Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
Petitioner Vs Vs Respondent: Third Division
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ , J : p
On April 13, 1992, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondent and against
the defendants, thus:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants, ordering the latter to jointly and severally pay the plaintiff
as follows:
SO ORDERED." 7
Upon motion for reconsideration by RCBC, the RTC, in an Order dated December 21,
1992, modi ed its Decision by absolving RCBC from any liability and dismissing the
complaint against it, thus:
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"Going into the merits of defendant bank's contention that it has valid and
meritorious defense which should ultimately exculpate it from any liability, jointly
and severally, with the other defendants, the Court, after a careful review of the
evidence on hand, reconsiders its Decision insofar as the said bank is concerned.
The valid exercise by the plaintiff of its right to rescind the contract of sale for the
purchase of the motor vehicle in question does not apply to defendant bank. Said
contract is effective only as against defendant Supercars Management and
Development Corporation, which must principally suffer the consequence of its
breach of the contract.
This Court likewise takes notice of the fact that since the motor vehicle
was voluntarily surrendered by the plaintiff and that defendant bank merely
exercised its right under the chattel mortgage law, no fault can be attributed to the
latter. The fact that the plaintiff sent a letter to the O ce of the City Sheriff of
Quezon City, copy furnished the bank, seeking the postponement of the auction
sale of the subject motor vehicle, will not and cannot be considered as a valid
ground to hold said bank liable for only exercising its rights under the law. At
most, the liability must really be imputed only against defendants Supercars
Management and Development Corporation, Mamerto Catley and Pablito
Marquez.
SO ORDERED." 8
From the above Decision and Order, petitioner, Marquez and Catley interposed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 40419. In a Decision dated
November 29, 2000, the Appellate Court a rmed the RTC Decision with modi cation in
the sense that the complaint against Marquez and Catley was dismissed, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
"It is with respect to appellants Catley and Marquez' liability that we are
minded to modify the (appealed) Decision. The two being mere employees (of
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appellant Supercars Management and Development Corporation), they cannot be
held liable to refund the amount claimed by Flores. Nor can they be made liable
for damages and attorney's fees, there being no clear evidence that they had a
hand in giving rise thereto.
Petitioner led a motion for reconsideration but denied in a Resolution dated April
26, 2001. 1 0
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that respondent has "no right to rescind the contract of sale" 1 1
because "the motor vehicle in question, as found by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, is
already in the hands of a third party, one Mr. Lim — an innocent purchaser for value." 1 2
Thus, both courts erred in ordering petitioner to refund respondent of the amounts he paid
for the vehicle.
The issue here is whether respondent has the right to rescind the contract of sale
and to claim damages as a result thereof.
We rule for respondent.
Respondent's complaint led with the RTC seeks to recover from petitioner the
money he paid for the vehicle due to the latter's breach of his warranty against hidden
defects under Articles 1547, 1 3 1561, 1 4 and 1566 1 5 of the Civil Code. The vehicle, after it
was delivered to respondent, malfunctioned despite repeated repairs by petitioner.
Obviously, the vehicle has hidden defects. A hidden defect is one which is unknown or
could not have been known to the vendee. 1 6
The ndings of both the RTC and Court of Appeals that petitioner committed a
breach of warranty against hidden defects are fully supported by the records. The
Appellate Court correctly ruled:
"The evidence clearly shows that Flores [now respondent] was justi ed in
opting to rescind the sale given the hidden defects of the vehicle, allowance for
the repair of which he patiently extended, but which repair did not turn out to be
satisfactory.
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For when by letters of January 30, 1989 and February 7, 1989, which were
followed up by another dated March 1, 1989, Flores declared his rescission of the
sale, which rescission was not impugned or opposed by appellants as in fact they
accepted the return of the vehicle on February 9, 1989, such extra-judicial
rescission . . . produced legal effect (UP vs. de los Angeles, 35 SCRA 102 [1970];
Tolentino Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code , citing Magdalena
Estate v. Myrick, 71 Phil. 344 [1940–1941]).THEcAS
Petitioner's contention that under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, rescission can no
longer be availed of as the vehicle was already in the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value lacks merit. Rescission is proper if one of the parties to a contract commits a
substantial breach of its provisions. It creates an obligation to return the object of the
contract. It can be carried out only when the one who demands rescission can return
whatever he may be obliged to restore. Rescission abrogates the contract from its
inception and requires a mutual restitution of the bene ts received. 1 8 Petitioner is thus
mandated by law to give back to respondent the purchase price upon his return of the
vehicle. Records show that at the time respondent opted to rescind the contract, the
vehicle was still in his possession. He returned it to petitioner who, without objection,
accepted it. Accordingly, the 30% down payment equivalent to P63,600.00, plus the
premium for the comprehensive insurance amounting to P7,374.80 paid by respondent
should be returned by petitioner.
As further stated by the Court of Appeals:
"Appellant's invocation of Article 1191 of the Civil Code in support of his
argument that as the vehicle had been sold to a third party, rescission can no
longer ensue is misplaced.
For, Flores is asking for the refund of the downpayment and payment for
insurance premiums. This brings us to appellant's final argument.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban and Garcia, JJ ., concur.
Corona, J ., is on leave.
Carpio-Morales, J ., took no part. Ponente of assailed decision.
Footnotes
1. Per Resolution of this Court dated March 11, 2002 (Rollo at 174) and Resolution dated
July 29, 2002 (Rollo at 180).
2. Penned by Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales (now a member of this Court) and concurred
in by Justice Candido V. Rivera (ret.) and Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Rollo at
30–41.
3. Rollo at 43–44.
4. Complaint, Annex "F", Rollo at 48, 50–51.
5. Annex "F", Rollo at 48–58.
6. Petition, Rollo at 12.
7. Rollo at 122.
8. Id. at 123–125, 2–3.
9. Id. at 40.
10. Id. at 43.
11. Petition, id. at 23.
12. Id. at 2.
(1) An implied warranty on the part of the seller that he has the right to sell the
thing at the time when the ownership is to pass, and that the buyer shall from that time
have and enjoy the legal and peaceful possession of the thing;
(2) An implied warranty that the thing shall be free from any hidden faults or
defects, or any charge or encumbrance not declared or known to the buyer.
This article shall not, however, be held to render liable a sheriff, auctioneer,
mortgagee, pledgee, or other person professing to sell by virtue of authority in fact or
law, for the sale of a thing in which a third person has a legal or equitable interest."
14. "Article 1561. The vendor shall be responsible for warranty against the hidden defects
which the thing sold may have, should they render it unfit for the use for which it is
intended, or should they diminish its fitness for such use to such an extent that, had the
vendee been aware thereof, he would not have acquired it or would have given a lower
price for it; but said vendor shall not be answerable for patent defects or those which
may be visible, or for those which are not visible if the vendee is an expert who, by
reason of his trade or profession, should have known them."
15. "Article 1566. The vendor is responsible to the vendee for any hidden faults or defects
in the thing sold, even though he was not aware thereof .
This provision shall not apply if the contrary has been stipulated, and the vendor was
not aware of the hidden faults or defects in the thing sold."
16. Knecht vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-65114, February 23, 1988, 158 SCRA 80.
17. Rollo at 39.
18. Velarde vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108346, July 11, 2001, 361 SCRA 56.
19. Id. at 39–40.
20. Art. 2232, New Civil Code.
21. Estanislao, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143687, July 31, 2001, 362 SCRA 229.
22. Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119092, December 10,
1998, 300 SCRA 20; Salao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107725, January 22, 1998, 284
SCRA 493.