Ieee 487 - 2015

IEEE Standard for the Electrical
Protection of Communications
Facilities Serving Electric Supply
Locations—General Considerations
IEEE Power and Energy Society
Sponsored by the
Power System Communications Committee
IEEE
3 Park Avenue IEEE Std 487™-2015
New York, NY 10016-5997 (Revision of
USA IEEE Std 487-2007)
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSIDAD DE GUANAJUATO. Downloaded on January 26,2017 at 06:45:34 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
IEEE Std 487™-2015
(Revision of
IEEE Std 487-2007)

Sponsor
Power System Communications Committee

of the
IEEE Power and Energy Society
Approved 11 June 2015
IEEE-SA Standards Board
Copyrights and permissions
Figure 15 reprinted with permission from CEA Technologies Inc. (CEATI).
Figure 16 reprinted with permission from Grcev et al. [B19].
Figure 17 reprinted with permission from Grcev et al. [B20].
Abstract: General considerations are presented for the electrical protection of

telecommunications facilities serving electric supply locations. This standard contains material
that is common to the IEEE 487™ family of standards (i.e., dot-series) including fundamental
protection theory; basic electrical protection philosophy, concepts, and designs; protection
apparatus; service types; reliability; service performance objective (SPO) classifications; and
transmission considerations. In general, special protective measures, handling procedures, and
administrative procedures are necessary to provide electrical protection against damage to
telecommunications facilities and equipment, maintain reliability of service, and ensure the safety
of personnel.
Keywords: electric supply locations, high-voltage tower, IEEE 487™, power stations, protection,
wire-line telecommunications
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

3 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5997, USA
Copyright © 2015 by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

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Participants
At the time this standard was completed, the Wire-Line Working Group had the following membership:
Percy E. Pool, Co-Chair and Technical Editor

Larry S. Young, Co-Chair and Secretary
Steven Blume Ernest Duckworth Del Khomarlou

Joe Boyles John Fuller Richard Knight
Timothy Conser Ernest Gallo Randall Mears
Bhimesh Dahal Dave Hartmann Mark Tirio
Jean de Seve Dan Jendek Thomas Vo
The following members of the individual balloting committee voted on this standard. Balloters may have
voted for approval, disapproval, or abstention.
William Ackerman Yuri Khersonsky Michael Roberts

R. Baysden Richard Knight Charles Rogers
Steven Blume Jim Kulchisky Thomas Rozek
Gustavo Brunello Chung-Yiu Lam Daniel Sabin
William Byrd Robert Landman Steven Sano
Robert Christman Lawrenc Long Bartien Sayogo
Timothy Conser Albert Martin Devki Sharma
Jerry Corkran William McCoy Mark Simon
Gary Donner Joseph Mears David Singleton
Michael Dood Carl Moller Jerry Smith
Randall Dotson H. Nerhood Michael Swearingen
Ernest Duckworth Michael Newman David Tepen
Fredric Friend Joe Nims Mark Tirio
Frank Gerleve Gary Nissen John Vergis
David Gilmer James O’Brien Jane Verner
Mietek Glinkowski Carl Orde Thomas Vo
Jalal Gohari Bansi Patel Daniel Ward
Randall Groves S. Patel Donald Wengerter
Jeffrey Helzer Donald Platts Kenneth White
Lee Herron Percy E. Pool James Wilson
Werner Hoelzl Larry S. Young
vi
Copyright © 2015 IEEE. All rights reserved.
When the IEEE-SA Standards Board approved this standard on 11 June 2015, it had the following
membership:
John D. Kulick, Chair

Jon Walter Rosdahl, Vice Chair
Richard H. Hulett, Past Chair
Konstantinos Karachalios, Secretary
Masayuki Ariyoshi Joseph L. Koepfinger* Stephen J. Shellhammer

Ted Burse David J. Law Adrian P. Stephens
Stephen Dukes Hung Ling Yatin Trivedi
Jean-Philippe Faure Andrew Myles Phillip Winston
J. Travis Griffith T. W. Olsen Don Wright
Gary Hoffman Glenn Parsons Yu Yuan
Michael Janezic Ronald C. Petersen Daidi Zhong
Annette D. Reilly
*Member Emeritus
vii
Introduction
This introduction is not part of IEEE Std 487™-2015, IEEE Standard for the Electrical Protection of Communications
Facilities Serving Electric Supply Locations—General Considerations.
Telecommunications facilities serving electric supply locations often require special high-voltage
protection (HVP) against the effects of fault-produced ground potential rise (GPR) or induced voltages, or
both. Some of the telecommunications services are used for control and protective relaying purposes and
may be called on to perform critical operations at times of power system faults. This requirement presents a
major challenge in the design and protection of the telecommunications system because power system
faults can result in the introduction of interfering voltages and currents into the telecommunications circuit
at the very time when the circuit is most urgently required to perform its function. Even when critical
services are not involved, special HVP may be required for both personnel safety and plant protection at
times of power system faults. Effective protection of any telecommunications circuit requires coordinated
protection on all circuits provided over the same telecommunications cable. Figure 24 provides an
overview of a basic protection system.
Some electrical environments, collectively called electric supply locations, require the application of
unique electrical protection techniques because of their special nature. One such environment is the electric
power station or substation. Another is at or near power line transmission and distribution structures such as
towers or poles. Such structures often provide a convenient site for the location of wireless, personal
communications service, and cellular antennas and their associated electronic equipment that is served by a
link to the wired telecommunications network.
This standard presents general considerations for the electrical protection of telecommunications facilities
serving electric supply locations. This standard contains material that is common to the IEEE 487™ family
of standards (i.e., dot-series) including fundamental protection theory and basic electrical protection
concepts and designs. In general, special protective measures, handling procedures, and administrative
procedures are necessary to provide electrical protection against damage to telecommunications facilities
and equipment, maintain reliability of service, and ensure the safety of personnel. It is important to note
that special HVP for the purpose of personnel safety and plant protection may be required even when
critical services are not involved. For leased circuits, mutually agreeable methods for the installation of
protective equipment owned by either party are presented.
This project is part of a reorganization of the IEEE 487 documentation in which the main document is
broken down into a family of related documents segregated on the basis of technology:
 IEEE Std 487™ for general considerations

 IEEE Std 487.1™ for applications using on-grid isolation equipment involving metallic wire-line
 IEEE Std 487.2™ for applications consisting entirely of optical fiber cables
 IEEE Std 487.3™ for applications of hybrid facilities where part of the circuit is on metallic wire-
line and the remainder of the circuit is on optical fiber cable
 IEEE Std 487.4™ for applications using neutralizing transformers (NTs)
 IEEE Std 487.5™ for applications using isolation transformers
This standard has been prepared by the Wire-Line Subcommittee (SC6) of the Power System
Communications Committee of the IEEE Power and Energy Society, and it represents the consensus of
both power and telecommunications engineers.
viii
Contents
1. Overview .................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Background .......................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Scope ................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.3 Purpose ................................................................................................................................................ 2
1.4 Not covered ......................................................................................................................................... 2
2. Normative references.................................................................................................................................. 2
3. Definitions, acronyms, and abbreviations .................................................................................................. 3

3.1 Definitions ........................................................................................................................................... 3
3.2 Acronyms and abbreviations ............................................................................................................... 5
4. High-voltage environment (HVE) .............................................................................................................. 7

4.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................. 7
4.2 Coupling .............................................................................................................................................. 7
4.3 Disturbances ........................................................................................................................................ 8
5. Grounding considerations ..........................................................................................................................23

5.1 Electric power stations ........................................................................................................................23
5.2 Typical grounding for sites immediately outside the grid ..................................................................23
5.3 Typical grounding at power line structures such as towers or poles...................................................24
5.4 Typical grounding requirements for base transceiver station (BTS) ..................................................25
5.5 Step, touch, and mesh voltages for BTSs located on power line transmission or distribution
structures...................................................................................................................................................25
5.6 Grounding for distributed antenna systems (DASs) ...........................................................................29
6. Protection apparatus ..................................................................................................................................29
7. Service types, reliability, service performance objective (SPO) classifications, and transmission
considerations ................................................................................................................................................31
7.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................31
7.2 Service types .......................................................................................................................................31
7.3 SPO classifications .............................................................................................................................32
7.4 Transmission considerations ...............................................................................................................34
8. Protection theory and philosophy ..............................................................................................................34

8.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................34
8.2 Concepts and concerns .......................................................................................................................35
8.3 Ownership ...........................................................................................................................................35
8.4 General-use telecommunications cable in the electric supply location GPR ZOI ..............................35
8.5 Aerial cable installation ......................................................................................................................36
8.6 Conduit containing metallic members or tracing medium ..................................................................36
9. Protection configurations ...........................................................................................................................36

9.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................................36
9.2 GPR plus induced voltage levels ........................................................................................................37
9.3 Basic protection system ......................................................................................................................38
9.4 Protection configurations employing isolation devices ......................................................................40
9.5 General isolation protection configuration .........................................................................................46
9.6 Specific protection configurations ......................................................................................................47
9.7 Protection practices for electric supply locations services..................................................................48
ix
10. Inspection considerations ........................................................................................................................48
11. Safety .......................................................................................................................................................49

11.1 General safety considerations ...........................................................................................................49
11.2 Safety considerations in equipment design .......................................................................................49
11.3 Safety considerations related to installation and maintenance ..........................................................50
12. Summary .................................................................................................................................................51
Annex A (informative) Bibliography ............................................................................................................52
Annex B (informative) Characteristics of protection apparatus ....................................................................56
Annex C (informative) Telecommunications cable in the electric supply location GPR ZOI.......................66
Annex D (informative) Protection of isolation, drainage, NTs, and other apparatus by surge arresters .......71
Annex E (informative) Transmission characteristics and SPO requirements for various telecommunications
channels .........................................................................................................................................................76
Annex F (informative) DC offset waveform development ............................................................................77
Annex G (informative) High-dielectric optical fiber isolation systems .........................................................83
Annex H (informative) Theoretical verses actual field experience GPR and related ZOI profiles ...............85
Annex I (informative) Service request data ...................................................................................................89
x
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http://standards.ieee.org/IPR/disclaimers.html.
1. Overview
1.1 Background
Telecommunications facilities serving electric supply locations often require special high-voltage
protection (HVP) against the effects of fault-produced ground potential rise (GPR) or induced voltages, or
both. Some of the telecommunications services are used for control and protective relaying purposes and
may be called on to perform critical operations at times of power system faults. This requirement presents a
major challenge in the design and protection of the telecommunications system because power system
faults can result in the introduction of interfering voltages and currents into the telecommunications circuit
at the very time when the circuit is most urgently required to perform its function. Even when critical
services are not involved, special HVP may be required for both personnel safety and plant protection at
times of power system faults. Effective protection of any telecommunications circuit requires coordinated
protection on all circuits provided over the same telecommunications cable.
1
IEEE Std 487-2015
IEEE Standard for the Electrical Protection of Communications Facilities Serving Electric Supply Locations—
General Considerations
1.2 Scope
This standard presents general consideration for special HVP systems intended to protect
telecommunications facilities serving electric supply locations. This standard contains material common to
all of the IEEE 487™ family of standards including fundamental protection theory and basic electrical
protection concepts and designs.
1.3 Purpose
This standard presents general considerations for the electrical protection of telecommunications facilities
serving electric supply locations. This standard contains material that is common to the IEEE 487 family of
standards (i.e., dot-series) including fundamental protection theory and basic electrical protection concepts
and designs. In general, special protective measures, handling procedures, and administrative procedures
are necessary to provide electrical protection against damage to telecommunications facilities and
equipment, maintain reliability of service, and ensure the safety of personnel.
1.4 Not covered
Other telecommunications alternatives such as point-to-point radio and microwave systems are excluded
from this standard.
2. Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document (i.e., they must
be understood and used, so each referenced document is cited in text and its relationship to this document is
explained). For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of
the referenced document (including any amendments or corrigenda) applies.
IEEE Std 80™, IEEE Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding. 1, 2
IEEE Std 81™, IEEE Guide for Measuring Earth Resistivity, Ground Impedance, and Earth Surface
Potentials of a Ground System.
IEEE Std 367™, IEEE Recommended Practice for Determining the Electric Supply Location Ground
Potential Rise and Induced Voltage from a Power Fault.
IEEE Std 487.1™, Standard for the Electrical Protection of Communication Facilities Serving Electric
Supply Locations Through the Use of On-Grid Isolation Equipment.
Supply Locations Through the Use of Optical Fiber Systems.
Supply Locations – Through the Use of Hybrid Facilities.
Supply Locations Through the Use of Neutralizing Transformers.
1
IEEE publications are available from The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (http://standards.ieee.org/).
2
The IEEE standards or products referred to in this clause are trademarks of The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
2
IEEE Std 487-2015
Supply Locations Through the Use of Isolation Transformers.
IEEE Std 776™, IEEE Recommended Practice for Inductive Coordination of Electric Supply and
Communications Lines.
IEEE Std 789™, IEEE Standard Performance Requirements for Communications and Control Cables for
Applications in High-Voltage Environments.
IEEE Std C37.93™, IEEE Guide for Power System Protective Relay Applications of Audio Tones Over
Voice Grade Channels.
NFPA 70-2011, National Electrical Code® (NEC®). 3, 4
3. Definitions, acronyms, and abbreviations
3.1 Definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. The IEEE Standards
Dictionary Online should be consulted for terms not defined in this clause. 5
carbon block surge protective device (carbon block SPD): An assembly of two or three carbon blocks
and air gaps designed to a specific breakdown voltage. These devices are normally connected to
telecommunications circuits to provide overvoltage protection and a current path to ground during such
overvoltage.
6
NOTE—The manufacturing of carbon blocks has been largely discontinued.
conductive (resistive) coupling: See: coupling.
coupling: The mode of propagation of disturbing energy from a power system to a telecommunications
system. There are three forms of coupling between the two systems: magnetic (inductive) coupling, electric
(capacitive) coupling, and conductive (resistive) coupling. In addition, coupling by electromagnetic
radiation exists and is associated with propagation of radiation fields, e.g., radio frequency interference,
electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and corona.
demarcation point: The point of interconnection between the telecommunications facilities of a provider
of wire-line telecommunications service and the subscriber’s terminal equipment, protective apparatus,
cables, or wiring.
drainage unit or drainage reactor: A center-tapped inductive device designed to relieve conductor-to-
conductor and conductor-to-ground voltage stress by draining extraneous currents to ground. These units
are also designed to serve the purpose of a mutual drainage reactor (MDR), forcing near-simultaneous
surge protective device (SPD)-gap operation.
electric (capacitive) coupling: See: coupling.
3
The NEC is published by the National Fire Protection Association (http://www.nfpa.org/).
4
National Electrical Code and NEC are both registered trademarks of the National Fire Protection Association, Inc.
5
IEEE Standards Dictionary Online subscription is available at
http://www.ieee.org/portal/innovate/products/standard/standards_dictionary.html.
6
Notes in text, tables, and figures are given for information only and do not contain requirements needed to implement the standard.
3
IEEE Std 487-2015
electric supply location: Any building, separate space, or site in which electric supply equipment is
located that may be subjected to the effects of ground potential rise (GPR) from power system fault
currents. This definition includes generation, transformation, conversion, switching, and delivery facilities.
gas discharge tube (GDT): A discharge gap between two or more electrodes hermetically sealed in a
ceramic or glass envelope.
ground potential rise (GPR): The electrical potential that a ground electrode (or grounding system) may
attain relative to a distant grounding point.
NOTE 1—Under normal conditions, the grounded electrical equipment operates at near zero ground potential. In other
words, the potential of a grounded neutral conductor is nearly identical to the potential of remote earth. During a
ground fault, the portion of fault current that is conducted by an electric supply location grounding grid into the earth
causes the rise of the grid potential with respect to remote earth.
NOTE 2—See IEEE Std 367 for the method of calculating GPR. 7
high-dielectric cable: Cable that provides a higher voltage insulation between conductors, between
conductors and shield, and between shield and earth than standard (general use) outside plant cables.
NOTE—See IEEE Std 789 for additional information.
high-voltage disconnect jack: A device used to disconnect cable pairs for testing purposes. Used to help
safeguard personnel from remote ground potentials.
high-voltage environment (HVE): A location requiring caution because it may experience a ground
potential rise (GPR) from power line fault currents and/or lightning strike energy.
high-voltage interface (HVI): Protective apparatus that provides electrical isolation of wire-line
telecommunications conductive paths.
high-voltage isolating relay: A device that provides for the repeating of dc on/off signals while
maintaining longitudinal isolation. High-voltage isolating relays may be used in conjunction with isolation
transformers or may be used as stand-alone devices for dc tripping or dc telemetering.
horn gap: An air-gap metal electrode device, consisting of a straight, vertical, round electrode and an
angularly shaped, round electrode. For a telecommunications pair, there exist one common grounded,
central, straight, vertical electrode and two angular electrodes, one for each side of the pair. The gaps are
usually adjustable. Horn gaps are used usually outdoors on open-wire lines exposed to high-voltage power
transmission lines and in conjunction with isolation or drainage transformers. They are also frequently used
alone out along the open-wire pair. They provide protection against both lightning and power contacts.
insulating transformer: See: isolation (insulating) transformer.
isolation (insulating) transformer: A transformer that provides longitudinal (common-mode) isolation of

