G.R. No.

93335 September 13, 1990 On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of 1990.
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting
COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/
FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and dismiss the information on the following grounds, to wit:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for petitioner.
II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a
component element of, the "complexed" rebellion presently charged
Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the
committed rebellion complexed with murder 1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, basis of the same meeting on 1 December 1989;
government prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second information reads: III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one
prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion;
That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village,
Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged
the above-named accused, having reasonable ground to believe or violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;
suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime,
did then and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of
obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col.
Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house. for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due
process.
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the
issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal determination by the court of probable
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the information from the record. conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this
Court.
On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent
Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged
"there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
No. 1829."

Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special
the Information on the grounds that: law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense; The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99
Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus
(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar,(G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990).
and The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription
against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate
(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:
Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged
meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling
concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829. of the Court, which that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on
the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or as an
 unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there
supplied) is only one crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there
could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for harboring and concealing"
Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the complex
crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately elements is readily apparent.
for two (2) different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element or committed
in furtherance of rebellion. The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo
Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of
The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion
(c) which states: thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or resolution to
commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:

SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period,

or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political
order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve
upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates
or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. (p. 536)
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and
a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence
xxx xxx xxx
tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are
deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960];
knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect has committed People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col.
any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance
prosecution and conviction. of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case
of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
xxx xxx xxx
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed
accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S.,
house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a
do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when
petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes Identified with
No. 1829. the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or
used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a
executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a
Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and force and
birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989. trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not
The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in
1989, Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as
accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The a constitutive ingredient of treason.
prosecution thereby concluded that:
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is
In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio punishable under a special law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code;
"Gringo" Honasan in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument
soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that they were co- is specious in rebellion cases.
conspirators in the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65;
Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale
remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed
include the very incident which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential
in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as separate crimes in so to press it further now would be to place him in double jeopardy. (at
themselves. Thus: page 663)

This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990)
crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same where the Court had the occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the
and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with
of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section
at p. 528) 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his arguments on
the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion.
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime The Court, however, clarified, to wit:
of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson,
robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant ... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the
circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under
in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME
laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense. OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION
The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of
Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in
practically the same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. this case.
1829.
The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under
Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The
of conspiring with Honasan was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion
and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiple frustrated
murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and
rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and
violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the
overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.
in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as
"common" offenses, and assume the political complexion of the main
As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce
crime of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply
because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely
same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v.
Hernandez, supra, p. 541) different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of
rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being
punished separately.
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty
and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms. The Court ruled: In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition
to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court
to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.
An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with
which the accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is
necessary element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the QUASHED. The writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their
same accused is charged with other persons in a separate case and successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the
wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662) arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings therein is
made permanent.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is
charged in the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and
G.R. No. 131492 September 29, 2000 prosecution of the said heinous case by harboring and concealing said
suspects thus, leading to the successful escape of suspects Narag and
ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU another principal suspect JOEL CARLO DENOSTA; that said above acts were
LAMBINO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN, THE SPECIAL done by the above-named accused public officials despite their full knowledge
PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V. DIZON, respondents. that said suspects were implicated in the brutal slaying of said Dennis
Venturina, thus preventing the suspects arrest, prosecution and conviction.
MENDOZA, J.:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was
killed in a rumble between his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994. In Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the
a letter dated December 11, 1994, petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. dismissal of the case. But the recommendation was disapproved. In a memorandum,
Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation for dated September 8, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman directed the Special
assistance in determining the persons responsible for the crime. In response to the Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan. Hence
request, respondent Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the this petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman's
NBI, and his men went to U.P. on December 12 and, on the basis of the supposed office ordering the prosecution of petitioners.
positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro Lachica and Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, Petitioners contend that:
officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina.
It appears that the two suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a I. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
peace talk between their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity. DISCRETION WHEN HE RULED THAT: 1) STUDENTS COULD BE
ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT ON MERE SUSPICION; 2) PD 1829
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a INCLUDES ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS ON MERE SUSPICION; AND
certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did WHEN HE REVERSED THE FINDINGS AND RESOLUTION OF THE
not have warrants of arrest with them. Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER, THE DEPUTY SPECIAL
suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result of their intervention, Taparan and PROSECUTOR AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, WHO CONDUCTED
Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day. 1 However, criminal charges THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CASE; AND FINALLY WHEN HE
were filed later against the two student suspects.2 RESOLVED THAT PETITIONERS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO PUBLIC
TRIAL WHEN THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE AND NO BASIS.
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners
Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the II. SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH C OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829 IS
U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of P.D. 1829, 3 which makes it unlawful for UNCONSTITUTIONAL.5
anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
Two issues are raised in this case, to wit: (1) Whether the attempted arrest of the
On May 18, 1995, an information4 was filed against them, alleging that: student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether
there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829. We
That on or about December 12, 1994 and for sometime prior or subsequent answer these questions in the negative.
thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, namely: ROGER POSADAS, First. In view of Art. III, §2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made
Chancellor; ROSARIO YU — Vice Chancellor; ATTY. MARICHU LAMBINO except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after examining the complainant and
— Asst. Legal Counsel; and COL. EDUARDO BENTAIN — Chief, Security the witnesses he may produce and after finding probable cause to believe that the
Force, all of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, all public person to be arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions when an arrest may be
officers, while in the performance of their respective official functions, taking made even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113, §5 of the Rules of Criminal
advantage of their official duties and committing the crime in relation to their Procedure which reads:
office, conspiring and confederating with each other and with a certain ATTY.
VILLAMOR, did then and there wilfully, knowingly and criminally obstruct, (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
impede and frustrate the apprehension of FRANCIS CARLO TAPARAN and committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
RAYMUNDO NARAG, both principal suspects involved in the brutal killing of
DENNIS VENTURINA, a U.P. graduating student and Chairperson of the UP
College of Administration, Student Council, and delaying the investigation and
 (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal We have already explained what constitutes "personal knowledge" on the part of the
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed arresting officers:
it;
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b)
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
from one confinement to another. suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
The question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been arrest.8
committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag
and Taparan were probably guilty. Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the
scene of the crime. When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan
Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts gathered and Narag, the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that
by them in the course of their investigation indicating that the students sought to be would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On the contrary,
arrested were the perpetrators of the crime.6 They invoke the ruling in People v. Tonog, Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a
Jr. 7 in which it was held: peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the campus.

