SECOND DIVISION a period of ten (10) years.

Mapa, however, defaulted in the

payment thereof starting December 1976, prompting Labrador
G.R. No. 78585 July 5, 1989 to send to the former a demand letter, dated May 5, 1977,
giving him until May 18, 1977, within which to settle his unpaid
installments for the 4 lots amounting to P15,411.66, with a
JOSE ANTONIO MAPA, petitioner,
warning that non-payment thereof will result in the cancellation
vs.
of the four (4) contracts. Despite receipt of said letter on May
HON. JOKER ARROYO, in his Capacity as Executive Secretary, and
6,1977, Mapa failed to take any action thereon. Labrador
LABRADOR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
subsequently wrote Mapa another letter, dated June 15, 1982,
which the latter received on June 21, 1982, reminding him of his
Francisco T. Mamaug for petitioner. total arrears amounting to P180,065.27 and demanding
payment within 5 days from receipt thereof, but which letter
Emiliano S. Samson for private respondent. Mapa likewise ignored. Thus, on August 16, 1982, Labrador
sent Mapa a notarial cancellation of the four (4) contracts to sell,
which Mapa received on August 20, 1982. On September 10,
1982, however, Mapa's counsel sent Labrador a letter calling
Labrador's attention to, and demanding its compliance with,
REGALADO, J.: Clause 20 of the four (4) contracts to sell which relates to
Labrador's obligation to provide, among others, lighting/water
We are called upon once again, in this special civil action for certiorari, for a facilities to subdivision lot buyers.
pronouncement as to whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the executive branch of On September 10, 1982, Labrador issued a certification holding
Government, particularly in the adjudication of a controversy originally the implementation of the letter dated August 16, 1982 (re
commenced in one of its regulatory agencies. notarial cancellation) pending the complete development of road
lot cul de sac within the properties of Mapa at Barangay Hills
Petitioner herein seeks the reversal of the decision of the Office of the President, Subdivision.' Thereafter on October 25,1982, Labrador sent
rendered by the Deputy Executive Secretary on April 24,1987, 1 which dismissed Mapa a letter informing him 'that the construction of road,
his appeal from the resolution of the Commission Proper, Human Settlements sidewalk, curbs and gutters adjacent to Block 11 Barangay Hills
Regulatory Commission (HSRC, for short), promulgated on January 10, 1986 Subdivision are already completed' and further requesting Mapa
and affirming the decision of July 3, 1985 of the Office of Adjudication and Legal to 'come to our office within five (5) days upon receipt of this
Affairs (OAALA, for brevity) of HSRC. Petitioner avers that public respondent letter to settle your account.'
"gravely transcended the sphere of his discretion" in finding that Presidential
Decree No. 957 is inapplicable to the contracts to sell involved in this case and in On December 10, 1982, Mapa tendered payment by means of a
consequently dismissing the same. 2 check in the amount of P 2,137.54, but Labrador refused to
accept payment for the reason that it was agreed 'that after the
The established facts on which the assailed decision is based are set out therein development of the cul de sac, he (complainant) will pay in full
as follows: the total amount due,' which Labrador computed at P
260,138.61. On December 14, 1982, Mapa wrote Labrador
Records disclose that, on September 18, 1975, appellant Jose claiming that 'you have not complied with the requirements for
Antonio Mapa and appellee Labrador Development Corporation water and light facilities in lots 12, 13, 15 & 16 Block 2 of
(Labrador, for short), owner/developer of the Barangay Hills Barangay Hills Subdivision.' The following day, Mapa filed a
Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, entered into two contracts to sell complaint against Labrador for the latter's neglect to put 1) a
over lots 12 and 13 of said subdivision. On different months in water system that meets the minimum standard as specified by
1976, they again entered into two similar contracts involving lots HSRC, and 2) electrical power supply. By way of relief, Mapa
15 and 16 in the same subdivision. Under said contracts, Mapa requested the HSRC to direct Labrador to provide the facilities
undertook to make a total monthly installment of P2,137.54 over
1
 aforementioned, and to issue a cease and desist order enjoining Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations
Labrador from cancelling the contracts to sell. under this and the preceding provisions shall constitute a
violation punishable under Sections 38 and 39 of this Decree.
After due hearing/investigation, which included an on-site
inspection of the subdivision, OAALA, issued its decision of July Rule V of the implementing rules, on the other hand, requires two (2) sources of
3, 1985, dismissing the complaint and declaring that after the electric power, two (2) deep-well and pump sets with a specified capacity and two
lapse of 5 years from complainant's default respondent had standard fire hose flows with a capacity of 175 gallons per minute. 5
every right to rescind the contract pursuant to Clause 7 thereof.
.. The provision, in said contracts to sell which, according to petitioner, includes
and incorporates the aforequoted statutory provisions, is Clause 20 of said
Per its resolution of January 10, 1986, the Commission Proper, contracts which provides:
HSRC, affirmed the aforesaid OAALA decision.3
Clause 20. SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT — To insure the
It was petitioner's adamant submission in the administrative proceedings that the physical development of the subdivision, the SELLER hereby
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 4 and implementing rules form part of obliges itself to provide the individual lot buyer with the
the contracts to sell executed by him and respondent corporation, hence the following:
obligations imposed therein had to be complied with by Labrador within the
period provided. Since, according to petitioner, Labrador failed to perform the a) PAVED ROADS
aforementioned obligations, it is precluded from rescinding the subject contracts
to sell since petitioner consequently did not incur in delay on his part.
b) UNDERGROUND DRAINAGE
Such intransigent position of petitioner has not changed in the petition at bar and
c) CONCRETE CURBS AND GUTTERS
unyielding reliance is placed on the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957
and its implementing rules. The specific provisions of the Decree which are
persistently relied upon read: d) WATER SYSTEM

