Romulo Macalintal vs Commission on Elections

Political Law – Election Laws – Absentee Voters Act – Proclamation of Winners in a National Elections

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A.
9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others

That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting
provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to
vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects
the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because
it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.
HELD: No.

There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within the period
required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used.
Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has
the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is
considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the
immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the
proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice-presidential
elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
 GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public school teachers. Some time in September and
October 1990, during the teacher’s strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason they were administratively charged
with 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil Service Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty; 4) refusal to perform official
duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They were placed under
preventive suspension. Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day period. Margallo was dismissed from the
service. The three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to
reprimand only. Hence their reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back wages during the period of
their suspension and pending appeal (before the CA exonerated them).

ISSUE
Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if they are subsequently exonerated.

HELD
YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back wages, the respondent must be
exonerated from the charges and his suspension be unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive, and
it is actually considered illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is
reversed. Hence he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service
Decree states that the respondent “shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal
in the event he wins.” On the other hand if his conviction is affirmed the period of his suspension becomes part of the
final penalty of suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period of
suspension pending their appeal would be considered as part of the preventive suspension, entitling them to full pay
because they were eventually exonerated and their suspension was unjustified.
They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still reprimanded.
 Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary
94 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members of the Cabinet – Singularity of Office –
EO 284

In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in
any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding
any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may
be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in
the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of
their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on
the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot
override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284
is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
 G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo
G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001
FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he had personally
given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based
numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of
Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-
tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was
formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by
students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for
Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will
not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him
from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively
resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd
at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation.
Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only
in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a
president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that while the
Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution,
overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under
the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the
previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal
and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by
acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace.
Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of
all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his
questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that
petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer
entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to
the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity
for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear
that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent
actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).
G.R. No. 160093 July 31, 2007

MALARIA EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (MEWAP)

PUNO, CJ.:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65475 dated
September 12, 2003 which upheld the validity of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 102,1 the law Redirecting the Functions and
Operations of the Department of Health. Then President Joseph E. Estrada issued E.O. No. 102 on May 24, 1999 pursuant
to Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and Sections
78 and 80 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8522, also known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1998. E.O. No. 102
provided for structural changes and redirected the functions and operations of the Department of Health.

On October 19, 1999, the President issued E.O. No. 165 "Directing the Formulation of an Institutional Strengthening and
Streamlining Program for the Executive Branch" which created the Presidential Committee on Executive Governance
(PCEG) composed of the Executive Secretary as chair and the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) as co-chair.

The DBM, on July 8, 2000, issued the Notice of Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action (NOSCA). On July 17, 2000,
the PCEG likewise issued Memorandum Circular (M.C.) No. 62, entitled "Implementing Executive Order No. 102, Series of
1999 Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health."2 M.C. No. 62 directed the rationalization
and streamlining of the said Department.

On July 24, 2000, the Secretary of Health issued Department Memorandum No. 136, Series of 2000, ordering the
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau or Service Directors and Program Managers of the Department of Health to
direct all employees under their respective offices to accomplish and submit the Personal Information Sheet due to the
approval of the Department of Health – Rationalization and Streamlining Plan.

On July 28, 2000, the Secretary of Health again issued Department Circular No. 221, Series of 2000, stating that the
Department will start implementing the Rationalization and Streamlining Plan by a process of selection, placement or
matching of personnel to the approved organizational chart and the list of the approved plantilla items.3 The Secretary
also issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 94, Series of 2000, which set the implementing guidelines for the restructuring
process on personnel selection and placement, retirement and/or voluntary resignation. A.O. No. 94 outlined the general
guidelines for the selection and placement of employees adopting the procedures and standards set forth in R.A. No.
66564 or the "Rules on Governmental Reorganization," Civil Service Rules and Regulations, Sections 76 to 78 of the GAA
for the Year 2000, and Section 42 of E.O. No. 292.

On August 29, 2000, the Secretary of Health issued Department Memorandum No. 157, Series of 2000, viz.:

Pursuant to the Notice of Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action (NOSCA) approved by the DBM on 8 July 2000
and Memorandum Circular No. 62 issued by the Presidential Committee on Effective Governance (PCEG) on 17 July 2000,
Implementing E.O. 102 dated 24 May 1999, the following approved Placement List of DOH Personnel is hereby
disseminated for your information and guidance.

All personnel are hereby directed to report to their new assignments on or before 2 October 2000 pending processing of
new appointments, required clearances and other pertinent documents.
All Heads of Office/Unit in the Department of Health are hereby directed to facilitate the implementation of E.O. 102, to
include[,] among others, the transfer or movement of personnel, properties, records and documents to appropriate
office/unit and device other necessary means to minimize disruption of office functions and delivery of health services.