It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow
apprehended Accused-appellant. The warrantless arrest, however, was them to supplant the courts. The determination of the existence of probable cause that
justified under Section 5 (b), Rule 133 (sic) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal the persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law
Procedure providing that a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only
person "when an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal if the latter are committing or have just committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot leave
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it." to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our
In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of Accused-appellant, had civil liberties. This is evident from a consideration of the requirements before a judge
knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the course of his can order the arrest of suspects. Art. III, §2 of the Constitution provides:
investigation indicating that Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
In that case, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer who later effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
noticed the presence of blood stains on the pants of the accused. Upon reaching the for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
police station, the accused was asked to take off his pants for examination at the crime shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
laboratory. The question in that case involved the admissibility of the maong pants judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
taken from the accused. It is clear that Tonog does not apply to this case. First, the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
accused in that case voluntarily went with the police upon the latter's invitation. Second, searched and the persons or things to be seized.
the arresting officer found blood stains on the pants of the accused, on the basis of
which he concluded that the accused probably committed the crime for which reason For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural
the latter was taken into custody. Third, the arrest was made on the same day the crime requirements, we hold that their attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without a warrant
was committed. In the words of Rule 113, §5(b), the crime had "just been committed" was illegal.
and the arresting officer had "personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
to be arrested had committed it." Second. In ordering the prosecution of petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829, §1(c),
the Office of the Ombudsman stated in its memorandum dated September 8, 1997:
In contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four
days after the commission of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact From the facts adduced, it is submitted that respondents had reasonable
which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested participated in
had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is the clubbing of Dennis Venturina, eventually leading to the latter's demise. It
insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI. must be remembered that these SJ members were positively identified by two
 eyewitnesses. A reasonably prudent mind could not just ignore this positive founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has been committed and that the
identification. In fact, respondents do not dispute the identification made on respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial" (Section 1, Rule
the alleged participants in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina. 12, Rules of Court). The absence of an arrest warrant, the absence of knowledge or
reasonable ground on the part of the accused to believe that the students had
Respondent U.P. officials justify their act of barring the apprehending officers committed a crime, the absence of any law punishing refusal to attend an investigation
from arresting the SJ members on the ground that the warrantless arrest at the NBI, all show that there is no sufficient ground to charge the accused with
sought to be effected did not conform with Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Obstruction of Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the accused, in
Court; thereby averting, what would be in their opinion, an illegal arrest. While safeguarding the rights of students, were acting within the bounds of law.10
this justification may, at best, show their good faith, it does not detract from
the fact that they had reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ members Third. Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following provision of P.D. No. 1829:
sought to be arrested committed the heinous crime of murder as a result of
the positive identification made by two eyewitnesses. Besides, the reliance on SEC. 1. The-penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine
the alleged illegality of the arrest just shows the clear intent, on respondents' ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person
part, to wilfully obstruct, frustrate or, at the least, delay the apprehension and who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the
investigation and prosecution of the SJ members positively identified. apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases by committing any of the following acts:
To be sure, respondents knew fully well that inquest proceedings follow
warrantless arrests. It is in this forum where the prosecutor conducting the xxx xxx xxx
inquest may rule on their opinion on whether or not the warrantless arrest
effected was valid; he having the quasi-judicial authority to rule on this matter.
Of course, there are various remedies under the law which respondents may (c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person
have likewise availed of or resorted to in order to secure the liberty of the SJ he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has
members had the latter been arrested, without prejudice to any criminal or committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent
administrative actions that they may have filed against the arresting NBI his arrest, prosecution and conviction;
agents. However, it appears that they took the law into their own hands in a
manner that obstructed and delayed the investigation being conducted by a The rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. 11 But as has been
law enforcement agency like the NBI. They facilitated the escape of the two held, "[i]nfinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of
SJ members pinpointed by eyewitnesses as among those who clubbed to criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary
death Dennis Venturina.9 arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution."12 As we
held in the similar case of Venus v. Desierto:13
The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds to believe that the
suspects were guilty. The question is whether the suspects could be arrested even in Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be
the absence of a warrant issued by a court, considering that, as already explained, the restrained either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition,
attempted arrest did not fall under any of the cases provided in Rule 113, §5. this Court ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman
Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners could not very well have authorized the arrest to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime
without warrant of the students or even effected the arrest themselves. Only courts has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and,
could decide the question of probable cause since the students were not being arrested thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.
in flagrante delicto. As the Special Prosecutor stated in his memorandum, dated May There are, however, settled exceptions to this rule, such as those enumerated
18, 1995, in recommending the dismissal of the case against petitioners: in Brocka v. Enrile, to wit:

All told, the evidence adduced in this case do not show that on the night of December a. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
12, 1994, the accused knew or had reasonable ground to believe that the students who (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al. L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA
were then at the U.P. police headquarters had committed a crime. Neither were the 95);
warrantless arrest being sought to be made on campus that night, legal. The U.P.
officials then present had every right to prevent the commission of illegal arrests of b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
students on campus. oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez,
43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al.,
Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that, there is no probable cause L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
to charge Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Atty. Villamor of violating Section
1(c) of P.D. 1829. Probable cause is defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well
 c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon mentioned by both the resolution dated May 18, 1995 and the information, a certain
vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202); Joel Carlo Denosta, was not one of the students whose arrest by the NBI agents
petitioners prevented on December 12, 1994. Moreover, whether or not petitioner
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority Posadas surrendered the student suspects to the NBI agents the following day is
(Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62); immaterial. In the first place, they were not sureties or bondsmen who could be held to
their undertaking. In the second place, the fact remains that the NBI agents could not
have validly arrested Taparan and Narag at the U.P. Police Station as they did not have
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or a warrant at that time. Hence, only the NBI agents themselves could be faulted for their
regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. inability to arrest Taparan and Narag. If the NBI believed the information given to them
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389); by the supposed eyewitnesses, the NBI should have applied for a warrant before
making the attempted arrest instead of taking the law into their own hands. That they
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People chose not to and were prevented from making an arrest for lack of a warrant is their
and Alvendia, 109 Phil. 1140); responsibility alone. Petitioners could not be held accountable therefor.

g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. We understand that the highly publicized death of Dennis Venturina caused a public
City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616); clamor to bring to justice those responsible therefor. We also recognize the pressures
faced by law enforcement agencies to effect immediate arrests and produce results
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia without unnecessary delay. But it must be remembered that the need to enforce the
vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960); law cannot be justified by sacrificing constitutional rights. The absence of probable
cause for the filing of an information against petitioners is evident from the records.
They cannot be indicted because they dared to uphold the rights of the students.
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust Hence, we see no other recourse but to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the
for vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Rañoa vs. Ombudsman from proceeding with the case against petitioners.
Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et
al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577);
Fourth. The conclusion we have thus far reached makes it unnecessary to consider
petitioners' challenge to P.D. No. 1829, §1(c). For a cardinal rule of constitutional
j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and adjudication is that the Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground
Paño, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438); and such as the application of a statute or general law.16

k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Ombudsman and his agents are
prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. hereby prohibited from prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829 §1(c) as a
Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1953) cited in Regalado, Remedial Law result of the incident complained of in Criminal Case No. 22801 and the Sandiganbayan
Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.) is ORDERED to dismiss the information in Criminal Case No. 22801 against petitioners.

In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as SO ORDERED.
a violation of P.D. No. 1829, §1(c) without rendering it unconstitutional. Petitioners had
a right to prevent the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time because their attempted
arrest was illegal. Indeed, they could not have interfered with the prosecution of the
guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had asked the NBI for assistance in
investigating the death of Venturina. On the other hand, just because petitioners had
asked for assistance from the NBI did not authorize respondent Dizon and his men to
disregard constitutional requirements.