SEC. 20. Time of Completion. — Every owner or developer e) PARK AND OPEN SPACE
shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements,
infrastructures and other forms of development, including water These improvements shall apply only to the portions of the
supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in subdivision which are for sale or have been sold. All
the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, improvements except those requiring the services of a public
prospectus, printed matters letters or in any form of utility company or the government shall be completed within a
advertisements, within one year from the date of the issuance of period of three (3) years from date of this contract. Failure by
the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such the SELLER to reasonably comply with the above schedule
other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority. shall permit the BUYER/ S to suspend his monthly installments
without any penalties or interest charges until such time that
SEC. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. — In cases of subdivision lots these improvements shall have been made as scheduled.6
or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to the effectivity
of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially settled that absent a clear, manifest
developer of the subdivision or condominium project to and grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, the findings of
complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the administrative agency on matters falling within its competence will not be
the preceding section within two years from the date of this disturbed by the courts. 7 Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are
Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an accorded respect, if not finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise
adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Section gained by these tribunals from handling the specific matters falling under their
6 hereof. jurisdiction. Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they "are not
2
supported by evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or the cul-de-sac. But, even this is unavailing and is obviously being used only to
collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; when justify petitioner's default. The on-site inspection of the subdivision conducted by
palpable errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness the OAALA and its subsequent report reveal that Labrador substantially complied
or capriciousness is manifest." 8 with its obligation. 10

A careful scrutiny of the records of the instant case reveals that the Furthermore, the initial non-construction of the cul-de-sac, as private respondent
circumstances thereof do not fag under the aforesaid excepted cases, with the Labrador explained, was because petitioner Mapa requested the suspension of
findings duly supported by the evidence. its construction since his intention was to purchase the adjoining lots and
thereafter enclose the same. 11 If these were not true, petitioner would have
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 957 must be invoked that supposed default in the first instance. As the OAALA noted,
rejected. Said decree was issued on July 12, 1976 long after the execution of the petitioner "stopped payments of his monthly obligations as early as December,
contracts involved. Obviously and necessarily, what subsequently were statutorily 1976, which is a mere five months after the effectivity of P.D. No. 957 or about a
provided therein as obligations of the owner or developer could not have been year after the execution of the contracts. This means that respondent still has 1
intended by the parties to be a part of their contracts. No intention to give and 1/2 years to comply with its legal obligation to develop the subdivision under
restrospective application to the provisions of said decree can be gathered from said P.D. and two years to do so under the agreement, hence, it was improper for
the language thereof. Section 20, in relation to Section 21, of the decree merely complainant to have suspended payments in December, 1976 on the ground of
requires the owner or developer to construct the facilities, improvements, non-development since the period allowed for respondent's obligation to
infrastructures and other forms of development but only such as are offered and undertake such development has not yet expired." 12
indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures,
prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisements. Other than ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition should be, as it is
what are provided in Clause 20 of the contract, no further written commitment hereby DISMISSED.
was made by the developer in this respect. To read into the contract the matters
desired by petitioner would have the law impose additional obligations on the SO ORDERED.
parties to a contract executed before that very law existed or was contemplated.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
We further reject petitioner's strained and tenuous application of the so-called
doctrine of last antecedent in the interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively, of
Section 21. He would thereby have the enumeration of "facilities, improvements,
infrastructures and other forms of development" interpreted to mean that the
demonstrative phrase "which are offered and indicated in the approved
subdivision plans, etc." refer only to "other forms of development" and not to
"facilities, improvements and infrastructures." While this subserves his purpose,
such bifurcation whereby the supposed adjectival phrase is set apart from the
EN BANC
antecedent words, is illogical and erroneous. The complete and applicable rule
is ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia. 9 Relative words
refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context. In the G.R. No. 182380 August 28, 2009
present case, the employment of the word "and" between "facilities,
improvements, infrastructures" and "other forms of development," far from ROBERT P. GUZMAN, Petitioner,
supporting petitioner's theory, enervates it instead since it is basic in legal vs.
hermeneutics that "and" is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MAYOR RANDOLPH S. TING AND
to denote a joinder or union. SALVACION GARCIA, Respondents.