Appeals, oversights, issues and concerns of personnel related to this Placement List shall be made in writing using the
Appeals Form (available at the Administrative Service) addressed to the Appeals Committee chaired by Dr. Gerardo
Bayugo. All Appeals Forms shall be submitted to the Re-Engineering Secretariat xxx not later than 18 September 2000. 5

Petitioner Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) is a union of affected employees
in the Malaria Control Service of the Department of Health. MEWAP filed a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-
98793, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila seeking to nullify Department Memorandum No. 157, the NOSCA and the
Placement List of Department of Health Personnel and other issuances implementing E.O. No. 102.

On May 2, 2001, while the civil case was pending at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 22, petitioners filed with
this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners sought to nullify E.O. No. 102 for being
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as it allegedly violates certain provisions
of E.O. No. 292 and R.A. No. 8522. The petition was referred to the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same in its
assailed Decision. Hence, this appeal where petitioners ask for a re-examination of the pertinent pronouncements of this
Court that uphold the authority of the President to reorganize a department, bureau or office in the executive department.
Petitioners raise the following issues, viz.:

1. Whether Sections 78 and 80 of the General Provision of Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General
Appropriation[s] Act of 1998[,] empower former President Joseph E. Estrada to reorganize structurally and functionally
the Department of Health.

2. Whether Section 20, Chapter I, title i, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides legal basis in reorganizing
the Department of Health.

(A) Whether Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772, has been repealed.

3. Whether the President has authority under Section 17, Article VIII of the Constitution to effect a reorganization of a
department under the executive branch.

4. Whether there has been abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of former President
Joseph E. Estrada in issuing Executive Order No. 102, Redirecting the functions and operations of the Department ofHealth.

5. Whether Executive Order No. 102 is null and void.6

We deny the petition.

The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and
statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987
Constitution, viz.:

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.

In Canonizado v. Aguirre,7 we held that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It alters the existing structure of government offices
or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them.8 While the power to abolish an
office is generally lodged with the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch, which
may include such abolition, is permissible under our present laws, viz.:

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds
from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the
Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may
be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence.

The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the
President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant
him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.9

The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title
I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization measures,
viz.:

SEC. 20. Residual Powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and
functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above,
or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.10

We explained the nature of the President’s residual powers under this section in the case of Larin v. Executive Secretary,
11 viz.:

This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then gives him the power to
reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant
the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power
to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees [is] unquestionable. The
1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked." So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.12

The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1772, clearly support
the President’s continuing power to reorganize the executive branch, viz.:

1. The President of the Philippines shall have continuing authority to reorganize the National Government. In exercising
this authority, the President shall be guided by generally acceptable principles of good government and responsive
national development, including but not limited to the following guidelines for a more efficient, effective, economical and
development-oriented governmental framework:

xxx

b) Abolish departments, offices, agencies or functions which may not be necessary, or create those which are necessary,
for the efficient conduct of government functions, services and activities;

c) Transfer functions, appropriations, equipment, properties, records and personnel from one department, bureau, office,
agency or instrumentality to another;

d) Create, classify, combine, split, and abolish positions;

e) Standardize salaries, materials, and equipment;

f) Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge, or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities, and units of the National
Government, as well as expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their powers, functions, and authorities, including,
with respect to government-owned or controlled corporations, their corporate life, capitalization, and other relevant
aspects of their charters;

g) Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of this Decree.

Petitioners argue that the residual powers of the President under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 refer only to
the Office of the President and not to the departments, bureaus or offices within the executive branch. They invoke Section
31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the same law, viz.:

Section 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. – The President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President. x x x

The interpretation of petitioners is illogically restrictive and lacks legal basis. The residual powers granted to the President
under Section 20, Title I, Book III are too broad to be construed as having a sole application to the Office of the President.
As correctly stated by respondents, there is nothing in E.O. No. 292 which provides that the continuing authority should
apply only to the Office of the President.13 If such was the intent of the law, the same should have been expressly stated.
To adopt the argument of petitioners would result to two conflicting provisions in one statute. It is a basic canon of
statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. The rule is that a
construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.14

In fact, as pointed out by respondents, the President’s power to reorganize the executive department even finds further
basis under Sections 78 and 80 of R.A. No. 8522, viz.:15

Section 78. Organizational Changes – Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, no
organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective
organizational structure and funded from appropriations provided by this Act.

Section 80. Scaling Down and Phase-out of Activities of Agencies within the Executive Branch – The heads of departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in
the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased-out or abolished subject to Civil Service rules and
regulations. Said activities shall be reported to the Office of the President through the Department of Budget and
Management and to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Chairman,
Committee on Finance of the Senate. Actual scaling down, phase-out or abolition of the activities shall be effected
pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.

