EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 131384-87. February 2, 2000.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . ELEGIO NADERA,

JR. y SADSAD , accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. has four children by his wife Daisy. Daisy left for a job
in Bahrain. After working abroad for several years, she returned home and learned that her
two daughters had been raped by no less than her own husband and their own father,
herein accused-appellant. Thereupon, they went to the police authorities of Naujan and
filed a complaint against accused-appellant. Four informations charging accused-
appellant with rape on various dates were filed in the Regional Trial Court. Accused-
appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. The trial court, however, rendered judgment
finding accused-appellant guilty of four counts of rape against his daughters. He was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and three death penalties for the
rapes committed. In this automatic review, the accused-appellant's lone assignment of
error was that the trial court accepted his plea of guilty to a capital offense without making
a searching inquiry to determine whether he understood the consequences of his plea.
According to the Supreme Court, the warnings given by the trial court in this case fell short
of the requirement that it must make a searching inquiry to determine whether accused-
appellant understood fully the import of his guilty plea. Clearly, the plea of guilty of
accused in this case was made improvidently. Convictions based on an improvident plea
of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. The Supreme Court
found it necessary to set aside the decision of the trial court and remand the case for
proper arraignment and trial of the accused, considering not only the accused's
improvident plea of guilt but also his lawyer's neglect in representing his cause.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PLEA OF GUILTY TO CAPITAL OFFENSE;

THINGS ENJOINED UPON THE TRIAL COURT UPON ENTRY THEREOF. — Under this Rule,
three things are enjoined upon the trial court when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is
entered: (1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea
and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must
require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability; and, (3) the court must ask the accused if he desires to
present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCHING INQUIRY, CONSTRUED. — What constitutes a searching
inquiry, as explained in People vs. Alicando, 321 Phil. 657 (1995) is that the plea of guilt
must be based on a free and informed judgment. Hence, a searching inquiry must focus
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences
of the plea.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT THEREOF UPON CONVICTION. — Convictions based on an
improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If
the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the
conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of
the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.
4. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; REQUIRED FORMS AND CONTENTS THEREOF; NOT COMPLIED
WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — Except for the narration of the prosecution's evidence and a bare
recital of R.A. No. 7659, amending Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, there is nothing else
to indicate the reason for the decision. There is no evaluation of the evidence and no
reason given why the court found the testimonies of the witnesses credible. Rule 120 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: "Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment. —
The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by
the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the
facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based. If
it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there be any; (b) participation of the
accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there be any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has
been reserved or waived. In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on
the civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party." In People vs. Bugarin, 339
Phil. 570, 579-580 (1997) the Court stated: "The requirement that the decisions of courts
must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, to
inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals,
he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law
with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties
that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is,
thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by
ipse dixir. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless
vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property
of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained
public confidence in the justness of his decision. The decision of the trial court in this case
disrespects the judicial function."aACEID

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT TO

COUNSEL; CONSTRUED. — Only faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards his
client can give meaning and substance to the accused's right to due process and to be
presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Hence, a lawyer's duty, especially that of a
defense counsel, must not be taken lightly. It must be performed with all the zeal and vigor
at his command to protect and safeguard the accused's fundamental rights. In the case of
People vs. Bernas, no less than three PAO lawyers were found by the Court to have failed in
performing their duties to their client, an accused charged with raping his daughter. The
first lawyer inexplicably waived the cross examination of the private complainant and latter
asked to be relieved of her duties as counsel de oficio. A second lawyer appointed by the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 court missed several hearings during the trial and could no longer be located. The third
PAO lawyer appointed by the trial court accepted his duties reluctantly and later ceased to
appear for the accused. This Court held that: "The right to counsel must be more than just
the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions
and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal
assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and
acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic
rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case and his knowing the fundamental
procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel
finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client.
Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation." Measured by this standard, the defense counsel's conduct in
this case falls short of the quality of advocacy demanded of him, considering the gravity of
the offense charged and the finality of the penalty.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS; CROSS-EXAMINATION;
USED TO TEST CREDIBILITY; CASE AT BAR. — It bears pointing out that in rape cases, it is
often the word of the complainant against that of the accused, the two being the only
persons present during the commission of the offense. While the lone testimony of the
victim is sufficient to convict the accused, such testimony must be clear, positive,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
Complainant's testimony cannot be accepted with precipitate credulity without denying
the accused's constitutional right to be presumed innocent. This is where cross
examination becomes essential to test the credibility of the witnesses, expose falsehoods
or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may
successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which
create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus to give substance to the
constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him. For unless
proven otherwise to be guilty beyond all reasonable doubt, the accused is presumed to be
innocent.