Thus, if ever there is any valid ground to suspend the monthly installments due DECISION
from petitioner, it would only be based on non-performance of the obligations
provided in Clause 20 of the contract, particularly the alleged non-construction of BERSAMIN, J.:
3
Through certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, Rules of Court, the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the undersigned investigator finds that
petitioner assails the February 18, 2008 resolution of the Commission of respondents did not violate Section 261 subparagraphs (v) and (w) of the
Elections en banc (COMELEC),1 dismissing his criminal complaint against Omnibus Election Code and Sections 1 and 2 of Comelec Resolution No. 6634
respondents City Mayor Randolph Ting and City Treasurer Salvacion Garcia, and hereby recommends the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
both of Tuguegarao City, charging them with alleged violations of the prohibition merit.2
against disbursing public funds and undertaking public works, as embodied in
Section 261, paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus Election Code, during the The COMELEC en banc adopted the foregoing recommendation in its own
45-day period of the election ban by purchasing property to be converted into a resolution dated February 18, 2008 issued in E.O. Case No. 06-143 and
public cemetery and by issuing the treasury warrant in payment. He asserts that dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, holding that the acquisition of the two
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess parcels of land for a public cemetery was not considered as within the term public
of jurisdiction in thereby exonerating City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia works; and that, consequently, the issuance of Treasury Warrant No.
based on its finding that the acquisition of the land for use as a public cemetery 0001534514 was not for public works and was thus in violation of Section 261 (w)
did not constitute public works covered by the ban. of the Omnibus Election Code.

Antecedents Not satisfied but without first filing a motion for reconsideration, the petitioner has
commenced this special civil action under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, Rules
On March 31, 2004, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tuguegarao City passed of Court, claiming that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
Resolution No. 048-2004 to authorize City Mayor Ting to acquire two parcels of thereby dismissing his criminal complaint.
land for use as a public cemetery of the City. Pursuant to the resolution, City
Mayor Ting purchased the two parcels of land, identified as Lot Nos. 5860 and Parties’ Positions
5861 and located at Atulayan Sur, Tuguegarao City, with an aggregate area of
24,816 square meters (covered by Transfer Certificates of Title [TCT] No. T-
The petitioner contended that the COMELEC's point of view was unduly
36942 and TCT No. T-36943 of the Register of Deeds in Tuguegarao City), from
restrictive and would defeat the very purpose of the law; that it could be deduced
Anselmo Almazan, Angelo Almazan and Anselmo Almazan III. As payment, City
from the exceptions stated in Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code that
Treasurer Garcia issued and released Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 dated
the disbursement of public funds within the prohibited period should be limited
April 20, 2004 in the sum of P8,486,027.00. On May 5, 2004, the City
only to the ordinary prosecution of public administration and for emergency
Government of Tuguegarao caused the registration of the sale and the issuance
purposes; and that any expenditure other than such was proscribed by law.
of new certificates in its name (i.e., TCT No. T-144428 and TCT No. T-144429).

For his part, City Mayor Ting claimed that the mere acquisition of land to be used
Based on the transaction, the petitioner filed a complaint in the Office of the
as a public cemetery could not be classified as public works; that there would be
Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan Province against City Mayor Ting and
public works only where and when there was an actual physical activity being
City Treasurer Garcia, charging them with a violation of Section 261, paragraphs
undertaken and after an order to commence work had been issued by the owner
(v) and (w), of the Omnibus Election Code, for having undertaken to construct a
to the contractor.
public cemetery and for having released, disbursed and expended public funds
within 45 days prior to the May 9, 2004 election, in disregard of the prohibitions
under said provisions due to the election ban period having commenced on The COMELEC stated that the petition was premature because the petitioner did
March 26, 2004 and ended on May 9, 2004. not first present a motion for reconsideration, as required by Section 1(d), Rule
13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure;4 and that as the primary body
empowered by the Constitution to investigate and prosecute cases of violations
City Mayor Ting denied the accusations in his counter-affidavit but City Treasurer
Garcia opted not to answer. of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses
and malpractices,5 it assumed full discretion and control over determining
whether or not probable cause existed to warrant the prosecution in court of an
After investigation, the Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan alleged election offense committed by any person.
recommended the dismissal of the complaint by a resolution dated December 13,
2006, to wit:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) concurred with the COMELEC to the
effect that the acquisition of the land within the election period for use as a public
4
cemetery was not covered by the 45-day public works ban under Section 261(v) As a rule, it is necessary to file a motion for reconsideration in the court of origin
of the Omnibus Election Code; but differed from the COMELEC as to the before invoking the certiorari jurisdiction of a superior court. Hence, a petition for
issuance of Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514, opining that there was probable certiorari will not be entertained unless the public respondent has been given first
cause to hold City Mayor Ting and City Treasurer Garcia liable for a violation of the opportunity through a motion for reconsideration to correct the error being
Section 261(w), subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code. imputed to him.7

Issues The rule is not a rigid one, however, for a prior motion for reconsideration is not
necessary in some situations, including the following:
The issues to be resolved are:
a. Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
(1) Whether or not the petition was premature; jurisdiction;

(2) Whether or not the acquisition of Lots 5860 and 5881 during the b. Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
period of the election ban was covered by the term public works as to be duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
in violation of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code; and those raised and passed upon in the lower court;

(3) Whether or not the issuance of Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 c. Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question,
during the period of the election ban was in violation of Section 261 (w) and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or
of the Omnibus Election Code. of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable;

Ruling of the Court d. Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would
be useless;
The petition is meritorious.
e. Where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief;
I
f. Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and
The Petition Was Not Premature the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;

