TRANSPO NOTES

1. TRANSPORTATION - (etymology) movement of things or persons from one place to another; a

2. COMMON CARRIER - (1732, NCC) persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or, air, for compensation,
offering their services to the public.

3. CULPA AQUILIANA - (2176, NCC) Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict…

4. CULPA CRIMINAL - (Criminal Negligence-365,RPC) wrongful act resulting from imprudence,

5. SHIPPER - consignor, exporter, or seller (who may be the same or different parties) named in the
shipping documents as the party responsible for initiating a shipment and who may also bear the freight
cost.

6. CONSIGNEE - person or firm (usually a buyer) named by the consignor (seller) in the transportation of
documents as the party to whose order a consignment will be delivered at a port of destination.

7. Negotiorum Gestio - one of the principal kinds of quasi-contracts… It arises whenever a person
voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the business or property of another without any
power or authority from the latter.

8. Mora - default/delay; non-fulfillment of the obligation with respect to time.

Kinds:

a. Mora Solvendi - delay of the debtor to perform his obligation.

b. Mora accipiendi (acceptance) - delay of the creditor to accept the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the obligation (without justifiable cause).

9. Culpa Contractual (1170-1174, NCC) - Breach of Contract; fault/negligence of a person whose failure
to observe the required diligence to the obligation causes damage to another
CASES FINAL TERM (OTCOMM)

1. Tatad v. Garcia, G.R. No. 114222, April 6, 1995

Facts: DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along Edsa. EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a
foreign corporation was awarded the contract to build, lease and transfer the said light railway.

The said award was questioned by the petitioners on the basis that a foreign corporation cannot own the
EDSA LRT III, a public utility as it violates the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not an owner and lessor of the facilities used by a public utility constitute a public
utility?

Held: EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd. Is admittedly a foreign corporation “duly incorporated and existing
under the laws of Hong Kong”. However, there is no dispute that once the EDSA LRT III is constructed,
the private respondent, as lessor, will turn it over to DOTC as lessee, for the latter to operate the system
and pay rentals for the said use.

What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks, rail stations, terminals and the power
plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they
do not themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility in not their ownership but
their use to serve the public.

The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility. However,
it does not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long
as it does not operate them to serve the public. In law, there is a clear distinction between the “operation”
of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities and the equipment used to serve the public.

Facts:

DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA (EDSA LRT III) to provide a mass
transit system and alleviate the congestion and growing transportation problem in the metropolis. RA
6957 was enacted allowing for the financing, construction and operation of government projects through
private initiative and investment. Accordingly, prequalification and bidding was made and EDSA LRT
Corporation (organized under HK laws) was recommended to be awarded with the contract. The
President approved the awarding of the contract. Petitioners are senators praying for the prohibition of
respondents from further implementing and enforcing the contract.

Issue:

Whether or not the EDSA LRT III, a public utility, can be owned by a foreign corporation.

Ruling: YES.

The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility. However,
it does not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long
as it does not operate them to serve the public.

In law, there is a clear distinction between the “operation” of a public utility and the ownership of the
facilities and equipment used to serve the public. Ownership is defined as a relation in law by virtue of
which a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by
law or the concurrence with the rights of another. The exercise of the rights encompassed in ownership is
limited by law so that a property cannot be operated and used to serve the public as a public utility unless
the operator has a franchise. The operation of a rail system as a public utility includes the transportation
of passengers from one point to another point, their loading and unloading at designated places and the
movement of the trains at pre-scheduled times.
In sum, private respondent will not run the light rail vehicles and collect fees from the riding public. It will
have no dealings with the public and the public will have no right to demand any services from it. Even
the mere formation of a public utility corporation does not ipso facto characterize the corporation as one
operating a public utility. The moment for determining the requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity
applies for a franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for that purpose.
 2. Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, G.R. No. 143360, September 5, 2002;

Facts:
On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into the house cum store of Myrna
Tamayo in Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was destroyed which caused death and injury. Tutor
was charged with and later convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple
physical injuries.

Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, it was known that the registered owner of the
tractor was Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. On April 15, 1995, respondents filed
against Raul Tutor, Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable Leasing Corporation (Equitable) a
Complaint for damages.

The petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that the former was no longer
in possession and control thereof at the time of the incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee,
not of Equitable, but of Ecatine.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was liable for damages based on quasi delict for the negligent acts.

Held:
The Lease Agreement between petitioner and Edwin Lim stipulated that it is the intention of the parties to
enter into a finance lease agreement. Ownership of the subject tractor was to be registered in the name
of petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been fully paid by Edwin Lim.

Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of the tractor. Thus, a Deed of Sale over the tractor
was executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented by Edwin Lim. However, the Deed was not
registered with the LTO.

Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner of
the tractor at the time of the accident.The Court has consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a
motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are
concerned.

Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the
deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver.
 3. Benedicto v. IAC, 187 SCRA 547, July 19, 1990;

FACTS: Greenhills W ood Industries - bound itself to sell and deliver to Blue Star Mahogany,
Inc.100,000 board feet of sawn lumber with the understanding that an initial delivery would bemade.
Greenhills resident manager in Maddela, Dominador Cruz, contracted Virgilio Licuden, thed r i v e r o f a
c a r g o t r u c k , t o t r a n s p o r t i t s s a w n l u m b e r t o t h e c o n s i g n e e B l u e S t a r i n Valenzuela,
Bulacan; this cargo truck was registered in the name of Ma. Luisa Benedicto,the proprietor of Macoven
Trucking, a business enterprise engaged in hauling freight the Manager of Blue Star called up
Greenhills’ president informing him that the sawnlumber on board the subject cargo truck
had not yet arrived in Valenzuela, Bulacan; because of the delay in delivery Blue Star was
constrained to look for other suppliers G r e e n h i l l ’ s f i l e d c r i m i n a l c a s e a g a i n s t d r i v e r
L i c u d e n f o r e s t a f a ; a n d a c i v i l c a s e f o r recovery of the value of the lost sawn lumber plus
damages against Benedicto Benedicto denied liability as she was a complete stranger to the contract of
carriage, thesubject truck having been earlier sold by her to Benjamin Tee; but the truck had
remainedregistered in her name because Tee have not yet fully paid the amount of the
truck; bethat as it may, Tee had been operating the said truck in Central Luzon from that
andLicuden was Tee’s employee and not hers

ISSUE: WON Benedicto, being the registered owner of the carrier, should be held liable forthe value of the
undelivered or lost sawn lumber

HELD: Yes. The registered owner liable for consequences flowing from the operations of thecarrier,
even though the specific vehicle involved may already have been transferred to a n o t h e r
person. This doctrine rests upon the principle that in dealing wit h
vehiclesregistered under the Public Service Law, the public has the right to
a s s u m e t h a t t h e registered owner is the actual or lawful owner thereof It would be very
difficult and oftenimpossible as a practical matter, for members of the general public to enforce the
rights of action that they may have for injuries inflicted by the vehicles being negligently operated if they
should be required to prove who the actual owner is. Greenhills is not required to gobeyond the vehicle’s
certificate of registration to ascertain the owner of the carrier.
 4. BA Finance Corp. v. CA, 215 SCRA 715, November 13, 1992

Under the deed of chattel mortgage, B.A. Finance Corporation was constituted attorney-in-fact
with full power and authority to file, follow-up, prosecute, compromise or settle insurance claims;
to sign execute and deliver the corresponding papers, receipts and documents to the Insurance
Company as may be necessary to prove the claim, and to collect from the latter the proceeds of
insurance to the extent of its interests, in the event that the mortgaged car suffers any loss or
damage.