The Office of the Ombudsman, however, found that the intervention by petitioners
resulted in the escape of the student suspects as petitioner Posadas and Atty. Villamor
failed in their undertaking to surrender the students the following day. 14 Hence, the
information against them charged that petitioners willfully obstructed the apprehension
of the suspects Taparan and Narag, leading to the successful escape of these students
and another principal suspect, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta. 15 The student suspect
G.R. No. 165276 November 25, 2009 In the evening of that day, 12 April 1999, petitioner, accompanied by her friend Ines
Francisco, sought Michael Vistan in his residence in Sta. Cruz, Guiguinto, Bulacan to
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, Petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL B. GAITE, Acting confront him about the whereabouts of his half-sister. He disclosed that he brought the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs; HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, Senior girl to the residence of her maternal relatives in Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President; Former DOJ SECRETARY Petitioner then reported the matter and requested for the assistance of the 303rd
HERNANDO B. PEREZ (now substituted by the Incumbent DOJ Secretary RAUL Criminal Investigation and Detective Group Field Office in Malolos, Bulacan to locate
GONZALES); Former PROV. PROS. AMANDO C. VICENTE (now substituted by the girl. Consequently, PO3 Paquito M. Guillermo and Ruben Fred Ramirez
the Incumbent PROV. PROS. ALFREDO L. GERONIMO); PROS. BENJAMIN R. accompanied petitioner and her friend to Hagonoy, Bulacan where they coordinated
CARAIG, Malolos, Bulacan; and MICHAEL T. VISTAN, Respondents. with police officers from the said place. The group failed to find the girl. Instead, they
were given the run-around as the spouses Ruben and Lourdes Tolentino and spouses
Gabriel and Olympia Nazareno misled them with the false information that Maria
DECISION Mercedes was already brought by their brother Carmelito Guevarra and the latter’s wife
Camilia to Casiguran, Quezon Province.
PERALTA, J.:
On 13 April 1999, petitioner filed a complaint for Kidnapping under Article 271 of the
Before this Court is a Petition for Review,1 under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Revised Penal Code (Inducing a Minor to Abandon His Home) against Michael Vistan,
Procedure, assailing the February 13, 2004 Decision 2 and September 16, 2004 the Tolentino spouses, the Nazareno spouses and Guevarra spouses, all maternal
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76019. relatives of Maria Mercedes Vistan.

The facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner and likewise adopted by the CA, are as Warrants of arrest were subsequently issued against them and to evade the long arm
follows: of the law, Michael Vistan went into hiding. He dragged along with him his half-sister
Maria Mercedes.
Petitioner [Judge Adoracion G. Angeles] was the foster mother of her fourteen (14)
year-old grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan who, in April 1990 was entrusted to the From 12 April 1999 to 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan, with his little sister in tow, shuttled
care of the former by the girl’s grandmother and petitioner’s sister Leonila Angeles Vda. back and forth from Guiguinto to Hagonoy, Bulacan as well as in Manila and Quezon
de Vistan when the child was orphaned at the tender age of four. City, living the life of a fugitive from justice. He eventually brought the girl to ABS-CBN
in Quezon City where he made her recite a concocted tale of child abuse against herein
Petitioner provided the child with love and care, catered to her needs, sent her to a petitioner hoping that this would compel the latter to withdraw the kidnapping charge
good school and attended to her general well-being for nine (9) memorable and happy which she earlier filed.
years. The child also reciprocated the affections of her foster mother and wrote the
latter letters. In the early morning of 16 April 1999, Michael Vistan brought Maria Mercedes to the
DSWD after he felt himself cornered by the police dragnet laid for him.
Petitioner’s love for the child extended to her siblings, particularly her half-brother
respondent Michael Vistan, a former drug-addict, and the latter’s family who were Prompted by his overwhelming desire to retaliate against petitioner and get himself off
regular beneficiaries of the undersigned’s generosity. Michael would frequently run to the hook from the kidnapping charge, Michael Vistan had deliberately, maliciously,
the undersigned for his variety of needs ranging from day to day subsistence to the selfishly and insensitively caused undue physical, emotional and psychological
medical and hospital expenses of his children. sufferings to Maria Mercedes Vistan, all of which were greatly prejudicial to her well-
being and development.
In the evening of 11 April 1999, Michael Vistan had a falling out with petitioner for his
failure to do a very important errand for which he was severely reprimanded over the Thus, on 1 December 1999, petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before
phone. He was told that from then on, no assistance of any kind would be extended to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation
him and that he was no longer welcome at petitioner’s residence. of Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and
for four counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for
Feeling thwarted, he, in conspiracy with his co-horts (sic), retaliated on 12 April 1999 Libel against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.
by inducing his half-sister, Maria Mercedes, to leave petitioner’s custody. Michael used
to have free access to the undersigned’s house and he took the girl away while In a Resolution dated March 3, 2000, Investigating Prosecutor Benjamin R. Caraig
petitioner was at her office. recommended upheld (sic) the charge of Violation of RA 7160 but recommended that
only one Information be filed against Michael Vistan. The charge of Violation of PD
1829 was dismissed. Nonetheless, the Resolution to uphold the petitioner’s complaint Moreover, the CA ruled that the facts of the case as portrayed by petitioner do not
against Maria Cristina Vistan must (sic) remained. warrant the filing of a separate Information for violation of Section 1(e) of PD No.
1829.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that the DOJ did not err when it dismissed the complaint
However, Provincial Prosecutor Amando C. Vicente denied the recommendation of the for violation for RA No. 7610 as the same was not attended by grave abuse of
Investigating Prosecutor that Michael Vistan be indicted for Violation RA 7610. He also discretion.
approved the recommendation for the dismissal of the charge for Violation of PD 1829.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which was, however, denied by the CA
On 14 April 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. This was denied in a Resolution dated September 16, 2004.
in a Resolution dated 28 April 2000.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors, to wit:
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on 18 May
2000. She also filed a Supplement thereto on 19 May 2000. 1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
RELIANCE OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE PROVISIONS OF
In a Resolution dated 5 April 2001, Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, acting for MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 58.
the Secretary of Justice, denied the petition for review. The undersigned’s Motion for
Reconsideration filed on 25 April 2001 was likewise denied by then DOJ Secretary 2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
Hernando B. Perez in a Resolution dated 15 October 2001. DISMISSAL BY THE DOJ SECRETARY OF THE COMPLAINT OF
VIOLATION OF SECTION 1(E). P.D. 1829 (OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE)
On 26 November 2001, the undersigned filed a Petition for Review before the Office of AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICHAEL VISTAN.
President. The petition was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration was denied
before said forum anchored on Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or 3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
a petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT OF VIOLATION OF R.A. 7610 (CHILD
those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death. 4 ABUSE) AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT MICHAEL VISTAN.14

On March 18, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for review5 before the CA assailing the The petition is without merit.
Order of the Office of President. Petitioner argued that the Office of the President erred
in not addressing the merits of her petition by relying on Memorandum Circular No. 58, Petitioner's arguments have no leg to stand on. They are mere suppositions without
series of 1993. Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of the memorandum circular, any basis in law. Petitioner argues in the main that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an
specifically arguing that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation because invalid regulation, because it diminishes the power of control of the President and
it diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered
Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power. 6 Moreover, petitioner power.15This argument is absurd. The President's act of delegating authority to the
contended that the Department of Justice (DOJ) erred in dismissing the complaint Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview
against respondent Michael Vistan for violations of Presidential Decree No. 1829 7 (PD of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction.
No. 1829) and for violation of Republic Act No. 76108 (RA No. 7610).9
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive,
On February 13, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision, dismissing the petition, the "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
dispositive portion of which reads: Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents
of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that
of merit.10 he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
The CA affirmed the position of the Solicitor General (OSG) to apply the doctrine of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course
qualified political agency, to wit: of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."16 The CA cannot be deemed to have
committed any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the
When the President herself did not revoke the order issued by respondent Acting Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs nor saw the necessity to exempt
petitioner’s case from the application of Memorandum Circular No. 58, the act of the
latter is deemed to be an act of the President herself. 11 As early as 1939, in Villena v. Secretary of Interior,17 this Court has recognized and
adopted from American jurisprudence this doctrine of qualified political agency, to wit:
x x x With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one x x x Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the
purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain prerogative acts which, by
searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the
section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief
with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of
President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other
Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and
executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign
capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).21
bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-
General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of the These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental
President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, law. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional
their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental
and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those
States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the exercised by co-equal branches of government.22 The declaration of martial law, the
matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority" suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power,
(Myers v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U.S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this
160).18 special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the
constitutionally vested power.23 The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a
Memorandum Circular No. 58,19 promulgated by the Office of the President on June showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitasand exceptional
30, 1993 reads: import.24