The indispensable elements of a petition for certiorari are: (a) that it is directed
g. Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; process;
(b) that such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) that there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.6 h. Where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
The COMELEC asserts that the "plain, speedy and adequate" remedy available
to the petitioner was to file a motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the assailed i. Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
resolution, as required in the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure; and that his involved.8
omission to do so and his immediately invoking the certiorari jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court instead rendered his petition premature. That the situation of the petitioner falls under the last exception is clear enough.
The petitioner challenges only the COMELEC’s interpretation of Section 261(v)
We do not sustain the COMELEC. and (w) of the Omnibus Election Code. Presented here is an issue purely of law,
considering that all the facts to which the interpretation is to be applied have

5
already been established and become undisputed. Accordingly, he did not need the proscription as mandated under the aforementioned section of the Omnibus
to first seek the reconsideration of the assailed resolution. Election Code. And since the purchase of the lots is not within the contemplation
of the word public works, the third of the elements stated in the foregoing
The distinctions between a question of law and a question of fact are well known. guideline is not present in this case. Hence since not all the elements concurred,
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law the respondents are not liable for violation of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus
is on a certain state of facts. Such a question does not involve an examination of Election Code.
the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. But
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsehood of The foregoing ratiocination of the COMELEC is correct.
the alleged facts or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole
evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code provides as follows:
of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to one another and to the
whole, and the probabilities of the situation.9
Section 261. Prohibited acts.- The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
II
xxx
Acquisition of Lots 5860 And 5881
During the Period of the Election Ban, (v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public
Not Considered as "Public Works" in Violation funds.- Any public official or employee including barangay officials and
of Sec. 261 (v), Omnibus Election Code those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and
thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any
The COMELEC held in its resolution dated February 18, 2008 that: public funds:

To be liable for violation of Section 261 (v), supra, four (4) essential elements (1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:
must concur and they are:
(a) Maintenance of existing and/or completed public works
1. A public official or employee releases, disburses, or expends any project: Provided, that not more than the average number of laborers or
public funds; employees already employed therein during the sixth- month period
immediately prior to the beginning of the forty-five day period before
2. The release, disbursement or expenditure of such funds must be election day shall be permitted to work during such time: Provided,
within forty-five days before regular election; further, That no additional laborer shall be employed for maintenance
work within the said period of forty-five days;
3. The release, disbursement or expenditure of said public funds is for
any and all kinds of public works; and (b) Work undertaken by contract through public bidding held, or
negotiated contract awarded, before the forty-five day period before
4. The release, disbursement or expenditure of the public funds should election: Provided, That work for the purpose of this section undertaken
not cover any exceptions of Section 261 (v). (Underscoring supplied). under the so-called "takay" or "paquiao" system shall not be considered
as work by contract;
Applying the foregoing as guideline, it is clear that what is prohibited by law is the
release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds for any and all kinds of (c) Payment for the usual cost of preparation for working drawings,
public works. Public works is defined as fixed works (as schools, highways, specifications, bills of materials and equipment, and all incidental
docks) constructed for public use or enjoyment esp. when financed and owned expenses for wages of watchmen and other laborers employed for such
by the government. From this definition, the purchase of the lots purportedly to be work in the central office and field storehouses before the beginning of
utilized as cemetery by the City Government of Tuguegarao cannot by any such period: Provided, That the number of such laborers shall not be
stretch of imagination be considered as public works, hence it could not fall within
6
 increased over the number hired when the project or projects were It is decisive to determine, therefore, whether the purchase of the lots for use as
commenced; and a public cemetery constituted public works within the context of the prohibition
under the Omnibus Election Code.
(d) Emergency work necessitated by the occurrence of a public calamity,
but such work shall be limited to the restoration of the damaged facility. We first construe the term public works − which the Omnibus Election Code does
not define − with the aid of extrinsic sources.
No payment shall be made within five days before the date of election to laborers
who have rendered services in projects or works except those falling under The Local Government Code of 1991 considers public works to be the fixed
subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), of this paragraph. infrastructures and facilities owned and operated by the government for public
use and enjoyment. According to the Code, cities have the responsibility of
This prohibition shall not apply to ongoing public works projects commenced providing infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their
before the campaign period or similar projects under foreign agreements. For residents and funded out of city funds, such as, among others, roads and
purposes of this provision, it shall be the duty of the government officials or bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and secondary
agencies concerned to report to the Commission the list of all such projects being schools; and clinics, health centers and other health facilities necessary to carry
undertaken by them. out health services.10