the telecommunications facility. These transformers can be designed for use in a combined isolation-
drainage transformer configuration and also can be designed for a low longitudinal-to-metallic conversion.
isolation transformer with high-voltage isolating relay: An assembly that provides protection for
standard telephone service and consists basically of an isolation transformer and a high-voltage isolating
relay. The transformer provides a path for voice and ringing frequencies while the relay provides a means
for repeating dc signals around the transformer. A locally supplied battery or dc power supply is required
for operation of the telephone and relay.
7
Information on normative references can be found in Clause 2.
4
IEEE Std 487-2015
magnetic (inductive) coupling: See: coupling.
messenger: See: suspension strand.
metallic member: A non-telecommunications metallic cable component such as a shield, vapor barrier,
locating tracer wire, or strength member.
neutralizing transformer (NT) or neutralizing reactor: A device that introduces a voltage into a circuit
pair to oppose an unwanted voltage. These devices neutralize extraneous longitudinal voltages resulting
from ground potential rise (GPR), longitudinal induction, or both, while simultaneously allowing ac and dc
metallic signals to pass. These transformers or reactors are used primarily to protect telecommunications or
control circuits at electric supply locations, along routes where exposure to power line induction is a
problem, or both.
optic coupling device: An isolation device using an optical link to provide the longitudinal isolation.
Circuit arrangements on each side of the optical link convert the electrical signal into an optical signal for
transmission through the optical link and back to an electrical signal. Various circuit arrangements provide
one-way or two-way transmission and permit transmission to the various combinations of voice and/or dc
signaling logic used by the power industry. Single-channel optic coupling devices may be used in
conjunction with other isolation devices in protection systems.
optical fiber cable: A telecommunications cable in which one or more optical fibers are used as the
propagation medium. The optical fibers are surrounded by buffers, strength members, and jackets for
protection, stiffness, and strength. An optical fiber cable may be an all-fiber cable or contain both optical
fibers and metallic conductors.
reliability (power system protective relaying): For the purposes of this standard, a combination of
dependability (failure to deliver a valid trip signal) and security (delivery of a false trip or control signal).
solid-state surge protective device (solid-state SPD): A protective device that employs solid-state circuit
elements that provide a combination of high-speed voltage and current sensing. These SPDs are a
combination of voltage clamps (avalanche diodes) and crowbar devices (multilayer diodes similar to
silicon-controlled rectifiers) and are designed to limit the voltage to a specific value and to reduce current
flow to low values of milliamperes within nanoseconds. These devices are typically integrated into the
terminal apparatus.
spark gap: An air dielectric between two electrodes that may be a combination of several basic shapes that
is used to protect telecommunications circuits from damage due to voltage stress in excess of their
dielectric capabilities. It may or may not be adjustable.
surge arrester: A device that guards against dielectric failure of protection apparatus due to lightning or
surge voltages in excess of their dielectric capabilities and serves to interrupt power follow current.
suspension strand: A stranded group of wires supported above the ground at intervals by poles or other
structures and used to furnish, within these intervals, frequent points of support for cables.
thunderstorm day: A day during which thunder is heard at least once at a specified observation point.
3.2 Acronyms and abbreviations
AWG American wire gauge
BIL basic impulse insulation level
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IEEE Std 487-2015
BTS base transceiver station
CFJ wire-line (e.g., copper, steel, aluminum) to fiber cable junction
CO central office
DAS distributed antenna system
DDS digital data service
DS-1 digital service at 1.544 Mb/s
DSL digital subscriber line
GDT gas discharge tube
GPR ground potential rise
HDSL high-bit-rate digital subscriber line
HVE high-voltage environment
HVI high-voltage interface
HVP high-voltage protection
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network
MCOV maximum continuous operating voltage
MDF main distributing frame
MDR mutual drainage reactor
MGN multigrounded neutral
NT neutralizing transformer
OEI optical electrical interface
OGC overhead ground conductor
PVC polyvinyl chloride
RDL remote drainage location
RM rotating machine
rms root mean square
ROW right of way
SPD surge protective device
SPO service performance objective
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IEEE Std 487-2015
T-1 1.544 Mb/s pulse code modulated digital four-wire circuit
VF voice frequency
xDSL a generic type of digital subscriber line where ‘x’ denotes the specific type
ZOI zone of influence
4. High-voltage environment (HVE)
4.1 Overview
Two different electric supply location HVEs shall be considered, but the application of the standard should
not be limited to these:
a) Electric power stations: These locations generally utilize an extensive ground grid designed, per
IEEE Std 80, so that all grounded structures within the station can be connected to a common grid.
As a result, potential difference in the system is minimized during a power fault. However, the
potential difference between this grounding system and other distant grounding systems may be
substantial, and a significant portion of these currents may be redirected to any wire-line
telecommunications cables entering these locations. Ground grids in these locations help reduce
surges caused by lightning strikes.
b) Power line transmission and distribution towers or poles: These locations generally utilize a
smaller grounding electrode system with a common arrangement being one ground rod per tower
leg incorporated into the grounding system of the equipment placed at the tower base. Thus, the
grounding systems at towers or poles usually have a significantly higher resistance to ground than
those at electric power stations. Transmission lines also have a higher probability of being struck
by lightning; therefore, the chances of fault-producing surges are increased. A significant portion of
these surge currents may be redirected to any wire-line telecommunications cables entering these
locations.
At these types of locations, when a power system ground fault or lightning strike occurs, all or some of the
current returns via the earth through the grounding electrode and produces a potential difference between
the grounding electrode and remote earth. The fault current may be symmetrical or may have some degree
of asymmetry, depending on such factors as voltage phase angle at fault initiation, location of the fault,
impedance to ground, and other power system characteristics. The impedance to ground depends primarily
on the geometry of the grounding electrode, the connections to it, and the resistivity of the soil in the
vicinity of the site.
The ground potential rise (GPR) at an electric supply location may be reduced substantially because of its
physical connections to remote ground points by means of overhead ground (earth, static, or sky wires)
conductor (OGC), multigrounded neutrals (MGNs), counterpoises, cable shields, rail lines, etc. These
connections affect the distribution of fault currents through the system grounding paths and also affect the
total site impedance to remote earth. A rigorous analysis of GPR calculations at the power system
fundamental frequency is presented in IEEE Std 367.
4.2 Coupling
Coupling refers to the mode of propagation of disturbing energy from the power system to the
telecommunications system.
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Three forms of coupling between the two systems should be considered, i.e., magnetic (inductive) coupling,
electric (capacitive) coupling, and conductive (resistive) coupling. In addition, coupling by electromagnetic
radiation exists and is associated with the propagation of radiation fields, e.g., radio frequency interference,
electromagnetic pulse, and corona.
Bringing a metallic shield into an electric supply station is a means to provide a transfer of potential and
should be carefully reviewed.
Magnetic (inductive) coupling, particularly under power line fault conditions, is significant when several
kilometers of parallel or close to parallel routing of both systems are considered. The power line fault
current flowing to ground is coupled magnetically to the longitudinal circuit of the telecommunications
system and results in a distributed longitudinal voltage being induced in the telecommunications circuit.
The induced voltage is calculated by multiplying the inducing power line current by the mutual impedance
between the two systems. The inducing current is a function of the fault location and the power system
characteristics. The mutual impedance is a function of such variables as the frequency, length of parallel,
separation, soil resistivity, and shielding conductors [see IEEE Std 367 for methods of calculating magnetic
(inductive) coupling]. Heterogeneous soil conditions, the presence of shielding conductors, and resistances
to ground of shielding conductors are usually difficult to characterize accurately; however, they have a
significant effect on the resulting level of induced voltage. Therefore, a large spread in values can occur
between actual and estimated induced voltages because not all parameters can be assessed easily or
accurately.
In electric power stations, as mentioned previously, the ground grid minimizes the potential difference due
to conduction. For a high-voltage phase-to-ground fault inside an electric power station, inductive coupling
can induce voltages exceeding 1 kV on telecommunications cable pairs linking two buildings located on the
same ground grid. Electric protection of telecommunications cable pairs extended between two buildings
inside large electric power stations must be evaluated (i.e., the use of secondary protectors, high-dielectric
cables, optical fiber cable, etc.) especially when service performance objective (SPO) Class A circuits are
involved or contemplated.
Capacitive coupling at power system frequencies is significant only where telecommunications lines are not
shielded with a grounded metallic shield. Since most wire-line telecommunications cables are metallically
shielded, capacitive coupling is minimized.
Conductive (resistive) coupling is significant where the power and telecommunications grounding systems
are bonded together or where grounds are mutually coupled due to their proximity to each other. In general,
for wire-line telecommunications facilities, resistive coupling can be minimized by avoiding joint use. If
joint use cannot be avoided, adequate bonding of the grounding systems should be ensured in situations in
which the power line and its associated protective relaying circuits follow the same route.
4.3 Disturbances
4.3.1 Ground potential rise (GPR)
4.3.1.1 Theoretical background
With reference to Figure 1, the current causing GPR that is created by the returning fault current through
the electric supply location ground grid impedance has the form shown in Equation (1) (assuming the phase
currents are equal and in balance prior to the fault).
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Figure 1 —Simplified loop for GPR calculation
iGPR (t ) =
2
V pk
2 2
[cos(ωt + α − θ ) − cos(α − θ )e ]
− βt
(1)
( Rs + RTG ) + ω ( Ls + LTG )
where
Rs + RTG R
β = ≜
Ls + LTG L
ω = 2πf = 377 rad/s at 60 Hz
α is the angle of the power line voltage at the initiation of the fault, in radians
Rs is the power system equivalent resistance, in ohms
Ls is the power system equivalent inductance, in henries
RTG is the total ground resistance at the point where GPR is being evaluated, in ohms
LTG is the total ground inductance at the point where GPR is being evaluated, in henries
Vpk is the peak values of the system voltage (0 ohm source impedance assumed)
iGPR(t) is the GPR-producing current including the transient component, in amperes
ω   ωL 
θ is the loop impedance angle = tan −1   = tan −1   in radians
β
   R 
t is the time, in seconds
The GPR appearing across the RTG + jω LTG, in Figure 1, can be calculated as follows:
diGPR (t )
VGPR (t ) = RTG iGPR (t ) + LTG (2)
dt
diGPR (t ) V pk
dt
=
Z
[
− ω sin(ωt + α − θ ) + β cos(α − θ )e − βt ] (3)
∴VGPR (t ) =
V pk
Z
[R
TG cos(ωt + α − θ ) − RTG cos(α − θ )e − βt + ωLTG sin(ωt + α − θ ) + βLTG cos(α − θ )e − βt ]
(4)
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IEEE Std 487-2015
=
V pk
Z
[R
TG cos(ωt + α − θ ) + ωLTG sin(ωt + α − θ ) − cos(α − θ )( RTG − βLTG )e − βt ] (5)
Z = ( Rs + RTG ) 2 + ω 2 ( Ls + LTG ) 2 = R 2 + (ωL) 2 (6)
Simplifying further, let
2
Z TG ≜ RTG + ω 2 LTG
2
;
RTG
cos θ TG ≜ ;
Z TG
and
ωLTG
sin θ TG ≜
Z TG
∴ RTG = cos θ TG Z TG (7)
and
ωLTG = sin θ TG Z TG (8)
then
VGPR (t ) =
V pk
Z
[Z TG cos(ωt + α − θ + θ TG ) − cos(α − θ )( RTG − βLTG )e − βt ] (9)
Let a = ωt + α − θ
then
VGPR (t ) =
V pk
Z
[RTG cos a + ωLTG sin a − cos(α − θ )( RTG − βLTG )e − βt ] (10)
where
ωLTG
θ TG = tan −1 is the angle of the impedance, Z TG
RTG
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IEEE Std 487-2015
The two components of the expression for GPR are the steady-state and transient (dc offset) terms. The
quantity L/R is the inverse time constant of the transient term. Multiplication of this quantity by the angular
frequency, ω, yields the X/R ratio of the power system at the point of fault. The X/R ratio gives an
indication of the time required for the dc transient to decay and of the volt–time area contributed by the
transient term. Looking back toward the source, under line-to-ground fault conditions, X/R ratios may range
from 1 to 2 for low-voltage lines to as high as 75 for extra-high voltage lines. Refer to IEEE Std 367 for
information on the system’s effective X/R ratio, which is not the X/R of the transmission line.
The initial peak amplitude of the transient term and the maximum peak amplitude of the GPR depend on
the quantity cos(α−θ). The angle, θ, is fixed by power system parameters. The phase angle of the power
line voltage, α, at the initiation of the fault, therefore, becomes the controlling factor. For large values of
X/R, the angle, θ, approaches π/2 radians, and the power line voltage fault angle, α, which produces
maximum offset, approaches zero (0) radians.
4.3.1.2 Practical implications
When a fault to ground occurs on a transmission or distribution line terminating in a grounded-neutral

transformer bank at an electric supply location or substation, fault current will flow from the electric supply
location ground grid to the system neutral by way of the station grounding system. Since the grounding
system has a finite impedance to remote earth, it will experience a rise in potential with respect to remote
earth because of this ground return fault current. The magnitude of the GPR depends on such factors as the
impedance to ground of the station grounding system, the magnitude and location of the fault, the fault
impedance, the impedance of the transformers feeding the fault, the presence or absence of ground wires on
the line (insulated or not), and other grounding structures in the area. Also, a fault occurring at a station
without a grounded-neutral transformer or at a tower location may produce a GPR as long as there is a
ground source on the system and there exists a ground current path to the fault.
While the impedances of electric power station ground grids can range from 0.01 Ω to 10 Ω or more, they
are normally quite small, often less than 1 Ω. Bus fault currents, however, may sometimes be very large, in
the order of 70 000 A or higher. GPRs of several thousand volts, therefore, are possible. Ground electrodes
at tower locations are generally smaller in size and have a higher grid resistance than at electric power
stations.
The GPR consists of a steady-state symmetrical component and may contain a decaying dc transient
component (sometimes called the dc offset, see Annex F). The magnitude of the dc transient component
lies between zero and the peak value of the steady-state symmetrical component. The magnitude is
dependent on time, the ratio of the effective power system inductive reactance and resistance as determined
at the point of fault (X/R ratio), and the phase angle of the power line voltage at the initiation of the fault.
The rate of decay of the dc transient component is determined by the effective X/R ratio as well. The
combined dc and ac components will always have a peak value below twice the peak value of the ac
component. Figure 2 shows an illustration of a nonsymmetrical GPR waveform and the two components.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Figure 2 —Illustration of a nonsymmetrical GPR waveform
The reader of this standard should refer to IEEE Std 367 for more detailed discussion about GPR.
For a discussion of worst-case volt-ampere area in the context of neutralizing transformers (NTs), refer to
IEEE Std 487.4.
NOTE—Power line faults are generally initiated at or close to peak voltage. For such faults, the transient dc component
and the dc offset factor are minimal. Refer to IEEE Std 367 and Annex F of this document. For purposes of this
standard, the words “asymmetrical” and “nonsymmetrical” are synonymous.
Figure 3 through Figure 10 illustrate a theoretical GPR distribution from the edge (where the protection
requirements are usually specified) of four simple ground grids for a number of different earth resistivity
models. These curves are easily reproduced using the Electric Power Research Institute’s (EPRI) System
Grid Analysis (SGA) program. This program has been found to agree with certain measured data for
stations not influenced by external metallic paths such as pipes, OGC (static or sky wires), power neutrals,
etc. Where external grounds exist, this standard recommends that the fall of potential impedance
measurements referenced in IEEE Std 81 be used to generate the appropriate curves for a specific site
ground grid.
Two values of multilayered soils and one uniform layer soil are provided for in these curves (Figure 3
through Figure 10), 100/20 m-Ω, 100 m-Ω, and 100/1000 m-Ω.
NOTE—For multilayered soils, depth of the upper layer = 6 m (20 ft).
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Figure 3 —Earth potential distribution from edge of electric supply location grid
2
with respect to a remote earthing point (150 m )
2
with respect to a remote earthing point (3250 m )
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IEEE Std 487-2015
2
with respect to a remote earthing point (27 000 m )
2
with respect to a remote earthing point (87 000 m )
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IEEE Std 487-2015
2
with respect to a remote earthing point (1600 ft )
2
with respect to a remote earthing point (35 000 ft )
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2
2
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IEEE Std 487-2015
The area surrounding the electric supply location that is raised in potential above a remote (or true) earthing
point is referred to as the zone of influence (ZOI) due to the GPR. In practice, 300 Vpeak is often used as the
boundary of the ZOI. For a more complete discussion on this topic, refer to IEEE Std 367.
The potential of the ground around the electric supply location, with respect to remote earth, falls off with
distance from the station grounding system as indicated by the equipotential lines in Figure 11. Excluding
alternate return paths, this potential is roughly inversely proportional to the distance from the station
grounding system. For simplicity, the equipotential lines are shown in Figure 11 as concentric circles. Due
to the irregularity of the grounding system, variations in the earth resistivity around the station, and the
presence of metallic underground structures such as pipes and cables, the equipotential lines will not be
circular as shown.
Figure 11 —Theoretical illustration of electric supply location GPR

with conventional protection on telecommunications circuits
A telecommunications circuit, extending from the electric supply location to some remote point, is also
shown in Figure 11. In this example, the surge protective device (SPD) is installed at the electric supply
location end of the telecommunications circuit. The SPD ground terminal is connected to the electric
supply location grounding system. At some remote point on the telecommunications circuit, such as the far
end or some intermediate point, another protective device may be installed. In the latter case, the SPD
ground terminal is connected to what might be regarded as remote ground. These SPDs serve to limit the
voltage that may exist between the wire-line telecommunications circuit and local ground at the SPD
location. Therefore, SPDs are installed to help safeguard personnel and help prevent damage to property
and equipment that might be caused by induction, lightning, GPR, or direct contact with power circuits.
When there is a GPR at the electric supply location, a potential difference that is equal to this rise will exist
between the ground terminals of the SPDs at the two locations on the telecommunications circuit. This
difference in potential will cause (if of sufficient magnitude) the SPDs on the telecommunications circuit to
operate, possibly grounding them permanently or damaging the telecommunications circuit, and cause
personnel hazards.
To prevent the ground-return current from circulating over the telecommunications circuit and its protective
devices, methods have been devised that are discussed later in this standard. In applying these methods, it is
necessary to determine the expected GPR as accurately as possible.
Cables are exposed to electrical effects within the ZOI when they are entering under the following
scenarios: to serve the electric supply location, to serve subscribers within the ZOI, or to pass through the
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IEEE Std 487-2015
ZOI. The metallic shield-to-core and insulating outer jacket dielectric withstand (strength) should be
considered with respect to the expected GPR value at the cable location. It is important that SPD and cable
shield grounds not be placed in this zone without consideration of the effects of GPR at the proposed
grounding location.
The dedicated cable to the electric power station always enters the area of highest GPR, while the general-
use cable may pass through the ZOI at some lower potential level. Refer to IEEE Std 789 for a more
detailed discussion on such cables. Furthermore, SPD or arc noise should be more carefully avoided on
electric power station cables inside the electric power station carrying protective relaying signals, see
IEEE Std C37.93. If SPDs are used properly and metallic members of the cable can be assured of being
insulated from electric power station ground, then possible hazards from GPR will be greatly minimized.
The protection scheme should not be installed to cope merely with the existing fault current possibilities.
Provision should also be made for future power system expansion, or an increase in fault current levels, or
a change in electric power station ground grid impedance. Further considerations for telecommunications
cables passing through the ZOI of an electric supply location are covered in Annex C.
4.3.2 Longitudinal induction
Telecommunications facilities entering electric supply locations are frequently routed close to power lines.
Such facilities are then subject to the interfering induction effects of the power lines under both normal and
fault conditions. Satisfactory electrical coordination between the two systems should be achieved under
both normal and fault conditions on the power system. In addition to normal and fault conditions,
longitudinal induction caused by disturbing harmonic current flow in the power system can cause
interfering induction effects that should be coordinated. This effect is addressed by other IEEE standards
such as IEEE Std 367 and IEEE Std 776. Such coordination is particularly essential between cables
containing protective relaying circuits and the power lines that are being protected by those circuits. The
power line fault condition is most severe because inductive interference during this condition adds
vectorially to that produced by the GPR. Since induction is proportional to the fault current, the pair-to-
shield induced voltage may exceed the operational threshold of the typical protector ground terminal. The
longitudinal induction may exceed the threshold even if the calculated GPR is under 300 Vpeak. When
critical non-interruptible circuits (i.e., SPO Class A) parallel high- or medium-voltage power lines, either
inside or outside an electric power station, consideration is to be given to providing isolation or high-
voltage protection (HVP).
See IEEE Std 367 for methods of calculating the vectorial summation. This calculation may substantially
increase the stress on the telecommunications facilities and the associated protection.
All-dielectric optical fiber cables are immune to induction and other electrical effects.
4.3.3 Lightning
Transient and GPR analysis of lightning strikes is considered more complex than those for 50/60 Hz. From
the standpoint of lightning protection, the three most important parameters are the probability of lightning
occurrence, its intensity, and its rate of change (see Anderson and Eriksson [B2] 8). The first parameter is
expressed in terms of lightning flash density measured as the yearly number of lightning flashes to an area
of 1 km2; the second parameter is expressed as the peak amplitude of lightning current in kiloamperes; and
the last parameter is expressed as the rise time in the front of the lightning current wave. In view of past
records, keraunic levels 9 (yearly number of thunderstorm days) rather than the flash density are readily
8
The numbers in brackets correspond to the numbers of the bibliography in Annex A.
9
Often erroneously referred to as isokeraunic levels.
18
IEEE Std 487-2015
available in many countries. Approximate empirical relations are used for conversion between the two
measures. The relation is given by Equation (11):
N g = KTd1.3 (11)
where
Ng is the ground flash density [flashes/(km2 × year)]

Td is the annual number of thunderstorm days
K is the constant that ranges from 0.023 to 0.04. On the North American continent, the value of 0.04
is used.
The incidence of lightning to most supply locations is about the same as the incidence of lightning to about
1.5 km of buried telecommunications cable. For example, for a keraunic level of 30, there were 0.7 strokes
per year to a 310 m × 310 m (96 000 m2) electric supply location, 0.4 strokes per year to a 225 m × 225 m
(50 000 m2) station, and 0.07 strokes per year to a 9600 m2 substation (see Sargent [B58]). The ground
grids of 95% to 98% of all electric supply locations are smaller than 9600 m2. This compares with 0.1 to
0.2 strokes per 1.5 km of buried cable for the same keraunic level (see Trueblood and Sunde [B60]).
As a general rule, large electric supply locations receive more strokes because of the larger area; however,
the effects of strokes are usually less severe than those for smaller locations. If lightning strikes or enters an
electric supply location on the shielding system, the area and diversity of conduction paths of the ground
grid and tower system help to readily disperse the stroke current (see IEEE Committee Report [B28]). If a
shielding failure occurs, currents in the order of 2 kA to 20 kA are observed.
Current severity of lightning strokes is affected by structure height (see Eriksson [B14]). Since most
electric supply location shielding systems are lower than 30 m, stroke current severity for an electric supply
location and a buried cable are about the same. Thus, hazards to telecommunications facilities from
lightning strokes to supply locations are about the same as from lightning strokes to a length of buried cable
between 1.5 km and 3 km. Where microwave towers are located on electric supply location sites,
telecommunications facilities become more exposed because tall structures are more susceptible to
lightning. The reader should keep in mind that lightning strokes to tall structures have statistically smaller
current crest values.
Time variations of lightning voltages and currents take place in the range of microseconds. For the purpose
of testing, the wave shape of lightning stroke voltage shown in Figure 12 is normally used. The figure
shows that the lightning stroke voltage is characterized by a very steep wave front, in which the voltage
rises to its maximum or crest value in a very short period of time, and by a decay period occupying a
considerably longer length of time. Lightning stroke voltages and currents are usually described by two
numbers. The first number is related to the time in microseconds, starting from virtual zero, taken by the
wave to reach its crest, indicated by T1 in Figure 12. The second number is the time in microseconds, also
measured from the virtual zero, taken by the wave to decay to half its crest magnitude, as shown by T2 in
Figure 12. These times are characteristically 1.2 × 50 μs for the “standard” voltage waveform, and
8 × 20 μs for the “standard” current waveform (see IEEE Std 4™-2013 [B33]). In actual lightning strokes,
the front of the wave may be even steeper, while the decay of its tail may be considerably longer.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
NOTE—01 is the virtual zero obtained as the intersection with the zero axis of a straight line through point A′ and point
B on the front of the voltage wave at 30% and 90% crest value (or on the front of a current wave at 10% and 90% crest
value).
Figure 12 —Definition of a voltage impulse wave
Time rate of change of lightning current is primarily responsible for the voltage induced by a lightning
stroke in nearby apparatus. In addition, steepness of the wave determines, for the apparatus, the level of
its withstand voltage. Typical values of voltage steepness used in tests lie in the range of 100 kV/μs to
200 kV/μs. Steeper wave fronts of naturally occurring lightning have been observed.
Some idea of the statistical values of crest current, collected on the basis of measurements made in different
parts of the world, are shown in Figure 13. While some strokes exceed 200 kA in crest current, 50% of
events have currents that do not exceed 30 kA. IEEE uses, in its work, a lightning current crest probability
relation expressed by Equation (12).
1
PI = 2.6
(12)
 I 
1+  
 31 
where
PI is the probability of exceeding stroke current, I

I is the stroke current, in kiloamperes
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Figure 13 —Cumulative probability distribution of stroke current magnitude

in negative lightning flashes
The incidence of lightning varies widely in different parts of the world and, indeed, within countries the
size of the United States and Canada. This factor should be given consideration in estimating the exposure
of electrical power and telecommunications plants to lightning. Data accumulated by the meteorological
services of the Canadian and U.S. governments have been plotted on the isokeraunic map presented in
Figure 14. Information contained in this map can be used with good advantage for generalized decisions
regarding lightning protection. A thunderstorm day is defined as a day during which thunder is heard at
least once at a specified observation point. The fact that thunder can be heard means that the storm is close
enough to constitute a hazard to the electrical plant in the vicinity of the observation point.
Source: IEEE Std 142™-2007 [B34].
Figure 14 —Isokeraunic chart for the United States
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Recent studies have found that a closer approximation to lightning flash density can be achieved by the use
of thunderstorm hours per year. This measure better describes the extent and the duration of each lightning
storm and, for that reason, better characterizes the number of lightning flashes per year to the area. A
thunderstorm hour map for Canada is shown in Figure 15 (see CEA 077D-184A [B7]).
Reprinted with permission from CEA Technologies Inc. (CEATI), CEA Report No. 077D-184A [B7].
Figure 15 —Annual thunderstorm-hour map of Canada
The relation between thunderstorm hours in a region and lightning flash density is given by Equation (13).
N g = 0.054Th1.1 (13)
where
Ng is the ground flash density [flashes/(km2 × year)]