In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines enunciated in In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary
Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the review by the Office of the of Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as
President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by the Secretary of Justice concerning falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the
preliminary investigations of criminal cases are reiterated and clarified. President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58
allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it
No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of
Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so
entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses will unduly hamper the other important duties of the President by having to scrutinize
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x. each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latter’s
expertise in said matter.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction
of the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it In Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia,25 this Court discussed the predicament of imposing upon
shall be dismissed outright x x x. the President duties which ordinarily should be delegated to a cabinet member, to wit:

It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the
to review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the
the disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt
expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is
Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet
exercise of his discretion20 is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot any other sovereign debt management goals.
second- guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate
whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every aspect
administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet secretary – of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country
his own alter ego. long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the propriety of
incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that
Nonetheless, the power of the President to delegate is not without limits. No less than may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to
the Constitution provides for restrictions. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending
his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear: the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of
execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would x x x It is a surprise to hear from petitioner who is a member of the bench to argue that
negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which unserved warrants are tantamount to another violation of the law re: "obstruction of
the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s justice." Petitioner is like saying that every accused in a criminal case is committing
effectivity in running the government.26 another offense of "obstruction of justice" if and when the warrant of arrest issued for
the former offense/ charge is unserved during its life or returned unserved after its life
Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court cannot subscribe to petitioner’s – and that the accused should be charged therewith re: "obstruction of justice." What if
position asking this Court to allow her to appeal to the Office of the President, the warrant of arrest for the latter charge ("obstruction of justice") is again unserved
notwithstanding that the crimes for which she charges respondent are not punishable during its life or returned unserved? To follow the line of thinking of petitioner, another
by reclusion perpetua to death. or a second charge of "obstruction of justice" should be filed against the accused. And
if the warrant of arrest issued on this second charge is not served, again, a third charge
of "obstruction of justice" is warranted or should be filed against the accused. Thus,
It must be remembered that under the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO No. 292), the petitioner is effectively saying that the number of charges for "obstruction of justice" is
Department of Justice, under the leadership of the Secretary of Justice, is the counting and/or countless, unless and until the accused is either arrested or voluntarily
government’s principal law agency. As such, the Department serves as the surrendered. We, therefore, find the position taken by petitioner as contrary to the intent
government’s prosecution arm and administers the government’s criminal justice and spirit of the law on "obstruction of justice." x x x30
system by investigating crimes, prosecuting offenders and overseeing the correctional
system, which are deep within the realm of its expertise. 27 These are known functions
of the Department of Justice, which is under the executive branch and, thus, within the As correctly observed by the CA, the facts of the case, as portrayed by petitioner, do
Chief Executive's power of control. not warrant the filing of a separate information for violation of Section 1(e) of PD No.
1829. This Court agrees with the CA that based on the evidence presented by
petitioner, the failure on the part of the arresting officer/s to arrest the person of the
Petitioner’s contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates both the Constitution accused makes the latter a fugitive from justice and is not equivalent to a commission
and Section 1, Chapter 1, Book III of EO No. 292, for depriving the President of his of another offense of obstruction of justice.31
power of control over the executive departments deserves scant consideration. In the
first place, Memorandum Circular No. 58 was promulgated by the Office of the
President and it is settled that the acts of the secretaries of such departments, Petitioner, however, vehemently argues that the law does not explicitly provide that it
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved is applicable only to another person and not to the offender himself. 32 Petitioner thus
or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief contends that where the "law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish." 33
Executive.28 Memorandum Circular No. 58 has not been reprobated by the President;
therefore, it goes without saying that the said Memorandum Circular has the approval Again, this Court does not agree.
of the President.
Petitioner conveniently forgets that it is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal
Anent the second ground raised by petitioner, the same is without merit. statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused.34 Courts must not bring
cases within the provision of a law which are not clearly embraced by it. No act can be
Petitioner argues that the evasion of arrest constitutes a violation of Section 1(e) of PD pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by statute; so, too, no person who is
No. 1829, the same is quoted hereunder as follows: not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within them.35 Any reasonable
doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.36
(e) Delaying the prosecution of criminal case by obstructing the service of processes
or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscals' offices in Tanodbayan, or in the Indeed, if the law is not explicit that it is applicable only to another person and not the
courts. x x x offender himself, this Court must resolve the same in favor of the accused. In any case,
this Court agrees with the discussion of the CA, however sarcastic it may be, is
nevertheless correct given the circumstances of the case at bar.
Specifically, petitioner contends that respondent's act of going underground obstructed
the service of a court process, particularly the warrant of arrest.29
Lastly, petitioner argues that the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of the complaint
against respondent for violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI, of RA No. 7610. Said
This Court does not agree. Section reads:

There is no jurisprudence that would support the stance taken by petitioner. Any person who shall commit any other act of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or
Notwithstanding petitioner's vehement objection in the manner the CA had disposed of responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development, including those
the said issue, this Court agrees with the same. The CA ruled that the position taken covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised
by petitioner was contrary to the spirit of the law on "obstruction of justice," in the wise:
Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum While petitioner would argue that the victim was "brainwashed" by respondent into
period. executing the affidavit,41 this Court finds no conclusive proof thereof. Besides, even if
their reliance on the victim’s affidavit may be wrong, it is elementary that not every
On this note, the Provincial Prosecutor in disapproving the recommendation of the erroneous conclusion of fact is an abuse of discretion. 42 As such, this Court will not
Investigating Prosecutor to file the information for violation of Section 10(a), Article VI, interfere with the said findings of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice
of RA No. 7610, gave the following reasons: absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. The determination of probable
cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the prosecutor and
ultimately on the Secretary of Justice; it is an executive function, the correctness of the
APPROVED for: (1) x x x (2) x x x The recommendation to file an information for viol. exercise of which is a matter that this Court will not pass upon absent a showing of
of Sec. 10 (a) RA # 7610 vs. M. Vistan is hereby denied. The affidavit of Ma. Mercedes grave abuse of discretion.
Vistan, the minor involved, is to the effect that she found happiness and peace of mind
away from the complainant and in the company of her relatives, including her brother,
respondent Michael Vistan. How can her joining the brother be prejudicial to her with WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 13, 2004 Decision and September
such statement?37 16, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76019 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
Said finding was affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.
SO ORDERED.

This Court is guided by First Women's Credit Corporation and Shig Katamaya v. Hon.
Hernando B. Perez et. al,38where this Court emphasized the executive nature of
preliminary investigations, to wit:

x x x the determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an

executive function, one that properly pertains at the first instance to the public
prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. For this reason, the Court
considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary
investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for
the prosecution of supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do not
reverse the Secretary of Justice’s findings and conclusions on the matter of probable
cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion. Thus, petitioners will prevail
only if they can show that the CA erred in not holding that public respondent’s
resolutions were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 391avvphi1

Were the acts of the Provincial Prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice tainted with grave
abuse of discretion?