(2) The Ministry of Social Services and Development and any other Likewise, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the
office in other ministries of the government performing functions similar engineering and construction arm of the government, associates public works
to the said ministry, except for salaries of personnel and for such other with fixed infrastructures for the public. In the declaration of policy pertinent to the
expenses as the Commission may authorize after due and necessary DPWH, Sec. 1, Chapter 1, Title V, Book IV, Administrative Code of 1987, states:
hearing. Should a calamity or disaster occur, all releases normally or
usually coursed through the said ministries shall be turned over to, and Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall maintain an engineering and
administered and disbursed by, the Philippine National Red Cross, construction arm and continuously develop its technology, for the purposes of
subject to the supervision of the Commission on Audit or its ensuring the safety of all infrastructure facilities and securing for all public works
representatives, and no candidate or his or her spouse or member of his and highways the highest efficiency and the most appropriate quality in
family within the second civil degree of affinity or consanguinity shall construction. The planning, design, construction and maintenance of
participate, directly or indirectly, in the distribution of any relief or other infrastructure facilities, especially national highways, flood control and water
goods to the victims of the calamity or disaster; and resources development systems, and other public works in accordance with
national development objectives, shall be the responsibility of such an
(3) The Ministry of Human Settlements and any other office in any other engineering and construction arm. However, the exercise of this responsibility
ministry of the government performing functions similar to the said shall be decentralized to the fullest extent feasible.
ministry, except for salaries of personnel and for such other necessary
administrative or other expenses as the Commission may authorize after The enumeration in Sec. 1, supra − "infrastructure facilities, especially national
due notice and hearing. highways, flood control and water resources development systems, and other
public works in accordance with national development objectives" − means that
As the legal provision shows, the prohibition of the release, disbursement or only the fixed public infrastructures for use of the public are regarded as public
expenditure of public funds for any and all kinds of public works depends on the works. This construction conforms to the rule of ejusdem generis, which
following elements: (a) a public official or employee releases, disburses or Professor Black has restated thuswise:11
spends public funds; (b) the release, disbursement and expenditure is made
within 45 days before a regular election or 30 days before a special election; and It is a general rule of statutory construction that where general words follow an
(c) the public funds are intended for any and all kinds of public works except the enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning,
four situations enumerated in paragraph (v) of Section 261. such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be
held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as
those specifically mentioned. But this rule must be discarded where the
legislative intention is plain to the contrary.
7
Accordingly, absent an indication of any contrary legislative intention, the term We concur with the OSG’s position.
public works as used in Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code is properly
construed to refer to any building or structure on land or to structures (such as Section 261 (w) covers not only one act but two, i.e., the act under subparagraph
roads or dams) built by the Government for public use and paid for by public (a) above and that under subparagraph (b) above. For purposes of the
funds. Public works are clearly works, whether of construction or adaptation prohibition, the acts are separate and distinct, considering that Section 261(w)
undertaken and carried out by the national, state, or municipal authorities, uses the disjunctive or to separate subparagraphs (a) and (b). In legal
designed to subserve some purpose of public necessity, use or convenience, hermeneutics, or is a disjunctive that expresses an alternative or gives a choice
such as public buildings, roads, aqueducts, parks, etc.; or, in other words, all of one among two or more things.13 The word signifies disassociation and
fixed works constructed for public use.12 independence of one thing from another thing in an enumeration. It should be
construed, as a rule, in the sense that it ordinarily implies as a disjunctive
It becomes inevitable to conclude, therefore, that the petitioner's insistence − that word.14 According to Black,15 too, the word and can never be read as or, or vice
the acquisition of Lots 5860 and 5881 for use as a public cemetery be considered versa, in criminal and penal statutes, where the rule of strict construction prevails.
a disbursement of the public funds for public works in violation of Section 261(v) Consequently, whether or not the treasury warrant in question was intended for
of the Omnibus Election Code − was unfounded and unwarranted. public works was even of no moment in determining if the legal provision was
violated.
III
There was a probable cause to believe that Section 261(w), subparagraph (b), of
Issuance of the Treasury Warrant the Omnibus Election Code was violated when City Mayor Ting and City
During the Period of the Election Ban Treasurer Garcia issued Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 during the election
Violated Section 261 (w), Omnibus Election Code ban period. For this reason, our conclusion that the COMELEC en banc gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing E.O. Case No. 06-14 for lack of merit is
inevitable and irrefragable.
Section 261(w) of the Omnibus Election Code reads thus:
True, the COMELEC, as the body tasked by no less than the 1987 Constitution to
xxx
investigate and prosecute violations of election laws,16 has the full discretion to
determine whether or not an election case is to be filed against a person and,
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for consequently, its findings as to the existence of probable cause are not subject to
public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices.- During the review by courts. Yet, this policy of non-interference does not apply where the
period of forty five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a COMELEC, as the prosecuting or investigating body, was acting arbitrarily and
special election, any person who: (a) undertakes the construction of any public capriciously, like herein, in reaching a different but patently erroneous
works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b) result.17 The COMELEC was plainly guilty of grave abuse of discretion.
issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future
delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public
Grave abuse of discretion is present "when there is a capricious and whimsical
funds.
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
xxx personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
The OSG posits that the foregoing provision is violated in either of two ways: (a) in contemplation of law."18
by any person who, within 45 days preceding a regular election and 30 days
before a special election, undertakes the construction of any public works except WHEREFORE, WE grant the petition for certiorari and set aside the resolution
those enumerated in the preceding paragraph; or (b) by any person who issues, dated February 18, 2008 issued in E.O. Case No. 06-14 by the Commission of
uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of Elections en banc.
money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds within 45
days preceding a regular election and 30 days before a special election.
The Commission on Elections is ordered to file the appropriate criminal
information against respondents City Mayor Randolph S. Ting and City Treasurer
8
Salvacion Garcia of Tuguegarao City for violation of Section 261 (w), after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
subparagraph (b), of the Omnibus Election Code. party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

Costs of suit to be paid by the private respondents. xxxx

SO ORDERED. (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis
supplied.]