Petitioners contend that Section 78 refers only to changes in "organizational units" or "key positions" in any department
or agency, while Section 80 refers merely to scaling down and phasing out of "activities" within the executive department.
They argue that neither section authorizes reorganization. Thus, the realignment of the appropriations to implement the
reorganization of the Department of Health under E.O. No. 102 is illegal.

Again, petitioners’ construction of the law is unduly restrictive. This Court has consistently held in Larin16 and Buklod ng
Kawanihang EIIB v. Zamora17 that the corresponding pertinent provisions in the GAA in these subject cases authorize the
President to effect organizational changes in the department or agency concerned.

Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the
executive department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient.18 R.A. No. 665619 provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in
the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is
abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those
less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the
department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original
offices; and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation.

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the President did not commit bad faith in the questioned
reorganization, viz.:

In this particular case, there is no showing that the reorganization undertaking in the [Department of Health] had violated
this requirement, nor [are] there adequate allegations to that effect. It is only alleged that the petitioners were directly
affected by the reorganization ordered under E.O. [No.] 102. Absent is any showing that bad faith attended the actual
implementation of the said presidential issuance.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65475 dated
September 12, 2003 is AFFIRMED.
 Tarrosa vs. Singson, G.R. No. 111243, May 25, 1994

Facts:

Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1993. Jesus Armando
Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for prohibition questioning the appointment of Singson for not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments as required by the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which
established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. The Secretary of Budget and
Management was impleaded for disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of respondent
Singson. In their comment, respondents claim that Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation
by the CA of the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment to the said
position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the CA, citing Section 16 of Article VI of the
Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COA’s confirmation.

Held:

No. Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the COA of the appointment of the Governor
of the BSP. An appointment to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be confirmed by the COA
under Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. (Tarrosa vs. Singson, G.R. No. 111243, May
25, 1994)
Facts:

In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government departments and agencies, including SUCs,
GOCCs and LGUs to identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at
least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non--personal services items (Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding
of 10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) . On 10 December 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43, reducing to 5% the amount
of IRA to be withheld from LGU.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction
program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal autonomy

2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments, are valid
exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments

Held:

1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of
national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are
consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning
agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and
integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country. However, under the Constitution, the
formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate
public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.

Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines
is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment
of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."

There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public
sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the
secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore,
any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal
revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.

Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and the implementation
of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show that the national government was suffering from an
unmanageable public-sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues of
local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally
the LGU's internal revenue allotment.

AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of supervision over
local governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction
measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does
not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within
the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise
of the power of control.
2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of
LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code
specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of
the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is,
therefore, imperative. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000.
 Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

I. THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President
Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern
such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the
Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

II. THE ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and
sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions
are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when
so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized
as a treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the
Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in §25,
Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since
Congress has not required it.

xxx xxx xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized as a treaty” means that the other contracting party accepts or
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case,
to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to
the phrase.

Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should
be understood in the sense they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements
of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

xxx xxx xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the
United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of
America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the
treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
 JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO, GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER II,
MARIVIC A. TRABAJO-DARAY, ANTONIO E. VALENZUELA in his capacity as the Director for Fact Finding and
Intelligence of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, and MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., in his capacity
as Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao

On the Supreme Court's Supervision over Lower Courts

Facts:

Pursuant to the government’s plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the Republic of the Philippines filed an
expropriation case against the owners of the properties affected by the project. The expropriation case was presided by
Judge Renato A. Fuentes. The government won the expropriation case. DPWH still owed the defendants-lot owners. The
lower court granted Tessie Amadeo’s motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid
claim. On May 3, 1994, respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy, addressed to the Regional Director of the
DPWH, Davao City, describing the properties subject of the levy as ‘All scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the
Department of Public Works and Highways depot at Panacan, Davao City. The auction sale pushed through and Alex
Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together with respondent Sheriff Paralisan, attempted
to withdraw the auctioned properties on May 19, 1994. They were, however, prevented from doing so by the custodian
of the subject DPWH properties, a certain Engr. Ramon Alejo, who claimed that his office was totally unaware of the
auction sale, and informed the sheriff that many of the properties within the holding area of the depot were still
serviceable and were due for repair and rehabilitation.

On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second District of Davao City and Engineer Ramon A.
Alejo, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed Judge Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to
comment on the report recommending the filing of an administrative case against the sheriff and other persons
responsible for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution. The Department of Public Works and Highways,
through the Solicitor General, filed an administrative complaint against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.