DECISION

MENDOZA , J : p

These cases are before us on automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 40, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, finding accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. guilty of
four counts of rape of his minor daughters, Oleby and Maricris Nadera, and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for one count of rape and death for each of the
remaining three counts. Accused-appellant was also ordered to indemnify complainants
Oleby Nadera in the amount of P150,000.00 and Maricris Nadera in the amount of
P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. cdll

Reversal of the decision is sought on the sole ground that —

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ACCEPTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
IMPROVIDENT PLEA OF GUILTY TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE AND IN FAILING TO
CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE ACCUSED
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE CONSEQUENCE OF HIS PLEA. 1

The facts are as follows:

Accused-appellant Elegio Nadera, Jr. has four children by his wife Daisy, namely: Oleby,
born on October 2, 1982; Maricris, born on March 16, 1984; March Anthony, born on
January 8, 1986; and Sherilyn, born on September 27, 1987. 2
On September 22, 1991, Daisy left for a job in Bahrain, and came home to the Philippines
for vacation only in July 1993. She then left again for Bahrain in September 1993 and did
not return until September 12, 1995. 3
On April 28, 1996, Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor, Lita Macalalad, told their
mother that they had been raped by their father, herein accused-appellant. Thereupon, they
went to the police authorities of Naujan and filed a complaint against accused-appellant. 4
After preliminary examination, on June 6, 1996, four informations charging accused-
appellant with rape on various dates were filed in the Regional Trial Court, Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro.
In Criminal Case No. C-4982, the information 5 alleged —
That on or about the 17th day of May, 1992, at around 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, at Barangay Bayani, Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental
Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd design, and by means of force
and intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with his daughter, OLEBY NADERA, nine (9) years of age
at that time against the latter's will and consent.

In Criminal Case No. C-4983, the information 6 charged —

That on or about the 17th day of April, 1995 at Barangay Bayani, Municipality of
Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd
design, and by means of force and intimidation, wilfully, and unlawfully and
feloniously did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge with his daughter,
OLEBY NADERA, twelve (12) years of age at that time against the latter's will and
consent.

In Criminal Case No. C-4984, the information 7 stated —

That on or about the 24th day of April, 1995, sometime in the evening, at
Barangay Bayani, Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, motivated by lust and lewd design, and by means of force and
intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with his daughter, OLEBY NADERA, twelve (12) years of age at
that time against the latter's will and consent.
cdrep

In Criminal Case No. C-4985, the information 8 recited —

That on or about the 3rd day of March 1996 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening,
at Barangay Bayani, Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, motivated by lust and lewd design, and by means of force and
intimidation, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeeded in having
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 carnal knowledge with his daughter, MARICRIS NADERA, eleven (11) years of age
against the latter's will and consent.

The record shows that at his arraignment on July 23, 1996, accused-appellant, assisted by
Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty to the charges
filed against him. 9 However, on August 5, 1997, after the prosecution had presented Dr.
Cynthia S. Fesalbon, accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the crime charged in all the
informations.
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Dr. Cynthia Fesalbon, Oleby Nadera,
Maricris Nadera, and Daisy Nadera.
Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, Medical Officer IV of the Oriental Mindoro Provincial Hospital, who
conducted the medical examination of both complainants, submitted a report on the result
of Oleby Nadera's examination as follows: 10
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
- No sign of external physical injuries as of time of examination.
- Breast developed

- Abdomen: flat, soft non-tender.

EXTERNAL GENITALIA

- minimal pubic hair

- Healed incomplete hymenal lacerations at 5, 7, 12 o'clock positions.

- No bleeding.
INTERNAL SPECULUM EXAMINATION
- Vagina admits 2 fingers with ease.

- Cervix small, firm, close non-tender (-) bleeding.

- Uterus not enlarged.

- Adnexae negative
LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

- Smear for the presence of spermatozoa revealed positive result.

She testi ed that the hymenal lacerations may have been caused by the insertion of a
hard object, the patient's history of genitalic insertions, a straddle injury, or sitting on
hard wood. She could not determine when these lacerations were sustained because
they had healed over a period beyond seven days. 11
Dr. Fesalbon likewise rendered a report 12 on the medical examination of Maricris Nadera,
the pertinent parts of which state:
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:

- No sign of external physical injuries as of time of examination.