The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 – the
Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives
through the Party-List System – which it promulgated on June 25, 1996.
EN BANC
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on
G.R. No. 190529 April 29, 2010 October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or
organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was
Secretary-General GEORGE "FGBF GEORGE" DULDULAO, Petitioner, PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it
vs. did not participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. this Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party or organizations or
coalitions adversely affected can personally or through its authorized
representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.
RESOLUTION

PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its
BRION, J.:
pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization under the Party-List System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition for asserted that:
certiorari1 and in the motion for reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13,
(1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those
2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009
similarly situated to invoke Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any
denying PGBI’s motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). Via these
party, organization and coalition already registered with the Commission
resolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national,
to no longer register anew; the party though is required to file with the
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list
Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a
system.
manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system; since
PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its
BACKGROUND participation in the 2007 elections within the required period prior to the
2007 elections, it has the option to choose whether or not to participate
Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party- in the next succeeding election under the same conditions as to rights
List System Act, provides: conferred and responsibilities imposed;

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may (2) The Supreme Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 177548 – Philippine Mines
motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, Safety Environment Association, also known as "MINERO" v.
Commission on Elections – cannot apply in the instant controversy for
two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from
9
 PGBI’s; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded the opportunity to Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and
be heard, while PGBI and the 25 others similarly affected by Resolution did not participate at all in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least
No. 8679 were not. Additionally, the requirement of Section 6(8) has two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in the two preceding elections. COMELEC,
been relaxed by the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. therefore, is not duty bound to certify it.
COMELEC) and the exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a
denial of the equal protection of the laws; PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among
other arguments, PGBI claimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to
(3) The implementation of the challenged resolution should be law, the evidence and existing jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts that
suspended and/or aborted to prevent a miscarriage of justice in view of Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor and import of
the failure to notify the parties in accordance with the same Section 6(8) the deliberations inclusive of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on
or R.A. No. 7941.2 October 19, 1994. It cited the following excerpts from the Records of the Senate:

The COMELEC denied PGBI’s motion/opposition for lack of merit. Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under ground no. (7),
Section 5 – there are actually two grounds it states: " Failure to participate in the
First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of last two (2) preceding elections or its failure to obtain at least ten percent (10%)
Section 4 of R.A. 7941.3 The provision simply means that without the required of the votes case under the party-list system in either of the last two (2) preceding
manifestation or if a party or organization does not participate, the exemption elections for the constituency in which it has registered"
from registration does not arise and the party, organization or coalition must go
through the process again and apply for requalification; a request for deferment In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate in the last two (2) preceding
would not exempt PGBI from registering anew. elections. The second is, failure to obtain at least 10 percent of the votes cast
under the party-list system in either of the last two preceding elections, Mr.
Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of President,
the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.
Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate grounds.
Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of – the essence of due process; this is clear Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr. President.
from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly gave the adversely affected parties
the opportunity to file their opposition. Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.5 [Underscoring supplied.]

As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious
found the motion to have been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the that it failed to participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections.
deadline for accreditation provided in Resolution 8646. The motion was obviously Implied in this is that it also failed to secure the required percentage in one (1)
filed months after the deadline. but not in the two (2) preceding elections.

PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised Considering PGBI’s arguments, we granted the motion and reinstated the petition
with the COMELEC when it moved to reconsider its delisting. in the court’s docket.

We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety THE ISSUES
Environment Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections
(Minero);4 we said that no grave abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that
correctly applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence. Applying Section 6(8) of We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI;
RA 7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the following reasoning: and (b) whether PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

OUR RULING

10
We find the petition partly impressed with merit. seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
a. The Minero Ruling frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence,
it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding
or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. elections should therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list
groups or organizations garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet
qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.
First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or We need not extensively discuss Banat’s significance, except to state that a
coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) party-list group or organization which qualified in the second round of seat
fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list allocation cannot now validly be delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has than 2% in the last two elections. In other words, the application of this
registered.6 The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list
independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the
be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive House of Representatives, a percentage that is less than the 2% threshold
word.7 Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply
two (2) separate reasons for delisting. to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two
preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered.
Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of
RA 7941, as PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show. To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for
delisting; these grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and
(b) the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization
elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure
of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a
to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in
failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is
which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should
that a party list organization that does not participate in an election necessarily
be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law
gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a is,10 and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis.
confused interpretation of the law, given the law’s clear and categorical language
and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based
on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and
therefore a strained application of the law – in jurisdictional terms, it is an not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil
interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.8
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Association for Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC9 (Banat)
where we partly invalidated the 2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a
7941 as follows: country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme
Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should
as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 be deemed settled and closed to further argument.11 The doctrine is grounded on
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list
11
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon
judicial practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x.14 We find it obvious under the
to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case,
cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint
movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis on due process grounds.
simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly
same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first ANNUL COMELEC Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the
principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which
like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating denied PGBI’s motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). PGBI is
to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the coming May
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare 2010 elections.
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.12
SO ORDERED.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial
system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.13

As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero
exists; it was clearly an erroneous application of the law – an application that the
principle of stability or predictability of decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did
unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and SECOND DIVISION
to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by
the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and
G.R. No. Nos. L-23779-80 April 29, 1977
strike it out from our ruling case law.

