provinces according to their state
of readiness to implement certain provisions.
The focus on practicalities is further evidenced by the portfolio commit-
tee’s current position on the imprisonment of children below of the age of
14 years during the pre-trial and trial stage. The intention of the Bill as pre-
sented to Parliament was to place a complete ban on the imprisonment of
children below the age of 14 years. The portfolio committee has shown
reluctance to accept this complete ban, at least in part because they fear that
there will not be sufficient appropriate alternative secure facilities to accom-
modate such children. They therefore propose, in the case of pre-trial deten-
tion of children below the age of 14 years, that such children may be
imprisoned only if there are no alternative facilities within a reasonable dis-
tance from the court, and the portfolio committee further proposes that this
should be a temporary measure, to be reviewed by parliament within two
years of the Bill being passed ‘with a view to establishing whether the fac-
tual situation in respect of the availability of suitable placement facilities
warrants the continued application of those provisions and, if necessary,
every two years thereafter’ (redrafted Child Justice Bill, clause 24 (5)). The
idea behind this appears to be that parliament is using its oversight powers
to force government to deliver on the policy commitment that has been
made.
A second identifiable trend is the portfolio committee’s tendency to
emphasise regulation rather than discretion. The original drafters relied on
translating their vision through principles, objectives and substantive
clauses which left the details regarding the decisions to be made in each case
to the discretion of various role players in the system, within a broad frame-
work of norms and standards. This was considered to be the best way of
ensuring that each child would be dealt with in an individualised way, and
it was also in line with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice (1985) which state at rule 6 that in view
of the varying special needs of juveniles as well as the variety of measures
USA which try children as young as 13 years of age as adults on certain seri-
ous charges (Stafford and Kyckelhahn 2002).
A further factor leading to the highly regulatory approach mentioned
above may be a lack of faith in functionaries in the criminal justice system,
such as the police, the prosecution and the judiciary. All of these sectors are
undergoing transformation, with efforts being made to increase the number
of black and women candidates at all levels of the criminal justice system.
There is a fear that inexperienced personnel will not use their discretion
wisely, thus the tendency to centralise decision making through the more
peremptory style of law making.
A third identifiable trend has been the portfolio committee’s tendency to
focus on the exceptional cases, and shape the law to cater for the extraor-
dinary. This is again contrary to the approach of the original drafters. The
South African Law Commission noted that the majority of children do not
commit serious, violent crimes for example, and thus several sections of the
Bill focus on the first 48 hours following the arrest of the child and the
attempts to divert such a child from trial in the courts.
Although the portfolio committee has not proposed changing the basic
structure of the Bill, there is a tendency for them to reframe certain sections
to deal with the exceptional case. Numerous hypothetical examples have
been raised by politicians who are members of the portfolio committee along
the lines of ‘what if an eleven year old child who has committed a heinous
crime is arrested in an area where there are no secure alternatives to prison
and the police station has only one vehicle which cannot be tied up all day
to transport the child to another town that has a secure care facility …’. The
approach inherent in the Bill that was published by the Law Commission
was that there should be a generally applicable scheme with limited powers
available to deal with the exceptional case. In order to help this approach in
practice the drafters built in rules, such as ‘every child must be assessed by a
probation officer within 48 hours of arrest’ and then have a proviso to that
rule allowing for departure if there are substantial reasons for such depar-
ture, which reasons should be recorded by the presiding officer. Instead, the
politicians appear to be haunted by the idea of passing the legislation and a
few years down the line being confronted with a case which presents an
enormous challenge, such as the case involving the killing of James Bulger in
the UK, a case which has been referred to by the politicians during the delib-
erations on the Child Justice Bill on numerous occasions.
The portfolio committee’s approach in this regard is not unique. Brunk
(2001) makes the fascinating observation that people tend to form their
thinking about punishment when pondering the most horrendous cases.
Thus pressures are created for a criminal justice system that is designed to
deal with the ‘worst case’. Brunk cautions that ‘legal responses appropriate
for the worst cases are not necessarily the best way to handle the vast
majority of the routine offences that come to the attention of the criminal
76 Ann Skelton
CONCLUSION
Transition creates opportunities. These must be seized with both hands, but
there is a need to be thorough as well. New democracies require a high level
of consultation. Doing all these things properly takes time, and as time
passes, politics normalise—it is soon back to ‘business as usual’. It is there-
fore necessary to have a pragmatic approach that goes beyond policy artic-
ulation. It is necessary to try to foresee how patterns of thinking may
change once the euphoria of the new-found freedom has waned.
Simpson et al (2001) point out that the word ‘transition’ does not ade-
quately describe the changes that South Africa was going through in the
early years of the new democracy. ‘Transition is not the same as regime
change,’ the authors remark, and in the early years of a new democracy
it is not certain whether the basic liberal-democratic features will be per-
manent.
A lesson that can be learned from the unfinished journey of juvenile jus-
tice reform in South Africa is that there needs to be an awareness that soci-
eties do not remain static and that as a new democracy emerges so popular
expectations change. The initial impetus that is brought about by a regime
change is characterised by the desire to create legitimate structures and sys-
tems that reflect the new order. Thus, when the new ANC-led Government
of National Unity came to power, bolstered by a rights-based constitution
and a children’s rights lobby, it demonstrated the political will to bring
about dramatic changes to the way that children were dealt with by the
criminal justice system. But it did not take long before the public were ask-
ing new and different questions about crime and justice.
One of the difficulties that needs to be faced in countries that undergo
regime change is that everything is in transition. There are probably not
enough personnel to run current or future systems properly and new peo-
ple are being appointed who have to be trained. Procedures, institutions
The South African Child Justice Bill: Transition as Opportunity 77
REFERENCES
T
HE OBJECTIVE OF this chapter is to provide a broad overview of the
origins of the juvenile justice system in the United States and subse-
quent major changes in the system. This historical overview provides
the groundwork for the chapters by Armstrong and Feld on contemporary
issues in American juvenile justice. In addition, since the American juvenile
court has been a major influence on the systems in a number of Western and
Eastern European nations, this chapter provides an historical background
for those systems which are described in this book.1
The American model for the juvenile court, and more broadly the juvenile jus-
tice system, was created in Chicago in 1899. Just as the discipline of sociology
emerged out of a period of massive economic and related social changes in
Europe, the juvenile justice system was created during the transition from an
agricultural economy to an industrial economy, and from a rural to an increas-
ingly urban society in the U.S.A. (see Platt 1977). In a sense, these events may
parallel the economic and social transitions taking place in the developing
nations today. Of course, additional influences on the legal institutions in
developing nations today are the forces of economic and cultural globalization.
A number of societal forces influenced this change in the American legal
institution. These underlying societal forces cannot be discussed thoroughly
in this chapter but they are detailed in Platt’s The Child Savers (1977) and
Feld’s Bad Kids (1999).
1 Cunneen and White (1995) show that separate juvenile courts were also appearing in
Australia and England in the late 1800s and early 1900s (see also Farrington 1984). In fact,
the similarities underlying the development of separate courts for juveniles in the U.K. and the
U.S.A. are striking.
84 Eric L Jensen
Two cultural changes in the U.S.A. that were central to the creation of the
juvenile justice system were the social construction of childhood as a dis-
tinct stage of life, and the later social construction of adolescence. The
social construction of childhood began hundreds of years earlier in Europe
(Aries 1962). By the late 1800s it had become part of American culture.
Children were no longer seen as simply little adults, but as immature and in
need of ‘proper’ socialization and nurturing to develop into responsible
adults.
The social construction of adolescence was beginning in the late 1800s.
As the economy changed from agricultural to industrial, the traditional pat-
tern of becoming independent through employment and marriage in one’s
teenage years was no longer the norm. Persons in their teenage years were
now expected to continue to be economically dependent on their parents,
to attend school, and in essence prolong their childhood.
The Progressive Movement of the late 1800s and early 1900s was a
crucial force in creating policies directed at young people. The
Progressives were attempting to improve the life circumstances of
the working class and poor in this increasingly urban, industrial
America, and at the same time impose their rural, Protestant values on
the lives of the waves of immigrants coming into the United States at the
time. One element of the Progressive Movement has been termed the
‘child savers’.
Three of the youth-centered policies advocated by the Progressive
Movement were: (1) child labor laws, (2) compulsory school attendance,
and (3) the juvenile court (see Feld 1999). These were major changes in
social policy toward youth in the U.S.A.
Laws were passed that limited the number of hours children could work
and set minimum ages at which children could work, among other things.
These laws were, on the surface, intended to protect children from the harsh
conditions of the industrial workplace of the time, but at the same time to
open up more jobs for adults.
Youth were required to attend school until they reached a specified age; for
example, 16 years. These laws were intended to require that youth learn the
basic skills necessary to become a productive part of the adult workforce
and ‘good’ citizens. Of course, these laws also took youth out of the work-
force and opened up industrial jobs for adults.
An Historical Overview of the American Juvenile Justice System 85
One small, localized part of the Progressive Movement that became a major
force in the creation of the juvenile justice system was the Chicago Women’s
Club. Out of the industrial economy emerged a new upper-middle class in
the U.S.A. The cultural ethos of this newly affluent stratum of urban soci-
ety expected women to stay in the home and to be responsible for the
‘proper’ upbringing of their children. Given their affluence and their related
ability to hire others to perform the household labors for their families,
these women had the free time, the motivation, and the resources to be an
active part of the Progressive Movement in Chicago.
One of their priorities was to improve conditions in local jails. To famil-
iarize themselves with the conditions in jails, they visited the Cook County
jail in Chicago. Upon visiting the jail, they were appalled not only at the
physical conditions there, but also that children were being held with
adults. In conjunction with several other progressive-minded groups, they
worked to create the first juvenile court in Chicago in 1899.
The juvenile court model was based on the ideology of protecting and guid-
ing children to mature into responsible, law-abiding adults. The espoused
purposes of the juvenile court were to ‘help’ or rehabilitate, not punish. Since
its formal child welfare function was not to be punitive, the originators of the
juvenile court did not believe that it was necessary to provide due process
protections to youth in the court. These rights of due process are provided to
adults in the American criminal courts, at least in theory if not always in prac-
tice. In line with this lack of due process protections, the procedures of the
court were informal, not formal as in the adult criminal court system.
The juvenile court in the U.S.A. was based on the legal doctrine of parens
patriae. This doctrine was originally used in 1500s in English chancery
courts to protect the Crown’s interests in the property of children whose
parents had died and left an estate, that is, the state would take over man-
aging the property of the child until they were of majority age. The state
was ‘parent of the country’, and thus acted as parent for the estate of the
child (see Bernard 1992, Feld 1999).
The parens patriae doctrine emerged in the U.S.A. in the case of Mary
Ann Crouse in 1838. In that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled
that the child Mary Ann could be removed from the custody of her father
and placed in the Philadelphia House of Refuge because she was a poor
child and in danger of growing up to be a pauper; she had committed no
crime. The court asserted the parens patriae doctrine when affirming the
decision of a lower court to remove custody from the father and place her
in an institution (see Bernard 1992, Feld 1999).
Another change in the treatment of juveniles under the law that came
with the juvenile court was the creation of ‘status offenses’. These are
behaviors that are illegal for youth only. Examples of these are truancy
86 Eric L Jensen
from school, running away from home, and being beyond the control of
parents. The child savers believed that these behaviors were early signs, or
predictors, that a youth would become involved in crime. So the rationale
was that the juvenile court should intervene early in the lives of ‘wayward’
children to prevent the development of criminal behavior. This belief led to
an entire new category of behaviors becoming illegal for youth.
The American juvenile court eventually evolved into an entire juvenile jus-
tice system. This new juvenile justice system included age-specific courts, pro-
bation and parole (or aftercare) services, short-term detention facilities, and
long-term correctional facilities. The states were free to set the age limits for
the juvenile court. Today 39 of the 50 states have a maximum age of 17 years
(i.e., under 18 years of age). Eight states have upper age juvenile court juris-
diction limits of 16 years and three states have upper age limits of 15 years.
Following these beginnings, the juvenile justice system carried out its duties
relatively unchanged until the 1960s. At this time, societal and legal changes
in the U.S.A. led to changes in the juvenile justice system. Specifically, dur-
ing the 1960s it was discovered by civil liberties attorneys and criminologists
that many youth were being treated punitively in the juvenile court but they
did not have the due process protections provided to adults in the criminal
justice system. This realization and subsequent U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions led to major changes in the juvenile justice system. The initial phase of
these legal changes has been called the due process revolution.
The most influential and far-reaching of these decisions was the Gault
case in 1967. In this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held 8 to 1 that indi-
viduals in juvenile court hearings had the constitutional right to certain due
process protections when the youth was in jeopardy of being incarcerated.
These were: the right to counsel, the right to a notice of the charges, the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against them, and the privi-
lege against self-incrimination.
The next major juvenile court decision by the U.S. Supreme Court came
in the Winship case (1970). In this decision, the Supreme Court ruled that
juveniles are entitled to the highest standard of proof ‘beyond a reasonable
doubt’ during the adjudication proceedings (known as the trial in the adult
criminal court). The Court ruled that the ‘preponderance of evidence’ is not
a sufficient basis for a decision of delinquency when youths are charged
with acts that would be criminal if committed by adults.
These two Supreme Court decisions began a due process revolution in the
American juvenile court and, at the same time, served as the beginnings of
An Historical Overview of the American Juvenile Justice System 87
a more adversarial system. The social welfare model of justice for juveniles
was ending and a more legalistic orientation began to emerge.
In addition to these important Supreme Court decisions, the national
political agenda in the U.S.A. changed in the late 1960s. President Lyndon
Johnson appointed a series of task forces to examine the rise in ‘street’
crime at the time. The juvenile delinquency and juvenile justice task force
called for four major policy directions: due process for juveniles in the juve-
nile court, diversion from handling in the juvenile justice system for minor
offenses, ‘decriminalization’ of status offenses, and deinstitutionalization
(i.e. a reduction in the use of incarceration for juveniles, particularly for sta-
tus offenses and less serious violations of criminal law) (President’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 1967).
These policy directions have been referred to as the four Ds. These changes
moved across the nation, although not always with the results that were
anticipated by their advocates (i.e. an unanticipated consequence of diver-
sion programs was often an increase in youth being touched by state con-
trols or ‘net widening’) (Polk 1984, see also Feld 1999, 173–85).
In 1974 the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act cod-
ified many of the changes recommended in the President’s Commission
report into law. This Act required states to remove status offenders from
secure detention and correctional facilities, to remove juveniles from jails
where they were held with adults, and to encourage the development of
community-based alternatives to detention and correctional facilities,
among a number of other progressive changes. This Act allowed the federal
government to withhold juvenile justice funds from states if they did not
comply with the required policies.
Research on the deinstitutionalization of status offenders found that this
new policy was effective. The number of status offenders held in secure
short-term detention and in long-term correctional institutions decreased
substantially between 1974 and 1982 (Schneider 1984, Krisberg et al 1986,
see also Feld 1999, 175–9). An unanticipated consequence of this change
was that many more status offenders were subsequently held in private
mental health and substance abuse treatment facilities, in some instances
with levels of security comparable to those in public correctional institu-
tions (Feld 1999, 179–85). This change in the handling of status offenders
is not in line with the objectives of the federal deinstitutionalization legisla-
tion. Feld (1999) has referred to this new development as the ‘hidden sys-
tem’ of social control for youths.
This reform movement of the 1970s appears to have laid the framework
for portions of the juvenile justice sections of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (1989). For example, Article 37.b states in part, ‘The arrest,
detention, or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law
and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appro-
priate period of time’ (emphasis added). The latter part of this section is
88 Eric L Jensen
Another crucial political change that influenced juvenile justice policy in the
United States was the presidency of Ronald Reagan. Almost immediately
2 The United States of America has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The primary reasons behind this failure to ratify the CRC are that some states allow capital
punishment for juveniles, and that some rights accorded to children under the CRC are not
recognized as rights in the United States, such as the fundamental right to an education (see
Walker et al 1999, 36–8). The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled in Roper v Simmons (2005)
that a person cannot be executed for a crime they committed when under the age of 18 years.
An Historical Overview of the American Juvenile Justice System 89
upon entering office in 1980, Reagan began to alter the direction of federal
initiatives for juvenile justice policy from prevention programs and related
research to an emphasis on serious, violent youth offenders and incarcera-
tion. Specifically, the Reagan administration emphasized the following poli-
cies: (1) preventive detention—holding juveniles believed to be a risk to
public safety in secure holds before appearing in court; (2) transfer of juve-
niles charged with specified crimes to an adult criminal court; (3) mandatory
and determinate sentencing for violent juveniles; (4) increased confinement
of juveniles; and (5) enforcement of the death penalty for juveniles convicted
of committing aggravated murder. This direction in juvenile justice policy
has been termed the ‘crime control model’. The crime control model contin-
ues to be the dominant presence in U.S. juvenile justice policy today.
Alfred S. Regnery, director of the federal agency responsible for juvenile
justice policy and funding under President Reagan, explained their objec-
tives as follows:
In essence, we have changed the outlook of the office from emphasizing
the lesser offenses and the non-offender to one emphasizing the serious
juvenile offender. We have placed less emphasis on juvenile crime as a social
problem and more emphasis on crime as a justice problem. In essence, the
office now reflects the general philosophy of President Reagan and his
administration rather than that of Jimmy Carter and his administration.
(Regnery 1986, 40)
Interestingly, there was not a major increase in youth violent crime at the
time. Although there was a small increase in the homicide rate for 14–17
year olds in 1980 (www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/teens.htm), the rate of
serious violent crime for juveniles—homicide, aggravated assault, forcible
rape and robbery combined—declined between 1975 and 1985 (see Empey
et al 1999, 63). Furthermore, the proportion of persons under 18 years of
age who were arrested for serious violent crime steadily decreased from
1975 through 1982, reaching its low point in 1987. Juveniles accounted for
an average of 11.5% of arrests for serious violent crimes in the years 1978
to 1982 and this declined to an average of 9.3% in the years 1981 to 1989
(Maguire and Pastore 2001, 389).
The anti-youth sentiment underlying this Reagan administration policy
shift has been interpreted by many social scientists and others as a socio-
political construction to capture public attention and galvanize a voting
block for the Republican party that began under the Nixon administration
(see Baum 1996, Jensen and Gerber 1998, Beckett and Sasson 2004).
Although this ‘get tough’ trend began with conservative Republicans, it has
subsequently spread throughout the American political spectrum (see the
chapter by Jepsen in this volume for a similar experience in Denmark and
Ann Skelton on South Africa).3
3 See White (1990) regarding a moral panic about youth as a dangerous class in Australia.
90 Eric L Jensen
Later, homicide rates of youth exploded. Between 1987 and 1993 the
juvenile arrest rate for murder increased substantially, as did the murder
arrest rate for 18 to 25 year olds. This escalation in lethal violence was
widely covered by the media and served to support both in public opinion
and politically the ‘get tough’ policies that the Reagan administration had
been advocating for several years.
One of the crime control model changes that swept across the nation was
the increase in statutory or legislative transfer (or waiver) of juveniles to the
adult criminal court. Under this policy juveniles are automatically sent to
the adult criminal court for trial in certain instances. These statutes usually
specify an age range (e.g. 15–17 years) and specific offenses (e.g. first-
degree murder, forcible rape, robbery) for which a juvenile is automatically
transferred to an adult court for trial and sentencing. These statutes were
created because conservative legislators believed that juvenile court judges
were ‘too soft’ on juveniles accused of serious offenses. Of course, legisla-
tive transfer to the criminal court allows for or requires more severe pun-
ishments since juveniles are subject to sanctions in the adult criminal justice
system.
The research shows that legislative transfer of juveniles to the adult crim-
inal court has been ineffective in deterring serious violent crime among
youth. The first two studies of legislative transfer of juveniles to the adult
criminal court in the urban high crime rate state of New York (Singer and
McDowell 1988) and the rural low crime state of Idaho (Jensen and
Metsger 1994) both concluded that this policy was ineffective. Jensen
and Metsger (1994, 102) stated, ‘the movement away from the traditional
juvenile court model to the more punitive criminal justice system did not
deter youth from committing violent crimes’.
The most recent research on this topic follows two matched groups of
youth prosecuted for serious crimes for seven years after their appearances
in the adult criminal court or juvenile court. This research not only con-
firms the findings of the earlier studies, but also concludes that serious ado-
lescent offenders prosecuted in the adult criminal court are more likely to
be rearrested for violent, property and weapons offenses than are those
prosecuted in the juvenile court. In addition, ‘they are rearrested for these
crimes more quickly and more often, and they are more likely to be
returned to incarceration’ (Fagan et al 2003, i). The authors go on to state:
Law and policy facilitating ‘wholesale waiver’ or categorical exclusion of
certain groups of adolescents based solely on offense and age, are ineffec-
tive at ... specific deterrence of serious crime, despite political rhetoric
insisting the opposite. Non-individualized transfer to criminal court may
increase the risk of serious crimes by adolescents and young adults, by heav-
ily mortgaging their possibilities to deflect their behavioral trajectory and
resume a path of pro-social human development (Fagan et al 2003, ii; see
also Sampson and Laub 1993).
An Historical Overview of the American Juvenile Justice System 91
The crime control era was solidified further with the decision in Schall v
Martin (1984). In Schall the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the preventive
detention of juveniles is legal under the U.S. Constitution. That is, if the
judge believes the youth to be at risk of committing a serious crime, he/she
can be incarcerated until the adjudicatory hearing. There is no provision for
bail for juveniles in the U.S.A. Procedures in the adult criminal system are
very different. Bail is allowed for nearly all adult criminal cases. As Feld
(1999, 138) has noted, ‘juvenile pretrial detention practices contrast
sharply with the limited circumstances under which criminal courts preven-
tively detain adult defendants’.
As we have seen with the legislative waiver policy, the research reveals a
major flaw in this preventive detention policy. In a remarkable ‘natural exper-
iment’ study of the effects of preventive detention, Fagan and Guggenheim
found that judges predicted future violent crime incorrectly in four out of five
cases. ‘The high rate of false positives demonstrates that the ability to predict
future crimes—and especially violent crimes—is so poor that such predictions
will be wrong in the majority of cases’ (Fagan and Guggenheim 1996, 447).
In summary, with the U.S. Supreme Court decisions of the due process
revolution, the American juvenile court has experienced the addition of sev-
eral due process protections for juveniles in juvenile court, but these con-
tinue to be fewer than for adults accused of a crime. In the McKeiver and
Schall decisions the scope of the due process revolution was initially stalled
and later reversed. In a landmark study of the juvenile justice system in the
U.S., Feld (1999, 162) concluded:
The United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of youth possesses two
competing cultural constructions and legal conceptions of young people.
On the one hand, it views them as innocent, vulnerable, fragile and depend-
ent children. When the Court characterizes youths as children, it invokes
‘paternalistic’ rationales to enable their parents and the state to protect and
nurture them and subordinates their autonomy to the longer-term interests
of the adults they will become. On the other hand, the Court’s jurispru-
dence sometimes characterizes young people as autonomous and responsi-
ble adult-like people.
The Court adopts this ‘liberationist’ posture when young people engage
in adult-like activities, such as frightening criminal behavior, and treats
them as the formal and legal equals of their elders. ... [A]s a result ... young
offenders continue to receive the ‘worst of both worlds’.
and reporting statistical data on the juvenile justice system in the U.S.
Although OJJDP’s primary missions have changed to meet the philosophi-
cal positions of each federal administration since its inception, it continues
to furnish valuable information and services to practitioners and
researchers today, despite cut-backs by the George W. Bush administration.
One example is the OJJDP Model Programs Guide
(http://www.dsgonline.com/Model_Programs_Guide/Web.mpg_index_flash
.htm). This easily accessible website contains descriptions of model pro-
grams throughout the continuum of care, from prevention through re-entry
into society following residential care (see the Intensive Aftercare Model
chapter by Armstrong in this volume).4
OJJDP also sponsors numerous training sessions and workshops on juve-
nile justice practices. A major event of this type was the Justice for Children
national conference held in December 2000 in Washington, D.C. Justice for
Children was attended by hundreds of practitioners and researchers from
across the country. Numerous workshops were held on cutting-edge juve-
nile justice practices (e.g. the Intensive Aftercare Model and the Social
Development Model).
As part of its mission, OJJDP produces a number of statistical reports on
juvenile crime, juvenile victimization, and juveniles in the justice system
(http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/; then go to ‘statistics’). The information contained in
these reports is widely used by practitioners and researchers alike.
(www.fftinc.com), the Oregon Social Learning Center (www.oslc.org), and the Center for
Restorative Justice and Peacemaking, School of Social Work, University of Minnesota, St.
Paul, Minnesota, U.S.A. (http://ssw.che.unm.edu/rip).
An Historical Overview of the American Juvenile Justice System 93
CONCLUSION
in this volume.
An Historical Overview of the American Juvenile Justice System 95
REFERENCES
Aos, S., Phipps, P., Barnoski, R. and Lieb, R. (2001) The Comparative
Costs and Benefits of Programs to Reduce Crime. Version 4.0.
(Olympia, Washington: Washington State Institute for Public Policy).
Aries, P. (1962) Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life.
(New York, Knopf).
Baum, D. (1996) Smoke and Mirrors: The War on Drugs and the Politics
of Failure. (Boston, Little, Brown).
Beckett, K. and Sasson, T. (2004) The Politics of Injustice: Crime and
Punishment in America. 2nd edn. (Thousand Oaks, California, Sage
Publications).
Bernard, T.J. (1992) The Cycle of Juvenile Justice. (New York, Oxford
University Press).
Catalano, R.F. and Hawkins, J.D. (1996) ‘The Social Development Model’.
In J.D. Hawkins (ed.), Delinquency and Crime: Current Theories.
(New York, Cambridge University Press).
Cunneen, C. and White, R. (1995) Juvenile Justice: An Australian
Perspective. (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Empey. L.T., Stafford, M.C., and Hay, C.H. (1999) American Delinquency:
Its Meaning and Construction. 4th edn (Belmont, California,
Wadsworth Publishing).
Fagan, J.A. and Guggenheim, M. (1996) ‘Preventive Detention and Judicial
Prediction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural Experiment’.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 86, 415–48.
Fagan, J.A., Kupchik, A. and Liberman, A. (2003) The Comparative
Impacts of Juvenile versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism
among Adolescent Felony Offenders: A Replication and Extension.
Final Technical Report submitted to Office of Justice Programs, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
Farrington, D.P. (1984) ‘England and Wales’. In M.W. Klein (ed.), Western
Systems of Juvenile Justice. (Beverly Hills, California, Sage Publications).
Feld, B.C. (1999) Bad Kids: Race and the Transformation of the Juvenile
Court. (New York, Oxford University Press).
Hawkins, J.D., Catalano, R.F., Kosterman, R., Abbott, R. and Hill, K.G.
(1999) ‘Preventing Adolescent Health-risk Behaviors by Strengthening
Protection during Childhood’. Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent
Medicine 153, 226–34.
Henggeler, S.W., Melton, G.B. and Smith, L.A. (1992) ‘Family Preservation
Using Multisystemic Therapy: An Effective Alternative to Incarcerating
Serious Juvenile Offenders’. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology 60, 953–61.
Hirschi, T. (1969) Causes of Delinquency. (Berkeley, California, University
of California Press).
96 Eric L Jensen
Walker, N.E., Brooks, C.M. and Wrightsman, L.S. (1999) Children’s Rights
in The United States: In Search of a National Policy. (Thousand Oaks,
California, Sage Publications).
Welch, B.C., Farrington, D.P. and Sherman, L.W. (2001) Costs and Benefits
of Preventing Crime. (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press).
White, R. (1990) No Space of their Own: Young People and Social Control
in Australia. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
Cases Cited
Breed v Jones 421 U.S. 519 (1975)
Ex parte Crouse (4 Whart. 9 [Pa. 1838])
In re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
In re Winship 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
McKeiver v Pennsylvania 403 U.S. 528 (1971)
Roper v Simmons 125 S. Ct. 1111 (2005)
Schall v Martin 467 U.S. 283 (1984)
7
The New Spanish Penal System on
Delinquency
JOSÉ LUIS DE LA CUESTA
GENERAL BACKGROUND
D
URING MOST OF the twentieth century, the Spanish system with
regard to minors and juvenile delinquency was based on a welfare
model (modelo tutelar). This model experienced a deep crisis in the
1970s, particularly after the approval of the Spanish democratic
Constitution in 1978. This led to a progressive abandonment of the tradi-
tional system (de la Cuesta 2001a, 7). The protection of abandoned minors,
which since 1987 has been the responsibility of the regions (Comunidades
Autónomas)1 and the civil judges, was specially regulated by the 1996
Minors’ Legal Protection Act. The reform on delinquency came later.
In 1985 the new Act on Judicial Power created Judges for Minors and
required the Government to present to the Parliament a new Draft on
Minors. This legal mandate was not immediately acted upon, however.
Only after the Constitutional Tribunal Decision on the unconstitutionality
of the 1948 system in 1991 did the process to reform the old model begin.
The first reform—legally classified as ‘urgent’—became effective in 1992.
The true transformation of the system arrived with the new century. Act
5/2000 of 12 January was approved in the application of Article 19 of the
new 1995 Penal Code, with the aim of regulating the penal responsibility of
minors. After several reforms—the most important of which was created by
Act 7/2000 regarding very serious crimes and terrorism (Etxebarria
Zarrabeitia 2001a, 77)—the Act entered into force in January 2001.
Act 5/2000 regulates all of the material, procedural and executive aspects
of intervention against minors and juvenile delinquents (14–18 years old),
establishing a system integrated within the criminal justice system. The new
system is co-ordinated with the social services working to protect minors as
established in the Autonomous Communities; these are competent to give
1 Spain is a unitary state, but constitutionally divided into 17 regions that have political
The new model is a mixed one; it follows the trend begun in 1992 and is
fully respectful of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This model
admits the ‘penal responsibility’ (or criminal responsibility) of minors under
18, and intends to reduce the importance of the ideas of protection and
paternalism. According to the new model, minority of age (under 18) is no
longer a circumstance that relieves the person of responsibility for a crimi-
nal offense (against, Feijóo Sánchez 2001, 24); culpability is also required
to declare the penal responsibility of minors (Cuello Contreras 2001, 49).
Minority of age is thus a personal limit to the application of the adult Penal
Code that opens the way to the application of the Act on the Penal
Responsibility of Minors. The new absolute limit of criminal responsibility
is therefore established at 14 years of age (Article 3), and those who are
between 14 and 18 years can be criminally responsible.
Formally, the penal responsibility of minors is exclusively based on the
commission of a penal infraction with certain exemptions (Article 5.1). This
responsibility differs from that of adults because it opens the door to treat-
ment intervention. Allowing non-punitive intervention justifies important
differences and avoids (but not in an absolute way) essential principles of
adult penal law: proportionality, general deterrence, victim’s participation
in the penal process (de la Cuesta 2001b, 59), etc.
The application of treatment intervention for those minors who are deemed
to be without sufficient maturity is also possible, but this question has not
been yet adequately approached by Act 5/2000 and requires reconsideration.
If criminal responsibility must be declared, proof of sufficient maturity (in par-
ticular, of those under 16) should be required, and not only the absence of the
general circumstances of exemption from penal responsibility provided by the
adult Penal Code. On the other hand, in cases of absence of capacity for form-
ing criminal intent, the imposition of therapeutic measures should always
require a documented risk of criminal dangerousness.
According to the Act, the declaration of penal responsibility is the first step
in the process of re-education and resocialization of minors. Via a declara-
tion of penal responsibility, minors should realize the importance of their
The New Spanish Penal System on Delinquency 101
conduct and of the social intervention; this is possible only if they are capa-
ble of understanding the process and the aim of the intervention. Although
the new Act insists on this point and explicitly recognizes it, procedural
norms are not clear and it will be very difficult for many minors to partic-
ipate adequately in the penal process.
The special educative nature of the intervention also determines the
prominent position of the technical team, and the need for the specializa-
tion of all professionals who take part in the penal process (4th Final
Disposition).
Field of application
The new Spanish Penal Law on Minors is applied to those between 14 and
18 years of age2 who commit a penal infraction defined by the Penal Code
or by a Penal Special Act (Article 1). Those under 14 who commit a penal
infraction are sent by the Prosecutor to social services experienced in the
protection of minors (Article 3) (Lorca Martínez 2001, 79).
The penal process for minors as regulated by the Act is a judicial process—
possibly too similar to the one for adults—conducted by a specialized magis-
trate, the Judge of Minors, and fully respectful of the basic penal guarantees:
presumption of innocence, right of defense, and the right of appeal (before
the ‘Audiencia Provincial’). Even a final appeal to the Supreme Tribunal is
possible in the interest of the law in the most serious cases.
The Prosecutor’s participation in the process is an intensive one. The
prosecutor conducts the investigation and prepares the instruction (Article
23). At the same time, the Prosecutor must guarantee the minor’s rights and
protect their interests (Article 6). A Prosecutor cannot make decisions that
restrict a minor’s fundamental rights; only the Judge of Minors is compe-
tent to adopt decisions restricting minors’ fundamental rights based on a
request by the Prosecutor (Article 23.3).
Diversion
A characteristic feature of the legal processing of juveniles is the recognized
flexibility in the prosecution.
Article 18 authorizes the Prosecutor not to begin proceedings in cases of
first offenses of less serious infractions committed without coercion or vio-
lence. Discretion is very broad in this instance and not sufficiently con-
trolled. The decision should be based upon the possibilities for correction
in a familial or educational milieu, under the control of the regional insti-
tutions competent in the protection of minors (critically: Landrove Díaz
2001, 287).
3 Less serious offences are nowadays those punished by a prison term of up to five years
An investigation that has already opened can be closed (Article 19) if con-
ciliation or reparation occurs. The Prosecutor must in this case take into
account the seriousness of the infraction (in particular, the absence of coer-
cion or violence) and the minor’s circumstances. Mediation is conducted by
the technical team.
Conciliation is deemed to have been achieved ‘if the minor acknowledges
the harm and apologizes to the victim and the latter accepts it’ (Article
19.3). Reparation—operating here in the framework of ‘penal responsibil-
ity’ (Richard González 2000, 4) and not as a civil liability—is legally iden-
tified with the agreement of the minor to do something in the victim’s favor
or in favor of the community. Goodwill on the part of the minor is not
enough: the victim must accept conciliation (critically: Gómez Rivero 2001,
168) or the reparation compromise. The literature considers, however, that
the victim’s acceptance need not necessarily be an explicit one; the absence
of rejection is adequate (Martí Sánchez 2001, 77). Success in the applica-
tion of the educative measure proposed by the technical team could also, in
certain cases, be valid as reparation.
If conciliation and reparation are effective, only then (except if reparation
was not possible due to reasons other than the minor’s consent) can the
Prosecutor close the investigation and propose that the Judge dismiss the
case. If reparation (or the educative activity) is not fulfilled, the process goes
on (Article 19.5).
Once the process has begun and even once the measure of intervention
has been pronounced, there are possibilities for the suspension, modifica-
tion and/or substitution of the measures imposed (Articles 14 and 51) that
can put an end to the penal intervention (Mena Álvarez 2001, 221).
Provisional measures
Article 28 allows the Prosecutor—if they consider that there is sufficient
reason to suppose or a risk that the minor may elude justice—to demand of
the Judge of Minors the adoption of provisional measures in order to guar-
antee the custody and defense of the minor.
These provisional measures (Gisbert Jordá 2001, 103) can consist of
internment, controlled freedom, or custody by a family member or an edu-
cational group. The Judge must order the measures in the interests of the
minor after having heard the minor’s defense and having taken into consid-
eration, amongst other opinions, the input of the technical team.
The time a youth spends in a provisional measure is counted as time
served as part of a sanction, if a measure is finally imposed. This can also
be applied to minors who are not capable of culpability but who are sus-
pected of the commission of a criminal behavior. In these cases, the prosecu-
tor (Article 29) should demand the adoption of civil measures for the
protection and custody of the minor. However, the process is not interrupted
104 José Luis de la Cuesta
4 The National Audience is a central judicial body competent to deal with certain crimes,
Act 15/2003 has put an end to this exclusion of the victim and has mod-
ified Article 25. It allows the victim’s intervention as an actor in the penal
process for minors.
Victims’ exclusion from the penal process has never affected their
involvement in the process of establishing civil liability. The civil process is
examined in a ‘separate file’ (Articles 61–64) (de la Cuesta Arzamendi
2001c, 175; Navarro Mendizábal 2001, 121). Act 5/2000 has indeed estab-
lished a new procedure (Ventura Faci and Peláez Pérez 2000, 212), before
the Judge of Minors but independent of the penal action. In this ‘separate
file’ victims can intervene and they are allowed to present their civil claim
to the Judge (Article 109.2 Penal Code).
Act 5/2000 also regulates the liability of parents and legal guardians to
pay victims compensation for damage caused by the minor’s behavior.
2. An important feature of the new penal process for minors is the special
position of the technical team (Dolz Lago 2001, 129). It is usually composed
of a psychologist, a teacher and a social worker (although the Autonomous
Communities are allowed to establish their exact composition). The techni-
cal team has important responsibilities: to investigate and report on the
minor’s situation; to explore the possibilities of conciliation or reparation; to
advise on the appropriateness of application of the provisional measures;
and to advise on the final measures and their order of application, modifica-
tion, substitution or suspension. They can also present proposals for the
non-prosecution of the case, in the minor’s interests, if the ‘social concern’
has already been shown sufficiently or it is deemed inadequate due to the
time that has elapsed since the commission of the facts (Article 27.4).
The hearing
Flexibility is also assured in the hearing, where the Judge of Minors again
has broader discretion than in the adult criminal process.
A minor’s agreement with the Prosecutor’s petition leads directly to a
‘conformity sentence’ (Article 32). The hearing takes place in the presence
of the prosecutor, the lawyer, a representative of the technical team and the
minor, who can be accompanied by their legal representative unless barred
from doing so by a judicial decision. Participation of a representative of the
public entity responsible for the protection or reform of minors is also
allowed (Article 35).
According to Article 35.2, and although as a general rule (Tomé García
2001, 176) hearings are public, the Judge can decide to keep the hearing
private if it is in the best interests of the minor or the victim. The Judge can
also order the minor to leave the hearing temporarily if, officially or at the
parties’ request, they consider that it is in the minor’s best interests to do so
(Article 37.4).
106 José Luis de la Cuesta
After the hearing, the Judge makes public the sentence within five days.
The sentence establishes the measures and their content, duration and
objectives in a clear manner and with explanations appropriate to the
minor’s age (Article 39).
Article 35.2 explicitly establishes that the mass media cannot obtain or
disseminate the minor’s photograph or any data that will identify
them. The judge and the prosecutor must strictly enforce this mandatory
rule.
In general
The primary task of the technical team (Article 27.3) is to detect the possi-
bilities of conciliation and reparation and, eventually, to propose the con-
tent and aims of the reparatory activity that can lead either to the
abandonment of the process as foreseen in Article 19 or to the decision to
put an end to the execution of the measure already applied (Article 51.2).
Often, the elaboration of this proposal will require mediation by the tech-
nical team.
By virtue of the accusatory principle, the Judge of Minors cannot impose
a more severe measure than the one demanded by the Prosecutor.
Internment measures cannot exceed the length of deprivation of liberty
penalties foreseen by the Penal Code for the commission of the same offence
by an adult (Article 8). The general rules for the selection of measures are
contained in Article 7.3: the judge must take into account with flexibility
not only the evidence and the legal importance of the conduct, but in par-
ticular the minor’s age, social and family conditions, and personality. The
technical team must provide this information to the Judge in their reports;
in addition the public institutions competent for the protection and reform
of minors can advise the judge in this way.
In case of the minor’s non-culpability, only therapeutic internment or
ambulatory treatment can be imposed, and always taking into account the
risk of dangerousness by the minor.
Measures
1. Act 5/2000 establishes a list of ‘measures’. An important part of the
academic literature considers them to be ‘punitive sanctions’ (Sánchez
García de Paz 2000, 719) and prefers to call them ‘juvenile punishments’
The New Spanish Penal System on Delinquency 107
(Cerezo Mir 2000, 106, García Pérez 2000, 686, Etxebarria Zarrabeitia
2001b, 32. Measures consist of the following (Muñoz Oya 2001, 185):
Measures consisting of the deprivation of liberty: internment in a closed
regime, in a semi-open regime or in an open regime; and therapeutic intern-
ment (Ortiz González 2001, 185).
Other measures: ambulatory treatment, visiting a day-center; weekend
arrest; supervised freedom (eventually with intensive supervision); custody
by a family or educative group; community service; warning; socio-educative
tasks; deprivation of driving license for motorcycles; revocation of other
administrative licenses (to hunt, to fish, or allowing the use of arms);
absolute disqualification from taking part in political elections or becoming
a public servant.
The list is broad, but more imaginative measures are lacking; maybe they
could be applied through the socio-educative programs. It is also very doubt-
ful whether this kind of measure will really help to achieve rehabilitation.
2. Measures, in general, may not exceed two years (community service
100 hours, and weekend arrest 8 weekends) (Article 9.3). However, for
those over 16 years of age who have committed an offence with violence or
coercion or presenting a great risk to life or one’s physical well-being, meas-
ures can extend up to five years (200 hours community service, and up to
16 weekend arrests) (Article 9.4). In extremely serious cases (and recidivism
is always considered so) internment in a closed regime for 1–5 years is
allowable, followed by supervised freedom with educative assistance for up
to 5 additional years. This measure cannot be suspended or substituted
before one year of effective execution (Article 9.5).
In the case of very serious offences (murder, homicide, rape, violent sexual
aggressions and those punished by the Penal Code with 15 years’ imprison-
ment or more), minors of 16 years can receive a measure of internment in a
closed regime (1–4 years) followed by supervised freedom (up to three years
further); those over the age of 16 will receive a measure of internment in a
closed regime (1–8 years) followed by supervised freedom (up to five years
further) and the measure will not be modified, suspended or substituted until
half of the internment has been executed (4th Additional Disposition).
If the offence is terrorism and the minor is held responsible for more than
one offence—and one of them is punishable by 15 or more years’ imprison-
ment for an adult—internment in a closed regime can extend up to 5 years
for those under 16, and up to 10 years for those aged 16 and over.
Furthermore, taking into account the seriousness of the offence, the num-
ber of acts committed and the perpetrator’s circumstances, an absolute dis-
qualification from taking part in political elections or becoming a public
servant (4 to 15 years) can follow internment (4th Additional Disposition).
3. Act 5/2000 foresees the possibility of conditional suspension of the
execution of measures after two years (Article 40). Conditional suspension
requires both the absence of new convictions during the probation period
108 José Luis de la Cuesta
and the minor’s promise not to commit further offences. The Judge can sub-
mit the minor to a regime of supervised freedom during the conditional sus-
pension or to a socio-therapeutic activity (eventually with the participation
of parents or tutors), if the technical team or the public entity competent to
protect or reform minors proposes it.
The judicial capacity to modify, suspend, reduce, substitute or put an end
to the measure is an important feature of the system. These decisions can
take place ‘at any moment’, in accordance with the minor’s best interests
and if the social concern of the minor’s behavior has been sufficiently
expressed (Article 14).
The execution of measures (San Martín Larrinoa 2001, 141; also López
Martín and Dólera Carrillo 2001, 141) is founded upon the principle of
legality (Article 43) and is placed under the control of the Judge for Minors
(Article 44).
The Autonomous Communities are competent to execute the measures
directly or by means of contracts with other public or private, not-for-profit
entities. However, responsibility for the execution of measures remains in
the hands of civil servants (Article 45). Proximity is an important principle:
minors must be kept in institutions close to their residence, but the Judge
can decide to the contrary if there are indications that this will be in the best
interests of the minor (Article 46.3).
To execute a measure, the competent public entity designates a profes-
sional who assumes responsibility for oversight of the youth’s sentence. He
must report periodically to the Judge, the Prosecutor and counsel for the
minor on the execution of the measure and the minor’s progress (Article 49).