Facts: Spouses Manuel and Lilia Cuady obtained from Supercars, Inc. bought a Ford Escort 1300, four-
door sedan in installments. To secure the faithful and prompt compliance of the obligation under the said
promissory note, the Cuady spouses constituted a chattel mortgage on the aforementioned motor vehicle.
Supercars, Inc. assigned the promissory note, together with the chattel mortgage, to B.A. Finance
Corporation. The Cuadys made partial payment leaving an un paid balance.In addition thereto, the
Cuadys owe B.A. Finance .B.A. Finance Corporation, as the assignee of the mortgage lien obtained the
renewal of the insurance coverage over the aforementioned motor vehicle for the with Zenith Insurance
Corporation, when the Cuadys failed to renew said insurance coverage themselves. Under the terms and
conditions of the said insurance coverage, any loss under the policy shall be payable to the B.A. Finance
Corporation.

The motor vehicle figured in an accident and was badly damaged. The unfortunate happening was
reported to the B.A. Finance Corporation and to the insurer, Zenith Insurance Corporation. The Cuadys
asked the B.A. Finance Corporation to consider the same as a total loss, and to claim from the insurer the
face value of the car insurance policy and apply the same to the payment of their remaining account and
give them the surplus thereof, if any. But instead of heeding the request of the Cuadys, B.A. Finance
Corporation prevailed upon the former to just have the car repaired. Not long thereafter, however, the car
bogged down. The Cuadys wrote B.A. Finance Corporation requesting the latter to pursue their prior
instruction of enforcing the total loss provision in the insurance coverage. When B.A. Finance Corporation
did not respond favorably to their request, the Cuadys stopped paying their monthly installments on the
promissory note. In view of the failure of the Cuadys to pay the remaining installments on the note, B.A.
Finance Corporation sued them.

B.A. Finance Corporation contended that even if it failed to enforce the total loss provision in the
insurance policy of the motor vehicle subject of the chattel mortgage, said failure does not operate to
extinguish the unpaid balance on the promissory note, considering that the circumstances obtaining in the
case at bar do not fall under Article 1231 of the Civil Code relative to the modes of extinguishment of
obligations.

Issue: Whether or not BA Finance ca still collect on the deficiency of the Chattel Mortgage.

Held: In granting B.A. Finance Corporation the aforementioned powers and prerogatives, the Cuady
spouses created in the former’s favor an agency. Thus, under Article 1884 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, B.A. Finance Corporation is bound by its acceptance to carry out the agency, and is liable for
damages which, through its non-performance, the Cuadys, the principal in the case at bar, may suffer; in
such case, the assignee of the mortgage agreement is bound by the same stipulation and if the assignee
failed to file and prosecute the insurance claim when the car was damaged totally, the mortgagor is
relieved from his obligation to pay as he suffered a loss because of the failure of the mortgagee to file the
claim.

Under the deed of chattel mortgage, B.A. Finance Corporation was constituted attorney-in-fact with full
power and authority to file, follow-up, prosecute, compromise or settle insurance claims; to sign execute
and deliver the corresponding papers, receipts and documents to the Insurance Company as may be
necessary to prove the claim, and to collect from the latter the proceeds of insurance to the extent of its
interests, in the event that the mortgaged car suffers any loss or damage.
 5. Duavit vs. CA,GR. No. 82318, May18,1989;

Facts: Private respondents were on board a jeep when they met an accident with another jeep driven by
Sabiniano. This accident caused injuries to private respondents, thus they filed a case for damages
against driver Salbiniano and owner of the jeep Duavit. Duavit admits ownership of the jeep but contends
that he should not be held liable since Salbiniano is not his employee and that the jeep was taken by
Salbiniano without his (Duavit) consent.

Issue: Whether or not the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be held liable as an
employer when the said vehicle was neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with his
consent.

Held: No, an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving the said vehicle if the same
was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him. To hold the
petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor
employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident
caused by the person who stole such vehicle.
 6. Lim vs. CA, G.R. No. 125817, January 16,2002

Facts:

Gonzales purchased an Isuzu passenger jeepney from Vallarta. Vallarta remained as the holder of a
certificate of public convenience and the registered owner of the jeepney. Subsequently, the jeepney
collided with a ten-wheeler truck owned by Lim, driven by Gunnaban which resulted in the death of 1
passenger and injuries to all others. Failure to arrive to a settlement with Lim for the repair of the jeepney,
Gonzales brought an action for damages against Lim & Gunnaban. Lim denied liability asserting that
Vallarte, and not Gonzales, is the real party in interest being the registered owner of the jeepney. He
further asserts that an operator of the vehicle continues to be its operator as he remains the operator of
record; and that to recognize an operator under the kabit system as the real party in interest and to
countenance his claim for damages is utterly subversive of public policy.

Issue: WON Gonzales, an operator under the kabit system (considering that he is not the registered
owner of the jeepney), may sue for damages against Lim. Or, WON Gonzales is a real party in interest.

Held: Yes, Gonzales may sue. The evil sought to be prevented in enjoining the kabit system* does not
exist. 1 Neither of the parties to the pernicious kabit system is being held liable for damages. 2 The case
arose from the negligence of another vehicle in using the public road to whom no representation, or
misrepresentation, as regards the ownership and operation of the passenger jeepney was made and to
whom no such representation, or misrepresentation, was necessary. Thus it cannot be said that Gonzales
and the registered owner of the jeepney were in stoppels for leading the public to believe that the jeepney
belonged to the registered owner.3 The riding public was not bothered nor inconvenienced at the very
least by the illegal arrangement. On the contrary, it was private respondent himself who had been
wronged and was seeking compensation for the damage done to him. Certainly, it would be the height of
inequity to deny him his right. Thus, it is evident that private respondent has the right to proceed against
petitioners for the damage caused on his passenger jeepney as well as on his business.

N.B. The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has been granted a certificate of public
convenience allows other persons who own motor vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes
for a fee or percentage of the earnings. Although the parties to such an agreement are not outrightly
penalized by law, thekabit system is invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and therefore
void and inexistent under Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. It would seem then that the thrust of the law in
enjoining the kabit system is not so much as to penalize the parties but to identify the person upon whom
responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident with the end view of protecting the riding public. The
policy therefore loses its force if the public at large is not deceived, much less involved.
 7. Jardin v. NLRC, G.R. No. 119268, February 23, 2000

Facts:

Petitioners were drivers of private respondent’s taxicabs under the boundary system whose earnings
were regularly deducted washing fee for the taxi units. Petitioners decided to form a labor union to protect
their rights and interests on the belief that the deductions made were illegal. Upon learning, respondent
refused to let petitioners drive their taxicabs when they reported for work. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter but the latter dismissed said complaint. On appeal,
the NLRC tribunal declared that petitioners are employees of private respondent. On reconsideration
however, the decision was reversed by the NLRC tribunal and held that no employer-employee
relationship between the parties exists.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner taxi drivers are employees of respondent company.

Ruling: YES.

In a number of cases decided by this Court, we ruled that the relationship between jeepney
owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the other under the boundary system is that of
employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee. In the case of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney
drivers, the former exercise supervision and control over the latter. The management of the business is in
the owner’s hands. The owner as holder of the certificate of public convenience must see to it that the
driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising authority and the rules promulgated as regards its
operation. Now, the fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-
called “boundary” they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between
them from that of employer and employee. We have applied by analogy the doctrine to the relationships
between bus owner/operator and bus conductor, auto-calesa owner/operator and driver, and recently
between taxi owners/operators and taxi drivers. Hence, petitioners are undoubtedly employees of private
respondent because as taxi drivers they perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of their employer.
 8. Bascos v.CA, 221 SCRA 318, April 7, 1993;

FACTS: Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE for short) entered into
a hauling contract with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corp whereby the former bound itself to haul the latter’s
2,000 m/tons of soya bean meal to the warehouse in Calamba, Laguna. To carry out its obligation,
CIPTRADE, through Cipriano, subcontracted with Bascos to transport and to deliver 400 sacks of soya
bean meal from the Manila Port Area to Calamba, Laguna. Petitioner failed to deliver the said cargo. As a
consequence of that failure, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping Agency the amount of the lost goods in
accordance with their contract.

Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter refused to pay. Eventually, Cipriano filed
a complaint for a sum of money and damages with writ of preliminary attachment for breach of a contract
of carriage. The trial court granted the writ of preliminary attachment.

