EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-21897. October 22, 1963.]

RAMON A. GONZALES , petitioner, vs . RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as

Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of
Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO
BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and
SALVADOR MARIÑO, as Secretary of Justice , respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner.

Solicitor General and Estanislao Fernandez for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. PARTIES; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; SUFFICIENCY OF PETITIONER'S

INTEREST AS RICE PLANTER AND TAXPAYER TO SEEK RESTRAINT OF ALLEGEDLY
ILLEGAL RICE IMPORTATION. — The status of petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of
substantial proportion, entitled him to a chance to sell to the Government the rice; it
now seeks to buy abroad and, as a taxpayer affected by the purchase of the commodity
effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, gives said petitioner su cient
interest to le the instant petition seeking to restrain the allegedly unlawful
disbursement of public funds to import rice from abroad.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
EXCEPTIONS APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — The principle requiring the previous
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable: (1) where the question in
dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was
performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or (3) where the respondent
is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied
or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or (4) where
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar
falls under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule.
3. RICE IMPORTATION LAWS; ILLEGAL IMPORTATION WHERE CONDITIONS
FOR IMPORTATION NOT COMPLIED WITH. — Since the Rice and Corn Importation Laws
(Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452) set conditions for the importation of rice, and in
the case at bar such conditions have not been complied with, it is held that the
proposed importations are illegal.
4. ID.; IMPORTATIONS "MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF." — The
provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the importation of rice and
corn by any "government agency", apply likewise to importations "made by the
Government itself," because each and every o cer and employee of our Government,
are government agencies and/or agents.
5. ID.; PROTECTION OF LOCAL PLANTERS OF RICE AND CORN TO FOSTER
SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN LOCAL PRODUCTION. — The protection of local planters of rice
and corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-su ciency in the local
production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet a
possible national emergency.
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 6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE POWERS; AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER
CANNOT DISREGARD THE LAW EVEN IF HE BELIEVES THAT COMPLIANCE WILL NOT
BENEFIT THE PEOPLE. — Respondents' trend of thought, that, if an executive o cer
believes that compliance with a certain statute will not bene t the people he is at liberty
to disregard it, must be rejected — we still live under a rule of law.
7. ID.; ID.; PRESIDENT MAY NOT, BY EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, ENTER INTO
A TRANSACTION WHICH IS PROHIBITED BY STATUTES ENACTED PRIOR THERETO. —
Although the President may, under the American constitutional system, enter into
executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior
thereto.
8. ID.; ID.; MAIN FUNCTION OF EXECUTIVE IS TO ENFORCE LAWS ENACTED
BY CONGRESS, NOT TO DEFEAT SAME. — Under the Constitution, the main function of
the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in
the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of the
veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of
laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
9. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; THEORY THAT IN A CONFLICT BETWEEN
TREATY AND STATUTE, THE LATEST IN POINT OF TIME SHALL PREVAIL, NOT