If a minor escapes, as soon as they are apprehended they are returned to
the same institution where they were interned or to another institution bet-
ter adapted to their situation. If the measure was weekend arrest, they will
be obliged to remain at home for the rest of the time. If the measure did not
consist of deprivation of liberty, the prosecutor can propose to the judge
that it be substituted by another measure or, in exceptional cases, that the
minor be interned in a semi-open regime (Article 50).
The execution of the measure of internment (López Cabello 2001, 155)
is divided in two periods: effective internment and supervised freedom
(Article 7.2). The Act contains particular rules for the execution of meas-
ures of deprivation of liberty in specific centers outside the penitentiary
administration: these can be centers for the protection of minors or psychi-
atric facilities (Article 54).
Measures imposed as sanctions against terrorism are executed under the
control of specialized staff and in the centers of the Audiencia Nacional,
eventually established by means of a contract with the Autonomous
Communities (4th Additional Disposition).
A fundamental principle of treatment in the centers must be resocializa-
tion of the youth (Article 55). By virtue of this principle, those rights of the
inmate that are not affected by the conviction (and regulated by Article 56)5
must be guaranteed, and the internal life of the institution should be guar-
anteed; in addition, life inside must be organized in a manner that is simi-
lar to the outside world (Article 55.2). Administrative regulations establish
the system of ordinary and extraordinary leaves and releases (Article 55.3),
and all the other aspects of the establishment’s functioning. Minors have the
FINAL REMARKS
Five years ago, a new minors’ and juveniles’ penal justice system entered
into force in Spain, established by Act 5/2000 on the Penal Responsibility
of Minors. The new model is fully respectful of the CRC. Far from the
ancient social welfare approach, it does not follow a purely correctional
and repressive approach, but a mixed one. It is a responsibility model:
minors can be held responsible, but the declaration of their penal
responsibility is not answered by (minors’ or juveniles’) punishments, but
by ‘measures’ that should be oriented to serve the best interests of the
child.
In order to be effectively applied, any new system needs not only suffi-
cient investment in structures, facilities and means, but also, usually, nor-
mative development by the government of the general legal provisions.
Both aspects are essential. Without new and improved means and facili-
ties, the new system has no real opportunity to succeed in such a difficult
field. Without sufficient normative development, individual rights will suf-
fer and many of the new provisions will never be applied. Several years have
elapsed and these two essential preconditions for guaranteeing the adequate
application of the new system have needed a lot of time to be fulfilled or
are even still lacking.
At the regional level, only Catalunya urgently approved a new
Regional Act (Act 27/2001) on Juvenile Justice, in order to regulate the
The New Spanish Penal System on Delinquency 111
REFERENCES
Cerezo Mir, J. (2000) Derecho Penal. Parte General: Lecciones. 2nd edn
(Madrid).
Cuello Contreras, J. (2001) El nuevo derecho penal de menores. (Madrid).
de la Cuesta, J.L. (2001a) ‘La abolición del sistema tutelar: evolución del
Derecho español en materia de jóvenes y menores delincuentes’.
Harlax 37.
—— (2001b) ‘The Position of Victims and Victim Support in the New
Spanish Juvenile Criminal Law’. In E. Fattah and Parmentier (eds.),
Victim Policies and Criminal Justice on the Road to Restorative
Justice. Essays in Honour of Tony Peters. (Leuven).
de la Cuesta Arzamendi, J.L. (2001c) ‘Responsabilidad civil’. In Consejo
Vasco de la Abogacía, La Ley Orgánica 5/2000 de Responsabilidad
Penal de los Menores. (Bilbao).
Dolz Lago, M.J. (2001) ‘Labor y funciones del equipo técnico’. Estudios
Jurídicos. Ministerio Fiscal, I.
Etxebarria Zarrabeitia, X. (2001a) ‘Algunos aspectos de Derecho sustantivo
de la Ley Orgánica 5/2000, reguladora de la Responsabilidad Penal de
los Menores y de su Reforma en materia de terrorismo’. Icade 53.
—— (2001b) ‘Aspectos sustantivos’. In Consejo Vasco de la Abogacía, La
Ley Orgánica 5/2000 de Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores.
(Bilbao).
Feijóo Sánchez, B. (2001) ‘Sobre el contenido y la evolución del Derecho
Penal español tras la LO 5/2000 y la LO 7/2000’. Revista Jurídica,
UAM, 4.
Funes Arteaga, J. (1997) ‘Menores y jóvenes en situación de conflicto
social: posibles respuestas’. Justicia juvenil en la C.A.P.V. Situación y
perspectivas. (Vitoria-Gasteiz).
112 José Luis de la Cuesta
García Pérez, O. (2000) ‘La evolución del sistema de justicia penal juvenil’.
Actualidad Penal 32.
Gisbert Jordá, T. (2001) ‘Las medidas cautelares’. Estudios Jurídicos.
Ministerio Fiscal, I.
Gómez Rivero, M.C. (2001) ‘Algunos aspectos de la Ley Orgánica 5/2000,
de 12 de enero, reguladora de la responsabilidad penal del menor’.
Actualidad Penal 10.
Juan, A. and López Martín, E. (2001) ‘El interés del menor como columna
vertebral de la Ley 5/2000 de 12 de enero’. In Justicia de menores e
intervención socioeducativa. (Murcia).
Landrove Díaz, G. (1998) La Moderna Victimología. (Valencia).
Landrove Díaz, G. (2001) Derecho Penal de Menores. (Valencia).
López Cabello, P. (2001) ‘Ejecución de las medidas privativas de libertad’.
In Consejo Vasco de la Abogacía, La Ley Orgánica 5/2000 de
Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores. (Bilbao).
López Martín, E. and Dólera Carrillo, M.A. (2001) ‘Ejecución de las medi-
das no privativas de libertad’. In Justicia de menores e intervención
socioeducativa. (Murcia).
Lorca Martínez, J. (2001) ‘Las medidas de protección de menores y la inter-
vención de la entidad pública en la LORPM 5/2000 de
Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores’. Estudios Jurídicos. Ministerio
Fiscal, I.
Martí Sánchez, J.N. (2001) ‘Protección de la víctima y responsabilidad civil
en la ley penal de los menores’. Actualidad Penal 4.
Mena Álvarez, F. (2001) ‘Reglas para la determinación de las medidas aplic-
ables: modificación y sustitución de medidas’. Estudios Jurídicos.
Ministerio Fiscal, I.
Muñoz Oya, J.R. (2001) ‘Estudio sobre las medidas en la Ley Orgánica
Reguladora de la Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores’. Estudios
Jurídicos. Ministerio Fiscal, I.
Navarro Medizábal, I. (2001) ‘La responsabilidad civil en la Ley Orgánica
de Responsibilidad Penal del Menor’, 53 Icade 121–162.
Ortiz González, AL, (2001) ‘La medida de internamiento en la Ley
Reguladora de la Responsabilidad de los Menores’ 53 Icade 185–202
Palacio Sánchez Izquierdo, J.R. (2000) ‘El principio del superior interés del
menor’. Surgam, 466–7.
Richard González, M. (2000) ‘El nuevo proceso de menores’. La Ley,
28 June.
Ríos Martín, J.C. (2001) ‘La ley de Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores,
cambio de paradigma: del niño en peligro al niño peligroso’. Icade 53.
San Martín Larrinoa, B. (2001) ‘Ejecución’. In Consejo Vasco de la
Abogacía, La Ley Orgánica 5/2000 de Responsabilidad Penal de los
Menores. (Bilbao).
The New Spanish Penal System on Delinquency 113
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
G
ERMANY IS SITUATED at the centre of Europe, bordering Denmark,
Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria, Switzerland, France,
Luxemburg, Belgium and the Netherlands. The country has a geo-
graphical area of 357,026.55 square km. With about 82 million inhabi-
tants, the population density per square kilometre is 231.
Germany, with its capital city Berlin, is a parliamentary democracy.
Article 20 of the Constitution (Grundgesetz) defines the political system as
‘a democratic and social welfare state under the rule of law’. Germany is a
federal republic consisting of 16 federal states which exhibit a certain
degree of autonomy, particularly concerning questions of education and
culture, but not in criminal and prison law or juvenile justice. Therefore, in
these matters the same federal law applies for all federal states.
In 2004 the gross domestic product was 108 € per capita (2004) and the
unemployment rate stood at 12% (about 10% in West-Germany, 20% in
East-Germany, i.e. the 5 states which formed the former German
Democratic Republic prior to the re-unification of Germany in 1990).
The age structure is as follows (at 1 January 2004):
The history of a system of specific social control for minors in Germany goes
back to the beginning of the previous century. Since 1908, some courts, such
as in Berlin, Frankfurt/Main and Cologne, began to develop special court
chambers that specialised in issues concerning young delinquents. Only after
World War I could the idea of specific legislation successfully be pursued by
opting for the ‘dualistic’ approach of welfare and justice. Thus, in 1922, the
Juvenile Welfare Act (JWA—Jugendwohlfahrtsgesetz of 1922) dealing with
young persons in need of care was passed and in 1923 the Juvenile Justice
Act (JJA—Jugendgerichtsgesetz, literally translated as the Juvenile Courts
Act)1 dealing with juvenile offenders who had committed a delinquent act
proscribed by the general penal law (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB). A totally wel-
fare oriented model of juvenile justice did not fit with the German ‘mental-
ity’, which remained intent upon keeping the penal option to deal with
young offenders. The compromise was a somehow ‘mixed’ system of juve-
nile justice, combining elements of educational measures with legal guaran-
tees and a procedural approach in general which is characteristic of the
justice model. The JJA did not create a new ‘juvenile penal law’. Punishable
crimes are the same as for adults, i.e. so-called status offences do not form
an element of the JJA. The JJA consists of a specific system of reactions/sanc-
tions applicable to young offenders and of some specific procedural rules for
the juvenile court and its proceedings (e.g. the principle of non-public trials).
In comparison with the general penal law for adults, the legislator of
1923 for the first time ‘opened the floor’ for educational measures instead
1 The literal translation of ‘Jugendgerichtsgesetz’ reflects the historical roots of the JJA. It
goes back to the adjudication of specialised judges of youth chambers at some courts in big-
ger cities like Berlin, Cologne and Frankfurt. The ‘Jugendgerichtsbewegung’ (‘movement for
establishing juvenile courts’) had a major influence on the first JJA in 1923; see Schaffstein and
Beulke 2002, 34 ff.
Juvenile Justice in Germany 117
In cases of crimes the interventions of the JJA are characterised by the prin-
ciple of ‘subsidiarity’ or ‘minimum intervention’ (see the diagram at the end
of this chapter).2 This means that penal action should only be taken if it is
absolutely necessary. Furthermore, sanctions must be limited by the princi-
ple of proportionality. The legislative reform of the JJA in 1990, passed in
the same year as that of the JWA, underlines the principle of juvenile court
sanctions as a last resort (‘ultima ratio’). Therefore the primary sanctions of
the juvenile court are educational or disciplinary measures.
2 The application of the JJA is restricted to crimes defined by the general penal law (StGB).
The Juvenile Welfare Act (JWA) is applied when a child or juvenile in his personal develop-
ment seems to be ‘in danger’ and needs help or measures provided by the JWA. The measures
are chosen according to the estimated educational needs. They are not imposed in an ‘inter-
ventionist’ style, but are offered and taken upon the request of the parents. In part, the meas-
ures are the same as those provided by the JJA (e.g. social training courses, special care, etc.).
The residential care order exists in both laws, too. If the authorities of the youth welfare
department want to bring a child or juvenile to such a home (against the parents’ will), they
must ask the family court judge for a specific order (according to § 1631b Civil Code,
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). Such homes are usually open facilities.
Juvenile Justice in Germany 119
3 The situation is different in the general penal law for adults (>18 or 21 years old) where
4 See United Nations 1991, Dünkel 1994, 43; Rule No. 17.1 of the Beijing Rules restricts
youth imprisonment to cases of serious violent crimes or repeated violent or other crimes if
there seems to be no other appropriate solution.
5 The precondition of ‘dangerous tendencies’ for imposing a prison sentence is very often
Juvenile justice systems, particularly those following the welfare model, are
often criticised for failing to guarantee human rights. Compared to the gen-
eral criminal procedure for adults, the right of access to a legal defence coun-
sel and other basic human rights issues seem to be underdeveloped and some
critical scholars denounce the juvenile justice system as ‘second class justice’.
The German juvenile justice system shares these criticisms only to a very
minor extent, as in general the legal procedural rules are very similar for
juvenile and adult criminal justice. The JJA states that the procedural rules,
for example the rules of evidence, are the same as for general criminal pro-
cedure. Deviations from this general rule are based on educational aims. So,
for example, court hearings are not open to the public (see § 48 JJA) in
order to protect the juvenile’s privacy and to avoid stigmatisation. In juve-
nile trials the participation of the so-called social court assistant
(‘Jugendgerichtshilfe’), i.e. a social worker from the community youth wel-
fare department, is required (see § 38 (2) JJA). They have to prepare a social
report and are required to participate in the court trial in order to give evi-
dence about the personal background of the juvenile and to assist the judge
in finding the appropriate sanction. The right to a defence counsel, in prin-
ciple, is more extensive in the juvenile justice system, as every juvenile who
is put in pre-trial detention must have an advocate appointed immediately
(see § 68 No. 4 JJA), whereas in criminal cases for adults this right is
realised only after having suffered three months of pre-trial detention.
Furthermore, there are restrictions for imposing pre-trial detention on juve-
niles, particularly for 14 and 15 year-old offenders (see § 72 (2) JJA).
Residential care in a juvenile home should always be given priority to pre-
trial detention. The reality, however, sometimes indicates that the legal pre-
conditions are not always complied with. Therefore the criticism of
inappropriate forms of pre-trial detention cannot be refuted.
Another problematic issue is the appeal against juvenile court decisions. A
court decision cannot be appealed solely in order to receive another educa-
tional measure (see § 55 (1) JJA). This seems to be problematic in cases where
the judge imposes a rather ‘severe’ educational measure, such as several hun-
dreds of hours of community service. Unlike in other countries, in Germany
the community service order is not limited by a maximum period (in Austria
for example it is limited to 80 hours, in other countries 120–240 hours).
Thus, in individual cases, a violation of the principle of proportionality has
been observed.
Another critical issue concerning the system of judicial review in juve-
nile justice is that the juvenile can only appeal once, either to the district
court (‘Landgericht’) in order to get a second hearing, or to the high
court of a federal state (‘Oberlandesgericht’) for a review of legal questions
122 Frieder Dünkel
(see § 55 (2) JJA). This shortening of review procedures has been intro-
duced in order to speed up trials and to enforce the educational approach
of juvenile justice. However, from a legal and human rights perspective
this puts juveniles at a disadvantage compared to their adult counterparts.
On the other hand, juveniles profit from the exclusion of a joint procedure
by the victim or their representative counsel (‘Nebenklage’) and of the so-
called private criminal procedure (‘Privatklage’, i.e. the private charge if
the public prosecutor refuses prosecution in the public interest), both of
which are disallowed in the juvenile justice system (see § 80 (1), (3) JJA).
A few (practically unimportant) rules disadvantage juveniles for the sake
of educational concepts. For example, the period of pre-trial detention—
according to the discretion of the judge—will not be taken into account if
the remaining period of a juvenile prison sentence is less than six months
and therefore estimated as being insufficient for the educational process of
reintegration (see § 52a JJA).
In general one can say that the orientation of the German juvenile crim-
inal procedure towards preserving fundamental rights is quite well devel-
oped and that disadvantages as compared to adults are restricted to more
exceptional cases. Thus the German juvenile justice system does not share
the shortcomings of welfare systems that rely more on informal procedures
(e.g. round tables, family conferences etc.) than on formal legal rights.
Bundesministerium des Inneren and Bundesministerium der Justiz 2001; for a similar develop-
ment in other European countries see Estrada 1999; 2001.
Juvenile Justice in Germany 123
Figure 8.1: Male German suspects and convicted offenders by age group, 1984–2002. All
offences (without traffic offences)).
Figure 8.2: Male German suspects and convicted offenders by age group, 1984–2002.
Robbery (§§ 249–56, 316a PC).
124 Frieder Dünkel
Figure 8.3: Male German suspects and convicted offenders by age group, 1984–2002.
Serious and dangerous bodily injury.
violent offences, even exceeded the ratio of the western federal states (see
Figure 8.4). In the last 8 years, however, the violent and other young
offender crime rates in West and East Germany have grown closer together
because of an increase in West Germany and a stabilisation or even reduc-
tion in East Germany. This development could be interpreted as a kind of
normalisation after a period of particular problems of social transition and
anomie or ‘normlessness’ in East Germany.
Young migrants and members of ethnic minorities have become a major
problem for the criminal justice system in Germany. They are overrepre-
sented, particularly concerning violent offences. For the period 1984–97,
83% of the increase in the police registered juvenile and young adult
offenders crime rate (persons aged between 14 and 21) was due to foreign
citizens (see Pfeiffer et al 1998, 48). Most of these foreigners were born in
Germany. The Turkish minority plays a specific role in this problem. Self-
report studies reveal that the rate of violent offenders is twice as high in the
Turkish as compared to the German juvenile age group (Pfeiffer et al 1998,
81). Looking at different groups of ethnic minorities or foreigners up to
1993, asylum seekers played a predominant role, which explains the
increase in the general crime rate, but also the increase in pre-trial detainees
and sentenced prisoners. This problem disappeared after a change of immi-
gration legislation in 1993 reduced the influx of immigrants considerably.
Juvenile Justice in Germany 125
Figure 8.4: Suspected juveniles and young adults per 100,000 of the age group in East
and West Germany, 1995 and 2003.
All the phenomena described here concerning young migrants and ethnic
minorities are only valid for the old federal states of former West Germany.
The East German Länder face very different crime problems. These are con-
nected with the German native population. As very few foreigners live
there, they do not really contribute to the crime problem. However, they are
worthy of particular interest as they are overrepresented as victims of vio-
lent crimes, particularly committed by xenophobic or right wing extremists
(see Dünkel/Geng/Kunkat 2001; Dünkel/Geng 2003). However, right wing
extremist and xenophobic attitudes as well as self reported violent crime
since 1998 in East Germany have declined, too (see Wilmers et al 2002, 101
ff; Sturzbecher 2001; Dünkel/Geng 2003; all with further references).
There are many possible reasons for the increase in crime, and particu-
larly violent crime, that occurred after German re-unification and the open-
ing of borders in Eastern Europe in general and the concomitant social
changes. One of the most popular explanations is Heitmeyer’s theory of
social disintegration (see Heitmeyer 1992; Heitmeyer et al 1996). The East
German development can also be connected with the increase in opportu-
nity structures and a lack of social control at the beginning of the 1990s,
when police forces were re-established. One general argument to explain
the violent crime increase in the 1990s is a changed sensibility to and
reporting rate of violent crimes. One of the very few longitudinal victimisa-
tion studies, conducted by Schwind et al in the city of Bochum in 1975,
1986 and 1998, showed that a changed reporting rate accounted for the
major proportion of the increase in violent offences (assault/serious bodily
injury; see Schwind et al 2001). Thus, the officially registered assault rate
increased by 128%; the non-reported rate only by 9%. The overall increase
was only 24% from 1975 to 1998. What really had changed considerably
was the reporting rate: whereas in 1975 7.2 unreported crimes were added
to one reported crime, in 1998 the ratio was only 3.4:1. That means that
the dark figure had diminished by half and the ‘real’ increase in violent
crime is much less impressive than police data would suggest.
Another important statement is that the development of police registered
crime rates is not on a par with court-based crime rates. The increase in
sentenced young offenders is much less important than one would presume
when looking at the police data. This can be seen in Figures 8.1–8.3. The
gap between police registered and convicted (sentenced) young offenders
has increased considerably. One reason is the practice of diversion by juve-
nile court prosecutors and judges (see below), which is partly the result of
an increase particularly in petty property offences. There are, however,
indications that reported violent offences are too often not very serious
crimes and are therefore available for mediation and diversion as well (see
Pfeiffer et al 1998). For instance, in Hannover during the 1990s, apparently,
robberies causing very minor damage (of less than 15 Euros) have
increased.
Juvenile Justice in Germany 127
Table 8.1: Changes in police registered and non-registered violent crimes (assault) in
Bochum 1975–98
Figure 8.5: Suspected and sentenced German juveniles in a comparison of the federal
states in 2003.
Diversion became the principal reaction utilised in the 1980s in juvenile justice
in West Germany. In this context it has to be stressed that police registered
juvenile crimes during the 1980s had been quite stable; even violent crimes
Juvenile Justice in Germany 129
Figure 8.6: Suspected and sentenced 18–21 year old German young adults in a compari-
son of the federal states in 2003.
offenders registered by the police in East Germany until 1995 had tripled;
since then it has been stable or has decreased slightly.7 The practice of using
diversion as a measure of controlling input into the juvenile justice system
can clearly be shown in the Eastern federal states as well as in the so-called
‘city-states’: Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg. The elevated crime rates in these
states have been reduced by a more extensive diversion practice.
Before the law reform, the discharge rates (diversion) in West Germany
had already increased from 43% in 1980 to 56% in 1989. This increased
steadily to 69% in 2003 (see Heinz 1994; 2003; Heinz in Dünkel/van
Kalmthout/Schüler-Springorum 1997, and Figure 8.7). It should be stressed
that in particular the increase concerned diversion without intervention
(according to § 45 (1) JJA), whereas the proportion of diversion combined
with educational measures remained stable (see Figure 8.7).
However, the large regional disparities had not been eliminated. The dis-
charge rates varied in 2003 between 61% in Bavaria, 85% in Bremen and
84% in Hamburg. Apparently in all the federal states of Germany discharge
rates in cities are higher than in the rural areas (see Heinz 1994; 1998/99).
This contributes to the rather stable conviction rates and case-loads of juve-
nile court judges.
It is interesting to compare the diversion practices of East and West
Germany. Statistics for comparison have only recently become available. It
had been presumed that the penal culture in East Germany would be more
severe and repressive. However, first calculations of diversion rates gave
evidence of an even wider extended diversion rate in the new federal states,
with an overall rate of 77% (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and
Brandenburg as much as 82% and 81%; see Figures 8.8 and 8.9; see also
Heinz 2003). In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania statistical data is
available from 2001. Its diversion rate of 82% is similar to the other new
federal states (see also Dünkel/Scheel/Schäpler 2003). Here too, the ‘economic’
strategy of controlling the input and workload of the juvenile courts is
evident. There is, however, another explanation that seems to be plausible.
The expanded diversion rates could also be a reaction to different report-
ing behaviour. In East Germany possibly more petty offences are reported
to the police, which are later excluded from further prosecution by the
juvenile court prosecutors.
The strategy of expanding informal sanctions has proved to be an effec-
tive means, not only to limit the juvenile court’s workload, but also with
respect to special prevention. The reconviction rates of those first-time
offenders who were ‘diverted’ instead of formally sanctioned were significantly
lower. The re-offending rates were 27% : 36% (see Figure 8.10 and Heinz
7 From 1995 onward one can observe a (slightly) diminishing juvenile crime rate in East
Germany and an increasing rate in West Germany (also concerning violent offences), which
results in a ‘convergent’ situation in both parts of Germany; see Heinz 2003 and Figure 8.4
above.
Juvenile Justice in Germany 131
Figure 8.7: Diversion rates (dismissals by prosecutors or courts) in the juvenile justice
system of Germany, old federal states, 1981–2003.
1994; 2003; Dünkel 2003, 94). Even for repeat offenders the re-offending
rates after informal sanctions were not higher than after formal sanctions
(see Heinz/Storz 1992). The overall recidivism rates in states such as
Hamburg with a diversion rate of more than 80% or 90% was the same
(about 25%) as in states such as Baden-Württemberg or Rhineland-
Palatinate where the proportion of diversion at that time counted for only
about 40%. Thus the extended diversionary practice has had at least no neg-
ative consequences concerning the crime rate and general or special preven-
tion. It also reflects the episodic and petty nature of juvenile delinquency.
At the same time, the proportion of ‘formal’ sanctions diminished to only
31% of all cases that could have entered the system at the juvenile court level.
Interestingly, major changes in the juvenile court’s sentencing practice in the
1980s and 1990s can be observed (see Figure 8.11). The proportion of the
sanction of sentencing to short-term custody in a detention centre was
reduced from 11% to only 6% (which amounts to a reduction of about
45%!) in the West German federal states. Unconditional youth imprisonment
(six months up to five or, in exceptional cases, ten years; see above) accounts
only for 1.5%; the suspended youth prison sentence for 3.5% of all formal
and informal sanctions against 14–21 year-old offenders. The reduction in
youth prison sentences from 8% to 5% means a 38% reduction since 1981.
This is remarkable insofar as in the 1990s the proportion of youth prison
sentences remained stable, although the number of violent offenders
Juvenile Justice in Germany 133
Figure 8.10: Rates of formal and informal sanctions after a first sanction for larceny and
a risk period of 3 years (juveniles, cohort 1961).
Figure 8.11: Sanctioning practice in Germany’s juvenile justice system, old federal
states, 1981–2003.
Figure 8.12: Length of youth prison sentences under juvenile criminal law, 1981–2003.
Figure 8.13: Length of youth prison sentences under juvenile criminal law, 1990–2003,
Robbery.
136 Frieder Dünkel
Figure 8.14: Length of youth prison sentences under juvenile criminal law, 1990–2003,
Serious and dangerous bodily injury.
Figure 8.15: Comparison of juveniles and young adults suspected and sentenced to
unconditional youth imprisonment for robbery offences in East- and West- Germany*,
1997.
In Germany, since the reform law of 1953, all young adults are transferred to
the jurisdiction of juvenile courts. Comparing practices internationally, this
decision is remarkable, because it points the way to extending the scope of
juvenile courts for young adults between the ages of 18 and 21. So, for exam-
ple, in 2000 Spain introduced regulations for young adults that are very sim-
ilar to those of Germany. In 2001 Austria and Lithuania also introduced a
flexible system for dealing with young adult offenders, and the option to
138 Frieder Dünkel
choose an appropriate sanction from either the juvenile or the adult criminal
law, when dealing with the aspect of the personality and maturity of the
offender. Other countries, such the Netherlands and the former Yugoslavia,
have long provided for the possibility of avoiding sentences according to the
general penal law and instead impose sanctions according to juvenile law (see
Dünkel 2002a). But, if in these latter cases the application of educational
measures remained the absolute exception, the developments in Germany
have gone in the opposite direction. Undoubtedly a major reason is that the
reform of 1953 created the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for all young
adult offenders independently of whether sanctions under the JJA or under
the general Penal Law (StGB) were to be applied (see § 108 (2) JJA).
Section 105 (1) No. 1 of that law provides for the application of juvenile
law if ‘a global examination of the offender’s personality and of his social
environment indicates that at the time of committing the crime the young
adult in his moral and psychological development was like a juvenile’. In
other words, he should be punished according to the JJA (‘Reifeentwicklung’).
Furthermore, juvenile law must be applied if it appears that the motives
and the circumstances of the offence are those of a typical juvenile crime
(‘Jugendverfehlung’, see § 105 (1) No. 2 JJA). In 1965 only 38% of young
adults were sentenced under the terms of the Juvenile Justice Act, but by
1990 this proportion had nearly doubled to 64%. In 1995 the ratio
decreased slightly to 60%, but then increased again to 64.5% in 2003 (see
also Dünkel 2002a; these data refer to the ‘old’ West German federal
states). This makes it clear that the full integration of young adults into the
juvenile justice system has been accepted in practice. The regulations men-
tioned above have also been interpreted very widely by the courts to pro-
vide for the application of juvenile law in all cases where there were doubts
about the maturity of the young offender (see BGHSt 12, 116; BGH
Strafverteidiger 1989, 311; Eisenberg 2004, notes 7 ff to § 105). The
Supreme Federal Court (‘Bundesgerichtshof’, BGH) held that a young adult
has the maturity of a juvenile if ‘elements demonstrate that a considerable
development of the personality is still to be seen’ (‘Entwicklungskräfte noch
in größerem Umfang wirksam sind’, BGHSt 12, 116; 36, 38. This is the
case with the majority of young adult offenders. Thus the court does not
rely on an imagined (prototype of) juvenile, but on aspects of each individ-
ual’s personal development. There is no doubt that these arguments also
hold for a further extension of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, for example
for 21–24 year-old adults (see below). The interpretation of a ‘typical juve-
nile crime’, which is extensively used, follows a similar logic.8
8 The examples mentioned in the cases are crimes committed in groups or under the influ-
ence of a group, as well as hooliganism, and sometimes very violent crimes that have derived
from a specific situation (possibly in combination with alcohol abuse) etc.; see Eisenberg 2004,
notes 34 ff to § 105.
Juvenile Justice in Germany 139
Figure 8.16: Proportion of young adult offenders sentenced under juvenile criminal law
(§ 105 JJA) according to different crimes, 2003, old federal states.
140 Frieder Dünkel
9 These arguments do not consider that in fact sometimes the application of sanctions of the
JJA may be a disadvantage rather than a benefit, as can be shown by the fact that in the juve-
nile justice system the minimum prison sentence is six months, in the general criminal law only
one month; for some empirical evidence of disadvantages in sentencing see Dünkel 1990;
Pfeiffer 1991.
Juvenile Justice in Germany 141
Table 8.2: Proportion of young adults (18–21 years old) sentenced according to the JJA
(§ 105 JJA)
educational care order. This care order means that a social worker is
attached to a juvenile offender, rather like a mentor, for a period of usually
6 to 12 months. It is seen as an alternative to the classic probation sanction
where a probation officer sometimes has 70 or more cases. The care order
amounts to more intensive oversight, as a social worker will have no more
than 10 to 15 cases. It is evident that the care order can be much more effi-
cient in providing help and social integrative services than a suspended
prison sentence with supervision by a probation officer.
Since the beginning of the 1980s another ‘new’ community sanction has
been developed: the social training course. This is a group-centred educa-
tional measure that targets both leisure-time problems and day-to-day liv-
ing problems. Its aim is to improve social competence and the skills
required in private and professional life. Social training courses are organ-
ised as regular meetings once or twice a week, often in combination with
intensive weekend arrangements (sometimes sporting activities and ‘adven-
ture’ experiences such as sailing, mountain climbing, etc.), usually for a
period of up to six months (see Dünkel/Geng/Kirstein 1998).
The first mediation projects began in the mid-1980s (see Dünkel 1999,
108). At the beginning of the 1990s, 60% of the youth welfare departments
reported that a mediation project had already been established. In 1995 a
national poll revealed a total of 368 mediation projects, which is a 68%
increase since 1992 (see Wandrey/Weitekmap in Dölling et al 1998).
However, the authors reported that the majority of mediation schemes run
on an ‘ad hoc basis’ to cater for individual cases and not as a priority meas-
ure within the ambit of educational measures provided by the JJA (see
Wandrey/Weitekmap in Dölling et al 1998, 130 ff).
With the reform law of 1990 the legislator recognised the development
of ‘new community sanctions’ by creating legal provision for their further
and wider application. Mediation, in particular, in the draft bill was men-
tioned as ‘the most promising alternative to the more repressive traditional
sanctions’.10
The current JJA in Germany offers many opportunities for arranging
mediation or damage restitution. Juvenile court prosecutors may waive pros-
ecution if reformatory measures have already been implemented or intro-
duced (§ 45 (2) JJA). The 1990 reform Act explicitly equates mediation with
such a reformatory measure. Significantly, the legislator already recognises
sincere efforts by juveniles to resolve conflicts or to provide restitution. This
arrangement protects juvenile and young adult offenders if the victim of the
crime refuses to co-operate. Successful damage restitution more frequently
10 The legal justification referred to the favourable experiences with assorted pilot projects
launched since 1985, which increase consideration for the victim’s special circumstances and
‘settle the conflict between the offender and the victim that results from the criminal act more
appropriately and more successfully ... than traditional sanctions have done in the past’; see
Bundesratsdrucksache, No. 464/89, 44.
Juvenile Justice in Germany 143
11 After the juvenile justice legislation of 1990, the legislator also passed reforms of the gen-
eral penal law and the Criminal Procedure Act (StPO) which included some innovation with
emphasising mediation (see § 46a Criminal Law (StGB) of 1994 and §§ 155a, 155b Criminal
Procedure Act; see also Dünkel 1999, 110).
144 Frieder Dünkel
service order. This is, however, due to the fact that before 1990 almost all
youth welfare departments already ran community service schemes and
therefore scope for a further increase was rather limited.
The main aim of the nationwide Greifswald study on new community sanc-
tions was to obtain empirical data about the establishment of these sanctions
in the federal states, particularly in East Germany in the general context of
implementing the JJA in the former GDR. The process of social transition
proceeded very quickly in terms of legal reforms. The JJA came into force
simultaneously with re-unification in October 1990, shortly before the
amendment of the law in all of Germany. The poll was conducted in 1994
and 1995 and included a questionnaire sent to all community welfare
departments, private organisations running mediation and other community
sanction schemes and to juvenile court judges (see Dünkel/Geng/Kirstein
1998). The question was to what extent the new federal states had been able
to implement the structure of juvenile welfare as compared to the established
infrastructure in West Germany.
The results were astonishing as, a mere four years after re-unification,
East German Länder had not only reached equivalent structures and qual-
ity of juvenile welfare, but had even overtaken the ‘old’ federal states (see
Table 8.4).
This development continued in the five years that followed, as can be
demonstrated by several further studies, particularly in the field of media-
tion (see Steffens 1999; Schwerin-Witkowski 2003). The German federal
government sponsored and promoted many projects that focused on specific
violent offender groups, such as right-wing extremist skin-heads. At present
the police authorities estimate that there are about 10,000 right-wing, vio-
Table 8.4: ‘New’ educational community sanctions (offered by private or state organ-
isations) in the old and new federal states of Germany in 1994
Youth Social
welfare training Community
departments course Mediation Care order service
n n % n % n % N %
Old federal states 479 350 73.1 336 70.1 408 85.2 461 96.2
(FRG)
New federal states 127 96 75.6 112 88.2 119 93.7 127 100
(former GDR)
Total Germany 606 446 73.6 448 73.9 527 87.0 588 97.0
Juvenile Justice in Germany 145
lence-prone skin-heads etc. in the whole of Germany. About half of them live
in East Germany, although the East German population accounts only for
20% of the total German population (for an overview of right-wing extrem-
ism in Germany and particularly the East-German federal states see
Dünkel/Geng 1999, 2003; Dünkel/Geng/Kunkat 2001). The overrepresenta-
tion of right-wing extremists in East Germany is a very striking phenomenon
and can no doubt partly be explained by the specific problems generated by
the economic situation (the unemployment rate is double that of West
Germany), the lack of professional and personal perspectives, particularly in
young people, and also the authoritarian style of rearing families in East
Germany.
In consequence of the specific East German problems the youth welfare
authorities face a tough workload. Nevertheless, the infrastructure and the
number of social workers today is comparable to that of West Germany. In
the old federal states youth welfare authorities and the juvenile justice sys-
tem in general face different problems, particularly with young migrants
and young drug addicts, which are not (yet) prevailing problems in the east-
ern part of Germany. The ‘classic’ drug in the Eastern Länder is alcohol.
The illegal drug market has only recently increased there, too, although
there is no real hard drugs scene yet (heroine, cocaine).
Community sanctions have made progress in the East, too. However, it is
mainly the community service order that has gained major importance in
the practice of juvenile justice. Table 8.3 shows that the other community
sanctions, which are more educational and ‘constructive’ than community
service or other traditional sanctions, have made little progress.
Consequently, half of the community youth departments stated that they
had no more than eight young offenders participating in mediation per year.
In 50% of the cases in youth departments no more than eight young per-
sons in West Germany and seven young persons in East Germany were
under special educational care, and the number of participants at social
training courses was 18 and 11, respectively. On the other hand, 80 and 78
community service orders were counted in 50% of the youth departments
(see Table 8.5). The total number of young offenders sentenced to commu-
nity service was six to eight times as much as that for the other educational
sanctions mentioned in Table 8.5.
Table 8.5: Number of participants at educational measures of youth welfare departments, 1993
25%* 50%** 75%*** 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
n= n= n= n= n= n= n= n= n= n= n= n=
* This means: 25% of the departments had X clients in the specific measure
** This means: 50% of the departments had X clients in the specific measure (= Median)
*** This means: 75% of the departments had X clients in the specific measure
Juvenile Justice in Germany 147
cutors, social workers active in juvenile justice and welfare, and criminol-
ogists. This organisation has influenced the reform debate of the last 30
years quite considerably. The DVJJ wants to keep the idea of education in
the sense of special prevention and also to extend the scope of construc-
tive solutions, like mediation and other community sanctions. In this con-
text a ‘reconstruction’ of the system of community sanctions is being
advocated as well as the restriction (limitation) of youth prison sentences
(abolishing the possibility of imposing a prison sentence because of ‘dan-
gerous tendencies’) and of pre-trial detention. They urge for young adults
generally to be included in the JJA, for an extension of the maximum
penalty from 10 to 15 years (in cases where a life sentence would be
imposed for adults), and for a form of a summary written procedure to be
introduced for this age group in order to deal with minor traffic or prop-
erty offences (see Deutsche Vereinigung für Jugendgerichte und
Jugendgerichtshilfen 2002 and the recommendations of the Deutsche
Juristentag 2002: see www.djt.de).
Although the government of the social-democratic and the Green par-
ties in Germany should not be tempted to follow a ‘populist’ and ‘hyster-
ical’ criminal policy, it remains uncertain whether reform bills, including
a reduction in penal severity, will pass through parliament successfully.
Feelings of insecurity are exploited by most political parties (except the
Green party) and right-wing populist parties in some state parliaments,
as in Hamburg, have campaigned successfully during elections with law
and order paroles. The role of the mass media is very important in this
context. The German social-democratic party is sometimes badly influ-
enced by the more repressive ideas of criminal policy of the British
Labour Party. On the other hand, the ‘culture of education’ of those
working in juvenile justice is strongly engendered in Germany by perma-
nent further education of practitioners organised by the Deutsche
Vereinigung für Jugendgerichte und Jugendgerichtshilfen and other
organisations.
It was the honourable Franz von Liszt who, shortly after 1900, stated
that a good social policy would be the best criminal policy. The idea of
crime prevention has been developed more and more in the past 20 years in
Germany. Successful projects have been established, e.g. to prevent violent
or xenophobic crimes, in quite a few cities and communities (see e.g.
Dünkel/Geng 2003). This development does not detract from the need for
reforms of the juvenile justice system, but it points the way to dealing with
the causes of crime. Juvenile justice can play only a marginal role in this
regard and cannot solve general societal problems (such as poverty, unem-
ployment and discrimination).
Juvenile Justice in Germany 149
REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION
I
N POLAND , RESPONSIBILITY for juvenile offenders, as well as the meas-
ures that may be imposed upon juveniles showing other signs of social
maladjustment, are regulated independently of the adult criminal law.
Provisions regarding these issues are contained in the Proceedings in Cases
of Juveniles Act of 26 October 1982 (‘Juveniles Act’). Despite its title, this
act regulates not only procedural aspects of juvenile justice but also most
issues of substantive law. After 1989 (i.e. the fall of the communist regime)
it was amended twice, namely in 1995 and in 2000, but these amendments
were not of a substantive nature. They both introduced certain important
modifications but the model of the juvenile justice system and basic regula-
tions remained unchanged. This means that in Poland the area of juvenile
justice, as opposed to the ‘adult’ criminal justice system, is still regulated by
legislation dating back to the communist period.1 Moreover, it may be
worth noting that this particular piece of legislation was adopted in the
autumn of 1982 (i.e. less than one year after martial law introduced by the
communist authorities crushed independent trade unions, and hopes for
reform and liberalization of the system had to be abandoned). As a matter
of fact, in the autumn of 1982 martial law was still in force, many activists
of the opposition were still held in internment camps, and communist
authorities were busy introducing various extraordinary measures con-
tained in martial law decrees into ‘regular’ criminal law. In other words, in
general this period cannot be evaluated positively from the point of view of
its contribution to the development of criminal law in Poland (Wasek and
Frankowski 1995).
1 Old criminal codes from 1969 (i.e. adopted under the communist regime), although sub-
stantially amended, remained in force until 1998. On 1 September of that year they were sub-
stituted by the completely new Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code
on Execution of Penalties adopted by Sejm (the Diet) in April 1997.
156 Krzysztof Krajewski
Interestingly enough, this does not necessarily apply to the Juveniles Act.
Despite some controversial solutions and provisions which will be discussed
later, it constituted quite a modern piece of legislation and did not differ
substantially from models existing in many countries of Western Europe.
The main proof that this act may be evaluated quite positively is that after
only minor amendments, it has served over the last 15 years in democratic
Poland. There was, of course, always some talk of the necessity of prepar-
ing a new juvenile regulation, but this was not considered to be an immedi-
ate task. Moreover, postulates and proposals voiced in this area indicate
that the eventual new law may not necessarily bring real improvements and
progress into the area of juvenile justice.2
Prior to the passing of the 1982 Juveniles Act, most issues of the juve-
nile law and juvenile responsibility were regulated by the provisions of
Arts. 474–95 of the 1928 Code of Criminal Procedure, and Arts. 69–78 of
the 1932 Criminal Code. The 1932 Polish Criminal Code, considered at
that time to be one of the most modern pieces of penal legislation in
Europe, remained under significant influence of the sociological school in
penal law and positivist thinking in criminology. Because of this it adopted
an approach based predominantly on the welfare model of juvenile law,
and not a justice model of it (Beaulieu and Cesaroni 1999). As a conse-
quence, juveniles under 17 were not assumed to be capable of forming
criminal intent and thus of bearing criminal responsibility. Thus, priority
has been given to special rehabilitative measures, not punishment, and to
a separate system of procedure in cases of juveniles, as well as to the estab-
lishment of juvenile courts. From this point of view Poland was only fol-
lowing certain patterns established earlier in many countries of North
America (Bernard 1992; Trépanier 1999b) and Europe (Christiaens 1999;
Oberwittler 1999; Weijers 1999b), and all this despite the fact that tradi-
tions of welfare state and welfare based criminal policy were never very
strong there.
In the period after World War II, communist authorities in principle fol-
lowed this pattern. Moreover, a welfare approach to juvenile delinquency
was even reinforced during the 1980s. During the drafting of the new
Criminal Codes in the 1960s it was decided to take cases of juveniles com-
pletely out of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, and
to prepare a separate piece of legislation regarding these issues. Although it
took years to prepare this legislation,3 the Juveniles Act of 1982 continues
2 At the end of 2003 the Ministry of Justice finally decided to call a committee of experts
and entrust it with the task of preparing a draft of the new juvenile law. The work of this com-
mittee is currently at a very preliminary stage, and it is difficult to predict whether Poland will
follow its own tradition and the example of the recent very liberal Czech juvenile legislation
(Válková 2001), or make a switch towards a more punitive approach. Nevertheless, it is cer-
tain that the draft of a new law will not be ready soon.
The Juvenile Justice System in Poland 157
3 The pre-war criminal codes went out of force in ‘socialist’ Poland not earlier than 1 January
1970. However, it took 12 more years to prepare and pass the new, separate juvenile legisla-
tion. Because of this, earlier mentioned provisions of the old codes regarding matters of juve-
niles remained in force until 12 May 1983 (i.e. until the entry into force of the Juveniles Act).
4 For a general overview of the contemporary juvenile justice system in Poland see: Habzda
This provision makes it clear that Polish criminal law, like the legal
systems of most other European countries, does not treat retribution as an
exclusive purpose of punishment, and still pays much attention to the treat-
ment and rehabilitation of offenders. However, in case of juveniles it
stresses practically exclusively diagnosis and treatment, and disregards guilt
and punishment. Because of this the term ‘juvenile penal law’, which is used
in some other countries (such as Germany), although used colloquially, does
not constitute an official term in Polish. The term ‘juvenile law’ appears in
legal terminology, in this way stressing the non-punitive and non-penal
character of juvenile responsibility.
General remarks
Persons older than 18 years may not be subject to the proceedings instituted
on the basis of demoralization. In that case, then, the term ‘juvenile’ is iden-
tical with the concept of a minor under Polish civil law. As a consequence
there is no lowest limit whatsoever to judicial intervention in such cases,
and even the youngest children may, at least theoretically, be subject to it.