In her answer, petitioner interposed the defense that there was no contract of carriage since CIPTRADE
leased her cargo truck to load the cargo from Manila Port Area to Laguna and that the truck carrying the
cargo was hijacked and being a force majeure, exculpated petitioner from any liability

After trial, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Cipriano and against Bascos ordering the latter to
pay the former for actual damages for attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

The “Urgent Motion To Dissolve/Lift preliminary Attachment” Bascos is DENIED for being moot and
academic.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but respondent Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE:

(1) WON petitioner a common carrier

(2) WON the hijacking referred to a force majeure

HELD: The petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

1. YES

In disputing the conclusion of the trial and appellate courts that petitioner was a common carrier, she
alleged in this petition that the contract between her and Cipriano was lease of the truck. She also stated
that: she was not catering to the general public. Thus, in her answer to the amended complaint, she said
that she does business under the same style of A.M. Bascos Trucking, offering her trucks for lease to
those who have cargo to move, not to the general public but to a few customers only in view of the fact
that it is only a small business.

We agree with the respondent Court in its finding that petitioner is a common carrier.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as “(a) person, corporation or firm, or association
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.” The test to determine a common carrier is “whether
the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the
general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted.” 12 In this
case, petitioner herself has made the admission that she was in the trucking business, offering her trucks
to those with cargo to move. Judicial admissions are conclusive and no evidence is required to prove the
same. 13

But petitioner argues that there was only a contract of lease because they offer their services only to a
select group of people. Regarding the first contention, the holding of the Court in De Guzman vs. Court of
Appeals 14 is instructive. In referring to Article 1732 of the Civil Code, it held thus:

“The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as
a “sideline”). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier
offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers
services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article
1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.”

2. NO

Likewise, We affirm the holding of the respondent court that the loss of the goods was not due to force
majeure.

Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them. Accordingly, they are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if
the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. There are very few instances when the presumption of
negligence does not attach and these instances are enumerated in Article 1734. 19 In those cases where
the presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in
order to overcome the presumption.

In this case, petitioner alleged that hijacking constituted force majeure which exculpated her from liability
for the loss of the cargo. In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that hijacking, not being
included in the provisions of Article 1734, must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735 and
thus, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or negligent. To exculpate the carrier from
liability arising from hijacking, he must prove that the robbers or the hijackers acted with grave or
irresistible threat, violence, or force. This is in accordance with Article 1745 of the Civil Code which
provides:

“Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and
contrary to public policy; xx

(6) That the common carrier’s liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not act with
grave or irresistible threat, violences or force, is dispensed with or diminished;” xx

NOTES:

1. She cited as evidence certain affidavits which referred to the contract as “lease”. These affidavits were
made by Jesus Bascos and by petitioner herself and Cipriano and CIPTRADE did not object to the
presentation of affidavits by petitioner where the transaction was referred to as a lease contract. Both the
trial and appellate courts have dismissed them as self-serving and petitioner contests the conclusion. We
are bound by the appellate court’s factual conclusions. Yet, granting that the said evidence were not self-
serving, the same were not sufficient to prove that the contract was one of lease. It must be understood
that a contract is what the law defines it to be and not what it is called by the contracting parties.
Furthermore, petitioner presented no other proof of the existence of the contract of lease. He who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it.
2. Having affirmed the findings of the respondent Court on the substantial issues involved, We find no
reason to disturb the conclusion that the motion to lift/dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment has been
rendered moot and academic by the decision on the merits.
 9. National Steel Corp. v. CA, 283 SCRA 45, December 12, 1997

FACTS:

The MV Vlasons I is a vessel which renders tramping service and, as such, does not transport cargo or
shipment for the general public. Its services are available only to specific persons who enter into a special
contract of charter party with its owner. The ship is a private carrier, and it is in this capacity that its
owner, Vlasons Shipping, Inc. (VSA), entered into a contract of affreightment or contract of voyage
charter hire with National Steel Corporation (NSC) on 17 July 1974, whereby NSC hired VSI’s vessel, the
MV ‘VLASONS I’ to make 1 voyage to load steel products at Iligan City and discharge them at North
Harbor, Manila

The shipment was placed in the 3 hatches of the ship which arrived with the cargo at Pier 12, North
Harbor, Manila, on 12 August 1974. The following day, when the vessel’s 3 hatches containing the
shipment were opened by NSC’s agents, nearly all the skids of tinplates and hot rolled sheets were
allegedly found to be wet and rusty. The cargo was discharged and unloaded by stevedores hired by the
Charterer.

On 6 September 1974 NSC filed with VSI its claim for damages suffered due to the downgrading of the
damaged tinplates in the amount of P941,145.18. Then on 3 October 1974, NSC formally demanded
payment of said claim but VSI refused and failed to pay.

On appeal, and on 12 August 1993, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court by
reducing the demurrage from P88,000.00 to P44,000.00 and deleting the award of attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation. NSC and VSI filed separate motions for reconsideration. The CA denied both
motions. NSC and VSI filed their respective petitions for review before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not VSI contracted with NSC as a common carrier or a private carrier.

RULING:

Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as “persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air,
for compensation, offering their services to the public.” It has been held that the true test of a common
carrier is the carriage of passengers or goods, provided it has space, for all who opt to avail themselves
of its transportation service for a fee.

A carrier which does not qualify under the test of a common carrier is deemed a private carrier.
“Generally, private carriage is undertaken by special agreement and the carrier does not hold himself out
to carry goods for the general public. The most typical, although not the only form of private carriage, is
the charter party, a maritime contract by which the charterer, a party other than the shipowner, obtains
the use and service of all or some part of a ship for a period of time or a voyage or voyages.”Herein, VSI
did not offer its services to the general public. It carried passengers or goods only for those it chose under
a “special contract of charter party.” The MV Vlasons I “was not a common but a private carrier.”
Consequently, the rights and obligations of VSI and NSC, including their respective liability for damage to
the cargo, are determined primarily by stipulations in their contract of private carriage or charter party.

In Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals and Seven Brothers Shipping
Corporation, the Court ruled that “in a contract of private carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their
duties and obligations which perforce would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common
carrier, private carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the Civil
Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be applied to a ship transporting
commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently, the public policy embodied therein is not
contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in
contracts involving common carriers.”

From the parties’ Contract of Voyage Charter Hire, dated 17 July 1974, VSI “shall not be responsible for
losses except on proven willful negligence of the officers of the vessel.” The NANYOZAI Charter Party,
which was incorporated in the parties’ contract of transportation further provided that the shipowner shall
not be liable for loss of or damage to the cargo arising or resulting from unseaworthiness, unless the
same was caused by its lack of due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy or to ensure that the same
was “properly manned, equipped and supplied,” and to “make the holds and all other parts of the vessel
in which cargo was carried, fit and safe for its reception, carriage and preservation.” The NANYOZAI
Charter Party also provided that “owners shall not be responsible for split, chafing and/or any damage
unless caused by the negligence or default of the master or crew.”

Herein, NSC must prove that the damage to its shipment was caused by VSI’s willful negligence or failure
to exercise due diligence in making MV Vlasons I seaworthy and fit for holding, carrying and safekeeping
the cargo. Ineluctably, the burden of proof was placed on NSC by the parties’ agreement.

Article 361 of the Code of Commerce provides that “Merchandise shall be transported at the risk and
venture of the shipper, if the contrary has not been expressly stipulated. Therefore, the damage and
impairment suffered by the goods during the transportation, due to fortuitous event, force majeure, or the
nature and inherent defect of the things, shall be for the account and risk of the shipper. The burden of
proof of these accidents is on the carrier.”

Article 362 of the Code of Commerce provides that “The carrier, however, shall be liable for damages
arising from the cause mentioned in the preceding article if proofs against him show that they occurred on
account of his negligence or his omission to take the precautions usually adopted by careful persons,
unless the shipper committed fraud in the bill of lading, making him to believe that the goods were of a
class or quality different from what they really were.”