Th is the annual number of thunderstorm hours
See IEEE Std 1410™-2010 [B37] for more recent information about lightning, including a ground flash
density map of the United States.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
4.3.4 Switching surges
High-voltage systems can cause electromagnetic field disturbances and induce transient potentials in
control and telecommunications circuits located within the electric supply station switchyard. These
transients may be caused by the restrike characteristics of arcs that exist during the energization or
interruption of a high-voltage circuit and the resonance with lumped circuit reactances within the
switchyard. These reactances are attributed to potential transformers, capacitive coupling devices, power
factor capacitors, reactors, power transformers, and high-voltage power cables.
Typical operations of a high-voltage electric system that cause these transient switching surges are
a) Switching shunt capacitors

b) Overvoltage flashover of lightning arresters
c) Restrike of circuit breakers
d) Switching of a section of the high-voltage bus by an air-break disconnect switch
The transients are identified (see IEEE Std C37.90.1™ [B30]) as high frequency, high voltage, and short
time duration with a decaying amplitude characteristic. Resonant frequencies from 200 kHz to 2.9 MHz
with an amplitude of 12 kV and lasting for 10 ms to 100 ms have been measured on control circuits. Pulse
trains lasting up to 3 s have been observed.
Longitudinal induced voltages caused by these transient switching surges may be kept well below 1000 V
if the cable is in an iron or steel conduit and is shielded and paralleled with, for example, 2/0 AWG bare
wire. In this case, shield and parallel wire should be grounded at each end. The telecommunications cable
should be oriented perpendicular to any high-voltage bus overhead of the cable route. All-dielectric optical
fiber cables are immune to induction and other electrical effects.
4.3.5 Other disturbances
Other higher frequency disturbances include those caused by showering arc (contact arcing), restriking
faults, electrostatic discharge, and corona. These disturbances usually do not interfere with wire-line
facilities but may result in distortion and scattering of radio fields and TV and radio interference.
5. Grounding considerations
5.1 Electric power stations
The design of grounding electrode systems for electric power stations is a complex subject, beyond the
scope of this standard. See Del Alamo [B13], Pham [B52], and IEEE Std 80 for information.
5.2 Typical grounding for sites immediately outside the grid
When the high-voltage interface (HVI) [including the wire-line–fiber cable junction (CFJ) or optical
electrical interface (OEI)] is to be located immediately outside the electric power station fence, then
measures shall be taken to effectively extend the ground grid to make the HVI location as safe as possible
for personnel and facilities.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
When the HVI, CFJ, or OEI is located immediately outside the electric power station fence, the protection
equipment (HVP) shall be in a weatherproof cabinet. When power is required for the HVP equipment, the
power is to be obtained from the electric power station building or control house.
The electric power station ground grid is to be extended to the cabinet so that step and touch potentials
around the cabinet are no greater than on the main ground grid itself. A ground grid of appropriate
electrical design (2 AWG minimum) shall be placed under the cabinet and extended at least 3 m (10 ft)
beyond the cabinet in all directions. The ground grid of the cabinet shall be connected to the electric power
station ground grid with a minimum of two buried 4/0 AWG bare copper conductors parallel to each other
with at least 0.45 m (18 in) between the conductors. If the fence or any other metallic structures are within
3 m (10 ft) from the ground grid of the cabinet, they must be bonded to the ground grid.
The cabinet should be placed in a fenced area for physical protection and to restrict access.
NOTE—The HVI cabinet may contain modular isolation transformers equipment, discrete isolation equipment, CFJ
equipment, or OEI equipment.
5.3 Typical grounding at power line structures such as towers or poles
Traditional lattice towers consist of four-legged structures with spacing between the legs ranging from 3 m
× 4.5 m (10 ft × 15 ft) to 12 m × 12 m (40 ft × 40 ft). Their grid impedance is recommended by the
National Electrical Safety Code ® (NESC®) (Accredited Standards Committee C2) to be less than 25 Ω
(measured per IEEE Std 81). In conductive soils with high water table, 0.5 Ω is possible without
augmenting the grounding systems. In poor soils, such as crystalline granite or basalt, the grid impedance
may exceed 200 Ω.
Many towers have ground rods driven at all four corners and ground rings or counterpoise grounds to lower
their earth resistance. When wireless sites are located underneath a tower (not recommended 10), their
ground grid may augment the existing tower grounding and reduce the grid impedance. When the wireless
site grid is built off to the side of the tower and bonded to the tower, the grid impedance will be reduced
and may approach the characteristics of a small substation. If additional wireless providers co-locate and
change the parameters of the grid, a review of the electrical characteristics will be required to ensure a safe
and reliable design.
Single metallic monopoles typically have less than 1 m2 (10 ft2) earth contact and rely on their concrete and
steel foundation for an earth reference. These sites will rarely obtain 25 Ω or less. The wireless ground grid
is built off to the side, significantly increases the earth electrodes, and lowers the grid impedance.
Wooden “H” fixtures and single monopole leads sometimes have no earth reference in low lightning areas.
Because they are ungrounded or source-grounded systems, they rely on their vertical clearance and the
resistance of the wooden structure to insulate or isolate from ground. A fault on these structures can be very
violent and have extended clearing times. When wireless sites are attached to these structures, they
introduce a grounded system into an ungrounded environment. This may cause severe damage to the
grounded system and all remote grounded conductors during fault conditions.
Wooden poles with multigrounded (Y) distribution under builds provide multiple discharge paths for fault
current and will reduce the earth current through the grid that causes GPR. The NESC requires these
systems to be bonded to the MGN vertical on the joint-use structures and to maintain vertical and
horizontal clearances to assure personnel safety while working on the pole. If the grounded coaxial or other
conductors extend up through or above the ungrounded phase conductors, they should meet NESC
Rule 239. A fault of the ungrounded system may distribute fault currents over the neutral distributions
network and other grounded conductors and thereby reduce the earth return current through the wireless
10
See IEEE Std 1692™-2011 [B38] for details.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
site’s grid. Significant damage to the equipment and other structures in the immediate vicinity may occur
until the current drops below dangerous levels. This damage is particularly a problem in rural areas with
few ground references or rocky and high-resistant soils.
Throughout areas subject to lightning, many power companies employ overhead grounding systems: optical
ground wire (OPGW) (IEEE Std 1138™-2009 [B36]), overhead ground wire (OGW), OGC, sky wires, or
static wires. These overhead grounding systems provide protection to the transmission systems by
providing a shield above the phase wires that directs the lightning to ground. The overhead grounding
systems may be tied together from tower to tower to provide multiple discharge paths. The impedance of
the overhead grounding system will reduce the current at each subsequent tower until the lightning is
discharged. During a line-to-ground fault or follow-through fault, the line current will be distributed along
multiple discharge or power follow current paths; this overhead grounding system will reduce ground
return current at individual towers and reduce clearing time of the fault by providing a more direct path to
operate relays. These systems follow many different protection designs, from being grounded at each tower
and the substations to being insulated with a 3–5 kV spark gap device at every tower or every fourth tower.
They may be stopped two to four spans before the electric power station or extend from the electric power
station three to four spans only to protect the electric power station alone. In low lightning areas, they may
not exist at all, and each tower is left to stand on its own. The net effect of the overhead grounding system
is to reduce the ground return current at individual towers by providing multiple discharge paths. This
arrangement, in turn, reduces the current flowing through the ground grid, reduces clearing time, and
lowers fault-produced GPR to manageable levels.
5.4 Typical grounding requirements for base transceiver station (BTS)
Several documents, such as R56B [B54], are in general use in the wireless industry. These documents
provide minimum grounding requirements for the BTS, along with site preparation recommendations,
necessary to meet personnel safety and warranty conditions from the equipment vendors or manufacturers.
These documents tend to recommend low ground impedances for 50–60 Hz power as well as lightning
frequencies at the sites. When the BTS sites are located at, or near, power line transmission and distribution
structures such as towers or poles, enhancements of the ground field may be necessary to meet these
requirements to reduce step, touch, and mesh voltages.
As a reminder, and for the purposes of this standard, mesh voltage is the maximum touch voltage to be
found within a mesh of a ground grid; step voltage is the difference in surface potential experienced by a
person bridging a distance of 1 m (3 ft) with his or her feet without contacting any other grounded object;
and touch voltage is the potential difference between the GPR and the surface potential at the point where a
person is standing, while at the same time having his or her hands in contact with a grounded structure. See
IEEE Std 80 for additional information on these terms.
5.5 Step, touch, and mesh voltages for BTSs located on power line transmission
or distribution structures
Lightning and 50–60 Hz fault currents for BTSs located on a high-voltage transmission structures can flow
on three predominant conducting paths back to their source(s) within the power grid. The first path is the
tower sky wire system (when used) grounded to earth and near tower groundings in, on, or adjacent to the
line’s right of way (ROW). The second path is the tower and BTS combined grounding system. The third
path is through the local power system ground that provides power to the site. Figure 16 depicts these
current distribution paths (see Grcev et al. [B19] and [B21]).
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Reprinted with permission from Grcev et al. [B19].
Figure 16 —Possible lightning current distributions for a BTS on a power tower
The distribution, or current magnitude on the various paths, becomes a function of the path impedance at
the various fault frequencies. The frequency and fault current path relationships are shown in Figure 17.
According to Grcev et al. [B19], [B20], and [B21], at the fundamental 50–60 Hz power frequencies, the sky
wires conduct approximately 60% of the fault current while the tower/BTS grounding system conducts less
than 10% to remote earth (low-frequency GPR). The remaining current follows the local ac power
grounding network and is distributed throughout the community (see Rajotte et al. [B55]). At lightning
frequencies approaching 10 kHz to 100 kHz, the inductive characteristic of the sky wires and local power
presents higher impedances, while the tower presents a lower impedance to ground and conducts over 90%
of lightning fault currents (high-frequency GPR).
Reprinted with permission from Grcev et al. [B20].
Figure 17 —Current distribution between sky wires, tower grounds, and local power
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IEEE Std 487-2015
These current flow relationships present an abundance of step, touch, and mesh voltages at the site during
low- and/or high-frequency fault conditions. To promote worker safety and to reduce equipment electrical
failures, the recommended design shown in Figure 18 and subsequent notes provide various means of
reducing these hazardous voltage levels.
Figure 18 —Bonding and grounding recommendations for power tower installations
NOTE—This standard does not recommend locating wireless sites and equipment (BTS, HVP, CFJ, and/or OEI)
underneath a power tower.
The following notes relate to the small numbered diamonds [◊] within Figure 18.
◊1 Joint-use power transmission towers. At these specific locations, the recommendation is that an
additional 2 AWG bare solid tinned copper wire ground ring be placed at a 0.3 m (24 in) depth and bonded
to each tower leg with a listed bond. If a counterpoise is required due to poor soil resistivity, extend a
2 AWG solid tinned copper wire approximately 10 m to 15 m (30 ft to 50 ft) from each corner with ground
rods (if possible) placed at each end and at 6 m (20 ft) spacings. The recommended depth of the
counterpoise wire is 0.6 m (24 in) and shall not contact any other metallic components at the site (i.e.,
fences). This setup will help reduce touch and step potential.
◊2 Ice bridge bond. When the BTS radio is placed to the side of the power tower (as shown in Figure 18),
the ice bridge should not be bonded to the tower structure. The ice bridge should be bonded only at the
bulkhead for equalization purposes. This setup will help reduce touch and step potential.
◊3 BTS grounding ring. Place a 2 AWG bare solid tinned copper wire within 1 m (3 ft) [± 15% tolerance]
from edge of the concrete pad, elevated metallic platform, or building at a maximum depth of 0.6 m (2 ft).
Ground rods should be placed a minimum of 3 m (10 ft) apart and/or at each corner of the ground ring. This
setup will help reduce touch and step potential when the ring is bonded to the mat in note ◊4.
◊4 Wire mesh safety mat. The recommendation at joint-use power towers is that a wire mesh safety mat
[150 mm (6 in) on center] be bonded to the ground ring and extended a minimum of 3 m (6 ft) from the
27
IEEE Std 487-2015
edge of the pad or power tower foot print, whichever is the greatest distance. This setup will help reduce
touch, step, and mesh potential when covered with gravel fill as described in note ◊5.
◊5 Surface material. To increase the safety of the worker, a layer of washed crushed gravel a minimum of
75 mm to 150 mm (3 in to 6 in) deep should be placed over the entire grid/mesh area where personnel are
exposed to grounded metallic objects. When a security fence is in place, the clean crushed gravel should be
placed within the total security fence area. See IEEE Std 80 for design details. For worker safety, cold
rolled asphalt is not recommended due to variability in its electrical conductivity. Hot asphalt can be used
as a means to provide a layer of insulation when clean crushed rock is not available or does not provide the
adequate insulating properties.
◊6 Bulkhead ground bar. The bulkhead is the single-point ground for the installation. All equipment or
secondary SPDs that require a ground or ground reference shall be bonded to this single point, either
directly or with the use of a master ground bar located within 1 m (3 ft) of the bulkhead. Use individual
listed grounding kits for each coaxial cable entering the BTS at this location. This setup will help reduce
touch and step potential for workers and provide voltage equalization for equipment at the site.
◊7 Concrete pad, elevated metallic platform, or stand-alone building. If a concrete pad contains rebar
and/or wire mesh, it shall be equipped with external bonding connectors and bonded to the ground ring at a
minimum of two opposing corners. If the BTS is placed on an elevated metallic platform or stand-alone
building, it should also be bonded to the ground ring at a minimum of two opposing corners. The bonding
wires should be a minimum 6 AWG copper wire. This setup will help reduce touch, step, and mesh
potential and provide voltage equalization for equipment at the site.
◊8 AC power entrance panel. Commercial ac power service entrance cables should be placed in a polyvinyl
chloride (PVC) conduit (suitable for power cable pulling) at a minimum depth of 1 m (3 ft) to a point
beyond the power corridor (ROW). The entrance panel should be bonded directly to the ground ring at its
closest location. If properly installed, the BTS ring ground should meet or exceed Article 250 of the
National Electrical Code® (NEC®) (NFPA 70), or equivalent local code, utility protection ground. If local
codes require an additional ground rod, bond the ground rod to the ground ring. All power circuits that
enter the BTS shall be provided with primary protection (placed on the line side of the serving panel board)
and secondary protection (placed on the load side of each 20 A circuit). Some manufacturers provide
secondary protection within their equipment that meets the secondary requirement. All secondary green
wire safety conductors should be placed within 1 m (3 ft) of, and bonded to, the bulkhead or master ground
bar with a copper conductor sized per the NEC Article 250-122 or equivalent local code requirements.
◊9 High-voltage protection (HVP). Entrance cables, either metallic or optical fiber, should be placed in a
PVC conduit (suitable for telecommunications cable pulling) at a minimum depth of 0.6 m (2 ft) 11 to a
point beyond the power corridor (ROW). Secondary SPDs on the station side of the HVP and at the BTS
shall be placed directly on, or bonded within 1 m (3 ft) of, the bulkhead. This setup will help reduce touch
potential.
◊10 Fence and gate equalization bonds. Use 2 AWG solid tinned copper wire exothermically welded to the
ground ring and attached to each inside or outside corner fence post, and or gate post, with a listed wire
clamp. Place at a minimum 0.3 m (12 in) depth. Wherever practical, due to magnetic coupling with the
tower counterpoise wires (if used), cross at a 90° angle while maintaining a minimum 0.3 m (12 in) vertical
separation. Do not bond these two grounding systems together at crossings. Place a 2 AWG solid tinned
copper wire attached to each gate post with a listed wire clamp. Place a flexible bonding strap from each
gate post to the movable gate section(s) with listed clamps. If the metallic posts are not set in concrete,
place an additional ground rod at each post location. This setup will help reduce touch potential.
11
Placing the conduit below the frost line may be necessary in some locations.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
5.6 Grounding for distributed antenna systems (DASs)
A typical cellular network has large cell sites, often referred to as macrocell sites. These sites effectively
cover a large geographic area. However, a typical DAS network comprises smaller cell sites that provide
wireless coverage of a much smaller geographic area. Additionally, another classification, called small cell,
usually includes microcells, picocells, metrocells, and femtocells. The different types of wireless networks,
macrocells, DAS networks, and different kinds of small cells (including Wi-Fi® and WiMAX®
technologies) differ significantly with respect to functionality, capacity, and complexity. The different
architectures and technologies are not interchangeable. Each is suitable only for the particular application it
is designed to address.
A DAS network typically includes a master hub location and one or more remote node locations. The
equipment at the remote node locations radiates the radio frequency signal through an antenna to provide
coverage to the intended area.
DAS networks may be deployed outdoors, within large buildings, or within partially enclosed structures.
A DAS node typically transmits radio frequency signals at much lower power levels than macrocell sites.
The outdoor DAS nodes are typically attached to utility poles or similar structures in the public ROWs.
Antennas can also be placed on street lights or utility poles or, at times, camouflaged as different objects.
Outdoor DAS networks typically cover areas ranging from several blocks to larger city sections. See
Hariharan [B24] and HetNet Forum [B27] for additional information on DASs.
The antennas associated with DAS networks and small cells are usually placed on distribution poles and, as
such, are not covered under this standard. However, if the antennas are mounted on high-voltage structures,
the protection measures detailed in this standard are to be applied to both the antennas and the circuits into
them.
All DAS network equipment and small cell equipment is to be grounded per the manufacturer’s
requirements. When the antennas are located on the upper portion of a joint-use utility pole (supply space)
and the node equipment is on a lower portion of the pole (communications space), the requirements of
NESC Rules 239G and 239H are to be met.
6. Protection apparatus
The following paragraphs outline briefly the broad characteristics and application techniques of various
protective devices in current general use.
a) Carbon block SPD: An assembly of two or three carbon blocks and air gaps designed to a specific
breakdown voltage. These devices are normally connected to telecommunications circuits to
provide overvoltage protection and a current path to ground during such overvoltage (see B.1).
b) Gas discharge tube (GDT): A discharge gap between two or more electrodes hermetically sealed
in a ceramic or glass envelope. These gaps provide protection against excessive voltage in the same
manner as carbon block SPDs (see B.2). The differences in operating characteristics of GDTs and
carbon block SPDs are discussed in B.7.1.
c) Solid-state SPD: A protective device that employs solid-state circuit elements that provide a
combination of high-speed voltage and current sensing. These SPDs are a combination of voltage
clamps (avalanche diodes) and crowbar devices (multilayer diodes similar to silicon-controlled
rectifiers) and are designed to limit the voltage to a specific value and to reduce current flow to low
values of milliamperes within nanoseconds. The devices are usually integrated into the terminal
apparatus. The characteristics of solid-state SPDs are described in B.3. The comparison of solid-
state SPDs with carbon block SPDs and GDTs is included in B.7.2.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
d) Spark gap: A device consisting of air dielectric between two electrodes that may be a combination
of several basic shapes. These SPDs are used to protect telecommunications circuits from damage
due to voltage stress in excess of their dielectric capabilities (see B.1). They may or may not be
adjustable.
e) Horn gap: An air-gap metal electrode device, consisting of a straight, vertical, round electrode and
an angularly shaped, round electrode. For a telecommunications pair, there exist one common
grounded, center, straight, vertical electrode and two angular electrodes, one for each side of the
pair. The gaps are usually adjustable. Horn gaps are used usually outdoors on open-wire lines
exposed to high-voltage power transmission lines and in conjunction with isolating or drainage
transformers. They are also used frequently alone out along the open-wire pair. Horn gaps provide
protection against both lightning and power contacts. See B.1 for additional information.
f) SPD: A device that guards against dielectric failure of protection apparatus due to lightning or
surge voltages in excess of the apparatus’s dielectric capabilities and serves to interrupt
power follow current. Protection of isolation transformers and NTs by surge arresters is covered in
Annex D.
g) Isolation transformer: A transformer that provides longitudinal (common-mode) isolation of the
telecommunications facility. These transformers can be designed for use in a combined isolation-
drainage transformer configuration and also can be designed for a low longitudinal-to-metallic
conversion (see IEEE Std 487.5).
h) NT and neutralizing reactor: A device that introduces a voltage into a circuit pair to oppose an
unwanted voltage. These devices neutralize extraneous longitudinal voltages resulting from GPR,
longitudinal induction, or both, while simultaneously allowing ac and dc metallic signals to pass.
These transformers or reactors are used primarily to protect telecommunications or control circuits
at electric supply locations, along routes where exposure to power line induction is a problem, or
both (see IEEE Std 487.4).
i) Drainage unit or drainage reactor: A center-tapped inductive device designed to relieve
conductor-to-conductor and conductor-to-ground voltage stress by draining extraneous currents to
ground. These units are also designed to serve the purpose of a mutual drainage reactor (MDR),
forcing near-simultaneous protector-gap operation (see B.4). These devices have a high conductor-
to-conductor impedance to allow transmission and a low wire-to-ground impedance to drain
longitudinal mode current.
j) High-voltage isolating relay: A device that provides for the repeating of dc on/off signals while
maintaining longitudinal isolation. High-voltage isolating relays may be used in conjunction with
isolation transformers [see item k)] or may be used as stand-alone devices for dc tripping or dc
telemetering (see IEEE Std 487.5).
k) Isolation transformer with high-voltage isolating relay: An assembly that provides protection
for standard telephone service and consists basically of an isolation transformer and a high-voltage
isolating relay. The transformer provides a path for voice and ringing frequencies while the relay
provides a means for repeating dc signals around the transformer. A locally supplied battery or dc
power supply is required for operation of the telephone and relay (see IEEE Std 487.5).
l) Optic coupling device: An isolation device using an optical link to provide the longitudinal
isolation. Circuit arrangements on each side of the optical link convert the electrical signal into an
optical signal for transmission through the optical link and back to an electrical signal. Various
circuit arrangements provide one-way or two-way transmission and permit transmission to the
various combinations of voice and/or dc signaling used by the power industry. The optical link may
be either a quartz rod or a short length of optic fiber.
Single channel optic coupling devices may be used in conjunction with other isolation devices in
protection systems as described in IEEE Std 487.1. A multichannel protection system utilizing a
cabinet with mounting arrangements for a multiplicity of optic coupling devices is described in
IEEE Std 487.1. IEEE Std 487.3 covers hybrid applications that have an equipment junction
30
IEEE Std 487-2015
between the metallic wire-line and the fiber cable (CFJ) and use more complex optical isolation
devices.
m) High-voltage disconnect jack: A device used to disconnect cable pairs for testing purposes. These
devices help safeguard personnel from remote ground potentials (see B.6).
n) Cable in the GPR ZOI: A high-dielectric cable, which provides a higher voltage insulation
between conductors, between conductors and shield, and between shield and earth than standard
(general use) outside plant cables. The cable dielectric should be equal to, or greater than the
combined expected GPR and induced voltage from a power fault (see 8.6, Annex C, IEEE Std 367,
and IEEE Std 789).
7. Service types, reliability, service performance objective (SPO)

classifications, and transmission considerations
7.1 Overview
The term reliability means different things to different people. In the broadest sense, the term reliability is
used with the term availability to measure system or equipment performance over a given period of time.
Reliability and availability formulae and objectives are not addressed in this document.
In the context of power system protective relaying, reliability consists of a combination of dependability
(failure to deliver a valid trip signal) and security (delivery of a false trip or control signal.) This subject is
addressed briefly in 7.3 and 7.3.2.
SPO classifications, as used in this standard, are a function of interruptions or outages due to the effects of
power system faults (see 7.3 and 7.3.2).
Telecommunications services provided to electric supply locations are of different service types and have
different SPO classes in accordance with the definitions given in this clause. The responsible power utility
engineer, when ordering leased telecommunications facilities within the ZOI, should specify the service
type and the desired SPO class for each telecommunications service provided at the electric supply
location.
NOTE—Annex I has a form that may be used to provide this, and other, information.
In addition to GPR and longitudinal induction considerations, service type, and SPO, the transmission
characteristics of the channel should be considered when selecting the method of protection to be used.
7.2 Service types
For purposes of this standard, telecommunications services to electric supply locations can be classified
into five major types according to the definitions in Table 1.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Table 1 —Service types