One of the most controversial issues of this type of intervention under
current Polish law is that the Juveniles Act of 1982 does not provide for a
precise definition of the very term signs of demoralization (Korcyl-Wolska
2001). Article 4 of the Juveniles Act contains only some examples of behav-
iour types or circumstances which typically have to be treated as signs of
demoralization. To those belong violation of the principles of community
life, commission of a prohibited act, truancy, abuse of alcohol or illegal
The Juvenile Justice System in Poland 159
The second possible ground for intervention in the case of juveniles is com-
mission of what the law refers to as a punishable act. The Juveniles Act
provides for various forms of responsibility and reactions which may be
5 None of the forms of behaviour mentioned in this provision-with the exception of com-
mission of a prohibited act-constitutes an offence per se under current Polish law. Because of
this demoralization is something much broader than behaviour considered to be criminal. This
means that the concept of demoralization under the Juveniles Act constitutes, as a matter of
fact, an equivalent of status offences under the American legal tradition.
6 The principles of community life clause is often used in various provisions of Polish civil
law, and in this area it has a relatively clear meaning established by the jurisprudence and judi-
cature of the Supreme Court and appellate courts. However, in the area of juvenile law its
meaning is much less clear, and because of this its use may be questionable.
160 Krzysztof Krajewski
7 Under the Polish criminal law system all adult prohibited acts are divided into offences
and contraventions. Contraventions are defined as minor types of rule violations. They are
generally dealt with by fines only, and are decided in a very simplified procedure. Nowadays
contravention cases are handled in courts. Under communism special administrative boards
had this jurisdiction.
8 This list includes assassination of the President of the Republic, homicide and manslaugh-
ter, causing serious bodily harm with deadly consequences, causing a catastrophe of a serious
character, hi-jacking, road accident with fatal consequences, aggravated rape, taking hostages,
and robbery.
The Juvenile Justice System in Poland 161
juvenile in question. The Code also states that the main grounds for such
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction is that juvenile measures were applied
earlier without a positive effect (i.e. that the juvenile in question is in fact a
‘recidivist’). But, if such a juvenile is tried as an adult, the Criminal Code
provides a special sentencing rule, namely that the maximum penalty
imposed in such cases shall not exceed two-thirds of the statutory maxi-
mum for a given offence. The court may also apply provisions on the
extraordinary mitigation of punishment (Art. 60 of the Criminal Code)
independently of all other requirements. This may result in imposing a
sentence below the statutory minimum.
It may be worth noting that a similar provision was contained in the
Criminal Code of 1969. However, the new Code introduced one significant
modification that was important from the point of view of due process
guarantees. The old Code was less specific about the types of offence which
give grounds for the possibility of a juvenile being tried as an adult. It
referred only in general terms to certain types of most serious offences;
this gave—at least theoretically—prosecutors and juvenile judges more dis-
cretion in deciding on that issue. The new Code enumerates specific
offences, thus making the use of discretion practically impossible. It must
be underlined that in practice this provision is seldom used—no more than
in a few cases each year.
The above regulation means that currently for persons under 15 (and
above 12) waiver of juvenile jurisdiction is impossible. Such juveniles may
never be held responsible for their wrongdoings according to the rules of
the adult criminal law. For them responsibility under the Juveniles Act and
specific juvenile measures remain the only possibility. It is only 15 to 16
years olds that may be subject to such responsibility, although the rule—
applied in most cases—also constitutes special juvenile responsibility here.
Since the beginning of the 1990s this regulation has been subject to some
public discussion in Poland. Public perceptions of the serious growth of
juvenile delinquency, as well as some very brutal and ruthless violent
offences committed by juveniles publicized broadly by the media, resulted
in demands for the age limit of 15 to be lowered and the possibilities for
applying adult criminal law to juveniles to be broadened. As a matter of fact
the new Criminal Code had lowered it already—in the Code of 1969 this
limit was set at 16 years. For many the lowering of the age limit in 1997
was not enough and demands that it be lowered further to 13 or even 10
years are voiced from time to time, although the chances of such proposals
being implemented remain rather small.
It may also be worth noting that there are certain possibilities for juve-
nile courts to impose penalties, and not only specific juvenile measures. This
situation is regulated by Article 13 of the Juveniles Act. According to this
article, in cases involving juveniles, who at the moment of adjudication of
the case and sentencing are older than 18 years (although they are still
162 Krzysztof Krajewski
treated as juveniles, if they committed their act before reaching 17), the
juvenile court may waive juvenile measures if it considers them inappropri-
ate and impose ‘regular’ punishment. However, in such cases extraordinary
mitigation of punishment (i.e. its reduction below the lowest statutory
limit) is mandatory.
A possibility of modifying the general age limit of 17 for juveniles in the
opposite direction is regulated in Art. 10 § 3 of the Criminal Code. According
to this article, persons who are older than 17 (i.e. who are in principle
already adults) may be treated as juveniles under certain circumstances, if
at the moment of their offence they were not older than 18. This rule
applies in cases of misdemeanors, but not felonies. Courts adjudicating such
cases may impose measures provided under the Juveniles Act instead of
penalties, if the circumstances of the act and personal characteristics of its
perpetrator warrant it.
All of the above means that under Polish law persons 17 years and over—
with the above-mentioned minor exceptions—are treated by penal law as
adults and are subject to normal criminal responsibility. However, it must
be noted that the Criminal Code designates a special category of adult
offenders who receive special treatment because of their young age: the
group labelled adolescents (mlodociani). Under Art. 115 § 10 of the
Criminal Code, an adolescent is a person who at the moment of an offence
was younger than 21 years and at the moment of sentencing younger than
24 years. Adolescents constitute only a subgroup within the category of
adult offenders. This means that they are held criminally responsible for
their law violations according to the general rules of penal responsibility.
However, Art. 54 § 1 of the Criminal Code provides a special sentencing
rule or directive which applies exclusively to this category of offenders.
Namely, when sentencing such offenders courts shall consider primarily the
need to rehabilitate them. Moreover, under Art. 60 § 1 of the Code, courts
may always apply with respect to them an extraordinary mitigation of pun-
ishment. Additionally, an adolescent who at the moment of the offence was
not yet 18 years old may not be sentenced to life imprisonment.9 This
means that while punishing adolescents, courts will always consider first of
9 Life imprisonment constitutes the severest possible sanction under Polish criminal law.
The death penalty was abolished in Poland in 1997 by the new Criminal Code, although since
1995 there has been a formal moratorium on executions, which was preceded by an informal
one since 1989. The last execution took place under the communist regime in 1988. Even
when capital punishment was still in use it was prohibited by the law to sentence persons under
18 to death.
The Juvenile Justice System in Poland 163
— caution;
— obligation to behave in a certain way, especially to repair the damage,
to offer an apology to the victim, to continue education at school or
employment, to refrain from presence in certain milieus or places, to
refrain from use of alcohol or drugs;
— responsible supervision by parents or by a custodian;
— supervision by a youth organization or other association, an employer
or trusted person, who is obliged to guarantee the juvenile’s proper
conduct;
— supervision by a probation officer;
— directing the juvenile to a probation centre, a social organization or
institution providing care, therapy or training for juveniles, applied
with the consent of these institutions or organizations;
— ordering the juvenile to be put in a foster family, in an appropriate
child or educational institution or in a training and educational centre;
— ordering the juvenile to undergo appropriate treatment for his/her
mental handicap, mental illness, alcohol or drug abuse;
— withdrawal of driving licence;
— forfeiture of the proceeds of a punishable act;
— correctional centre (suspended or not);
— other measures under the Juveniles Act or Family Code.
Although this list of measures provided by Polish juvenile law is not neces-
sarily extremely broad or innovative, it provides for flexible reactions in
cases of misbehaving and lawbreaking children, that is, reactions aimed
primarily at approaching the root causes of such misbehaviour and law-
breaking located either in the juvenile him/herself or in his/her environment
(primarily the family). It must also be mentioned that the law and practice
stress up to a certain point imposition of measures aimed at improving the
164 Krzysztof Krajewski
10 This means that, apart from two earlier mentioned meanings of the term ‘juvenile’ (i.e.
persons under 18 for the purposes of intervention in cases of demoralization, and persons
between 13 and 17 years for the purposes of intervention in cases of punishable acts), the
Juveniles Act recognizes a third meaning of this term. For the purpose of the execution of juve-
nile measures, juveniles are persons under 21 years.
The Juvenile Justice System in Poland 165
If the juvenile’s parents do not comply with the above court orders, Art. 8
of the Juveniles Act provides for sanctions for such misbehaviour, beyond
those which may eventually be imposed on the basis of the Family Code.
The family court may impose a financial sanction in the amount of 50 to
1.500 PLN (currently about €10–350).
Under the 1982 Juveniles Act, jurisdiction over all types of juvenile cases is
placed with special family courts. It is a tradition under the Polish system
that despite the child welfare orientation of juvenile law and juvenile inter-
ventions, measures provided for under juvenile law are imposed by the judi-
ciary, and not by agencies of some other type. During the 1970s, as several
drafts of the Juveniles Act were discussed in various commissions, there was
an idea to introduce special juvenile boards of non-judicial character, con-
sisting of specialists of various types involved in child welfare issues. This
idea, based on Scandinavian examples, received relatively strong support
among some specialists. It was expected that such boards may diminish
166 Krzysztof Krajewski
11 The exact English equivalent of the Polish term postepowanie wyjaśniajace would be
‘explanatory proceedings’. As this sounds rather artificial in English the term ‘investigative
proceeding’ will be used here to designate this phrase.
168 Krzysztof Krajewski
It is also worth mentioning that since the amendment to the Juveniles Act
adopted in 2000, additional possibilities of diversion have been introduced.
The new Art. 3a of the Juveniles Act provides that at any stage of the pro-
ceedings the juvenile judge, while acting on the initiative or with acceptance
of both juvenile and victim, may transfer the case to mediation by an insti-
tution or a trustworthy person. Results of such mediation efforts shall be
presented to the judge by this institution or person and taken into consid-
eration while deciding the case. This provision constitutes a first attempt to
introduce elements of restorative justice in a formal way into the Polish
legal system. So far, practical experience with this form of deciding juvenile
cases is rather limited. Nevertheless, Art. 3a was introduced as a result of
the encouraging results of a pilot experimental program of mediating juve-
nile cases which has been running in eight family courts since 1995. This
experiment has laid the groundwork for the development of certain institu-
tional elements of a mediation system in Poland (Czarnecka-Dzialuk and
Wójcik 2001).
It is important to note that the discretionary powers of the judge are not
unlimited, as they are subject to appellate review. Decisions of the family
judge to institute proceedings, as well as refusing to institute or to discon-
tinue them, may always be appealed, also by the victim (Art. 21 § 3). This
situation is the subject of intense discussion in the Polish literature. In prin-
ciple the rights of the victim, and possibilities of influencing the course of
proceedings with various motions—normally rather broad under ‘adult’
criminal procedure—are severely limited in juvenile proceedings. This is
considered to be justified by the special purpose of this type of proceeding,
namely that the welfare of a juvenile and his/her rehabilitation are the most
important aims of intervention. Because of this right to appeal, the juvenile
judge’s decision to refuse to institute proceedings or to discontinue them
constitutes one of the very few instruments which remain in the hands of
the victim. For some time, especially due to some cases of serious violent
offences committed by juveniles and publicized by the media, this regula-
tion is hotly contested. Various victim organizations and associations are
struggling for more victim rights in juvenile courts. However, so far and
in accordance with the ‘child welfare’ ideology, the legal position of the
victim in juvenile proceedings remains significantly weaker than in ‘adult’
criminal procedure.
The main purposes of the investigative phase of the proceedings in cases
of juveniles are to reveal all relevant circumstances of the case, and to col-
lect and record all relevant evidence for the purpose of future use during the
trial. Due to the character of this proceeding devoted primarily to the
welfare of the child, the juvenile judge also has the duty to collect all rele-
vant personal data on the juvenile, as well as on his/her family. In this
respect juvenile courts have to rely on specialized institutions, so-called
family diagnostic and consultative centres. They are entrusted with the task
170 Krzysztof Krajewski
in investigating juvenile cases, and does not prepare a charge sheet in such cases. Activities of
an equivalent type are undertaken by the juvenile judge in such cases.
14 In addition, court hearings in care and educational proceedings are closed to the public,
but this is a rule in civil non-litigious proceedings, as opposed to criminal proceedings, where
hearings are as a rule public.
174 Krzysztof Krajewski
Despite the fact that reformatory proceedings are regulated by the provi-
sions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and bear a close similarity to the
‘adult’ criminal trial, it cannot and should not be considered to be of a pri-
marily penal or punitive character. As was mentioned earlier, the only refor-
matory measure known to Polish juvenile law (i.e. correctional centre
suspended or not) is not considered to constitute a punishment. And this is
true despite the fact that it bears a certain similarity to deprivation of lib-
erty or to a suspended sentence under ‘adult’ criminal law. Nevertheless a
correctional centre is not a prison. It constitutes a juvenile measure, and its
application and execution are governed by the general rule of Art. 3 § 1 of
the Juveniles Act (i.e. child’s welfare and rehabilitation). Moreover, if the
court after trial comes to the conclusion that reformatory measures are not
justified in a given case of a punishable act, it may always impose care and
educational measures.
The above description of the Polish juvenile justice system may be supple-
mented by some statistical data on the juvenile delinquency problem in
Poland, as well as the functioning of the juvenile justice system. First of all
it is necessary to stress that Poland, like all other countries of Central and
Eastern Europe after the political, economic and social change which began
in 1989, saw a serious growth in registered offences (Jasinski 1995; 1999,
Widacki 2001, Krajewski 2004). A detailed presentation of this phenome-
non and its causes goes beyond the scope of the present analysis—only a
few general remarks are possible here. After a sharp jump in the registered
offence rate in 1990 (from 1,440 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1989 to 2,317)
during the first half of the 1990s this rate actually stabilized. It was only
during the second half of the decade that it began to grow again in a signif-
icant way (Figure 1).
As a consequence, the rate of registered offences in 2001 was approxi-
mately 55% higher than it was in 1990. If one considers additionally the
fact that especially rapid growth could be observed in the area of violent
offences, such as assault, bodily injury, robbery and homicide, which were
growing much quicker than property offences, it may be argued that the
evolution of the crime problem in Poland took a very problematic direction.
In the literature this picture is often countered with the argument that avail-
able results of victimization surveys do not necessarily confirm this dra-
matic growth trend. They show rather that the prevalence rate of
victimization has stabilized or even decreased slightly during recent years,
although readiness to report offences remains extremely low, which results
in a large dark figure. However, this readiness to report seems also to be
The Juvenile Justice System in Poland 175
growing steadily. This means that the growth of registered offences may
result primarily from increased readiness to report them to the police.
Nevertheless, if one compares the development of the adult offence rate
and the juvenile offence rate during the 1990s, it becomes obvious, first of
all, that the latter remained much lower than the former. Its growth was
also somewhat less spectacular than in the case of adults, and at the begin-
ning of the present decade even some slight decrease could be observed.
Because of these different developments the juvenile offence rate in 2001
was 49% higher than in 1990, as compared to 55% growth in the overall
offence rate. This picture certainly becomes more pessimistic if one consid-
ers developments in the area of some violent offences committed by juve-
niles (Krajewski 2003) (Figure 2).
Here growth rates were significant, sometimes even spectacular, such as
in the case of robbery. They increased more than tenfold during the 1990s!
But also in cases of assault or causing bodily harm these increases were very
significant. This necessarily brought about changes in the structure of reg-
istered juvenile offences (Figure 3).
Prior to 1990, juvenile delinquency in Poland was dominated by property
offences, such as simple theft and burglary, which even in 1990 still consti-
tuted almost 80% of all juvenile offences registered by the police. Certainly,
this changed during the 1990s, as in the year 2001 the proportion of prop-
erty offences among all juvenile offences decreased to about 40%, while the
proportion of violent offences grew to more than 20%. Interestingly enough
176 Krzysztof Krajewski
it is the category ‘other’ which has also grown significantly, to slightly less
than 20%. This was mainly due to a substantial growth in the drug offence
rate. However, it may be interesting to note that despite all this, the propor-
tion of juvenile offences among all registered offences (Figure 4) still
remains fairly low (under 10%). Moreover, after growth during the first
half of the 1990s it started to fall, and in 2001 it reached a historical low
of 4.9%.
All this may indicate that juvenile delinquency in Poland does not neces-
sarily pose a serious problem in quantitative terms, but undergoes certain
qualitative changes which may give reason for some concern: it becomes
more violent and generally more serious. This may be true, although some
reservations are necessary. A comparison of registration and processing pat-
terns of juvenile delinquents in some central and western European cities
(Neubacher et al 1999) shows that these patterns are quite different. It
seems for example that in Hamburg a very high number of registered acts
is followed by an extremely intensive selection processes and very high
‘drop-out’ ratio. In Central European cities (Budapest, Prague, Krakow) the
number of registered offences is much lower, but at the same time selection
processes seem to be much less intensive. This may give grounds for the sus-
picion that a substantial proportion of less serious delinquent acts in
Central Europe either go unnoticed by the police or are selected-out in a
quite informal way and are never officially registered. This would mean of
course that the dark number of juvenile offences in Central Europe may
remain extremely high.
Similar patterns indicate data regarding juvenile suspects, although here
general rates of suspects and rates of juvenile suspects developed according
to a much more similar pattern than offence rates (Figure 5).
But the juvenile suspect rate was usually also 30–40% lower than the
respective adult rate. Interestingly enough, if one examines the age distribu-
tion of offenders (Figure 6), it becomes clear that although substantial
changes took place during the 1990s in the incidence of criminal behaviour
in all age brackets, it was not necessarily the bracket of 13–16 years that
was most problematic.
178 Krzysztof Krajewski
This distribution in 1989 was still relatively flat, and differences in the
incidence of criminal behaviour between younger and older offenders were
not very high. During the 1990s this changed, and younger age brackets
experienced a sharper growth in offending than the other age categories.
However, this growth was most substantial among 17–21 year olds (i.e.
among adolescents), which have the highest offence rates, and not among
juveniles. At the same time the proportion of juvenile suspects among all
suspects remained fairly stable and low during the 1990s. In recent years
this proportion decreased even further, following the same pattern as the
number of registered offences (Figure 7).
The remaining data illustrate the reality of the Polish juvenile justice sys-
tem, and the way it adapted to the changing patterns of juvenile delin-
quency. First of all it is worth noting that the number of juvenile cases in
family courts grew substantially during the 1990s (Figure 8).
The number of cases related to signs of demoralization doubled during
that time, while the number of cases related to punishable acts more than
doubled. The fact that the number of cases of the second type has been
growing a little bit faster is confirmed by the fact that in 1990 their ratio
was 1:2.5. In 2001 it became more than 1:3. This means that the majority
(about three-quarters) of all juvenile interventions under Polish juvenile law
are related to punishable acts. Despite these changes in the rate and struc-
ture of juvenile offending, the structure of sanctions imposed by juvenile
courts remained almost unchanged (Figures 9 and 10).
There are even some indications that a more lenient and liberal approach
actually established itself in the practice of family courts. In both types of
juvenile cases, namely cases of demoralization and cases of punishable acts,
the type of measure most often used, applied in about a third of cases of
both types, is supervision by a probation officer. Although the use of pro-
bation decreased during the 1990s, it was followed by more intensive use
of such measures as cautions and obligations of various types. This may
have two bases. First, during the 1990s Polish criminal policy in cases of
adults underwent a significant process of liberalization, as compared with
the communist period (Krajewski 2004). For example, a significant drop in
the use of imprisonment and an increase in the use of fines took place.
Additionally, the average duration of imprisonment went down. Something
similar may occur also in cases of juveniles, as courts opt for less restrictive
sanctions. But it may also be that the less intensive use of supervision by
probation officers resulted from probation agencies being overloaded with
work, which in turn forced courts to seek alternative measures.
Finally it is worth noting that the use of the most restrictive juvenile
measure, namely the correctional centre, remained quite limited. This meas-
ure was and still is applied on average in less than 10% of all cases of pun-
ishable acts and showed decreasing use, which ended in a spectacular fall to
4.1% in 2000! And all of this despite the growing number of more serious
juvenile offences. It seems that in the opinion of the judges, who have daily
contact with the realities of juvenile delinquency, there is no need to react
to these tendencies in a harsher way. This may be confirmed by the fact that
a vast majority of measures imposed in cases of punishable acts are care and
educational measures, and not the reformatory option (Figure 11).
At the same time, despite some growth in 2000, the majority of reforma-
tory measures or correctional centre orders imposed by Polish juvenile
courts (about three-fifths) remain suspended (Figure 12).
This indicates again that in face of the above mentioned qualitative
changes in juvenile delinquency, Polish juvenile judges either moved in
favour of a more lenient treatment of juvenile offenders, or do not perceive
the problem of juvenile delinquency in such a dramatic way as the media
and politicians.
Figure 11: The proportions of care and educational, and reformatory measures
imposed in cases of punishable acts
182 Krzysztof Krajewski
Figure 12: The proportions of suspended and non-suspended correction centre orders
CONCLUSIONS
Current laws regulating the juvenile justice system in Poland are clearly ori-
ented towards a ‘child welfare’ model, with the rehabilitation of young
offenders constituting the main task of all actions undertaken in cases of
juvenile law violators. It means that the basic idea behind the creation of
the juvenile courts in the U.S. at the end of the nineteenth century, namely
that children in trouble ought to be ‘saved’ and not ‘punished’ (Weijers
1999a, 330), also underlies the Polish juvenile justice system. As a conse-
quence, procedures in juvenile cases are constructed in a much more flexi-
ble way than in adult cases. Much more discretion is permissible, and the
law gives broader possibilities for intervention in a juvenile’s life than is the
case with adults. Finally, juvenile measures are not aimed at punishment of
the lawbreaker, but almost exclusively at his/her treatment and rehabilita-
tion. However, this does not necessarily mean that what Weijers (1999a,
341) refers to as efficiency and consequentialism have absolute priority over
civil rights. It is true that an emphasis on child needs often results in the
conviction that there is no need to safeguard all his/her procedural rights
(Trépanier 1999a, 314). It seems, however, that the Polish legislation was in
principle able to strike a common sense balance between these elements of
any juvenile justice system. As a recent major empirical study on this sub-
ject (Korcyl-Wolska 2001) shows, this balance may not be perfect, and
there are sometimes serious practical problems. Nevertheless, it does not
result in widespread excesses or abuses. Interestingly, such a model has
existed in Poland since before World War Two and its principles were not
changed under the communist rule. Because of this, the 1982 Juveniles Act
The Juvenile Justice System in Poland 183
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10
Responses to Juvenile Crime:
The Swedish System
JERZY SARNECKI
INTRODUCTION
T
HE ENGLISH CONCEPT ‘juvenile delinquency’ has no direct equivalent
in the Swedish language or in the Swedish legal system. Instead, in
Sweden we usually speak of juvenile criminality, a concept which
differs from juvenile delinquency in that it does not include so-called status
offences, i.e. acts committed by juveniles which constitute a crime but are
legal if they are committed by adults. Of course this does not mean that
the Swedish authorities do not react if young people drink alcohol, run
away from home or commit other acts which jeopardise their development.
However, the authorities’ reactions in such cases have the character of
social measures and are regulated by social legislation, not penal legislation.
In this paper the term ‘juvenile delinquency’ is used synonymously with the
Swedish concept of juvenile criminality and thus covers all acts which are
subject to penal sanctions according to Swedish law.
The objective of this paper is to describe the ways in which Swedish
authorities respond to juvenile delinquency/criminality and also how this
response has changed over the past two decades. These changes will then be
related to existing knowledge of the extent and character of crimes commit-
ted by young people over the course of the period in question.
On the whole, criminality in Sweden has increased greatly since the mid-
1920s. This is most frequently explained by the increase in the level of
opportunities for crime. People today own a lot of attractive goods which
are also relatively easily accessible. Cars constitute a good example of this.
Considering their value, they are relatively easy to steal. The enormous
expansion in private car ownership in Sweden (435 per 1,000 inhabitants
188 Jerzy Sarnecki
1 The English term ‘conviction’ is used throughout this text as a translation of the Swedish
‘lagföring’. This means that besides referring to persons adjudicated to have committed a given
offence by a court, the term ‘conviction’ also covers two other responses to crime, these being
1) the issuance of a fine by the prosecutor (without proceeding through the court system)
and 2) a so-called ‘waiver of prosecution’, which in effect amounts to a caution issued by the
prosecutor (again in combination with a decision not to prosecute the offender through
the courts). Both these responses require an admission of guilt on the part of the offender, and
are thus treated as ‘findings of guilt’ in official statistics in the same way as court adjudications.
2 Crimes where a prison term is included in the sanctioning scale.
3 The final year for which von Hofer presents data is 1994. Unfortunately statistics relating
Figure 10.1: Absolute numbers of young people aged 15–17 and 18–20
years convicted of criminal offences in Sweden 1993–2000 (BRÅ, 2002).
4 If certain minor offences such as thefts from school or the respondent’s home, and fare
dodging on public transport, are ignored, the proportion of youths reporting having commit-
ted one or more (non-minor) offences during the last year stood at 61% in 1995 and 52% in
2001 (Ring 2003).
190 Jerzy Sarnecki
that they had committed one or a few offences during the past year. Relatively
few youths reported having committed large numbers of offences, however.
Since property crimes dominate among the reported offences, the total
level of self-reported crime has decreased. This decrease is greatest among
the most socially well-adjusted respondents and those reporting the lowest
levels of participation in crime, but it is also discernable among youths pre-
senting much higher levels of delinquent participation and among those
from socially disadvantaged backgrounds. It should also be pointed out,
however, that the study includes a number of questions relating to the
young people’s experience of criminal victimisation. In contrast with the
levels of self-reported crime, levels of reported victimisation as regards cer-
tain types of theft, threatening behaviour and violence remain fairly con-
stant over the period examined.
The first large self-report study of juvenile crime in Sweden was con-
ducted in the town of Örebro in 1971. Twenty-five years later, in 1996, this
study was repeated using the same survey instrument (Ward 1998). This
study also indicated that variations in levels of self-reported crime were rel-
atively small. Ward shows, however, a certain polarisation among the
groups studied, with the group presenting the highest levels of criminal par-
ticipation becoming both larger and more heavily involved in crime
between the two surveys, whilst at the same time the size of the group
reporting no involvement in crime whatsoever also became larger.
The majority of researchers in Sweden are more or less in agreement that
the total level of juvenile crime has not increased over the last decades
(Sarnecki 2003). The question of trends in juvenile violence is rather more
controversial. According to official statistics (see Figure 10.2), the number
of young people convicted of violent offences underwent a dramatic
increase between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, after which point a cer-
tain decrease may be observed.
Certain academics (e.g. Kühlhorn 2003) have contended that this
increase in recorded violent crime reflects a real increase, not least in rela-
tion to levels of serious violence. This contention has been called into ques-
tion, however. Estrada and Sarnecki (2002), for example, have pointed out
that the most serious form of violence—i.e. that resulting in death—has
not increased among young people. The number of youths who die as a
result of acts of violence has remained constant at approximately 16 indi-
viduals per year since the beginning of the 1970s. Whilst this does not con-
stitute a direct indication that juveniles are not in fact committing crimes
of this type, it does indirectly belie the perception that serious violence is
on the increase among this group, since the perpetrators and victims of vio-
lence are most often drawn from approximately the same age group
(Sarnecki 2001).
Nor does the apparent increase in the number of 15 to 17 year olds con-
victed of homicide (murder and manslaughter) during the second half of the
Responses to Juvenile Crime: The Swedish System 191
Figure 10.2: 15–17 year olds convicted of assault and robbery respectively,
per 100,000 of population, 1973–2000 (Estrada and Sarnecki 2002,
source: BRÅ, 2002).
1990s provide support for the contention that serious violence among juve-
niles is on the increase. On the contrary, a study from the Swedish National
Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ 2002) shows that the total number of
convictions relating to violence resulting in death in fact decreased during
this period. This decrease is a result of the fact that whilst convictions
within the two most serious categories (murder and manslaughter)
increased, the number of convictions relating to aggravated assault resulting
in death fell. According to Lindström and Rying’s calculations, 24 individuals
between the ages of 15 and 17 were convicted of murder, manslaughter or
negligent homicide between 1990 and 1994, whilst the corresponding figure
for 1995 to 1999 was 14 individuals. This involves a reduction of slightly
over 40%. One hypothesis that might be suggested in this context is that the
courts today view cases of violence resulting in death more severely than
they used to. It is not unreasonable to assume that this more severe view
might relate not only to violence resulting in death, but rather to violence in
general. Support for this hypothesis that Swedish society views violent
crime more seriously than it did previously may be found, inter alia, in the
findings from research into changes in the way violent crime is reported in
the mass media (Estrada 1999, Pollack 2001).
As was mentioned earlier, the increase in levels of juvenile violence
recorded by the police over recent years is not corroborated by either the
self-report or victim surveys conducted among Swedish 15-year-olds since
1995. Victim surveys have been conducted among the general population in
Sweden since the end of the 1970s. These surveys do not indicate any major
increase in the level of youths’ (16–24 years) exposure to violent crime
either (Figure 10.3).
192 Jerzy Sarnecki
Figure 10.3: Proportion of youths aged 16–24 who report having been subjected to
violence resulting in visible injury, or requiring medical attention, during the past
year, 1978–2000 (Estrada and Sarnecki, 2002).
In particular, the figure provides no support for the thesis that more
serious violence is on the increase, at least not since the beginning of the
1990s. Once again, this statement is based on the assumption that crimes
against young people are for the most part committed by other young
people.
• For those below the age of 15, the main responsibility for the response
to crime lies with the social services.
• For those aged between 15 and 17 (and in certain cases up to the age
of 20), the responsibility is divided between the social services and the
judicial authorities.
• From the ages of 18 to 20, the responsibility lies mainly with the judi-
cial authorities.
The Swedish justice system functions on the basis of the legality principle,
which means that the police and other agencies within the justice system are
obliged to intervene where the legal criteria that serve to define a criminal
act are fulfilled. At the same time, however, the system allows for a large
number of exceptions to this rule. In practice, therefore, as is the case in
many other countries, the Swedish police have a large amount of discre-
tionary power. When the police discover that a minor offence is being com-
mitted, their efforts are often limited to an order to cease and desist. If this
is sufficient to stop the improper behaviour, the police do not report the
matter. According to the legislation, the police have the right in certain cases
to direct young offenders to repair the damage caused by their criminal acts.
If the offender complies, the offence is not reported. In 1990, however, cer-
tain restrictions were introduced in relation to the police’s right to exercise
discretion in relation to the reporting of offences (RPS 1999).
According to Swedish law the police shall prevent, discover and investigate
crimes. If a crime has been reported, the official task of the police is to inves-
tigate who committed the crime. As in most western countries, the police in
Sweden have a low success rate (approximately 15%) when it comes to clear-
ing up traditional crimes. This is true both for crimes committed by juveniles
and for those committed by adults. Nevertheless the police, and in particular
those police who work with juvenile crimes, are familiar with most of the
highly criminally active juveniles within a police district. The criminal activi-
ties of these young people are so extensive that even given the low risk of dis-
covery, they will become the subject of a police investigation at some time or
other. Furthermore, the police obtain substantial knowledge about the more
active juvenile offenders through contacts with and interrogations of other
juveniles, neighbourhood police work and other police activities.
194 Jerzy Sarnecki
5 The prosecutor may also discontinue a criminal investigation if the crime in question may
be deemed to be insignificant in relation to another offence and if the costs of the investiga-
tion would assume unreasonable proportions, providing the sanction would not exceed a fine
or a waiver of prosecution. In such cases, however, the interests of other parties (e.g. those of
the victim) may not be disregarded.
196 Jerzy Sarnecki
Figure 10.4: Youths aged 15–17 years who have been convicted by means of a court
sentence, a prosecution waiver or a prosecutor’s fine in 1980 and 2000, for assault
and theft offences respectively.
The Swedish Young Offenders Act (LUL) gives prosecutors broad pow-
ers regarding the issuance of prosecution waivers when a suspect is below
the age of 18, and in certain cases up to the age of 20. The rules are much
more generous in relation to young people than older people. But the pros-
ecutor may revoke a prosecution waiver if the young person returns to
crime. In the legislation from 1988 on young offenders, the prosecutor’s
power to revoke such decisions was extended. The provisions regarding
prosecution waivers were also made more formal and were to some extent
given the form of a formal caution issued by the prosecutor to the juvenile
and his parents. A further legislative change in 1994 (SFS 1994: 1760)
produced a situation whereby waivers of prosecution may in principle no
longer be used for youths who have previously been registered in connec-
tion with offences.
Over the course of 2001, approximately 111,000 court sentences, prose-
cutor’s fines and waivers of prosecution were issued in Sweden.
Approximately 16% of these convictions took the form of waivers of
prosecution. Approximately 12,000 of the convictions related to young
people aged between 15 and 17. Of these, approximately 24% were com-
prised of waivers of prosecution. Of the 10,000 or so convictions relating
to youths aged between 18 and 20, approximately 11% took the form of
waivers of prosecution. In the mid-1980s, these proportions were signifi-
cantly higher among the youngest group (45%) whilst they lay at approxi-
mately the same level (9%) among the older youths.
Before a prosecutor issues a waiver of prosecution to a person under
the age of 18, he often obtains an opinion from the social services if the
Responses to Juvenile Crime: The Swedish System 197
6 According to Swedish law, exceptional cause is required before an individual aged between
the care of young people (here referred to as a youth care facility). These
are the same institutions where youths are placed in compulsory care by
the social services (see below). These institutions are focused on the treat-
ment of young people and have a staff to ‘inmate’ ratio approximately
three times that of prisons (approximately three staff members per youth
in care). Over the course of 2000 and 2001, approximately 100 annually
youths have been sentenced to the new sanction (of which approximately
85% were aged between 15 and 17 at the time of the offence, whilst the
remainder were over the age of 18). This constitutes a slightly higher
number than those who were sentenced to prison (including probation
with a prison term) prior to the new Act coming into force. In addition, the
introduction of the secure youth care sanction has led to longer custodial
sentences. Youths sentenced to prison prior to 1999 served an average sen-
tence of approximately 5.4 months. Youths sentenced to the new sanction,
on the other hand, spend an average of 9.5 months in custodial care
(BRÅ, SOS, SiS 2002).
The other sanctions that a court can use in sentencing minors are:
Certain of the sanctions presented above may be combined with each other
or with other forms of sanction. Thus probation may for example be com-
bined with contractual care or community service. Combinations of this
type are rare, however, for young persons under the age of 18. On the other
hand, surrender into the care of the social services may be combined with
the sanction youth service, which comprises community service specifically
adapted to younger people. For approximately 20% of the 15 to 17 year
olds sentenced to care within the social services, the sanction is combined
with youth service in this way. In rare instances, youth service is also
applied in combination with probation for young people over the age of 18.
Fines may also be awarded in combination with other sanctions. Finally,
young people are in rare cases sentenced to psychiatric care. This sanction
is however extremely rarely used in relation to the youngest age group.
The distribution of sanctions in 2001 for all those convicted, and for
young people aged 15 to 17 and 18 to 20 respectively, is presented in
Figures 10.7, 10.8 and 10.9.
The social services do not have the task of punishing young people for their
crimes. Therefore, when the social services make a decision regarding a
measure suitable as a response to a criminal act, the decision should be
Figure 10.7. Convictions for all persons sentenced by the courts, or awarded
prosecution waivers or summary sanctions by the prosecutor, 2001. 110,711
convictions in total.
Responses to Juvenile Crime: The Swedish System 201
Figure 10.8: Convictions for all 18 to 20 year olds sentenced by the courts, or
awarded prosecution waivers or summary sanctions by the prosecutor, 2001.
10,333 convictions in total.
Figure 10.9: Convictions for all 15 to 17 year olds sentenced by the courts, or
awarded prosecution waivers or summary sanctions by the prosecutor, 2001.
12,029 convictions in total.
based solely on the young person’s social situation. (If an individual has a
serious history of criminality, that is naturally included in the overall pic-
ture of his social situation.) Swedish law places the entire responsibility for
responding to crimes committed by individuals under the age of 15 on the
social services. Thus the criminality of this group is regarded as a social wel-
fare problem.
Accordingly the measures of the social services are to have the aim of
helping the young offender out of the social situation that is causing
202 Jerzy Sarnecki
Figure 10.10: Youths aged 15 to 17 placed outside of their own home by the social
services in accordance with SoL and LVU in 2001. 1,995 persons in total. (Source:
BRÅ, SoS, SiS).
204 Jerzy Sarnecki
Other institutions
Thus, according to Swedish law, the social services and the judicial system
are the institutions which are responsible for society’s response to juvenile
delinquency. The social services are also responsible for the response to
other forms of antisocial behaviour among young people. On the other
hand, young people with social problems also come into contact with other
societal institutions and they are often the subject of measures taken by
these institutions.
The largest and most important of these institutions is the school system.
Sweden has a system involving nine years of compulsory education, but
most young people (approximately 97%) go on to some form of further
education. The 3% or so who do not continue their education are to a large
extent young people with serious adjustment problems (Sarnecki 1983).
According to Swedish law, they are to be followed up by the local authori-
ties until they reach the age of 18. In those cases where these young people
do not obtain jobs on the open labour market, they are offered various
types of assistance by the local authority such as short training programs,
job counselling, educational guidance, etc.
The school system has no formal responsibility for the control of deviant
behaviour among young people. However, its de facto role is of course very
large. Schools have to a great extent replaced the social control previously
placed upon young people by working life and to a certain extent by the
family and the neighbourhood. In a country like Sweden, where the major-
ity of women work outside the home, the school constitutes the most
important agent for social control of the young during most of the hours of
a normal working day.
In Sweden, just as in other countries, there is a strong correlation between
behaviour in school and criminality as well as other forms of deviant behav-
iour, both in the teenage years and in adulthood (SOU 1972, 76; Sarnecki
1986; Torstensson 1987; Ring 1999). Swedish teachers recognise very well
Responses to Juvenile Crime: The Swedish System 205
CONCLUSIONS
The ideas of welfare and pluralism also contribute to the relatively large
amount of tolerance and humanity shown in Sweden towards persons who
deviate from the norm. These ideas are considered to be important in the
formulation of the measures to be used in relation to young offenders.
Relatively substantial and long-term criminality is required before the
authorities are allowed to undertake more far-reaching measures. The
emphasis on treatment instead of punishment is also considered to be more
humane, even though the ideas behind it have been questioned (BRÅ
Rapport 1977, 7; SOU 1993, 35). The criticisms directed at the strong
treatment focus within the Swedish justice system, and primarily within
that part of the justice system focused on young people, comprised two ele-
ments. One related to the lack of scientific evidence that treatment was an
effective method, the other to the perception that the system was unfair. In
the light of more recent research, the first of these arguments against
employing treatment as a means of responding to crime has shown itself to
overstate the case (e.g. Lipsey 1992, 1995; Loeber and Farrington 1998 and
BRÅ 2001b). The treatment of young offenders has shown itself capable of
producing positive effects, even if these effects are rarely all that strong
(CUS, SiS, Andersson 2003). The criticism of the system’s unfairness, on the
other hand, is still relevant. In this context, a hypothetical case is usually
referred to whereby two youths who have committed the same offence are
responded to in quite different ways. One comes from a well-functioning
social background and is merely given a caution, whilst the other comes
from much more difficult conditions and is therefore taken into care and
placed in an institution.
In general, one can argue that in Sweden, the 1980s and 1990s were char-
acterised by increasing levels of concern for juvenile violence which has
been perceived both within the media and among the public as undergoing
a substantial increase. Discussions of the trends in violent crime of the kind
presented above seldom reach the public and tend to be contrasted in the
press with descriptions of tragic and particularly bloody cases of violence.
The general perception among the public at large may be assumed to be that
the country has suffered a dramatic increase in the levels of violent crime
committed by young people and other forms of serious youth crime. In the
context of this climate of opinion, there is a general questioning of methods
used to treat young offenders that are perceived to be too lenient. Certain
treatment measures, such as taking youths with a long criminal record on
sailing trips, have been presented in the media as both ineffective and at
odds with the public’s general sense of justice. This atmosphere has led
politicians to perceive a need to show that they take juvenile crime seri-
ously, and in particular violent crime (cf. Garland 1990, Estrada 2001, von
Hofer 2004). Many of the reforms of legislation and praxis relating to
young offenders appear to have the objective of accentuating the idea that
this is a problem that cannot be taken lightly.
208 Jerzy Sarnecki
REFERENCES
Ring, J. (1999) Hem och skola, kamrater och brott. [Home and school,
peers and crime] (Stockholm, University of Stockholm, Department of
Criminology).
—— (2003) Stöld, droger och våld bland Sveriges elever. [Theft, drugs and
violence among Swedish pupils] (Stockholm, National Council for
Crime Prevention).
RPS (1999) Polislagen [The Police Law] National Police Board Sweden.
http://www.polisen.se/inter/mediacache//4347/4734/2671/polislagen_
pdf.pdf
Sarnecki, J. (1983) Fritid och brottslighet [Leisure and criminality]
(Stockholm, National Council for Crime Prevention, Report No. 17).
—— (1986) Delinquent Networks. (Stockholm, National Council for
Crime Prevention Report No. 1986: 1).
—— (1987) Skolan och brottsligheten. [School and crime] (Stockholm,
Carlssons).
—— (2001) Delinquent Networks: Youth Co-offending in Stockholm.
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
—— (2003) Introduktion till kriminologi. [Introduction to criminology]
(Lund Studentlitteratur).
SCB (1989) Ungdomar och Brott. [Youth and crime] (Stockholm, Statistic
Sweden).
SCB (2002) Undersökning av levnadsförhållanden (ULF) [Survey of living
conditions] http://www.scb.se/statistik/le0101/le0101.asp
SFS (1994:1760) Svensk Författningssampling, författningarna 1994:1604
till 1994:1800 http://www.notisum.se/rnp/reg/SF9941.HTM–226K
SOU (1972) Carlsson, G., Unga lagöverträdare II. Familj, skola och
samhälle i belysning av officiella data. 1956 års klientelundersökning
rörande ungdomsbrottslingar. [Young Offenders 11. Family, school
and society in the light of official data. The 1956 Clientele
Investigation Relating to Juvenile Delinquents] (Stockholm).
SOU (1993) Reaktion mot ungdomsbrott. [Reaction to juvenile delin-
quency] (Stockholm, Ungdomsbrottskommitten. B Statens offentliga
utredningar).
Torstensson, M. (1987) Drug Abusers in a Metropolitan Cohort.
(Stockholm, Department of Sociology, University of Stockholm,
Report No. 25).
Ward, M. (1998) Barn & brott av vår tid?: självdeklarerad ungdoms-
brottslighet 1971 och 1996: en jämförelse utifrån Örebroprojektets
data. [Children and crimes of our time? Self reported juvenile crime
in 1971 and 1996: a comparison employing data from the Örebro
project] (Stockholm, University of Stockholm, Department of
Criminology).
11
Juvenile Justice in Denmark:
From Social Welfare to Repression
JØRGEN JEPSEN
INTRODUCTION
T
HE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT of developments in juvenile justice in
Denmark in recent years was originally intended to demonstrate how
a so-called welfare state has handled the problems of youth crime
with non-repressive measures based upon social and personal support to
young law violators, rather than through harsh repression with an empha-
sis on crime control. The somewhat unique use in Denmark—as in
Scandinavia—of communal welfare boards instead of juvenile courts or
adult courts was at the time of the presentation at Oñati seen as a model
that might serve as an inspiration for developing nations or nations want-
ing to reform more repressive juvenile justice systems in a welfare direction,
all in pursuance of the goals of the Oñati conference.
In the process of re-writing the original contribution after the Oñati con-
ference it became increasingly clear, however, with the passage of time and
the emergence of new information, that this would have amounted to pre-
senting much too rosy and optimistic a picture of the actual developments.