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act not at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or hostility.40

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the provincial prosecutor and the Secretary
of Justice did not act with grave abuse of discretion, as their conclusion of lack of
probable cause was based on the affidavit of the alleged victim herself. The reasons
for the cause of action were stated clearly and sufficiently. Was their reliance on the
victim's affidavit constitutive of grave abuse of discretion? This Court does not think so.
JACKSON PADIERNOS Y QUEJADA, JACKIE ROXAS Y GERMAN AND DENROs represented that the transportation of the seized lumber had the required
ROLANDO MESINA Y JAVATE, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE permit but they, too, failed to produce any supporting document.
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015
The DENRO group - composed of Balico, Tarcila Vivero (Vivero) and Rodolfo
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Jackson Tumagan (Tumagan) - and the policemen, Gamboa and Romulo Derit, guarded the
Padieraos y Quejada (Padiernos), Jackie Roxas y German (Roxas) and Rolando truck loaded with lumber.4
Mesina y Javate (Mesina). The petitioners seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals'
(CA) decision1 dated May 10, 2007 and resolution2 dated December 20, 2007 in CA- The DENRO group decided to transfer the truck and the lumber to the police station at
G.R. CR No. 28920. The assailed CA rulings affirmed with modification the decision of Poblacion. They transferred the lumber first from November 15 to November 16, 2002,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66, Baler, Aurora in Criminal Case No. 3122. and left the truck at the national highway in Dingalan, guarded by the DENROs and
some police officers.5

The petitioners were charged as accessories to the crime of illegal possession of On November 16, 2002, accused Gatdula, Santiago, and petitioners Mesina, Roxas,
lumber, in violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code and Padiernos arrived at the place where the truck was being held in custody. 6
of the Philippines. According to the Information, the petitioners took away the truck
that carried the lumber to prevent its use as evidence and to avoid its Santiago, who claimed ownership of the truck,7 agreed with the DENROs and the police
confiscation and forfeiture. The Information specifically states as follows: officers to bring the truck to the police station. Santiago gave the truck key to Mesina
who volunteered to drive the truck; while Padiernos asked Balico where the seized
lumbers were.8
That at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning on November 15, 2002, in Caragsacan, Mesina started the engine and Roxas, Santiago, and Padiernos immediately got on
Dingalan, Aurora, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforesaid board at the front of the truck. The DENRO group also got on board at the back of the
principals, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there, truck. SPO2 Renato Mendoza (Mendoza) and his companion, PO1 John Fajardo
unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in their possession and control 818 pieces of (Fajardo) follow on a motorcycle.
lumber with a total volume of 10,253 board feet and valued at P133,289.00 loaded on
a ten-wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 and owned by the accused Santiago Since the truck was then parked opposite the direction to the police station, Balico
Castillo y Cruz without any permit, license or documents from the proper authority and thought that Mesina would maneuver the truck so that they could proceed to the police
that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the following day, November 16, station. To their surprise, Mesina increased the truck's speed and headed towards the
2002, the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually helping direction of Nueva Ecija, leaving behind their two policemen escorts 9 who chased the
one another, did then and there unlawfully, feloniously and willfully take and truck and fired three warning shots.10
carry away the aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it
could not be used as evidence and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor of As the truck sped faster, Balico yelled "Saklolo! Saklolo!" but the truck maintained its
the government as tool or instrument of the crime, [emphasis and italics supplied] speed. SPO2 Mendoza corroborated this testimony; he and Fajardo saw the three
DENROs waving but could not hear what they were saying.
CONTRARY TO LAW. When the truck had exited Dingalan, SPO2 Mendoza and Fajardo decided not to
Accused Santiago Castillo (Santiago), Frederico Castillo (Frederico), and Roger pursue the truck anymore and simply reported the incident to the Philippine Army
Mostera (Mostera) remain at large; accused Eddie Gatdula (Gatdula) pleaded not guilty stationed at Brgy. Tanawan.
as principal to the crime; while petitioners Padiernos, Mesina, and Roxas pleaded
not guilty as accessories to the crime. The Philippine Army blocked the road with a 50-caliber machine gun and flagged down
the truck at Brgy. Bagting, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija.11
Prosecution's evidence
As the truck passengers alighted, petitioner Padiernos uttered bad words to them,
The presented evidence of the prosecution shows that on November 15, 2002, the saying that they had no right to apprehend the truck and the lumber. 12
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Officer (DENRO) Felimon Balico
(Balico) approached a truck loaded with lumber, which was parked at a national Police officers Gamboa, Joemar Balmores, Sagudang, Fajardo, and
highway in Dingalan, Aurora (Dingalan)3 The truck bore the name "JEROME" with Plate Mendoza13 immediately proceeded to Brgy. Bagting where they found the DENRO
No. TFZ-747. Balico requested from the truck driver, Frederico, and the truck helper, group, Padiernos, and Roxas. The DENROs and the policemen proceeded back to
Mostera, the lumber's supporting documents but they failed to produce any. Dingalan, with police officer Gamboa driving the truck to the police station compound.

Balico reported the matter to SPO4 Ramil Gamboa (Gamboa) and SPO4 Romulo Derit.
Thereafter, he proceeded to the DENR office to report the incident. Some of the Evidence for the defense
Mesina testified that on November 16, 2002, he was watching television with his wife
and children when his former employer, Santiago, arrived and asked him to bring the The RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were categorical,
latter's truck to Cabanatuan City. He refused Santiago's request because he knew that straightforward, and consistent; they had no improper motive to testify falsely against
the truck had been engaged in illegal activities; particularly, the truck had been the petitioners.33 Thus, the RTC disregarded the petitioners' defense that they did not
previously loaded with lumber that were confiscated. 14 intentionally take away the truck.34

Santiago insisted and assured him that he would take care of everything and that there The RTC also found that the petitioners' testimonies and admissions established their
was really no problem with the truck. Mesina finally agreed and rode in Santiago's car. prior knowledge that the truck had been previously confiscated for illegal transport of
Santiago asked him to fetch Roxas to accompany them.15 forest products. This explains the reluctance of Mesina and Roxas to go with Santiago
in getting the truck.35
Roxas was resting in his house when Santiago and Mesina arrived. Santiago asked
Roxas if he could drive his truck to Cabanatuan City.16 Roxas refused because he had The RTC further ruled that Padiernos' defense of denial fails in view of Balico's
already heard of the truck's apprehension,17 but he finally relented after Santiago testimony that Padiernos gave the DENROs a "tongue-lashing" as they had no right
assured him that there was no problem with the truck. They proceeded to Caragsacan, to apprehend the truck and its cargo.36 Padiernos' knowledge of the status of the
Dingalan where the truck was parked.18 On cross-examination, Roxas testified that he truck is also undeniable as he admitted his familiarity with the townsfolk of Dingalan
knew very well that the vehicle was a "hot" truck but he relied on Santiago's claim that and its rampant problem of illegal transport of forest products. The RTC concluded that
the problem already been settled.19 the incident and the personalities involved could not have escaped Padiernos' notice,
yet he still went with them to get the truck.37
On their way to Caragsacan, Dingalan, they saw Padiernos at the waiting shed of
Aplayang Malaki, Dingalan.20 According to Padiernos, he had been waiting for a ride to Finally, the RTC disregarded the petitioners' claim that they did not hear the
Cabanatuan City from 12:30 to 1:30 p.m. but only Santiago's group came policemen's warning shots and the DENROs' shouts because of the noisy engine and
by.21 Padiernos hitched a ride with them after learning that they would bring Santiago's the defective windows of the truck. The RTC had observed during its ocular inspection
truck to Cabanatuan City.22 of the truck that both windows were in order and sounds outside could be clearly heard
even with a running engine.38
Padiernos testified that he only learned where the truck was parked when they reached
Caragsacan.23 The CA's ruling