As the MV Vlasons I was a private carrier, the shipowner’s obligations are governed by the foregoing
provisions of the Code of Commerce and not by the Civil Code which, as a general rule, places the prima
facie presumption of negligence on a common carrier.

The Supreme Court denied the consolidated petitions; and affirmed the questioned Decision of the Court
of Appeals with the modification that the demurrage awarded to VSI is deleted. No pronouncement as to
costs.
 10. Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Terminal Services Inc. G.R. 148496, March 19, 2002;

Lessons Applicable: Legal Effect (Transportation)

FACTS: At the time material to this case, Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc. (TCTSI) owned
by Virgines Calvo entered into a contract with San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of 114 reels
of semi-chemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the Port Area in Manila to SMC's
warehouse at the Tabacalera Compound, Romualdez St., Ermita, Manila. The cargo was insured by
respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. July 14, 1990: arrived in Manila on board "M/V Hayakawa
Maru" and later on unloaded from the vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila Port Services,
Inc. July 23 to July 25, 1990: Calvo withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to
SMC's warehouse in Ermita, Manila July 25, 1990: goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors,
who found that 15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting paper were "wet/stained/torn" and 3 reels of kraft
liner board were likewise tor SMC collected payment from UCPB the total damage of P93,112 under its
insurance contract. UCPB brought suit against Calvo as subrogee of SMC Calvo: Art. 1734(4) The
character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers spoilage or wettage" took place while
the goods were in the custody of either the carrying vessel "M/V Hayakawa Maru," which transported the
cargo to Manila, or the arrastre operator, to whom the goods were unloaded and who allegedly kept them
in open air for 9 days notwithstanding the fact that some of the containers were deformed, cracked, or
otherwise damaged. Trial Court: Calvo liable. CA: affirmed

ISSUE: W/N Calvo can be exempted from liability under Art. 1734(4)

HELD: NO. CA AFFIRMED. mere proof of delivery of goods in good order to a carrier, and of their arrival
at the place of destination in bad order, makes out a prima facie case against the carrier, so that if no
explanation is given as to how the injury occurred, the carrier must be held responsible extraordinary
responsibility lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of and received
by the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered actually or constructively by the carrier to the
consignee or to the person who has the right to receive the same

Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business
of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering
their services to the public."

The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity . . . Article 1732
also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service
on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public,"
i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population. concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732 may be seen
to coincide neatly with the notion of "public service," under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act
No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the
Civil Code

Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, "public service" includes:

" x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for
hire or compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and
done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway
motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever may be its
classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat, or steamship line,
pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard,
marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric
light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless
communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public services. x x x"

when Calvo's employees withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator, they did so without exception or
protest either with regard to the condition of container vans or their contents. Calvo must do more than
merely show the possibility that some other party could be responsible for the damage. It must prove that
it used "all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for transport
and that it exercised due care in the handling
11. Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, 23 SCRA 24, April 4, 1968
12. Calvo v. UCPB General Insurance Terminal Services Inc. G.R. 148496, March 19, 2002;
13. Davao Stevedore Co. v. Fernandez, 54 O.G. No. 5, 1957
 14. Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 38 Phil 768, October 14, 1918

Lessons Applicable: Legal Effect (Transportation)

FACTS: January 20, 1915 around 7 to 8 p.m.: Jose Cangco arose from his seat in the 2nd class-car
where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach,
seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support As the train slowed down another passenger
and also an employee of the railroad company Emilio Zuñiga got off the same car alighting safely at the
point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little
farther Cangco stepped off but 1 or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons so his feet
slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body rolled from the platform and was
drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. the car moved
forward possibly 6 meters before it came to a full stop He was bought to the hospital in the city of Manila
where an examination was made and his arm was amputated operation was unsatisfactory so he had
second operation at another hospital was performed and the member was again amputated higher up
near the shoulder expending a total of P790.25 It is customary season for harvesting these melons and a
large lot had been brought to the station for the shipment to the market CFI: favored Manila Railroad Co.
(MRR)- Cangco had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded
form recovering

ISSUE: W/N MRR should be held liable.

HELD: YES. lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25 It
can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence. It necessarily
follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred
by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these
conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable
to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations — or to use the technical form
of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual article 1903 of the
Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract two things are
apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that
that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he
has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability.

As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume
the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary,
in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows
that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove negligence.

The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to
alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an
ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the
passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be,
not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of
ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury.
 Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety under
such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it
may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and
of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the
length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting.
Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly
under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence. at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries
he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant has not
shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the
standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair
compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that
he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital
services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.

FACTS: On January 20, 1915, Jose Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Company where he
was an employee. As the train drew near to his destination, he arose from his seat. When he was about
to alight from the train, Cangco accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice
because it was already 7:00pm and it was dim when it happened. As a result, he slipped and fell violently
on the platform. His right arm was badly crushed and lacerated which was eventually amputated.

Cangco sued Manila Railroad Company on the ground of negligence of its employees placing the sacks
of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of
passenger alighting from the company’s trains.

The company’s defense was that granting that its employees were negligent in placing an obstruction
upon the platform, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own
contributing negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contributing negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

HELD: In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act – that is to say,
whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly – the age, sex, and physical condition of the
passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be
considered.

The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at the
station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step
which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. The Supreme
Court’s conclusion was that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet
slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of
contributory negligence.
15. Medina v. Cresencia, 99 Phil 506, July 11, 1956
16. Saludo Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 95536, March 23, 1992

Facts:

Crispina Saludo died in Illinois. Preparations were made by a funeral home for the shipment of the
remains to the Phil. The shipment was booked with TWA for the first route, and with PAL for the second.
Airway bills were issued. But somehow, the remains of Crispina were switched with another. Thus, there
was delay in the delivery of the cargo. Saludo then instituted an action for damages alleging that the
carriers failed to exercise extraordinary diligence over the cargo received by them for shipment. To
support such assertion, Saludo invoked the dictum that a bill of lading is prima facie evidence of the
receipt of the goods by the carrier Respondents, however, deny liability alleging that they did not receive
the remains.

Issue:WON TWA and PAL should be held liable.

Held: No.

The airway bills issued was not an evidence of receipt of delivery to the airline but merely a confirmation
of the booking.

A bill of lading, when properly executed and delivered to a shipper, is evidence that the carrier has
received the goods described therein for shipment.

Alhough an airway bill estops the carrier from denying receipt of goods of the quantity and quality
described in the bill, a further reading and a more faithful quotation of this authority would reveal that (a)
bill of lading may contain constituent elements of estoppel and thus become something more than a
contract between the shipper and the carrier. . . . However, as between the shipper and the carrier, when
no goods have been delivered for shipment no recitals in the bill can estop the carrier from showing the
true facts . . . Between the consignor of goods and receiving carrier, recitals in a bill of lading as to the
goods shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment. As
between the consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital.