- Abdomen, flat, soft.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 EXTERNAL GENITALIA:

- Absence of pubic hair healed hymenal lacerations, incomplete at 1, 5,

8, 11 o'clock positions.
INTERNAL EXAMINATION:

- Vagina admits 1 finger with ease.

- Cervix small (-) bleeding

- Uterus not enlarged.

- Adnexae (-).
LABORATORY EXAMINATION
- Smear for the presence of spermatozoa revealed
Negative result.

In the case of Maricris Nadera, Dr. Fesalbon explained that the hymenal lacerations could
have been caused by penetration such as through instrumentation or insertion of an object
inside the vagina. They could also have been caused by the penetration of the penis. Upon
inquiry from the court, Dr. Fesalbon stated that the fact that Maricris had more hymenal
lacerations than Oleby could be due to the difference in the impact of penetration. She
added that the number of times each of the girls had sexual intercourse could not be
ascertained merely from the hymenal lacerations, although it could be concluded that an
object had been inserted in the vagina. 13
Oleby Nadera testified about the rapes committed by her father against her as follows: cdasia

On May 17, 1992, at around 10 o'clock in the evening, while Daisy was away working as a
domestic helper in Bahrain, accused-appellant pulled Oleby, then nine years of age,
towards a bed, removed her panties and shorts and ordered her to keep quiet. He then
placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. He proceeded to make
an up and down motion while on top of his daughter. All the while, Oleby was crying,
pleading with her father, "Huwag po!", Huwag po!" Accused-appellant again ordered Oleby
to keep quiet lest her brother and sisters were awakened. Afterwards, accused-appellant
told Oleby to put on her panties and shorts and to go to sleep. Oleby went to the bed
where her brother and sisters were sleeping and cried.
On another occasion, on April 17, 1995, accused-appellant sent Sherilyn and Maricris to the
sari-sari store while he asked March Anthony to gather firewood. While Oleby was left
alone inside their house in Barangay Bayani, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, accused-appellant
again raped her. Oleby was 12 years old at that time. Accused-appellant closed the door
and windows, removed Oleby's panties and shorts and sat down. While sitting down,
accused-appellant placed Oleby's legs on his thighs and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Later on, he told Oleby to put on her panties and shorts and told her to fetch her brother
and sisters.
Oleby was raped by her father for the third time on April 24, 1995. That evening, she woke
up to find her father on top of her, taking off her shorts and panties and inserting his penis
into her vagina. As her father was taking off her clothes, Oleby cried and pleaded, "Huwag
po! Huwag po!" Instead of desisting, accused-appellant told her to keep quiet so as not to
awaken her brother and sisters, and threatened her with harm if she made any noise.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 Accused-appellant then made a pumping motion, consummating the sexual act with his
daughter. 14
After Oleby's direct examination had been finished, Atty. Brotonel, accused-appellant's
counsel, did not conduct any cross examination on the ground that he was convinced
Oleby was telling the truth. 15
On that same day, Maricris also testified. She related how she was raped by her father on
March 3, 1996, the year before, when she was 11 years old. At about eight o'clock in the
evening of said date, while her brother and sisters were sleeping, she was pulled by her
father towards his bed and told to lie down. Accused-appellant then placed himself on top
of Maricris and inserted his penis into her vagina. Maricris pleaded "Papa, huwag po,
maawa naman kayo sa amin." Ignoring his daughter's pleas, accused-appellant continued
raping her by making a pumping motion and threatened to kill all of them if she cried.
Accused-appellant afterwards asked Maricris to put on her shorts and panties and return
to bed. He told Maricris not to cry so as not to awaken her siblings. She did not tell anyone
what befell her because she was afraid. A neighbor, named Lita Macalalad, asked her if
Oleby had been raped by their father. It turned out Oleby had told her ordeal to Lita
Macalalad while they were washing clothes and talking about Oleby's parents. Oleby also
told Lita Macalalad that Maricris had been raped by their father as well, a fact related to
Oleby by Maricris. 16
Daisy Nadera, accused-appellant's wife, also testified for the prosecution. Her testimony
focused on the dates of births of her children and the fact that she was out of the country
when the alleged rapes occurred. She testified that she and her daughters filed a
complaint for rape against accused-appellant after discovering his hideous acts.
Thereafter, her children were subjected to a medical examination. 17

On August 12, 1997, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence and
rested its case thereafter. prcd

Accused-appellant did not present any evidence in his defense.