Tendencies that were discernible in the first years of the new millennium
have become more prominent and the optimism originally expressed has
been replaced by serious concern over the increasing repression character-
izing juvenile justice—like criminal justice in general—in Denmark up until
July 2005.
The following account will take up some of the characteristics of the orig-
inal Danish welfare model of juvenile justice and look at the transformation
it is undergoing which is bringing it closer to the crime control model of
other Western countries such as the U.S.A. Both the welfare board model
and the use of social support instead of institutionalization have come
under pressure. The system of sanctions against youth in trouble with the
law in recent years has been superseded by symbolic legislation aimed pri-
marily at signalling official disapproval of juvenile deviance and instituting
214 Jørgen Jepsen
A caveat
Historical development1
In the mid 19th century steps were taken to limit the use of penal sanctions
for children and juveniles. Ten years as the minimum age of criminal
responsibility was made statutory while sentencing of children between 10
and 15 years came to be dependent on individual evaluation. They were
only to be punished if they were evaluated to have been sufficiently mature
to understand the criminal nature of the behaviour (Greve 1996).
Punishment was seen as both unsatisfactory and burdensome and in 1905
an absolute age limit of 14 was introduced. Simultaneously, a law on child
welfare was introduced, which was based on the still valid principle that
children and juvenile offenders under 18 years should be educated, not pun-
ished (Greve 1996). Child welfare committees were set up and reformato-
ries established to take care of ‘erring and wicked children’ as well as young
offenders as the new law gave the committees the authority to detain chil-
dren on the basis of behavioural problems and neglect.
The inspiration to form child welfare committees came from Norway,
where a similar arrangement was established in 1900 (Dahl 1985).
Moreover, the new radical ideas about criminal policy and about possibili-
ties for treating the offender, which emerged in Europe around the turn of
the 19th century, also influenced the changes concerning children and child
welfare. It was the idea developed from the positivist school that led to a
paradigm shift in the view of the offender and later on to a change in the
classical penal ideology based strictly on proportionality.
The Criminal Code of 1930 (in force in 1933) introduced a number of spe-
cial sanctions, all based on the idea of treatment and all partly or totally
indeterminate. For youth justice it resulted in the establishment of the youth
prison sanction, a sentence for juveniles between 15 and 21 years of age
with the intention of educating and training juveniles with criminal procliv-
ities. The youth prison sanction was partly indeterminate as it was to last
for a minimum of one year and maximum of three years, in case of re-
admission up to four years.
Even though the youth prison sanction was meant only for juveniles in
need of care and education, it gradually became the most important prison
sentence for juveniles. Most youth prison sentences, however, concerned
offenders between the ages of 18 and 20, as offenders under 18 years in
most cases had their charges withdrawn and were instead subjected to child
and youth welfare. During the last decades of the existence of the youth
218 Jørgen Jepsen
prison, however, there was an increasing tendency to use the sanction for
juveniles under 18 years.
The youth prison sanction was abandoned in 1973 together with the
other (indeterminate) special sanctions based on the idea of treatment. Since
then, no legislation concerning only juveniles and young adults was passed
until 2001 when a new Youth Sanction, indicating the partial re-emergence
of treatment-related ideas, was introduced.
The initiative from the criminal law system may occur either through a
waiver of prosecution—granted by the prosecutor, but subject to limited
review by the local court—or via a court decision. The latter type of deci-
sion may take the form of a conditional sentence (probation) with condi-
tions subjecting the juvenile to supervision or placement within the welfare
system or to a specific type of treatment, e.g. for psychiatric disease, or an
unconditional ‘Youth Sanction’ (see below). When the young offender turns
18, however, (s)he becomes the responsibility of the adult probation system,
which normally takes over supervision for the remaining period.
Adolescents may, however, become the responsibility of the Department
of Corrections (Kriminalforsorgen, translated as the Department of Prisons
Juvenile Justice in Denmark: From Social Welfare to Repression 219
and Probation (DP&P)), from the age of 15 in more serious cases, e.g.
serious violence and repeated grave offences. This decision is up to the sen-
tencing court, which may also pass an ordinary prison sentence.
According to the provisions of the CRC (Art 37), juveniles below 18 are
presumed not to serve an unconditional sentence together with adult
offenders, i.e. in adult prisons, and they are not supposed to be held in cus-
tody with adults in adult jail. Due to lack of slots in secure wards under the
social welfare system, several young offenders aged 15–17 are still placed in
local jails or prison rather than in secure social service institutions
(Politiken, 27 March 2005).
The DP&P, in a count as of 13 August 2002, found a total of 16 juve-
niles aged 15–17 in its institutions, consisting of 5 in local jails, 4 in the
Copenhagen jails, 1 in the special psychiatric prison at Herstedvester, 1 in
an open prison and 5 in the closed prison at Ringe (in a special section for
juvenile prisoners). In 1999 the Danish Supreme Court decided (UfR
1999.1415) that the CRC does not expressly prohibit placing a juvenile in
isolation (solitary confinement) in an adult prison in extraordinary
situations.
Adolescents aged 15–17 who are sentenced to prison are supposed (since
1998) to serve their prison sentence in an alternative way under section 78,
subs. 2 of the Act on Execution of Sentences. Serving in alternative way cov-
ers a number of different options, some of them involving specialized treat-
ment (e g in a psychiatric or other hospital), some involving placement by
the welfare authorities in a foster family or other group setting and some of
them involving special institutions for juveniles, including so-called ‘secure
wards’. See figure 11.1 for an overview of the Danish system.
The fact that the latter category of placement is under the auspices of the
welfare authorities (run by the counties) may cloud the fact that the secure
wards are tough institutions not so different from prisons. They are sup-
posed to maintain maximal security, i.e. protection against escape. They are
also supposed to contain elements of treatment, particularly for those
young offenders serving a Youth Sanction (see below), but in practice treat-
ment is rather limited and lacks any clear theoretical or professional basis
(Vestergaard 2004b). The treatment element is clearly subordinate to the
element of security. Some of the secure wards are specifically authorized to
hold the most violent and dangerous categories of young offender, and even
within these there are special isolation units or cells used for the most recal-
citrant and escape-prone young offenders.
The secure wards are also to some extent used as alternatives to remand
in ordinary jails for young offenders aged 15–17, as they are supposedly
220 Jørgen Jepsen
Figure 11.1: Denmark's juvenile justice system: an overview. The measures for different
age groups ('juveniles' primarily 15–17)
more geared to housing young offenders and fulfil the CRC principle that
juveniles should not be institutionalized with adult offenders. Still, occa-
sionally a juvenile awaiting trial may be transferred to (or housed in) an
adult jail when no room is available in a secure ward or when even these
are insufficient to prevent escape and repeated offending.
The decision to place a juvenile in a secure ward is usually taken by the
ordinary courts in connection with a remand custody order or as part of a
Youth Sanction, as is transfer to an ordinary institution for juveniles.
According to current provisions and agreements, the local social welfare
authorities at the municipal level do not have to cover the specific costs for
each individual placement in a secure ward. According to available accounts,
from a purely budgetary point of view, local authorities may therefore pre-
fer placement in more restrictive, secure wards or even in prison.
It is understandable that the communes are also reluctant to remove a child
from its home if this is not deemed absolutely necessary. But this reluctance
has given rise to criticism that the communes are unwilling to bear the costs
necessary for safeguarding the welfare and best interests of children. A parlia-
mentary proposal was put forward in 2004 to move responsibility for decision
making from the municipalities to a different forum which is independent of
economic considerations (Forslag til Folketings-beslutning B 77/2004,
Socialministeriet 2004). It resulted in a limited reform on placements, but
without any major change in the organizational setup.
Juvenile Justice in Denmark: From Social Welfare to Repression 221
2 These statements are based upon the Analysis of Procedures in Children’s cases
(Socialministeriet 2004).
Juvenile Justice in Denmark: From Social Welfare to Repression 223
Placement in a secure unit under the general rules of the Social Welfare Act
is an available option in the following circumstances: (1) if such a measure
is considered absolutely necessary to protect an individual from harming
himself or others, (2) for initial observation, or (3) to implement a decision
regarding a longer period of treatment (section 58 of the Social Service Act).
For juveniles above 15 the total duration of placement in a secure unit may
be up to 14 months and the decision is made for 2 months at a time with the
possibility, however, of two lots of 6 months in connection with a treatment
program. In addition, the court may make a decision concerning placement
in a secure unit at a juvenile institution as a surrogate for pre-trial custody
according to the provisions of the Administration of Justice Act.
In connection with recent criticism of CYBs, a parliamentary initiative
(Forslag til Folketingsbeslutning, B 77/2004) gave rise to an analysis of pro-
cedure in these cases (Socialministeriet 2004). Four considerations were
seen as essential: decision-making should be improved in relation to (1) pro-
fessionalism, (2) legal safeguarding of the interests of parents (to a lesser
extent the child), (3) uniformity in decisions, and (4) counteracting of irrel-
evant economic considerations (i.e. the interest of the communes in saving
money). Various reform models were presented in the analysis, one of them
involving the removal of the judge from the local CYB and letting the local
court be the first instance for complaints about decisions of the communal
administration, another introducing a new national board as decision-
maker, and a third variation involving regional centres. It was alleged that
having a judge present in the CYB creates confusion between the adminis-
trative and the judicial powers. This discussion, however, did not result in
any change in the organization of children’s and juvenile cases within the
communal sector.
In a separate piece of legislation (Act No. 1442 of 22 December 22 2004)
the duty of the communes to provide preventive and supportive measures
before removing children from the home was stressed, and a specific obli-
gation for the communes to provide a cohesive policy for children was
introduced. Also a duty was introduced to provide a quick plan of action
(within 7 days from the receipt of documentation from the police), for chil-
dren below 18 having committed violent crimes. The act further specified
the options for support etc. that should be available, the rules for com-
plaints and the rules for distribution of expenses. The system of decision-
making was not changed in any fundamental way, however.
Within the next few years a major communal reform will be imple-
mented, which involves a significant reduction in the number of communes,
and the counties will be abandoned in favour of a limited number of regions
(five). How the professional qualifications for dealing with cases of children
in trouble with the law will be provided and improved is at present unclear.
224 Jørgen Jepsen
Figure 11.2: Self reported crimes among 14-15 year olds in 1979, 1989 and 1999
Source: Flemming Balvig: RisikoUngdom, 2000.
Administration of Justice for the first time, limiting the time the police are
allowed to keep under-age children in custody while investigating their sus-
pected offences to 6 hours and regulating the way ‘charges’ might be presented.
The Social welfare authorities are required to be represented during question-
ing of such underage suspected ‘offenders’. These rules—which were drawn up
pursuant to a report by the Criminal Procedural Committee of the Ministry of
Justice (Justitsministeriets Strafferetsplejeudvalg 2003)—have been criticized
for giving the police too wide powers in this respect (Boerneraadet 2005).
Only a small fraction of children below 15 are removed from their home
by the social welfare authorities primarily because of acts which, if commit-
ted by an adult, would amount to a crime. Law violation should in principle
be seen as a signal of trouble and interventions are seldom implemented due
to crime exclusively, as other circumstances are indicators of a need for help.
Statistics on child welfare do not tell us the number of measures initiated
on the basis of criminality. At the end of 2000 nearly 1,800 boys between
12 and 14 years of age were placed outside their home, which amounts to
19 per 1,000 population in that age group (Kyvsgaard 2004b, 368).
Placement in foster families is the most common type, while placement in
institutions constitutes around one-fourth of the placements
(Socialministeriet 2003a).
A study on Fyn (=‘Fünen’—one of the major Danish islands) estimated that
if the figures from Fyn were calculated up to the national level an estimated
2,300 cases involving law violations would be brought before the CYBs. Of
these, some 800 would result in a juvenile being placed outside their home.
3 Until July 1991 around half of all charges for shoplifting were dropped and a warning was
issued. By 1 July 1991 this practice had changed and instead a fine was imposed. Offences not
leading to a charge are not included in the table.
Table 11.2: Number of sanctions (waivers of prosecution, fines, prison sentences (conditional and unconditional)) 1992–2002 for juveniles
aged 15–17
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Sex offences, total 21 22 19 34 19 28 19 28 39 23 21
Of which Rape 2 2 3 9 0 3 5 5 11 2 3
Violence, total 264 380 482 493 424 407 441 482 693 748 777
Of which Murder 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Attempted murder 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Penal Code § 244 (simple vi.) 207 292 364 372 309 308 311 334 522 548 572
PC § 245 (aggravated violence) 19 31 40 49 54 46 34 51 66 81 73
PC § 246 (v. with death or 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0
serious damage)
Property Crimes, total 4172 4065 4108 4246 3951 3744 3680 3345 3583 3527 3194
Of which Burglary 705 515 534 512 451 434 322 297 299 318 302
Shoplifting 1217 1294 1335 1320 1315 1282 1371 1210 1194 1024 911
‘Joy-riding’ 284 311 333 394 359 405 341 365 340 345 271
Robbery 61 58 70 86 87 112 110 113 142 152 134
Other Penal Code offences 48 79 90 102 51 73 75 76 84 111 103
Of which Drug offences 2 1 0 3 1 0 7 2 1 7 4
Penal Code offences, total 4505 4546 4699 4875 4445 4252 4215 3931 4399 4409 4095
Other law* violations, total 677 636 613 569 465 349 388 313 332 397 379
Of which Drug Act violations 59 77 81 61 66 57 99 70 91 109 119
Act on weapons 441 374 328 266 246 196 182 145 156 213 213
Total 5182 5182 5312 5444 4910 4601 4603 4244 4731 4806 4474
Per 1,000 15–17 year olds 25 26 27 29 27 26 27 26 29 29 26
Juvenile Justice in Denmark: From Social Welfare to Repression
For offenders in the age group 15–17 years the system is mixed: the great
majority of these adolescent offenders are referred by the police, prosecution
and/or the court for action to the welfare boards (CYBs), which are also exclu-
sively responsible for dealing with child offenders below 15 years of age, and
are often already in contact with the adolescent offenders and their families.
The board may decide to remove the adolescent offender from their
home, but the majority of cases consist of measures not involving depriva-
tion of liberty (Socialministeriet 2003b). Furthermore, 15–17 year olds are
not normally placed in jail on remand awaiting a decision on their case. The
most serious young offenders may be placed in substitute remand (‘surro-
gatfängsling’), normally in an institution within the welfare system. For the
most serious of these, such remand may take place in high security institu-
tions but still within the social service system, normally in small institutions
(Socialministeriet 2003a).
Types of disposition
The formal basis for special welfare measures against juvenile offenders
aged 15–17 is a conditional waiver or suspension of prosecution4, where
referral to the welfare board and to the social services for youthful offend-
ers is a condition for suspension of prosecution. After the lapse of a proba-
tion period of up to two years—or upon reaching 18—without further
offending and without serious infractions of the condition(s) of submission
to possible welfare measures the case is closed.
The ‘traditional’ waiver will only be kept on the juvenile’s criminal record
for two years after the initiation, if the conditions have not been violated.
This may be seen as a partial expression of the wish not to stigmatise young
offenders unnecessarily. It was further reduced in 1998 along with the
introduction of the youth contract.
4 Sections 722 and 733 of the Act on Administration of Justice (Retsplejeloven); see
Rigsadvokaten (1998).
Juvenile Justice in Denmark: From Social Welfare to Repression 231
Remand
As of January 15 1999 new rules came into force under which juvenile
offenders aged 15–17 were to be placed as far as possible in surrogate
232 Jørgen Jepsen
remand custody in one of the secure institutions under the child and youth
welfare authorities and could not normally be placed in ordinary jails. Still,
a few of the most recalcitrant and escape-prone youths are occasionally
placed in adult jails (see below).
Young prisoners
Until January 1999, young offenders aged 15–17 sentenced to prison under
the Department of Prisons and Probation (DPP) were placed in special
prison wards separate from adult offenders, one of them in a former youth
prison, others in the Copenhagen Jail. These placements were, however,
found to be problematic for geographical reasons and due to difficulties of
providing suitable activities.
Thus, in the period 1999–2002 there was at any one time an average of
13–14 young inmates in prisons or jails, of whom 7–8 were serving a sen-
tence and 6 were in remand custody. In 2003, however, the figures were
notably higher: as of 25 February 2003 a total of 32 offenders below 18
were in prison or jail, of whom 12 were serving a sentence and 20 were on
remand awaiting trial. This latter group would normally be put in a jail in
Copenhagen or near their home.
Usually, young prisoners aged 15–17 serving a sentence in an open prison
are also placed according to the principle of proximity to the home. At least
every two weeks the prison staff are supposed to discuss the juvenile’s situ-
ation and decide whether there might be grounds for placement elsewhere.
Prisoners aged 15–17 sentenced to serve time in a closed institution should,
as a rule, serve in the State Prison at Ringe—normally in a special section
for the youngest group—or in a jail. The institutions are supposed to pro-
vide individual treatment programs according to the motivation of the
youth. Cognitive skills programs, treatment of abuse, training in daily liv-
ing (ADL), supplementary school education and other activities are offered.
At the state prison in Ringe, a special three-year project on separate wards
in co-operation between the prison service and the social welfare system was
introduced for young prisoners aged 15–18. These slots should aim specifi-
cally at the small group of young offenders repeatedly committing serious (or)
violent crimes. It is maintained that these placements have a double objective:
—Taking care of the needs of the adolescent for relevant pedagogical and
therapeutic measures, and
—fulfilling the demands of society for sanctioning the criminal activities of
the juvenile (the public sense of justice), including keeping the offender
in a closed environment as long as and to the extent that he violates the
environment with his illegal behaviour.’ (Socialministeriet 2003a)
The project includes the special section at Ringe and two open residential
institutions with a mobile unit to assist in critical situations. The special
ward at Ringe was fully occupied in 2002 and has a waiting list.
Juvenile Justice in Denmark: From Social Welfare to Repression 233
Figure 11.3: Sanctions for Criminal Code offences for 15-17 year old offenders by type
of sanction, 1986-2000. Absolute numbers, cumulated
Source: Statistics Denmark, Kyvsgaard (2004b).
Within the social welfare sector 23% of the 3,000 slots for young persons
were occupied by youthful offenders in 2000. In secure residential institu-
tions (for placements based upon administrative deprivation of liberty)
there was in 2003 a total of 85 slots in 7 institutions (Socialministeriet
2003a, 47); this number later increased to a total of 94. In one of the secure
institutions a special secure ward was established in 1998 to provide for
those young remand prisoners who represent the greatest danger to their
surroundings and to themselves.
In critical situations, the most difficult and violent young offenders are
moved around among the secure institutions and the jails. The pressure on
the secure wards has also meant that an increasing number of young offend-
ers on remand have to be held in ordinary jails instead of the secure welfare
institutions (Politiken, 27 March 2005).
Regarding prison sentences imposed on young offenders, the length of
the sentence will normally be shorter than is the case for adults irrespective
of the fact that a prison sentence for young offenders typically embraces
offences for which the juvenile has earlier been given a withdrawal of
charge and/or a suspended sentence. For youth aged 15–17 a prison sen-
tence may not be for more than 8 years.
In the year 2000, the average length of a prison sentence was 4.4 months
for young offenders (aged 15–17) compared to 6.5 months for older offend-
ers (aged 18–30), and none of the sentences for the juveniles exceeded 3
years (Kyvsgaard 2004b).
Until 2001, a provision in the Penal Code (section 49 subs. 2) was used
to grant transfers from a prison to a treatment institution5. In connection
with a change in the legislation which established the new Youth Sanction
5 See Hagemann and Olsen (2001) for an evaluation of the effects of the application of sec-
Table 11.3: Number of young offenders aged 15–17 sentenced to imprisonment and
the number serving the sentence in an alternative way, respectively, 1991–99
Figure 11.4: The flow of juvenile justice in Denmark 2003, age group 15–17
Juvenile Justice in Denmark: From Social Welfare to Repression 235
Table 11.4: Data on Reactions to ('sanctions') in Denmark, young offenders (aged 15–17
years) 2003
% of total Overall
decisions total decisions
10591
Acquittals (in court) 117
Charges not sustained
(no grounds for prosecution) 1720
No guilt, total 1837 17%
Guilt established 8754 83%
Measures (Greenland) 25
Unconditional
sentences 351 22% 1574
unconditional.
sentences. alone 175
youth sanction 70
unconditional sentences 176
combination sentences 14
more frequently used for young offenders (Kyvsgaard 2004b, 374), and
most fines are ticket fines6.
The annual number of prison sentences for young offenders increased
somewhat in the 1990s due to both an increase in robberies and violence
6 Ticket fines are imposed by a police officer or a prosecutor without being taken to court—
unless the offender denies guilt or is unwilling to pay the amount stipulated.
236 Jørgen Jepsen
Cases involving violation of the Act on Weapons declined during the period,
which is also the case for 15–17 year olds. However, after 2002 the police
launched systematic crackdowns on illegal weapons—knives, in particular.
The knife-killing of a young Italian tourist in a street in Copenhagen by two
young second generation immigrants in 2003 triggered a heated debate on
the carrying of knives. The anger generated by this crime led to a (Supreme
Court) sentence stating that the two young killers, after serving prison sen-
tences of 10 and 8 years respectively, should be deported to Turkey, from
where their families originated (one of them was born there, but came to
Denmark with his parents at the age of three, the other was born in
Denmark and both of them had lived most of their lives in Denmark).
As can be seen from the last row in Table 11.5, the number of disposi-
tions per 1,000 population aged 18–20 years increased from 1992 to 1994
and has since then returned to the level we saw at the beginning of the
1990s. The figures reflect a decrease in the number of 18–20 year olds dur-
ing the 1990s, down 23% from 1992 to 2002 (Kyvsgaard 2004b, 364).
The pattern of sanctioning for young offenders aged 18–20 in the year
2003 is shown in Table 11.6 (p. 239).
For youth aged 18–20, the proportion of waivers (2%) is just one third
of those for 15–17 year olds (6%). Fines (the majority of which are for traf-
fic offences) clearly dominate the picture (75% of all sanctions).
The development in relative offence rates, distributed by sex and age
group (15–17 and 18–20), can be seen from Table 11.7 (see p. 241).
238
Table 11.5: Number of penal sanctions (waivers of prosecution, fines and prison sentences (conditional and unconditional)) 1992–2002 for
the age group 18–20
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Sex crimes, total 33 30 33 42 27 34 24 35 33 38 35
Of which Rape 4 5 3 4 6 7 3 7 4 6 7
Jørgen Jepsen
Violence, total 680 829 1069 909 858 889 830 862 852 997 970
Of which Murder 2 2 2 6 2 2 1 4 2 1 1
Attempted murder 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Simple violence (PC § 244) 524 601 793 616 596 608 562 559 592 652 610
Aggravated violence (PC § 245) 61 111 109 125 104 102 103 95 88 141 144
Very serious violence (PC § 246) 2 0 4 2 3 4 1 1 5 2 0
Property crimes, total 5470 5699 5606 5220 4821 4577 4332 4010 3817 3825 3525
Of which Burglary 1108 1087 958 829 804 662 601 504 474 486 450
Shoplifting 1139 1300 1318 1110 1056 1025 990 985 894 811 719
‘Joy-riding’ 360 434 521 500 540 551 514 452 362 403 363
Robbery 119 121 89 110 115 112 115 103 140 133 157
Other Penal Code Offences 191 199 228 288 232 214 246 224 282 285 362
Of which Drug crimes 11 20 17 17 20 16 28 36 35 49 79
Penal Code decisions, total 6374 6757 6936 6459 5938 5714 5432 5131 4984 5145 4892
‘Special laws’, total 1583 1598 1563 1390 1145 1073 1123 1074 1137 1232 1199
Of which Drug Act violations 465 463 468 388 353 401 402 476 511 565 559
Act on Weapons 487 496 461 329 305 264 288 219 208 268 243
Total 7957 8355 8499 7849 7083 6787 6555 6205 6121 6377 6091
Per 1,000 15–17 year olds 36 38 39 37 35 35 34 33 34 37 36
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Kyvsgaard 2003c.
Juvenile Justice in Denmark: From Social Welfare to Repression 239
It is notable that in 2001 and 2002 the proportion of sanctions for older
boys was pretty much the same as in the period 1993–95. And for boys
aged 15–17 the relative sanctioning level in 2002 returned to a fairly low
level when looking at the period as a whole.
‘NEW SANCTIONS’
In 1998 a new form of waiver of prosecution was instituted under the name
Youth Contract (YC). The YC came into force on 1 July 1998 (Kyvsgaard
2000, Rigsadvokaten 1998, Stevens 2003). These contracts were to replace
the traditional waivers of prosecution for most young offenders aged
15–17. At the same time, the use of fines and warnings were recommended
by the Attorney General as the primary measures for young (first) offend-
ers committing only less serious acts (Rigsadvokaten 1998).
On the basis of a pre-decision study, a contract is drawn up by the wel-
fare services in conjunction with the prosecutor’s office and the juvenile,
and in some cases his or her parents. If the juvenile does not accept the con-
tract at the end of the negotiations, prosecution resulting in a conditional
sentence (i.e. a higher level of sanction) or an unconditional prison sentence
is the presumed result.
The conditions of a youth contract might involve a promise to conscien-
tiously attend school or another type of education, spend leisure time in a
certain way, e.g. in a youth club, perform some type of work, etc. The
types of promises are not necessarily different from the conditions that
might be attached to the old style waivers or to a suspended sentence with
probation. In addition, traditional welfare measures, including placement
in an institution or foster family, may be used as a condition in a Youth
Contract.
The Youth Contract was designed to gradually replace the old style
waivers, particularly in cases of a somewhat serious nature. It was thus
meant for a ‘medium severity’ type juvenile offender, who could not
adequately be sanctioned by a warning or a fine. However, it was not meant
for ‘youth who seem to be involved in a fairly stable pattern of crime’,
i.e. repeated burglaries, theft etc. of a more serious nature. Robbery, drug
crimes and drunken driving were also exempt from the Youth Contract
system.
The ideology behind the Youth Contract was that young offenders should
receive a more serious warning than implied by the traditional waivers.
They should be warned that this was ‘a last chance’ and that more serious
reactions would occur in the case of further offending or violation of condi-
tions. On the reward side the law stated that if a youth contract was fulfilled,
Table 11.7: Number of sanctions (waivers of prosecution, fines, prison sentences (conditional and unconditional)) per 1,000 in the respective
age groups, distributed by sex
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Age 15–17 years Girls 8 9 9 10 9 10 11 11 11 10 9
Boys 40 42 45 47 44 41 42 40 46 47 42
Age 18–20 years Girls 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Boys 60 64 67 63 59 59 59 56 59 64 63
Source: Danmarks statistik, Kyvsgaard 2003c.
Juvenile Justice in Denmark: From Social Welfare to Repression
241
242 Jørgen Jepsen
the decision would only remain on the offender’s criminal record for one
year after the court’s decision (as opposed to two years for ordinary
waivers). The idea was to make youthful offenders accountable for their
deeds (Kyvsgaard 2000).
There was at that time no willingness to use community service in the
patterns of reactions towards juveniles. However, in connection with a
tightening up in 2001of sanctions for car theft (classified as ‘joy-riding’) it
was assumed that community service as condition of a suspended sentence
would be a normal reaction towards young car thieves (15–17 years of age)
and preliminary data show that the number of community service orders
for young first offenders actually rose in the following year (Kyvsgaard
2004a).
In Denmark there has been no clear tendency towards more imaginative
sanctions, e.g. restorative justice. Even the importation of conflict coun-
cils (‘Konfliktraad’) from Norway was carried out in a way that did not
involve any real alternative. Participation in a conflict council meeting
was not supposed to reduce the sanction to be imposed and the system
was tried only on a pilot basis in a few circuits. In 2004 there was a pro-
posal to expand its application on a national basis, but in April 2004 the
government declared its intention to abandon the measure altogether.
Its use has continued, however, on a limited experimental basis in a few
circuits.
mopeds from 505 to 277, and ‘other theft’ from 657 to 453. It should be
noted, however, that part of the decline was due to the fact that the
population of youth in the relevant age bracket—15–17 years—declined
from 220,000 in 1990 to 165,000 in 1999, i.e. a decline of some 25%, so
that the relative level of youth crime had not reduced so markedly as might
first be assumed.
On the other hand, robbery cases rose from 72 to 113, serious violence
from 27 to 51 and simple violence from 208 to 334. This is possibly wor-
rying—percentage-wise—but not large in absolute numbers.
In actual practice it turned out that YCs were used increasingly over the fol-
lowing years (1998–2001) against young offenders within the intended age
brackets, but particularly for 15–16 year olds (Kyvsgaard 2000). Out of a
total of 482 waivers in 1999, 162 involved YCs.
But in general the late 1990s and the early 2000s were characterized by
a decline in the use of waivers altogether. Furthermore, in the sanctioning
pattern we see a development resembling a polarization. Relatively more
juveniles received fines (or warnings) rather than waivers and suspended
sentences, and relatively more were sentenced to deprivation of liberty. The
proportion of prison sentences thus rose from 17% of all dispositions in
1989 to 22% in 2003.
The explanation for this development may be an increasing level of crime
among the more active juvenile offenders—more serious offenders, and seri-
ous offenders commit more crimes—or it may be that the prosecutors
demand heavier penalties than previously.
This development in the sanctioning pattern parallels to some extent the
developments in Sweden, where likewise ‘a substantial reduction in the
number of young persons convicted of crime has … been followed by a sub-
stantial tightening of both the law and its application … a dramatic reduc-
tion in the number of young offenders being awarded waivers of
prosecution and to a large number of youth being sentenced by the court’—
a paradox possibly explained by a perceived serious increase in juvenile vio-
lence (see Sarnecki’s article in the present volume).
As indicated above, the idea of the Youth Contract was to provide a more
constructive reaction to juveniles aged 15–17. In actual practice, however,
this sanction did not take the place of the traditional waiver of prosecution,
which still represents a large proportion of sanctions not involving depriva-
tion of liberty. This may be due to a number of factors. One factor could be
244 Jørgen Jepsen
their increasingly limited use by local courts, which make decision based
upon proposals from local prosecutors (Rigsadvokaten 2000). It also seems
as though prosecutors have not been as enthusiastic about the YC measure.
The concept of swift and harsh reactions to breaches of conditions relating
to social welfare measures did not quite materialize either. The welfare serv-
ices were late in reporting violations and most reported violations were met
with quite mild sanctions—if any (Stevens 2003).
The use of waivers in general had been decreasing over the preceding
years. Only 3% received more than one waiver with conditions and if those
waivers without conditions are included, only 7% received more than one
waiver. This was in contrast to the public perception of extreme leniency in
granting repeated waivers.
The results in relation to recidivism were studied by Stevens (2003), who
compared recidivism among those young offenders who received YCs with
those who received only an ‘old style’ waiver, with or without conditions of
social welfare measures. Among those young offenders who in the period
1996–99 received a waiver with conditions, 20% committed a new offence
resulting in a penalty more serious than a fine within the first two years.
The corresponding figure for youth receiving a conditional sentence was
33% and for those receiving an unconditional sentence, the rate of recidi-
vism was 48%. For those receiving a prison term of more than 3 months,
the rate was 65% (Stevens 2003, 5). It must be noted, of course, that these
differences are to some extent a product of selection mechanisms placing
the more recidivism-prone offenders in the prison category.
Stevens’ study compared those young offenders who in the period 1 July
1998 to 31 December 2000 received a waiver of prosecution conditioned
upon a youth contract with those who in a comparable prior period
received a traditional waiver with (other) conditions. The result was that
the two groups largely recidivated to the same extent and at the same fre-
quency and speed. Even when controls were made for age, sex and prior
criminal record as well as for the type of crime leading to the waiver with
conditions, it was impossible to demonstrate significant differences in their
inclination to commit new crimes. The conclusion that there were no signif-
icant differences is probably what might be expected as there are in reality
only rather minor differences between the two types of sanction—namely
the contractual element in the YC group (Stevens 2003, 40).
Thus one might say that neither youth contracts nor other waivers of
prosecution have succeeded in holding or expanding their place in the total
pattern of sanctions for offences committed by 15–17 year olds, even
though their results must be considered to be fairly positive.
Although the use of fines had been rising for some years, it decreased
again in the early 2000s. This development may be said to imply that ‘the
soft approach’ has been seen as insufficient to handle the perceived prob-
lems of juvenile crime. But—more importantly—it did not seem to fulfil the
Juvenile Justice in Denmark: From Social Welfare to Repression 245
alleged public demand for security and for notable and serious reactions to
juvenile deviance, hence the ensuing upsurge of ‘signal legislation’.
Waivers of prosecution have also been a major traditional reaction towards
juvenile offenders in Sweden, where their use has reduced substantially since
1980, but it is still a relatively common form of decision taken by prosecutors
(see Sarnecki’s contribution in the present volume, Figures 10.4, 10.7, 10.8 and
10.9). Legislative changes in 1988 and 1994 involved further restrictions on the
provisions for such waivers. Today a larger proportion and number of youths
are indicted for crimes in public courts in Sweden (Sarnecki, this volume).
During the early 1990s and the years 2000–02 an increasing concern was
noted in relation to serious juvenile crime. It had three main components:
(1) Fear of (serious) violence, (2) the ‘Rocker War’, and (3) the unruly
behaviour of ethnic minorities.
The early 1990s and the following years were characterized by increasing
public alarm about violence. This concern was nurtured by the public, media
and politicians alike. Even if the crime statistics did not reflect any great
increase in violence in general, there was some increase in serious violence,
also committed by 15–17 year olds (see Table 11.2 above). The result was the
enactment of two consecutive ‘violence packages’, involving new legislation
with higher penalties for violence—a dramatic inflation—and a ‘violence sec-
retariat’ to launch a number of violence prevention activities. Between 2003
and 2005 a heavy investment in fighting the perceived increase in (youth) vio-
lence has by far overshadowed the beginnings in earlier years.
This ‘War’ involved gunfights and other battles during the 1990s between
the motorcycle clubs Hells Angels and Bandidos and their respective sup-
porters and ‘prospects’. It resulted in a number of killings and spectacular
events which frightened the public and resulted in a special law prohibiting
their residence in so-called ‘Rocker fortresses’ (Rockerborge).
7 The term ‘rockers’ was imported to Denmark from England. It is erroneously applied to
designate national chapters of international motorcycle clubs with provocative jacket decora-
tions (‘colors’). In Germany they have been outlawed as ‘criminal organizations’, but not in
Denmark. See Jepsen (1998).
246 Jørgen Jepsen
The fighting went on for several years, but seemed to end in 1999 when
a truce between the two gangs was negotiated. The police played a large
role in investigating and prosecuting members for a large number of
crimes—not only the murders, but also drug trafficking and property crime.
On only one occasion were innocent non-members exposed to serious risk
and on another occasion a visitor to a rocker fortress party was killed when
the opponent group fired an anti-tank missile into the fortress.
In 2003 a number of extraordinary legal and enforcement measures were
processed through parliament to fight this problem. Part of the problem is
that a large proportion of the offences are committed by supporters and
recruits who try to obtain status and membership in the groups. The motor-
cycle groups seem to be extremely attractive to young persons impressed by
their macho image. Keeping youngsters away from them has become a
major goal of crime preventive activities.
(2003) on the daily operations of police in a police circuit with a high rep-
resentation of ethnic youth. Kyvsgaard (2005) notes social and cultural
discrimination of young persons of non-Danish ethnic origin as the most
important factors in explaining juvenile crime, but not necessarily as a reflec-
tion of culture conflict in the traditional sense (Sellin 1938).
Furthermore, new immigrants to Denmark have tended to be clustered
in certain sections of major towns: Copenhagen, Aarhus and Odense. Here
they have come into conflict with Danish citizens and the police. Battles
have been fought within the immigrant ghettoes: Nörrebro in Copenhagen
and Vollsmose in Odense. Police cars have been turned over and set on fire,
and a local police station in the ghetto was set alight. These areas are not
as run-down and slum-like as American racial ghettoes or the huge French
congregations of immigrants from the former colonies. Most of them are
areas of rather expensive public housing that ordinary Danes cannot
afford, but where consequently the immigration and refugee authorities
have tended to place refugees and immigrants with considerable public
subsidies. On the other hand, the inhabitants have not been properly inte-
grated into the labour market and particularly the younger generations
have been left to fend for themselves. Ordinary Danish citizens have moved
out, leaving the ethnic composition characterized by people of dark skin
colour. In 2005 this led to an official move to find ways of reducing the
number of coloured persons in the ghettoes, inter alia by prohibiting them
from moving in.
The immigrants and their offspring maintain—and seem to be right in
doing so—that they are being discriminated against in relation to employ-
ment and participation in Danish society. They are increasingly forming a
distinct underclass with all the characteristics of deprived minority groups
known from the U.S.A. and elsewhere. Minority youth express their frus-
trations in violent behaviour. Many of them are also isolated from society
by language barriers and by living within foreign cultures resistant to inte-
gration into the general institutions of society.
The situation of dark-skinned immigrants and asylum-seekers from a
number of African and Middle Eastern countries is parallel to the situation
of black youth in the U.S.A. in many ways, as demonstrated in Feld’s paper
in the present volume. Although the ‘blacks’ in Denmark cluster in urban
ghettoes, the minorities there are more of a mixture of different cultures.
But their social situation and the way their ‘alien-ness’ is perceived and
reacted to by the conservative politicians and the majority of the popula-
tion, stimulated by sensation-seeking media, is strongly reminiscent of the
‘race problem’ in the United States.
By contrast, the minority problems in Sweden are less pronounced and
the public and political attitudes are much more accepting and rational,
although minority ghettoes are also becoming evident in Stockholm and a
few other larger cities.
248 Jørgen Jepsen
The coming into power of the right-wing government in late 2001 and
the influence of the Danish People’s Party has contributed to the alienation
of immigrants and their offspring in Denmark. This alienation results in
both expressive crimes due to frustration and instrumental crimes due to
economic underprivilege. Altogether, these factors have generated and for-
tified public demands for toughness on crime and particularly for attention
to crimes committed by ‘ethnic youth’.
Nevertheless, perceptions of public sentiment may have been overstated
by politicians in search of a cause. Repeated annual surveys (with four
measurements each year) of public opinion and fears about violence and
crime (Institut for Konjunktur-Analyse, figures elaborated by the Ministry
of Justice, see Kyvsgaard 2003b and 2004c) indicate that the proportion of
respondents worrying ‘a lot’ about violence and crime declined from some
60–70% in most years within the period 1985–1996 to 50–60% at the end
of the 1990s. In 2001 and 2002 this proportion was only 43%. This ten-
dency towards fewer ‘worriers’ continued into 2003 and 2004 when only
37% of respondents stated that they worry a lot about violence and crime,
and this despite the dramatic events that took place in the summer of 2003.
A recent report (2005) by ‘Visionsudvalget’ (Report on ‘The Future of
Danish Police’ (Fremtidens Politi) by a Ministry of Justice Committee on
visions for the Danish Police states the following regarding the public’s feel-
ings of security and insecurity:
In December 2004 a report was published by TrygFonden and Huset
Mandag Morgen named Tryghedsrapport 2004—en analyse af danskernes
tryghed og utryghed (Report on Subjective Security 2004—an Analysis of
Feelings of Security and Insecurity among Danes). The study demonstrates
that the Danish population generally does not feel particularly insecure in
relation to crime. Thus only one out of fifteen Danes feels insecure in rela-
tion to the risk of being hit by violence. It further indicates that four out of
five Danes find that the media overstate the risk of many things. Two out of
three Danes find in addition that society often uses large resources by doing
something against risks which are in reality insignificant. It is finally con-
cluded that ‘more remote sources of insecurity, such as crime, violence and
terrorism play no measurable role for the subjective quality of life of the
Danes’.
These surveys indicate that when you ask the citizens themselves a much
more nuanced picture appears than those signals on rise in insecurity and
worries which often seem to be dominant in the media and in the legal-
political debate.
Visionsudvalget thus finds that the predominant focus in the media
and politics on ‘citizens’ feelings of insecurity’ and ‘a visible police’—
which is thus not demanded by the citizens themselves—is very problem-
atic in relation to an adequate and reasonable use of the resources of the
police.
Juvenile Justice in Denmark: From Social Welfare to Repression 249
Only a few of the former state institutions for juveniles—including the most
closed ones—survived the municipal reform of the mid-1970s which initi-
ated a massive movement of de-institutionalisation. A couple of them were
high security institutions which held juveniles on remand awaiting trial
(surrogat-fängsling). The 1990s—after Denmark had signed the CRC—saw
an increase in the use of such institutions as alternatives to remand in tra-
ditional jails. Today, however, only a few juveniles, representing very seri-
ous behavioural problems and high escape risk, are held on remand in
jails—ideally, but rarely in reality, jails with special sections for juveniles. As
a consequence of the CRC the number of slots in secure wards within the
social welfare system increased during the 1990s, but the capacity of these
institutions has on repeated occasions been lagging behind the need.
The quest for security has led to an increase in the use of these wards.
Between 1996 and 2001 the number of secure slots rose from 45 to 85 and
in 2004 there were 94. In addition it was estimated that before the end of
2003 there would be a need for 120 more slots in open institutions
(Socialministeriet 2003a).
The total number of placements in secure wards rose from 321 in 1996
to 509 in 2001, and jumped to 750 in 2002.
The need for secure wards was aggravated by the creation of the new
Youth Sanction (in force 1 July 2001), which requires as part of the sen-
tence initial placement in a secure ward, normally for at least two months.
The time to be spent in institutions should not exceed 18 months in total.
But re-institutionalization may take place as a reaction to new crimes or
violation of conditions for release. The number of placements in secure
wards in 2002 stemming from Youth Sanctions amounted to 10% of all
secure placements. The utilization ratio for secure places was 65% in 1996
versus 91% in 2002 and 101 in 2004 (Politiken, 27 March 2005).
In 2002 a total of 185 stays in secure wards were interrupted: in 31 of
these transfer to ordinary prison took place, and in 63 cases the interrup-
tion was due to violence or threats (Socialministeriet 2003a, 51). The place-
ment of children below 15 in secure wards on the basis of criminality
decreased, however, from 29 in 2002 to 11 in 2003 (Amtsrådsforeningen,
quoted from Söndagsvisen, 21 March 2004).
250 Jørgen Jepsen
From 1 July 2001 until the end of 2002 a total of 77 sentences involved a YS.
In 2003 a total of 70 were imposed. This caseload somewhat exceeded the
Juvenile Justice in Denmark: From Social Welfare to Repression 251
Denmark ratified the CRC in 1991, but has not yet incorporated it into
Danish Law—as has happened with the European Convention on Human
Rights.
In general, Denmark is reluctant to undertake such incorporation, partic-
ularly of conventions of a more general nature (Espersen 2002) which are
not ‘self executable’. Under the ‘dualist principle’ Denmark is, however,
obliged to take the CRC into consideration in legislation and policy as well
as in administration. For several years the Danish state has maintained a
somewhat self-sufficient attitude, indicating that Danish law and practice is
generally of a high standard in relation to the topics covered by conventions,
but this assumption is becoming increasingly doubtful. Thus there has been
repeated criticism from NGOs—and from the relevant UN committees—
that Denmark has not sufficiently implemented or incorporated the
Convention Against Torture (CAT) or the CRC. Thus in 2001 the CRC com-
mittee criticized Denmark for forming insufficient bases for initiatives in leg-
islation. Most recently Danish policy in the CRC field has been criticized by
the Danish Council On Children (Børnerådet—here BR8) for this deficit and
for its policies inter alia in relation to youth in trouble with the law.
It should be evident from the above that legislation and practice in the field
of juvenile justice in Denmark since the 1930s has followed a pendulum
course, swinging back and forth between a belief in welfare and treatment
on the one hand and the demand for public security and control on the
other. While the 1973 reform did away with some of the old paternalism
and belief in indeterminate treatment, it probably shortened sentences and
resulted in some de-institutionalization in the long run. It also emphasized
proportionality and justice, i.e. that persons who commit similar crimes
should receive similar sentences, regardless of their personal circumstances.