APPLICABLE TO EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS; CASE AT BAR. — The American theory that
in the event of con ict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of
time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit,
but, also, insist that the contracts in question are not treaties. Said theory may be
justi ed upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is a signatory require
the advice and consent of the Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative
department. No such justi cation can be given as regards executive agreements not
authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in
our constitutional set up and that of the United States.
10. COURTS; JURISDICTION; POWER TO INVALIDATE TREATIES. — The
Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled the question of whether an
international agreement may be invalidated by our courts in the affirmative, by providing
in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or a rm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of
error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, nal judgments and decrees of
inferior courts in (1) all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question." In other words, our
Constitution authorizes the nulli cation of a treaty, not only when it con icts with the
fundamental law, but, also when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
Bautista Angelo, J., concurring:
1. RICE IMPORTATION; INJUNCTION GRANTED DESPITE ILLEGALITY OF
IMPORTATION WHERE ARRANGEMENTS ALREADY CONCLUDED WITH FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS; REASONS. — Respondents, despite their lack of compliance with the
Rice Importation Law, should not be enjoined from carrying out the importation of the
rice which according to the record has been authorized to be imported on a
government to government level; it appearing that arrangement to this effect has
already been concluded, the only thing lacking being its implementation. Had the writ
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 been issued, our government would have been placed in a predicament where, as a
necessary consequence, it would have to repudiate a duly formalized agreement to its
greet embarrassment and loss of face.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE POWERS; CIVIL AUTHORITY
SUPREME OVER THE MILITARY. — The injunction embodied in the National Defense Act
(Sec. 2, Com. Act No. 1) that the civil authority shall always be supreme, can only mean
that while all precautions should be taken to insure the security and preservation of the
State, and, to this effect the employment of all resources may be resorted to, the action
must always be taken within the framework of the civil authority.
Barrera, J., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREMACY OF CIVIL AUTHORITY; THEORY
THAT THE MILITARY MAY DISREGARD RICE IMPORTATION LAWS IS DANGEROUS. —
The theory that rice can he legally imported by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
avowedly for its future use, notwithstanding the prohibitory provisions of Republic Act
Nos. 2207 and 3452, is a dangerous trend. To adopt this theory is to proclaim the
existence in the Philippines of three economic groups or classes: the producers, the
consumers, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. What is more portentous is the
effort to equate the army with the Government itself.
2. ID.; EXECUTIVE POWERS; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL; FUNCTION TO
DELIBERATE ON EXISTENCE OF EMERGENCY. — It is not for the Department of
National Defense to unilaterally determine the existence of a threat of emergency, but
for the National Security Council to do so. Otherwise, any change in the political climate
of any region of the world is apt to be taken as an excuse for the military to conjure up a
crisis or emergency and, thereupon, attempt to override our laws and legal processes,
and imperceptibly institute some kind of martial law on the pretext of precautionary
mobilization measure avowedly in the interest of the security of the state.
3. ID.; ID.; THEORY OF "THE END JUSTIFIES THE MEANS" REJECTED. —
Adoption as a government policy of the theory of "the end justi es the means" brushing
aside constitutional and legal restraints, must be rejected, lest we end up with the end
of freedom.