On August 27, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of
four counts of rape against his daughters. The dispositive portion of its decision 18 reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds accused Elegio Nadera, Jr., guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Rape [4 counts] with the qualifying
circumstance that the victims are under 18 years of age and the offender is a
parent. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
ranging from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years for the rape committed on May 17,
1992 and three DEATH PENALTIES for the rape committed on April 17 and 24,
1995 and March 3, 1996, together with the accessory penalties provided by law.
He is also ordered to indemnify victim Oleby Nadera the total amount of
P150,000.00 in Criminal Case Nos. C-4982, C-4983 and C-4984 and Maricris
Nadera, the amount of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. C-4985, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

As already stated, accused-appellant's lone assignment of error is that the trial court
accepted his plea of guilty to a capital offense without making a searching inquiry to
determine whether he understood the consequences of his plea. In support of his
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 contention, accused-appellant invokes the ruling in the case of People v. Dayot 19 in which
this Court ruled that, in criminal cases, the judge must be convinced that the accused, in
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. This could be done by requiring him to narrate the events
leading to the crime, making him reenact it, or asking him to supply missing details. The
judge must satisfy himself that: (1) the accused is voluntarily pleading guilty, and (2) he is
truly guilty and there is a rational basis for a finding of guilt based on his testimony.
We find merit in accused-appellant's allegations. In addition, we find that there was
inadequate representation of his case in court, thus necessitating the remand of this case
for further proceedings.
I.
Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his
plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of
culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf.

Under this Rule, three things are enjoined upon the trial court when a plea of guilty to a
capital offense is entered: (1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences
thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt
of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and, (3) the court must ask the
accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires. 20
What constitutes a searching inquiry, as explained in People v. Alicando, 21 is that the plea
of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Hence, a searching inquiry must
focus on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea.
In the case at bar, the record does not show what exactly transpired at the re-arraignment
of accused-appellant, for what reason he changed his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty," and
whether he fully understood the consequences of his guilty plea. The only indication in the
record that accused-appellant changed his plea to guilty is the Certificates of Re-
Arraignment, dated August 5, 1997, in Criminal Case Nos. C-4982 to C-4985. 22 On what
exactly accused-appellant said in entering his plea of guilty and what exactly he had been
told by the trial judge, the records shed no light. There is thus no evidence to show that
accused-appellant's guilty plea was voluntarily made or that he had fully understood the
consequences of such plea.
In its decision, the trial court described the manner in which the accused pleaded guilty,
thus: prcd

Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public

Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. However, on August 5,
1997, when these cases were called for pre-trial and trial, counsel for the accused
manifested that the accused, realizing the futility of entering into trial and
considering that he actually committed the acts complained of, intimated his
intention to enter a plea of guilty to the above-mentioned charges. The accused
was then asked by this Court if he was aware of the consequences of a plea of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 guilty to a capital offense: that for the rape he committed on May 17, 1992
against his daughter, Oleby Nadera, who was 9 years old at the time, he would be
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and for the three other counts of rape committed
on April 17 and 24, 1995 [both against Oleby Nadera] and on March 3, 1996
[against Maricris Nadera, 11 years old at the time], he would be sentenced to
death by lethal injection. After having been informed of this, he insisted that he is
willing to enter a plea of guilty to the crimes charged and is ready to face the
consequences thereof. 23

The warnings given by the trial court in this case fall short of the requirement that it must
make a searching inquiry to determine whether accused-appellant understood fully the
import of his guilty plea. As has been said, a mere warning that the accused faces the
supreme penalty of death is insufficient. 24 For more often than not, an accused pleads
guilty upon bad advice or because he hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty. The
trial judge must erase such mistaken impressions. 25 He must be completely convinced
that the guilty plea made by the accused was not made under duress or promise of
reward. The judge must ask the accused the manner the latter was arrested or detained,
and whether he was assisted by counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations. In addition, the defense counsel should also be asked whether he conferred
with the accused and completely explained to him the meaning and the consequences of a
plea of guilt. Furthermore, since the age, educational attainment and socio-economic
status of the accused may reveal insights for a proper verdict in the case, the trial court
must ask questions concerning them. 26 In this case, absent any showing that these
questions were put to accused-appellant, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been
undertaken by the trial court. cdphil

What the trial court did in this case, as described in its decision, is similar to what
happened in People v. Sevilleno. 27 In that case, the accused was charged with the rape
and homicide of a nine-year old girl. The accused pleaded guilty whereupon the judge
asked him questions: (1) Do you understand your plea of guilt? and (2) Do you know that
your plea of guilt could bring the death penalty? This Court held that these questions did
not constitute a searching inquiry.
. . . In every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense,
especially where he is an ignorant person with little or no education, the proper
and prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as are available and
necessary in support of the material allegations of the information, including the
aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge
himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused
really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and
consequences of his plea. 28