On reaching the place where the truck was parked, they all alighted from the car and The CA affirmed the RTC's decision and adopted its factual findings, but modified the
walked towards the back of the truck; Padiernos crossed the street. Mesina saw penalty imposed on the petitioners. 39
Santiago talk to DENRO Tumagan and several other persons for about 25 to 30
minutes.24 The CA considered the subject truck as an "instrument" in the commission of the
offense, within the meaning of Article 19, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code
Thereafter, Santiago handed the truck keys to Mesina.25 Padiernos seated himself in (RPC). While the lumber had already been unloaded and placed in police custody, the
the front cab of the truck with Santiago and Roxas, while Mesina took the driver's truck still served as the essential link to the discovery of the loaded undocumented
seat.26 Mesina drove the car towards Cabanatuan City upon Santiago's instruction. 27 lumber. Similarly, its presentation as evidence is material in proving the commission of
the offense of violation of P.D. 705, as amended.40

The petitioners unanimously testified that they did not hear people shouting or tapping The CA added that since the petitioners' violation of P.D. 705 is mala prohibita, their
on the truck to stop them.28 They also did not notice any motorcycle following them as intent, motive, or knowledge need not be shown. Nevertheless, their defense of denial
the truck's side mirrors were broken. They did not reach Cabanatuan City because the must fail in view of the evidence on record and their own admissions that they were
Philippine Army flagged them down.29 aware of the truck's involvement in an illegal activity at the time that they drove it
towards Nueva Ecija.4 1
After the incident, Padiernos boarded a jeepney bound for Cabanatuan City while
Roxas and Mesina boarded a jeepney bound for Dingalan.30 The prosecution had also clearly established Padiernos's close association with
Santiago, Roxas, and Mesina. Padiernos previously facilitated Santiago's application
The RTC's ruling for mayor's permit as a lumber dealer; Roxas is a family friend of Padiernos and his
father is Padiernos's driver, while Mesina and Padiernos' are long-time
The RTC convicted petitioners Padiernos, Mesina and Roxas as accessories to the acquaintances.42
crime of violation of P.D. 705.31
The Parties' Arguments
The RTC ruled that the petitioners had a common design to take away the truck that
earlier had been used in violating P.D. No. 705 or the Forestry Reform Code. 32
 xxx the aforesaid accessories, confederating together and mutually helping one another,
The petitioners argue that they could not be held liable as accessories for violation of did then and there unlawfully, feloniously and willfully take and carry away the
P.D. 705 because the DENROs and the police authorities had already discovered the aforementioned ten wheeler truck with Plate No. TFZ-747 so it could not be used as
crime and had, in fact, control over the truck when the petitioners drove it towards evidence and avoid confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or
Nueva Ecija.43 Article 19 of the RPC only punishes accessories who prevent the instrument of the crime.
discovery of the crime.44 Applying the doctrine, the controlling charge against the petitioners is not the allegation that
they were accessories to the crime, which is merely the public prosecutor's conclusion
On the other hand, the respondent maintains that the petitioners' acts were aimed at of law or the technical name of an accused's criminal participation under Article 19 of
preventing the discovery of the crime. The respondent alleges that without the truck, the RPC, but the factual charges against them. In short, their alleged acts control in
the accused in the present case could easily produce the necessary transportation defining the crime for which they should stand trial.
documents to account for the entire volume of the confiscated lumber.45 The
respondent refers to the testimony of James Martinez of CENRO Dingalan who tried to These material factual allegations pertain to their act of conspiring with each other to take
make it appear that the seized lumber had the proper transportation permit for 8,254 and carry away the subject truck so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its
board feet and 261 pieces of lumber. This transportation permit did not tally, however, confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as tool or instrument of the crime.
with the actual volume of the confiscated lumber of 10,253 board feet, totaling 818 Notably, the petitioners had been sufficiently apprised of these factual allegations, against
pieces.46 which they should defend themselves.

Reading the facts alleged in the Information and proved at the trial, in relation with the legal
The Court's Ruling definition of "accessories" under Article 19 of the RPC, we find that the RTC and the CA
erred in convicting the accused as accessories to the crime of violation of P.D. 705.
We emphasize at the outset the well-settled doctrine that an appeal throws the whole case
wide open for review. An appeal therefore empowers, and even obligates, the appellate court Article 19, paragraph 251 defines "accessories" as those who, with knowledge of the
to correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if these errors have not commission of the crime and without having participated therein, either as principals or
been raised. It is likewise settled that when an accused appeals, he opens the whole case accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the
for a new trial.47 body of the crime, its effects or instruments, in order to prevent its discovery.
The Court is therefore not precluded from determining the correct criminal liability of the Under this provision, the punished acts should have been committed for the purpose
appealing accused, and from imposing the corresponding punishment in accordance with of preventing the discovery of the crime.52
the charges in the Information and the crime proved during trial.
In the present case, the crime punishable under P.D. 705 - the illegal possession of
Thus, in People v. Manalili et al.,48 the Court held that since the Information in that case lumber - had already been discovered at the time the petitioners took the truck. This
contained a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessarily constituting both discovery led to the confiscation of the truck and the loaded lumber on November 15, 2002.
the crimes of illegal possession of firearms and of murder, the separate crime of multiple The petitioners took the truck on November 16, 2002, after its confiscation.
murder may be validly taken into account49 in the resolution of the appeal before the Court,
although the appellants have been acquitted of illegal possession of firearms. The Court In these lights, the petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime charged in the
ruled that the appellants in that case were fairly apprised of the nature of the crime of multiple Information as the legal definition of the technical term "accessories" does not coincide with
murder and granted a fair opportunity to defend themselves. the factual allegations in the Information that serves as the actual criminal charge against
the petitioners.
Even with this premise, we find that insofar as the petitioners are concerned, the facts
alleged in the Information and the crime proved in the present case do not make the The factual allegations in the Information constitute the crime of obstruction of justice
petitioners liable as accessories for violation of P.D. 705. They are, however, liable for under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829
violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.
The petitioners, however, cannot go scot-free. The factual allegations in the Information,
The petitioners are not liable as accessories to the crime while not constituting an offense committed by accessories under Article 19, paragraph 2 of
the RPC, constitute instead the criminal offense of obstruction of justice, which is defined
The well-settled doctrine is that the allegations in the Information determine the nature of the under Section 1(b) of P.D. No. 1829 entitled "Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and
offense, and not the technical name that the public prosecutor assigns in the preamble of Prosecution of Criminal Offenders."
the Information. From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, the accused is not
concerned with the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way P.D. 1829 addresses the necessity of penalizing acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend
aids him in a defense on the merits. His attention should be directed and his interest should to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and prosecution of criminal
be on the facts alleged. The real question is not "did he commit a crime given in the law offenders.
with some technical and specific name," but "did he perform the actsalleged in the
body of the information in the manner therein set forth."50 Under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, the crime of obstruction of justice is committed through the
following acts:
In the present case, the Information charges the petitioners of committing the following acts:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from According to Mesina, Roxas also initially refused to go with them because he already
1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or heard the news of the truck's apprehension. Roxas admitted that he only agreed to join
willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and Santiago and Mesina, after being assured that there was no problem with the truck.
the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following
acts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Padiernos' demeanor after the army flagged them down establishes his knowledge of the
xxxx truck's involvement with the seized lumber. Padiernos uttered bad words at the DENROs,
saying they had no right to apprehend the truck and the lumber. This testimony, together
(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with his close association with the other petitioners, destroys his flimsy defense of denial.
with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as
evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in criminal cases, or to be
used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in criminal cases; xxx" [emphasis The RTC's findings during its ocular inspection of the truck also prove that the petitioners
supplied] deliberately drove the truck to Nueva Ecija despite evident knowledge of the policemen's
warning shots, tapping, and the DENROs shouting for help from the back of the truck.
The factual allegations in the Information, as duly proved during trial, show that the
petitioners' acts actually constituted a violation of Section 1(b) above. Clearly, these testimonies, the petitioners' admissions, and the findings of the trial court
negate the petitioners' defense of denial of their intent to take the truck and their knowledge
First, the Information duly alleges all the essential elements of the crime of obstruction of of the truck's involvement in an illegal activity.
justice under Section 1(b).
The unanimous factual findings of the RTC and the CA - such as the petitioners' close
The factual allegations in the Information clearly charge the accused of taking and carrying association with each other, their flimsy defense of denial of their intent to take away the
away the truck so that it could not be used as evidence and to avoid its confiscation truck, and the totality of their acts showing their common design to take the truck - lead us
and forfeiture in favor of the government as a tool or instrument of the crime. to conclude that the petitioners had indeed mutually conspired with one another to take away
the truck to suppress it from being used as evidence in the criminal investigation or
In the present case, the truck that carried the undocumented lumber serves as material proceeding for violation of P.D. 705.
evidence that is indispensable in the criminal investigation and prosecution for violation of
P.D. 705. Particularly, the truck is an indispensable link to the persons involved in the illegal Since the crime charged in the Information and the crime proved during trial point to the
possession/transportation of the seized lumber as the permit for the transportation of the petitioners' violation of P.D. 1829, we reverse the CA's findings and find the petitioners guilty
lumber necessarily involves the truck and the lumber. According to DENR forest ranger of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829.
Rogelio Pajimna,53 the transport of lumber should be covered with supporting documents
that should be in the possession of the transporter. Under Section 1 of the same law, the penalty for the crime of obstruction of justice is prision
correccionalin its maximum period, or a fine ranging from P1,000.00 to P6,000.00 pesos, or
Second, the petitioners deliberately took the truck or "suppressed" this particular evidence. both.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The term "suppress" means to subdue or end by force. 54
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Court of Appeals' decision dated
Specifically, the petitioners intentionally suppressed the truck as evidence, with the intent May 10, 2007, and its resolution dated December 20, 2007. We find petitioners Jackson
to impair its availability and prevent its use as evidence in the criminal investigation Padiernos y Quejada, Jackie Roxas y German, and Rolando Mesina y Javate GUILTY for
or proceeding for violation of P.D. 705. This intent was duly proved during trial. violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. They are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of prision correccional for 4 years, 9 months, and 11 days to 5 years, 4 months, and 20 days.
It is undisputed that Santiago owns the truck, which serves as his link to the illegal
possession/transport of the seized lumber. Santiago had every reason and motive to take
his truck after its confiscation. Without the truck, Santiago could be exculpated and the SO ORDERED.
forthcoming criminal investigation or proceedings for violation of P.D. 705 would be
frustrated.