After 1973, the term ‘inmate’ was changed back to ‘prisoner’ and Nils
Christie’s view of imprisonment as the intentional infliction of pain and the
belief that ‘nothing works’ gained a foothold.
Juvenile justice, however, managed to resist the swing of the pendulum
away from welfare thinking for a long time. Juveniles have continued to be
excused many of their norm violations due to their immaturity and the hope
of socialization with the passage of time. The aura of innocence or lack of
reproach has lingered for several years in this field. Resocialization was seen
as the best way to further public security (Socialministeriet 2003a).
But this view has become increasingly unpopular in later years. Moral
panics about increasing violence, unsafe streets and violent gangs have
dominated the public discourse. Cautious criminologists have been swept
aside as ‘self-pronounced so-called experts’ and ‘judges of taste’.
Balvig (2003) sees this development as an indication of a more funda-
mental change in the existential view of society and of one’s fellow beings.
The latter are—if they commit offences—not seen as persons in need of sup-
port and resocialization, but as mature and responsible individuals. Their
256 Jørgen Jepsen
transgressions are connected with guilt and ill will and the response to their
lack of self-control is public control and incapacitation. The changes needed
in society have nothing to do with changing social conditions, improving
welfare and decreasing social inequalities and discrimination. Rather they
involve more control, supervision and internment of transgressors.
For many years the Danish model of juvenile justice and its primary ele-
ments—the social welfare boards, the extensive use of waivers of prosecu-
tion and the other elements for diverting young offenders into social service
instead of the criminal justice system—worked reasonably well in Denmark.
There was a widespread feeling that it might also serve as a model for other
systems with similar goals. It was assumed to be in accordance with the let-
ter and spirit of the CRC and other international instruments for safeguard-
ing the interests of society and of wayward youth at the same time.
As can be seen from the history sketched above, today it is not seen in the
same favourable light. First, the age of criminal responsibility is—if not in the
law books—in reality slowly creeping down from 15 towards 12 years for the
‘heavy end’ of delinquent children aged 12–15 through administrative provi-
sions for the placement of such children in secure institutions or wards.
Control has become a key word in this respect, and these secure institutions,
although placed within the social welfare system, have many characteristics
in common with the closed prisons, but lack the same legal safeguards.
Secondly, the municipal social welfare boards (CYBs), as decision-mak-
ers in cases of forced removal of children and juvenile offenders from their
homes, are coming under increasing criticism for not safeguarding the legal
and social interests of youth, by not investing sufficiently in support of the
family at an early point, by not removing neglected children and juveniles
soon enough from unhealthy surroundings, and by not reacting adequately
to their delinquency. This is due in part to economic reasons, partly to a
lack of professionalism and partly to a lack of an adequate knowledge base.
The construction of the boards with the judge present in cases of involun-
tary removal of children from the home has been criticized for being inef-
fective as a guarantee of due process. The system has also been criticized as
an obfuscation of the separation of powers, which today is seen as a prob-
lem rather than as an asset.
Thirdly, the primary administrative responsibility for safeguarding the
fundamental legal rights of youth in the sanctioning system—including the
institutions under the Youth Sanction—has been found to be lacking, and
there has even been a proposal to extend the responsibility of the ordinary
courts for juveniles down to the age of 12.
Juvenile Justice in Denmark: From Social Welfare to Repression 257
Fourthly, the system for complaints against coercive measures has been
found to be unsatisfactory and cumbersome. Reform plans are under way,
but the scientific basis for such reforms is scarce, the ideology is seen as irra-
tional and the resources insufficient.
Fifthly, secure wards and the provisions for exercise of power in them are
seen as expressions of an extreme focus on security and control, based upon
fears of a small group of aggressive and treatment-resistant youthful offend-
ers committing serious and violent offences, even while under age. A large
part of the public discourse on juvenile delinquency and juvenile justice has
focused on this group, particularly the growing part of the group of non-
Danish origin, and even more particularly second generation immigrants
with dark skin.
Finally, in general the system of reactions towards youthful offending has
been polarized. The intermediate sanctions of waivers of prosecution, youth
contracts and sentences conditional upon the application of welfare measures
have been significantly reduced. Instead, fines are used increasingly for young
offenders at the ‘soft end’ and closed institutions with secure wards as part of
the Youth Sanction at the hard end. Serving ‘alternatives to sentence’, i.e. in
treatment institutions, has reduced in favour of youth sanctions or ordinary
serving of a sentence in closed prisons. New separate secure institutions are
being created to house difficult young offenders of ‘ethnic’ origin. The Youth
Sanction is being criticized for having an obfuscating mantel of treatment—
with no or little rationale or reality—and for violating basic tenets of propor-
tionality in the setting of sentences (Vestergaard 2004b).
How has all this come about—and must the ‘soft’ welfare approach give
way once and for all to outright repression and control?
The repressive development of the system of reactions is to a limited
extent founded upon a rise in violent and serious offences committed to a
disproportionate extent by young ‘ethnic’ boys—in a situation when crime
in general and juvenile crime in particular has been decreasing for some time.
The overrepresentation of ethnic youth in certain types of crime is con-
siderably reduced when socio-economic background is controlled, but even
so, the increase in the number of ethnic youth in secure institutions is alarm-
ing. Immigrants and refugees in Denmark are to an increasing extent form-
ing a distinct underclass, clustering together in ethnic ghettoes (which most
of them would like to leave, but are unable to do so), with problems of high
unemployment, linguistic difficulties and outright discrimination. Young
groups in the larger cities are experiencing this situation, exacerbated by
xenophobic rhetoric at the political level as well as in day-to-day interac-
tion. The result is despair and aggressive reactions towards mainstream
Danish society. In this way the fear of strangers is becoming a self-fulfilling
prophecy and a downward spiral is the result.
Criminal policy and juvenile justice have been taken out of the hands of
academic experts in the name of democracy and invocations of ‘the public
258 Jørgen Jepsen
REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION
T
HE LEGAL STATUS of children and adolescents is different from that of
adults in every democratic country. In addition, children and youth
are not held accountable for violations of the criminal law in the same
way as adults in these systems. The ultimate aim of such treatment of chil-
dren and adolescents is to protect them from the negative effects of the adult
justice system and also to provide a more appropriate way of dealing with
them. These notions are guaranteed by international human rights law,
which substantially considers children who violate the law to be victims of
social hardship, neglect, violence, and deprivation. The juvenile justice con-
cept is based on the assumption that a person below a certain age, because
they are at en early stage of mental development, shall not and cannot be
held responsible for their wrongful acts in the same way as adults. For this
basic reason, it is now a widely accepted notion that juvenile justice systems
should be established differently from traditional criminal justice systems.
The Nepalese judicial system has, at least nominally, given such attention
to child offenders. With the ratification by Nepal of the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child (1989) (CRC) in 1990 and the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR) in 1991, it has theoretically accepted
the fundamental notion of juvenile justice systems adopted in most parts of
the world. Enactment of a separate Children’s Act (1992) is another strong
commitment Nepal has made. It is the first Act entirely dedicated to chil-
dren’s rights. It is designed to safeguard the interests and welfare of chil-
dren. The Nepal Treaty Act (1990) is another important step that Nepal has
taken towards fulfilling its international commitments. This Act was
adopted by the Parliament to implement the treaty provisions mentioned in
the Constitution of 1990 to which the country is a party, and it foresees in
section 9 (1) the superiority of international law (either customary or
treaty-based) over national legislation. Under this provision, inconsistent
264 Kishor Silwal
domestic law is rendered void, and provisions of the treaty are to prevail as
the law of Nepal. Therefore, any provision in the domestic Act may be set
aside if it is found to be inconsistent with the provisions of the CRC or the
ICCPR. These are some of the efforts Nepal has made to distinguish the
juvenile justice system from the criminal justice system.
The Constitution
1. No person shall be punished for an act, which was not punishable by law when the act
was committed, nor shall any person be subjected to a punishment greater than that
prescribed by the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.
2. No person shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence in a court of law more
than once.
3. No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
4. No person who is detained during investigation or for trial or for any other reason shall
be subjected to physical or mental torture, nor shall be given any cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment. Any person so treated shall be compensated in a manner as deter-
mined by law.
5. No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon
as may be, of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall be denied the right to consult and
be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice.
6. Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before a judicial
authority within a period of twenty-four hours after such arrest, excluding the time nec-
essary for the journey from the place of arrest to such authority, and no such person shall
be detained in custody beyond the said period except on the order of such authority.
7. [...] nothing in clause 6 shall apply to any person who is arrested or detained under any
law providing for preventive detention.
4 Article 15 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal.
Juvenile Justice in Nepal: An Overview 265
then for the highest court to ensure that the constitutional provisions are
properly observed.
The Muluki Ain, also called ‘Law of the Land’, is categorised into five parts.
The first and last parts of the instrument deal respectively with generalities and
repeal provisions; they are not related to the present topic. The second part
refers to court procedures, both civil and criminal. This part is particularly rel-
evant to the issue of juvenile justice, as it deals with the functioning of regular
courts. However, it does not provide for a separate juvenile court or for spe-
cific procedures applicable to juveniles. Therefore the common law is applied.
However, as soon as a specific juvenile justice system is adopted, in accordance
with the CRC and the Children’s Act of 1992, the provisions of the Muluki
Ain will be set aside: speciala generalibus derogant, the special law supersedes
the general law. The third and fourth parts are dedicated to civil and criminal
offences respectively, and as such determine the legality of any offence that
may be perpetrated by young offenders. In the absence of a proper and inde-
pendent system of juvenile justice, the general law applies to juvenile cases.
This legislation was enacted after the ratification of the CRC. In fact, it was
crafted to fulfil the obligation created by CRC. The Children’s Act was
enacted for the overall protection of children. Basically, the following six
provisions of the Children’s Act relate directly to juvenile justice.
Section 2(a) of the act defines ‘child’ as every human being below the age
of 16. The age of criminal liability set by the Act is slightly lower than that
recommended by the CRC. There is no universally acceptable standard for
the age of criminality; there is also no uniform international standard for
the age of criminal responsibility for children.
The CRC, Article 40.3.a, only requires State Parties to establish ‘a mini-
mum age’ below which children should not be presumed to have the capac-
ity to violate the penal law. The Commentary on Rule 4.1 of the Beijing
Rules declares the principle that ‘the beginning of that age shall not be fixed
at too low an age level, bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and
intellectual maturity’. Section 11 of the Children’s Act establishes the age of
criminal responsibility. Nepalese legal provisions establish three distinc-
tions: below 10—age of complete innocence; between 10 and 16—age of
quasi responsibility (with sub-divisions 10–14 and 14–16); above 16—age
of complete responsibility.
The minimum age of criminal liability in Nepal is far below that recom-
mended by international instruments. The CRC recommends 18 years as
the upper age for a ‘child’. Although it has given latitude for a lower age by
domestic legislation it does not mean that there should always be a lower
age than 18 years for that purpose.
Section 15 of the act clearly prohibits using handcuffs and fetters, solitary
confinement and keeping a child in prison with a prisoner who has attained
maturity. It ensures basic minimum protection by prohibiting rigorous pun-
ishment. Section 42 provides for the establishment and operation of chil-
dren’s rehabilitation homes, guaranteeing that children will be put in these
homes rather than prison. Section 50 gives leeway to the concerned author-
ity who hears juvenile cases to use alternative measures instead of police
custody or imprisonment. Section 55 is another provision relating to juve-
nile justice. It creates the obligation to establish a juvenile court. This sec-
tion also authorises the government to establish a special bench for juvenile
justice in each District Court.
The actors within the field of juvenile justice may be divided into two groups:
institutional and individual. The major functions and roles of the actors as
well as deficiencies in their structure and operation are described below.
Institutional actors
The police
One of the basic functions of the police is to enforce laws. The police is the
first official body with which juvenile offenders come into contact after the
commission of an offence.6 Nepal’s police force is headed by the Inspector
6 The information mentioned in the present paragraph is derived from CeLRRd (2002a), 28
General of Police (IGP) and is organised under the Police Act 1955 and
Police Rules 1992. It is under the direct line of command of the Home
Ministry. Dealing with the pre-trial phase, the crime investigation branch is
in charge of investigating juvenile cases. The Criminal Investigation
Department operates through 5 Regional, 14 Zonal and 75 District Police
Offices (DPOs). The DPOs are the grassroots law enforcement units,
entrusted with the responsibility to investigate crimes within their territo-
rial jurisdiction. There is no specialised mechanism for dealing with issues
of delinquency, although a Women’s and Children’s Cell exists within the
Crime Investigation branch of Nepal.
In Nepal, there is no separate police system handling cases relating to
juvenile delinquency. In the absence of specialised police to deal with juve-
nile matters, the police officers who investigate crimes committed by adults
have the power to investigate juvenile offences. Principally, the State
Offence Act (1993) and State Offence Rules (1998) prescribe the process of
crime investigation as well as prosecution. However, in the case of juveniles,
the Children’s Act (1991) has established special provisions for conducting
investigations. Handcuffing and solitary confinement are prohibited even at
this stage of the investigation. The presence of a lawyer has been made com-
pulsory at every stage of trial.7 But hardly any of these protections provided
by the legislation have been implemented.
In juvenile matters as in other cases, the State Cases Act authorises all
persons to report the commission of any offence to the nearest police office.
The police are required to examine the place of commission of the crime
and preserve any necessary evidence. The police can arrest a person sus-
pected of committing a crime for investigation. If a juvenile is suspected or
arrested, special procedures should be initiated. It is during this period that
protection of juveniles is most important. It has been argued that of all
phases of the juvenile justice procedure, it is at the point of arrest and
immediately thereafter, while in police custody, that an accused juvenile is
most likely to become the victim of torture or other forms of cruel treat-
ment. As stated in the Commentary to Rule 10 of the Beijing Rules, the
period of initial contact with law enforcement agencies is of great impor-
tance. In this sensitive period, juveniles need a high standard of protection.
Unfortunately, rights to this protection are often denied, as seen in frequent
failures to ensure the involvement of a juvenile’s legal representative and
guardians during the proceedings. The involvement of the above mentioned
people are valuable not only in their support for the child but also as
observers of how the case is handled.
In Nepal, there is legislative protection against maltreatment of juveniles.
The Constitution prohibits physical or mental torture of a person who is
7 Section 19 of the Children’s Act states that children’s cases are not to be entertained in the
detained during investigation, for trial or for any other reason. It forbids
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and moreover provides for compen-
sation to the victims of such treatment.8 The Children’s Act applies this pro-
vision more specifically to cases of juveniles. It states that, ‘notwithstanding
anything mentioned in the other law in force, no child shall be subjected to
handcuffs and fetters, solitary confinement or put together in prison with a
adult prisoner in case a child is convicted of any offence’.9 However, this
legislative protection is not matched by practice. His Majesty’s Government
has stated that no cases have been reported of children who have been the
victims of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (CRC
para. 22). Yet, handcuffing juveniles as well as adults is a common practice
in Nepal.
The Supreme Court has condemned the practice of handcuffing, observ-
ing (obiter dicta) that it is immoral, and issuing a writ of mandamus to
compel the removal of handcuffs from juvenile offenders who are travelling
from the police cell to the court.10 Surprisingly, against the spirit of the law
and the earlier rulings of the Supreme Court, in another case the judge of
the Supreme Court refused to remove the handcuffs of a juvenile who was
produced before the bench with handcuffs under a writ of habeas corpus.
When the lawyer representing the case demanded the removal of the hand-
cuffs, the bench dismissed it, asking: ‘Who would be responsible if the juve-
nile escaped?’11 This sort of attitude is typical of the adult criminal justice
system.
Protection against abuse of authority can be found in measures relating
to its supervision and the encouragement of participation by different inter-
est groups. This may be observed in the following procedures: the police are
required to conduct interrogation of the suspect in the presence of a public
prosecutor/government attorney. Furthermore, number 24 of the Chapter
on Court Procedure directs that in the case of an individual who has not
attained the age of 16 years, the statement may only be made in the pres-
ence of a guardian. This is in accordance with the international emphasis
on the involvement of parents and guardians in the justice process for juve-
niles.12 However, this sort of legal provision is regularly ignored by interro-
gation officers.
In Nepal the police can generally place a suspect in police custody for
investigation, without judicial authority, for only 24 hours. If it is required
that the person be kept in custody for more than 24 hours, this can only be
the charges against them, and, if appropriate, through their parents or legal guardians.
Juvenile Justice in Nepal: An Overview 269
13 See also JDLs Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, (General
shall be kept separate from adults and shall be detained in a separate insti-
tution or in a separate part of an institution also holding adults’.16
In Nepal, provision for these requirements can be found in section 42 (2)
(a) of the Children’s Act, 2048 (1992). It clearly states: ‘A child to be
imprisoned pursuant to the existing law for the investigation or proceedings
of the case being accused of any crime shall be kept in the Juvenile Reform
Home’. Further, Section 50 (1) of the Children’s Act provides that where
under other laws in force any person accused of committing any offence is
to be kept in custody for investigation of the crime, the court hearing the
case may order a suspected juvenile to be placed in the custody of their
father, mother, relatives or other guardian. Furthermore, the court may
order the suspected juvenile to be placed in the care of a social organisation
working for the protection of children’s rights or in a child reform centre.
Such order will be made on the condition that the party with whom the
juvenile is placed can ensure the appearance of the juvenile at the necessary
time. The court is empowered to make such orders if, considering the age
and physical condition of the juvenile, the details of the crime and the place
of custody, it is found to be inappropriate to put him/her in custody.
However, despite such provision, in most of the cases studied so far there
has been no practice of placing a child in the custody of any other person
or entity except that of the police.
Generally, the police and prosecutors are blamed for inflating the age of
juveniles above 16 years on the charge sheet. During the investigation
period, the prosecution must record the age of the suspect. If there is any
inconsistency between the suspect’s statement and other evidence collected
by the prosecution, it will be necessary to verify which facts are genuine
after collecting other necessary evidence. If there is any doubt remaining
after such a process, the prosecutors consider the higher age to be the gen-
uine age. The suspect has the right to rebut the statement of the prosecution
in court. After completion of the investigation, the police will send their
report to the public prosecutor’s office, along with their opinion of the
crime for which the suspect should be prosecuted and what punishment
(s)he should receive.
Nepal’s justice system is characterised by procedure and the norms of a ‘for-
mal’ justice system. However, it is slowly becoming more flexible. In juvenile
cases, there is increasing recognition of the need to ensure care and assistance
for young people and encourage their personal development and reintegration.
Nonetheless, the system is still far from full compliance with the fundamental
principles of juvenile justice. These principles can be seen in the use of
‘diversion’. Diversionary approaches are those that seek to avoid ‘unnecessary’
contact with the formal justice system and its potentially harmful aspects.
16 See also the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 85 (2).
Juvenile Justice in Nepal: An Overview 271
Instead, alternative responses are sought that are sensitive to the personal cir-
cumstances of the offender and the nature of the crime as well as the interests
of the victims, such as cautions, mediation and life skills training. Diversion
can occur at all stages of a case, but is perhaps most significant when initiated
in the early stages, prior to a hearing. International instruments encourage its
use, namely Guideline 58 of the Riyadh Guidelines, and Article 40.3.(b) of the
CRC. Rule 11 of the Beijing Rules further expands on its application. In
Nepal, there is presently no provision for diversion in the treatment of juve-
nile offenders. However, the development of such approaches should be a pri-
ority, along with allocation of resources to establish them. Despite some
necessary investment, alternative approaches could eventually take pressure
off the formal justice system and, moreover, improve the justice available to
juveniles, particularly those committing first-time or non-serious offences.
17 At the district level, section 17 of the State Cases Act also provides the District
Government Attorney with the authority to decide whether or not to initiate judicial proceed-
ings against suspects. There are 75 district level offices and 16 appellate offices to discharge
the responsibility of the Attorney General.
272 Kishor Silwal
if the age of the accused is below 16 years, prosecutors ask for remission of
the sentence as per section 11 of the Children’s Act.
The judiciary
The judicial system is threefold and is presented in Part 11 of the
Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990. The first level of hearing is
the district level. District Courts, also called Courts of First Instance, have
jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases (whether adult or juvenile)
and are located in all the 75 districts. The second level of hearing lies with
the Courts of Appeal, of which there are 16 throughout the Kingdom of
Nepal. The third and highest court in the judicial hierarchy is the Supreme
Court. It is composed of a Chief Justice and a maximum of 14 Associate
Judges, all of whom are appointed by His Majesty the King, on the recom-
mendation of the Judicial Council. Article 88 of the Constitution provides
the Supreme Court with vast jurisdiction. Decisions made by the Supreme
Court strongly influence the development of law and act as precedents.
The Nepalese judicial system is uniform; it does not have a separate sys-
tem of courts for the hearing of civil and criminal cases. However, there are
provisions regarding the establishment of Special Courts to hear excep-
tional cases, such as State Treason. In violation of Article 40.3 of the CRC,
there are no juvenile courts in Nepal. In the year 2000 the government
decided to create Juvenile Benches, composed of one judge, one psycholo-
gist and one social worker (on the model of the Juvenile Courts mentioned
in the Children’s Act). Many regarded that decision as a first step toward
the establishment of independent juvenile courts. However, three years after
that decision, Juvenile Benches were yet to be established. Now, of the 75
districts, Juvenile Benches are only partially operating in two districts, viz.
in Chitwan and Dolakha.18 Juvenile cases are therefore heard in the ordi-
nary judicial system, which obviously does not have the same focus on child
welfare and rehabilitation as a separate system of courts would have.
There are no differences in trial procedures for adults and juveniles. A
juvenile is arrested and detained in exactly the same manner as an adult.
The public prosecutor files a charge sheet, along with the evidence collected
during the investigation, and, if the accused person is in custody, s/he pres-
ents the accused before the relevant District Court; then the trial begins. As
a general rule, trial in a court of law is open, according to the principle of
public hearing19. However, the proceedings of a case involving a juvenile
should be conducted in camera. Children’s cases must be taken up by
a juvenile court or by a child bench. The name and address of the child
18 Juvenile cases in these two districts have been heard in the presence of a social worker;
Individual actors
24 See CeLRRd (2003), 98. Information and data were gathered from 63 districts (informa-
Lawyers
It is a fundamental right of any person accused of having infringed the law to
be represented in court by a defence counsel, hence young offenders are also
supposed to be in contact with lawyers. Legal assistance at each stage of the
judicial process is extremely important, as it is often the only way to be
informed of one’s rights and to have them observed. In the absence of a real
social-worker profession, the role of the lawyer may require more skills than
mere legal knowledge. In dealing with juvenile justice, lawyers must target the
best interests of the child as the most important objective to achieve.
Social workers
The role of social workers is essential in the administration of a proper
juvenile justice system. However, due to lack of resources and political
27 The Treaty Act 1990 specifies the superiority of provisions provided by international
agreements to which Nepal is a party over national provisions that would be inconsistent with
international law. Therefore, the legality of section 2 (a) of the Children’s Act is questionable
insofar as it does not comply with the definition given by the CRC (to which Nepal is party).
28 See HMG (2002), 24.
29 There are 5,513,485 children below the age of 10 in Nepal, and 2,727,710 between 10
Parents
Parents have an important role to play in explaining the reasons for juve-
nile delinquency and youth criminality. In an ideal world, parents take
care of their children and surround them with love, affection and educa-
tion throughout their youth, which ultimately prevents them
from exhibiting socially deviant behaviour, the most obvious being the
breach of penal law. But we do not live in an ideal world. Parental respon-
sibility implies duties (legal and moral) toward children and rights owed
by the State to the parents. The limited scope of the present paper
excludes a discussion of the duties of parents toward their children; how-
ever, some of the parental rights are specifically linked to juvenile justice
and may be considered as providing psychological support for young
offenders.
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES
The Nepalese juvenile justice system has undergone major reforms, result-
ing in a distinct change in the structure and function of the adult justice sys-
tem. Theoretically, legislation relating to the juvenile justice system in Nepal
is clearly oriented towards the child welfare model, thus complying with
international standards. But in the practical aspects it has been generally
observed that the state of juvenile justice is pitiful, hence there are calls for
immediate reform at the practical level. The fundamental issues mentioned
below are the major concerns to be addressed in order to make our system
just, reasonable and fair.
Juvenile Justice in Nepal: An Overview 277
Criminal responsibility
Quasi-judicial bodies
In Nepal there exists no official data regarding the extent of juvenile delin-
quency. There is an obvious lack of knowledge and understanding of the
child issue at all levels of administration and of the judiciary. Section 52 of
the Children’s Act creates the obligation for police organisations to keep
accurate records of the manifestation of juvenile justice in Nepal. As per the
Act those statistics must be made available for any study or research work
without mentioning the name, surname or address of the child. Further,
Rule 12 of the Beijing Rules reads as follows:
In order to best fulfill their functions, police officers who frequently or exclusively
deal with juveniles or are primarily engaged in the prevention of juvenile crime
shall be specially instructed and trained.
An internal policy letter from the Office of the Attorney General, dated
July 2003, seems to have established a new recording system of juvenile
cases:
Each District Government Attorney should submit a monthly report stating the
number of cases where children were involved. Police organisations should also
take the initiative to maintain the records of delinquency as per the provisions of
Children’s Act. In large cities, special police units should be established for that
purpose.
CONCLUSION
Nepal does not have separate comprehensive legislation regarding the treat-
ment of juvenile delinquents. The Children’s Act of 1992 contains some
provisions which deal with delinquent behaviour. But these provisions have
not proven sufficient to establish a separate justice system for juveniles.
Even now, the process of investigation, prosecution and trial is almost iden-
tical to that applied in the adult criminal justice system. Although the
notion of a modern juvenile justice system accepted by the international
community has been partly incorporated in Nepalese legislation, it is far
from being applied. Despite the constitutional guarantee of legal assistance
to delinquent suspects, this right has been frequently denied. The use of
280 Kishor Silwal
REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION
I
N THE LAST twenty years, major reforms in the political, economic and
social fields have taken place in Spain. Among these changes, the crimi-
nal justice system and its agencies have been through a process of mod-
ernisation and democratisation. One of the more recent reforms affected
the juvenile justice system and was introduced by a new law in 2000.
The police are a law enforcement agency within the criminal justice sys-
tem. They hold a key position in this system as they can be considered the
main entrance to it. In Spain a specific justice system for juveniles was cre-
ated at the beginning of the 20th century. If we follow the historical evolu-
tion of the Spanish juvenile justice system we can observe changes in the
model legislation and ages for application of juvenile law that go from the
guardianship model—a paternalistic model similar to the American social
welfare model—to treatment ideology—a mixed model based on individual
responsibility, as in the crime control model—that have shaped police inter-
vention with juveniles (see the chapter by de la Cuesta in this volume for
additional information on the new Spanish model).
The guardianship model (modelo tutelary) was introduced in Spain by
the Law of Bases in 1918, which opened the door to the progressive cre-
ation of Children’s Courts following the model of the Cook County juve-
nile court (Chicago, 1899). Thirty years later, in 1948, the Law of 1918 was
replaced by the Law of Juvenile Courts. The juvenile courts sought to pro-
tect those under 16, whether victims or offenders, from the improper exer-
cise by their parents or guardians of the right to custody and education. It
was a very ‘paternalistic’ and ‘male based’ conception. For instance, the
284 Lola Vallés
main prerequisites for membership of this court were being male, over 25
years of age and with irreproachable morals and an unblemished lifestyle.
After a long dictatorship, democracy was re-established in 1976 and the
lack of procedural guarantees in the Law of 1948 conflicted with key arti-
cles in the Spanish Constitution of 1978. During the 1980s there was in
general minimum intervention by the juvenile justice system against juvenile
delinquency as the law was in conflict with some of the principles of democ-
racy. In addition to this, the need to introduce international treaties and
agreements in law created a need to promulgate a new law regarding jus-
tice for juveniles; this took place in 1992 (Act 4/1992). This law constituted
an urgent and provisional reform prompted by the declaration of unconsti-
tutionality of the Law of 1948. The year 1995 saw the change of lawful age
to 18 years, which was introduced by the new Penal Code, bringing it into
line with the civil age of majority. Following this approval, a new law on
justice for juveniles became all the more necessary.
The promulgation of Act 5/2000 on minors’ penal responsibility was a swift
movement towards treatment ideology1 as it puts judicial intervention regard-
ing juveniles somewhere between a formal sanction and a ‘materially educa-
tional intervention’. It emphasises the recognition of the special vulnerability
and educational demands of the offending juvenile and his/her legal responsi-
bility for his/her acts. The law mandates that children under 14 years will not
be criminally responsible for their actions and they cannot go through the
criminal justice system. In exceptional instances, the law can be applied to
young people of 18–20 years of age2 (i.e. ‘young adults’). Treating young
adults as juveniles seems to take into account structural changes in western
societies where the beginning of adulthood has been moved to run in parallel
with the increasing practice of delaying entry to the employment market.
The way the police intervene with juveniles has gone through an impor-
tant transformation in the last decades, especially since the democratisation
of the State.
as the United Nations Rules, the Council of Europe Recommendations, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the European Charter on Children’s Rights.
2 Provided young people fulfil the conditions presented in Art. 4 of the law: having commit-
ted a less serious crime or penal misdemeanour without violence or intimidation to the per-
sons, or putting them in serious danger; not having been condemned by a final sentence for
crimes committed after reaching 18 years of age; and that the special circumstances and the
degree of maturity of the accused make it advisable, all those being considerations assessed by
the Technical Advice Team.
3 The 2000 reform fixes the minimum age for applying the juvenile justice system at 14
years; this has also been done in Italy, Sweden and Germany. The maximum age is 17.
The Role of the Police within the Spanish Juvenile Justice System 285
13 are exempt from the juvenile justice system and criminal intervention is
limited according to what biology and psychology define as childhood and
adolescence. As a result, police intervention with juveniles under 14 years
who commit a crime must be oriented towards child protection and must
be done in connection with the juvenile welfare system and under the super-
vision and direction of the juvenile prosecutor’s office.
Concerning the police, the new legislation on juveniles is a shift towards
better protection of juvenile rights and legal safeguards in police perform-
ance. In this sense the reform introduces an exhaustive list of formal con-
siderations relating to the detention of juveniles4. It must be emphasised
that the 2000 Law limits the time of detention by the police to 24 hours5
and also diminishes police discretion by establishing external bodies to lead
police interventions: a judicial body—the prosecutor, and an administrative
one—the juvenile welfare board. Furthermore, the law implies the official
recognition and adoption in law of practices that were already in force,
such as the existence of specialised police units for juveniles.
Act 5/2000 emphasises the protection of the basic legal safeguards and
basic rights of juveniles; for instance, juveniles can request the habeas cor-
pus procedure,6 which will be initiated by the chief of police. The compe-
tent preliminary investigation judge in the place where detention has taken
place will intervene. When the police detain a juvenile they are clearly
instructed to avoid ‘using tough language, physical violence and exhibiting
4 Art. 17 of Law 5/2000: the detention of juveniles must be exceptional and must always be
put into practice in such a way that it should cause the minimum detriment to the juvenile;
juveniles must be informed of their constitutional and legal rights in words that they can
understand and that should allow them to understand also the events they are being charged
for, and the reasons for their detention; the police must immediately notify the prosecutor and
the juveniles’ representatives of the arrest, and also the appropriate legal personnel, as the case
may be; a lawyer must assist the juveniles at all times; they must be questioned before their
parents and a defence lawyer; and in their absence, before a prosecutor other than the one in
charge of the proceedings; juveniles must be retained in adequate facilities and separate from
those used for adults of penal age; they must also receive any physical, medical, psychological
and social assistance and all the care and protection their age requires according to their sex
and individual characteristics; and finally, within a maximum period of 24 hours juveniles
must regain their freedom, and must be handed over to their parents, guardians or relatives or
put under the Public Prosecutor, as the case may be.
Whenever the crime committed gives rise to liability to a prison sentence of over three
years, juveniles must be put under the custody of the prosecution; if the presumed sentence is
shorter, juveniles will be freed after giving evidence under the guardianship of those responsi-
ble for it. The prosecutor has 48 hours from the time of the arrest to decide on their freedom
or request from a judge the precautionary measures they see fit to apply to the juvenile’s
situation.
5 All juvenile detentions must be immediately communicated to the juvenile prosecutor by
telephone and fax. During detention juveniles should be kept separate from adults and also be
transported separately. Normally the police statement should also be sent within 24 hours to
the juvenile prosecutor’s office. In those cases where both adults and juveniles are considered
perpetrators of a crime, a copy of the police statement must be sent to the juvenile prosecutor
within 24 hours.
6 The juvenile’s parents or legal representative, the prosecutor, the juvenile’s lawyer and the
weapons’7. Furthermore, the police are only to use special protective secu-
rity measures, such as handcuffs, on juveniles between 16 and 18 in serious
crimes (i.e. violent crimes, sexual crimes or terrorism)8.
Regulations on juvenile arrest and detention are provided by the new law,
including the issue of place of detention. The law states that juveniles must
be detained in adequate facilities and separate from those used for adults.
The experience of the Catalan Police proves that improving and adapting
facilities leads to less violence during the detention of juveniles. The juve-
nile prosecutor’s office in Catalonia had made repeated requests to adapt
detention facilities for juveniles since December 2001, when the 2000
reform came into force. However, the adaptions were not completed until
July 2003.
When juveniles were kept in the old-style cells, violent episodes arose
continuously such as self-inflicted injuries or furniture destruction. The new
facilities consist of two big rooms with natural lighting and capacity for 30
juveniles each. The rooms have TV, video and special furniture designed to
resist vandalism. Juveniles’ attitudes towards the police have changed radi-
cally since the new facilities were put into use. For instance, taking inter-
views and testimonies is much easier and there is less self-injury.
Law mandates that specialised police units for juveniles should be the main
actors within the police segment of the juvenile justice system at the differ-
ent levels of political power. It must be mentioned that in Spain there are
three levels of government—state, regional and local—and as a conse-
quence different police services with different tasks coexist, each service
corresponding to one of the following levels: (1) At the state level there are
two services: the National Police Force and the Civil Guard. (2) At the
regional level there are three regional police services, in Catalonia (Mossos
d’Esquadra), in the Basque Country (Ertzaintza) and in Navarra. In
Catalonia and the Basque country these regional police services are
intended to replace the state police forces. (3) At the local level in munici-
palities with more than 5,000 inhabitants there are local police services,
better known as municipal police or guardia urbana.
Both state and regional police services in Spain have special units for
dealing with juveniles; these units form part of the judicial police. The 2000
7 Following the 2000 law reform the State General Prosecutor’s Office dictated
Recommendation 1/2000 for Police Services [Circular 1/2000 de la Fiscalía General del Estado
sobre criterios de aplicación de la Ley Orgánica Reguladora de la Responsabilidad Penal del
Menor] containing instructions for implementing the new law on juvenile justice. In section 9
instructions are given for police intervention during the detention of juveniles.
8 Section 12 of General Prosecutor Recommendation 1/2000 for police services.
The Role of the Police within the Spanish Juvenile Justice System 287
reform specifies for the first time in Spanish law that the juvenile police
units will be the main police body to implement juveniles’ law. However, it
should be noted that these units had been set up long before the 2000
reform.
In Spain during the 1980s constitutional safeguards and European stan-
dards on criminal justice were gradually introduced, and the legal treatment
for juveniles set apart a child protection system and a separate criminal jus-
tice system for children (those under 18 years of age). However, the police are
the only criminal justice agency in which staff still deal with both juvenile jus-
tice and child protection tasks9. The 2000 reform maintains this situation.
Child protection tasks are aimed at all juveniles under 18 and the police
develop them in collaboration with the juvenile welfare system. They target
children and juveniles who are unprotected or at specific risk, and victims
of ‘a crime likely to affect their normal development as individuals’.
Intervention of the police with juveniles under 14 who have committed a
crime is protective only and only civil legislation on child protection can be
used. In these cases police services may intervene only for the purposes of
civil identification or determination of age, and they cannot use techniques
and measures that are used to fight crime in relation to older juveniles or
adults. They should apply child protection regulations, inform the prosecu-
tor, follow his/her instructions and hand the juveniles over to their parents,
guardians or relatives or to the juvenile welfare system.
Juvenile justice tasks are aimed at juveniles between 14 and 17. The
police act as a part of the juvenile justice system which targets juveniles
below the legal age of responsibility who have violated the law in such a
way that, had they been of age, they would have been considered perpetra-
tors of an offence or crime. Regarding juvenile justice procedures, police
intervention according to Act 5/2000 must be fitting for juveniles who have
committed acts considered misdemeanours in the Penal Code. It should be
emphasised that juvenile criminal law is not applicable to children under 14
years of age regardless of the crime committed, nor to youngsters over 18
years who are processed in the adult criminal justice system.
Police enforcement of immigration law also applies to juveniles. When
dealing with foreign juveniles, juvenile police units perform controls and
administrative restrictions as part of their tasks.
At the state level the most important juvenile police unit is the group
under the National Police Force. In the late 1970s and as a result of the
emergence of juvenile delinquency within urban settings (crimes against
property, vehicle theft, climate of insecurity, violence), Juvenile Delinquency
Groups were created within the National Police Force (NPF), aimed at
focusing on the offending juvenile. The emergence of juvenile delinquency
9 For instance, the Catalan police force’s juvenile unit self-reports that 30% of their work
At the regional level there is a juvenile unit in the Catalonia police force: the
Minors Brigade. It was created in June 1986 together with a Minors Police
Headquarters. It began to deal with questions relating to the victimisation of
children and juveniles and also with criminal lawsuits brought against them.
Since the beginning, a social educator has been part of its staff.
As a consequence of an organisational change after the 2000 reform, the
Minors Police Headquarters was disbanded and instead a Minors Service
Office (MSO) was created in December 2001. The MSO is a police unit
solely for children and juveniles, on duty 24 hours a day, covering the entire
region of Catalonia10. Three operational groups were established: two
working from the public prosecutor’s office for juveniles and one from the
police headquarters building. Their duties are similar to those performed by
10 The Minors Service Office covers the whole region of Catalonia, which has a population
of 6.5 million. The average number of juveniles the Minors Service Office receives is close
to 15 juveniles per day, with an average of four declarations being taken for each juvenile
(perpetrators, victims and witnesses).
The Role of the Police within the Spanish Juvenile Justice System 289
the Juveniles Unit of the NPF. They include, on the one hand, the investiga-
tion of complaints and reports which require subsequent inquiries. On the
other hand, the MSO undertakes all other investigations ordered by the
public prosecutor’s office for juveniles and the courts as well as all steps in
pursuance of court orders and administrative requests, detentions, appear-
ances, summons, locations, confiscations, etc.
The rapport between the police and the prosecutor is very close and since
the reform it has become even closer. Act 5/2000 recommends to the
Ministry of the Interior, at both the national and regional level, that the staff
of the juvenile units of the Judicial Police Brigades be assigned to the juve-
nile sections of the prosecutor’s office. This has already been done, for
instance, in the Catalan regional police where there are two groups assigned
to the prosecutor’s office dealing mainly with investigations following com-
plaints or judicial orders. Under the 2000 reform, juvenile prosecutors lead
the police investigations. However, after the detention and release of a juve-
nile offender investigations can be followed by the police with or without
the request of the prosecutor or the judge11.
Co-ordination between prosecutors and police services is better at the
local level than at the regional level. The 2000 reform introduced the figure
of the regional prosecutor who specialises in juveniles, but the police are
still building bridges with regional prosecutors.
At the local level some positive initiatives have been taken in order to
fight certain types of violence or crime in a more global and effective way
through the creation of specific protocols among the different agencies deal-
ing with the problem, including the prosecutor and the police. In fact, col-
laboration with other agencies through protocols is encouraged in section
30 of the National Police Service’s ‘2001 Provisional Rules on police inter-
vention with juveniles’. For example, in the case of the protocol for domes-
tic violence: ‘... consensual performing of all the agencies: schools, health
services, hospitals, prosecutors, police, judges and so on’. Evaluation of the
protocol outcomes shows an increase in the number of complaints reported
to the police and to the criminal justice system and more convictions result-
ing from co-ordination of the different agencies.
sionales sobre tratamiento policial de menores] of the National Police Service, January 2001.
290 Lola Vallés
qualitatively equal. Within the Spanish system police cannot use diversion
formally—only the prosecutor is allowed to do so. Following the law
strictly, police should always report improper behaviour and offences com-
mitted by juveniles. However, they do use diversion informally. It must be
said, though, that the 2000 reform has reduced police discretion to some
extent: it has introduced certain limits to the performance of the police by
regulating in more detail the conditions for the detention of juveniles. In
addition, police services must follow the prosecutor’s orders when they per-
form criminal investigations and are under the juvenile welfare system
when they perform child protection tasks.
In Spain, law regulates police proceedings, as they must be subject to the
rule of law. However, there is a common thought that the police should be
‘softer’ with certain groups, especially those not able to defend themselves
or to attack. This is the case with youngsters and children. This is based on
the assumption that juvenile offenders are not responsible for their acts,
thus they are not guilty. Their offences are seen as the result of the failure
of those institutions in charge of socializing juveniles. Therefore police have
a difficult role when dealing with juveniles. They must react to juveniles’
offences, so they do have to intervene, but at the same time they should try
not to stigmatise juveniles while performing their control function. For
instance, two of the common characteristics of juvenile police units are that
police officers do not wear uniforms and they receive specific training on
skills that encourage juveniles to trust them.
When facing juvenile delinquency the police use even more discretion.
They tend to react only when there is clear evidence of a crime and then
they will apply the least degree of sanction permitted. In fact, when dealing
with juveniles, police services tend to perform in a manner different from
that which the law strictly stipulates. The reason for this adjustment is to
try to avoid the stigmatisation that any criminal justice system intervention
generates. This informal diversion by the police is mainly done in two ways:
Out of this informal diversion arises the problem that police officers are not
trained to undertake mediation, conciliation or referral to other agencies These
The Role of the Police within the Spanish Juvenile Justice System 291
are not strictly legal actions because Spanish law does not regulate them as
police actions. In the event that it becomes regulated by law, training could
then be included in police curricula. In fact, conflict resolution strategies are
already part of the training curricula of some police services in Spain12.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the promulgation of the new law on the juvenile justice sys-
tem in 2000, Spanish police have changed the way they work with juveniles.
The reform is a shift towards treatment ideology which considers that juve-
niles are not responsible for their acts and envisions juvenile crime as a
result of problems in their process of socialisation—so it is in fact a shift
towards a ‘softer’ approach to juvenile delinquency.
The law has introduced a very detailed regulation on police intervention
with juveniles. It lowers the maximum time of detention, introduces the
possibility of claiming habeas corpus, and lowers the age of criminal
responsibility. All in all it limits police intervention and stresses the protec-
tion of the basic rights of juveniles.
In Spain there were already special juvenile police units, but they are now
regulated by law. Members of these units receive special training. The func-
tions of the police under the new system are quite wide as they range from
protecting children at specific risk to detaining juveniles who have commit-
ted a crime. The law reinforces co-ordination between prosecutors and
police services. It appears to be a more effective way of fighting criminality
and reducing victimisation of juveniles.
When dealing with juveniles, police services tend to use more informal
diversion. In Spain this diversion consists mainly of conciliation and medi-
ation, and diversion to other agencies. This still happens even though these
functions are not recognised by law and policemen are not trained to do so.
REFERENCES
12 For instance, during the Basic Training Course of the Catalan Regional Police-Mossos
d’Esquadra there is a 17 hour course on ‘mediation and communication’. The course aims at
teaching cadets how to use mediation for the alternative resolution of conflicts, how to analyse
conflicts and decide whether mediation is suitable, and techniques of mediation.