FACTS:

Shipper - Pomierski and Son Funeral Home

Consignee – Maria Saludo

Carrier - Transworld Airlines (TWA) Chicago

San Francisco, and Philippine Airlines (PAL)- San Francisco – Manila

After the death of petitioner's mother, Crispina Galdo Saludo, in Chicago Illinois, Pomierski and Son
Funeral Home of Chicago, made the necessary preparations and arrangements for the shipment, of the
remains from Chicago to the Philippines. Philippine Vice Consul in Chicago, Illinois, Bienvenido M.
Llaneta, at the Pomierski & Son Funeral Home, sealed the shipping case containing a hermetically sealed
casket that is airtight and waterproof wherein was contained the remains of Crispina Saludo Galdo). On
the same date, October 26, 1976, Pomierski brought the remains to C.M.A.S. (Continental Mortuary Air
Services) at the airport (Chicago) which made the necessary arrangements such as flights, transfers, etc.;
C.M.A.S. is a national service used by undertakers to throughout the nation (U.S.A.). C.M.A.S. booked
the shipment with PAL thru the carrier's agent Air Care International, with Pomierski F.H. as the shipper
and Mario (Maria) Saludo as the consignee. The requested routing was from Chicago to San Francisco
on board TWA Flight 131 of October 27, 1976 and from San Francisco to Manila on board PAL Flight No.
107 of the same date, and from Manila to Cebu on board PAL Flight 149 of October 29, 1976. Maria
Saludo upon arriving at San Francisco Airport, she then called Pomierski that her mother's remains were
not at the West Coast terminal, and Pomierski immediately called C.M.A.S., which in a matter of 10
minutes informed him that the remains were on a plane to Mexico City, that there were two bodies at the
terminal, and somehow they were switched. The following day October 28, 1976, the shipment or remains
of Crispina Saludo arrived (in) San Francisco from Mexico on board American Airlines. This shipment was
transferred to or received by PAL at 1945H or 7:45 p.m. (Exh. 2-PAL, Exh. 2-a-PAL). This casket bearing
the remains of Crispina Saludo, which was mistakenly sent to Mexico and was opened (there), was
resealed by Crispin F. Patagas for shipment to the Philippines (See Exh. B-1). The shipment was
immediately loaded on PAL flight for Manila that same evening and arrived (in) Manila on October 30,
1976, a day after its expected arrival on October 29, 1976.

Aggrieved by the incident, the petitioners instituted an action against respondents and were asked to pay
for damages.

Petitioner allege that private respondents received the casketed remains of petitioners' mother on
October 26, 1976, as evidenced by the issuance of PAL Air Waybill No. 079-0118045.

by Air Care International as carrier's agent; and from said date, private respondents were charged with
the responsibility to exercise extraordinary diligence so much so that for the alleged switching of the
caskets on October 27, 1976, or one day after private respondents received the cargo, the latter must
necessarily be liable. RTC - absolved the two respondent airlines companies of liability. CA - affirmed the
decision of the lower court in toto , and in a subsequent resolution, denied herein petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUE W/N the delay in the delivery of the casketed remains of petitioners' mother was due to the fault of
respondent airline companies,

HELD: NO. A bill of lading is a written acknowledgment of the receipt of the goods and an agreement to
transport and deliver them at a specified place to a person named or on his order . According to foreign
and local jurisprudence, "the issuance of a bill of lading carries the presumption that the goods were
delivered to the carrier issuing the bill, for immediate shipment, and it is nowhere questioned that a bill of
lading is prima facie evidence of the receipt of the goods by the carrier. . . . In the absence of convincing
testimony establishing mistake, recitals in the bill of lading showing that the carrier received the goods for
shipment on a specified date controls. However, except as may be prohibited by law, there is nothing to
prevent an inverse order of events, that is, the execution of the bill of lading even prior to actual
possession and control by the carrier of the cargo to be transported. There is no law which requires that
the delivery of the goods for carriage and the issuance of the covering bill of lading must coincide in point
of time or, for that matter, that the former should precede the latter. As between the shipper and the
carrier, when no goods have been delivered for shipment no recitals in the bill can estop the carrier from
showing the true facts . . . Between the consignor of goods and receiving carrier, recitals in a bill of lading
as to the goods shipped raise only a rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment.
As between the consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital."

In the case at bar, it was on October 26, 1976 the cargo containing the casketed remains of Crispina
Saludo was booked for PAL Flight Number PR-107 leaving San Francisco for Manila on October 27,
1976, PAL Airway Bill No. 079-01180454 was issued, not as evidence of receipt of delivery of the cargo
on October 26, 1976, but merely as a confirmation of the booking thus made for the San Francisco-
Manila flight scheduled on October 27, 1976. Actually, it was not until October 28, 1976 that PAL received
physical delivery of the body at San Francisco. Explicit is the rule under Article 1736 of the Civil Code that
the extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier begins from the time the goods are delivered to the
carrier. This responsibility remains in full force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or
stored in transit, unless the shipper or owner exercises the right of stoppage in transitu, and terminates
only after the lapse of a reasonable time for the acceptance, of the goods by the consignee or such other
person entitled to receive them. And, there is delivery to the carrier when the goods are ready for and
have been placed in the exclusive possession, custody and control of the carrier for the purpose of their
immediate transportation and the carrier has accepted them. Where such a delivery has thus been
accepted by the carrier, the liability of the common carrier commences eo instanti . As already
demonstrated, the facts in the case at bar belie the averment that there was delivery of the cargo to the
carrier on October 26, 1976. Rather, as earlier explained, the body intended to be shipped as agreed
upon was really placed in the possession and control of PAL on October 28, 1976 and it was from that
date that private respondents became responsible for the agreed cargo under their undertakings in PAL
Airway Bill No. 079-01180454. Consequently, for the switching of caskets prior thereto which was not
caused by them, and subsequent events caused thereby, private respondents cannot be held liable.
17. Maerskline v. CA, 222 SCRA 108, May 17, 1993

Facts:

Castillo ordered from Eli Lilly gelatin capsules. The shipment was boarded on a vessel owned by Maersk
Line. However, due to a misshipment, there had been a delay of two months in the delivery. Thus,
Castillo rejected the entire shipment and asked for damages, among others. Negligence was attributed to
Maersk Line. But the carrier denied liability alleging that there was no special contract under which it
undertook to deliver the shipment on or before a specified date. Trial court found Maersk Line liable
relying on the character of the bill of lading as a contract of adhesion which is void.

Issue:

WON Maersk Line should be liable.

Held:

Yes, the two-month delay is not reasonable.

The provision of the bill of lading is a contract of adhesion. Nevertheless, such contract is not entirely
prohibited. One who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it in its entirety.

In this case, the questioned provision in the bill of lading has the effect of practically leaving the date of
arrival of the subject shipment on the sole determination and will of the carrier. While it is true that
common carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver merchandise…unless such common
carriers previously assume the obligation to deliver at a given date or time, delivery of shipment or cargo
should at least be made within a reasonable time.
18. Tan Chiong Sian v. Yngchausti & Co., 22 Phil 152, March 18, 1912;

FACTS:

Three bill of lading were executed. To this end 3 bills of lading were executed (38, 39, and 76). The
steamer Sorsogo arrived at the port of Gubat on 28 November 1908 and as the lorcha Pilar the other
vessel to which the merchandise was to be transshipped for its transportation to Samar was not yet there.
The cargo was unloaded and stored in the defendant company’s warehouses at that port. The lorcha Pilar
arrived several days later and the merchandise owned by Sip and other goods were transported to
Catarman, Samar. On 5 December 1908, however, before the Pilar could leave for its destination a heavy
and strong wind caused the lorcha to wrecked and its cargo including Sip’s package were scattered.
Workmen of Inchausti tried to save the merchandize but it is already futile so they proceeded to have it
sold at public auction before a notary for the sum of P1,693.67 A complaint was filed against Inchausti
because the same neither carried nor delivered his merchandise to Ong Bieng Sip, in Catarman, but
unjustly and negligently failed to do so, with the result that the said merchandise was almost totally lost,
and thus claimed the value of the merchandise which was P20,000, legal interest thereon from 25
November 1908, and the cost of the suit. *include the lower court and appellate decision and ratio if
applicable *include as well the respective contentions/ allegations of the petitioner(s) and respondent(s)

ISSUE(S) :WON Inchausti is liable for the shipwreck?

HELD : NO. RTC- infavor of the Chinese man SC- The Supreme Court reversed the judgment appealed
from, and absolved Inchausti & Co., without special finding as to costs; holding that Inchausti is not liable
for the loss and damage of the goods shipped on the lorcha Pilar by the Chinaman, Ong Bieng Sip, in
asmuch as such loss and damage were the result of a fortuitous event or force majeure, and there was
no negligence or lack of care and diligence on the part of Inchausti or its agents.
19. Compania Maritima v. CA, 164 SCRA 685, August 29, 1988

Facts: Vicente Concepcion is doing business under the name of Consolidated Construction. Being a
Manila based contractor, Concepcion had to ship his construction equipment to Cagayan de Oro. On
August 28, 1964, Concepcion shipped 1 unit pay loader, 4 units of 6x6 Roe trucks, and 2 pieces of water
tanks. The aforementioned equipment was loaded aboard the MV Cebu, which left Manila on August 30,
1964 and arrived at Cagayan de Oro on September 1, 1964. The Reo trucks and water tanks were safely
unloaded however the pay loader suffered damage while being unloaded. The damaged pay loader was
taken to the petitioner’s compound in Cagayan de Oro.