Clearly, the plea of guilty of accused-appellant in this case was made improvidently.
II.
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole
basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict
the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on
the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged. 29
As already stated, the prosecution evidence consisted of the testimonies of Oleby and
Maricris Nadera, the results of their medical examinations, and the testimonies of their
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 mother, Daisy, and the physician who conducted the medical examination of the two girls,
Dr. Cynthia Fesalbon. Certain circumstances present in this case, however, persuade us
that a remand of this case is necessary.
First. A perusal of the decision of the court reveals that the trial judge failed to state the
factual and legal reasons on which he based accused-appellant's conviction. Except for the
narration of the prosecution's evidence and a bare recital of R.A. No. 7659, amending Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code, there is nothing else to indicate the reason for the decision.
There is no evaluation of the evidence and no reason given why the court found the
testimonies of the witnesses credible. Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgment. — The judgment must be written in
the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by
him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or
admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
If it is of conviction, the judgment shall state (a) the legal qualification of the
offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attending the commission thereof, if there be any; (b)
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon
the accused; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to
be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there be any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived.

In case of acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment shall make a finding on the
civil liability of the accused in favor of the offended party.

In People v. Bugarin, 3 0 we stated:

The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they
must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based
serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of
the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point
out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with
which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties
that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing
him from deciding by ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by
the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing
judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must
ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the
justness of his decision. The decision of the trial court in this case disrespects the
judicial function.

Second. The cavalier attitude of accused-appellant's counsel, Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of

the Public Attorney's Office, cannot go unnoticed. It is discernible in (a) his refusal to cross
examine Oleby Nadera; (b) the manner in which he conducted Maricris Nadera's cross
examination; and, (c) his failure not only to present evidence for the accused but also to
inform the accused of his right to do so, if he desires. LLpr

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 Only faithful performance by counsel of his duty towards his client can give meaning and
substance to the accused's right to due process and to be presumed innocent until proven
otherwise. Hence, a lawyer's duty, especially that of a defense counsel, must not be taken
lightly. It must be performed with all the zeal and vigor at his command to protect and
safeguard the accused's fundamental rights.
In the case of People vs. Bermas, 31 no less than three PAO lawyers were found by the
Court to have failed in performing their duties to their client, an accused charged with
raping his daughter. The first lawyer inexplicably waived the cross examination of the
private complainant and later asked to be relieved of her duties as counsel de oficio. A
second lawyer appointed by the court missed several hearings during the trial and could
no longer be located. The third PAO lawyer appointed by the trial court accepted his duties
reluctantly and later ceased to appear for the accused. This Court held that:
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The
right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance
extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and
acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the
proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of
the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case and his knowing
the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right
of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his
sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly
decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.

Measured by this standard, the defense counsel's conduct in this case falls short of the
quality of advocacy demanded of him, considering the gravity of the offense charged and
the finality of the penalty. A glaring example of his manifest lack of enthusiasm for his
client's cause is his decision not to cross examine Oleby Nadera, as revealed in the
following portion of the records:
COURT:
Any cross?
ATTY. BROTONEL:
If Your Honor please, we are not conducting any cross-examination,
because this representation, from the demeanor of the witness, I am
convinced that she is telling the truth. 32

It may be so that defense counsel personally found Oleby's testimony to be believable.

Nonetheless, he had the bounden duty to scrutinize private complainant's testimony to
ensure that the accused's constitutional right to confront and examine the witnesses
against him was not rendered for naught.
It bears pointing out that in rape cases, it is often the word of the complainant against that
of the accused, the two being the only persons present during the commission of the
offense. While the lone testimony of the victim is sufficient to convict the accused, such
testimony must be clear, positive, convincing and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things. Complainant's testimony cannot be accepted with precipitate
credulity without denying the accused's constitutional right to be presumed innocent. 33
This is where cross examination becomes essential to test the credibility of the witnesses,
expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination
testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus to give
substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.
For unless proven otherwise to be guilty beyond all reasonable doubt, the accused is
presumed to be innocent. 34
Indeed, cross examining Oleby Nadera becomes indispensable if her testimony is viewed
together with the results of her medical examination. Oleby Nadera claimed that she was
last raped by her father on April 24, 1995. 35 Yet, the medical examination conducted on
her on April 30, 1996 36 revealed the presence of spermatozoa in the vaginal canal on that
date. This was a year after the last rape allegedly committed by her father. This evident
discrepancy leads to only one natural conclusion: Oleby engaged in sexual intercourse a
few days before she was examined. This raises a number of questions that bear upon the
credibility of Oleby as a witness and upon the guilt of accused-appellant. This may not
necessarily mean that she was lying when she said that on April 24, 1995 she had been
raped by accused-appellant, but it does indicate a necessity — that of cross examining her
in order to ferret out the truth. cdll