The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that Judge Renato A. Fuentes be charged before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and likewise be administratively charged before the
Supreme Court with acts unbecoming of a judge.

Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal complaint charging Judge
Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e).

Fuentes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward
all records to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3
[e]. And he conducted an investigation of said complaint against petitioner. Thus, he encroached on the power of the
Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.

The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation because the Supreme Court is not in
possession of any record which would verify the propriety of the issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover,
the Court Administrator has not filed any administrative case against petitioner judge that would pose similar issues on
the present inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.

Issue:

Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his official functions alleged
to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts
before the Supreme Court.
Held: No.

Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

“Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.”

Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against
petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the
Supreme Court, for appropriate action.

Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts
and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into
this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.

Petitioner’s questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ of execution were done
in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of
jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired
into in the course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. “No other entity
or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary
thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or not--and pronounce it
erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order.
 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

482 SCRA 233 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

“Automatic release” of approved annual appropriations to Civil Service Commission, a constitutional commission which is
vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.

FACTS:

The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002 (GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was
P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only
P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.

CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM on the ground of their ―no report, no release‖ policy.
Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year
2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal
autonomy.

ISSUE: Whether or not DBM‘s policy, ―no report, no release‖ is constitutional

HELD: DBM‘s act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared unconstitutional.

The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed.
Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section
5 of the Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

The Court held in the case of, Batangas v. Romulo, ―automatic release‖ in Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is defined
as ―an automatic manner; without thought or conscious intention. Being ―automatic,‖ thus, connotes something
mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the ―just
share‖ accruing to them from the national coffers.

By parity of construction, ―automatic release‖ of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional

Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that the CSC may be subjected to withholding or
reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC and the other entities vested with
fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught
the distinction established by the Constitution.
 DELA CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS

Petitioners are public school teachers who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually
dismissed by Sec. Carino in Oct. 1990. It was alleged that the teachers participated in the mass action/ illegal strike on
Sept. 1990. The teachers also violated the return-to-work order issued by the DECS. Respondents failed to explain to the
DECS despite the 5 day period given. Hence they were found guilty as charged, and subsequently dismissed from office by
Sec. Carino of the DECS. The Civil Service Commission, upon appeal, found the teachers guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of service, and imposed upon them the reduced penalty of six month’s suspension. However in view of the
length of time that the teachers had been out of service due to the dismissal issued by Sec. Carino, the CSC likewise
ordered their immediate reinstatement without back wages.

ISSUE

1. Whether the teachers’ conducts are prejudicial to the best interest of service.

2. Whether or not the teachers are entitled to back wages for the period of 3 years pending their appeal deducting the 6
months’ suspension eventually meted out to them.

HELD

1. YES, the mass actions amounted to a prohibited strike of civil service servants. Although the right to peaceably assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances is guaranteed by the Constitution, this liberty must be exercised
within reasonable limits. The public school teachers committed acts prejudicial to the interest of the service by staging
the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and failing to return despite the return to work order.

2. NO, they are not entitled to backwages. The teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, the 2
circumstances necessary for the grant of backwages in administrative disciplinary cases.
 In Re: Derogatory News Items Charging Court Of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria With Interference On
Behalf Of A Suspected Drug Queen: Court Of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria

FACTS:

This administrative charge was triggered by newspaper accounts which appeared on the July 2000 issues of The Manila
Standard, The Manila Times, Malaya, The Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today. The national dailies collectively reported
that Court of Appeals Assoc. Justice Demetrio G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected Chinese drug queen
Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai.

The facts as evidence presented by the prosecution are quite clear. Yu Yuk Lai, together with her supposed nephew, a
certain Kenneth Sy Alias William Sy, was alleged of “conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
deliberate intent and without authority of law . . . (to) sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms, more or less,
of (shabu), which is a regulated drug.”

On 2000, it was concluded that “the evidence is strong and sufficient to warrant conviction of the two accused for the
crime charged”.

Justice demetria allegedly intercede in behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk lai when he called and instructed the
prosecutor to withdraw the motion to inhibit of Judge Muro, the judge who handle the case and was alleged to be partial
to Yu Yuk Lai.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Demetria violated Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING:

Yes. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is
circumscribed with the heavy responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with propriety and must be above
suspicion. His must be free of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his judicial duties,
but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private individual.

Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed to live up to this expectation. Through his indiscretions,
Justice Demetria did not only make a mockery of his high office, but also caused incalculable damage to the entire
Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected drug queen and
interfering with her prosecution seriously undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary.

Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be
maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot be preserved.
There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.

Justice Demetria is GUILTY of violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or reappointment to any government office, agency
or instrumentality, including any government owned or controlled corporation or institution.