DECISION

CONCEPCION , J : p

This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary
authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private
sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed of the other
respondents herein 1 for the implementation of said proposed importation. Thereupon,
or on September 25, 1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales — a rice planter, and
president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose members are,
likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn — led the petition herein, averring
that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the
aforementioned respondents "are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 — which allegedly repeals or amends
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 Republic Act No. 2207 — explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the
Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency"; that petitioner has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a
preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties
during the pendency of this case and to prevent the judgment therein from becoming
ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due course; that a
writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued restraining respondents, their agents
or representatives from implementing the decision of the Executive Secretary to import
the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered
making said injunction permanent.
Forthwith, respondents were required to le their answer to the petition which
they did, and petitioner's prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing,
at which both parties appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a memorandum was led,
shortly thereafter, by the respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution of said
incident may require some pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a
decision on the merits of the case, the same was set for hearing on the merits soon
thereafter. The parties, however, waived the right to argue orally, although counsel for
respondents filed their memoranda.
I. Sufficiency of Petitioner's interest.
Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give
him su cient interest to le the petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for.
We nd no merit in this pretense. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice and
corn "by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency", Republic
Act No. 3452 declares, in Section 1 thereof, that "the policy of the Government" is to
"engage in the purchase of these basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers,
growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of their
products at a price that will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital
investment. . . ." Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of
substantial proportion, 2 is entitled to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now
seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will have to be
effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and
landowner petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has su cient
personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he
believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.
II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs prayed for because he "has not
exhausted all administrative remedies available to him before coming to court". We
have already held, however, that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not applicable "where the question in dispute is purely a
legal one" 3 , or where the controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, 4 or where the respondent is a
department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or
assumed approval of the latter 5 , unless actually disapproved by him, 6 or where there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 7 The case at bar falls
under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule. Respondents'
contention is, therefore, untenable.
III. Merits of petitioner's cause of action.
Respondents question the su ciency of petitioner's cause of action upon the
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 theory that the proposed importation in question is not governed by Republic Act Nos.
2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President as commander-in-chief "for
military stock pile purposes" in the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1; 8 that in cases of necessity, the President "or his
subordinates may take such preventive measure for the restoration of good order and
maintenance of peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces, "the
President . . . is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency
without waiting for any special authority."
Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as
contended by petitioner herein — on which our view need not be expressed — we are
unanimously of the opinion — assuming that said Republic Act No. 2207 is still in force
— that the two Acts are applicable to the proposed importation in question because the
language of said laws is such as to include within the purview thereof all importations
of rice and corn into the Philippines. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2207, "it shall be
unlawful for any person, association, corporation or government agency to import rice
and corn into any point in the Philippines", although, by way of exception, it adds that
"the President of the Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities
through any government agency that he may designate", if the conditions prescribed in
Section 2 of said Act are present. Similarly, Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly enjoins "the
Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency" from importing rice and corn.
Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452, prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any "government agency", do
not apply to importations "made by the Government itself", because the latter is not a
"government agency". This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National
Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and
each and every o cer and employee of our Government, are government agencies
and/or agents. The applicability of said laws even to importations by the Government,
as such, becomes more apparent when we consider that:
1. The importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be
authorized by "the President of the Philippines", and, hence, by or on
behalf of the Government of the Philippines;
2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn Administration and any
other government agency from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 3452 adds " that the importation of rice and corn is
left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes", thus
indicating that only "private parties" may import rice under its
provisions; and
3. Aside from prescribing a ne not exceeding P10,000.00 and
imprisonment of not more than ve (5) years for those who shall
violate any provision of Republic Act No. 3452 or any rule and
regulation promulgated pursuant thereto, Section 15 of said Act
provides that "if the offender is a public o cial and/or employee", he
shall be subject to the additional penalty speci ed therein. A public
o cial is an o cer of the Government itself, as distinguished from
o cers or employees of instrumentalities of the Government. Hence,
the duly authorized acts of the former are those of the Government,
unlike those of a government instrumentality which may have a
personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the
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 Government, as such. The provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 are, in
this respect, even more explicit. Section 3 thereof provides a similar
additional penalty for any "o cer or employee of the Government"
who "violates, abets or tolerates the violation of any provision" of said
Act. Hence, the intent to apply the same to transactions made by the
very government is patent.
Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are merely additional to
those prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 138, entitled "An Act to give native
products and domestic entities the preference in the purchase of articles for the
Government." Pursuant to Section 1 thereof:
"The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the
Philippines and other officers and employees of the municipal and provincial
governments and the Government of the Philippines and of chartered cities,
boards, commissions, bureaus, departments, offices, agencies, branches, and
bodies of any description, including government-owned companies, authorized to
requisition, purchase, or contract or make disbursements for articles, materials,
and supplies for public use, public buildings, or public works, shall give preference
to materials . . . produced . . . in the Philippines or in the United States, and to
domestic entities, subject to the conditions hereinbelow specified." (Emphasis
supplied.)