292 Lola Vallés
INTRODUCTION
D
URING THE 1960 S , the more progressive wing of American juvenile
justice assumed a stance that professional expectations for
improved performance and behavior among youth released into the
community following placement in secure confinement facilities (i.e. refor-
matories, training schools, secure treatment units) were simply not being
met (Abadinsky 1991). In fact, the growing legitimacy of a nascent commu-
nity corrections movement nationwide was being derived in part from the
critical findings of research studies that noted the failure of accepted prac-
tices within youth correctional systems to resolve the legal, social and devel-
opmental problems exhibited by juvenile offenders experiencing extended
periods of confinement. Regarding this failure, Dean-Myrda and Cullen
(1985, 19) observed:
… research on recidivism rates revealed that prisons did little to diminish crimino-
genic predispositions. It was estimated that somewhere between fifty and eighty-
five percent of all children committed to a reformatory eventually returned to
crime after release. (Jensen and Rojek 1980, 50; Horwitz and Wasserman 1977)
some things ‘do work’ in the attempt to rehabilitate juvenile offenders and
adjust them to normal community life. A new rehabilitative literature is
beginning to emerge and is revealing that certain treatment modalities are
demonstrating long-term positive effects with delinquents (Andrews et al
1990; Borum 2003; Gendreau and Ross 1987; Lipsey 1992, 1995, 1999;
Lipsey and Wilson 1998; Lipsey et al 2000; MacKenzie 2000; Palmer 1992,
1994; Sherman et al 1997). As Gies has noted, ‘Despite early skepticism
regarding intervention programs, recent literature reviews and meta-analy-
ses demonstrate that intervention programs can effectively reduce delin-
quency’ (2003, 3).
Interestingly, the renewed interest starting in the mid-1980s in commu-
nity-based intervention strategies both as alternatives to incarceration and
as reintegrative approaches has largely focused upon the problems posed by
the most severely delinquent segment of this nation’s larger juvenile
offender population (Palmer 1991). These developmental efforts and the
particular nature of the reforms can readily be shown to follow both from
the impact of the ‘get tough’ school and from a number of research-based
but widely disseminated insights about the relative role of serious juvenile
offenders within the larger crime patterns of adolescent offenders in the
United States. With regard to the influence of the get-tough school of the
late 1970s and early 1980s, juvenile justice planners and practitioners were
forced to take into consideration in designing and operating new programs
the public demands that serious juvenile offenders be held much more
accountable for their criminal behavior and that relatively high levels of
social control be imposed upon them, especially while being managed in the
community. In fact, much of the interest shown in juvenile restitution and
community service programs throughout the 1980s and beyond can be
readily tied to their ability to satisfy the widespread call for more account-
ability.
The clearest result of targeting severely delinquent youth for intervention
has been the system’s response of launching experimental program initiatives
under the rubric of intensive supervision (Krisberg et al 1991, 1995;
Wiebush 1993). Intensive juvenile aftercare as a coherent programming
approach can be traced to experiences during the past several decades in
adult intensive probation supervision and then subsequently to experiments
with intensive supervision in juvenile probation (Armstrong 1991b). Clearly,
the spread of the juvenile intensive probation supervision movement (JIPS)
throughout the country has had important implications for the design and
operation of juvenile intensive aftercare programs (Clear 1991; Steenson
1986; Wiebush and Hamparian 1991). Although largely grounded in
notions of enhanced surveillance and heightened social control, JIPS has
assumed a number of forms, the majority of which include various combi-
nations of intensified surveillance/monitoring and highly specialized treat-
ment modalities along with supportive service provision. Programs geared
Intensive Aftercare Program (IAP) Model 297
almost totally to strategies of increased control have met with little accept-
ance or success; rehabilitation and treatment persist as central considerations
in interventions with delinquents. From a long-term perspective the feared
decline and demise of the rehabilitative ideal have simply not occurred.
can address known risk and protective factors, and 3) ensure the delivery of pre-
scribed services and supervision in the community. As this definition makes clear,
both the correctional facility and the community have a critical role to play in
aftercare. This definition stands in marked contrast to the customary conception
and practice of aftercare historically in America where the focus is primarily—if
not exclusively—on supervision in the community, with little or no focus on what
takes place before release back into the community (Altschuler, Armstrong and
MacKenzie 1999). Moreover, all too commonly, post-release aftercare falls far
short on service delivery and treatment, leaving aftercare as little more than sur-
veillance and monitoring in the community. (Altschuler and Armstrong 2001, 2–3)
The central concern explored in this definitional framework is that aftercare
practice within the juvenile justice system has been largely confined to those activ-
ities in working with youth in the community once they had been released from
confinement. Usually, little was done to pave the way for a more carefully
designed reintegrative process in terms of pre-release planning and collaborative
decision making by institutional and field staff as the youth transitioned from
confinement. There has been a growing recognition among practitioners working
with issues of re-entry that this approach to reintegration, often described as
‘falling off the table,’ tends to be fraught with a variety of inherent problems, fre-
quently resulting in high rates of failure and recidivism. Yet, for the most part
innovative strategies to make the step-down phase of the institution/community
continuum smoother and less disjointed had not been developed and tested.
Obviously, changes are now beginning to occur both in the way aftercare is
defined and in how programming efforts are being configured.
It has repeatedly been stated over the past two decades that greater empha-
sis should be placed upon transitional and aftercare services for confined
juvenile offenders, but progress in this area has been slow for a number of
reasons. A matter of particular irony is that although this population of
serious and chronic delinquents, given their high-risk behaviors and
propensity for repeated illegal acts, should supposedly be receiving the ben-
eficial, cumulative effects of residential treatment and community-based
follow-up, the reality is one where this programming arena has been given,
at best, short shrift and, at worst, has simply been overlooked or ignored.
Programs designed to respond to the needs and difficulties of youth
re-entering the community have, historically, been assigned low priority on
a regular basis in the competition for scarce resources.
Another major concern has been the ongoing inability of staff (located
both in facilities and in the community) to provide continuity of service
delivery and supervision from the point of confinement to reinsertion in the
community. The issue of boundary has long hampered transition and result-
ingly plagued efforts to achieve successful long-term adjustment for juvenile
300 Troy L Armstrong
Within the past fifteen years, as the field has experienced a resurgence of
experimentation with innovative community corrections programs, one
area of particular interest has been initiatives to develop more effective
transitional and aftercare services for high risk youth. Notable among them
have been several well documented projects including the Skillman
Foundation’s Intensive Aftercare Project, the State of Maryland’s Juvenile
Drug Treatment Program, the Michigan Nokomis Challenge Program, the
Philadelphia Intensive Probation Aftercare Project, and the OJJDP-funded
Intensive Aftercare Programs (see Altschuler et al 1999 for a description of
these initiatives). It should be noted that much of this recent experimenta-
tion with innovative juvenile aftercare programming has focused on ways
to develop more effective ‘intensive’ approaches that combine an appropri-
ate mix of increased social control and intensified service delivery/treat-
ment. This resurgence of interest in community corrections has dovetailed
with a renewed confidence in the efficacy of treatment (Palmer 1992; Lipsey
and Wilson 1998; MacKenzie 2000).
Intensive Aftercare Program (IAP) Model 301
The IAP model that resulted from the research and development process
and was tested in four pilot sites nationwide represents a carefully designed
attempt to combine in a coherent fashion the most innovative policies and
practices identified nationally to facilitate effective transitioning of high-
risk adjudicated offenders back into the community and to offer a reason-
able chance of long term normalization of behavior and reduced recidivism
(Altschuler and Armstrong 1996). The model is grounded in a set of
assumptions about the need to specify clearly the range of factors that gen-
erate and are highly correlated with serious delinquency. This identification
process logically suggests promising strategies of intervention that are the-
oretically linked with these factors. Consequently, the model is theory
driven and provides a framework of differential responses designed to meet
the problems and needs of individual juvenile offenders. It is our impression
that when the basic conceptual or theoretical principles of a program model
either have not been stated or are ambiguously stated, it is difficult if not
impossible for staff, program participants, or any other observers to under-
stand with any degree of clarity what practices, services and procedures
should be pursued and why, how they should be conducted and when, with
which particular youth, and under what circumstances.
The design of the model was driven by a growing recognition arising
largely from the assessment phase of the research and development process
that a small set of goals must be incorporated if reintegration was to be suc-
cessful. In the broadest sense, the implementation and management of effec-
tive aftercare services depends upon operationalizing programmatically
four central goals. They are:
Table 14.1: The four conceptual levels that configure the IAP model
3. Program Elements
• Organization and Structural Characteristics
• Overarching Case Management
• Assessment and Classification for Client Selection
• Individual Case Planning with a Family and Community Perspective
• Surveillance/Service Mix
• Incentives and Graduated Consequences
• Service Brokerage and Linkage with Social Networks
• Management Information and Program Evaluation
4. Service Areas
• Special Needs and Special Populations
• Education and Schooling
• Vocational Training, Job Readiness, and Placement
• Living Arrangements
• Social Skills
• Leisure and Recreation
• Client-Centered Counseling (Individual and Group)
• Family Work and Intervention
• Health
• Special Technology
Each of the five plays a role in determining how clients are targeted for
particular levels and types of supervision, how clients are matched with
appropriate resources and services, how clients can be tracked through the
system without falling through the cracks, and how specific techniques can
aid in the provision of supportive activities and sanctioning measures
necessary for client supervision in the community.
At the most concrete and tangible level of the IAP model are the ten serv-
ice areas identified as central to the comprehensive provision of supportive
activities for juvenile aftercare. They are: 1) special needs and special pop-
ulations, 2) education and school, 3) vocational training, job readiness and
placement, 4) living arrangements, 5) social skills, 6) leisure and recre-
ation, 7) client-centered counseling (individual and group), 8) family work
and intervention, 9) health, and 10) surveillance and monitoring technol-
ogy. While it is highly unlikely that any one program or participating
provider would or even could provide this array of services, a strong argu-
ment can be made that a comprehensive system of aftercare offering an
adequate continuum of interventions in a given jurisdiction must be
equipped in some fashion to deliver this set of services to high-risk, multi-
problem youth on aftercare status. These are the key service parameters
that have been identified as relevant to juvenile populations transitioning
from confinement. For a detailed discussion of each area, see Altschuler
and Armstrong (1990).
A final but absolutely critical dimension of the IAP model’s design and
implementation concerns a conceptualization of the system domain for
applying this framework. Here, the continuum for aftercare intervention is
Intensive Aftercare Program (IAP) Model 307
Figure 14.3: The structural configuration of and associated activities for juvenile
aftercare across the institutional-community programming continuum.
During the research and development process four states were selected to test
the model from a larger group of eight states that had initially participated in
a series of three-day training conferences on IAP. These four states (Colorado,
310 Troy L Armstrong
One should note that all of these factors are very consistent with essential
requirements of the IAP model and represent ‘doing business’ in a way that
is quite different from traditional, standard aftercare practice.
Within the IAP initiative, three states (Colorado, Nevada, Virginia) remained
active in testing the model across the five years of pilot programming. Factors
largely extraneous to implementing the model itself forced the state of New
Jersey to discontinue the IAP test after two and a half years. While adhering
closely to the fundamental design features and procedures that define the IAP
framework, the three remaining states demonstrated considerable flexibility
312 Troy L Armstrong
Positive Facilitators
• Previous well-established history of community, multi-agency collaborations for
troubled youth where clear guidelines and procedures and guidelines have been
identified and followed.
• The presence of scientifically valid assessment tools, both in the area of risk and
need, to help match offenders with appropriate levels of supervision and relevant
services.
• The availability of knowledgeable experts who can regularly provide technical
assistance and training in the enhancement, fine-tuning and refinement of after-
care programs.
• Frequent interaction between institutional and parole staff to help overcome diverg-
ing interests and perceptions of relevant interventions.
• The presence or capacity to develop formal program structures and/or procedures
to facilitate the transition from institution to aftercare.
• A jurisdictional history of contracting and brokerage for specialized services from
various vendors in the community.
Impediments
• Difficulty of parole/aftercare line staff in adjusting to changing supervisory expec-
tations and revisions in job description and responsibilities as aftercare evolves
away from traditional casework practice.
• The fact of substantial physical distance between the home community of con-
fined offenders and the institutions where they are being housed.
• The resistance of grassroots agencies and groups to embrace and provide oppor-
tunities for youth who have been identified as chronic, serious juvenile offenders
and have been incarcerated due to the threat they pose to the community.
• The resistance of families—essential players in the intervention process—to
agree to participate fully and openly in treatment and counseling along with
their children.
• The inability to provide a condition of short-term ‘lock-up’ as the most stringent
measure in a graduated sanctioning framework.
• An approach to intensive supervision that relies almost exclusively upon surveil-
lance and social control techniques.
• A lack of creative approaches to work with older adolescent offenders on after-
care caseloads (generally tied to tendency to be inflexible in managing this popu-
lation).
• Inability to find a common meeting ground, programmatically and philosophi-
cally, when working with other large and significant organizational entities in the
community such as public schools and mental health.
and ingenuity in adapting the generic model to the specific circumstances and
needs of their jurisdictions. The creativity revealed in these variations of the
model served as a rich source of information and insight into the numerous
ways the primary implementation goals of the IAP project could be achieved.
Intensive Aftercare Program (IAP) Model 313
Colorado
The Colorado IAP project was operated by the State Division of Youth
Services (DYS), Department of Institutions. The catchment area for eligible
youth in confinement was comprised of parts of Jefferson, Arapahoe and
Denver counties, including greater metropolitan Denver. The designated
youth correctional facility for this project was Lookout Mountain Youth
Services Center (LMYSC) and was located only 18 miles from downtown
Denver, beneficial for close proximity to juvenile offenders’ home commu-
nities. LMYSC was the state’s most secure facility, housing the most
severely delinquent youth in the DYS system. Project design required that
all IAP participants be housed in a single cottage on the grounds of
LMYSC.
Decision making about matching services with offenders and determin-
ing levels of supervision benefited from the availability of a battery of
comprehensive assessment tools including the Youth Level of Service
Inventory, the Adolescent Living Independently Via Education and
Employment instrument, and a variety of privately provided tools
focusing upon the assessment of family, vocation, and drug/alcohol prob-
lems and needs. These instruments supplemented the standard set of
educational and psychological tools, completing other case file data
already gathered to develop a youth’s social, legal, medical, and person-
ality profile. Within 60 days of confinement, a discrete case plan
that established goals and procedures for successful community reinte-
gration was developed. This master plan established guidelines for
both institutionally based treatment and follow-up activities in the
community.
To ensure adequate levels of supervision and service delivery, an IAP
client manager (a DYS employee) provided oversight for each client
from the point of institutional referral through transition and step-down
into the community and throughout follow-up and eventual discharge.
Specific standards for client management included monthly face-to-face
contact with the youth during confinement and weekly contact that
began 60 days prior to release and continued throughout community
placement. A relatively intense level of contact was also maintained with
ancillary individuals and agencies in the community including family
members, school officials, employers and other involved parties.
Caseload size was capped at 18 cases with a maximum of 6 institutional
and 12 community clients.
Client managers assumed primary responsibility for all community con-
tacts, but various service providers aided in the supervision process.
Trackers employed by private providers were used extensively for daily
face-to-face contacts. They were trained to make random spot checks, to
monitor daily schedules and to employ electronic surveillance technology
314 Troy L Armstrong
Nevada
The Nevada IAP project was operated by the State Division of Youth
Corrections’ Youth Parole Bureau. Clark County (Las Vegas), which had
the greatest concentration of serious juvenile offenders in state confine-
ment, was selected as the IAP pilot. The correctional facility identified
for participation in the project was Caliente Youth Center, located
approximately 150 miles from Las Vegas. This geographical factor of
distances presented a substantial challenge in implementing the IAP
Model.
Within the Caliente Youth Center, particular emphasis was placed on the
special pre-release curriculum taught during the month prior to re-entry
into the community. The curriculum focused major attention upon social
skills training and issues related to street readiness. An aftercare worker (a
parole agent) from Las Vegas resided and worked in the Caliente facility
and in that role served as an ongoing liaison between the institution and
community, ensuring regular, sustained contact and communication. All
IAP youth returning to the Las Vegas area were required as part of transi-
tion to step-down into a highly structured and intensive day treatment pro-
gram, the Center for Independent Living. Within this transitional setting
existed the option of short-term residential placement for youth who were
simply not prepared to return immediately to their homes for any one of a
number of reasons. As a collaborative gesture, the Clark County School
District employed an educational liaison specialist who spent considerable
time at the institution and had primary responsibility for reintegrating IAP
youth into public schools. Unfortunately, this strategy only achieved mixed
results since retention proved to be a much greater obstacle than simply the
act of enrolment.
The community supervision component relied on a team approach in
which three parole officers assigned to the IAP project were collectively
responsible for supervising 45 IAP parolees. This approach afforded
24-hour coverage in the community when required and facilitated a quick
response when problems arose. Each officer managed a small caseload
Intensive Aftercare Program (IAP) Model 315
Virginia
The national attention that was given to the IAP Model during the formal
demonstration period at the pilot sites resulted in a number of other juris-
dictions across the U.S.A. beginning to experiment with variations of this
basic framework in the mid-to-late 1990s. These sites have contributed sub-
stantially to the emerging knowledge base about issues in the design, imple-
mentation, and operation of intensive aftercare. Projects that were
particularly valuable in providing insight were 1) the Network Aftercare
System (NAS) in Mobile, Alabama; 2) the Intensive Parole Program (IPP)
that was instituted throughout the state of Washington; 3) the Minority
Youth Transition Program with the Oregon Youth Authority; 4) the
Hennepin County Home School Intensive Aftercare Project in Minnesota;
and 5) a number of statewide youth correctional system projects including
the states of Alaska, Florida, Kentucky, New York, South Carolina, and
South Dakota. Experimental or quasi-experimental design outcome evalua-
tions have been conducted on a number of these projects.
At present, the most ambitious national juvenile re-entry/aftercare proj-
ect grounded in the IAP design is the Targeted Re-entry Initiative. Managed
by the Boys and Girls Clubs of America, the project has been funded by the
Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, as a three-year
demonstration at a number of pilot sites. Primary attention is being focused
upon four intensive sites where a quasi-experimental design evaluation is
being conducted by a research team from Indiana University, Indianapolis.
A key element in this elaboration of the IAP Model is the introduction of a
Boys and Girls Club providing recreational and other programming activi-
ties inside the participating juvenile correctional facility at each site (Barton
et al 2004). In addition, major emphasis has been placed upon superimpos-
ing a strength-based, positive youth development component on more con-
ventional correctional interventions that have traditionally targeted
problems and deficits being exhibited by offenders in confinement
(Armstrong 2004; Barton 2004).
Another widely discussed juvenile aftercare program that is currently
in operation and builds upon IAP design features is the Minority Youth
Transition Program (MYTP) housed within the state of Oregon Youth
Authority. It represents an effort to adapt the IAP Model specifically to the
needs and circumstances of African American youth in confinement as they
transition into their home communities. This programming experiment has
already been described in considerable detail in another publication
(Armstrong and Jackson 2005).
The most serious manifestation of minority overrepresentation in the U.S.
juvenile justice system can be found at the point of secure confinement,
where the highest level of overrepresentation occurs. One strategic
Intensive Aftercare Program (IAP) Model 317
Table 14.3: Baseline characteristics of IAP pilot programs for comparison with other
intensive aftercare initiatives
PROGRAM DESIGN
Institutional Phase
Pre-release Community Family therapist Aftercare Planning for com-
planning sources offer assesses, diag- caseworker munity re-entry is
input via pro- noses, develops commences initiated 30 days
bation offi- family contract, contacts with after placement in
cers. and begins weekly youth and residential phase.
Preparation of family group ses- family 3
post release sions. (Highly months prior
plan. uneven implemen- to release.
tation.)
Involvement of Probation Family visits facili- Not indicated. Parents meet with
outside agen- officers meet ty at lease once; confined children,
cies and indi- with institu- therapist involves institutional staff
viduals in tional staff youth in family and a community
institution and juveniles. assessment ses- worker once
sion. (Less than every 2 weeks.
half of youth
involved in family
assessment ses-
sion.)
Targeted com- Probation Family attends Not indicated. Community
munity activi- officers meet weekly group ses- workers see par-
ties during with parents sions with thera- ents once per
confinement on regular pist and support week at their
period basis in the groups. (Low fam- home.
community. ily involvement.)
Transitional Phase
Testing and Not indicated. Not indicated. Not indicated. Not indicated.
probing of
re-entry prior
to placement
in community
Intensive Aftercare Program (IAP) Model 323
Structured step- First 6 weeks Initial period First few weeks Initial month
down process with very high of intense after facility of virtual
using residential level of pro- contact, fol- release: carefully house arrest.
placement or bation offi- lowed by less- prescribed pro- Level of com-
intensive day cer/client con- er contact gram. Average munity work-
treatment tact. No use with case monthly contacts er/client con-
of intensive manager, 10 over 67 months tact also high
day treatment additional in Detroit; 60 over during first 3
or short-term counselor, and 6 months in months. No
residential family thera- Pittsburgh. use of inten-
treatment. pist. No use Contacts taper off sive day treat-
of intensive after first 2 ment or short-
day treatment. months. Pittsburgh term residen-
uses transition tial treatment.
group home.
Community Follow-up
Provision of mul- Few pre- Wide spec- Efforts to improve Variety of
timodal treatment scribed activi- trum of serv- family functioning required pro-
services ties but some ices offered through counseling gramming
emphasis on with links to and to link clients activities.
education and community with education Some major
vocational resources. program. Jobs far questions
activities. short of expecta- about quality
tions. of delivery.
Discrete case Required pro- Three articu- Not highly devel- Not empha-
management serv- cedures nei- lated levels of oped. sized.
ices ther highly intervention:
developed nor pre-release,
clearly articu- initial inten-
lated. sive aftercare,
and transition-
al aftercare.
Use of graduated Not indicated. Not indicated. Not indicated for Not indicated.
sanctions and pos- incentives.
itive incentives Pittsburgh sanctions
permitted return to
group or wilderness
program.
324 Troy L Armstrong
Table 14.5: Operational procedures for structuring step-down at the point of transi-
tion: essential principles identified for effective transitioning in IAP
Multiple per- Case manager, institu- Parole officer, insti- Parole officer, institu-
spectives incor- tional staff, youth, tutional community tional case manager,
porated in plan parents, and commu- liaison, institutional youth, interagency
nity providers rou- staff, and youth: Community
tinely involved. parent participation Assessment Team, par-
limited. ent.
Parole officer One to two times per Once per month; One to two times per
visits to institu- week; routine. routine since spring month; routine.
tion 1997.
Treatment Via community Via institutional- Via one provider at
begun in insti- providers. Includes community liaison Hanover only.
tution and con- multifamily counsel- and parole officers. Drug/alcohol treatment;
tinued in com- ing, life skills train- Includes life skills sporadic use. State poli-
munity ing, individual coun- and drug/alcohol cy discourages contract
seling, and vocational curriculums; done services by community
skills training; done routinely until liai- providers for institu-
routinely. son vacancy. tionalized youth.
Youth pre- Supervised day trips Not allowed. Not allowed.
release visits to to community pro-
community grams, beginning 60
days prior to release.
Pre-parole fur- Overnight/weekend 30 day conditional Not allowed.
lough home passes, begin- release to commu-
ning 30 days prior to nity, prior to offi-
release. cial parole.
Transitional Not part of the Not part of the Two group homes in
residence design, but occurs for design. Norfolk; 30- to 60-day
some youth. length of stay; used for
most youth.
Transitional day Two day-treatment One-day supervi- Day treatment used for
programming programs in Denver; sion/ treatment pro- youth who do not go to
used for almost all gram; used for most group homes.
youth during the first youth.
few months after
release.
Intensive Aftercare Program (IAP) Model 327
* Source: Richard G.Wiebush, Betsie McNulty and Thao Le, ‘Implementation of the
Intensive Community-Based Aftercare Program’, OJJDP Juvenile Justice Bulletin, U.S. Dep.
of Justice (July 2000).
Given their roots in the adult probation arena, intensive supervision pro-
grams within juvenile justice systems (the origins of IAP being traced to this
approach) have a tendency to be or quickly become surveillance and social
control approaches. However, research indicates that this tendency has nega-
tive implications for the long-term success of youth enrolled in such pro-
grams, namely, the relative lack of rehabilitative services precludes the option
of promoting the development of skills and competencies in this population
330 Troy L Armstrong
CONCLUDING REMARKS
testing the efficiency of this model in order to reduce markedly the level of
recidivism among the most severely delinquent youth transitioning from
confinement. The development process in this initiative built upon a num-
ber of key ideas about effective policy and practice drawn partially from
previous efforts and also incorporating new, untested strategies. Over the
past several years, upon completion of the demonstration phase of the proj-
ect, considerable effort has been devoted to generating findings and draw-
ing conclusions about the initiative from a program development
perspective. The resulting synthesis has allowed for considerable clarifica-
tion about exactly what are the requisite dimensions for achieving success-
ful treatment outcomes in reintegrative systems utilizing this approach.
Following a number of years of research and development activities tied
to model design, implementation and operations, the broadly prescribed
framework for systems utilizing the IAP approach appears to point to five
basic programming dimensions that define procedural steps and practices
essential in the effective delivery of treatment services and geared toward
achieving positive outcomes. First, reflective of a number of earlier experi-
ments aimed at providing highly structured interventions for serious juve-
nile offenders, the IAP Model clearly represents a version of reintegrative
programming grounded in intensive supervision strategies and techniques.
Yet, based upon extensive testing of the model, an essential aspect of inten-
sification has been shown to be simultaneously placing a strong emphasis
upon social control/supervision and service delivery/treatment. Decision
making geared towards ensuring an appropriate mix of these two strategies
must be guided by collaborative planning and assignment of responsibilities
among agencies and sectors of the system managing various aspects of pre-
release, transition and community follow-up.
Second, the IAP model is largely conceptualized as a rehabilitative frame-
work operationalized by procedures through which participating youth are
carefully profiled and then matched with proven, evidence-based treatment
modalities. Deployment and co-ordination of these highly specialized inter-
ventions across the entire span of reintegrative process (i.e. from the point
of placement in confinement to the completion of supervision in the com-
munity) is central to the model’s design.
Third, application of the model within any juvenile justice system is
highly dependent upon the recognition and incorporation of certain struc-
tural characteristics essential for mobilizing open communication, joint
decision making, collaboration, and reinforcement in the community of
gains made in the institution. These structural characteristics are directly
tied to programming activities that characterize the three key phases of the
reintegrative continuum: institutional pre-release, transition spanning insti-
tution and community, and long-term community follow-up.
Fourth, at the heart of operational effectiveness in the IAP Model resides
a framework for overarching case management. This specification of case
Intensive Aftercare Program (IAP) Model 333
REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION
A
GROWING NUMBER OF Native American and Canadian First
Nations communities, both reservation-based (Indian Country) and
within urban areas, are going ‘back to the future’ (Jim Zion quot-
ed in Rubin 2001) by using a variation of restorative justice conflict reso-
lution based in their traditional culture. At the same time, mainstream
communities are looking to restorative justice as a new way of resolving
community problems, and American Indian communities are recognizing
that their traditions are founded in conflict resolution through restorative
justice. Reintroduction and revitalization of these traditions may provide a
better system than the introduced Western criminal justice system for
Native communities to respond to serious problems with juvenile delin-
quency.
In this chapter we will explore use of the traditional Native American
variety of restorative justice conflict resolution with Native American juve-
nile offenders. This chapter relies on limited research on restorative justice,
primarily Braithwaite (2002), and various sources on use and reintroduc-
tion of tradition in conflict resolution in Indian communities, including
research conducted by one of the authors (Dumesnil), who interviewed
friends and colleagues who manage prevention and intervention programs
for Native American youths and adults about their use of tradition in their
programs.
* The authors wish to thank Howard Bad Hand, Pat Bad Hand, John Beheler, Chuck Ross,
Dorothy Brave Eagle, Dana Brave Eagle, Dawn Brave Eagle, and James W. Zion.
342 Barbara Mendenhall and James Dumesnil
1 In reviewing a draft of this paper James W. Zion commented: ‘it [is also] changing public
issues into private problems in the sense of taking a dispute out of the “public”, i.e. governmen-
tal, arena and returning it to where it belongs—the private scene’ (personal communication).
Exploring Traditional Cultural Mechanisms of Conflict 343
In this case, if the only truth that mattered was the conviction and sentencing
of the offenders, healing for the individuals, the family and the community
at large would not have occurred or even been possible. The opportunities
for ‘offender’ and ‘victim’ restoration or rehabilitation would have been
overlooked. Co-author Dumesnil is a forensic counselor who works with
offenders and victims. The preponderance of forensic counseling suggests
that offenders tend to be more open to therapeutic gains prior to adjudi-
cation. As the people of Hollow Water discovered (see below), the adver-
sarial legal process positions an offender to deny, minimize or evade one’s
guilt. Accountability to family, victim, peers and community is required by
the treatment process, and embracing responsibility and restoration
routinely occurs. To satisfy legal obligations and accomplish full recovery,
344 Barbara Mendenhall and James Dumesnil
Not all legal scholars agree that restorative justice is helpful or timely
(Delgado 2000). Delgado concludes that restorative justice is typically no
worse than conventional justice, but says that it can be an opportunity to
promulgate middle class values upon minorities in society, and can allow
and encourage the ‘victim’ to indulge in exacting revenge on the offender.
What Delgado appears to be concerned with is the practice of mediation,
where a court-appointed mediator referees differences between two parties
with the primary goal being compensation paid to the victim by the
offender. He is pessimistic about mediation allowing victims to indulge in
revenge against offenders, with mediators perpetuating conservative mid-
dle-class values. His concerns may be valid since mediation is the one form
of restorative justice that does not extend ‘ownership of the crime problem
beyond the victim and offender to concerned community members’. Presser
and Gaarder (2000, 181) acknowledge that ‘restorative justice has been
inaccurately equated with mediation in the US’.
In addition, when this paper was initially presented at the ‘Youthful Law
Violators, Human Rights, and Development of New Juvenile Justice
Systems Conference’ at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law
in Oñati, Spain, several participants raised concerns about the reintroduc-
tion of traditional methods of social control in restorative justice systems
dealing with juvenile crime. Participants who worked in juvenile justice in
Africa and with the United Nations cautioned that the use of severe corpo-
ral punishment is one traditional sanction that has been championed by
indigenous groups wanting to re-establish traditional community-based
restorative justice systems for juvenile offenders. The level of corporal pun-
ishment cited as traditional can be more severe than Western proponents of
restorative justice can accept.
These participants also pointed to the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (‘the Beijing Rules’)
which expressly state in Part Three, section 17: ‘Juveniles shall not be sub-
ject to corporal punishment.’ In the commentary to the convention, it is
explained that this statement is in line with Article 17 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention Against Torture
(i.e., corporal punishment is against international law). Although the
Convention on the Rights of the Child does not forbid corporal punishment
outright, it states that ‘Every child deprived of his liberty shall be treated
Exploring Traditional Cultural Mechanisms of Conflict 345
with humanity and the inherent dignity for human person and in a manner
which takes into account the needs of the person and his or her age’ (sec-
tion 37a). Thus, the extent to which cultural traditions that advocate cor-
poral punishment should be respected has been questioned by some within
the framework of international instruments on the treatment of juveniles
under the law.
Another possible limitation to the utility of community restorative justice
programs is that to date evaluations of such programs are minimal and pri-
marily anecdotal. Restorative justice system advocates have not produced
evaluation reports demonstrating the benefits of such programs in a variety
of Native communities. Finally, systems and individuals in positions of
authority in some Native communities may be so damaged that restorative
justice would only create another means of victimization. Such damaged
communities will need to heal at a more fundamental level before introduc-
ing restorative justice programs using traditional healing methods with
juvenile offenders. However, careful use of restorative justice may be part
of healing Native communities to a point where traditional healing can be
reintroduced.
In response to these criticisms, the research reported in this chapter indi-
cates that restorative justice programs, including Peacemaker Courts,
Sentencing Circles and Family Group Conferences are designed to address
and manage Delgado’s criticism of mediation. More systematic evaluations
of restorative justice programs for juvenile law violators will be needed to
answer the final criticism of the efficacy of restorative justice in Native (or
other) communities.
are more satisfied than with the criminal justice system. In addition, recidi-
vism rates for those who participate in restorative justice conferences tend
to be lower. This ties in with criminological research which shows that
criminal rehabilitation most often occurs through the rehabilitation of the
family of the offender—restorative justice strengthens family responsibility
for dealing with crime in contrast to punitive court systems that weaken
family responsibility for dealing with crime and deterring reoccurrence
(Braithwaite 2002). There is also evidence of restorative justice efforts per-
meating the community at large and preventing potential offenders from
offending (Braithwaite 2002; Ross 1996).
Finally, with regard to the integration of the modern restorative justice
movement and indigenous communities, Braithwaite suggests the ‘need ...
to save and revive the restorative justice practices that remain in all soci-
eties’ (2002, 142). He suggests ‘... helping indigenous community justice to
learn from the virtues of liberal statism—procedural fairness, rights, pro-
tecting the vulnerable from domination (which did not get mandated along
with Western legal systems or were corrupted by political and illiberal sta-
tism [authors’ opinion]), ... and helping liberal state justice to learn from
indigenous community justice—learning the restorative justice community
alternatives to individualism’ (2002, 142).
until about 1960 was that ‘nothing (Native) was of value to themselves:
nothing of spiritual belief and practice, child-raising, pharmacology, psy-
chology, dispute resolution, decision making, clan organization, or commu-
nity governance’ (Ross 1996, 46). This was conveyed despite mainstream
adoption of much that came from Native American culture: domesticated
crops, herbal medicine, governance structure, ideals of democracy.
Despite these enormous pressures to assimilate into American culture,
Native American communities have maintained cultural values and tradi-
tional beliefs and practices. Fundamental to Native American values are:
first, the importance of community and family; second, the responsibility of
every individual to be part of community and family with a wide under-
standing of extended family; and third, the responsibility of the community
and family to include each individual with social control and support oper-
ating through traditions of family responsibility (Ross 1996). This concept
of interdependent society is expressed by the Lakota people as Mitakuye
Oyasin, meaning ‘we are all related’. Given these foundations of belief,
restorative justice as a process of conflict resolution can work well in Native
American communities presuming a certain level of social stability.
Much of the Native American cultural context was lost in the clash with
European civilization. As noted previously, many, if not all, Native
American traditional practices and ceremonies were made illegal in the late
1800s with recommendations and principles introduced by the Quaker
Policy (Delano 1873) and establishment of codes for the Courts of Indian
Offenses in 1883. The problem today is that traditional teaching without
the living cultural context of tradition may result in the seed not taking root
in young people. The teaching may be blamed for no longer having rele-
vance to the modern world, as not being beautiful and powerful guideposts
and landmarks in personal development and transformation.
As an example of this possibility, John Beheler, educator and principal of
Marty’s Indian School, relates a day where his school observed the
‘Throwing of the Ball Ceremony’. This ceremony is a coming of age cere-
mony for a girl. As she comes into the age of motherhood, she is understood
to have the ‘world (or creation) in her hands’. Beheler involves parents and
teachers and observes traditional forms to create the sacred space in an
attempt to preserve or revive the living cultural context.
Beheler explains that the Sacred Ball, representing the universe and the
Creator, is tossed over her back by a young girl dressed in traditional regalia
representing purity, beauty and unspoiled humanity that are closely con-
nected to the divine or creative. This ceremony teaches that challenges or
opportunities may be dropped into a young person’s life that will serve as a
test. Will he/she reach out and bring the Creator into his/her life? How much
conviction will he/she have in this effort? Will the young person be ready if
it comes to him/her? Does he/she understand what it means to reach out for
it? Does he/she understand what it means to accept it? If the world were
dropped in his/her hands now, would the youth know what to do with it?
Bringing these questions to the students’ consciousness following the cere-
mony is most important, according to John Beheler. This is the way the
experience impacts education. It is how the child’s development, the commu-
nity and the ceremony take their role in sustaining one another. Beheler
emphasizes that teachers and parents must have the capacity to provide a liv-
ing cultural context to ensure this quality in education. If adults are not
versed in traditions and song or are not allowed or encouraged to speak and
to live them, then activities such as the Throwing of the Ball Ceremony
become simply folklore. These concerns are echoed at schools within Indian
Country. Bureau of Indian Affairs2 (BIA) schools may have cultural directors,
2 The Bureau of Indian Affairs is the agency of the U.S. Department of the Interior respon-
sible for providing services to federally recognized Native American tribes and communities.
Services include the array of government provided services that would ordinarily by funded
and managed by special districts, cities, counties and states, including health, education, wel-
fare, law enforcement and courts, community infrastructure (roads, water, etc.). In recent years
there has been an effort to provide funds to the tribes and communities and to allow tribal
authorities to manage many of these services directly.
350 Barbara Mendenhall and James Dumesnil
but teachers who live and practice the tribe’s sacred traditions cannot share
personal experience with the children, or teach songs or crafts that honor
their Native spirituality because BIA schools enforce the U.S. government
standard of separation of church and state. Teachers who participate in tribal
traditions are silenced.
Our advisors note that sharing information covertly helped to maintain
knowledge and practice of traditional beliefs and ceremonies.3 Children
respect teachers who provide traditional knowledge; children also develop
self-respect through knowledge of ancestral beliefs. At tribally administered
schools, teachers and staff have more freedom to include rituals and cere-
monies as part of the normal school routine. In these situations, teachers
report that Native American practices have become powerful and helpful
tools in early intervention and prevention work. Some traditions, such as
Pow-Wows and costume and dance contests are preserved at BIA schools.
Although these activities may maintain the social form of traditions, they
were never intended to keep the spiritual context alive. There is also con-
cern that the appointment of a school Cultural Director acknowledges that
traditional culture no longer survives adequately in the community. Bad
Hand states that ceremonies have always been a living and dynamic
process. They are a product of time, place and tradition: handed down by
history, and interpreted by elders and leaders to meet the demands of the
time. He states that this element has been lost in much of contemporary cer-
emonial observances. Instead, Native Peoples have become concerned with
‘getting it right’, and the responsiveness, complexity and adaptability of liv-
ing tradition has been lost. This dynamic is addressed further in our discus-
sion of complex adaptive systems and complexity theory below.
In addition to schools, tribal juvenile justice systems are also incorporat-
ing traditional teachings and ceremonies into rehabilitation programming
in their facilities. Pat Bad Hand is a director of the Rosebud Sioux
Community’s new (2005) Youth Wellness and Renewal Center, Wiconi
Wanbli Tipi, serving a detained, court-ordered juvenile population.
The project is committed to the use of traditional Lakota Sioux teachings in
rehabilitating the youth who are in the facility. One of the major program
goals of Wiconi Wanbli Tipi is to help youth to regain and reclaim an
understanding of their tios’paye, which is a Sioux concept representing the
story of one’s relatives and ancestry, one’s name, one’s circle and one’s life.4
3 Howard Bad Hand (personal communication), A.C. Ross (personal communications) and
Meyer (2002) share that such covert or secretive observance is a time-honored tradition for
native peoples. Bad Hand states that for the century that the Sun Dance was outlawed, his peo-
ple would sneak it in, early in the morning before July 4th celebrations. As Meyer indicates
with the legal system, Native People often needed to disguise their teachings and practices in
a European or American form in order to secretly pay honor to their knowledge and their
ways.
4 According to Black Elk; translated as ‘ti (where we live) ospaye (apart but not separated
... from every direction and in every way, that (they) have no value to anyone, no
purpose to (their) lives, no positive impact on the world around (them) ... At
some point people brought to this position stand up and demand to be noticed,
to be recognized as being alive, as having influence and power (author’s empha-
sis). And the easiest way to assert power, to prove that you exist, is to demon-
strate over people who are weaker still, primarily by making them do things they
don’t want to do. The more those things shame and diminish that weaker person,
the more the abuser feels, within the twisted logic of victimizations, that they
have been empowered and restored themselves. (Ross 1996, 48)
Zion (2002a, 9) reports that one contemporary theory of Indian crime and
violence is that it is actually a form of ‘mass post-traumatic stress disorder’
(PTSD), resulting from centuries of failed European experiments to solve
the ‘Indian problem’. Europeans viewed the interrelated systems of educa-
tion, religion, justice, science, medicine, agriculture, hunting, and gover-
nance as the ‘Indian problem’ that needed to be eradicated. Eradication
attempts have been partially successful with severe damage to the integrated
social systems of precontact Native America that has led to a prevalence of
352 Barbara Mendenhall and James Dumesnil
Imagine that our two cultures are represented by a skin diver and a moon walker.
Because they lived and worked in different environments, they developed differ-
ent footwear to suit their needs. The moon walker created heavy boots, because
there is less gravity on the moon. Without them, he would float off into space.
The skin diver needed swimfins to propel him through the ocean. Without them,
his ability to move about was diminished. As long as each stayed with his own
footwear, in his own environment, he could move easily and well. If, however, the
skin diver were forced to put on weighted moon boots, he would be at risk of
drowning. Similarly, if the moon walker changed to swimfins, he would likely
float off into space. In either case, each would be likely to come to grief if forced
to wear the other’s footgear.
But imagine that Moon Boots came over to Swim Fins’ land, and not appre-
ciating why he needed flippers said ‘You need to wear Moon Boots’. Believing
in the ‘rightness’ of his ways, all measures were employed: from persuasion
and ridicule right through to legal prohibition ... However, Swim Fins would
not have changed environments, he would have only lost the ability to move
around in his own world. Over time, his loss of mobility and power would
take away his wish to move. No longer would he rejoice in his land and his
relationships to it.
Within that metaphor, the Western world has indeed done everything it could
to force Aboriginal people to discard their traditional footwear. ... Instead of
being encouraged to develop personal qualities and wide notions of responsibil-
ity, they found themselves trained into unthinking acceptance of codes of ‘right’
behavior established by others. Instead of a ‘Natural Law’ of interdependence
requiring that they connect with each other as co-adventurers, they were trained
to start thinking of themselves as ‘better than’ or ‘worse than’ their fellows ... .
... Traditional law makes no such assertion, and attempts no such imposition.
Instead, it grants that each person, family, community and nation should be as
free as possible to put their own wisdoms into practice within their own spheres
of activity. Ironically, it is our very system of Canadian (American or English) law,
especially its emphasis on absolute truths and one right answer, which seems to
be the greatest felon where traditional law is concerned. (Ross 1996, 268–70)
their spirits were stronger. They did not compete for the top spot in the hier-
archy because they had no appreciation that a hierarchy existed (Neihardt
1932; Mails 1991; Ross 1989; Bad Hand 2002). For example, with regard
to the Lakota:
I am not a biblical scholar, but as I have come to understand it, in the Judeo-
Christian tradition, man occupies a position just below God and the angels, but
above all other earthly creation ... In sharp contrast, the aboriginal world-view
holds that mankind is the least powerful and least important factor in creation ...
Mankind’s interests are not to be placed above those of any other part of creation
... In the matter of hierarchy, or relative importance of beings within creation,
Aboriginal and Western intellectual tradition are almost diametrically opposed.
(Ross 1996, 61)
cellular biology (Cairns, et al 1988; Lipton 1998, 2001; Thaler 1994), fetal
development (Gibbons 1998a; Lipton 2001), early childhood development
and psychology (Siegel 1999), chaos and complexity theories (Siegel and
Hartzell 2003), study of complex adaptive systems (Peroff and Wildcat
2002; Siegel and Hartzell 2003), and Native American psychology (Bad
Hand 2002) all point toward congruence between the previously dualistic
nature of the Western worldview and the holistic nature of the Native
American worldview. The predominant trend is toward the holistic view-
point that healthy systems are interactive and naturally adaptive and self-
organizing in the direction of increased complexity. Complexity lies
between the extremes of sameness, rigidity and predictability, or random-
ness, unpredictability and disorder (Siegel and Hartzell 2003). Such systems
are open, receive input from outside, have layers of components capable of
chaotic behavior and are thus adaptable in changing circumstances.
Complexity is the path of harmony, the path of wicozani or hozho’, the
path between the two extremes. It is the same as the ‘Good Red Road’ often
referred to in Lakota life and prayer. It is similar to what Dr. A.C. Ross
describes as the struggle of some Native people to live a sober life. On one
side are the invitations of the comrades for drinking and excess. On the
other are the tee-totalers and prohibitionists. For him and for other Native
peoples their path to recovery consists of staying on the path between the
chaos of excessive drinking and the rigidity of prohibitionists (Ross 1989).