Type Definition
Type 1 Services requiring either dc transmission or ac and dc transmission used for
1. Basic exchange telephone service or private line, or both; voice telephone service (e.g.,
telephone, tie lines, trunks, radio control, dc alarms, telegraph); and digital data service (DDS)
(ac and dc transmission).
2. Telemetering, supervisory control, etc.
Type 2 Private line services requiring ac or dc transmission, or both, used for pilot wire protective relaying, or dc
tripping.
Type 3 Private line services requiring only ac transmission used for telemetering, supervisory control, data, etc.
Type 4 Private line services requiring only ac transmission used for audio tone protective relaying.
Type 5 Digital services with equipment subject to latency, or synchronization, time delay issues. May include
services such as DS-1 digital transmission, time-division multiplex (TDM), packet-based, T-1, ISDN
PRI, xDSL private line transport services, DDS (ac transmission only), and Ethernet.
NOTE—Various other classifications may be used.
7.3 SPO classifications
7.3.1 General
Interruptions or outages of telecommunications circuits serving electric supply locations may occur for
physical reasons such as cable damage due to extraordinarily heavy storm loading, a vehicle striking and
breaking a utility pole, or a direct lightning stroke. Circuit failures caused by such events cannot be
prevented but may be minimized through careful application of the appropriate construction and
maintenance practices.
Interruptions or outages due to the effects of power system faults can be minimized through the installation
and maintenance of special protection systems that are designed to operate in the fault-produced electrical
environment (GPR and longitudinal induction) at electric supply locations. Because of the critical need for
service continuity during power system faults on certain types of telecommunications services provided to
electric supply locations, a system of optional SPO classifications, for the purpose of this standard, has
been established for all types of telecommunications services provided to electric supply locations. These
SPOs, with respect to the effects of power system faults, fall into the classifications in Table 2.
Table 2 —SPO classes

SPO class Definition
Class A Non-interruptible service performance (shall function before, during, and after the power
fault condition)
Class B Self-restoring interruptible service performance (shall function before and after the power
fault condition)
Class C Interruptible service performance (can tolerate a station visit to restore service)
7.3.2 Class A service performance considerations
SPO Class A is the most demanding type. Service performance for this class cannot tolerate even a
momentary service interruption before, during, or after a power system fault. The non-tolerable service
interruptions include both loss of dependability (failure to deliver a valid trip or control signal) and loss of
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IEEE Std 487-2015
security (delivery of a false trip or control signal). Examples of services that may have an SPO Class A are
pilot-wire protective relaying, audio-tone protective relaying, and critical supervisory (remote control)
circuits.
To provide additional reliability, dual alternate routing of two SPO Class A circuits should seriously be
considered. This arrangement means that critical operating circuits are duplicated, end-to-end, over two
geographically separated routes, minimizing the risk of simultaneous interruption of both circuits.
In addition to the special protection employed for achieving the SPO Class A, certain other special or
nonstandard physical design and administrative procedures of the plant facilities should be followed. Such
procedures include the following:
a) Bridged taps and multiple appearances of these cable pairs should be minimized.
b) The number of appearances on central office (CO) main distributing frames (MDFs) should be
minimized.
c) Special protective covers are required on all SPO Class A MDF appearances.
d) These circuits should not be tested, switched, electrically contacted, or changed unless prior
arrangements have been made with the appropriate group within the electric utility regarding the
date, time, and duration of such operations.
The use of some digital services/equipment, such as high-bit-rate digital subscriber line (HDSL), to provide
SPO Class A is not recommended due to synchronization issues that may preclude the circuit from
operating before, during, and after the fault.
Care should be taken in grounding, and due consideration should be made in shielding metallic pairs that
are used for digital circuits (e.g., DS-1) and require frame synchronization. Loss of frame due to noise or
surge (on these pairs) can lead to loss of traffic. Downstream DS-0 or voice frequency (VF) channels will
not be available (for protection/telemetry purposes) until frame synchronization is regained.
7.3.3 Class B service performance considerations
SPO Class B is less demanding than SPO Class A in that a service interruption can be tolerated for the
duration of a power system fault, but service continuity should be restored immediately after the fault
without requiring any repair personnel activity. Examples of services that are SPO Class B (with self-
restoring requirements) are storm or emergency telephone circuits, telemetering and data circuits,
supervisory control circuits, and signal and alarm circuits. The telecommunications engineer may
determine that, for reasons of service performance, some or all of the special, nonstandard, physical design,
and administrative procedures indicated in 7.3.2 described for SPO Class A are also necessary for SPO
Class B.
7.3.4 Class C service performance considerations
SPO Class C is the least demanding in that an interruption or a service outage due to a power fault that
requires a station visit to restore service can be tolerated. Examples of services that are SPO Class C are
basic exchange telephone service, non-critical telemetering and data circuits, and some types of signal and
alarm circuits. The special nonstandard design and administrative procedures described for SPO Class A
are not required to achieve SPO Class C.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
7.4 Transmission considerations
The transmission characteristics of the channel should be considered in selecting the optimum protective
arrangement to safeguard electric supply location telecommunications channels.
Depending on the type of service, the transmission requirements will vary widely. For example, some
services require a physical metallic pair, end-to-end. Certain channels should carry both ac and dc signals,
while others are required to carry only ac signals. In the selection of protective hardware, transmission
demands of the terminal equipment should be matched with the transmission capability of the channel.
Transmission characteristics and SPO requirements for various types of telecommunications channels are
shown in Annex E.
The following is a partial list of characteristics that should be specified by the user, if applicable, so that the
transmission channel and associated protective equipment can be designed to meet the demands of the
terminal equipment:
a) Type of termination (two-wire or four-wire)

b) Mode of operation (simplex, half-duplex, or full-duplex)
c) Function (remote trip, supervisory control, pilot wire, etc.)
d) Transmission (VF audio tone, dc on/off, dc pulses, etc.)
e) Attenuation requirements
f) Required frequency response
g) Steady-state and impulse noise requirements
h) End-to-end round-trip delay
i) Allowable harmonic distortion over frequency range of interest
j) Envelope delay distortion requirements
k) Shunt capacitance limitation between conductors of a single pair
l) Maximum loop resistance, including all HVI terminations
m) Allowable capacitive or resistive unbalance of the pairs, or both
n) Maximum differential mode voltage
o) Impedance of source and load
p) Need for metallic continuity (hard-wired or derived) in the channel
8. Protection theory and philosophy
8.1 Overview
Both the telecommunications protection engineer and the power system protection relaying engineer agree
that the basic objectives for the protection of telecommunications facilities serving electric supply locations
are to maximize personnel safety, to protect the telecommunications plant and terminal equipment, to
maintain reliability of service, and to accomplish these in the most economical way. In the design of a
protection system to meet these objectives, however, the telecommunications protection engineer and the
power protective relaying engineer may differ in their design approaches due to differences in their network
reliability standards and protection philosophies. The design of a protection system requires a blending of
the philosophies of the engineers responsible for telecommunications protection and for protective relaying
in order to effect a solution that meets the primary protection objectives of both industries and the mutual
customer base they serve.
The type, quality, and quantity of protective devices that would be used in any particular application should
be dictated by the nature, magnitude, and frequency of occurrence of the interference; the nature of the
service requirements; considerations of personnel and plant safety; and the general protective policies
employed by the organizations concerned.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
The protective devices recommended today range from very simple, low-cost GDTs and small-gauge wire
fuse links to sophisticated schemes involving isolation transformers, MDRs, and optical isolation cables or
systems.
Annex B provides further details, including operating characteristics, on various types of protective
apparatus.
The operation of a protective device may result in a residual voltage between the telecommunications
conductors and earth. The permissible magnitude of this residual voltage should be such that the
requirements for personnel and plant safety are not jeopardized. For circuits protected by NTs or
neutralizing reactors, this residual voltage is termed the remanent voltage or unneutralized voltage. See
IEEE Std 487.4 for additional information on the use of NTs.
8.2 Concepts and concerns
A fundamental concept regarding the protection of telecommunications facilities serving electric supply
locations is that of a coordinated protection system design. This design refers to a system of protection in
which special protection measures are applied to SPO Class C services, as well as to SPO Class A and
Class B services, that are provided in the same cable so that a circuit interruption or outage on an
interruptible service will not cause a circuit failure or interruption on a non-interruptible service.
The SPDs used on the various services should, therefore, be coordinated with each other with respect to the
environment and the SPOs of the services on which they are employed. The objective of the coordination is
to minimize the likelihood of cable failure, SPD operation, failure of special SPDs, failure of terminal
equipment, or other similar occurrences that could create hazards to personnel and plant and result in
interruptions or outages of critical and non-critical services alike.
8.3 Ownership
Telecommunications circuits entering electric supply locations may be owned by the electric power utility
or by the end user or are leased from a telecommunications service provider. For leased
telecommunications circuits, the protective devices located at the HVI are considered part of the network.
In some jurisdictions involving leased telecommunications facilities, the telecommunications service
provider/user interface (demarcation point), by mutual agreement, would be at a point outside the ZOI;
therefore, this point would not be the HVI. In this case, the entrance cables traversing the ZOI and the HVI
protective equipment would be owned either by the power utility or by the end user. The
telecommunications service provider/user interface shall be a protected terminal or protector block outside
the ZOI. These telecommunications circuits are of various types and have different SPOs, as described in
Clause 7.
8.4 General-use telecommunications cable in the electric supply location GPR ZOI
When the general-use telecommunications cable to which the dedicated cable is connected passes through
an area subject to GPR, dielectric breakdown in that cable may compromise the reliability of the electric
supply location circuits. Additional protection may be required on the general-use cable to avoid such
degradation. The case of a general-use cable passing through the ZOI beyond the junction with the
dedicated cable is discussed in Annex C. Routing the electric supply location circuits through another
electric supply location ZOI between the remote drainage location (RDL) and the CO is undesirable and
should be avoided. If this routing cannot be avoided, then the reliability of service on cables that pass
through the ZOI of another electric supply location should be evaluated.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Telecommunications-type cables suitable for this type of installation are covered in IEEE Std 789.
The electric supply location GPR may be transferred by the MGN outside of the ZOI under certain
conditions and especially in rural environments; see Rajotte et al. [B56]. This location may require alternate
methods of cable isolation and shield grounding to be considered.
NOTE—A more detailed description of transferred potentials by the MGN may be found in 9.5 of IEEE Std 367-2012.
8.5 Aerial cable installation
The use of cables using a metallic messenger in aerial installations into an electric supply location is not
recommended. Cables serving an electric supply location should be in a buried PVC conduit.
If the cable is to be aerial, it should transverse the ZOI using a pole line exclusively for the cable. Down
guys and messenger attachments within the ZOI should also be isolated.
The additional engineering methods and personnel safety measures required to minimize safety risks
associated with an aerial entrance installation far outweigh the choice of placing an aerial installation over a
buried or underground installation.
Refer to IEEE Std 487.1 for specific considerations relating to aerial cable installations.
8.6 Conduit containing metallic members or tracing medium
The cable entrance facility shall be in an all-dielectric raceway (such as PVC conduit) from the HVI
location to a point at least 3 m (10 ft) on the CO side of the grid or perimeter fence, whichever is closer to
the CO.
Conduits or raceways containing any metallic members shall not be utilized for the cable entrance facility
to the electric supply location.
The metallic members (locating wires or metallic materials) violate the concept of an all-dielectric cable
entrance conduit and should not be used for safety reasons.
9. Protection configurations
9.1 Overview
The application of protective devices such as GDT, isolation and drainage transformers, NTs or
neutralizing reactors, optical coupling isolators, etc., involves both the physical and electrical planning of
the protection installation to maximize personnel safety and ensure operating reliability. The configuration
may range from no protection to a simple protection plan to a complex configuration. This clause provides
recommended practices on the use of the various protection schemes and the reasons for their selection.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
9.2 GPR plus induced voltage levels
9.2.1 Voltage level quantification
Voltage protection levels in this document are given in terms of peak values due to telecommunications
cable dielectric, bare spots on wires, and air gaps essentially break down close to the peak of the voltage
waveform and because some degree of a dc offset may be superimposed on the sinusoidal waveform. As a
result of the nonsymmetrical wave shape (see Figure 2), the relationship between the Vrms and Vpeak values
is rarely as simple as
Vpeak = ( 2 )Vrms
The user may specify values in terms of Vrms, but if the user wishes to choose his or her own dc offset
factor for the first half cycle of the wave shape, the asymmetric relationship in Equation (14) may be used.
 −π 
Vpeak asymmetric = ( 2 )Vrms 1 + e X / R  (14)
 
where
X/R is the system reactance over resistance values
Example: What is the maximum stress voltage, under worst-case fault conditions, given that the GPR Vrms
is 2000 V when the power system X/R ratio is 12?
 −π 
Vpeak asymmetric = ( 2 )(2000) 1 + e 12  ≅ 2828.4[1.77] ≅ 5006 V

 
For purposes of this standard, protection options are given for three voltage levels: I, II, and III.
9.2.2 Voltage Level I
For Voltage Level I, an electric supply location is considered to have minimal GPR, minimal induction, and
minimal ZOI; therefore, no special HVP, such as isolation or neutralization, is required. Even in Voltage
Level I, however, special protection arrangements on highly critical services may be used and may differ
from those on less critical services. Figures and options are discussed in detail in Table 1 and Figure 8 in
IEEE Std 487.1-2014.
Voltage Level I is the voltage level at which virtually no pair-to-pair or pair-to-shield dielectric failure
would occur in cables serving the electric supply location that had not been specifically installed and tested
as a dedicated high-dielectric cable. If service is to be continuous during the fault (SPO Class A) or restored
immediately after the fault (SPO Class B), then consideration of the dielectric withstand capabilities of the
elements of the plant is important. Experience has shown that the general-use telecommunications cable
may fail in the pair-to-pair and pair-to-shield modes at the splices at voltages that exceed 300 Vpeak.
Similarly, some GDT may fire as low as 300 Vpeak. When determining the peak value of the voltage in
meeting this criteria, adding an appropriate value of dc offset of the transient and the longitudinally induced
voltage (expressed by Vpeak) to the steady-state GPR (expressed in Vpeak) is necessary (see Clause 4).
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IEEE Std 487-2015
NOTE—Many administrations have chosen a value of 300 V, either rms or peak, as the upper limit for Voltage Level I.
Other administrations have chosen values such as 420 V, 430 V, or 650 V, either rms or peak. Some administrations
have chosen even higher voltages on the basis of their higher cable and equipment dielectric withstand capabilities.
9.2.3 Voltage Level II
The upper limit for Voltage Level II is 1000 Vpeak. This limit is based on experience and is considered to
provide a suitable safety margin below voltage and current levels that would cause telecommunications-
type SPDs to fuse, explode, or cause fire hazards. In Voltage Level II, special SPDs are not required on
electric supply location services, provided that momentary interruption of service can be tolerated during a
power system fault.
If certain services require isolation or neutralization for reliability reasons, however, then all other services
should be isolated or neutralized, or the dielectric capability of the dedicated cable should be coordinated to
withstand the conductor-to-conductor voltage stresses that can occur.
An upper limit of 1500 Vpeak is suggested if protection is used at the junction of the dedicated and general-
use cables (typically the RDL). An upper limit of 1000 Vpeak is suggested if the protection is not used at the
RDL. For specific locations, some administrations establish an upper limit for Voltage Level II based on
the time-current characteristics of the dedicated cable, the SPDs, and the electric supply location
parameters.
For leased or rented telecommunications facilities, the choice of the magnitude of the voltage should be by
agreement between the local power utility or end user and its serving telecommunications service provider.
Power utilities regularly use rms values as the basis for their own facilities and calculations. However, in all
cases the upper limit shall not exceed 3 kVpeak in order to be in agreement with the voltage limit criteria for
the construction of joint-use lines.
An upper limit exceeding 1.5 kVpeak, but not exceeding 3 kVpeak, may be acceptable only if the following
conditions are satisfied:
 The power utility or the end user owns the dedicated cable traversing the ZOI.
 The telecommunications service provider/user interface (demarcation point) is outside the ZOI.
 The telecommunications service provider/user interface (demarcation point) is a protected terminal.
 The power utility or the end user take into account the time-current limit of cable pairs, cable
shield, and SPD if grounding protection techniques are used for SPO Class B or Class C services.
 The time-current calculations must show that cable pairs, cable shield, and SPD will not be
degraded if the voltage limit is fixed.
9.2.4 Voltage Level III
Voltage Level III begins at the upper limits of Voltage Level II and requires special HVP such as isolation
or neutralization, or both, for the protection of plant, personnel, and circuit integrity for all types of services
and SPO classes.
9.3 Basic protection system
Depending on the SPO requirements and the GPR plus induced voltage level requirements, basic wire-line
telecommunications protection, as shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20, may be used for SPO Class B and
Class C services. The basic protection illustrated in Figure 19 may be used on all electric supply location
services, provided that the interfering voltage is calculated not to exceed Voltage Level I. Administrations,
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IEEE Std 487-2015
power utilities or telecommunications companies, and end users who so choose will permit this limit to be
higher. Above the chosen voltage, basic protection, as illustrated in Figure 20, may be used on certain
services in the Voltage Level II range. SPO Class A requires special protection, i.e., neutralization or
isolation for all voltage levels. For Voltage Level I and Voltage Level II, a mix of special (for SPO Class
A) and standard protection (for SPO Class B and Class C) schemes is allowed on the same cable under
agreement between the local power utility, or end user, and its serving telecommunications service
provider. For the Voltage Level III range, special protection is required in all the circuits to the location.
See Table 3.
Table 3 —Basic HVP matrix

Voltage Level
SPO
I II III
Class A No special HVP unless Special HVP at HVI, RDL, and Special HVP at HVI, RDL, and
requested and paid for CO locations. Use dedicated CO locations. Use dedicated
by customer. cable with isolated shield. cable with isolated shield.
Class B No special HVP unless Special HVP at HVI location Special HVP at HVI, RDL and
requested and paid for only. Dedicated cable not CO locations. Use dedicated
by customer. needed. Cable shield bonded cable with isolated shield.
and grounded. Use GDT at CO.
Class C No special HVP unless Special HVP at HVI location Special HVP at HVI, RDL, and
requested and paid for only. Dedicated cable not CO locations. Use dedicated
by customer. needed. Cable shield bonded cable with isolated shield.
and grounded. Use GDT at CO.
NOTE—Voltage Level I = less than 300 Vpeak; Voltage Level II = more than 300 Vpeak but less than 1000 Vpeak
(1500 Vpeak if protection is at the RDL); and Voltage Level III = more than 1000 Vpeak (1500 Vpeak if protection is at
the RDL).
NOTE 1—See IEEE Std 487.1 for applicable options.

NOTE 2—Some telecommunications administrations may require that shields of all general-use cables be grounded at
electric supply locations. Current-carrying capacity of the shield under power system fault conditions should be
considered.
Figure 19 —Basic protection for Voltage Level I for Class B and Class C services
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IEEE Std 487-2015
NOTE 1— See IEEE Std 487.1 for applicable options.