FEDERICO QUIZON and PROFITISA QUIZON, Petitioners,

We are aware that PGBI’s situation – a party list group or organization that failed
vs.
to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in
HON. JOSE L. BALTAZAR, Municipal Judge of San Fernando, Pampanga;
the preceding election – is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA
ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Assistant Provincial Fiscal, of Pampanga; and
7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such
CECILIA SANGALANG, Respondents.
is a matter for Congress to address. We cannot and do not address matters over
which full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to
do so will offend the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then Lorenzo P. Navarro for petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library
the present case should bring this concern to the legislature’s notice.
Eligio G. Lagman for respondent Cecilia Sangalang.chanrobles virtual law library
b. The Issue of Due Process
Eliodoro B. Guinto for and in his own behalf.
On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI’s right to due
process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did BARREDO, J.:chanrobles virtual law library
seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process, we
have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to Petiion for certiorari and prohibition to declare null and void the orders of the
administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, issued in Criminal Cases Nos.
or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 4203, People vs. Federico Quizon and 4204, People vs. Profitisa Quizon, dated
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The July 11 and August 17, 1964, respectively, denying petitioners' motion to quash
requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable the criminal complaints against them based on the ground of prescription of the
12
offense of serious oral defamation of which they were charged, and to prohibit From Nov. 12 to 30, 1964, there are 19 days
said court from proceeding further with the said criminal cases, except to dismiss
the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library December 30 days
January 30 days
On May 11, 1964, private respondent, Cecilia Sangalang, with the assistance of
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Eliodoro B. Guinto, who had conducted the preliminary February 30 days
investigation, filed with respondent court two separate criminal complaints both
for serious oral defamation, the one against petitioner Federico Quizon in March 30 days
Criminal Case No. 4203 and the other petitioner Profitisa Quizon in Criminal April 30 days
Case No. 4204, committed, according to the said complaints on the same day,
November 11, 1963. Upon being called for arraignment, petitioner presented a From May 1 to 11, 1964, there are 11 days
written motion to quash contending principally that the offense charged had
From Nov. 12, 1963 to May 11, 1964 are 180 days
already prescribed as of May 9, 1964.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library (Opposition to the Motion to Quash, p. 2)

In support of their motion, petitioners argued that by express provision of Article

A study of the provisions of the laws pertinent to the issue at bar leads one to
90 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense of oral defamation prescribes in six
agree with the mode of computation submitted by the public prosecutor because
months and under the authority of People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67, the correct
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, in providing for the prescriptive period for
computation of said six months for the purposes of their particular case is as
oral defamation, speaks of month, not of day, as the basic unit in reckoning the
follows:
duration of the prescription, when it says that "offenses of oral defamation ... shall
prescribe in six months." Article 13 of the new Civil Code says that "when the
From Nov. 12 to 30, 1963 there were 19 days laws speak of ..., months, ..., it shall be understood that ... month ... of thirty days
each ... It says further that "If months are designated by their name, they shall be
December, 1963 had 31 days computed by the number of days which they respectively have. Conformably to
January, 1964 had 31 days these legal provisions and applying the same to the case at bar, the computation
given by the public prosecutor appears to be correct. The month of November
February, 1964 had 29 days was designated in the complaint so it will be given the number of days it has in
the calendar which is 30 days. But the succeeding months of December,
March, 1964 had 31 days January, February, March and April, which are the months comprised within the
April, 1964 had 30 days prescriptive period of six (6) months are nowhere specifically designated by their
name, consequently they should be given the 30-day period of duration in
From May 1 to 9, 1964 was a matter 9 days accordance with the first paragraph of Article 13 aforesaid. It is believed, and the
of Court so holds, that this formula or mode of computation is more squarely in
accordance with the one adopted in the case of People vs. Del Rosario (GR No.
From Nov. 12, 1963 to May 9, 1964 180 days L-7234) quoted in the motion to quash. The month of May, having been
were. designated in the complaint, was given the number of 31 days it has in the
(Page 26, Record.) calendar, the succeeding month of June comprised within the prescriptive period
was given 30-day duration, so it resulted to be thus:

Overruling their motion, respondent court reasoned out thus:

May 28 to 31 3 days (the 28th was excluded)
The prosecution opposed the motion to dismiss by making a computation of time June 30 days
as follows:
July 27 27 days (the 27th was included)
60 days