According to Zion (2002a), the Navajo spiritual path is similarly not the
path of being ‘all good’. It is a path of being in balance between the
extremes of all good and all evil.
Howard Bad Hand, in responding to questions about Native American
healing today, says: ‘All dynamic systems require change. We are in the
midst of change and transformation with our traditions, practices and
beliefs. However, the truths I have learned about humanity and life from my
people, especially from the old ones, have been solidly consistent and
enduring’ (Bad Hand 2002, 12). Further, Howard Bad Hand relates that,
‘... If you wish to know the independence of that which is idealized in life,
the growth of that which is High cannot be based on the rigid and the
unmoving ... All face the law of having to change with the times. Or, the
times will come and shatter their rigidity’ (Bad Hand 2002, 192). It appears
that teachers (e.g. Bad Hand) are confirming that Native American spiritu-
ality and tradition endure because they honor the principles of complex
adaptive systems.
There is a vibrant quality that emerges when systems are able to move in
their natural, self-organizational flow toward complexity. The natural
movement of the mind is also toward complexity and toward mental
health. A stressed system, on the other hand, is one that tends to move away
from complexity, toward extremes of rigidity or disorder (Siegel and
Hartzell 2003). Psychological research with securely attached children and
Exploring Traditional Cultural Mechanisms of Conflict 355
The Western legal system: when did victims of crime become victims of
the criminal justice process?
Over time, restitution was viewed as interfering with the crown’s right to
exact a penalty for crime. Victims could sue for damages, but the state
authority received what was originally direct restitution to the victim
(Meyer 2002). The victim’s role in providing evidence for the state’s prose-
cution became more important than his/her need for healing, safety or com-
pensation.
The justice system began to serve the needs of the abstract state, more
than it served the needs of the victim and community (Umbreit and
Bradshaw 1997).5 This trend and pattern became so out of balance that by
1970 the ‘Victim’s Rights Movement’ erupted in the United States, as well
as movements for alternative and community policing, neighborhood
watch, and other forms of more informal social control (Meyer 2002). In
contemporary society most systems of adjudication and municipal law
remain reactive adversarial processes, which are vertical and hierarchical in
nature and use force to implement decisions or sanctions assuming one
truth in any given situation. This reactive, adversarial, coercive and hierar-
chical system has essentially prevailed over traditional forms of justice, even
in Tribal Courts. Most Native American scholars date the formal destruc-
tion of tribal justice systems at 10 April 1883, when the U.S. Commissioner
of Indian Affairs created the Courts of Indian Offenses. With this ruling,
followed by the Major Crimes Act of 1885, Native justice systems were
completely transformed at the mandate of the federal government (Meyer
2002, 1380; Meyer and Zion 2000). Meyer notes:
However, traditional justice was not completely annihilated; some tribal members
were able to conceal their continued practice of traditional forms of justice from
white view or found ways to embed some traditional thought in decisions issued
from the Euro-American Courts of Indian Offenses. (Meyer 2002, 1380)
5 Nowhere has this imbalance been as pronounced as the War on Drugs. Pre-1984, U.S.
prison populations were largely made up of violent criminals. Today, 60% of those in prison
are non-violent drug offenders (Jensen et al 2004).
Exploring Traditional Cultural Mechanisms of Conflict 357
and disorder. They lost the ability to develop a ‘coherent narrative’ to deal
with what had occurred. The tios’paye of the tribe was no longer allowed
to inform or be informed by the transgression and the corresponding
opportunity for restoration. Recent efforts in Native communities are
reinstituting forms of traditional justice by engaging in restorative justice
conflict resolution.
Navajo peacemaking
A similar program operated in one district of the Navajo Nation court sys-
tem between 1996 and 1999 (Rubin 2001). The Navajo Nation operates its
own tribal justice system with only those offenders who commit crimes
falling under the Major Crimes Act being processed in the U.S. Federal jus-
tice system. Serious problems with juvenile delinquency exist in the Navajo
Nation: over 2,000 charges were dealt with in the tribal court system in
1999. Gangs are well-established and cause serious violence (Rubin 2001).
The Navajo Tribal Code directs the court to utilize Navajo common law and
tribal statutes enacted by the Tribal Council as the laws of preference, fol-
lowed by federal law, if applicable, and finally state law. Navajo common
law is the traditional ways of the Navajo people, which are regularly argued
in the Nation’s courts and can be found in many publications and Navajo
Supreme Court decisions, as well as by consulting elders, stories and oral his-
tory. Chief Justice Robert Yazzie states the vision of the tribal court system:
It is not to punish, boss people around, have courts seen as powerful people who
tell others how to live their lives, or courts being distant and alien from the peo-
ple. It is a vision of courts as partners in the process of making it possible for
Navajos to live freely as Navajos. (Rubin 2001, 2)
Within the Navajo courts, one method of increasing the use of tradition is
to institutionalize historic Peacemaking practices by using community lead-
ers and elders to resolve conflicts. Peacemaking is used primarily in family
and civil disputes but it has also been used in juvenile delinquency cases as
a diversion from court or as directed by a judge at judicial disposition.
Navajo district courts employ liaisons who arrange for Peacemakers, who
are elders with traditional Navajo wisdom, to meet with the concerned par-
ties, keep records, and monitor implementation of an agreement. The
Peacemaker Court heals relationships and achieves solidarity, balance and
harmony. Lawyers and judges, as well as other professionals, are not
involved. Restitution is only a small part of healing with a talking-out
process being the major action that enables authentic healing.
Usually, three Peacemaking sessions are held for each case during a one
year time period, with counseling occurring in between sessions. The first
session gathers a wide range of information about the family and the youth
with development of an individualized treatment plan that can include use
of traditional ceremonial healing along with more standard counseling and
Exploring Traditional Cultural Mechanisms of Conflict 361
other services. A second session several months later reviews progress and
needs—service providers may participate and the treatment plan is
reviewed. A final session assesses whether the treatment plan was com-
pleted and successful, and a follow-up plan is designed.
Rubin (2001) analyzed the Chinle District Juvenile Peacemaking Court
for three years (1996–9) and states that the value of Peacemaking was
demonstrated in the lives of juveniles and families. Records are scant, there-
fore it is difficult to know if juvenile delinquency has been reduced by
Peacemaking. It is the author’s impression that Peacemaking with juvenile
offenders was only used within one district for a small number of cases.
However, the potential exists for much more extensive involvement of
Peacemaking throughout the Navajo Nation.
This section will add to our discussion of Native American philosophy, psy-
chology, point of view, and understanding of the role of humanity in the
cosmos and the close fit between restorative justice and use of traditional
healing for dispute resolution with delinquent juveniles in these Native con-
ceptions. Carey Vicenti, Chief Judge of the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, writes
that in stark contrast to American society:
... the Indian concept of the human being is one in which all aspects of the per-
son and his or her society are integrated. Every action in daily life is read to have
meaning and implication to the individual and guides how he or she interacts
with tribal society or fulfills obligations imposed by society, law, and religion ...
Therefore our institutions were not designed, as in American society, to discover
the truth. Our institutions focused more upon determining the manner in which
a transgression against social order would be remediated ... part of the remedy is
in performing the exploration ... (It) is essential that the internal and external life
of any perpetrator be examined to determine whether the individual is healthy or
whole. And ultimately, we desire to reintegrate the individual back into tribal
society. (Vicenti 1995, 3, 9–10)
Zion (2002b, 5) states that ‘Traditional Indian Justice differs from Western
models because it recognizes the healing component. Indian justice is not
simply indigenous methods of resolving disputes, but a philosophy of life
based upon respect and relationships’. Another contrast that Zion
364 Barbara Mendenhall and James Dumesnil
(undated) discusses is that Western justice does not try to reach into the
mind or deal with psychological injuries, whereas traditional indigenous
law does, which is why it heals and restores both victim and offender. Brill
(1997) notes the emphasis of Indian justice on civil sanctions and diffusion
of power rather than consolidation of political power. This writer also notes
that ‘civil refers to processes that attempt to restore relationships rather
than permanently separate or stigmatize’ (Brill 1997, 131). Chief Justice of
the Navajo Nation, Robert Yazzie, recently called for a push by tribes,
tribal courts, Indian Law organizations, Indian Country leadership and aca-
demics to promote and use Indian law as the law of preference (Yazzie
2003). Vicenti (1995) discusses the status of tribal courts across the U.S.
and notes that lack of funding for sufficient competent staff to adequately
justify the place and purpose of the court within the democratic structure
of tribal government undermines the rest of tribal government. He also
states that in 1995 ‘few tribes [had] reached a level of maturity where they
can meaningfully make choices between traditional practice and American
legal process’ (Vicenti 1995, 15). However, it is our impression that
progress is occurring rapidly in this area.
Others describe the benefits of indigenous or traditional justice in the
forms in which it is being reintegrated into tribal court systems. Melton
(1999, 24) notes that the indigenous process is ‘non-adversarial and facili-
tates discussion between people in conflict in a safe environment that pro-
motes resolution of underlying problems and keeping relationships intact.
The communication process is fluid and allows for discussion of multiple
viewpoints of the problem or conflict from those directly or indirectly
affected’.
Native thought on adversarial courts is that opportunities are missed by
offering healing to no one and only relying on deterrence and confinement,
which works against the healing process and moves unbalanced persons
further out of balance. One should not get the idea that traditional
Indian law was without provision for dealing with dangerous individuals.
Community welfare was paramount and those persons who resisted or
were beyond community efforts aimed at healing could be killed (usually
reserved for those considered truly evil, e.g. practitioners of witchcraft
that harmed others) or banished to the wilderness (Ross 1996). In addition,
traditional teaching could be quite painful to body and mind. The differ-
ence with Western justice is that it is not ‘strictly ... punishment, unac-
companied by efforts to move people forward out of their problems ...’
(Ross 1996, 14).
Vicenti (1995) points out that the American system of government with
its adversarial system of justice is a large part of American culture. Imposition
of this justice system with the purpose of correcting perceived rampant
injustice creates greater injustice by forcing its culture on Indian peoples.
Finally, Cruz says: ‘an indigenous nation’s sovereignty is strengthened if its
Exploring Traditional Cultural Mechanisms of Conflict 365
law is based upon its own internalized values and norms ... traditional law
is internal to a particular community, oral and for the most part, dynamic
and not static in nature...(as) the fundamental principles of customary law
do not change. They are simply extended to cover new situations’ (Cruz
undated, 2, 4).
Restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence and other original
forms of dispute resolution (ODR) represent a horizontal legal system.
Examples of such forms of justice are found in international law, in addi-
tion to the laws of many Native peoples. The core of the common law of
most Native peoples is the ‘segmentary lineage system’, which is a method
of tracing relationships and adjusting disputes among people who are
related to each other in various ways (Barkun 1968). A horizontal legal
system assumes and works for equality between participants (Haberfeld
and Townsend 1993). It is a relationship-centered process, not agreement-
centered. Its goal is to sustain community health (LeResche 1993). It is
not a reactive adversarial process, and its preference is to avoid force or
coercion.
According to Zion (2002b), ‘therapeutic jurisprudence’ is a new philoso-
phy of using science and healthcare (including mental health services) to
seize crime as an opportunity for healing rather than only for retribution
and punishment. Zion (2002b) adds that we need therapeutic jurisprudence
because people hurt each other. Violence is part of our human behavior;
aggression is used as a form of intimidation and dominance, and aggression
is redirected by people who have been hurt against weaker victims (e.g.
women, children and animals). For many traditional peoples who hear of
the possible healing nature of law, of ‘appreciative inquiry’, of ‘Getting to
Yes’, of ‘talking things out’ in a circle and giving every person a voice and
honoring mutuality, most would respond with ‘What’s new? Our ancestors
were doing this for centuries’ (Haberfeld and Townsend 1993; Whitney and
Trosten-Bloom 2003; Zion 2002a, 2002b).
Original forms of dispute resolution revolve around the ability of offend-
ers to completely restore themselves and their victims within their commu-
nity, even in the case of very serious crimes. A prime example is the
approach described above in Hollow Water, Manitoba, Canada. Instead of
focusing on legal sanctions, prosecution and punishment, the community-
based program focuses on full accountability, retribution to victims, and
healing for all. The program involves a 13-step program over a period of
several years. For some people, it would be easier to go to jail:
After completing the program, the former abuser goes through a cleansing cere-
mony to ‘mark a new beginning for all involved’. During the ceremony, the for-
mer abuser washes his victim’s feet (part of a traditional puberty rite),
symbolically allowing her to re-enter womanhood, then throws a mask he has
worn throughout the ceremony into a fire, symbolically destroying his identity as
366 Barbara Mendenhall and James Dumesnil
an abuser. Those who complete the program are welcomed back into society as
though they had never offended in the first place. (Meyer 2002, 1382; see also
Community Holistic Circle Healing 1993)
This program has a very low recidivism rate. In American society many
accept the claim that adult sex offenders are incurable and need to be
incapacitated, registered and monitored for life.6 In the Hollow Water
program recidivism for adult sex offenders is less than 5% (Aboriginal
Peoples Collection 1997; Community Holistic Circle Healing 1993;
Ross 1996).
As the restorative justice program for sexual abusers at Hollow Water
indicates, there can be and needs to be a powerful healing component for
all parties involved. Disharmony and crime are viewed as signs of problems
with the health of the community, not only with an individual. By
approaching the problem and intervention from a community standpoint,
specific ceremonies aimed at eliminating the roots of disorder can be
approached and accomplished as a community. In this way, Native
Americans cope with emotional losses and other traumatic life altering
occurrences at the same time as using crime as an opportunity for restoring
offenders, victims and the community to greater strength, wholeness, inte-
gration and complexity (Meyer 2002).
While establishment of the Courts of Indian Offenses in 1883 and the
Major Crimes Act of 1885 transferred prosecutorial power from Native
American tribes to the federal government for certain serious offenses, the
experience of Hollow Water indicates that for some very serious offenses,
confinement may be inadequate (Ross 1996). In the words of the people of
Hollow Water:
What the threat of incarceration does do is keep people from coming forward and
taking responsibility for the hurt they are causing. It reinforces the silence and
therefore promotes, rather than breaks, the cycle of violence that exists. In real-
ity, rather than making the community a safer place, the threat of jail places the
community more at risk. (Aboriginal Peoples Collection 1997, 148)
6 California’s Megan’s Law requires major and minor sex offenders to register for life.
Minor offenses may include indecent exposure, pornography, or ‘mooning’ the basketball
team as part of a drunken fraternity party. All registrants who attend college or work on a
campus are required to have their identities made public. California’s law distinguished
between minor and major offenders, but due to a need to conform to federal law, the distinc-
tion has been lost in the renewed bill.
Exploring Traditional Cultural Mechanisms of Conflict 367
that he’ll take what he doesn’t have to face, what he doesn’t have to
acknowledge’ (Aboriginal Peoples Collection 1997, 148). Hollow Water
now has a few defense attorneys it can trust. These good attorneys do not
encourage minimization or denial, and still protect rights and due process
for clients.
Meyer and Zion (2000, 104) report that ‘Navajos, as most Native
American nations, have great contempt for the federal promise of incarcer-
ation as a solution to their crime problem’. Western jurisprudence does not
deal with the causes of crime and recidivism.7 Rather than dealing with the
collapse of the living cultural context of Native communities, it has con-
tributed to the demise of the indigenous cultural context.
Although its declared focus is on handing out punishment to fit the
crime, just desserts, its punishments do not appear to help to restore the
community, victims or offenders to wholeness and we find that increased
incarceration has not reduced crime8 (Koetting and Schiraldi 1997). Yet,
our current policy increasingly requires mandatory minimum sentences
resulting in lengthy sentences for minor drug offenses. In combination
with disproportionately high rates of confinement for youth of color who
are arrested, our policies have resulted in prison becoming a ‘normal’
socialization experience for poor minority youth (Anderson 2003) with
little effect on creating safer communities. As expressed by Chairman
Robert Horner, of the (Canadian) Parliament’s Standing Committee on
Justice: ‘If locking up those who violate the law contributed to safer soci-
eties, then the United States would be the safest country in the world’
(Ross 1996, 267).
CONCLUSION
7 Francis Deisler (2002) has demonstrated that being incarcerated is frequently synonymous
with receiving incompetent treatment. He argues that while prisoners are seen as ‘second class
citizens’ they are still entitled to competent treatment. It is incorrect to conclude that people
are incurable if they have not yet received treatment.
8 Placing low-risk offenders in programs designed for high-risk offenders increases recidi-
vism (Andrews et al 1990). After 3.5 years of incarceration, prisoners’ coping skills become
better suited to prison society than to mainstream life (Hammond and Chayen 1963). Thus
longer prison sentences increase recidivism since recidivism is inversely related to evolving cop-
ing behaviors (Armentrout 2003).
368 Barbara Mendenhall and James Dumesnil
that much of the American justice system is ready for reform (Zion 2002a,
2002b: Hora et al 1999; Winck and Wexler 1996; Boldt 1998; Schma
2000). However, adopting systems born from a culture that honored com-
plexity, into a culture that currently tends toward rigid, reactive application
of policy reforms can spell disaster. We need to embrace restorative justice
while honoring the complexity of the living cultural context from which it
sprang. Otherwise employing it may be no more meaningful or life chang-
ing than taking a souvenir home from a guided bus tour of the Black Hills.
We must ask the question: are the victim, the offender and the community
being restored through this process? If we cannot answer that question
affirmatively, then the true purpose of restorative justice is not being ful-
filled.
Native American peoples are in a dynamic process of revitalizing their
traditions. One way in which this is occurring is by using restorative justice
conflict resolution with delinquent juveniles outside of punitive court sys-
tems. This is being implemented in very different judicial structures such as
tribal courts like the Navajo Nation or where state or federal courts have
jurisdiction such as Alaska Native communities or Canadian Aboriginal vil-
lages. These communities are finding that by applying the principles of
restorative justice toward conflict resolution with delinquent youth they are
able to:
• save children from progressing deeper into the system and being lost to
the community;
• restore families to better relations and restore relations between families;
• bring healing to victims;
• prevent other youths from becoming delinquent;
• restore and recognize the value and usefulness to the community of
elders;
• further restore traditional values, beliefs, and practices throughout the
community, which restores the locus of social control in families and
community; and
• restore the whole community as a functioning integrated system based
in traditional Native philosophy and spirit.
REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION
T
HIS PAPER SEEKS to share the experiences of a new juvenile justice
program in Malawi—the Juvenile Justice Forums of Malawi. The
Lilongwe Juvenile Justice Forum (a regional/district forum) will be
treated as a case study. This is a relatively new initiative intending to pro-
vide various interventions leading to the improvement of the juvenile justice
delivery system in Malawi by adopting an ‘integrated approach’ to juvenile1
justice issues.
One of the biggest constraints for the Malawi juvenile justice system has
been the lack of a policy developing body and no development of proce-
dural rules, guidelines and tools. Based upon a successful model tested in
Namibia, Malawi established its own National Juvenile Justice Forum
(NJJF) in 2000. The task of addressing the gaps in juvenile justice has been
the responsibility of this forum. The NJJF is part and parcel of the judici-
ary, and is chaired by a High Court judge who works in consultation with
the relevant authorities and stakeholders in the juvenile justice sector. The
establishment of the working committee within the NJJF will result in a
major improvement in the development of policy on juvenile justice. The
NJJF has made progress in achieving its goals, some of which are high-
lighted below.
1 The term ‘juvenile’ is here applied to young suspects aged 12–18. The minimum age of
The Malawi Judiciary donated office space at the High Court in Zomba.
The offices have been refurbished and furnished by British funds through the
DFID-Malawi Safety, Security, and Access to Justice (MaSSAJ) program
and UNICEF, who are also funding the operations of the National Office.
The office has recruited staff.
Three new Regional/District Forums (Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu)
have been formed. Blantyre and Lilongwe have been launched and are now
fully functional. The Regional/District Forums are headed by the Judiciary
(a Magistrate) but co-ordinated by NGO partners. The Forums were
formed and funded by UNICEF and they also receive support from the
Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR).
All the Forums have held training sessions and awareness campaigns.
They are also spreading to communities and establishing community com-
mittees. They have now been recognized, and children with problems are
referred to them by the communities. The communities are slowly accept-
ing that ‘problem’ children are not always police material.
Firstly, the NJJF, with the assistance of the American Bar Association
(ABA), has produced draft Rules of Juvenile Procedure to create uniformity
of approach and ensure that the constitutional rights of the child are pro-
tected. In addition to this, the NJJF has secured the authority of the
Judiciary to have courts specializing in Juvenile Justice in the four Regional
centers of Malawi. Twelve Magistrates will initially be trained to run these
courts. This will reduce or hopefully remove the errors in procedure so far
experienced. Further, the Malawi Police Service is compiling statistics on
the arrest of children district by district. It is the intention of the NJJF to
target districts with high arrest rates for specialization of courts.
With the collaboration of the Para-Legal Advisory Services (PAC), the
NJJF has compiled comprehensive statistics on juveniles in custody, and
juveniles convicted and sentenced to imprisonment contrary to the Children
and Young Persons Act (CYPA). Also, in collaboration with the Board of
Visitors established under the Children and Young Persons Act, funding has
been secured from the British DFID-MaSSAJ Program to refurbish and fur-
nish two dormitories at Mpemba Reformatory Centre to receive, assess and
counsel juveniles who have been wrongfully convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment. In collaboration with the Malawi National Council on
Community Services (MNCCS), the NJJF is working to establish compre-
hensive rules and procedure for community service and diversion of juveniles.
Diversion will be at pre-trial level; both at community and court level, and
The Juvenile Justice Forums of Malawi 375
post-trial. In this regard, the NJJF has drafted Screening Guidelines for
juveniles with a view to emphasizing diversion. The establishment of com-
munity committees is instrumental to the success of pre-trial diversion at
community level.
In conjunction with the Ministry of Gender and Community Services, the
NJJF is establishing a working committee that will develop further policy
on juvenile justice under the direction of the National Council for Safety
and Security, which is headed by the Vice President of Malawi. And finally,
with the agreement of the Judiciary and donors, the NJJF has secured sep-
arate chambers from adults for trials of juveniles charged with homicide.
Although the National Forum will be launched after a trial period of two
years, it has satisfactorily networked with other institutions and NGOs. A
directory of institutions and NGOs dealing with juveniles will also be com-
piled and published.
The forum was launched in Lilongwe in March 2002 with all the key stake-
holders in support of the program. This was in line with the Government
of Malawi’s intention to support the establishment of Juvenile Justice
Forums in all the cities of the country where the crime rate (largely due to
urbanization) was generally high, including that of juvenile delinquency.
Members of the LJJF are drawn from the stakeholders in the juvenile
justice sector and include persons from such wide-ranging institutions as
the police, social welfare programs, judiciary branch, prisons, NGOs,
traditional leaders, religious leaders, the Malawi Human Rights Commission,
the National Youth Council, and the Ministry of Education.
The four main objectives of the LJJF are: (1) to attempt to provide a platform
for exchange of information among the stakeholders regarding juvenile law
376 Desmond Kaunda
Structure
Activities
During its launch, the LJJF developed an action plan which spelled out
activities to be undertaken, and identified the institutions that would
be responsible for undertaking these activities. The activities included the
following:
Capacity building
This activity took the form of a workshop. It was intended to provide
forum members with skills and knowledge about juvenile justice procedures
so that they could return to their institutions and share those skills and
knowledge.
Forum meetings
Forum meetings were intended to provide a platform for discussion where
the members would periodically come together and update each other on
progress. The meetings were also meant to contribute towards enhancement
of their working relationship. Problems to be faced by respective institu-
tions were to be tabled at such forum meetings with a view to finding pos-
sible solutions. The meetings also provide the core group members with an
opportunity to give progress reports.
So far, the forum has been able to sit for meetings and attended to some of
the issues raised in the meetings. These issues have been in reference to the
day-to-day experiences of respective institutions. A case in point is that
police officers are continuing to handcuff young offenders on arrest and
during trial at the court. The forum has been concerned with this practice
and has tried to find out the reasons for its continuation contrary to legal
requirements. Mostly, the police have been at pains to defend themselves,
stating that children are ‘slippery’ to the extent of running away from the
police officers, especially when not in handcuffs and as they go to court. It
must be noted that police officers and the accused usually walk to court due
to a shortage of transport.
With the training complete, there are now fewer allegations among var-
ious institutions that others are in the wrong, that they caused the delay
of a juvenile’s case or that they mishandled a case. The forum meetings
have strengthened the relationships between the different institutions:
they assist in identifying where the problems in the system are located and
encourage the institutions to work together to attempt to rectify those
problems.
Support structures, such as community monitoring committees relating
to the preventive aspects of young offenders committing crimes, are still in
the early stages of development. The committees have been able to provide
the Forum Co-ordinator with reports regarding their community outreach
initiatives. These have included the sensitization of village chiefs through
meetings, the gathering of students and out-of-school youth, and several
community sessions targeting various groups.
In terms of policy, the Chief Justice has recently directed the judiciary that
juveniles be considered for placement in community service, depending on
the nature of the offences committed. The system will work in a similar way
to community service for adult offenders, the difference being the number
of hours and type of work that may be given to young offenders. This direc-
tion came about upon recommendations being sent to the Judicial Service
Commission for consideration following research in the area.
The LJJF has identified some vital issues as being in need of immediate
attention, including the need for a change of ‘Institutional Mindset’ within
the juvenile justice delivery institutions. This lends itself to lack of mental
transformation of the Justice Officers. The ‘Presumption of Guilt’ of juve-
niles in conflict with the law is also a serious problem. Poor facilities,
which lead to lack of separation of juveniles from adult inmates, present a
The Juvenile Justice Forums of Malawi 379
danger to juvenile offenders. Finally, there are concerns about lengthy stays
of juveniles in detention on remand awaiting trial, and poor qualifications
of Juvenile Justice Officers.
Immediate challenges
Background
With financial support from the DIHR(Danish Institute for Human Rights),
the LJJF embarked on a project: Advocating for the improvement of crimi-
nal justice system for juveniles in conflict with the law. The project has three
main focus areas: (1) capacity development of the juvenile justice institutions
through training, (2) continuous research/monitoring and data collection on
juvenile issues through monitoring, and (3) advocacy and lobbying for the
improvement of juvenile justice. The project, which began in August 2002,
is being implemented by two leading NGOs—the Centre for Youth and
Children Affairs (CEYCA), and the Centre for Legal Assistance (CELA), with
co-ordination and technical support from the Malawi Human Rights
Resource Centre (MHRRC).
This particular case study will focus on the research and data collection
component of the project (the monitoring exercise). The monitoring exer-
cise began in September 2002 with the following objectives. First, to iden-
tify key stakeholders in the juvenile justice system; next, to measure
knowledge and practice among the stakeholders; also to find out how dif-
ferent institutions handle and view juvenile offenders; to find out what
actions are viewed as appropriate when different institutions discharge
juvenile justice; and finally, to establish whether the Children and Young
380 Desmond Kaunda
Persons Act (CYPA) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
are recognized and applied when discharging juvenile justice.
By early September, the monitoring exercise had made strides in fulfill-
ing the first objective, having identified the following institutions as key
stakeholders in the LJJF: police, prisons, courts, social welfare, the com-
munity, and civil society. The monitoring exercise was largely facilitated by
a set of guiding tools (questionnaires) which were specifically designed to
gather various information concerning juvenile offenders as well as the
knowledge, practice and attitudes of various identified stakeholders. Apart
from administering the questionnaires, the information was also gathered
through continuous observation as well as perusal of official files and
records. The information sought included the following: characteristics of
juvenile offenders, roles of the various stakeholders, handling of juvenile
cases, and relationships among the stakeholders as well as their limita-
tions. A sample questionnaire targeting social welfare appears in the
Appendix to this chapter.
Although the Lilongwe Forum has registered some positive develop-
ments, the case study below reveals a picture which demonstrates that the
various stakeholders do not fully appreciate their role in juvenile justice;
that there are persistent problems in the handling of juvenile cases; that
there is a lack of communication between stakeholders; that the responsi-
bilities are unclear among the stakeholders; and that the various stakehold-
ers face limitations (particularly resource constraints) and lack adequate
knowledge and training on their legal obligations and duties relating to
juveniles. All of this prevents the stakeholders from carrying out their duties
and delivering effective and efficient juvenile justice. Further, other stake-
holders/duty bearers (such as traditional authorities, families, businesses,
churches and NGOs) do not fully understand that they too have a role to
play in the delivery of juvenile justice.
Most of the juveniles in the Kawale study are within the age range of
12–18 years, and the average age of young offenders is 15.
Statistics available from Kawale Police Station, a local police station,
indicate that the most frequently committed offences by young offenders
within Lilongwe are assaults, thefts and robbery, in order of decreasing fre-
quency. However, statistics emanating from Lilongwe Police Station (a
receiving and holding station for juveniles from all districts in the Central
Region of Malawi) point to the fact that at the Central Region level, the
most frequently committed offences are theft, burglary and robbery, in that
order.
Pre-trial
While the law states that juveniles should not be handcuffed, throughout
the monitoring period police officers were observed handcuffing juveniles.
When asked why they were doing this, the frequent response was ‘to pre-
vent them from escaping’. While it may be the case that some of the offi-
cers were not aware of the international and domestic rule against
handcuffing juveniles, it was also evident to the monitors that such atti-
tudes and practices were a major problem for other officers, especially
those who took part in recent training on juvenile justice provided by
Centre for Youth and Children Affairs (CEYCA). However, issues of
capacity also contribute to the problem. With the current police to popu-
lation ratio of 1:16672 and officer/prisoner ratio of 1:14,3 law enforcement
officials find themselves—and were observed—escorting large numbers of
prisoners (adults as well as juveniles) and are therefore compelled by such
circumstances to handcuff all of them (Malawi Government 2002, 75).
This is compounded by a lack of transportation, which means that officers
often have to walk with prisoners to and from the court/prison/police sta-
tion. As the penalty for ‘allowing a prisoner to escape’ is heavy, most offi-
cers would rather contravene the international and domestic rule against
handcuffing juveniles than face the harsh sanctions for facilitating their
escape.
While police officers try their best to separate juveniles from adults, they
are often faced with the reality that there are no separate cells for juveniles.
Consequently, some juveniles are kept at the OB Counter. Once juveniles
are remanded to prison, both Maula and Kachere Prisons have separate
cells for juveniles. The observed practice, however, is that juveniles are only
2 The current Police to population ratio of 1:1667 is against an SADC regional standard of
1:500.
3 The Warder to Prisoner ratio of 1:14 is against an international standard of 1:5.
382 Desmond Kaunda
separated from adults during the night when they are locked up; during the
day, they are largely allowed to move freely within the prison.
Although police officers did often state that once a juvenile is arrested,
they immediately inform probation/social welfare officers, probation offi-
cers often complained that they are not informed early enough for them to
be able to play their role in the process. Prison officers confirmed this as
they also complained that police officers rarely follow up on juveniles once
they are committed to prison. At the same time, prison warders do not con-
sider that they have a special mandate towards juveniles. Consequently,
prison officers do not compile or keep separate information or submit
returns to police, court or social welfare officials. The observation of the
monitors was that since there were no specialized officers within the police,
at the courts, or within social welfare and prisons to deal with juvenile
matters, juveniles may often be ‘lost’ in the system. Further, it was quite
apparent to the monitors that some law enforcement officials found cases
of juveniles very involving and intimidating due to the strange and special
regime of rules governing juvenile justice. It therefore does not come as a
surprise that none of the police officers mentioned special handling and
treatment of juveniles from the moment of arrest as part of their role as law
enforcement officials.4
The monitors observed that juveniles are not provided with any food in
police cells. The only food available has to be brought in by relatives and
those with no relatives may end up with empty bellies unless they are given
a share by their fellow inmates. For those who end up on prison remand,
they have to make do with the monotonous diet of Nsima (maize meal) and
beans which is taken once a day. Sanitation and ventilation in both police
and prison cells were observed to fall well below minimum international
standards.
The constitutional requirement for juveniles to be remanded for the
shortest possible period is one that is often flouted. Statistics obtained from
both Maula and Kachere Prisons indicated that most juveniles are often left
on remand for too long, the majority staying for more than six months.
During September 2002, there were approximately 54 juveniles at Maula
Prison. Of these, 33 were being held on remand for homicide cases. Most
had been held for so long that they were no longer children. One had been
on remand for more than six years. Table 16.2 provides a picture of the
numbers of juveniles held in Maula and Kachere Prisons during the six
months between July and December 2002.
4 Police officers mentioned their traditional roles of arresting offenders, investigating crime
MAULA KACHERE
JULY
Juvenile Remand 31 15
Juvenile Remand Murder 37 0
Juvenile Convicted 82 0
AUGUST
Juvenile Remand 30 11
Juvenile Remand Murder 37 0
Juvenile Convicted 86 0
SEPTEMBER
Juvenile Remand 31 17
Juvenile Remand Murder 37 0
Juvenile Convicted 83 0
OCTOBER
Juvenile Remand 27 12
Juvenile Remand Murder 37 0
Juvenile Convicted 88 0
NOVEMBER
Juvenile Remand 21 14
Juvenile Remand Murder 37 0
Juvenile Convicted 85 0
DECEMBER
Juvenile Remand 21 16
Juvenile Remand Murder 39 0
Juvenile Convicted 84 0
Trial
Post-trial
The researchers observed that convicted and remand juveniles at Maula and
Kachere Prisons are not kept in separate cells, and they are only separated
from adult prisoners during lock-up hours. Juvenile cells lack sufficient
mats, which are used as mattresses. There is also insufficient bedding and
the few blankets that are available are torn.
Both convicted and remand juveniles are given the same food as all other
prisoners: maize meal with beans, which they take once a day. There is no
special diet for juveniles requiring special meals.
There is very poor sanitation in the juvenile blocks at both Maula and
Kachere Prisons due to a lack of disinfectants and cleaning materials. With
the overcrowding situation, the prisons become fertile ground for diseases
such as scabies.
It was observed that the only recreation activity available at either prison
is football, and even this is only played once in a while when footballs are
available. There is no formal education and training or rehabilitation
The Juvenile Justice Forums of Malawi 385
are well informed and sensitized regarding the rights of the child. Attitudes
of community members and some traditional authorities may offer some
illustrations, such as the fact that juveniles are reported or handed over to
the police with the expectation that the police will perform the role of par-
ents or guardians (e.g. provide counselling sessions), or punish the juveniles.
On the other hand, the police, courts, prisons and social welfare officials
may not effectively deliver and discharge their roles as ‘duty bearers’ unless
they too have the requisite knowledge and training in juvenile justice issues
followed by a deliberate change in attitudes and practices regarding the
manner in which juveniles are handled.
Limitations
However, the research team also observed that in addition to the limitations
outlined above, there are generally low levels of morale and poor commit-
ment to work on the part of most officials in all the key juvenile justice
institutions (police, courts, prisons and social welfare). The Malawi Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP) has recognized this problem and formu-
lated strategies to change and improve on what it calls ‘political will’ and
‘mindsets’ (Malawi Government 2002, 72–3). This may be attributed to
poor salaries, lack of resources, and lack of training and knowledge. The
research team would, however, wish to register its observation of the shared
interest and willingness to learn in order to improve the delivery of juvenile
justice among the stakeholders in the LJJF.
REFERENCES
APPENDIX
SOCIAL WELFARE
4.0 FAMILY
1. What is the common life history of the young offenders?
............................................................................................................
............................................................................................................
2. Do you contact their parents or guardians?
............................................................................................................
6.0 What factors may hinder your operations in delivering juvenile justice?
............................................................................................................
............................................................................................................
17
Combining Juvenile Justice with
Family Law Reform in Serbia
IVANA STEVANOVIC
INTRODUCTION
E
VEN THOUGH THE status of children in Serbia is directly contingent
upon political, economic and societal circumstances, it also depends
on attitudes toward children, and the understanding of what their
rights should be. The patriarchal extended family still plays an exceptionally
important role in Serbia and Montenegro—as the main provider of support
and influence. These patriarchal characteristics are more visible and domi-
nant in the south of the country. Attitudes toward women, therefore, and
toward female children as well, are predominantly discriminatory, and,
again, more so in the south of the country than in the north. One of the
most prominent characteristics of the traditional approach toward children
is the tendency to overprotect them, at least declaratively, undermining their
right to participation, as well as their right to privacy and expression of
thought and opinions.
Similar attitudes and practices are visible in the education, health and
social care and protection systems, as well as in judicial bodies.
Traditional attitudes are clearly held by the majority of those who are
major political decision-makers and policy-creators. Of course, it would
be unrealistic to expect different attitudes and treatment toward children
in a country where even the most basic human rights are not yet accepted
and adopted in society. The family situation—crucial for the proper
development of every child—is very bleak. Most families in Serbia face a
growing threat of poverty and an inability to maintain basic household
standards. At the same time, the state cannot provide adequate help,
not only because a growing number of families need help, but also
because the state itself is extremely poor, and must use its limited budget
for the basics—social security allocations, replenishing dilapidated pen-
sion funds—but also to support a gigantic administration, army and
police.
392 Ivana Stevanovic
Croatia—with the aim of studying best practices in this field. These countries
were selected as representatives of Western Europe and as the regions with
juvenile justice systems serving as good examples.
Within the research part of the project, one of the planned activities was
a survey of the viewpoints of professionals and of their views on possible
future directions for legal reform. Bearing in mind the experiences from
practice, which indicate deficiencies and inadequacies in some legal solu-
tions that diminish the efficacy of the protection of rights, we reached the
conclusion that it was necessary to obtain the viewpoints of professionals,
and insights into practice and problems in the implementation of the cur-
rent regulations, as well as to obtain proposals for possible amendments.
Therefore, the aim of the research was to discover the views of profes-
sionals working on the implementation of regulations in the domain of
family and criminal law and related to juveniles more specifically on cur-
rent practice, on some contemporary concepts and legal solutions in
comparative law, and on the possible and necessary changes to be made
in this field in order to comply with the conditions and capacities of our
country.
Two working groups—dealing with criminal law and family law respec-
tively—began their activities on 1 October 2001. In October and November
they worked on defining legal models of protection in line with interna-
tional standards and basic characteristics of our legal tradition, as well as
on defining the basic theses of the legal projects. The result of their work
was the Policy Proposal, a document submitted to the relevant ministries in
the Republic of Serbia at the beginning of November 2001.
In the following five months, the working groups focused on defining the
final version of legal models for the protection of child rights in the legal sys-
tem, in compliance with international standards and contemporary scientific
knowledge, as well as the needs and specifics of practice.
With regard to assessment of priorities, the work focused on the follow-
ing areas:
has the right to be acquainted with the course of the proceedings as well as to make propos-
als in their course and point to the facts and evidence of relevance to the adoption of a correct
decision.
Combining Juvenile Justice with Family Law Reform in Serbia 399
was due to the primary focus of the project on the protection of the child
from family violence. Supplements were imposed by the need to place this
protection in a broader framework, which defines the legal status of the
child and the parent.
The model is primarily based on the concept of child rights contained in
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on
the Exercise of Child Rights, as well as other international human rights doc-
uments. In its creation, we consulted the solutions from comparative legal
systems, particularly of the countries that had adopted modern standards of
legal protection of child rights and family relations. Thus, we considered the
legislations of Norway, the U.K., Germany, Denmark and Hungary, as well
as Croatia and Slovenia, with which we share legal traditions.
The working groups (criminal-legal and family-legal) organized profes-
sional discussions in which they presented the results of the survey, the
Draft Law on Juvenile Justice, the proposed amendments and supplements
to the substantive criminal law (in the part concerning incrimination in
which the child is the victim) and the Draft Family Law (in parts concern-
ing parent-child relations, with corresponding procedural regulations). This
constituted the first phase of the project.
The second phase began upon completion of the first, in August 2002. It
ended in February 2003. In phase two the CRC working group undertook
two important activities:
The second group of activities in this phase focused on the CRC working
group liaising with other relevant working groups addressing reform of the
justice system, as well as on including the issue of the establishment of the
juvenile justice system in the justice system of the Republic of Serbia. This
involved liaising with the working group for the system of courts organised
as part of the Danish Centre for Human Rights project in Belgrade. In meet-
ings with experts of this group it was agreed that the proposed solutions of
the Child Rights Centre would be included in their activities, in the sense
of the competence and composition of courts in the proposed establish-
ment of the juvenile justice system in the Republic of Serbia.
It is important to emphasise that throughout the second phase of the proj-
ect, presentation of the Model to the relevant subjects (seminars, conferences
and in the media) as well as lobbying for its adoption was continuous. In
November 2002, we had the opportunity to present the Model at the annual
Combining Juvenile Justice with Family Law Reform in Serbia 401
gathering of the Supreme Court of Serbia to all judges for juveniles in Serbia.
At the round table organised during this event, we had the opportunity once
again to emphasize the necessity and urgency of the proposed legal changes
in this domain. The family law draft was also presented at the same event
and a discussion followed on the problems that the justice system is facing
in this domain, particularly in relation to the issue of specialization.
Another important issue should be emphasized here—the problems that
were encountered in the realisation of this phase. After the final versions
were submitted to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Serbia, which
was directly involved in the implementation of the first phase of the project
through its representatives in working groups, the Ministry provided nei-
ther a positive nor a negative response to the initiative of the Child Rights
Centre. Consequently, all our lobbying activities were redirected to the
Council for the Rights of the Child of the Republic of Serbia, some mem-
bers of the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the Prime Minister.
In December 2002 our efforts were rewarded—we were invited to pres-
ent and explain the Model to the Council for the Rights of the Child. As a
result, the Council supported the Model and sent out a request to all com-
petent ministries of the Republic of Serbia for active involvement, with spe-
cial emphasis on the High Council for the Reform of the Justice System of
the Republic of Serbia (the Model is presented on the official website of the
Republic of Serbia).
It is also important to stress that the UNICEF Belgrade Office participated
very actively in all these activities and that they strongly support the Model.2
A model for the protection of child rights in family relations implies the
design of some new arrangements in the field of substantial and procedural
law, whereby the child’s legal position, as a subject in family relations, is har-
monized with the international legal standards, which produces a more com-
prehensive and efficient protection of his/her rights within the judicial system.
Basic approach
The novelties of the proposed model are based on modern theoretical con-
cepts of family-legal relations, on international human rights and child
2 We need to emphasize, though, that during the organization of round tables and public
debates of this Model Law the following was pointed out: the need to modify certain things
and the need to introduce into the text of this legal act a section on execution of criminal sanc-
tions on children in conflict with the law. UNICEF Belgrade Office supports these activities.
402 Ivana Stevanovic
(1) The rights of the child have been formulated as special rights, sep-
arate from the parents’ rights, with corresponding legal require-
ments regarding parents and state institutions.
(2) Parental responsibility towards children should be joint and it
implies active exercise of parental rights and duties.
(3) The child’s right to family life is essentially conditioned by the fam-
ily’s integrity and is secured through appropriate social support to
parents.
(4) The family’s autonomy presupposes strictly limited intervention on
the part of the state based on detailed legal requirements and con-
ditioned by the principle of the child’s ‘best interests’ or well-being.
One of the basic novelties of this Draft is a totally new concept of the
child’s procedural position and the legal representation of his/her rights in
court proceedings. Bearing in mind the fact that the child’s rights in matters
of parent-child relations are directly affected in each of the special court
proceedings, the child has been granted the status of a party to the proceed-
ings. Proceeding from the fact that the child’s interests cannot be automat-
ically identified with the interests of his/her parents, or his/her legal
representatives, or, for that matter, the interests of the state, whose repre-
sentative is the guardianship authority, it has been proposed to prescribe a
possibility for the court to appoint, ex officio, a special counsel for the child
as the independent legal representative of the child’s rights.
General provisions envisage the special representative’s authority, cre-
ated after the example of modern arrangements contained in comparative
law and international instruments (the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights).
For the purpose of protecting the child and implementing his/her rights,
the child’s special representative shall have a duty, in addition to taking
actions during the proceedings, to provide the child with all relevant infor-
mation and explanations regarding the legal matter at hand and to explain
to the child the meaning, objective and consequences of procedural actions
before taking them, in a way suitable for his/her age and development
level, except when it is contrary to the child’s well-being. The special rep-
resentative will also be obliged to assist the child in expressing his/her
views and opinions, to explain to him/her the consequences that could
arise in case his/her opinion is accepted, and to inform the court of the
child’s opinion.