Under this provision, in all purchase by the Government, including those made by
and/or for the armed forces, preference shall be given to materials produced in the
Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of
our Government, aside from the provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452.
The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national
security — predicated upon the "worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the
recent tension created by the Malaysia problem" — and the alleged powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2
of the National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the
protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would foster and
accelerate self-su ciency in the local production of said commodities constitutes a
factor that is vital to our ability to meet a possible national emergency. Even if the intent
in importing goods in anticipation of such emergency were to bolster up that ability, the
latter would, instead, be impaired if the importation were so made as to discourage our
farmers from engaging in the production of rice.
Besides, the stocking of rice and corn for purposes of national security and/or
national emergency is within the purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof
expressly authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration "to accumulate stocks as a
national reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any
contingencies". Moreover, it ordains that " the buffer stocks held as a national reserve . .
. be deposited by the Administration throughout the country under proper dispersal
plans . . . and maybe released only upon the occurrence of calamities or emergencies . .
. (Emphasis supplied.)
Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which
respondents rely so much, are not self-executory. They merely outline the general
objectives of said legislation. The means for the attainment of those objectives are
subject to congressional legislation. Thus, the conditions under which the services of
citizens, as indicated in said Section 2, may be availed of, are provided for in Sections 3,
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 4 and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth Act No. 1. Similarly, Section 5 thereof speci es
the manner in which resources necessary for our national defense may be secured by
the Government of the Philippines, but only "during a national mobilization" 9 , which
does not exist. Inferentially, therefore, in the absence of a national mobilization, said
resources shall be produced in such manner as Congress may by other Laws provide
from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn are concerned, Republic Act Nos. 2207 and
3452, and Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.
Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but in vain. An examination
of the work cited 1 0 shows that Corwin referred to the powers of the President during
"war time" 1 1 or when he has placed the country or a part thereof under "martial law". 1 2
Since neither condition obtains in the case at bar, said work merely proves that
respondents' theory, if accepted, would, in effect, place the Philippines under martial
law, without a declaration of the Executive to that effect. What is worse, it would keep
us perpetually under martial law.
It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, it should, nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to
the benefit of the people". Salus populi est suprema lex, it is said.
If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But
the respondents, as o cials of this Government, have expressly a rmed again and
again that there is no rice shortage. And the importation is avowedly for stockpile of
the Army — not the civilian population.
But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more serious
implication that appears on the surface. It implies that if an executive o cer believes
that compliance with a certain statute will not bene t the people, he is at liberty to
disregard it. That idea must be rejected — we still live under a rule of law.
And then, "the people" are either producers or consumers. Now — as respondents
explicitly admit — Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature
for the bene t of producers and consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow that the
welfare of the people lies precisely in the compliance with said Acts.
It is not for respondent executive o cers now to set their own opinions against
that of the Legislature, and adopt means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway,
those laws permit importation — but under certain conditions, which have not been, and
should be complied with.
IV. The Contracts With Vietnam and Burma. —
It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered
into two (2) contracts for the purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and
another with the Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive
agreements under international law; that such agreements became binding and
effective upon signing thereof by representatives of the parties thereto; that in case of
con ict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and the
aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty
and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the con ict must be resolved — under
the American jurisprudence — in favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that
petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the executive relative to foreign relations
in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and that the
aforementioned contracts have already been consummated, the Government of the
Philippines having already paid the price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable
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 letters of credit in favor of the sellers of said commodity. We nd no merit in this
pretense.
The Court is not satis ed that the status of said contracts as alleged executive
agreements has been su ciently established. The parties to said contracts do not
appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But, even assuming that
said contracts may properly be considered as executive agreements, the same are
unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements
being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although
the President may, under the American constitutional system, enter into executive
agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement,
enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the
Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by
Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of
the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws.
The American theory to the effect that, in the event of con ict between a treaty
and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to
the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist that the contracts
adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justi ed upon the ground that treaties
to which the United States is signatory require the advice and consent of its Senate,
and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justi cation can be given
as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without
completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks
and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of the United
States.
As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated
by our courts, su ce it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled
it in the a rmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme
Court may not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or a rm
on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, nal
judgments and decrees of inferior courts in — (1) All cases in which the constitutionality
or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". In
other words, our Constitution authorizes the nulli cation of a treaty, not only when it
con icts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of
Congress.
The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and
Burma does not render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our
Government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from
importing rice, except under the conditions prescribed in said Act. Upon the other,
Republic Act No. 3452 has two (2) main features, namely; (a) it requires the
Government to purchase rice and corn directly from our local planters, growers or
landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of rice by the Government, and leaves
such importations to private parties. The pivotal issue in this case is whether the
proposed importation — which has not been consummated as yet — is legally feasible.
Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not
compel our Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may
have contracted with the sellers of the rice in question, because, aside from the fact
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 that said obligations may be complied with without importing the commodity into the
Philippines, the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the
provisions of the aforementioned laws.
V. The writ of preliminary injunction.
The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or
not respondents herein should be enjoined from implementing the aforementioned
proposed importation. However, the majority favors the negative view, for which reason
the injunction prayed for cannot be granted.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive
Secretary had and has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he
exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; that said importation is not
sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite
majority, the injunction prayed for must be and is, accordingly, denied. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C . J ., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Makalintal, JJ ., concur.
Bautista Angelo and Barrera, JJ ., concur separately.
Paredes and Regala, JJ ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO , J ., concurring :