Consolidated Construction thru Vicente Concepcion wrote Compania Maritima to demand a replacement
of the broken pay loader and also asked for damages. Unable to get a response, Concepcion sent
another demand letter. Petitioner meanwhile, sent the damaged payloader to Manila, it was weighed at
San Miguel Corporation, where it was found that the payloader actually weighed 7.5 tons and not 2.5 tons
as declared in its bill of lading. Due to this, petitioner denied the claim for damages of Consolidated
Construction. Consolidated then filed an action for damages against petitioner with the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint stating that the proximate cause
of the fall of the payloader which caused its damage was the act or omission of Vicente Concepcion for
misrepresenting the weight of the payloader as 2.5 tons instead of its true weight of 7.5 tons. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals, reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance and ordered the plaintiff to pay
Concepcion damages. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the act of respondent Concepcion of misdeclaring the true weight of the payloader
the proximate and only cause of the damage of the payloader?

Held: No, Compania Maritima is liable for the damage to the payloader. The General rule under Articles
1735 and 1752 of the Civil Code is that common carriers are presumed to be at fault or to have acted
negligently in case the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed, or had deteriorated. To overcome
the presumption of liability for the loss destruction or deterioration common carriers must prove that they
have exercised extraordinary diligence as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code.

Extraordinary Diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the common
carrier to know and follow the required precaution fro avoiding damage or destruction of the goods
entrusted to it for safe carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render service with the
greatest skill and foresight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristics of
goods tendered for shipment and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage including such
methods as their nature requires.

The Supreme Court further held that the weight in a bill of lading are prima facie evidence of the amount
received and the fact that the weighing was done by another will not relieve the common carrier where it
accepted such weight and entered it in on the bill of lading. The common carrier can protect themselves
against mistakes in the bill of lading as to weight by exercising extraordinary diligence before issuing
such.
20. Government of the Philippines v. Ynchausti & Co. 40 Phil 219, September 29, 1919
21. Ganzon v. CA, 161 SCRA 646, May 30, 1988

FACTS: Gelacio > Ganzon (via Capt. Niza) > Lighter “Batman” (common carrier) (loaded half)

November 28, 1956: Gelacio Tumambing (Gelacio) contracted the services of of Mauro B. Ganzon to
haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of Manila on board the light LCT “Batman”
December 1, 1956: Gelacio delivered the scrap iron to Filomeno Niza, captain of the lighter, for loading
which was actually begun on the same date by the crew of the lighter under the captain’s supervisor.
When about half of the scrap iron was already loaded, Mayor Jose Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan arrived
and demanded P5000 from Gelacio Upon resisting, the Mayor fired at Gelacio so he had to be taken to
the hospital Loading of the scrap iron was resumed December 4, 1956: Acting Mayor Basilio Rub (Rub),
accompanied by 3 policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza and his crew to dump the scrap iron where
the lighter was docked Later on Rub had taken custody of the scrap iron. RTC: in favor of Gelacio and
against Ganzon

ISSUE: W/N Ganzon should be held liable under the contract of carriage

HELD: YES. Petition is DENIED. Ganzon thru his employees, actually received the scraps is freely
admitted. Pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery,
actual or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them.
The fact that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter did not impair the said
contract of transportation as the goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier, albeit still
unloaded. failed to show that the loss of the scraps was due to any of the following causes enumerated in
Article 1734 of the Civil Code, namely:

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;

(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;

(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;

(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;

(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

Hence, the petitioner is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. By reason of this
presumption, the court is not even required to make an express finding of fault or negligence before it
could hold the petitioner answerable for the breach of the contract of carriage. exempted from any liability
had he been able to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods in his
custody, according to all the circumstances of the case, or that the loss was due to an unforeseen event
or to force majeure. As it was, there was hardly any attempt on the part of the petitioner to prove that he
exercised such extraordinary diligence.

We cannot sustain the theory of caso fortuito - "order or act of competent public authority"(Art. 1174 of the
Civil Code) no authority or power of the acting mayor to issue such an order was given in evidence.
Neither has it been shown that the cargo of scrap iron belonged to the Municipality of Mariveles. Ganzon
was not duty bound to obey the illegal order to dump into the sea the scrap iron.

Moreover, there is absence of sufficient proof that the issuance of the same order was attended with such
force or intimidation as to completely overpower the will of the petitioner's employees. The mere difficulty
in the fullfilment of the obligation is not considered force majeure.
22. Quisumbing, SR. v. CA, 189 SCRA 605, September14, 1990

FACTS:

Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. and Gunther Leoffler were among the passengers of PAL’s plane from Mactan
City to Manila.

Florencio Villarin, a Senior NBI agent who was also a passenger of the plane, noticed a certain Zaldy, a
suspect in the killing of Judge Valdez. Soon thereafter, Zaldy announced to the passengers and the pilots
that it was a hold-up and ordered the pilot not to send any SOS. The hold-uppers divested passengers of
their belongings including Quisumbing who was divested of jewelries and cash; and Leoffler who was
divested of a wrist watch, cash and wallet. Upon landing at Manila, Zaldy and his 3 companions
succeeded in escaping.

Quisumbing and Leoffler made demands to PAL to indemnify them but PAL refused averring that it is not
liable to them.

Plaintiffs filed a suit against PAL contending that the loss is a result of breach of PAL’s contractual
obligation to carry them and their belongings and effects to Manila without loss or damage, and
constitutes a serious dereliction of PAL’s legal dut y to exercise extraordinary diligence.

PAL denied liability alleging that the robbery constitute force majeure, and neither of the plaintiffs had
notified PAL that they were in possession of cash and valuable jewelries and watches or surrendered said
items to the crew on board the aircraft.

Trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint because they did not notify defendant that they were in

possession of the cash, jewelries and wallet they are claiming; and that the robbery is a force majeure for
which the defendant is not liable because robbers were able to gain entrance to the plane with the guns
they used already in their possession, which fact could not have been prevented nor avoided by the
defendant since it was not authorized to search its passengers for firearms and deadly weapons.

CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. PAL could not be faulted for want of diligence for failing to take

positive measures to implement regulations prohibiting civilians from carrying firearms on board aircrafts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is negligence of the part of the PAL crew occurring before and exposing them to
hijacking.

HELD: No.Hijackers do not board an airplane through blatant display of firepower. Firearms and grenades
are brought to the plane surreptitiously. The use of the most sophisticated electronic detection devices
may have minimized hijacking but still ineffective against truly determined hijackers. The evidence fail to
prove any want of diligence on the part of PAL or it had failed to comply with the applicable regulations or
universally accepted and observed procedures to preclude highjacking; and the particular act singled out
by the petitioners is not negligent acts sufficient to overcome the force majeure nature of armed robbery.
23. Lu do vs. Binamara, 101 Phil 120, April 22, 1957
24. Ganzon v. CA, 161 SCRA 646, May 30, 1988

Ganzon v. CA

Facts: Tumambing contracted the services of Ganzon for the latter to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from
Mariveles, Bataan to the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT “Batman”. Accordingly, Ganzon sent his
lighter “Batman” to Mariveles. Tumambing then delivered the scrap iron for loading to Filomeno Niza, the
lighter’s captain. However, when about half of the scrap iron was being loaded, Mayor Advincula of
Mariveles, Bataan, demanded P5,000 from Tumambing. The latter refused, an altercation started, until
Mayor Advincula fired his gun at Tumambing, who was later brought to a hospital in Balanga, Bataan.
After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron resumed. However, Acting Mayor Basilio Rub, accompanied
by 3 policemen, ordered Captain Niza and its crew to dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked.
The remaining scrap iron was confiscated and brought to the compound of NASSCO. A receipt was
issued by the Acting Mayor stating that he had taken custody of the scrap iron. Hence, Tumambing filed
an action against Ganzon for damages based on culpa contractual. Ganzon claims that he should not be
liable because the scrap iron has not been unconditionally placed under his custody and control.