NOTE 2—Although this standard recommends that the dedicated cable shield be isolated from the electric supply
location ground grid, some administrations may require that shields of all dedicated cables be grounded at electric
supply locations. Current-carrying capacity of the shield under power system fault conditions should be considered.
Figure 20 —Basic protection for Voltage Level II range Class B or

Class C service only
9.4 Protection configurations employing isolation devices
9.4.1 General
Circuit configurations range from the simple, consisting basically of the isolation device at the electric
supply location and dedicated cable to a remote location, to the more elaborate, when distance to the remote
location or distance between the isolation device and terminal equipment at the electric supply location is
increased. A remote location is defined as another electric supply location or dispatch office, telephone CO,
or other remote telecommunications terminal. Figure 21 illustrates the simplest situation. Figure 22 and
Figure 23 illustrate the more elaborate situations in which extended distance between the electric supply
location and the remote location may make routing of dedicated cable for the entire distance impracticable.
The dedicated and general-use cables are normally interconnected, and remote drainage protection may be
required at the junction point. The decision to use remote drainage protection should be by mutual
agreement between the administrations involved. When the cable length between the isolation device and
terminal equipment at the electric supply location becomes significant, protection is further complicated by
the shielding required for the interconnecting cable. Where the remote location is another electric supply
location, an HVI may also be provided at the remote location (see Figure 23).
9.4.2 Basic isolation protection configuration
A very simple and effective protection system can be realized with high-dielectric isolation transformers,
relays or optical coupling isolators, high-voltage disconnect jacks, surge arresters, and high-dielectric
dedicated cable. In all cases, the dielectric of these devices shall coordinate with GPR and the dielectric
rating of the dedicated cable (see Figure 21).
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IEEE Std 487-2015
NOTE 1—Use of drainage device and surge arrester to be by mutual agreement between protective relay and
telecommunications engineers.
NOTE 2—PVC conduit, 3 m minimum from grid or fence, whichever is further.
Figure 21 —Basic isolation protection configuration
9.4.3 Protection at the electric supply location
Protection at the interface between the electric supply location and the incoming telecommunications cable
(i.e., the isolation or neutralization device) is intended to keep the GPR from appearing on the incoming
cable. The electric supply location telecommunications cable interface will, therefore, be referred to as the
HVI. This point is not necessarily the telecommunications service provider/user interface or demarcation
point.
The HVI can be located either at the edge of the electric power station ground grid (either inside or just
outside the fence) or in the control building. Wiring between the HVI and the terminal equipment should be
kept short to minimize exposure to inductive interference, switching transients, or differential ground grid
voltages. Measures as shown in Figure 22 and Figure 23 should be taken to protect against such
interference. Drainage to the electric supply location ground is provided on the electric power station side
of the isolation device.
NOTE—When the HVI is at the edge of the grid and just outside the fence, the grid is to be extended around the HVI
as described in 5.2.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
NOTE 1—Use of drainage device, spark gap, and surge arrester to be by mutual agreement between protective relay
and telecommunications engineers.
Figure 22 —General isolation protection configuration
Figure 23 —General isolation protection between two electric supply locations
For a totally ac class of service, direct drainage may be applied. When ac and dc signals will both be
present on the pair, a drainage reactor with a gap protector in each leg, termed a mutual drainage reactor
(MDR), should be used because the drainage reactor presents a low bridging impedance to dc signals.
Blocking capacitors could be used in place of the gap protectors; however, resonant conditions should be
considered.
Drainage provided on pairs assigned to SPO Class C (see 7.3.4) may consist only of GDTs or solid-state
SPDs. Pairs assigned to SPO Class A (see 7.3.2) should be equipped with a mutual drainage arrangement to
minimize noise interference and prevent signal loss.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
The isolation device may also be an isolation transformer with a well-balanced center tap serving the dual
function of isolation and drainage. The center tap on the electric supply location side may be connected to
the ground grid to provide direct drainage, as shown in Figure 25 (in 9.5.4), as long as a ground loop is not
created. The center tap of the line or CO side winding should have a specified minimum drainage
capability.
If the dielectric of the isolation devices and cable may be exceeded, cable protection can be provided on the
remote location side of the isolation device to the dedicated cable shield through a spark gap intended to
limit pair-to-shield stress. This cable protection will not be effective for longitudinally induced voltages, as
both the pair and shield are in the same field. When isolation devices other than well-balanced, center-
tapped isolation and drainage transformers are used, separate drainage coils with direct, capacitor-blocked,
or protector drainage connections should be provided for SPO Class A services and may be provided for
SPO Class B services. SPO Class C services utilize only GDTs or equivalents. The spark gap does not
normally operate except as a safety measure to prevent cable damage in the event that an isolation device
fails or the dedicated cable shield contacts the station ground.
The surge arrester shown in Figure 25 protects the isolation device in the event of a lightning stroke to the
electric supply location ground structure or telecommunications facility that exceeds the isolation device’s
basic impulse insulation level (BIL). The arrester may be eliminated if the dielectric BIL of the isolation
device is capable of withstanding the voltage from a lightning stroke.
The dedicated cable should be routed in a well-drained (i.e., dry) non-metallic conduit (PVC), within the
electric power station ground grid area.
9.4.4 Protection at the CO or non-electric supply location remote location
The basic configuration of Figure 21 shows the dedicated cable extending the entire distance to the remote
location where the shield is grounded. Drainage is applied to all pairs at the point of entry to the remote
location to ensure that voltages from telecommunications line-to-ground are within prescribed safety limits.
On SPO Class A services, direct, capacitor-blocked, or protector-blocked drainage reactors are used,
depending on whether dc is present. On SPO Class B services, the use of an MDR is optional. GDTs or
solid-state SPDs are used for SPO Class C services such as exchange telephone service. If drainage is
required along the cable route (outside the GPR zone) to mitigate the effects of longitudinal induction, it
should be applied to all cable pairs to preclude possible arcing between in-service and unassigned or
unused pairs.
9.4.5 Protection at a remote service location situated within the ZOI of an adjacent
electric supply location
9.4.5.1 Introduction
This subclause addresses the less frequent scenario where the owner of the electric supply location desires
to extend telecommunications circuits outside the ground grid of an electric supply location (but inside the
ZOI) on a permanent or interim basis. Typically, the incoming telecommunications circuits already have
IEEE Std 487.1-compliant HVP equipment or IEEE Std 487.3-compliant HVP equipment installed at or
near the telecommunications service provider demarcation point located on the ground grid of the electric
supply location.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Examples of this situation include the following scenarios:
 A revenue meter (pole-mounted, pedestal-mounted, or H-frame mounted) located outside the

ground grid of an electric power station and connected to a circuit (voice or data) extended from
that electric power station.
 One or multiple construction trailers located adjacent to an existing electric power station, outside
the ground grid, that require various telecommunications circuits to be extended from inside the
electric power station.
 An outdoor telephone or intercom located along an access road to an electric power station to
provide voice access to plant security personnel (i.e., access control).
 An antenna or other equipment associated with cellular telephony (e.g., microcells).
In each of these scenarios, specific measures shall be implemented by the owner of the electric supply
location to provide appropriate HVP for the telecommunications circuits to be extended in order to ensure
personnel safety, continuity of service, and equipment reliability. The concern relates to the difference in
voltage that will inevitably exist between the electric supply location ground grid and the off-grid terminal
(e.g., construction trailer, revenue meter) during a GPR event and to the method chosen to effectively
mitigate the effects of that voltage differential on the telecommunications facility that is extended. The
discussion in the subsequent subclauses is based on the following assumptions:
 The extension of the existing electric supply location ground grid to include the location to be
served (e.g., construction trailer, revenue meter) is neither practical nor feasible; therefore, an HVP
solution is to be implemented for the telecommunications circuits to be extended.
 The establishment of a new demarcation point by the telecommunications service provider for the
location to be served (off-grid terminal) is neither practical nor feasible.
To maintain the isolation of the facilities, the approach in 9.4.5.2 or 9.4.5.3 should be selected.
NOTE—When the grid is extended to the remote location, no special HVP treatment is necessary.
9.4.5.2 Use of HVP equipment to protect metallic circuits being extended
One approach is the installation of HVP equipment at the location to be served for each of the metallic
circuits to be extended outside the perimeter of the existing ground grid. This approach ensures personnel
safety, continuity of service, and equipment reliability. Another approach might be to use HVP at the
electric supply location; however, this approach requires specific grounding, isolation, and/or wiring
depending on circuit and powering options and, therefore, is not recommended.
This case is depicted in Figure 24 and reflects the guidelines detailed in IEEE Std 487.1 for the protection
of telecommunications facilities serving electric supply locations through the use of on-grid isolation
equipment.
The isolation device installed at the remote site ensures that there is no electrical continuity between the
electric supply location and the remote site related to the circuits extended via the metallic
telecommunications cable.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Figure 24 —Typical use of HVP equipment to protect circuits being extended
9.4.5.3 Use of HVI equipment and hybrid facilities to extend telecommunications

circuits via all-dielectric optical fiber
The preferred approach, especially when several telecommunications circuits are to be installed, comprises
the placement of all-dielectric optical fiber to extend the desired circuits beyond the electric supply location
ground grid to the remote location(s) that require connectivity. The proper application of hybrid facilities is
detailed in IEEE Std 487.3.
This approach is particularly effective for the case where several contractor trailers are transported to the
vicinity of an electric supply location and deployed outside the ground grid of that location during a
scheduled outage or major capital improvement at an electric power station. Since these trailers typically
require telecommunications connectivity but may be situated well within the ZOI of the adjacent electric
supply location, the utilization of all-dielectric optical fiber to provide that connectivity is an inherently
safer means of achieving the desired isolation.
In this scenario, there is a need to extend several telecommunications circuits from the location in the
electric power station housing the telecommunications equipment to the remote location(s). The
recommended approach would include these elements:
 Install the CFJ in the telecommunications room with sufficient equipped capacity to support the
number of circuits required at the remote location(s).
 Install the OEI system near the remote location(s). The OEI cabinet is typically installed on an
outdoor H-frame or wooden pole.
 Install all-dielectric optical fiber cable between the CFJ and the OEI to ensure isolation for the
telecommunications circuits being extended and personnel safety for the people working inside or
near the remote location(s).
This scenario is depicted in Figure 24 where the optical fiber cable would be placed in the conduit.
When a ground grid has been established at the remote site (which is outside the electric supply location
ground grid but inside the ZOI) in order to mitigate touch potential and step potential, the protection
engineer must consider and resolve the following important issues:
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IEEE Std 487-2015
a) Adequacy of the ancillary ground mat at the remote site in the ZOI
b) AC power source to the remote site (e.g., must be isolated from the electric supply location)
c) Grounding the hybrid OEI equipment (bonding to ground grid at the remote site)
d) Provisions for lightning protection at the remote site
9.5 General isolation protection configuration
9.5.1 Dedicated cable
In many situations, using dedicated cable facilities for the entire distance from the electric supply location
to the remote location may not be feasible or economically practical. Dedicated cable facilities may be
merged with a general-use telecommunications plant at a location outside the ZOI of the station GPR. As
an alternative, the dedicated cable could be merged with general-use cable at a point where the station GPR
coordinates with the dielectric strength of the general-use cable. Protection at the electric supply location
and at the remote location is identical to that provided in the basic configuration of Figure 21.
9.5.2 Remote drainage protection
Remote drainage protection may be added at the point at which the high-dielectric dedicated cable facilities
and the low-dielectric general-use plant merge, as shown in Figure 22 and Figure 23. This approach ensures
that voltages are maintained within the capabilities of the low-dielectric cable in the event of failure of the
isolation devices or the dedicated cable insulation. For types of drainage units, see B.4.
A suitable location for remote drainage protection may be determined by using the information given in
Clause 4. The site should be chosen to ensure that local GPR does not exceed Voltage Level I. If a higher
GPR point were chosen, the dielectric strength of the general-use cable jacket might be exceeded and
personnel safety might be jeopardized. In addition, circuit noise could be produced due to an unbalance of
the drainage system.
If parallel routing of power and telecommunications cables exists, then remote drainage protection should
be located at the point at which the combination of longitudinally induced voltage (on the remote side of
the point) and GPR does not exceed Voltage Level I. Consideration should also be given to local GPR due
to ties or couplings with local power line grounds.
Two grounds are established at the remote drainage protection location as shown in Figure 22 and
Figure 23: a local ground associated with the general-use cable and drainage, and a remote ground
associated with the dedicated cable shield. This standard recommends that these grounds be established a
minimum of 6 m apart.
Additional lightning protection is provided by the spark gap connected between dedicated and general-use
cable shields. When there is assurance that the isolation devices at the HVI have been properly engineered
and installed, the ground electrode on the dedicated cable and general-use cable is bonded at the splice.
9.5.3 Local terminal
When the HVI is located sufficiently far from the terminal equipment to expose the interconnecting cable
to inductive interference, the cable between the two locations should be placed along with a 2/0 AWG bare
copper conductor. The cable shield and the 2/0 AWG conductor should be bonded together and then
bonded to the electric supply location ground at the location where the cable enters the conduit and leaves
the conduit.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
The circuit balance should be maintained by using balanced, twisted-pair conductors within this cable and
in any wiring extending to the terminating equipment. Interconnecting cable length is not critical, provided
that proper shielding has been applied.
9.5.4 Composite protection system
Figure 25 shows a protection system utilizing various types of isolation devices at the HVI using the
general protection configuration of Figure 22. Direct drainage, protector drainage, or GDTs are provided at
the various protection locations, depending on the type of service provided, over the wire pair. Figure 25
shows how the various drainage techniques are used with the different isolating protection devices.
Figure 25 —Composite protection system
9.6 Specific protection configurations
Specific protection configurations are described in detail in other standards in the IEEE 487 family of
standards:
 For protection configurations employing modular high-dielectric and modular optic isolators, refer
to IEEE Std 487.1.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
 For protection configurations employing NTs, refer to IEEE Std 487.4.

 For protection configurations employing hard-wire isolation transformers, refer to IEEE Std 487.5.
 For protection configurations consisting of both metallic cables and fiber cables, i.e., hybrid
facilities (using metallic wire-line components in part of the telecommunications circuit and optical
fiber systems in the remainder of the telecommunications circuit), refer to IEEE Std 487.3.
 For protection configurations consisting entirely of optical fiber cables, refer to IEEE Std 487.2.
9.7 Protection practices for electric supply locations services
Views on protection of electric supply locations services may vary, not only between power and
telecommunications utility people, but also within their respective industries. Some protection options are
more common to leased services while other options are more common to services provided over user-
owned facilities. This standard emphasizes that, for each leased facility, mutual agreement on the protection
options selected is required between the facility’s owners (including electrical protection engineers) and
users. The available options are discussed in more detail in IEEE Std 487.1.
10. Inspection considerations

The protection techniques used for wire-line and optical fiber facilities serving electric supply locations are
vastly different from those employed for general, business locations. This approach is particularly true with
respect to location, separation and isolation of ground points and conductors, and the provision of higher-
than-usual insulation levels in cables, transformers, and other protection hardware.
Telecommunications or power company technicians may inadvertently do things that, to them, are almost
second nature, but that will negate special protective measures. Two common examples of this activity
include the disconnection of an NT’s remote ground or primary circuit (either at a CO or during a cable
transfer) or the connection of a dedicated cable shield to station ground. In addition, connections may
become loose or burn open, transformer windings may fail, insulation may fail or become faulty, etc. Since
a protection system is quiescent, many such defects will not become apparent until the protection system
fails to function properly under fault conditions, causing failure or damage, or both, to critical electric
supply location telecommunications equipment and, possibly, injury or loss of life.
Periodically, usually annually, both power utility and telecommunications company personnel need to
inspect in detail all aspects of protection facilities in and around electric supply locations and remote
ground points to ensure that special protection requirements have not been violated or negated by
conditions such as mentioned in the previous paragraph, i.e., the rating of the NT should be examined and
the present GPR evaluated to see if the NT is adequate to meet the present duty.
The period within which such inspection should be conducted should be worked out mutually by the power
and telecommunications utilities for leased facilities. In addition to planned, periodic tests, this standard
recommends that a very thorough inspection of protection facilities be made following each case of faulty
or questionable operation of such facilities, particularly if damage has resulted or false relaying has
occurred.
Inspection of protection facilities should include all cable plant within the GPR ZOI, all transformers,
remote ground circuits, SPDs, and wiring at the electric supply location and at all non-power station
locations.
Tests (e.g., continuity, polarity, insulation withstand) on major protection system components such as
isolation transformers and NTs may also be considered. Such tests would be indicated at any location that
has a history of equipment failures or damage. For power-utility–owned facilities, the power utility usually
has available a standard inspection procedure.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
11. Safety
11.1 General safety considerations
Hazardous voltages may appear suddenly and without warning on cables (shields and pairs) and on
associated protection hardware during fault conditions. The basic safety objective is to protect personnel
from coming into contact with both remote and local grounds simultaneously. Therefore, safety
considerations should be directed toward the following two goals:
a) Educating personnel regarding the special hazards of working on telecommunications facilities

serving electric supply locations
b) Minimizing the possibility of simultaneous contact with both remote and local grounds and
reducing the length of time that personnel are required to work under conditions that may expose
them to danger
This standard emphasizes that these exposed conditions include telecommunications facilities external to
the electric supply location itself (including, in some cases, a telecommunications cable not serving electric
supply locations, when such facilities are within the ZOI of an electric supply location). In the event of
excessive NT remanent voltage or dielectric failure of cables or other components within the HVI, the
exposed conditions may extend even further.
Care should be taken to separate the station and remote side terminals and hardware so that physical contact
cannot be made simultaneously with both. Separation can be achieved through either distance or dielectric
barriers. All exposed HVI metallic components should be bonded to the station or local ground, as
appropriate. Special care should be exercised during HVI installation or maintenance activities by using
rubber gloves and/or insulating blankets to maintain separation between local and remote grounds. No work
should be undertaken on an HVI during an electrical storm. At all times, close cooperation between the
power and telecommunications companies is required to maximize personnel safety.
The periodic inspection is also a vital component of the overall safety considerations. All components of
the special protection system, including non-HVI location items such as remote ground or primary winding
connections for NTs and remote drainage reactors, should be verified periodically for proper connection
and/or operation.
11.2 Safety considerations in equipment design
In the design of protective equipment for a telecommunications plant serving electric supply locations,
consideration of the following features or precautions is recommended:
a) A dead-front concept should be used for transformer cases or equipment cabinets, i.e., the external
casing always remains at the potential of the local ground.
b) The physical design should protect against inadvertent simultaneous contact with electric supply
location and remote location connections on protective apparatus. Barrier covers or other types of
insulated closures should be used over all open terminals and exposed, non-grounded metallic parts
of protection apparatus and its associated hardware and wiring. This standard highly recommends
that as much protection apparatus as possible be housed in nonmetallic cabinets or grounded
metallic cabinets that can be securely closed and locked.
49
IEEE Std 487-2015
c) A sign warning technicians of the hazards should be prominently displayed. A typical sign might
read as follows:
WARNING
Substantial (15 kV or more) potential difference may be present
between local and remote ground conductors. Do not
interconnect local and remote grounds. Refer questions to the
protection engineer.
d) On-site wiring should be done prior to connecting telecommunications and signal cable pairs and
shield. Pre-wiring of protective equipment cabinets would minimize on-site activity.
e) If arresters, gaps, and drainage units are not used, the cable shield should be cut and isolated at a
point removed from local ground to prevent technicians from inadvertently interconnecting local
and remote grounds at the electric supply location.
f) Properly insulated wire and plastic shields should be used on the CO side of protection apparatus at
the HVI, or on the electric supply location side at the remote drainage protection location, to protect
technicians from contact with remote potential.
11.3 Safety considerations related to installation and maintenance
All safety precautions, detailed in applicable safety practices, should be observed when installing or
maintaining protective devices at or in the vicinity of electric supply locations or when placing cables
within the ZOI of the GPR. The following precautions are of particular importance:
a) When installing a new cable, the station end should be connected first, while isolating the field end
from ground. If used, high-voltage disconnect plugs at the HVI should then be removed to isolate
the station end from station ground while connecting the field end to the cable going to the remote
location. High-voltage disconnect plugs are reinserted after all pairs and shield connections have
been made. The use of rubber gloves and insulating blankets is mandatory when working on or
near protective equipment or telecommunications cables serving the electric supply location.
b) In wiring protective transformers, wiring and equipment associated with the electric supply location
side of the transformer shall be adequately separated from the CO side to withstand impulses up to
the BIL of the protection apparatus.
c) Bonding, grounding, and isolation procedures in installing protective devices are extremely
important. Faulty grounds, bonds, and/or isolation practices can make an expensive installation
inoperative. These procedures have been clearly defined in this standard and should be
meticulously followed. For the most part, the bonding, grounding, and isolation procedures
described in this standard are different from those observed in the general plant environment.
d) Test sets and tools required for either installation or maintenance activities shall be battery
operated. The use of ac power test tools shall be avoided.
e) Consideration should be given to including telecommunications cable work at electric supply
locations in the permit and tagging system used to protect personnel working on power circuits.
f) Work shall not be performed on telecommunications circuits when electrical storms are occurring
in the area through which the circuits pass. Furthermore, work should not be performed on
equipment that has become wet from rain or other causes.
g) When both telecommunications and power company personnel are involved in an installation, close
cooperation between the companies is required to maximize personnel safety.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
12. Summary
The protection of telecommunications facilities serving electric supply locations is a complex subject
involving several disciplines. On one hand, there are the protection schemes and their hardware employed
where the electric power utility alone is involved in protecting its own wire-line telecommunications
circuits. On the other hand, there are the leased telecommunications wire-line facilities that involve
additional protection problems. In the first case, a question of satisfying only the operational, personnel
safety, and reliability needs of the power utility itself is essential. Personnel and public safety is of utmost
importance to both the power utility and the telephone company, but the power utility personnel are more
accustomed to working on or near high-voltage circuits. The use of the leased telecommunications facility
involves all the problems of the power-utility–owned services plus the problems associated with the
possible impairment to the general-use telecommunications plant and wider exposure of non-power utility
personnel. There are possible or even probable different treatments for the protection requirements for these
two classes of facilities. Within the electric power utility industry itself, there are divergent opinions
regarding protection schemes just as there are within the telecommunications industry. There are also
different approaches around the world.
For the electric-power-utility– or user-owned circuits, the maximum permissible interfering voltage and
time duration are often higher without the need for special protection than are permitted by many
telecommunications utilities. Some telecommunications administrations also permit higher interfering
voltage levels without special protection.
No matter which utility or utilities are involved, as accurate a prediction as possible should be made of the
magnitude and time duration of the interfering voltage. The established and agreed-on level of protection
should be consistent with the SPO class of the involved circuits. Safety questions should be considered in
all cases.
Obviously, there will be economic considerations as to the basic protection schemes to be employed as well
as to the hardware specifications. For leased (rented) telecommunications facilities, the additional question
of the use of a high-dielectric dedicated cable from the electric supply location to a point outside the
influence of the electric supply location ground grid should also be considered and agreed on if the
dielectric of a general-use cable is determined to be inadequate. The effects on or from telecommunications
subscribers’ protection equipment within the ZOI should also be considered.
Unfortunately, laying down hard and fast protection rules is very difficult. Therefore, having this standard
contain several options is important and acknowledges that not every option will necessarily be acceptable
to all personnel involved. The determination of the electric supply location GPR or induced voltage, or
both, will usually involve several engineering departments within the power utility. The maximum GPR
and induced voltage calculations and any derating factors used in protection design are critical to the
success of any wire-line protection scheme. These voltages are essential for the design of the protective
systems and devices. A reference on this subject is IEEE Std 367. The relay and telecommunications
engineers will then design a protection system to suit their own SPOs and safety needs. Up to this point,
there will have been a number of engineering judgments made. Where a leased telecommunications facility
is involved, however, the relay and telecommunications engineers from the power utility should then come
to a mutually acceptable agreement with the engineers from the telecommunications utility on a protection
scheme and its hardware in order to achieve the desired results. To minimize difficulties, this cooperative
consultation should begin at a very early stage in the life of a project, and such cooperation should be an
ongoing process. Essentially, an engineering solution should be employed that will result in the most
economical solution to all concerned. Rigid positions, if taken by either utility without sound engineering
evaluations, usually will not produce the most satisfactory solution. Consultation and cooperation are,
therefore, paramount.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Annex A
(informative)
Bibliography
Bibliographical references are resources that provide additional or helpful material but do not need to be
understood or used to implement this standard. Reference to these resources is made for informational use
only.
[B1] Accredited Standards Committee C2-2007, National Electrical Safety Code® (NESC®). 12, 13
[B2] Anderson, R. B., and A. J. Eriksson, “Lightning parameters for engineering application,” Electra,
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[B3] ANSI C62.61-1993, American National Standard for Gas Tube Surge Arrestors on Wire Line
Telephone Circuits. 14
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Electronics Engineers, Inc.
14
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52
IEEE Std 487-2015
[B16] Golde, R. H., Lightning Protection. Academic Press, 1978.