Under Republic Act 2207, which took effect on May 15, 1959, it is unlawful for
any person, association, corporation or government agency to import rice and corn into
any point in the Philippines. The exception is if there is an existing or imminent shortage
of such commodity of such gravity as to constitute national emergency in which case
an importation may be authorized by the President when so certi ed by the National
Economic Council.

However, on June 14, 1962, Republic Act 3452 was enacted providing that the
importation of rice and corn can only be made by private parties thereby prohibiting
from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
Republic Act 3452 does not expressly repeal Republic Act 2207, but only repeals or
modi es those parts thereof that are inconsistent with its provisions. The question that
now arises is: Has the enactment of Republic Act 3452 the effect of prohibiting
completely the government from importing rice and corn into the Philippines?
My answer is in the negative. Since this Act does not in any manner provide for
the importation of rice and corn in case of national emergency, the provision of the
former law on the matter should stand, for that is not inconsistent with any provision
embodied in Republic Act 3452. The Rice and Corn Administration, or any other
government agency, may therefore still import rice and corn into the Philippines as
provided in Republic Act 2207 if there is a declared national emergency.
The next question that arises is: Can the government authorize the importation of
rice and corn regardless of Republic Act 2207 if that is authorized by the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Army as a military precautionary measure for
military stock-pile?
Respondents answer this question in the a rmative. They advance the argument
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 that it is the President's duty to see to it that the Armed Forces of the Philippines are
geared to the defense of the country as well as to the ful llment of our international
commitments in Southeast Asia in the event the peace and security of the area are in
danger. The stock piling of rice, they aver, is an essential requirement of defense
preparation in view of the limited local supply and the probable disruption of trade and
commerce with outside countries in the event of armed hostilities, and this military
precautionary measure is necessary because of the unsettled conditions in the
Southeast Asia bordering on actual threats of armed con icts as evaluated by the
Intelligence Service of the Military Department of our Government. This advocacy, they
contend, nds support in the national defense policy embodied in Section 2 of our
National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), which provides:
"(a) The preservation of the State is the obligation of every citizen. The
security of the Philippines and the freedom, independence and perpetual
neutrality of the Philippine Republic shall be guaranteed by the employment of all
citizens, without distinction of sex or age, and all resources.
"(b) The employment of the nation's citizens and resources for
national defense shall be effected by a national mobilization.
"(c) The national mobilization shall include the execution of all
national defense shall be effected by a national mobilization.
"(d) The civil authority shall always be supreme. The President of the
Philippines as the Commander-in-Chief of all military forces, shall be responsible
that mobilization measures are prepared at all times." (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, I nd in that declaration of policy that the security of the Philippines and
its freedom constitutes the core of the preservation of our State which is the basic duty
of every citizen and that to secure which it is enjoined that the President employ all the
resources at his command. But over and above, all that power and duty, fundamental as
they may seem, there is the injunction that the civil authority shall always be supreme.
This injunction can only mean that while all precautions should be taken to insure the
security and preservation of the State and to this effect the employment of all
resources may be resorted to, the action must always be taken within the framework of
the civil authority. Military authority should be harmonized and coordinated with civil
authority, the only exception being when the law clearly ordains otherwise. Neither
Republic Act 2207, nor Republic Act 3452, contains any exception in favor of military
action concerning importation of rice and corn. An exception must be strictly
construed.
A distinction is made between the government and government agency in an
attempt to take the former out of the operation of Republic Act 2207. I disagree. The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines under the Revised Administrative Code
refers to that entity through which the functions of government are exercised, including
the various arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be
provincial, municipal or other form of local government, whereas a government
instrumentality refers to corporations owned or controlled by the government to
promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people. A government agency,
therefore, must necessarily refer to the government itself of the Republic, as
distinguished from any government instrumentality which has a personality distinct and
separate from it (Section 2).
The important point to determine, however, is whether we should enjoin
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 respondents from carrying out the importation of the rice which according to the
record has been authorized to be imported on government to government level, it
appearing that the arrangement to this effect has already been concluded, the only
thing lacking being its implementation. This is evident from the manifestation
submitted by the Solicitor General wherein it appears that the contract for the purchase
of 47,000 tons of rice from Vietnam had been signed on October 5, 1963, and for the
purchase of 20,000 tons from Burma on October 8, 1963, by the authorized
representatives of both our government and the governments of Vietnam and Burma,
respectively. If it is true that our government has already made a formal commitment
with the selling countries there arise the question as to whether the Act can still be
impeded at this stage of the negotiations. Though on this score there is a divergence of
opinion, it is gratifying to note that the majority has expressed itself against it. This is a
plausible attitude for, had the writ been issued, our government would have been placed
in a predicament where, as a necessary consequence, it would have to repudiate a duly
formalized agreement to its great embarrassment and loss of face. This was avoided
by the judicial statesmanship evinced by the Court.