Issue Whether or not Ganzon is liable for Tumambing’s loss.

Ruling Yes, Ganzon is liable. Ratio Decidendi There is no dispute that the scrap iron was already
delivered to Ganzon’s carrier and received by Captain Niza and the crew. By the said act of delivery, the
scrap iron was already deemed to be unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common
carrier and upon their receipt, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected. Consequently, petitioner-
carrier’s extraordinary responsibility for the loss or deterioration of the goods commenced. According to
Art 1736 of the NCC, such responsibility will only cease upon the actual or constructive delivery to the
consignee or any person who has a right to receive the goods. However, in this case, the same is not true
since the scrap iron remained in the custody and control of the carrier, albeit still unloaded. Ganzon may
be exempt from liability if the loss of the scrap iron was due to any of the causes enumerated under Art.
1734 of the NCC. However, Ganzon was not able to prove the same. Art 1743 provides as follows: Art.
1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the
same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural
disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act of omission
of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority. Lastly, the SC cannot sustain Ganzon’s claim
that the cause of the loss was a caso fortuito considering that in the courts below, his defense was that
the loss of the scrap iron was due to an “order or act of a competent public authority”. Such change in
theory o n appeal cannot be allowed. In any case, the intervention of the municipal officials is not of such
character as would render the fulfilment of Ganzon’s obligation impossible. According to the SC, the
scrap iron could have still been delivered in accordance with the contract of carriage after the dispute has
been settled.
25. Macam v. CA, G.R. No. 125524, August 25, 1999

Facts: Benito Macam, doing business under name Ben-Mac Enterprises, shipped on board vessel Nen-
Jiang, owned and operated by respondent China Ocean Shipping Co. through local agent Wallem
Philippines Shipping Inc., 3,500 boxes of watermelon covered by Bill of Lading No. HKG 99012, and
1,611 boxes of fresh mangoes covered by Bill of Lading No. HKG 99013. The shipment was bound for
Hongkong with PAKISTAN BANK as consignee and Great Prospect Company of Rowloon (GPC) as
notify party. Upon arrival in Hongkong, shipment was delivered by respondent WALLEM directly to GPC,
not to PAKISTAN BANK and without the required bill of lading having been surrendered. Subsequently,
GPC failed to pay PAKISTAN BANK, such that the latter, still in possession of original bill of lading,
refused to pay petitioner thru SOLIDBANK. Since SOLIDBANK already pre-paid the value of shipment, it
demanded payment from respondent WALLEM but was refused. MACAM constrained to return the
amount paid by SOLIDBANK and demanded payment from WALLEM but to no avail. WALLEM submitted
in evidence a telex dated 5 April 1989 as basis for delivering the cargoes to GPC without the bills of
lading and bank guarantee. The telex instructed delivery of various shipments to the respective
consignees without need of presenting the bill of lading and bank guarantee per the respective shipper’s
request since “for prepaid shipt ofrt charges already fully paid.” MACAM, however, argued that, assuming
there was such an instruction, the consignee referred to was PAKISTAN BANK and not

GPC. The RTC ruled for MACAM and ordered value of shipment. CA reversed RTC’s decision.

Issue: Are the respondents liable to the petitioner for releasing the goods to GPC without the bills of
lading or bank guarantee?

Held: It is a standard maritime practice when immediate delivery is of the essence, for shipper to request
or instruct the carrier to deliver the goods to the buyer upon arrival at the port of destination without
requiring presentation of bill of lading as that usually takes time. Thus, taking into account that subject
shipment consisted of perishable goods and SOLIDBANK pre-paid the full amount of value thereof, it is
not hard to believe the claim of respondent WALLEM that petitioner indeed requested the release of the
goods to GPC without presentation of the bills of lading and bank guarantee. To implement the said telex
instruction, the delivery of the shipment must be to GPC, the notify party or real importer/buyer of the
goods and not the PAKISTANI BANK since the latter can very well present the original Bills of Lading in
its possession. Likewise, if it were the PAKISTANI BANK to whom the cargoes were to be strictly
delivered, it will no longer be proper to require a bank guarantee as a substitute for the Bill of Lading. To
construe otherwise will render meaningless the telex instruction. After all, the cargoes consist of
perishable fresh fruits and immediate delivery thereof the buyer/importer is essentially a factor to reckon
with. We emphasize that the extraordinary responsibility of the common carriers lasts until actual or
constructive delivery of the cargoes to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them.
PAKISTAN BANK was indicated in the bills of lading as consignee whereas GPC was the notify party.
However, in the export invoices GPC was clearly named as buyer/importer. Petitioner also referred to
GPC as such in his demand letter to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court. This
premise draws us to conclude that the delivery of the cargoes to GPC as buyer/importer which,
conformably with Art. 1736 had, other than the consignee, the right to receive them was proper.
26. Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, 8Z23 SCRA 24, April 4, 1968

FACTS:

Consorcio Pesquero del Peru of South America – shipped freight pre-paid jute bags of Peruvian fish meal
through SS Crowborough; cargo, consigned to San Miguel Brewery, Inc.and insured by Home Insurance
Co. arrived in Manila and was discharged into the lighters of Luzon Stevedoring Co.; when the cargo was
delivered to consignee San Miguel, there were shortages amounting to P12K, causing the latter to lay
claims against Luzon Stevedoring, Home Insurance and the American Steamship Agencies, owner and
operatorof SS Crow borough.

Home Insurance paid the consignee; it filed against American Steamship Agencies, Inc. and Luzon
Stevedoring Corp a complaint for recovery of a sum of money with legal interest

Section 2, paragraph 2 of the charter party, provides that the owner is liable for loss or damage to the
goods caused by personal want of due diligence on its part or its managerto make the vessel in all
respects seaworthy and to secure that she be properly manned, equipped and supplied or by the
personal act or default of the owner or its manager. Said paragraph, however, exempts the owner of the
vessel from any loss or damage or delay arising from any other source, even from the neglect or fault of
the captain or crew orsome other person employed by the owner on board, for whose acts the owner
would ordinarily be liable except for said paragraph.

ISSUE:

WON the stipulation in the charter party of the owner’s non-liability is valid so as to absolve the American
Steamship Agencies from liability for loss

HELD:

Yes. A common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person only,
becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting theowner from liability for the
negligence of its agent is not against public policy, and is deemed valid.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------
27. H.E. Heacock Co. v. Macondary & Co., 42 Phil 205, October 3, 1921
28. Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. IAC, 150 SCRA 463

Doctrine:

When a carrier fails to establish any caso fortuito, the presumption by law of fault or negligence on the
part of the carrier applies.

Facts:

- 13 coils of uncoated 7-wire stress relived wire strand for prestressed concrete were shipped on board
the vessel “Japri Venture” (owned by Easter Shipping Lines) for delivery to Stresstek Post-Tensioning
Phils. in Manila. The cargo was insured by First Nationwide Assurance Corporation (FNAC).

- The vessel arrived in Manila and discharged the cargo to the custody of E.Razon Inc., from whom the
consignee’s customs broker received it for delivery to the consignee’s warehouse.

- It appears that while en route to Manila, the vessel encountered very rough seas and stormy weather
and the cargo stored in the lower hatch of the vessel was flooded with water about one foot deep. That
upon survey, it was found that several coils were rusty on one side and that the wetting of the cargo was
caused by fresh water that entered the hatch when the vessel encountered heavy weather.

- FNAC paid Stresstek about Php 172K for damage and loss to the insured cargo.