The petitioners' intent to take and carry away the truck is established by their knowledge of
the status of the truck and their commission of the crime at Santiago's prompting.

Notably, both the RTC and the CA correctly considered the testimonies of the witnesses and
the petitioners' admissions in ruling that the petitioners knew that the truck had been involved
in the illegal transportation/possession of the seized lumber.

Mesina admitted that he knew the truck's involvement in illegal activities as it had
beenpreviously loaded with lumber that was confiscated.
G.R. Nos. 186659-710 October 19, 2011 February 2, 1993 414493 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,

ZACARIA A. CANDAO, ABAS A. CANDAO AND ISRAEL B. HARON, Petitioners, vs. February 2, 1993 414494 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
February 3, 1993 414499 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 450,

DECISION February 5, 1993 414500 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,
February 5, 1993 461801 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
February 18, 1993 461803 Israel Haron & Zacaria Candao 500,
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is theDecision1 dated February 18, 1993 461804 Israel Haron & Zacaria Candao 104,
October 29, 2008 and Resolution2 dated February 20, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) finding the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation February 22, 1993 461876 Israel Haron & Zacaria Candao 500,
of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
February 22, 1993 461877 Israel Haron & Zacaria Candao 500,
The Facts February 22, 1993 461878 Israel Haron & Zacaria Candao 500,
February 22, 1993 461879 Israel Haron & Zacaria Candao 500,
On August 5, 1993, Chairman Pascasio S. Banaria of the Commission on Audit (COA)
constituted a team of auditors from the central office to conduct an Expanded Special February 22, 1993 461880 Israel Haron & Zacaria Candao 500,
Audit of the Office of the Regional Governor, Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao
(ORG-ARMM). State Auditors Heidi L. Mendoza (Team Leader) and Jaime Roxas February 22, 1993 461881 Israel Haron & Zacaria Candao 500,
(Member) were directed to conduct the said audit under the supervision of Jaime P.
Naranjo (State Auditor V). From August 24 to September 1, 1993, the expanded audit February 24, 1993 461888 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 64,0
was thus conducted on the financial transactions and operations of ORG-ARMM for the March 18, 1993 461932 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,
period July 1992 to March 1993.
March 18, 1993 461933 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,
As stated in Special Audit Office (SAO) Report No. 93-25 submitted by the audit team,
March 19, 1993 461934 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 350,
it was found that illegal withdrawals were made from the depository accounts of the
agency through the issuance of checks payable to the order of petitioner Israel B. Haron March 22, 1993 461935 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,
(Disbursing Officer II) without the required disbursement vouchers. The following are
the details of the government accounts and the fifty-two (52) checks3 issued and March 22, 1993 461936 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,
encashed without proper supporting documents:
TOTAL ₱11,
PNB Account No. 370-3208
Account No. 844061 (Treasurer of the Philippines)
DATE CHECK NO. SIGNATORIES AMOUNT
DATE CHECK SIGNATORIES AMOUNT
ISSUED ISSUED NO.

December 29, 1992 414431 Israel Haron & Abas Candao January
500,000.00 11, 968739 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 400,000.00
1993
December 29, 1992 414432 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 439,585.00
January 11,
1993
December 29, 1992 414433 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 210,000.00
January 26, 1993 414487 Israel Haron & Abas Candao January
500,000.00 11, 968740 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 400,000.00
1993
January 26, 1993 414488 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00
January 11, 968741 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 400,000.00
January 26, 1993 414489 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00
1993
 In a letter dated September 10, 1993, Chairman Banaria demanded from petitioner
January 13, 968751 Pandical Santiago & Abas 120,000.00
Haron to produce and restitute to the ARMM-Regional Treasurer immediately the full
1993 Candao
amount of ₱21,045,570.64 and submit his explanation within seventy-two (72) hours
January 18, 968804 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 380,000.00 together with the official receipt issued by the ARMM Regional Treasurer in
1993 acknowledgment of such restitution.