[B17] Grcev, L. D., “Computer analysis of transient voltages in large grounding systems,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 815–823, Apr. 1996.
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using FEM,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 595–600, Apr. 2004.
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appropriately,” OSP Magazine, May 2014.
[B25] He, J., G. Yu, J. Yuan, R. Zeng, B. Zhang, J. Zou, and Z. Guan, “Decreasing grounding resistance of
substation by deep-ground-well method,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 20, no. 2, part 1,
pp. 738–744, Apr. 2005.
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considering the influence of seasonal frozen soil layer,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 20,
no. 1, pp. 107–115, Jan. 2005.
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Distinguished_HNForum.pdf).
[B28] IEEE Committee Report, “Lightning protection in multi-line stations,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Apparatus and Systems, vol. PAS-87, no. 6, pp. 1514–1521, Jun. 1968. 15
[B29] IEEE Std AIEE S117-1960, Application and Protection of Pilot Wire Circuits for Protective
Relaying.
[B30] IEEE Std C37.90.1™-2012, IEEE Standard Surge Withstand Capability (SWC) Tests for Protective
Relays and Relay Systems Associated with Electric Power Apparatus. 16
[B31] IEEE Std C62.11™-2012, IEEE Standard for Metal-Oxide Surge Arresters for AC Power Circuits
(>1 kV).
[B32] IEEE Std C62.32™-2004, IEEE Standard Test Methods for Low-Voltage Air Gap Surge-Protective
Device Components (Excluding Valve and Expulsion Types).
[B33] IEEE Std 4™-2013, IEEE Standard for High-Voltage Testing Techniques.
[B34] IEEE Std 142™-2007, IEEE Recommended Practice for Grounding of Industrial and Commercial
Power Systems.
15
IEEE publications are available from The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (http://standards.ieee.org/).
16
The IEEE standards or products referred to in this annex are trademarks of The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
53
IEEE Std 487-2015
[B35] IEEE Std 455™-1985 (Reaff 1992), IEEE Standard Test Procedure for Measuring Longitudinal
Balance of Telephone Equipment Operating in the Voice Band. Archived.
[B36] IEEE Std 1138™-2009, IEEE Standard for Testing and Performance for Optical Ground Wire
(OPGW) for use on Electric Utility Power Lines.
[B37] IEEE Std 1410™-2010, IEEE Guide for Improving the Lightning Performance of Electric Power
Overhead Distribution Lines.
[B38] IEEE Std 1692™-2011, IEEE Guide for the Protection of Communication Installations from
Lightning Effects.
[B39] ITU-T directives concerning the protection of telecommunications lines against harmful effects from
electric power and electrified railway lines. 17
[B40] ITU-T Recommendations for protection against interference, IX Plenary Assembly, vol. IX, series K
(Blue Book).
[B41] Kershaw Jr., S. S., G. L. Gaibrois, and K. B. Stump, “Applying metal-oxide surge arresters on
distribution systems,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 301–307, Jan. 1989.
[B42] Lee, C.-H., and C.-N. Chang, “Comparison of 161/69-kV grounding grid design between indoor-
type and outdoor-type substations,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 20, no.2, part 2, pp. 1385–
1393, Apr. 2005.
[B43] Lightning and Insulator Subcommittee of the Transmission and Distribution Committee,
“Parameters of lightning strokes: A review,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 20, no. 1, pp.
346–358, Jan. 2005.
[B44] Liu, Y., N. Theethayi, and R. Thottappillil, “An engineering model for transient analysis of
grounding system under lightning strikes: Nonuniform transmission-line approach,” IEEE Transactions on
Power Delivery, vol. 20, no. 2, part 1, pp. 772–730, Apr. 2005.
[B45] Lorentzou, M. I., N. D. Hatziargyriou, and B. C. Papadias, “Time domain analysis of grounding
electrodes impulse response,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 517–524,
Apr. 2003.
[B46] Martinez, H. E., E. L. Fuentealba, H. R. Galleguillos, J. F. Kasaneva, and O. A. de la Fuente, “A
new artificial treatment for the reduction of resistance in ground electrode,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Delivery, vol. 19, no.2, pp. 601–608, Apr. 2004.
[B47] Mattos, M. A. F., “Grounding grids transient simulation,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery,
vol. 20, no. 2, part 2, pp. 1370–1378, Apr. 2005.
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Transactions Power Apparatus Systems, vol. PAS-102, no. 2, pp. 389–399, Sept. 1983.
[B49] Mousa, A. M., and K. D. Srivastava, “The implications of the electrogeometric model regarding
effect of height of structure on the median amplitude of collected lightning strokes,” IEEE Transactions on
Power Delivery, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 1450–1460, Apr. 1989.
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vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 841–845, Apr. 2004.
[B51] Papalexopoulos, A. D., and A. P. Meliopoulos, “Frequency dependent characteristics of grounding
systems,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 1073–1081, Oct. 1987.
[B52] Pham, K. D., “Design a safe grounding system for rural electric power distribution substations,”
Rural Electric Power Conference, pp. C1/1–C1/4, 1990.
[B53] Popovic, L. M., “Practical method for evaluating ground current distribution in station, tower and
ground wire,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 123–128, Jan. 1998.
17
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IEEE Std 487-2015
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systems during fault conditions,” IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, vol. 5, pp. 1026–1033, Apr. 1990.
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grounding grids and two-end grounded cables by the moment method coupled with circuit equations.”
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55
IEEE Std 487-2015
Annex B
(informative)
Characteristics of protection apparatus
B.1 Air gap SPDs
Air gap SPDs use air as the discharge medium. These SPDs are open-circuit devices that pass no significant
current at normal operating potentials. Air gap SPDs are normally connected to or closely associated with
the protection of telecommunications circuits, equipment, plant, and personnel.
Air gap SPDs usually consist of a ground electrode and one or two line electrodes that are made of carbon
or metal. If the potential between a line and ground electrode should rise to the point at which the sparkover
rating of the gap is exceeded, an arc will be established and ground the line conductor. These devices are
designed to be self-restoring within their rated limits. Unlike surge arresters, most types are not designed to
interrupt power follow current. These devices will produce electrical noise when arcing.
Air gap SPDs are described in more detail as follows:
a) Carbon block SPDs. Two carbon blocks are mounted with an air gap between them so that
sparkover between them will occur at a particular voltage. These devices are connected so they
provide a path to ground or bypass a piece of equipment and prevent dielectric stress in excess of
the gap sparkover voltage. Usually, a carbon block SPD is provided with an arrangement so that
sustained current will melt a fusible pellet or soften a bonding material and permit a spring-loaded
contact to permanently connect the protector terminals. This provides a fail-short feature. Repeated
protector operation (flashover of the gap) tends to lower the breakdown voltage and may cause
reduced gap resistance or complete short circuit.
Carbon block SPDs are made in various configurations, with various flashover voltages and with
various degrees of current-carrying capacity. These devices are sometimes used in conjunction with
fuses or other auxiliary equipment such as drainage reactors.
b) Spark gaps (fixed or adjustable). These gaps consist of air dielectric between two electrodes, in
some types adjustable, which may be any combination of several basic shapes. Breakdown voltage
will vary with several factors: gap spacing, rate of rise of applied voltage, electrode shape, air
pressure and temperature, and the presence of humidity and dust. The gaps can be designed to
coordinate with power frequency current magnitude by proper selection of electrode material and
electrode shapes. Some characteristics are shown in Figure B.1.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Figure B.1—Typical spark-gap breakdown voltages
c) Three-element horn gap arrester characteristics. A horn gap is an air gap metal electrode device
consisting of a straight, vertical, round electrode, usually grounded, and an angularly shaped, round
electrode, usually insulated from ground, whereby the apex of its included angle is placed
alongside and toward the bottom of the vertical electrode with an air gap of usually less than 1 mm
between them. A phenomenon exists whereby an arc struck across the air gap at the closest point
between the two electrodes progressively climbs upward between the two electrodes until the air
gap becomes too long to sustain the arc. At that gap length, the arc is automatically quenched.
For the three-element horn gap arrester, the common or center electrode should be a round, smooth
copper rod, at least 5 mm in diameter, which is solidly bonded to ground. The two angular side or
line electrodes should be of similar material but well insulated from ground. The electrodes must be
designed so that their spacing to the center electrode can be varied. The included angle of the
angular adjustable electrodes must be such that the air gap between the top of the center grounded
electrode and the top of the angular electrode is at least 75 mm.
The air gap at the closest point between the electrodes should be adjustable from 0.2 mm to 10 mm.
The adjustable line electrodes should be insulated from ground for at least 30 kV under frost or rain
conditions and preferably should be mounted on porcelain insulators.
B.2 GDT characteristics
GDTs consist of metal electrodes encased in a glass or ceramic envelope that contains an inert gas or
combination of gases. The GDTs may consist of two electrodes generally connected between one conductor
of a circuit and ground (see Figure B.2) or of three electrodes generally connected between the two
conductors of a circuit and ground (see Figure B.3). Low-pressure GDTs (for example, 0.1 atmosphere) use
relatively large spacing between electrodes. If air enters such a GDT through loss of its seal, the sparkover
voltage is substantially raised, and desired voltage coordination with the protected circuit may be lost.
Backup protection against loss of seal is frequently provided by paralleling the GDT with a carbon block
SPD of slightly higher sparkover voltage than that of the GDT. Backup protection against the loss of seal is
provided in some newer GDTs by building an external air gap into the protector assembly or by designing
the tube to operate at approximately atmospheric pressure so that loss of seal makes little change in
sparkover voltage.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Figure B.2—Schematic of a typical fuseless SPD or terminal equipped

with two-element GDT only
Figure B.3—Schematic of a typical fuseless SPD or terminal equipped

with a three-element GDT only
The major difference between two- and three-electrode GDTs is that if one gap of the three electrode GDT
is operated by a surge, the surge firing voltage of the other gap is lowered, and, generally, it also will
operate within a few microseconds.
In many situations in which a longitudinal surge is present on both conductors of a circuit, the three-
electrode GDT will operate almost simultaneously on both sides and thus prevent large metallic surges
through the protected equipment. This characteristic may be an advantage to the protection of some types
of equipment. Typical operating characteristics of GDTs are shown in Figure B.4. Performance criteria for
GDTs are found in references ANSI C62.61-1993 [B3], GR-974 [B22], and IEEE Std 142™-2007 [B34].
Two- and three-electrode devices have similar characteristics and may be used interchangeably.
Figure B.4—Typical voltage characteristics of a two-element GDT
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IEEE Std 487-2015
B.3 Solid-state SPD characteristics
New semiconducting devices have been developed for telecommunications line overvoltage SPDs as an
alternative to carbon block SPDs or GDTs for CO, building entrances, and other applications. The solid-
state SPDs are comparable in physical size to carbon block SPDs or GDTs. Reduced maintenance and
longer service life than carbon block or GDT “arc discharge” devices are predicted. However, further
studies, including long-term field trials, are necessary to verify and quantify these claimed advantages.
The following improved features should be noted:
a) Lower power dissipation at current above the hold current due to low on-state voltage
b) Tighter control over the operating voltage
c) More stable operation with age
d) Lower generated noise during clamping
The performance characteristics of solid-state SPDs are temperature dependent. The characteristics of
GDTs and carbon block SPDs are constant throughout the temperature range expected in the environment
(from −40 °C to 65 °C). Thus, the solid-state SPD characteristics will vary with temperature changes above
or below room temperature (20 °C).
Some units have semiconductor elements between each conductor and ground. Other designs also have
semiconductor elements between conductors. In the latter unit designs, when the designed breakdown
voltage from conductor to conductor or from conductor to ground is exceeded, the unit clamps all three
terminals to a low-voltage state.
B.4 Telecommunications-type drainage units
B.4.1 General
A drainage unit (also called drainage reactor, mutual drainage reactor (MDR), mutual drainage transformer,
mutual reactor, etc.) consists of two coil windings on a single magnetic core. When the two coils are
connected in series across the wires of a telecommunications pair with the center point grounded, the
drainage unit presents a high impedance to differential mode (metallic) signals on the telecommunications
pair, and a low impedance to ground for common-mode (longitudinal) signals. Drainage units are designed
for a wide range of drainage currents, voltages, insulation levels, and frequency and saturation
characteristics. Several different types of drainage units are available for various applications. The drainage
units may be specified for continuously draining currents resulting from longitudinal induction and for
ensuring symmetrical protector block operation. Special units are available for low surge impedance and
for low surge plus 50/60 Hz impedance applications. Continuous drainage units are made in a variety of
current-carrying capacities, from a few amperes up into the 50 A region. Regardless of what type of
drainage unit may be selected for a specific purpose, having the unit’s two halves extremely well balanced
inductively, capacitively, and resistively is important; otherwise, difficulties will be encountered in service.
There are two uses of drainage units: direct drainage, and protector drainage that forces simultaneous firing
of carbon blocks. In the second type, it is important that any rise of voltage across one winding be followed
by a rise of voltage in the other winding in a very short space of time, probably with a delay in the
microseconds range. The voltage in the other winding is of opposite polarity and is approximately equal to
the original disturbing voltage plus induced voltage from the transformer’s other winding; as a result,
almost zero time difference occurs between firing of the two sets of protectors.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
B.4.2 Typical specifications for a telecommunications-type drainage unit
A typical specification for a telecommunications-type drainage unit (see Table B.1), also designed to be
used as an MDR associated with carbon blocks, should basically reflect the following points:
a) Drainage capacity should be equal to or greater than associated carbon blocks or GDTs.
b) Winding resistances should be low.
c) Bridging impedance should be high.
d) Bridging loss should be low.
e) Transient and 60 Hz (including harmonics) response or surge transference capability from one half
of the winding to the other should be high and fast.
f) Core steel remanence should be kept low.
g) Dielectric and BIL should be reasonably high.
B.4.3 Typical specification for drainage unit
Typical specifications for drainage units are shown in Table B.1.
Table B.1—Typical specification for drainage unit

Factor Specification
2
Drainage capacity 0.5 A continuous (400 A s surge drainage rating) (1.2 × 50 μs test wave)
Winding resistance 15 Ω each winding [see Note 1]
Winding resistance unbalance 0.5% maximum
Inductance unbalance 1% maximum
Bridging impedance 100 V at 60 Hz: 50 000 Ω minimum
Bridging loss 0.1 dB: within a range of 20 Hz to 20 kHz
Transient response 75% of applied voltage across one half should be generated across other half
within 5 μs (10 × 1000 μs test wave)
Longitudinal balance 80 dB per IEEE Std 455-1985 [B35]
Insulation tests 1) DC dielectric test
a) between windings: 2 kV for 3 s
b) between windings and mounting brackets or case: 2 kV for 3 s [see Note 2]
2) BIL (1.2 × 50 μs test wave)
a) between windings: 5 kV
b) between windings and mounting bracket or case: 5 kV [see Note 2]
NOTE 1—Each half of the winding should be terminated separately so that optional external connections can be
achieved.
NOTE 2—In certain applications, a higher dielectric withstand capability may be required.
NOTE 3—Power utility applications usually require drainage units having much higher ratings.
B.4.4 MDR installation design examples
For deployment on an SPO Class A circuit, the MDR is hard- or direct-wired to ground to provide direct
drainage on the circuit.
When needed for an SPO Class B circuit, MDRs are usually wired with a circuit SPD in the grounding
circuit to provide drainage only when the interfering energy level exceeds the circuit SPD’s operating
voltage. Since the SPO Class B circuit shall restore after the event causing the drainage, a carbon block
type of unit shall not be used.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
An MDR is used to drain off unwanted energies on a two- or four-wire circuit, usually ac data. These could
also be used on a digital circuit (e.g., DDS, frame relay) where this unwanted energy is not acceptable for
protection level design (SPO Class B service may be the only level available for these circuit types). These
energies are usually present as the result of induction. The source of the induction is a faulting power line.
Is an MDR absolutely required?
 For an SPO Class A Circuit: YES

 For an SPO Class B Circuit: Sometimes
An SPD installed at any point in the circuit will cause the circuit to be shunted to ground when common-
mode voltage causes SPD operation. This shunting effect will stop all data transmission. Therefore, the
circuit is out of service while the shunting is in effect.
Following are the details for deployment of MDR(s) into an SPO Class A circuit:
 An SPO Class A circuit rating or protect level is not available for a dc circuit. A dc circuit is
available only for deployment as an SPO Class B.
 An SPO Class A circuit shall work regardless of whether there is induction. Proper engineering
requires that the induction issue shall be evaluated for the possible effects of this induced energy on
the circuit.
This subclause assumes that the circuit under discussion utilizes simplex span power or sealing current and
deploys an MDR.
The proper placement of MDRs reflects a minimum of one to a maximum of five locations where an MDR
might be required (five locations may seem extreme, but the circuit may be exposed to an interfering level
that requires all five). The locations are as follows:
a) At the CO
b) At the beginning of an inducing line exposure
c) At the end of an inducing line exposure
d) On the station side of the isolation equipment to address induction on the station cable pairs at the
site
e) On both ends of a circuit inside the substation
The proper installation of an MDR(s) in an SPO Class A circuit requires that certain steps be followed.
Knowing the electrical exposure for this circuit before deciding where to place the needed MDR(s) is
necessary. While it is generally thought that a single MDR located at a CO is sufficient to protect an SPO
Class A circuit, this is not always the case.
An SPO Class A circuit always requires that the CO MDF SPD be removed from the cable pair(s). A cut-
through module is inserted into the MDF SPD block on each cable pair to allow the circuit to connect
through the MDF block. Then the MDR is wired into the circuit (bridged on) and subsequently becomes the
CO SPD. Otherwise, the normal MDF SPD unit will fire, and the circuit will be interrupted. This
arrangement is identified in IEEE Std 487.1.
The use of an MDR physically located in the circuit on the station side of the HVI at the substation is
sometimes necessary. If the substation cable length (from the HVI to the station equipment) is greater than
30 m, then additional measures may be needed to adequately protect any circuit at the substation. For a
SPO Class A circuit, the secondary SPDs would be replaced with MDR(s).
Induced voltage from a transmission or distribution power line may require the use of an additional one or
two MDR(s) that are located at the beginning, the end, or both, of an exposure on a cable route. See
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IEEE Std 487-2015
IEEE Std 487.1. This unit usually will work in tandem with the MDR in the CO after the MDF SPD has
been removed.
B.5 Typical specification for optical coupler (optic coupling device)
Typical specifications for optical couplers (optic coupling devices) are shown in Table B.2.
Table B.2—Typical specification for optical coupler (optic coupling device)

Input to output breakdown voltage 25 kV
Line current rating 60 mA continuously
Phototransistor collector/emitter forward breakdown voltage 30 V minimum
Input impedance 1000 Ω balanced
Line circuit voltage 260 V maximum
Line circuit loop impedance 3000 Ω maximum
Figure B.5 is a basic schematic drawing of an optical coupler.
Figure B.5—Typical optical coupler
B.6 Typical specification for high-voltage disconnect jacks
Typical specifications for high-voltage disconnect jacks are shown in Table B.3.
Table B.3—Typical specification for high-voltage disconnect jacks