- Being subrogated to the rights of Stresstek, FNAC now seeks o recover from Eastern what it has
indemnified Stresstek less the salvage value of the goods, or the total of about Php 124K.

- The RTC ordered for the dismissal of the case.

Upon appeal, the CA held that Eastern is liable to FNAC.

Issue: Whether Easter should be held liable even if it claims that the shipment was discharged and
delivered complete into the custody of the arrastre operator under clean tally sheets.

Held:- YES. In arriving at the decision, the SC agreed with the CA on its findings and conclusions.

- The heavy seas and rains referred to in the master’s report were not caso fortuito, but normal
occurrences that an ocean going vessel, particularly in the month of September which, in our area, is a
month of rains and heavy seas would encounter as a matter of routine. They are not unforeseen nor
unforeseeable. These are conditions that ocean-going vessels would encounter and provide for, in the
ordinary course of voyage.

- The rain water (not sea water) found its way into Japri Venture is a clear indication that care and
foresight did not attend the closing of the ship’s hatches so that rain water would not find its way into the
cargo,

- Since Easter has failed to establish any caso fortuito, the presumption of fault or negligence on the
part of the carrier applies; and the carrier must present evidence that it has observed the extraordinary
diligence required in Art. 1733 to escape liability.

The SC held that the presumption that the cargo was in apparent good condition when it was delivered by
the vessel to the arrastre operation by the clean tally sheets has been overturned. The evidence is clear
to the effect that the damage to the cargo was suffered while aboard petitioner’s vessel.
29. Everett Steamship Corp. v. CA, 297 SCRA 496, October 8, 1988

FACTS: Hernandez Trading Co., Inc. (Hernandez) imported 3 crates of bus spare parts (MARCO C/No.
12, MARCO C/No. 13 and MARCO C/No. 14), from Maruman Trading Company, Ltd. (Maruman), a
foreign corporation based in Japan. The crates (covered by Bill of Lading No. NGO53MN) were shipped
on board “ADELFAEVERETTE,” a vessel owned by Everett Orient Lines Upon arrival at the port of
Manila, it was discovered that the crate marked MARCO C/No. 14 was missing Hernandez made a formal
claim for Y1,552,500.00, as shown in an Invoice No. MTM-941, dated November 14, 1991 Everett
Streamship Corp. offered to pay only Y100,000.00 the maximum amount stipulated under Clause 18 of
the covering bill of lading Hernandez rejected the offer and thereafter instituted a suit for collection Trial
Court: in favor of Hernandez. CA: Affirmed but deleted the award of attorney’s fees

ISSUE: W/N the limited liability clause in the Bill of Lading is valid

W/N Hernandez as consignee, who is not a signatory to the bill of lading is bound by the stipulations
thereof

HELD: 1. YES. A stipulation in the bill of lading limiting the common carrier’s liability for loss or destruction
of a cargo to a certain sum, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is sanctioned by law,
particularly Articles 1749 and 1750 of the Civil Code which provide:

ART. 1749. A stipulation that the common carrier’s liability is limited to the value of the goods appearing
in the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding.

ART. 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and
has been freely and fairly agreed upon.

Maruman Trading, had the option to declare a higher valuation if the value of its cargo was higher than
the limited liability of the carrier. Considering that the shipper did not declare a higher valuation, it had
itself to blame for not complying with the stipulations.

The trial court’s ratiocination that private respondent could not have “fairly and freely” agreed to the
limited liability clause in the bill of lading because the said conditions were printed in small letters does
not make the bill of lading invalid. contracts of adhesion are valid and binding Greater vigilance, however,
is required of the courts when dealing with contracts of adhesion in that the said contracts must be
carefully scrutinized “in order to shield the unwary (or weaker party) from deceptive schemes contained in
ready-made covenant Article 24 of the Civil Code which mandates that “(i)n all contractual, property or
other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his
protection

Maruman Trading, we assume, has been extensively engaged in the trading business. It can not be said
to be ignorant of the business transactions it entered into involving the shipment of its goods to its
customers. The shipper could not have known, or should know the stipulations in the bill of lading and
there it should have declared a higher valuation of the goods shipped. Moreover, Maruman Trading has
not been heard to complain that it has been deceived or rushed into agreeing to ship the cargo in
petitioner’s vessel. In fact, it was not even impleaded in this case.

2. YES. the right of a party in the same situation as Hernandez, to recover for loss of a shipment
consigned to him under a bill of lading drawn up only by and between the shipper and the carrier, springs
from either a relation of agency that may exist between him and the shipper or consignor, or his status as
stranger in whose favor some stipulation is made in said contract, and who becomes a party thereto when
he demands fulfillment of that stipulation, in this case the delivery of the goods or cargo shipped When
Hernandez formally claimed reimbursement for the missing goods from Everett and subsequently filed a
case against the it based on the very same bill of lading, it accepted the provisions of the contract and
thereby made itself a party thereto, or at least has come to court to enforce it.[ The commercial Invoice
No. MTM-941 does not in itself sufficiently and convincingly show that Everett has knowledge of the value
of the cargo as contended by Hernandez.
30. Alitalia v. IAC, 192 SCRA 9, December 4, 1990
31. Sarkies Tours Phil., Inc. v. CA, 280 SCRA 58, October 2, 1997

FACTS:

Fatima boarded Sarkies Tours’ bus in Manila on her way to Legazpi City. She had her 3pieces of luggage
containing all of her optometry review books, materials and equipment, rial lenses, trial contact lenses,
passport and visa, as well as her mother Marisol’s U.S. immigration (green) card, among other important
documents and personal belongings loaded in the bus’ luggage compartment. During a stopover at Daet,
it was discovered that only one bag remained in the open compartment. The others, including Fatima’s
things, were missing and might have dropped along the way.

Fatima filed an action against Sarkies Tours, claiming that the loss was due to its failure to observe
extraordinary diligence in the care of her luggage and that Sarkies Tours dealt with them in bad faith from
the start

ISSUE:WON Sarkies Tours is liable

HELD:Yes. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them, and this
liability lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the
carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
person who has a right to receive them, unless the loss is due to any of the excepted causes under Art.
1734. The cause of the loss was Sarkies Tours’ negligence in not ensuring that the doors of the baggage
compartment of its bus were securely fastened. As a result of this lack of care, almost all of the luggage
was lost, to the prejudice of the paying passengers.
32. Laguna Tayabas Bus v. Tiongson, 16 SCRA 940, April 30, 1960;

33. Landicho v. BTC, 52 O.G. 764, Septemeber 20, 1956;

34. Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil 657, February 2, 1924;

35. La Mallorca v. De Jesus, 17 SCRA 23, May 14, 1966;

36. Aboitiz Shipping v. CA, GR No. 84458, November 6, 1989;

37. Jesusa Vda Nueca, et al. v. Manila Railroad Company, CA-No. 31731, 1968;

38. LRTA v. Natvidad, GR. 145804, February 6, 2002

39. Sy v. Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. 102 Phil 482, November 29, 1957;

40. Mallari, Sr. v. CA, 324 SCRA 147, January 31, 2000

41. Lara v. Valencia, 104 Phil 65, June 30, 1958

42. De Gillaco v. MRR, 97 Phil 844, December 18, 1955

43. MRR c. Ballesteros, 16 SCRA 641, April 29, 1966;

44. Fortune Express, Inc. v. CA, 305 SCRA 14, March 18, 1999

45. Philippine National Railways v. CA, 139 SCRA 87, October 4, 1985;

46. Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. CA, 205 SCRA 574, October 7, 1991

47. Calalas v. CA, 332 SCRA 356, May 31, 2000;

48. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. CA, GR. No. L-58897, December 1987

49. Aboitiz Shipping Corp., v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp GR. 100446

50. Rubiso v. Rivera, 37 Phil 72, October 30, 1917

51. Luzon Stevedoring v. Escano, 154 SCRA 169

52. Caltex v. Sulpicio Lines, GR. No. 131166, September 1999

53. Planters Products Inc. v. CA, 263 SCRA 476, September 15, 1993