The same may be said of defense counsel's treatment of Maricris' testimony. While she
was cross examined by defense counsel, the examination was at best a half-hearted
attempt to comply with a lawyer's obligation, lacking the rigor and zeal required
considering that a man's life is at stake. The cross examination centered on what Maricris
did or did not do while she witnessed her sister being raped, and on her failure to report
the allegedly incestuous rapes against them. Said cross examination did not even touch
upon the specific details concerning the rape committed against her. Containing lurid
details as it may be, it was nonetheless important to probe Maricris' testimony, especially
since it was substantially similar to the first incident of rape narrated by her sister, and
thus raised the possibility that it was a rehearsed, if not concocted, story.
Lastly, not only did defense counsel fail to object to the documentary evidence presented
by the prosecution, according to the trial court's decision, he even expressed his
conformity to the admission of the same. Neither did he present any evidence on behalf of
accused-appellant. 37 Worse, nowhere in the records is it shown that accused-appellant
was informed, either by his counsel or by the court, of his right to present evidence, if he so
desires.
Atty. Brotonel, as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his client and protect his rights,
no matter how guilty or evil he perceives accused-appellant to be. The performance of this
duty was all the more imperative because the life of accused-appellant hangs in the
balance. His duty was no less because he was counsel de oficio.
In view of the foregoing, we find it necessary to remand the case for the proper
arraignment and trial of the accused, considering not only the accused's improvident plea
of guilt but also his lawyer's neglect in representing his cause. A new trial has been ordered
in criminal cases on the ground of retraction of witnesses, negligence or incompetency of
counsel, improvident plea of guilty, disqualification of an attorney de oficio to represent
the accused in the trial court, and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts
entered into by both the prosecution and the defense. 3 8
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated April 27, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40,
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, is hereby SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. C-4982, C-4983, C-
4984 and C-4985 are REMANDED to it for further proceedings in accordance with this
decision. The trial court is enjoined to conduct the proper trial of accused-appellant with all
deliberate speed upon receipt of the records of the cases. cdrep

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Rollo, p. 73.
2. TSN, pp. 3-8, Aug. 12, 1997.

3. Id., pp. 9-10.

4. Id., pp. 11-13.
5. Rollo, p. 10.
6. Id., p. 12.
7. Id., p. 14.
8. Id., p. 16.
9. Records of Criminal Case No. C-4982, p. 20.
10. Exh. A; Records of Criminal Case No. C-4982, p. 10.

11. TSN, pp. 9-10, Aug. 22, 1996.

12. Exh. B; Records of Criminal Case No. C-4985, p. 20.

13. Id., p. 16-17.

14. TSN, pp. 4-19, Aug. 6, 1997.
15. Id., p. 22.
16. Id., pp. 24-34.
17. TSN, pp. 1-13, Aug. 12, 1997.

18. Records of Criminal Case No. C-4982, p. 63; Decision, p. 7.

19. 187 SCRA 637 (1990).

20. People v. Bello, G.R. Nos. 130411-14, Oct. 13, 1999.

21. 321 Phil. 657 (1995).

22. Records of Criminal Case No. C-4982, pp. 49, 54-56.

23. Records of Criminal Case No. C-4982, pp. 58-59.

24. People v. Estomaca, 326 Phil. 429 (1996).
25. People v. Bello, supra.
26. People v. Estomaca, supra.
27. G.R. No. 129058, March 29, 1999.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 28. Ibid.
29. People v. Lakindanum, G.R. No. 127123, March 10, 1999.
30. 330 Phil. 570, 579-580 (1997).

31. G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999.

32. TSN, p. 22, August 6, 1997.

33. People v. Estrera, 285 SCRA 372 (1998).

34. People v. Pido, 200 SCRA 45 (1991).
35. TSN, p. 16, Aug. 6, 1997.

36. Exh. A.
37. Records of Criminal Case No. C-4982, p. 61.

38. People v. Del Mundo, 262 SCRA 266 (1996), citing Jose v. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA
257 (1976).

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com