Number of circuits per panel Varies by source
Protection Between line side and equipment side: 20 kV at 60 Hz
Between adjacent circuits within panel: 20 kV at 60 Hz
At plug handle maximum leakage current: 0.5 mA at 20 kV
Figure B.6 depicts the various types of bantam plugs that are employed with high-voltage disconnect jacks.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Figure B.6—Types of bantam plugs
B.7 Comparison of carbon block SPDs, GDTs, and solid-state SPDs
B.7.1 Comparison of gap-type SPD characteristics
B.7.1.1 DC breakdown
GDTs are available with dc breakdown levels as low as 70 V. With carbon blocks, however, the minimum
practical level is approximately 500 V dc (3 mil). Clearances of less than 3 mil tend to fill with carbon dust
quickly and lead to noisy circuit operation or complete short circuits.
B.7.1.2 Impulse breakdown
The impulse ratio of carbon blocks is typically lower than that of GDTs. At low rates of rise, the gas easily
fires ahead of the carbon because the dc breakdown can be set much lower. However, at high rates of rise,
the carbon blocks may fire ahead of the GDT (depending on the GDT design).
B.7.1.3 Repeatability
The voltage at which the gaps break down depends on the past history of the gaps. With carbon blocks, the
breakdown voltage tends to reduce with time. In addition, temperature, pressure, and humidity tend to
affect dc breakdown voltage or lead to permanent shorts of carbon blocks.
GDTs tend to have more stable characteristics because they are sealed and have a constant gas
environment. The magnitude and duration of current and the number of previous operations also have a
tendency to reduce the breakdown voltage of GDTs. The heating effect of large currents passed through the
GDT causes sputtering of the electrode metal, which coats the side walls of the GDT. The number of
operations leading to failure is larger for GDTs.
Example: Six to 15 operations for carbon blocks at 500 A using a 10 × 1000 μs wave compared to 600 to
2000 operations at 500 A and a 10 × 1000 μs wave for some GDTs.
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B.7.1.4 Maintenance
Because the GDT is capable of a larger number of operations at a given current before breakdown, overall
maintenance costs are lower than for carbon blocks.
B.7.1.5 Reliability
Failure of carbon blocks leads to a short-circuit condition, and the circuit becomes inoperative and thus
provides an indication of failure.
GDTs, however, can develop leaks, and the resulting loss of gas can cause the breakdown voltage to
increase. The GDT may not provide protection in this condition, and no indication is given of the GDT
failure.
Some GDTs are available with a shorting element device that can be activated on sustained currents to
provide a claimed fail-short mode of operation. In other instances, carbon blocks, coordinated with the
GDT characteristics, can be used in parallel to provide backup protection.
B.7.1.6 Noise
Since both the GDT and carbon blocks are arcing devices, they are not well adapted to low-noise operation.
When operating, carbon blocks tend to be least noisy at discharge currents just above the point at which
arcing begins, but become increasingly noisy as the current is increased, to the point where they are fully
conducting.
GDTs have relatively low noise in the low-current glow mode, but become very noisy as the current
increases to the arcing condition. As current is increased further, the noise decreases until the GDT is in the
fully conducting state, at which the noise from the carbon blocks and the GDT is approximately equal.
Carbon blocks are not as likely to extinguish on current zeros of induced power frequency noise. The GDT
will extinguish and restrike on each cycle; as a result, metallic voltage spikes appear on the circuit.
B.7.1.7 Selection of gaps for the proposed protection scheme
One of the most significant factors in the overall protection scheme is the reduction of noise on audio-tone
protective relaying circuits. Noise can appear either directly on the audio-tone circuit or as crosstalk from
other circuits.
A spark gap may be used between the core and sheath of the dedicated cable. The spark gap coordinates
with the high dielectric strength of the cable. Gaps with this voltage rating can be obtained with unity
impulse ratios and facilitate insulation coordination.
Circulating currents that can create metallic noise and crosstalk are limited in direct drainage circuits until
the breakdown voltage of this gap is exceeded.
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B.7.2 Comparison of solid-state SPDs with GDTs and carbon block SPDs
B.7.2.1 DC breakdown
Solid-state SPDs can be designed for lower breakdown voltages than carbon blocks or GDTs. Generally, an
SPD for telecommunications use has a breakdown voltage greater than 265 V to provide a margin above
the signal (dc battery and 20 Hz ringing voltage) and 50 Hz or 60 Hz induced voltages that may be present
on the telecommunications line.
B.7.2.2 Impulse breakdown
Solid-state SPDs operate more precisely when subjected to surges with high rates of rise. A surge current in
the ground lead of an SPD produces an inductive voltage that may appear at an equipment terminal, even
though the SPD clamps at a relatively low voltage. Therefore, keeping the ground leads as short as possible
is most important.
B.7.2.3 Repeatability
SSPs have more consistent breakdown characteristics than gap-type SPD at a specified test temperature of
20 °C.
B.7.2.4 Maintenance and reliability
The low on-state voltage and fast clamping operation minimizes damage from power dissipation. This
operation improves reliability and reduces maintenance costs. However, with severe surge currents above
200 A driven by a 10 × 1000 μs wave shape, a typical solid-state SPD will fail in a short-circuit mode
sooner than a typical gap-type SPD.
B.7.2.5 Noise
Because of manufacturing tolerances, two two-element solid-state SPDs will operate in a more balanced
mode than gap-type SPDs, i.e., both line conductors are shorted to ground almost simultaneously. When
operated, no noise is generated from arcing discharge as in a gap-type unit. However, if any SPD (gap type
or solid state) is subjected to a periodic voltage waveform above the breakdown voltage of the SPD,
harmonic noise will be generated.
B.7.2.6 Temperature
Solid-state SPDs have temperature dependence of insulation resistance, limiting voltage, and impulse life.
Gap-type SPDs are not affected by temperature changes to the same extent.
B.7.2.7 Capacitance
The capacitance of solid-state SPDs increases as voltage decreases and is higher than that of gap-type
SPDs. Gap-type SPDs have a capacitance that is independent of applied voltages.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Annex C
(informative)
Telecommunications cable in the electric supply location GPR ZOI
C.1 General-use telecommunications cable in the electric supply location ZOI
NOTE—The models and graph shown in the following paragraphs are for illustrative purposes only. Each illustration
should be engineered to include all ground resistance customer drop (entrance wiring) impedances, as these can have a
significant effect on pair and shield potentials. Conductor and shield voltage and current should be evaluated to
determine possible cable damage and the need for special protective apparatus. A further consideration is the effect that
current flow on the shield of the general-use cable might have on the electric supply location telecommunications
services. Because shield and pair potentials can differ from that of surrounding earth in the ZOI, safe working practices
are required.
All computations in this annex are done using a fundamental frequency of 60 Hz.
A telecommunications cable that has its metallic shield grounded in a GPR ZOI will pick up current during
the duration of the fault. The current will flow along the shield to remote ground and will cause a voltage
on the shield. This phenomenon results in a transfer of potential from the GPR to the metallic shield.
An example of a cable shield grounded at a single point in a GPR ZOI and extending to a remote ground is
shown in Figure C.1.
Figure C.1—Example of telecommunications cable grounded at one point in GPR ZOI
The approximate current flow I, in amperes, on the telecommunications cable shield due to the GPR at the
pedestal location is shown in Equation (C.1).
VGPR
I= (C.1)
Rg + Z ca + Rrem
where
VGPR is the earth GPR at the pedestal with the cable shield open
Rg is the resistance of the pedestal to remote earth in ohms
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Z ca is the impedance of the cable shield in ohms

Rrem is the resistance of the remote ground electrode in ohms
In practical situations, the reactive component of the cable shield impedance is so small compared to the
resistance of the pedestal ground that the absolute value of cable shield impedance can be used in
calculating the current flow on the cable shield.
The approximate cable shield voltage to remote earth, Vca, at the pedestal is shown in Equation (C.2).
Vca ≈ I ( Z ca + Rrem ) (C.2)
For a simple example, assume that a 200-pair, 24-gauge telecommunications cable is grounded by a single
pedestal having 50 Ω resistance to remote earth at a 1000 Vpeak point within the ZOI. The cable
extends outside the ZOI for a distance of 1.524 km (5 kft), where it is connected to an electrode
having 2 Ω resistance to remote earth. The self-impedance of this cable shield at 60 Hz is 0.162 + j0.076
(0.179 25.5°) Ω/km {0.53 + j0.25 (0.587 25.3°) Ω/kft}. For the duration of the fault, approximately
18.2 A would flow along the cable shield to remote ground. The transfer of potential from the 1000 V earth
potential to the cable shield would be approximately 90 V.
The mutual impedance between the cable shield and 200 pairs in the core of the cable is 0.055 + j0.0771
(0.0773 85.9°) Ω/km {0.018 + j0.253 (0.254 85.9°) Ω/kft}. The current on the shield, 18.2 A, will
induce approximately 23.1 V in each of the pairs of the 200-pair cable.
When a dedicated cable carrying circuits to an electric supply location connects to a general-use
telecommunications cable that continues through an area subject to a GPR, there are two general areas of
concern. The first is a reduction in reliability of the circuits serving the electric supply location, and the
second is safety, service, and damage aspects of the general-use cable and the customers served by that
cable. This situation is illustrated in the following example in which the circuits to the electric supply
location are in a general-use cable that continues through the ZOI. Figure C.2 depicts a typical GPR
gradient.
Figure C.2—Illustrative GPR gradient
In this example, a 900-pair, 26-gauge telecommunications cable extends from the CO through six sections
of underground conduit and is then buried through a GPR ZOI to a point 2.18 km (7.15 kft) from the CO.
At that location, a 50-pair, 26-gauge cable extends to the end of the route, 3.35 km (11 kft) from the CO.
The cable parameters are shown in Table C.1.
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Table C.1— Cable parameters
Shield diameter DC resistance Self-impedance (Ω/kft)

Pairs and gauge
(cm) (Ω/km) R+jX Z
900 26 4.57 1.28 0.124+j0.07494 0.144 30.6°
50 26 0.94 3.15 0.298+j0.085 0.310 15.9°
Shield diameter DC resistance Self-impedance (Ω/kft)

Pairs and gauge
(in) (Ω/kft) R+jX Z
900 26 1.80 0.39 0.408+j0.242 0.474 30.6°
50 26 0.37 0.96 0.978+j0.278 1.02 15.9°
At the 1.55 km (5.1 kft) location, a dedicated cable extends to the electric supply location, but the pairs
serving the electric supply location do not go past the 1.55 km (5.1 kft) point in the general-use cable. The
900-pair cable passes near the ground grid of the electric supply location where the GPR is 1880 V. The
CO ground resistance is assumed to be 0.75 Ω, each of the six manholes is 2 Ω, and each of the
16 pedestals has a resistance of 50 Ω. The details of grounds to the cable shield and of the assumed GPR
along the route are shown in Table C.2.
Table C.2—Shield grounds, GPR and spreadsheet results

Distance from CO GPR Shield grounds Cable shield Cable shield
(kft) (km) (V) (Ω) (A) (V)
0.00 0.00 0 0.75 6.4
0.75 0.23 0 2 –8.5 9.4
1.50 0.46 0 2 –13.2 14.1
2.25 0.69 0 2 –20.3 21.4
3.00 0.91 0 2 –31.0 32.4
3.70 1.13 0 2 –47.2 48.0
4.40 1.34 0 2 –71.2 71.6
5.10 1.55 300 50 –107.0 107.1
5.20 1.59 400 50 –103.1 112.0
5.50 1.68 800 50 –97.4 125.9
5.80 1.77 1880 50 –83.9 137.8
6.00 1.83 1880 50 –49.1 142.5
6.20 1.89 1250 50 –14.3 143.8
6.55 2.00 520 50 +7.8 142.5
7.00 2.13 200 50 +15.4 139.2
7.15 2.18 100 50 +16.6 138.1
7.60 2.32 0 50 +15.8 130.8
8.20 2.50 0 50 +13.2 122.7
9.00 2.74 0 50 +10.8 113.9
9.50 2.90 0 50 +8.5 109.6
10.00 3.05 0 50 +6.3 106.4
10.50 3.20 0 50 +4.2 104.3
11.00 3.35 0 50 +2.1 103.25
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IEEE Std 487-2015
The purpose of this example is to calculate the current flowing on the cable shield, the voltage of the cable
shield to remote ground along the route, and the induced voltage in the pairs of the cable due to the current
flowing on the cable shield. Calculations involved writing 22 loop equations and solving for loop current
using a 22 × 22 matrix in a spreadsheet. The voltage of the cable shield to remote earth at each ground
location was calculated on the same spreadsheet layout. The results of the current and voltage calculations
are also shown in Table C.2. The current shown at each ground location is the current flow on the cable
shield on the CO side of that location. A minus sign indicates an instantaneous current flow toward the CO;
a plus sign indicates instantaneous current flow away from the CO.
The highest cable shield current, 107 A, flows in the section toward the CO side of the ZOI. The highest
voltage of the cable shield to remote earth is 143.8 V at the 1.89 km (6.20 kft) location where the earth
GPR is 1250 V. The GPR voltage and cable shield voltage are plotted graphically in Figure C.3.
Figure C.3—Cable shield and GPR voltage
Another area of concern is the induced voltage on the pairs in the general-use cable due to the current
flowing on the shield. The section of greatest concern is from the CO to the 1.55 km (5.1 kft) point, where
the dedicated cable splices into the general-use cable. The mutual impedance for a 900-pair, 26-gauge cable
is 0.794 Ω/km (0.242 Ω/kft). The calculation of this induced voltage is shown in Table C.3.
The calculated value of 51.3 V induced in the first seven sections of cable is well below a level that would
cause circuit degradation.
Table C.3—Calculation of induced voltage

Length Shield current Zm Induced voltage
Section
(kft) (km) (A) (Ω) (V)
1 0.75 0.23 8.5 0.182 1.5
2 0.75 0.23 13.2 0.182 2.4
3 0.75 0.23 20.3 0.182 3.7
4 0.75 0.23 31.0 0.182 5.6
5 0.70 0.21 47.2 0.169 8.0
6 0.70 0.21 71.2 0.169 12.0
7 0.70 0.21 107.0 0.169 18.1
Total 5.1 1.55 51.3
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IEEE Std 487-2015
C.2 Evaluation of calculated values
In this example, a telecommunications cable passed through an electric supply location ZOI where the
maximum GPR was 1880 V. The maximum current that was picked up through the pedestal grounds and
flowed along the cable was 107 A. The maximum voltage transferred to the cable shield was calculated to
be approximately 144 V. This current and voltage would be present only for a short time, usually less than
a second.
The metallic elements of cable splice cases are typically designed to carry 1000 A rms current for 20 s. The
dielectric strength of cable plant depends on the type of cable and condition of splicing locations. Many
companies select several hundred volts as a minimum for cable dielectric in field applications.
If calculations, or experience, indicate that pair-to-shield voltages are excessive, full-count protection (all
pairs protected) using GDTs may be applied at an appropriate point. If protection is placed at the remote
drainage location, MDRs with GDTs should be used on SPO Class A circuits serving the electric supply
locations.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Annex D
(informative)
Protection of isolation, drainage, NTs, and other apparatus by surge

arresters
D.1 Possible modes of applied voltage
The possible modes of applied voltage are as follows:
a) Quiescent: stress—only low levels of 60 Hz steady-state induction, if any

b) Lightning impulse only:
1) GPR on station ground terminal
2) Surge on remote side from exposed cable
c) Power frequency fault (GPR and induction only), either symmetrical or asymmetrical
d) Lightning and power frequency coincident
D.2 Equipment insulation level
The insulation level for insulation between terminals is governed by the protective level of the surge
arrester and should be adequate for
a) Voltage developed when subjected to a surge having a wave front of 100 kV/μs per 12 kV of duty
cycle voltage rating (front of wave sparkover); discharge voltages with 8/20 discharge currents with
crests of varying magnitude for silicon carbide arresters and the front-of-wave; and discharge
voltage protective levels for metal oxide surge arresters
b) Voltage developed during a power frequency fault condition (possibly asymmetrical) with adequate
60 Hz protective margin related to maximum applied voltage
The protection ratio between the insulation withstand strength and arrester protection level generally falls
between 1.2 and 1.5.
The fact should be emphasized that, since the isolation transformer or NT is not connected to a power
transmission line, its insulation requirements are not directly related to system voltage insulation standards.
The in-service exposure of these transformers is distinctly different from that of power transformers:
 They are not exposed to continuous 60 Hz service voltage (except for low levels of steady-state
induction).
 They are not, therefore, exposed to direct switching surges.
 They are not exposed to the same stroke frequency as power equipment with the same nominal
kilovolts rating.
D.3 Protection of the transformer or other apparatus
Surge arresters are designed and specified for repeated operation to limit transient surge overvoltages that
can appear across insulation of the equipment and to interrupt power follow current. The arrester should not
enter operation nor remain in operation following transient actuation during a 60 Hz fault condition.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
D.4 Selection of the arresters
D.4.1 Types of arresters
D.4.1.1 Introduction
In the past, the use of nonlinear resistor gap-type (valve) arresters for the protection of rotating machines
(RMs) (distribution type) was recommended. Advances in surge arrester technology have led to the
development of gapless arresters using metal oxides for the nonlinear impedance element, and this type is
currently recommended (see D.4.1.1). However, for the sake of completeness, a description of the gap-type
arresters is included in D.4.1.2.
D.4.1.2 Metal oxide surge arresters
Gapless metal oxide surge arresters are widely used on power systems to protect transformers and other
apparatus. Finely crushed zinc oxide and small amounts of other selected metal oxides are mixed and
pressed into discs that are sintered at a high temperature to obtain blocks or discs of dense ceramic material.
The basic structure of these blocks consists primarily of zinc oxide grains that are surrounded and separated
by intergranular layers of the metal oxide additives. The zinc oxide grains are highly conductive, while the
boundary with the intergranular layers has a very high resistance at low electrical stresses. However, when
the electrical stress across this layer boundary is increased sufficiently, its resistance falls very rapidly. This
nonlinear characteristic limits surge voltages appearing across the arrester terminals.
Selection of the arrester for power system applications is based on the maximum continuous operating
voltage (MCOV) that can be applied to the arrester terminals on a continuous basis. Arresters can be
damaged if the power frequency voltage exceeds the MCOV, unless such operation is within the limits of
special application guidelines provided by the manufacturer for temporary overvoltage capability of the
arrestors. Specifically, these guidelines define overvoltage-time curves below which the arrester will not be
damaged.
At voltages below the MCOV rating, the arrester conducts very small currents in the microampere range.
However, as the MCOV is exceeded, conducted currents will increase and can remain in the ampere range
for short-time durations.
Surge arresters used in telecommunications cable protection schemes are not exposed to continuous power
frequency voltages of significant magnitudes; therefore, duty cycle and MCOV ratings are not directly
relevant to this application.
D.4.1.3 Gap-type arresters
Gap-type arresters consist of internal and external spark gaps connected in series with either silicon carbide
or metal oxide valve elements. The purpose of the valve element is to limit 60 Hz power follow currents to
levels that can be interrupted by the series gap assembly.
Specifying an RM surge arrester based on the rated voltage of the transformers and to coordinate the
insulation level to the protection level of the surge arrester has been common practice. Since the actual
impulse environment is unknown, RM arresters were chosen because of their low impulse sparkover
voltages. Therefore, an overly stringent requirement was not placed on designing transformer insulation.
RM arresters have lower impulse sparkover values than distribution-type arresters. The determining factor
may be their cost or availability, or both.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
D.4.2 Rating of arresters
D.4.2.1 Metal oxide arresters
The following procedures apply to metal oxide arresters:
a) Select an arrester that has an MCOV equal to or greater than the maximum power frequency
voltage that will appear across the apparatus terminals on a continuous basis. Where applicable, dc
offset effects and some design margin should be considered. Coordinate any power frequency
voltage that may appear on equipment terminals due to transient conditions with the temporary
overvoltage capabilities of the arrester. This coordination will ensure that the arrester will not be
damaged in service.
b) Confirm that the arrester-conducted current at the maximum transient overvoltage will have no
significant adverse effects on the cable protection system. For example, in an NT installation that
does not use a spark gap between the primary pairs and the arrester, the remanent voltage will be
increased by the current conducted through the arrester. In this instance, the arrester must be
selected to reduce its influence on the remanent voltage to an acceptable level.
c) For the selected arrester, refer to the maximum discharge voltages provided by the manufacturer.
These values can be used to define the impulse test level of the transformer or other apparatus. The
appropriate discharge current to be used will depend on the application and degree of lightning
exposure (for well-shielded stations the discharge currents are considered to be low). For
telecommunications protection purposes, the user should note that the 0.5 μs front-of-wave
discharge current is considered excessive.
D.4.2.2 Gap-type arresters
The following procedures apply to gas-type arresters:
a) Select an arrester that has a duty cycle voltage rating equal to or greater than the maximum power
frequency voltage that will appear across the transformer.
b) This standard procedure ensures that the arrester will interrupt power follow current (for example,
proper arrester operation). Use of arresters with ratings that are too low may result in excessive
failure rate of arresters in service. The principal cause of arrester damage in the field is a system
condition that subjects the arrester to a sustained power frequency voltage in excess of its voltage
rating. With the higher voltage, the follow current may not be interrupted because
1) Follow current is increased.
2) The voltage the gap must interrupt is higher.
c) Not only will the arrester fail to function properly with power frequency voltages in excess of its
rating, but an increasing risk of damage also exists as voltage exceeds the arrester rating up until a
point at which it equals the power frequency sparkover voltage. (At this point on a transmission or
distribution system, damage is virtually certain.) The power frequency sparkover voltage is usually
at least 1.5 times the rating. Although the asymmetrical magnitudes can be higher than symmetrical
rated voltage, the duty cycle is less severe due to current limiting, decay, and duration of applied
voltage.
d) However, if an arrester with a higher rating is chosen to provide a greater safety factor during
asymmetrical fault conditions, an increase in impulse sparkover voltage will result, and a
corresponding increase in the impulse insulation strength of the transformer will be required.
Compare the impulse protective level of the arrester with the full-wave impulse withstand
insulation strength of the device, or the impulse withstand strength for any shorter durations for
73
IEEE Std 487-2015
which higher values are given by the manufacturer, if applicable. The minimum protective ratio
between insulation withstand strength and arrester protective level should be 1.2.
e) The impulse protective level is given numerically by the maximum of the following quantities:
1) Front-of-wave impulse sparkover voltage divided by 1.15
2) 1.2 × 50 μs sparkover voltage (full wave)
3) Residual (discharge) voltage at a given discharge current (for well-shielded stations the
discharge currents are considered to be low in magnitude)
A surge arrester, if used, is connected across an NT primary winding or between isolation

transformer windings, or both. (See IEEE Std 487.4.)
D.4.3 Surge arrester characteristics
Typical characteristics for distribution class, metal oxide surge arresters are given in Table D.1.
Typical characteristics for distribution class, low-impulse sparkover-type RM surge arresters are given in
Table D.2.
Table D.1—Typical characteristics for distribution class, metal oxide surge arresters
Unit ratinga Maximum Maximum IR discharge voltaged
MCOVb
rms front of wavec
(kV) 1500A (kV) 5000A (kV) 10000A (kV) 20000A (kV)
(kV) (kV)
3.0 2.55 14.0 9.7 10.9 12.0 13.7
4.5e 3.00 18.0 13.0 15.0 16.5 18.0
6.0 5.10 27.0 18.2 21.0 23.5 25.7
7.5f 5.70 29.0 21.0 24.0 26.0 29.0
9.0 7.65 35.3 25.5 28.7 31.5 35.9
10.0 8.40 43.0 29.0 35.0 39.0 45.0
12.0 10.20 51.0 35.0 42.0 47.0 54.0
a
Standard duty cycle ratings.
b
The maximum duty continuous operating voltage is the maximum designated rms value of power frequency voltage
that may be applied continuously between the arrester terminals.
c
Equivalent front-of-wave protection level is the discharge voltage for a 5 kA (normal duty) or 10 kA (heavy duty)
impulse current wave cresting in 0.5 μs.
d
8/20 current wave.
e
These are not standard ANSI ratings and may not be readily available.
f
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Table D.2—Typical characteristics for distribution class,

low-impulse sparkover-type RM surge arresters
Maximum impulse sparkover voltage
Maximum IR discharge voltage
IEEE front-of-wave testa
Unit With Without
1500A 3000A 5000A 10000A 20000A
ratingb rms external gapc external gap
(kV) (kV) (kV) (kV) (kV)
(kV) (kV) (kV)
3.0 — 16 9.5 10.5 11.0 12 13.5
4.5d — 18 15.0 17.0 17.5 19 21.5
6.0 — 24 19.0 21.0 22.0 24 27.0
7.5e — 26 25.0 27.0 29.0 31 35.0
9.0 — 32 28.0 32.0 33.0 36 40.0
10.0 — 34 28.0 32.0 33.0 36 40.0
12.0 — 39 38.0 42.0 44.0 48 54.0
a
All values listed are maximum values.
b
Maximum permissible line-to-ground system frequency voltage on arrester.
c
Rate of voltage application: 100 kV/μs per 12 kV of arrester rating or fraction thereof.
d
e
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Annex E
(informative)
Transmission characteristics and SPO requirements for various

telecommunications channels
Table E.1 describes the transmission characteristics and SPO requirements for various telecommunications
channels.
Table E.1—Transmission characteristics and SPO requirements for