BARRERA , J ., concurring :

Because of possible complications that might be aggravated by

misrepresentation of the true nature and scope of the case before this Court, it is well
to restate as clearly as possible, the real and only issue presented by the respondents
representing the government.

From the answer led by the Solicitor General, in behalf of respondents, we

quote:
"The importation of the rice in question by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines is for military stockpiling authorized by the President pursuant to his
inherent power as commander-in-chief and as a military precautionary measure in
view of the worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam and, it may be added, the
recent tension created by the Malaysia problem." (Answer, p. 2: emphasis
supplied.)

During the oral argument, Senator Fernandez, appearing in behalf of the

respondents, likewise reiterated that the imported rice was for military stockpiling, and
while he admitted that some of it went to the Rice and Corn Administration, he
emphasized again and again that the rice was not intended for the RCA for distribution
to the people, as there was no shortage of rice for that purpose, but it was only
exchanged for palay because this could be better preserved.
From the memorandum led thereafter by the Solicitor General, again the claim
was made:
"We respectfully reiterate the arguments in our answer dated October 4,
1963 that the importation of rice sought to be enjoined in this petition is in the
exercise of the authority vested in the President of the Philippines as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as a measure of military preparedness demanded
by a real and actual threat of emergency in the South East Asian countries. (p.
1:emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

"It (the stressing of the unsettled conditions in Southeast Asia) is merely

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 our intention to show the necessity for the stockpiling of rice for army purposes,
which is the very reason for the importation. (p. 3 emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
"As it is, the importation in question is being made by the Republic of the
Philippines for its own use: and the rice is not supposed to be poured into the
open market as to affect the price to be paid by the public. (p. 4, Emphasis
supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx

What we do contend is that the law, for want of express and clear provision
to the effect, does not include on its prohibition importation by the Government of
rice for its own use not for the consuming public, regardless of whether there is or
there is no emergency." (p. 5, emphasis supplied.)
From the above, it not only appears but is evident that the respondents were not
concerned with the present rice situation confronting the consuming public, but were
solely and exclusively after the stockpiling of rice for the future use of the army. The
issue, therefore, in which the Government was interested is not whether rice is imported
to give the people a bigger or greater supply to maintain the price at P.80 per ganta —
for, to quote again their contention: "the rice is not supposed to be poured into the open
market to affect the price to be paid by the public", as it is "not for the consuming
public, regardless of whether there is or there is no emergency", — but whether rice can
legally be imported by the Armed Forces of the Philippines avowedly for its future use,
notwithstanding the prohibitory provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. The
majority opinion ably sets forth the reasons why this Court can not accept the
contention of the respondents that this importation is beyond and outside the
operation of these statutes. I can only emphasize that I see in the theory advanced by
the Solicitor General a dangerous trend — that because the policies enunciated in the
cited laws are for the protection of the producers and the consumers, the army is
removed from their application. To adopt this theory is to proclaim the existence in the
Philippines of three economic groups or classes; the producers, the consumers, and
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. What is more portentous is the effort to equate
the army with the Government itself.
Then again, the importation of this rice for military stockpiling is sought to be
justi ed by the alleged threat of emergency in the Southeast Asian countries. But the
existence of this supposed threat was unilaterally determined by the Department of
National Defense alone. We recall that there exists a body called the National Security
Council in which are represented the Executive as well as the Legislative department. In
it sit not only members of the party in power but of the opposition as well. To our
knowledge, this is the highest consultative body which deliberates precisely in times of
emergency threatening to affect the security of the state. The democratic composition
of this council is to guarantee that its deliberations would be non-partisan and only the
best interests of the nation will be considered. Being a deliberative body, it insures
against precipitate action. This is as it should be. Otherwise, in these days of ever
present cold war, any change or development in the political climate in any region of the
world is apt to be taken as an excuse for the military to conjure up a crisis or
emergency and thereupon attempt to override our laws and legal processes, and
imperceptibly institute some kind of martial law on the pretext of precautionary
mobilization measure avowedly in the interest of the security of the state. One need not
be too imaginative to perceive a hint of this in the present case.
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 The Supreme Court, in arriving at the conclusion unanimously reached, is fully
aware of the di cult and delicate task it had to discharge. Its position is liable to be
exploited by some for their own purposes, by claiming and making it appear that the
Court is unmindful of the plight of our people during these days of hardship; that it
preferred to give substance to the "niceties of the law" than heed the needs of the
people. Our answer is that the Court was left no alternative. It had, in compliance with
its duty, to decide the case upon the facts presented to it. The respondents,
representing the administration, steadfastly maintained and insisted that there is no
rice shortage; that the imported rice is not for the consuming public and is not
supposed to be placed in the open market to affect the price to be paid by the public;
that it is solely for stockpiling of the army for future use as a measure of mobilization in
the face of what the Department of National Defense unilaterally deemed a threatened
armed con ict in Southeast Asia. Confronted with these facts upon which the
Government has built and rested its case, we have searched in vain for legal authority or
cogent reasons to justify this importation made admittedly contrary to the provisions
of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. I say admittedly, because respondents never as
much as pretended that the importation ful lls the conditions speci ed in these laws,
but limited themselves to the contention, which is their sole defense, that this
importation does not fall within the scope of said laws. In our view, however, the laws
are clear. The laws are comprehensive and their application does not admit of any
exception. The laws are adequate. Compliance therewith is not di cult, much less
impossible. The avowed emergency, if at all, is not urgently immediate.
In this connection, it is pertinent to bear in mind that the Supreme Court has a
duty to perform under the Constitution. It has to decide, when called upon to do so in an
appropriate proceeding, "all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
law, ordinance, executive order or regulation is in question". We can not elude this duty.
To do so would be culpable dereliction on our part. While we sympathize with the public
that might be adversely affected as a result of this decision, yet our sympathy does not
authorize us to sanction an act contrary to applicable laws. The fault lies with those
who stubbornly contended and represented before this Court that there is no rice
shortage, that the imported rice not intended for the consuming public, but for
stockpiling of the army. And, if as now claimed before the public, contrary to the
Government's stand in this case, that there is need for imported rice to stave off
hunger, our legislature has provided for such a situation. As already stated, the laws are
adequate. The importation of rice under the conditions set forth in the laws may be
authorized not only where there is an existing shortage, but also when the shortage is
imminent. In other words, lawful remedy to solve the situation is available, if only those
who have the duty to execute the laws perform their duty. If there is really need for the
importation of rice, why adopt some dubious means which necessitates resort to
doubtful exercise of the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army?
Why not comply with the mandate of the law? Ours is supposed to be a regime under
the rule of law. Adoption as a government policy of the theory of "the end justi es the
means" brushing aside constitutional and legal restraints, must be rejected, lest we end
up with the end of freedom.
For these reasons, I concur in the decision of the Court.