In order to make the modern concept of the child’s rights operational
and ensure full procedural competence in proceedings for the child whose
rights are being decided upon, the Draft proposes that a provision be
made for the court to have the duty to enable the child, in accordance
with his/her age and development level, to receive all relevant information
on the proceedings and legal matter at hand; to be consulted and to
express his/her opinion; to be informed of the consequences that could
arise from the acceptance of his/her opinion; as well as the possible con-
sequences of the court’s ruling. In line with this aim, the court should be
able to appoint a special service or person that will supply the child with
relevant information, consult him/her, find out his/her opinion, assist the
child to express his/her views and report to the court thereon. This would
create real conditions for the child, as a party to the proceedings, to imple-
ment his/her right to be informed and to express his/her own opinion in
the course of proceedings. It should also be necessary to envisage the
court’s duty to conduct an interview with the child, without the presence
of third persons, in a place and way suitable for the child’s age and evolving
capacities.
404 Ivana Stevanovic
Specific approach
In the new Juvenile Justice Model, in the area of family law reform the
position of the child who is under the age of criminal responsibility (under
14 years), according to the proposed Draft Family Law, underwent a
change.
According to the proposed Draft law, fairly detailed criteria have been set
for the implementation of the child’s compulsory referral to an appropriate
institution or another family.3 This measure is to be implemented if the
child demonstrates a certain level of social deviation, which necessitates
special education and the child’s removal from its immediate living environ-
ment. Since this measure is of a repressive character and entails the child’s
separation from his/her parents, it is proposed that the existing competence
of the guardianship authority be replaced by that of a court in non-con-
tentious proceedings. The duration of the measure is limited, but the meas-
ure may be extended or the selected measure may be replaced with another
protective one. The court may institute proceedings either in the line of duty
(ex officio) or at the request of the Guardianship Authority, a parent or the
person entrusted with the child’s care. Just as with respect to the decision to
temporarily suspend the parent’s right to actual custody of the child, in this
case, too, the guardianship authority will make the decision on the child’s
referral on the basis of the court’s ruling.
The new Family Law was passed in 2004—this delineates many proce-
dural solutions that respect and recognize the various needs of the child,
provide for more adequate addressing of those needs, and ensure the child’s
active participation in accordance with his/her developmental levels and
abilities. The State should develop the mechanisms for its enforcement,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
3Article 43: ‘The court may decide in non-contentious proceedings to place the child in a
social care or educational institution or with another family under the following conditions:
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Reform of the legislation in the above-stated areas represents only the first
step in improving the legal protection of child rights. An integral approach
in the realization of these rights requires a systematic development of the
legal, institutional and methodological bases of the matter, both in justice
and social care, police and other services participating in the process of pro-
tection. In that sense it is necessary to comply and complement the regula-
tions on social care, practice of law, execution of criminal sanctions,
internal affairs service, etc. However, a reform of the legal system can only
achieve the expected results if relevant standards of professional work are
developed simultaneously and if staff working on its implementation are
continuously educated.
REFERENCES
E
VERY SOCIETY CONFRONTS similar problems when childhood and crim-
inality intersect. How should we respond when a child is a criminal and
a criminal is a child? How should we balance youth policy and crime
policy? In American juvenile courts, a tension has always existed between social
welfare and social control—between rehabilitating the young offender and
punishing her for the offence, between safeguarding children and protecting
society (Feld 1999a; McCord 2001). Resolving these tensions entails a choice
between policies of paternalism and protectionism or liberation and autonomy.
How should the legal system treat the criminal conduct of adolescents com-
pared with that of adults? In part, the answers reflect broader social structural
processes, political economic arrangements, media depictions and public per-
ceptions of youth, the politics of crime, and other legal policies that affect the
conditions under which young people develop and attain adulthood.
American juvenile courts focus primarily on youths’ criminal behaviour
and replicate many characteristics of the adult criminal justice system. The
juvenile court’s criminal law foundations and its relationship to the adult
criminal justice system implicate issues of both youth policy and crime pol-
icy and raise questions about its basic purposes (Zimring 1998). Is the juve-
nile court’s primary purpose to function as a rehabilitative social welfare
system and to intervene and change young peoples’ lives? In the alternative,
is its main function simply to divert youth from and to serve as a barrier
against the life-harming sanctions of the criminal justice system (Zimring
2000a)? Should the juvenile court function as a modified criminal justice
system, but one which recognizes young offenders’ reduced competency and
diminished responsibility, and which provides additional procedural safe-
guards and mitigates the harshness of penalties?
408 Barry C. Feld
During the past three decades in the United States, the public and politi-
cians have perceived a frightening increase in youth crime and violence.
Many people question juvenile courts’ ability to rehabilitate violent young
offenders and, simultaneously, to protect public safety. Sensational media
depictions of young criminals as a different breed of ‘super-predators’ fur-
ther heightened public anxiety and fanned a ‘moral panic’ (Feld 2003). A
politically popular desire to ‘get tough’ has provided the impetus to trans-
fer more youths to criminal courts for prosecution as adults and to increase
the severity of sentences juvenile courts impose on delinquents. Such a shift
has repudiated traditional assumptions of childhood blamelessness, disre-
garded adolescent immaturity, and punished youths as the moral equals of
adults (Scott and Steinberg 2003).
Since 1967, judicial decisions, legislative amendments, and administra-
tive changes have transformed the juvenile court from a nominally rehabil-
itative social welfare agency into a scaled-down, second-class criminal court
that provides young offenders with neither therapy nor justice (Feld 1993a;
1999a). This transformation occurred because of the migration of African-
Americans from the rural South to the urban North that began three-quarters
of a century ago, the macro-structural transformation of American cities
and the economy over the past quarter of a century, and the current link-
ages in the media, popular and political culture between race and serious
youth crime (Feld 1999b; 2003).
Two competing cultural and legal conceptions of young people have facil-
itated this transformation. On the one hand, law and culture view young
people as innocent, vulnerable, fragile, and dependent children whom their
parents and the state should protect and nurture. On the other hand, law
and culture perceive young people as vigorous, autonomous and responsi-
ble almost adult-like people from whose criminal behavior the public needs
protection. Policy makers selectively manipulate these competing social
constructs of innocence and responsibility to maximize the social control of
young people (Scott 2000). Most states’ juvenile justice systems provide nei-
ther special procedures to protect juveniles from their own immaturity nor
the full panoply of adult procedural rights. Instead, they treat delinquents
like adult criminal defendants when formal equality redounds to their dis-
advantage and use less-adequate juvenile procedures when those deficient
practices provide a comparative advantage to the state.
For the past three decades, states’ juvenile law reforms have used the
competing imagery of immaturity and responsibility to engage in a process
of ‘criminological triage’. At the ‘soft end’ of juvenile courts’ jurisdiction,
reforms have shifted non-criminal status offenders out of the juvenile jus-
tice system into a ‘hidden system’ of social control in the private-sector
mental health and chemical dependency industries. At the ‘hard end’, states
transfer larger numbers of youths into the criminal justice system for pros-
ecution as adults with no formal recognition of youthfulness as a mitigating
The Inherent Tension of Social Welfare and Criminal Social Control 409
juxtaposed binary conceptions for the juvenile and criminal justice systems:
either child or adult; either determinism or free-will; either immature or
responsible; either treatment or punishment; either social welfare or just
deserts; either procedural informality or formality; either discretion or the
rule of law. During the last third of the twentieth century, juvenile justice
policies witnessed a marked shift from the former to the latter of each of
these pairs in response to the structural and racial transformation of cities,
the rise in youth crime, and the erosion of confidence in rehabilitation
(Garland 2001).
During the 1960s, the Warren Court’s civil rights decisions, criminal due
process rulings, and ‘constitutional domestication’ of the juvenile court
responded to broader structural and demographic changes taking place in
America, particularly those associated with race and youth crime (Feld
1999a; 2003). In the decades prior to and after World War II, black
migration from the rural South to the urban North increased minority
concentrations in urban ghettos, made race a national rather than a
regional issue, and provided the impetus for the Civil Rights movement
(Lemann 1992). The 1960s also witnessed ‘baby boom’ increases in youth
crime that continued until the late 1970s. During the 1960s, the rise in
youth crime and urban racial disorder provoked cries for ‘law and order’
and provided the initial political impetus to ‘get tough’. Republican politi-
cians seized crime control as a wedge issue with which to distinguish
themselves from Democrats and crime policies for the first time became a
central issue in partisan politics (Beckett 1997; Feld 2003).
The Supreme Court’s due process decisions responded to macro-structural
and racial demographic changes, and attempted to guarantee civil rights, to
protect minority citizens, and to limit the authority of the state (Feld 2003).
In re Gault (1967) began to transform the juvenile court into a very differ-
ent institution from that contemplated by the Progressives. The Court
identified two crucial disjunctions between juvenile justice rhetoric and
reality: the theory versus the practice of rehabilitation, and the differences
between the procedural safeguards afforded adult criminal defendants and
those available to delinquents. Rather than uncritically accepting the
Progressives’ rehabilitative rhetoric, Gault examined the punitive realities
of juvenile justice—high rates of recidivism, the stigma of a delinquency
label, harsh conditions of confinement, and the arbitrariness of the process.
The Court mandated some basic procedural safeguards for delinquents
charged with crimes and facing confinement: advance notice of charges; a
fair and impartial hearing; a right to counsel; a right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses; and the privilege against self-incrimination (Feld 1984).
412 Barry C. Feld
Criminological triage
Status offenders
At the ‘soft’ end, policy makers’ disillusionment with juvenile courts’
responses to non-criminal youths led to diversion, deinstitutionalization and
decriminalization reforms (Feld 1999a). Deinstitutionalization reduced
access to secure facilities for non-criminal offenders, and provided the cata-
lyst to transfer many white, female and middle-class youths whom juvenile
courts formerly handled as status offenders into private sector mental health
and chemical dependency treatment facilities (Schwartz 1989). Most states’
civil commitment laws do not provide juveniles with the same procedural
safeguards as they do adults. Instead, states’ laws invoke the imagery of
immaturity and dependency to allow parents ‘voluntarily’ to commit their
children to secure treatment facilities based solely on a physician’s determi-
nation that such confinement is medically appropriate (Feld 1999a).
Sources of punitiveness
The sources of these changes in penal policies lay in broader social struc-
tural changes, media coverage of crime, and the politics of race (Feld 2003;
The Inherent Tension of Social Welfare and Criminal Social Control 415
During the turbulent 1960s, the sharp rise in youth crime and urban
racial disorder evoked fears of ‘crime in the streets’ and provoked cries for
‘law and order’. Republican politicians blamed escalating crime, campus
disorder, urban riots, and social upheavals on the Warren Court and liberal
Democratic policies. Crime and welfare policies became issues of partisan
politics and acquired a racial quality as conservatives cast Blacks and their
Democratic allies as the villains (Gilens 1999; Mendelberg 2001). The
polarization between Democrats and Republicans on issues of race became
explicit during the 1964 presidential contest between Lyndon Johnson,
whose leadership led to the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and Barry
Goldwater, a staunch conservative who opposed the law (Edsall and Edsall
1992). Democrats’ support for black civil rights alienated white southern
voters and presaged a racial realignment in American politics as voters
began to identify clear differences between the two parties on a host of race-
related public policy issues. Although the civil rights movement initially
focused on achieving basic citizenship rights for Blacks, such as the right to
vote and equal access to public accommodations, the post-1964 agenda
addressed broader goals of implementing rights and assuring equality of
outcomes for Blacks, often through the use of racial preferences.
Conservatives strongly opposed governmental actions to redistribute
public and private goods—jobs, education and housing—to achieve greater
racial equality. Negative media coverage of crime and welfare reinforced
public perceptions and political depictions of Blacks as criminals and unde-
serving (Edsall and Edsall 1992; Gilens 1999). The civil rights movement
changed perceptions of the Democratic and Republican parties and conser-
vative politicians used crime and welfare as racially-tinged ‘wedge issues’
with which to distinguish themselves from Democrats in order to woo
southern white and ethnic voters (Edsall and Edsall 1992).
In 1968, Richard Nixon’s presidential campaign attributed urban riots
and rising crime rates to liberal ‘permissiveness’ and criticized the Warren
Court for ‘coddling criminals’ and ‘handcuffing the forces of law and
order’. Nixon’s strategy effectively straddled the conflict between public
support for the abstract principle of racial equality and resistance to gov-
ernment-prescribed remedies to end inequality. Nixon articulated the views
of many white Americans who believed that it was wrong to deny Blacks
basic citizenship rights, but who also opposed government-imposed resi-
dential, employment and educational integration (Mendelberg 2001).
Republican political strategists found a responsive audience among white
southerners, suburbanites, socially-conservative ethnic Catholics and blue-
collar workers to foster a political realignment around racial issues. Pursuing
Kevin Phillips’ ‘southern strategy’, Republicans courted these constituencies
with racially-charged ‘code words’, such as ‘law and order,’ that indirectly
evoked racial themes without explicitly challenging egalitarian ideals
(Phillips 1969; Omi and Winant 1994). The Republicans’ ‘southern strategy’
420 Barry C. Feld
In this time, conservative politicians and the mass media have pushed
crime to the top of the political agenda by focusing on sensational and vio-
lent crime to promote more punitive policies for political purposes.
Politicians generate crime-news stories in order to shape public attitudes
and promote crime policies that they believe will provide them with a polit-
ical advantage. The 1988 Bush presidential campaign’s focus on Willie
Horton—a convicted black murderer released on furlough who burglarized
and stabbed a white middle class man and raped a woman—tapped voter
anger over criminal defendants’ and prisoners’ rights through the threaten-
ing archetype of the black male rapist of a white woman (Mendelberg
2001). By the early 1990s, ‘youth crime’ had acquired a coded meaning and
juveniles had become a symbolic ‘Willie Horton’ (Beckett 1997; Beckett and
Sasson 2000).
Sentencing delinquents
The jurisprudential shift from treatment to punishment that inspired
changes in waiver policies increasingly affects the sentences that juvenile
court judges impose on delinquent offenders as well. Progressive reformers
envisioned a social welfare system for youths that minimized procedural
safeguards and maximized discretion to focus on youths’ ‘real needs’. The
recent impetus to ‘get tough’ also impels juvenile judges to punish delin-
quents more severely and these harsher sanctions disproportionately affect
minority youths (Feld 1999a; Poe-Yamagata and Jones 1999).
Legislative preambles and court opinions explicitly endorse punishment
as an appropriate delinquency sanction. States’ juvenile codes increasingly
employ the rhetoric of accountability, individual responsibility, punishment,
and public safety rather than a child’s welfare or ‘best interests’ (Feld 1988;
1998). Half the states’ juvenile sentencing laws use some type of offense-
based criteria—determinate or mandatory minimum sentences—based on
the seriousness of the offense to structure sentencing discretion (Torbet et al
1996; Feld 1998; Sheffer 1995). Some use sentencing guidelines to impose
presumptive, determinate sentences based on age, offense, and prior record
(Feld 1998; Sheffer 1995). Others impose mandatory sentences that define
minimum terms of confinement or level of security placement based on age
and offense (Torbet et al 1996; Sheffer 1995). States’ departments of cor-
rections administratively have adopted security classification and release
guidelines that use offense criteria to specify proportional or mandatory
minimum terms of confinement (Feld 1998). All of these sentencing provi-
sions—determinate and mandatory minimum laws, and correctional and
parole release guidelines—base the length of time delinquents will serve on
the seriousness of the crime they committed rather than their ‘real needs’ or
future welfare (McCord et al 2001). Offense criteria achieve proportionality
The Inherent Tension of Social Welfare and Criminal Social Control 423
Today, American juvenile courts punish rather than treat young offenders
and use procedures under which no adult charged with a crime would con-
sent to be tried. The fundamental shortcoming of the juvenile court reflects
a failure of conception and not simply a century-long failure of implemen-
tation. The juvenile court’s creators envisaged a social service agency in a
judicial setting, and attempted to fuse its welfare mission with the power
of state coercion. Combining social welfare and penal social control func-
tions in one agency ensures that juvenile courts do both badly. Providing
for child welfare is a societal responsibility rather than a judicial one.
Juvenile courts lack control over the resources necessary to meet children’s
welfare needs because of the social class and racial characteristics of their
clients and because the public fears ‘other people’s children’. In practice,
juvenile courts almost inevitably subordinate welfare concerns to crime
control considerations.
If we created a child welfare system ab initio, would we choose a court
as the best agency to deliver services and would we use criminality as the
criterion to define eligibility for benefits? If we would not initially choose
a court to deliver social services, then does the fact of a youth’s criminal-
ity confer upon it any special competence as a welfare agency? Many
young people who do not commit crimes need social services and many
youths who commit crimes do not require or will not respond to social
intervention. In short, criminality is an indiscriminate criterion upon
which to allocate social services. Because we fail to meet the welfare
needs of all young people, juvenile courts’ treatment ideology serves pri-
marily to legitimate judicial coercion of some youths because of their
criminality.
The attempt to combine social welfare and criminal social control in one
agency constitutes the inherent flaw of the juvenile court. The juvenile
court subordinates social welfare concerns to criminal social control func-
tions because of its penal focus. Legislatures do not define juvenile courts’
jurisdiction on the basis of characteristics of children for which they are
not responsible and for which effective intervention could improve their
lives. For example, juvenile court law does not define eligibility for welfare
services or create an enforceable right or entitlement based on young peo-
ple’s lack of access to quality education, lack of adequate housing or nutri-
tion, unmet health needs, or impoverished families—none of which is their
fault and all of which are risk factors for subsequent criminality (McCord
et al 2001). In all these instances, children bear the burden of their parents’
circumstances literally as innocent bystanders. Instead, states define juve-
nile court jurisdiction based on a youth’s criminality, a prerequisite that
detracts from a compassionate response. Unlike adverse social conditions
for which youth are not responsible, criminal behavior represents the one
The Inherent Tension of Social Welfare and Criminal Social Control 425
Competence
As juvenile justice becomes more punitive and states transfer more youths
to criminal courts, difficult questions about immature youths’ ability to
understand the trial process and to make critical legal decisions have
emerged (Redding and Frost 2001; Bonnie and Grisso 2000). The welfare-
oriented juvenile court assumed an informal and co-operative process. But
as juvenile courts have become more adversarial and legalistic, they con-
front issues of youths’ competence. Waiver reforms to lower the age of
criminal responsibility to 14 years or younger present criminal courts with
larger numbers of youths whose developmental immaturity, rather than
mental illness, presents significant issues of competence (Grisso 1997b;
Feld 2000).
Competence refers to a person’s ability to understand the nature and
consequences of legal proceedings and to make decisions, to participate,
and to assist counsel (Grisso 1997b; Grisso and Schwartz 2000). More
commonly, mental illness or disability provide the primary reasons to
question defendants’ competence to stand trial and to doubt their ability
to understand proceedings and assist counsel—’sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under-
standing’ and a ‘rational as well as factual understanding of proceedings
against him’ (Dusky v United States (1960)). However, developmental
immaturity also may render juveniles incompetent to stand trial. States
adopt protective policies toward minors in most activities because they
assume that adolescents’ legal competencies—reasoning, understanding,
appreciation, decision-making, maturity of judgment—are not equal to
those of adults (Scott et al 1995; Grisso et al 2003). Juveniles’ diminished
understanding of rights, confusion about trial processes, limited language
skills, and inadequately developed decision-making abilities undermine
their ability effectively to participate or to assist counsel. Most youths
younger than 13 or 14 years of age lack the basic competence to under-
stand or meaningfully participate in their defense (Redding and
Frost 2001). Many youths younger than 16 years of age lack adjudicative
competence either to stand trial as adults or to make legal decisions
in juvenile court without the assistance of counsel (Steinberg and
Cauffman 1999). Juveniles’ lesser competence does not derive from men-
tal illness, as is the case for adult defendants, but rather from generic
developmental limitations—immaturity, lack of knowledge, attitude
toward risk, emphasis on short-term rather than long-term consequences,
susceptibility to peer and parental influences—which affect their
ability to communicate, to reason and understand, and to exercise judg-
ment and make sound decisions (Grisso 2000). Thus, states must provide
greater procedural safeguards in order to offset the inherent limitations
of youth.
The Inherent Tension of Social Welfare and Criminal Social Control 427
States confront several policy choices when they devise such a justice sys-
tem. Should they create a separate juvenile justice system or adopt special
procedures and sentencing provisions within criminal courts? How should
they organize such courts? How should they balance welfare and crime con-
trol goals? If they create a separate juvenile court, should it exercise juris-
diction over non-criminal misconduct? What procedural safeguards are
necessary to compensate for youths’ limited competence? How should they
incorporate principles of penal proportionality into the justice system?
What is the appropriate age for criminal responsibility? How should crim-
inal or juvenile courts respond to the youngest offenders, those below the
ages of twelve or ten? Who should decide which youths to try in criminal
courts? Although the United States’ experience provides primarily caution-
ary answers to these difficult questions, developmental psychological
research provides the basis for better-informed decisions.
Jurisdiction—age
Jurisdiction—dispositional age
extends several years beyond the jurisdictional age would reduce the pres-
sure to transfer all but the most serious and criminally responsible older
juveniles.
Jurisdiction—subject matter
Procedural safeguards
Because a justice system for youth is first and foremost a criminal justice
system, youths should receive all of the procedural safeguards that adult
defendants charged with comparable crimes receive. Many states provide
summary procedures for simpler cases and more elaborate procedural safe-
guards for more serious offenses. If states create a youth-adjunct to the
criminal justice system, it would be easier initially to institutionalize proce-
dural parity with adults. If they create a separate juvenile system, then the
presumption should be for procedural parity and additional protections to
compensate for youths’ lack of adjudicative competence. This also includes
consideration of whether proceedings should be open to the public and
records sealed and confidential.
Procedural justice hinges on the delivery of effective legal services (Feld
1993b; ABA 1995). The first issue is simply to assure the delivery of legal
services to youths. In many states in the United States, for example, simply
The Inherent Tension of Social Welfare and Criminal Social Control 433
Sentencing as delinquents
Even as juvenile courts punish youths, they still must provide delinquents
with ‘room to reform’, impose sanctions that provide delinquents with
opportunities to change, and protect their long-term life chances (Zimring
1998; 2000b). While restrictions and unpleasant consequences are elements
of any sanction, punishment must not permanently disfigure or stigmatize
(Zimring 2000b). Delinquency sanctions that deter, incapacitate or punish
can still provide an offender with the opportunity to change. ‘Room to
reform’ has both prescriptive and proscriptive qualities. Affirmatively,
states must prepare a young person for adulthood and this includes educa-
tion, vocational training, and appropriate social services. Proscriptively,
delinquency sanctions cannot be so severe as to destroy any possibility of a
successful transition to adulthood.
The sanctions imposed in a criminal justice system for youth should be
proportional to the gravity of harm and the culpability of the actor. Unlike
a welfare-oriented disposition which is ‘future-oriented’, indeterminate and
non-proportional, penal proportionality imposes limits on the state and
provides for equality among similarly-situated young offenders. Within the
limits defined by proportionality, states should provide youths with oppor-
tunities to change. If a state fails to provide opportunities for growth and
further debilitates already disadvantaged youths, it guarantees that it will
incur greater long-term human, criminal and correctional costs. A sentenc-
ing and correctional policy that offers young offenders ‘room to reform’
does not covertly reinstate a treatment ideology but facilitates young
offenders’ constructive use of their time and the resources available.
Although the state bears an obligation to provide the means and incentives
434 Barry C. Feld
for personal change, the length of a youth’s sentence should not depend on
perceived treatment needs or responsiveness. Uncoupling social welfare
from criminal social control and divorcing treatment from punishment
means providing opportunities to change voluntarily.
Where states should confine youths and what services they should provide
are separate questions from those of criminal liability and accountability.
States should maintain separate age-segregated correctional facilities to pro-
tect both younger offenders and older inmates. Even though youths are
somewhat responsible for their criminal conduct, they are not the physical
or psychological equals of adults in prison. While some youths may be vul-
nerable to victimization or exploitation by adults, other youths’ lack of self-
control may pose a threat to older inmates.
Because all young offenders will eventually return to society, the state
must provide them with resources for self-improvement on a voluntary basis
because of its basic responsibility to its citizens and in its own self-interest.
A correctional policy that offers youths ‘room to reform’ opportunities and
resources does not reinstate a welfare or treatment ideology, but facilities
youths’ constructive use of their time. With maturity, most young offenders
develop a capacity for self-control. Youths require education, social and clin-
ical services, and economic and vocational training for their personal growth
and future life chances, regardless of the impact on recidivism rates.
CONCLUSION
States bring youths to the justice system because they committed crimes,
not because they need social services. Accordingly, states should uncouple
social welfare from social control. This would enable them to pursue child
welfare directly, unencumbered by penal considerations. A society that
cares for the welfare of its children does so by supporting families, commu-
nities, schools and social institutions that nurture all young people, and not
by cynically incarcerating its most disadvantaged children and pretending
that it is ‘for their own good’. Separating social welfare and social control
would also honestly acknowledge that the real business of juvenile courts is
crime control. Once we recognize that the child is a criminal and the crim-
inal is a child, we must make substantive and procedural modifications to
accommodate the youthfulness of some defendants. Only by doing so can a
state achieve justice and fairness for its children.
REFERENCES
Cases Cited
S
EVERAL COMMON THEMES and related international trends become
obvious from the chapters in this book. First, the notion of a separate
justice system for juveniles is now and was at its origins grounded in
the social construction of childhood (see deMause 1974; Platt 1977). That
is, children or juveniles are perceived of as less cognitively and socially
developed than adults, and cannot be held to a standard of adult culpabil-
ity, or mens rea. Based on this conception of childhood, youth are in need
of nurturing and guidance to grow into responsible adults, and deserve a
chance to rectify their law violating actions short of feeling the iron hand
of criminal punishment—with the possible exception of those committing
extremely violent crimes. This was the underlying philosophy of the origi-
nal American juvenile court until the insertion of a crime control model in
the early 1980s.
Variations on the original social welfare model were also subsequently
adopted by many European countries from the early 1900s through the
1930s (see Dünkel in this volume; Edelbacher and Fenz 2002; Walgrave 2002;
Gelsthorpe and Kemp 2002; McAra 2002). These actions were inspired in
part by the international Criminalist Conferences and the coming into
power of the social democrats.
Several years after the Reagan claims about youthful violence, an epi-
demic of violence swept the nation, especially in low-income neighborhoods
of large cities. The rapid increase in murders coupled with the images of
dangerous youth spread by the Nixon and Reagan administrations and rei-
fied by the media resulted in a new social construction of teenagers and
changed ideas about appropriate legal punishments for them in the minds
of many Americans. When self-proclaimed experts on youth crime created
the image and label of ‘superpredator’ it was widely covered in the media
and firmly implanted in the minds of the public (see Bennett, Dilulio and
Walters 1996). This rapid increase in violence by youth coupled with a
changed cultural view of adolescents and the political dominance of the
neo-conservatives at the time, combined to lead to the enactment of harsh
penalties for serious youthful offenders and an explosion in the incarcera-
tion of juveniles for many forms of law violation—not only violence (see
Feld’s chapter in this volume).
Often a kernel of truth exists in these claims that may lead to moral panics
(see Reinarman 2003). In general, street crime, interpersonal violence and
victimization occur at higher rates among marginalized populations, and in
nations with weak social welfare systems among the lowest income strata.
The research shows that the socio-economic living environments of the
marginalized are an important influence on the prevalence of law violation,
especially serious offenses (Jarjoura, Triplett and Brinker 2002; Elliott and
Huizinga 1983; Sampson 1995; Sampson and Groves 1989; Anderson
1999).
Marginalized populations are more likely to be immigrants or people of
color in the U.S.A. and Western Europe. As Feld (1999, 290) has pointed
out, a tendency exists to perceive the children of these marginalized groups
as different and more deserving of harsh punishments when they violate the
law. In addition, there is a tendency for politicians to make scapegoats of
these less powerful groups. Politicians often deflect attention from inequal-
ities in society and the resulting harmful consequences of these structural
problems to the life problems of less powerful groups in the society (see
Baum 1996; Jensen and Gerber 1998; Beckett and Sasson 2004).
In the U.S.A., Denmark, South Africa and the former West Germany, the
social construction of dangerous youth is firmly connected to images of
young people in non-white, marginalized populations. On the one hand,
this connection has been made rather covertly by politicians and the media
in the U.S. On the other hand, in Denmark the immigrant-crime connection
has been made quite openly and frankly by major national political figures.
In South Africa the image of the poorest, marginalized black street children
448 Eric L Jensen and Jørgen Jepsen
South Africa is perhaps the most obvious case here with a sense of under-
lying fear following the move to democracy. Given the wide racial divisions
in South Africa and the insecurities of many elements of society with the
change to democracy, Skelton points to a regressive shift from a modern
developmental view of children to a ‘popular punitiveness’. She writes, ‘The
fears of the white minority about the myriad of societal changes they were
experiencing tended to be most effectively articulated in terms of fear about
crime’ (this volume). As in the U.S.A., political and media constructions of
youth—especially non-white youth—as dangerous and violent have been
influential in South Africa recently.
This growing fear of crime and violence among the public has led to ‘law
and order’ changes in the proposed South African juvenile justice legisla-
tion. What was initially a progressive, restorative justice and child rights-
based proposal has been partially transformed due to this fear and the sense
of ‘popular punitiveness’.
In the U.S.A., the economic position of the average family has steadily dete-
riorated since the mid-1970s. People sense their increasing insecurity but are
often not aware of the structural, and indeed global, sources of their frustra-
tions. Thus they are more susceptible to the politics of fear. In Denmark, one
of the most comprehensive social welfare systems in the world has been
slowly weakened over time. While these changes are at least in part due to the
baby boom generation approaching retirement and the anticipated increased
demands that will be made on the social welfare system in the near future, the
situation was exacerbated by claims-making in the tabloid media and politi-
cal campaigns of the right-wing focused on alleged abuses of the social wel-
fare system by immigrants. The Danish case reminds observers of the code
words and symbolic politics used so often by neo-conservatives in the U.S.A.
American society was suffering massive structural economic dislocations
in the 1980s when the neo-conservatives came into power. The unemploy-
ment rate was high, especially in the ‘rust belt’ Northeast, poverty rates
soared in large cities of the Northeast, and well-paid unionized, industrial
jobs were being moved to other nations or Southern non-union states by
major corporations. The neo-conservative politicians would rather make
issues of the myth of youth violent crime—at that time—and illicit drugs
than face the serious economic problems which the nation was facing. At
the same time, the public was hoping for a promise of stability and eco-
nomic well-being. As Scheingold (1984) has noted, these conditions are fer-
tile ground for ‘get tough’ crime policies.
Although Sweden was subject to claims-making activities about youth
violence from the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s, this nation resisted
the path taken by so many other countries (see the chapter by Sarnecki in
this volume). At least during the mid-1990s, Sweden was going through a
period of concern about immigrants and an economic downturn. More
recently, Sweden has returned to a position of economic strength in Europe.
450 Eric L Jensen and Jørgen Jepsen
The nature of reporting violent crime in the media has influenced public
opinion in Sweden to believe that youthful violence is on the rise, despite
research to the contrary. Despite the shift in public concern about youth
violence, the cultural values and the societal institutions of Sweden have
resisted massive movements toward demonizing youth and a related crime
control model—the basic welfare approach to delinquency has not been
altered. However, a special new sanction of ‘secure (closed) youth care’ has
been developed for the ‘hard end’ of the spectrum of Swedish juvenile
crime. At the same time, mediation and other community-based non-puni-
tive types of reactions have also been developed.
Poland has also experienced a moral panic regarding youth crime and
violence since the early 1990s (see Krajewski’s chapter in this volume). ‘Due
to growing problems with juvenile delinquency and foremost juvenile vio-
lence, or rather public perception that such processes take place, the public,
media, and politicians increasingly support a more punitive approach to the
problems of juvenile delinquency’ (emphasis added). Today Poland has the
highest unemployment rate among the major nations of Western and
Eastern Europe. When combined with reductions in benefits to pensioners
since the regime change and low wages for the employed, economic insecu-
rities and social malaise in Poland are rife.
Conservative political pressures have also been exerted in Germany to
move toward a crime control model. As elsewhere, feelings of insecurity
associated with a major transition in society (i.e. reunification) have been
exploited by most German political parties (except the Green party), with
law and order being hot topics. To date, however, these repressive efforts
have failed. Apparently somewhat unique to Germany, an organization of
juvenile justice practitioners has been quite influential in resisting the con-
servative push for ‘get tough’ policies.1
The factor that appears to differentiate the nations represented in this vol-
ume more than moral panics regarding youth crime are their respective
socio-cultural constructions of youth. This point became clear to the
authors when we heard reports of conditions in Malawi at the Oñati con-
ference, read the chapter on Nepal, and read drafts of chapters for the
Durban volume from Uganda and Tanzania (see Sørensen and Jepsen 2005).
These papers confirmed Jepsen’s observations while participating in pre-
appraisal missions to Africa as part of the DIHR juvenile justice program.
1 This situation is in sharp contrast to Denmark, where the new conservative government
The manner in which children and youth are treated under the rubric of the
legal system in these nations reflects cultures that have not adopted
the modern social constructions of childhood and adolescence that were the
philosophical underpinnings of child welfare-based juvenile justice systems
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. This situation is clearly
understandable since the modern constructions of childhood and adoles-
cence were reified with the movement from agricultural to urban, industrial
economies in Western societies (see Feld 1999). The developing nations are
presently moving towards a contemporary version of this structural socio-
economic transition experienced earlier by Western societies.
Sweden, Poland, the reunified Germany, Catalonia, and to some degree
Serbia, continue to hold to cultural traditions of treating youthful law vio-
lators as victims of their life circumstances and in need of support and assis-
tance due to their developmental stage of life. These sentiments are clearly
stated by Krajewski:
It [the social welfare approach] is based on the assumption that persons below a
certain age, because of their mental development, shall not and cannot be held
responsible for their wrongful acts in the same way as adults. This excludes …
retributive purposes of punishment ... Moreover, it is assumed that possibilities of
changing youthful law violators, or rehabilitating them, are, because of their
young age, much better than in the case of … adults. (this volume)
Achieving the tenets set out in the Convention on the Rights of the Child
requires cultural and by extension legal systems that recognize the special
needs of children (see Grisso and Schwartz 2000). On the other hand, power-
ful conservative political forces in many Western nations adhere to a model of
children and youth as simply little adults who are rational decision makers.
Speaking on crime, then President Reagan (1984, 886) said, ‘Choosing a career
in crime is not the result of poverty or of an unhappy child or a misunderstood
adolescence; it is the result of a conscious, willful choice made by some who
consider themselves above the law, who seek to exploit the hard work and,
sometimes, the very lives of their fellow citizens’. When applied to children and
adolescents, this philosophy is a regression toward cultural values that had
been replaced hundreds of years ago in Western cultures by a modern social
construction of childhood. This backward step has also occurred, at least in
juvenile justice policy, in South Africa, the United Kingdom (see
Antonopoulous and Winterdyk 2003), and recently in Denmark.
Another theme that runs through several of the chapters in this book is the
movement toward restorative justice concepts and alternatives to the tradi-
tional juvenile justice system. Restorative justice is an ancient practice.
452 Eric L Jensen and Jørgen Jepsen
Restorative justice has been the dominant model of criminal justice throughout
most of human history for perhaps all of the world’s peoples. ... Beyond the parts
of the globe ruled by European kings (among the Indigenous peoples of the
Americas, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific), restorative traditions persisted into mod-
ern times ... remaining today as a resource of cultural diversity that can be drawn
upon by European peoples whose justice traditions have been more homogenized
and impoverished by central state power. (Braithwaite 2002, 5)
Of course, the process of instituting new policies often faces obstacles dur-
ing implementation. The 1998 restorative juvenile justice model in the U.K,
for example, has experienced forms of punitiveness that would not be
expected from a truly restorative system. For example, restorative confer-
encing has become dominated by the police officer. In practice, the offender
and the victim play minor roles in the process. In addition, if the offenders
are not willing to comply with a reparation order, ‘the reparation order
automatically becomes punishment. In other words, “the offender may be
coerced into reparation”’ (Antonopoulos and Winterdyk 2003, 394).
Based on observational research on youth justice conferences in Australia
and New Zealand, Daly (2002, 72) stated, ‘there appears to be limits on
“repairing the harm” for offenders and victims’. On the one hand, juveniles
often lack the empathetic orientation toward others which is necessary for
a restorative process—often a developmental issue. On the other hand, the
victims are limited by ‘the capacity to be generous to lawbreakers and to see
lawbreakers as capable of change’ (Daly 2002, 72).
The state of Idaho in the U.S.A. formally adopted the Balanced and
Restorative Justice Model as the theoretical basis for its new juvenile justice
system in 1995 (see U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
1998), yet long-term incarcerations of juveniles increased substantially follow-
ing the implementation of this legislation absent a clear indication of a rise in
serious youth crime (see Chinn Planning, Inc. 1998; Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention 2004). An increase in long-term incarceration in
this case directly opposes Braithwaite’s (2002) view of restoration.2
2 These increases in the incarceration of juveniles following the adoption of a model intended
to be restorative parallel those of the ‘widening of the net’ phenomena experienced with some
programs in the American experiences with diversion.
454 Eric L Jensen and Jørgen Jepsen
element of judicial control. Such a model may overcome many of the recur-
ring disappointments experienced with both the social welfare models and
the crime control model, and assist in bringing reparation to victims.
It is worth noting that the push for reforms come not only from donors and for-
eign advocates of juvenile justice reform but also from national and regional
sources. It is important that juvenile justice reform is not pushed upon the less
developed countries by foreign donors. Programs of development are sustainable
only to the extent they build upon local partnerships in the participating coun-
tries. These partners include persons and institutions with actual and potential
standing and influence in the individual countries. It is therefore paramount to
include all major stakeholders in the reform process, both in relation to goals and
deciding on appropriate mechanisms. … The use of advocacy—for human rights
in general and for juvenile justice in particular—is an important element in these
efforts. Raising awareness about problems and solutions is a first and indispen-
sable element in the process of reform.
... it is patently clear that most of us would seek a justice system that is founded
on core principles of charity and redemption if it were our own children who
were in trouble. This, of course, is the key issue. If we recognize the truth that all
children are our children, the search for the juvenile justice ideal [of the original
juvenile court] is our only choice. (2005, 196)
Treating young law violators humanely and fairly is part of the effort to
secure the future of society and lies at the heart of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child. This instrument envisions delinquent youth as part of
society now and in the future as they mature, not as objects for punishment
and marginalization.
Conclusions: Themes, Trends, and Challenges 457
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Index
Estrada, F., 11, 190, 191, 192, 194, Gendreau, P., 296
206, 207, 446 Geng, B., 120, 126, 136, 142, 145, 148
ethnic minorities: Gerber, J., 89, 445, 447, 448
and delinquency, 49 Germany:
Denmark, 246–9, 250, 251, 257, 447 age structure, 115–16
German juvenile delinquency, 122–6, Bochum study, 126–7
447 demography, 115–16
social construction, 447–8 domestic violence, 127
Sweden, 247 East European migrants, 125–6
United States, 94, 316–17, 415, East German Länder, 126, 130,
417–20 134–6, 144–5
anti-black code-words, 420–1 ethnic minorities, 122–6, 447
social construction, 447 insecurity, 450
Etxebarria Zarrabeitia, X, 99, 107 juvenile justice system
European Convention on the Exercise 1923 Juvenile Justice Act, 116–17
of Children’s Rights, 19 age groups, 121
European Rules on Social Sanctions and age of criminal responsibility, 117
Measures 1992, 5, 399 appeals, 121–2
experts: Brücke initiatives, 141–4
Spanish system, 105 community sanctions, 118, 120,
Sweden, 205 140–4, 147–8
US system, 92–4 East Germany, 144–5
community service, 120, 137,
Fagan, J.A., 90, 91, 92, 295, 303 144, 146
fair trial see due process detention, 117–18, 120, 122
Farrington, D.P., 207, 319 diversion, 119–20, 126, 130–3
Feijóo Sanchez, B., 100 due process, 121–2
Feld, Barry C, 2, 85, 88, 91, 94, 407, 408, educational care orders, 142,
409, 411, 413, 414, 415, 416, 421, 143, 146
422, 423, 425, 426, 427, 428, 430, generally, 115–48
431, 432, 434, 435, 436, 447, 451 historical background, 115–18
Fenz, C., 443 Mecklenbourg-Western Pomerania,
Finland, 214 122, 127, 130, 136–7, 140, 141
Francioni, F., 20 mediation projects, 142, 146
Frankowski, Stanislaw, 155 minimum intervention principle,
Frazier, C., 423 118, 120
Freeman, M.D.A., 398 mixed system, 115–18
Frost, L.E., 426 move to crime control model, 450
Funes Arteaga, J., 101 Nazi period, 117
Furby, Lita, 428 parens patriae doctrine, 117
political approaches, 145–8
Gaarder, E., 344 post-1970 reforms, 140–4
Gaberle, Andrzej, 158, 168 regional differences, 138–40
García Perez, O., 107 reparation, 119, 142–3
Gardner, William, 428 restorative justice, 142–3, 452
Garland, David, 207, 415, 420, 421, 436 rhetoric debate, 140
Gelsthorpe, L., 443 sanctions, 118–22, 153
gender, and juvenile justice, 27–32 sentencing practice, 128–37
Index 467
draft law, 396, 397, 399 social control see crime control model
European models, 394–5, 399, 400 Social Development Research Group,
priorities, 395 92, 93, 94
problems, 401 Somalia, 16
research, 394–5, 399 Sommer, B., 430
second phase, 400–1 Sommers, C., 32
welfare model, 398, 451 Sørensen, J.J., 11, 450
new model of juvenile justice, 401–5 South Africa:
basic approach, 401–2 age of criminal responsibility, 74
information rights, 403 backwards steps, 451
legal representation, 403 balancing act, 67–8
principles, 402 Bill of Rights, 67
referrals, 404 Child Justice Bill, 2, 65–78
special representative, 403 politics, 71–6
specialized chamber, 402 pragmatism, 77
speedy procedures, 402 reform process, 69–71
overprotectiveness of children, 391, regulation v discretion, 72–3
392 children’s rights movement, 65
parental responsibility, 402 Constitution, 74
patriarchy, 391, 392 diversion programs, 68, 73, 74, 75
poverty, 391 Human Rights Commission, 51
sanctions, 393 immigrants, 447
youth crime, 393 insecurity, 449
Shannon, L., 295 minimum sentence for children, 73–4
Sheffer, J.P., 422 National Crime Prevention Strategy,
Sherif, A.O., 20 67
Sherman, L.W., 296, 455 NICRO, 53
Sickmund, M., 414, 416 popular punitiveness, 448
Siegel, D.J., 354, 355 rape, 73, 74
Simpson, G., 67, 68, 76 restorative justice, 1, 68, 452
Sinclair, Murray, 353 role of international law in, 74, 77–8
Singer, S., 90 transformation of criminal justice,
single parent families, 49 66–8
Sioux (Lakota people), 347, 348, 353, transition politics, 76–7
354, 355 Truth and Reconciliation
Skelton, Ann, 68, 73 Commission, 67
Sloth-Nielsen, J., 65, 70–1 urban street children, 447–8
Snyder, H., 414, 416 Southern Africa Human Rights NGO
social capital, 55 Network (SAHRINGTON), 51
social construction: Southern Africa Legal Aid Network
childhood, 24–5, 443–51 (SALAN), 51
United States, 84, 91, 408, 443–6 Spain:
crime, 416–17 Basque Country, 286
immigrants, 447–8 Catalonia, 110–11, 286, 288–9, 451
and moral panics, 446–50 Constitution, 284, 287
national variations, 450–1 juvenile justice system, 2
news, 417 14–16 years old, 102
youth crime, 446–50 16–18 years old, 102
Index 475