various telecommunications channels
Type of Typical
telecommunications SPO Transmission characteristics
channel class
Pilot wire—used for A Certain pilot-wire schemes require a physical metallic path end-to-end. There are many
line relay protection. different types of pilot-wire schemes, and the transmission limitations may vary widely.
Tripping occurs as a A typical pilot-wire system may operate at a maximum of 60 V with a 60 Hz current
result of the combined varying between 0 mA and 100 mA. In addition to the circulating 60 Hz current, a
output of the small circulating dc (usually 1 mA) may be employed to monitor cable pair continuity.
telecommunications Typically, the maximum loop resistance permissible may vary from 1000 Ω to 2800 Ω.
channel and the end This is influenced by the tap settings on the relay. The maximum permissible shunt
relays. capacitance is normally between 0.75 μF and 1.5 μF.
Remote or transfer A 1) DC tripping schemes. Some power companies employ simple dc tripping schemes
trip—used to direct for short-haul applications. There are different types, but most require a metallic
trip the far end of a path end-to-end. A typical dc tripping scheme will operate at a voltage of 130 V dc
line without isolated and a current of 0.35A. The maximum loop resistance permissible may vary
permission of the far between 2000 Ω and 3000 Ω. There is no shunt capacitance limitation.
end for transformer 2) Tripping schemes employing VF (audio) tones. These channels have attenuation,
protection, local gain-frequency, and steady-state noise limitations, all of which will vary widely
backup breaker failure, depending on the power system design criteria and the type of telecommunications
etc. equipment to be used.
Audio-tone line A Same as for direct transfer trip [see item 2) above].
relaying—used for line
relaying protection.
Tripping occurs as a
result of the combined
output of the
telecommunications
channel and the end
relays.
Telemetry and B 1) DC telemetry. Simple dc telemetry schemes are used for short-haul application.
supervisory control. Normally, a physical metallic pair is provided. A possible limitation is dc resistance
of the pair.
2) Schemes employing VF tone or analog signals. The telecommunications channel
normally has attenuation, gain, frequency, and steady-state noise limitations that
vary widely depending on the design criteria and the equipment used.
Remote-control B 1) Voice channel with a control scheme employing dc signals. A typical channel may
channels associated have a maximum 1000 Hz attenuation of 10 dB. This is normally the only
with mobile radio transmission requirement, although dc resistance could be a limitation.
transmitters. 2) Voice channel with a control scheme employing VF control tones. These channels
normally have attenuation, gain-frequency, and steady-state noise limitations.
Telephone and teletype B or C 1) Analog signal with dc or ac signaling. A typical channel is one with an attenuation
channels. of 10 dB at 1000 Hz.
2) Teletypewriter channels carry dc on/off pulses at various baud rates, typically
30 baud or 57 baud. There is a typical background noise limitation of 70 dBrn (flat).
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Annex F
(informative)
DC offset waveform development
F.1 Sine wave
All the ac circuits that are considered have current and voltages following a sine wave. A sine wave is
generated by a revolving vector, i.e., inside an RM (see Figure F.1).
Figure F.1—Generation of sine wave
F.2 Sinusoidal wave
A sinusoidal wave is the same as a sine wave (see Figure F.1).
F.3 Effective current
Since an alternating current varies continuously from 0 to maximum to 0, first in one direction and then in
the other, the true current value really is not readily apparent.
The current at any point on a sine wave is called the instantaneous current. Determining the arithmetic
average value of the alternating current is also possible, but none of these values correctly relate ac to dc.
Having 1 A ac do the same work as 1 A dc is certainly desirable. This current is called the effective current,
and 1 A effective ac will have the same heating effect as 1 A dc.
F.4 RMS current
Effective current is more commonly called rms current. Root mean square (rms) is the square root of the
average of all the instantaneous currents squared.
The rms value of a sine wave is readily determined by calculus but can perhaps be more easily understood
by simple arithmetic. The user should consider a half sine wave having a 10 A maximum or peak value (see
Figure F.2).
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IEEE Std 487-2015
10.00
9.86
9.86
9.40
9.40
8.66
8.66
7.66
7.66
6.43
6.43
5.00
5.00
3.42
3.42
1.74
1.74
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
10 30 50 70 90 110 130 150 170
Degrees
Figure F.2—Instantaneous current
Using instantaneous currents at 10° intervals, the value of the instantaneous currents can be easily
measured. These values have been tabulated in Table F.1. These values have also been squared. The
average instantaneous current and the average squared instantaneous current are found by dividing the
totals by 18. The square root of the average squared instantaneous current is easily found and readily
understood.
Table F.1—Calculation of average and rms currents

Degrees Instantaneous amperes Instantaneous amperes squared
0 0 0
10 1.74 3.03
20 3.42 11.79
30 5.00 25.00
40 6.43 41.25
50 7.66 58.67
60 8.66 75.00
70 9.40 88.36
80 9.86 97.22
90 10.00 100
100 9.86 97.22
110 9.40 88.36
120 8.66 75.00
130 7.66 58.67
140 6.43 41.35
150 5.00 25.00
160 3.42 11.79
170 1.74 3.03
180 0 0
Total 114.34 900.0
Average 6.36 50.0
rms = 50.0 = 7.07 A
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IEEE Std 487-2015
The average current of a sine wave is 0.636 of the peak current, and the effective or rms current is 0.707 of
the peak current.
In other words, the peak is 1.4 times the rms value. Standard ac ammeters are marked in rms amperes, and,
unless stated otherwise, all ac currents are considered rms currents.
When considering currents that flow for a few cycles or less, it is necessary to specify what kind of
amperes are being considered, such as
a) RMS (effective)
b) Peak (crest)
c) Average
d) Instantaneous
The two currents shown in Figure F.3 have the same effective value.
Figure F.3—Effective value of 1 ampere dc and ac
F.5 Symmetrical current
A symmetrical current wave is symmetrical about the zero axis of the wave. This wave has the same
magnitude above and below the zero axis (see Figure F.4).
Figure F.4—Symmetrical current
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IEEE Std 487-2015
F.6 Asymmetrical current
An asymmetrical current wave is not symmetrical about the zero axis. The axis of symmetry is displaced or
offset from the zero axis, and the magnitudes above and below the zero axis are not equal.
F.7 Offset current
An asymmetrical wave can be partially offset or fully offset. Figure F.5 shows a fully offset wave. Offset
waves are sometimes called displaced waves.
Figure F.5—Fully offset wave
F.8 DC component
The axis of symmetry of an offset wave resembles a dc current, and asymmetrical currents can be readily
handled if they are considered to have an ac component and a dc component. Both of these components are
theoretical. The dc component is generated within the ac system and has no external source.
Figure F.6 shows a fully offset asymmetrical current with a steady dc component as its axis of symmetry.
The symmetrical component has the zero axis as its axis of symmetry. If the rms or effective value of the
symmetrical current is 1, then the peak of the symmetrical current is 1.41. This figure is also the effective
value of the dc component. By adding these two effective currents together and taking the square root of
the sum of the squares, the effective or rms value of the asymmetrical current becomes the result of
Equation (F.1) and Equation (F.2).
2 2
I asymmetric = I dc + I symmetric (F.1)
I asymmetric = (1.41) 2 + 12 = 3 = 1.73 (F.2)
The rms value of a fully offset asymmetrical current, therefore, is 1.73 times the symmetrical rms current.
The fact is readily apparent that the peak asymmetrical current is twice the peak symmetrical current, i.e.,
2 × 1.41 = 2.82.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Figure F.6—Fully offset ac wave with dc component
F.9 Total current
The term total current is used to express the total sum of the ac component and the dc component of an
asymmetrical current.
Total current and total asymmetrical current have the same meaning and may be expressed in peak or rms
amperes.
F.10 Decay
Unfortunately, fault currents usually are neither symmetrical nor fully asymmetrical, but rather somewhere
in between. The dc component is usually short lived and is said to decay rapidly.
In Figure F.7, the dc component decays to zero in about four cycles. The rate of decay is called decrement
and depends on the circuit constants, i.e., the effective X/R of the circuit. The dc component would never
decay in a circuit that has reactance but zero resistance, and it would remain constant forever. In a circuit
that has resistance but zero reactance, the dc component would decay instantaneously. These values are
theoretical conditions, and all practical circuits have some resistance and reactance. The dc component
disappears in a few cycles, generally less than four cycles.
Figure F.7—DC component decay
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IEEE Std 487-2015
F.11 Closing angle
A short-circuit fault can occur at any point on the voltage wave of a circuit; however, faults generally occur
at or close to maximum voltage.
The voltage wave resembles the current wave. The two waves may be in phase or out of phase, and the
magnitude and symmetry of the current wave on a short circuit depends on the point on the voltage wave at
which the short occurs.
In laboratory tests, picking the point on the voltage wave at which the fault occurs by closing the circuit at
any desired angle on the voltage wave is possible.
F.12 Random closing
Faults can occur at any and every point on the voltage wave and, in a laboratory, this phenomenon can be
duplicated by closing the circuit at random. This procedure is known as random closing. The following is
true of a short circuit that has negligible resistance:
a) If the fault occurs at zero voltage, the current wave is fully asymmetrical; thus, a maximum value
of short-circuit current is obtained.
b) If the fault occurs at maximum voltage, the current wave is completely symmetrical, and a
minimum value of short-circuit current is obtained.
Power system faults usually fall into one of two categories, depending on the cause of the fault and the
power equipment and system involved. The first category would include slow-acting phenomena relative to
the power frequency voltage waveform. Examples include many forms of insulation breakdown,
conductors swinging in the wind, the approach of animals or birds, and the slow contact closure of certain
types of circuit breakers into an existing fault. These types of faults occur at or close to peak voltage;
therefore, the dc offset will be at or near zero.
Faults due to certain fast-acting phenomena fall into the second category. Faults due to the closing of some
types of fast-acting circuit breakers that do not involve the use of pre-insertion resistors or inductors, or
faults due to lightning strokes to phase conductors where there are no overhead ground wires (OGWs), may
occur at points on the voltage waveform at or close to zero voltage. The resulting dc offset, depending on
other important criteria, may vary from zero upward to some significant magnitude. Only in this case, the
resulting dc offset may, although very infrequently, approach maximum based on the specific circuit
parameters.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Annex G
(informative)
High-dielectric optical fiber isolation systems
G.1 Overview
Optical fiber isolation systems utilize a length of either high-dielectric plastic fiber or glass fiber to provide
high-voltage isolation. Circuit arrangements on each side of the optical fiber cable convert electrical signals
to optical signals for transmission through the optical fiber(s) and then reconvert these signals back to
standard telecommunications signals. Various circuit arrangements provide one-way or two-way
transmission and permit transmission of various combinations of voice and/or dc signals.
Optical fiber isolation systems may be located inside an electric supply location, may be located outside the
ZOI, or may have one end (CFJ) outside the ZOI and the other end (OEI) inside the electric supply
location. The optical fiber cable(s) or optical transmission links may vary in length depending on the ZOI.
Refer to IEEE Std 487.3 for applications where both the CFJ and the OEI are not inside an electric supply
location.
G.2 Protection configurations employing optical fiber isolation systems
G.2.1 General
This optical fiber equipment can provide high-voltage isolation for a single telecommunications line or for
multiple lines (shelves with plug-in cards for each line). In either single-line or multi-line applications, the
following design criteria should apply.
Such equipment provides HVP by isolating the CO exchange cable pairs (ground) from any source of high
voltage by a section of nonconductive (i.e., dielectric) optical fiber cable.
To maintain the integrity of this protective system, careful consideration should be given to the following
areas:
a) Isolation requirements
b) Equipment placement
c) Powering requirements
G.2.2 Isolation requirements
The length of optical fiber cable will usually provide more than enough isolation. Note that optical fiber
cables used with isolation systems may be nonconductive (i.e., dielectric) or may have metallic strength
members. Where the optical fiber cables have metallic members, the members must be isolated from
ground at the electric supply location and within the ZOI in the same manner as the metallic shields of
paired cables. When both ends of an optical fiber cable are to be installed within the ZOI, special
consideration must be given to the CFJ interface end. For this reason, most optical fiber terminal equipment
employs housings that are made of high-dielectric material and are designed to be installed on a
nonconductive backplane. The thickness of the backplane will vary from 19 mm to 26 mm, depending on
the manufacturer’s recommendations. However, care should be taken during backplane installation and
83
IEEE Std 487-2015
location to minimize the possibility of moisture contamination, which can substantially reduce the isolation
provided.
G.2.3 Equipment placement
An equipment package can increase flexibility in the design of an installation and reduce the space
required. This package can allow for the design of installations that will eliminate the possibility of
personnel bridging the isolation protection with their hands or bodies during maintenance or use. To
achieve this objective, the CFJ end equipment is located at least 2 m from the OEI end equipment.
G.2.4 Powering requirements
Optical fiber terminal equipment is an electronic-based system that requires power for both the CFJ end
equipment and the OEI end equipment. To preclude the possibility of bridging the isolation protection with
a power supply or source, this equipment, installed within the ZOI, is designed to be powered from two
isolated sources, i.e., via the cable pairs at the CFJ end and ac/dc rectifier with battery backup at the OEI
end. Some applications may require alternate power sources at the CFJ.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Annex H
(informative)
Theoretical verses actual field experience GPR and related ZOI profiles
H.1 Overview
Figure H.1 illustrates theoretical equipotential GPR voltage lines, as depicted in numerous technical
publications, with the assumption that earth resistivity ρ(Ω·m) measurements are homogeneous with no
metallic infrastructure attached to the grid under consideration, including any power facilities feeding the
grid. See Figure 11 of this standard for a theoretical example. This theoretical condition never occurs in a
working power system.
Figure H.1—Theoretical equipotential lines of GPR for a community power substation

(homogeneous non-metallic infrastructure environment)
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Figure H.2 illustrates a typical GPR profile with non-homogeneous conditions with metallic infrastructure
influences. During GPR fault conditions, the equipotential GPR profiles around a grid, as well as the
metallic structures in, on, or adjacent to it, become a function of the ground return fault currents returning
back to their source, or sources, in the power network through a non-homogeneous environment. This non-
homogeneous environment consists of, but is not limited to, the grid under consideration; multiple earth
resistivity regions and layers; transmission tower and MGN grounding systems; sewer, water, and gas
piping; rivers and lakes; train tracks; telecommunications cables; and their mutual bonding and grounding
networks.
Figure H.2—Actual equipotential lines of GPR for a community power substation

(non-homogeneous metallic infrastructure environment)
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Figure H.3 illustrates a theoretical GPR profile for a small grid on a power transmission line assuming
homogeneous conditions with no metallic infrastructure influences; this scenario is also depicted in various
standards. This example depicts a joint-use radio facility grid placed on a high-voltage transmission line.
Figure H.3—Theoretical equipotential lines of GPR for a small transmission line grid
(homogeneous non-metallic infrastructure environment)
The theoretical 300 V ZOI metric value for small grids is derived (Sunde [B59]) from the relationship
shown in Equation (G.1).
I Fault
ZOI 300V ≅ ρ (G.1)
2π (300)
where
ρ is the earth resistivity at the grid location

IFault is the fault current flowing through the grid
Due to the non-homogenous environment of small grounding grids in working power systems, these
theoretical conditions also never occur.
Figure H.4 illustrates actual GPR profiles with non-homogeneous conditions and metallic infrastructure
influences. In this example the fault currents will flow not only into the grid under study, but also in the
adjacent transmission tower footings and interconnected MGN power system grounds. On a transmission
line with static or sky wire systems, the majority of 60 Hz fault currents will be distributed to five to ten
adjacent towers in an exponential manner. Current distribution also occurs with lightning-initiated strikes at
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IEEE Std 487-2015
a single tower. Therefore, the actual fault currents seen at the driving source, or sources, will not be the
same value flowing through the grid under study; only a small fraction of the total fault current will flow
here. This phenomenon produces substantially smaller ZOIs than those calculated using theoretical values.
Figure H.4—Actual equipotential lines of GPR for a small transmission line grid
(non-homogeneous metallic infrastructure environment)
H.2 Summation
The curves in Figure 3 through Figure 10 (in 4.2.1.2 of this standard) may be theoretical, but they are the
only documented standard readily available for determining the ZOI. As always, engineering judgment
should be applied when determining the ZOI. Actual GPR profiles under realistic working conditions, as
well as theoretical, must be taken into consideration when determining ZOI conditions. The resulting ZOI
may, or may not, be that depicted in Figure 3 through Figure 10 and in Figure 11. Localized GPR (or
ground reference potential) is a function of current flow through individual impedances. As an example, if
1000 to 1500 MGN “grounds” exist within the EPRI curve ZOI (Figure 3 through Figure 10), each and
every ground will carry a portion of the fault current return(s) as a function of its individual ground and/or
return path(s) impedances. As a result, calculating the exact GPR profile of a grounding grid or single
power pole within the ZOI is difficult, if not impossible. In other words, the profile looks more like the
above non-homogeneous diagrams and will never be uniform. There will be ground reference potential
differences between all of the “grounds” during substation fault conditions. Bonding and grounding
requirements substantially reduce ground reference potential conditions within the ZOI; therefore, their
effects must be considered when determining actual GPR profiles.
(Refer to IEEE Std 367 for information on GPR calculation.)
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IEEE Std 487-2015
Annex I
(informative)
Service request data
I.1 Overview
This annex lists some of the minimum information that should be provided by representatives of a power
company or a wireless service provider (WSP) to the telecommunications service provider (or local
exchange carrier) when requesting telecommunications services. This information is necessary so that
appropriate electrical protection measures can be made to protect the technicians that use the
telecommunications systems or work at the site.
The power company typically has the responsibility to characterize the environment at the electric supply
location either from their records or from measurements.
Furnishing the information in writing typically minimizes questions and delays due to misunderstandings or
misinterpretations of the data. It also provides a historical trail.
I.2 Location and contact information
The following location and contact information should be included:
a) Name. The name of the power company or WSP should be provided.

b) Authorized agent. The name and telephone number of the individual(s) placing the request for
service should be provided.
c) Location. The location of the electric supply location (either electric power station or wireless site)
where service is to be provided should be properly identified by a street address, location name,
structure number or other similar customary identification, and city or town name.
d) Signatures. The power company’s licensed engineer who provides the technical data should sign the
form. The names, titles, and telephone numbers of the technical contact representatives (i.e., of the
power company, WSP, and local exchange carrier) should be provided for future reference.
I.3 Circuit information
The following circuit information should be included:
a) Circuit description. The number and type of circuits desired should be provided. A projected circuit
forecast may also be helpful.
b) Service performance classification (SPO). The SPO and the service type, per Clause 7, should be
provided for each circuit requested.
c) Service date. The customer’s desired service date should be provided at the time the order is placed.
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IEEE Std 487-2015
I.4 Technical data
The following technical data should be included:
a) Grid area. The dimensions of the ground mat, or grid area, should be provided in either square feet
or square meters.
b) Grid dc resistance or impedance at 60 Hz. The resistance to remote earth of the ground mat at either
a power substation or a tower/pole location should be provided in ohms.
c) Expected fault current. The expected total fault current (line to ground) at the location should be
provided. Fault current is the total current produced by the fault.
d) X/R ratio. The X/R ratio, i.e., the ratio of the inductive reactance to the resistance of the power
system at the fault location, should be provided. The X/R ratio for the zero sequence component is
the one usually provided.
e) Expected GPR. The calculated GPR information should be provided as both volts rms and volts
peak.
f) Earth return current. The earth return current, i.e., the portion of the fault current that returns to the
power station through the earth (also called % earth return) should be provided.
A typical sample form for providing the information listed in I.2, I.3, and I.4 is shown in Figure I.1.
90
IEEE Std 487-2015
Power Company/WSP: Authorized Agent: Telephone:
Telephone Company: Authorized Agent: Telephone:
Order Date: Order Number: Requested Service Date:
Service Performance
Circuit Number Service Type Circuit Description
Objective (SPO)
Power Station: Address:
Grid Area (square feet): Earth Return Current:

Fault Current Grid DC Resistance X/R: Ground Potential Rise (GPR)
(rms): or Impedance at rms:
60 Hz (Ω): peak:
Pole/Tower: Address/Number:
Grid Area (square feet): Earth Return Current:

Fault Current Grid DC Resistance X/R: Ground Potential Rise (GPR)
(rms): or Impedance at rms:
60 Hz (Ω): peak:
Power Company Engineer

Name: Telephone: Date: Signature:
Title:
WSP Company Engineer
Title:
Telephone Company Engineer
Title:
Figure I.1—Typical sample service request form
91
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IEEE Standard for the Electrical

IEEE Power and Energy Society

IEEE Standard for the Electrical

Power System Communications Committee

Approved 11 June 2015

IEEE-SA Standards Board

Figure 15 reprinted with permission from CEA Technologies Inc. (CEATI).

Figure 16 reprinted with permission from Grcev et al. [B19].

Figure 17 reprinted with permission from Grcev et al. [B20].

Abstract: General considerations are presented for the electrical protection of

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

Copyright © 2015 by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

Wi-Fi is a registered trademark of the Wi-Fi Alliance®

WiMAX is a registered trademark of the WiMAX Forum.

PDF: ISBN 978-0-7381-9782-1 STD20269

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Comments on standards should be submitted to the following address:

Secretary, IEEE-SA Standards Board

Laws and regulations

Percy E. Pool, Co-Chair and Technical Editor

Steven Blume Ernest Duckworth Del Khomarlou

William Ackerman Yuri Khersonsky Michael Roberts

John D. Kulick, Chair

Masayuki Ariyoshi Joseph L. Koepfinger* Stephen J. Shellhammer

 IEEE Std 487™ for general considerations

3. Definitions, acronyms, and abbreviations .................................................................................................. 3

4. High-voltage environment (HVE) .............................................................................................................. 7

5. Grounding considerations ..........................................................................................................................23

6. Protection apparatus ..................................................................................................................................29

8. Protection theory and philosophy ..............................................................................................................34

9. Protection configurations ...........................................................................................................................36

11. Safety .......................................................................................................................................................49

12. Summary .................................................................................................................................................51

Annex A (informative) Bibliography ............................................................................................................52

Annex B (informative) Characteristics of protection apparatus ....................................................................56

Annex F (informative) DC offset waveform development ............................................................................77

Annex G (informative) High-dielectric optical fiber isolation systems .........................................................83

Annex I (informative) Service request data ...................................................................................................89

1.4 Not covered

IEEE Std 80™, IEEE Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding. 1, 2

NFPA 70-2011, National Electrical Code® (NEC®). 3, 4

3. Definitions, acronyms, and abbreviations

conductive (resistive) coupling: See: coupling.

electric (capacitive) coupling: See: coupling.

NOTE—See IEEE Std 789 for additional information.

insulating transformer: See: isolation (insulating) transformer.

isolation (insulating) transformer: A transformer that provides longitudinal (common-mode) isolation of

magnetic (inductive) coupling: See: coupling.

messenger: See: suspension strand.

3.2 Acronyms and abbreviations

AWG American wire gauge

BIL basic impulse insulation level

BTS base transceiver station

CFJ wire-line (e.g., copper, steel, aluminum) to fiber cable junction

DAS distributed antenna system

DDS digital data service

DS-1 digital service at 1.544 Mb/s

DSL digital subscriber line

GDT gas discharge tube