Footnotes

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 1. The Secretary of National Defense, the Auditor General, the Secretary of Commerce and
Industry, and the Secretary of Justice.

2. 275 hectares.

3. Tapales vs. The President and the Board of Regents of the U.P., L-17523, March 30,
1963.

4. Mangubat vs. Osmeña, L-12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio vs. Hon. Jose Rodriguez, L-
11078, May 27, 1959; Pascual vs. Provincial Board, L-11959, October 31, 1959.

5. Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. vs. Secretary of Public Works, L-15982, May 31,
1963.

6. In the present case, respondents allege in their answer that "the importation . . . in
question . . . is authorized by the President."
7. Alzate vs. Aldaba, L-14407, February 29, 1960; Demaisip vs. Court of Appeals, L-13000,
September 25, 1959.

8. Which provides that "the national defense policy of the Philippines shall be as follows:

"(a) The preservation of the State is the obligation of every citizen. The security of
the Philippines and the freedom, independence and perpetual neutrality of the Philippine
Republic shall be guaranteed by the employment of all citizens, without distinction of
sex or age, and all resources.
"(b) The employment of the nation's citizens and resources for national defense
shall be effected by a national mobilization.

"(c) The national mobilization shall include the execution of all measures
necessary to pass from a peace to a war footing.
"(d) The civil authority shall always be supreme. The President of the Philippines
as the Commander-in-Chief of all military forces, shall be responsible that mobilization
measures are prepared at all times.

"xxx xxx xxx"

9. In line with the provisions of paragraphs b), c), e), and f) of section 2 of said Act.
10. The Constitution and What It means Today, pp. 95-96.

11. The power of the President as Commander-in-Chief is primarily that of military

command in wartime, and as such includes, as against the persons and property of
enemies of the United States encountered within the theater of military operations, all the
powers allowed a military commander in such cases by the Law of Nations. President
Lincoln's famous Proclamation of Emancipation rested upon this ground. It was
effective within the theater of military operations while the war lasted, but no longer (p.
93, Emphasis supplied).

12. From an early date the Commander-in-Chiefs' power came to be merged with the
President's duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed". So, while in using
military force against unlawful combinations too strong to be dealt with through the
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 ordinary processes of law the President acts by authorization of statute, his powers are
still those of Commander-in-Chief. . . .

Under "preventive martial law", so-called because it authorizes "preventive" arrests and
detentions, the military acts as an adjunct of the civil authorities but not necessarily
subject to their orders. It maybe established whenever the executive organ, State or
national, deems it to be necessary for the restoration of good order. The concept, being
judicial origin, is of course for judicial application, and ultimately for application by the
Supreme Court, in enforcement of the "due process" clause. (See, also, Section III of this
Article, and Article IV, Section IV. (Pp. 95-96, Emphasis supplied.)

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