13
In pursuance thereto, the Supreme Court in the Del Rosario Case finally held that manner that Article 13 of the new Civil Code is applied to determine the length of
the filing of the action on July 27 was on the 60th day. the two months period required for the prescription of the offense, its provision (of
the said Article 13) contained in paragraph 3 which reads "In computing a period,
If the formula for computation of the defense is to be followed, Article 13 in so far the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included" should also be applied,
as a month is to be understood to be of 30 days, unless the month is designated so that the information should be considered as filed on the 60th day and not on
by its name, will be rendered nugatory, for the simple reason that there are the 61st day after the offense has been committed. The resolution of the appeal
months that have 31 days in the calendar to be reckoned with as they will be involves the determination of two legal issues, first, whether the prescriptive
within the prescriptive period. The basic unit of computation used by the defense period should commence from the very day on which the crime was committed,
is by the day and not by the month of 30-day duration as provided for in Article 90 or from the day following that in which it was committed, in accordance with the
of the Revised Penal Code, the counting of which is to be made in relation to third paragraph of Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Penal Code
Article 13 of the Civil Code (new).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law should be understood to be a month of 30 days, instead of the civil or calendar
library month.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The contention of the private prosecutor no longer needs discussion in view of As to the first question, we note that Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
the conclusion arrived at above. (Pp 37-40, Record.) provides that the period shall commence to run from the day on which the
offense is committed or discovered. The title indicates that the provision merely
purports to prescribe the of computing the period of prescription. In the
Surely, such ratiocination is plainly erroneous. In the case of People vs. del
computation of a period of time within which an act is to be done, the law in this
Rosario, supra, which was properly brought to the attention of the court in
jurisdiction has always directed the first day be excluded and the last included
petitioners' motion to quash, this Court held very clearly that:
(See section 1, Rule 28 of the Rules of Court; section 13, Rev. Adm. Code and
Art. 13, Civil Code of the Philippines). And in the case of Surbano vs. Gloria, 51
The pertinent provisions of Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code are as Phil., 415, where the question involved was whether an offense had prescribed,
follows: we held that from February 18 to March 15, 1927 only a period of 25 days
elapsed, because we excluded the first day (February 18) and included the last
Art. 90. Prescription of crimes. - ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual day (March 15). The above method of computation was in force in this jurisdiction
law library even before the advent of the American regime (Article 7. Spanish Civil Code). It
is logical to presume, therefore, that the Legislature in enacting Article 91 of the
The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six Revised Penal Code meant or intended to mean that in the computation of the
months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library period provided for therein, the first day is to be excluded and the last one
included, in accord with existing laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Light offenses prescribe in two months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
We find much sence in the argument of the Solicitor General, that if the Civil
Code of the Philippines is to be resorted to in the interpretation of the length of
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - chanrobles virtual law library the month, so should it be resorted to in the computation of the period of
prescription. Besides, Article 18 of the Civil Code (Article 16 of the old Civil Code)
The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the expressly directs that any deficiency in any special law (such as the Revised
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, ... Penal Code) must be supplied by its provisions. As the Revised Penal Code is
deficient in that it does not explicitly define how the period is to be computed,
The court a quo held that in accordance with Article 13 of the new Civil Code the resort must be had to its Article 13, which contains in detail the manner of
"month" mentioned in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be one of 30 computating a period. We find, therefore that the trial Court committed error in
days, and since the period of prescription commences to run from the day "on not excluding the first day in the computation of the period of prescription of the
which the crime is discovered by the offended party," i.e., in this case on May 28, offense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1958 when it was committed, the two months period provided for the prescription
of the offense already expired when the information was filed, because the filing The other question is whether a month mentioned in Article 90 should be
was on the 61st day. The Solicitor General in this appeal argues that in the same considered as the calendar month and not the 30-day month. It is to be noted
14
that no provision of the Revised Penal Code defines the length of the Month. Indeed, it being obvious that respondent court disregarded the construction of the
Article 7 of the old Civil Code provided that a month shall be understood as pertinent legal provisions by this Court, the charge of petitioners that it has
containing 30 days; but this concept was modified by section 13 of the Revised committed grave abuse of discretion must be
Administrative Code which provides that month means the civil or calendar sustained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
month and not the regular 30-day month (Gutierrez vs. Carpio, 53 Phil., 334).
With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386), however, As to the contention of respondents that the denial of a motion to quash is not a
we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with ground for certiorari or prohibition, suffice it to state that to allow an accused to
which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month (Article 13). This undergo the ordeals of trial and conviction when the information or complaint
provision of the new Civil Code has been intended for general application in the against him is patently defective or the offense charged therein has been
interpretation of the laws. As the offense charge in the information in the case at indisputably, shown to have already prescribed is unfair and unjust, for which
bar took place on May 28, 1953, after the new Civil Code had come into effect, reason, procedurally, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and
this new provisions should apply, and in accordance therewith the month in adequate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood to mean the regular
30-day month.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the criminal complaint in the
aforementioned cases are hereby ordered dismissed. No costs.
In our conclusion that the term "month" used in the Revised penal Code should
be interpreted in the sense that the new Civil Code defines the said term, we find
persuasive authority in a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain. In a case
decided by it in the year 1887 (S. de 30 de Marzo de 1887), prior to the approval
of the Civil Code of Spain, it had declared that when the law spoke of months, it
meant the natural month or the solar month, in the absence of express provisions
to the contrary. But after the promulgation of the Civil Code of Spain, which
provided in its Article 7 a general rule for the interpretation of the laws, and with
particular respect to months, that a month shall be understood as a 30-day
month, said court held that the two months period for the prescription of a light
offense should be understood to mean 60 days, a month being a 30-day month.
(S. de 6 de Abril de 1895, 3 Viada, p. 45). Similarly we hold that in view of the
express provisions of Article 13 of the new Civil Code the term "month" used in
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood to mean the 30-day
month and not the solar or civil month.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

We hold, therefore, that the offense charged in the information prescribed in 60

days, said period to be counted by excluding May 28, the commission of the
offense, and we find that when the information was filed on July 27, 1953 the
offense had not yet prescribed because July 27 is the sixtieth day from May 29.
(97 Phil. 68-72.)

In the light of the foregoing pronouncements of this Court, the insistence of

respondents that the factual situation in this case is substantially different from
the one in del Rosario is too tenuous to merit consideration. Respondents have
not shown any ponderous reason why We have to depart from the above
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