March 2, 1993 974192 Israel Haron & Zacaria Candao 250,000.00 On April 17, 1998, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao, filed in the Sandiganbayan criminal cases for malversation of public funds
March 4, 1993 974208 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00 against the following ORG-ARMM officials/employees: Zacaria A. Candao (Regional
Governor), Israel B. Haron (Disbursing Officer II), Abas A. Candao (Executive
March 4, 1993 974209 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00 Secretary) and Pandical M. Santiago (Cashier). They were charged with violation of
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, under the following informations
March 4, 1993 974210 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00
with identical allegations except for the varying date, number and amount of the check
March 4, 1993 974211 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00 involved in each case:

March 4, 1993 974212 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 30,000.00 Criminal Case Nos. 24569-24574, 24576-24584, 24593, 24595-246204

March 5, 1993 974227 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00

(42 counts involving checks in the total amount of ₱17,190,585.00)
March 5, 1993 974228 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00
That on or about 29 December 1992, in Cotabato City, Philippines, and within the
March 12, 1993 974244 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 100,000.00 jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Israel B. Haron, a low-ranking public
officer being the Disbursing Officer of the Office of the Regional Governor, and as such
March 18, 1993 974324 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00 is responsible and accountable for the funds of the said office in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, in connivance and in conspiracy with [Abas] Candao,
March 18, 1993 974325 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00
Executive Secretary of the same office, who is a high ranking officer, while in the
March 18, 1993 974326 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00 performance of their respective official functions, taking advantage of their official
positions, and committing the offense in relation to their respective functions, with gross
March 18, 1993 974327 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00 abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously withdraw the
amount of P500,000.00 from the depository account of the Office of the Regional
March 18, 1993 974328 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00 Governor thru the issuance of Check No. 414431 dated 29 December 1992, payable
to the order of accused Israel B. Haron, without the required disbursement voucher and
March 19, 1993 974339 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 200,000.00 once in possession of the said amount withdrawn, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to their own personal use and benefit the
March 19, 1993 974340 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 25,000.00 amount of P500,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid sum as abovestated.
March 19, 1993 974341 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 172,000.00

March 29, 1993 979533 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00 CONTRARY TO LAW.

March 29, 1993 979543 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00 Criminal Case Nos. 24585- 24592 and 245945
March 29, 1993 979544 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 500,000.00
(9 counts involving checks in the total amount of ₱3,854,985.64)
March 29, 1993 979545 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 300,000.00
That on or about 18 February 1993, in Cotabato City, Philippines, and within the
March 30, 1993 979590 Israel Haron & Abas Candao 150,000.00 jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Israel B. Haron, a low-ranking public
officer being the Disbursing Officer of the Office of the Regional Governor, and as such
TOTAL ₱9,927,000.00
is responsible and accountable for the funds of the said office in the Autonomous
GRAND TOTAL = ₱21,045,570.64 Region in Muslim Mindanao, in connivance and in conspiracy with Zacaria Candao,
Regional Governor of the same office, who is a high ranking officer, while in the
performance of their respective official functions, taking advantage of their official
positions, and committing the offense in relation to their respective functions, with gross In response, the Finance and Budget Management Services of ORG-ARMM informed
abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously withdraw the the audit team that the vouchers were already submitted to COA Resident Auditor,
amount of P500,000.00 from the depository account of the Office of the Regional Supervising State Auditor IV Rosalinda Gagwis, purportedly under transmittal letters
Governor thru the issuance of Check No. 461803 dated 18 February 1993, payable to dated March 4 and March 30, 1993. Mendoza then personally verified from Gagwis
the order of accused Israel B. Haron, without the required disbursement voucher and who denied having received the subject vouchers and issued a certification to that
once in possession of the said amount withdrawn, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously effect. In a letter dated September 10, 1993, Chairman Banaria finally demanded for
take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to their own personal use and benefit the the restitution of the funds illegally withdrawn through the issued 52 checks and to
amount of P500,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the comply with such demand within 72 hours from receipt of said letter. As to the absence
aforesaid sum as abovestated. of her signature in the audit report, she explained that she was already on maternity
leave when the interim report (SAO Report No. 93-25) was submitted. However, she,
CONTRARY TO LAW. together with audit team member Jaime B. Roxas executed a Joint Affidavit dated May
17, 1996 regarding their conduct of the expanded audit and their findings and
recommendation. Although Haron submitted copies of disbursement vouchers to the
Criminal Case No. 245756 COA receiving clerk, this was made beyond the 72-hour deadline given to them.9

That on or about 13 January 1993, in Cotabato City, Philippines, and within the On cross-examination, witness Mendoza was asked if the audit team had informed the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Israel B. Haron, a low-ranking public office or parties concerned that they are going to be audited (entry conference). She
officer being the Disbursing Officer of the Office of the Regional Governor, and as such replied that this was a sensitive assignment, recalling that they were threatened after
is responsible and accountable for the funds of the said office in the Autonomous their identities were established during the earlier audit of the same office such that she
Region in Muslim Mindanao, in connivance and in conspiracy with Pandical Santiago had to be brought back to Manila. At that time, the Regional Governor was accused
and [Abas] Candao, Cashier and Executive Secretary, respectively, of the same office, Candao. Hence, during the expanded audit, the team was unable to proceed as in
while in the performance of their respective official functions, taking advantage of their ordinary situations. While they did an entry conference during the previous main audit,
official positions, and committing the offense in relation to their respective functions, they were unable to do so at the time of the expanded audit. Again for security reasons,
with gross abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously the team also did not conduct an exit conference after field work; they would be risking
withdraw the amount of P120,000.00 from the depository account of the Office of the their lives if they discuss there and then their findings. Due to threat to her life, it was
Regional Governor thru the issuance of Check No. 968751 dated 13 January 1993, her team supervisor (Naranjo) and member (Roxas) who personally retrieved the
payable to the order of accused Israel B. Haron, without the required disbursement documents in Cotabato City. She admitted the belated submission of original vouchers
voucher and once in possession of the said amount withdrawn, wilfully, unlawfully and (October 29, 1993) to the COA central office but these are without supporting
feloniously take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to their own personal use and documents.10
benefit the amount of P120,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the government in
the aforesaid sum as abovestated.
For the accused, the first witness was Nick Luz Aduana who was the Director of Finance
of ORG-ARMM from July 1991 until his resignation in March 1993. He testified that his
CONTRARY TO LAW. functions then include the supervision and overseeing of the three divisions: Budget,
Accounting and Management. When report of the audit team came out, he was
At their arraignment, all accused pleaded not guilty to the charge of malversation. In surprised because they were not informed of the audit. He was familiar with the 52
the meantime, accused Santiago died and consequently the case against him in checks because the disbursement vouchers passed through his office. He explained
Criminal Case No. 24575 was dismissed. the procedure with respect to the processing of cash advances as follows: generally,
there were cash advances made in ARMM which cover travels, salaries, etc. but
The prosecution’s lone witness was Heidi L. Mendoza, 7 COA State Auditor IV. She particularly for "peace and order campaign," it emanates from the ORG when the
testified that their expanded audit, conducted from August 24 to September 1, 1993, Regional Governor issues an authority for cash advance, and then they process the
disclosed the illegal withdrawals of funds from the PNB and Treasury accounts of ORG- voucher (Finance and Budget Management Services); once their division have
ARMM involving 52 checks issued without the required disbursement vouchers. performed their accounting functions relative to the vouchers, the same are forwarded
Specifically, their attention was caught by the fact that the Report of Checks Issued by to the Regional Governor for approval or in his absence to his Executive Secretary;
the Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDDO) showed that the subject 52 checks have after the approval of the voucher, it will be forwarded to the Cash Division for the
no assigned voucher numbers. The audit team demanded for the original of said issuance of check; the person who will liquidate the cash advance is usually the
RCIDDO for the months of December 1992, February and March 1993, which were employee mentioned in the voucher; and after they have prepared all the liquidation
supposed to be prepared and submitted by the disbursing officer, but the ORG-ARMM papers, these are submitted to the Budget and Management Division before forwarding
did not submit the same. In a letter dated August 24, 1993, the COA likewise made a them to the COA Auditor. He maintained that the original disbursement vouchers have
demand from the Regional Governor through the resident auditor for the production of already been submitted to the COA Special Audit Office. Since 1991, they have never
the original disbursement vouchers and complete supporting documents of the subject received any notice of disallowance of their disbursements, including those intended
checks.8 for "peace and order campaign." Being the first ARMM set of officials, they had sought
the advice of their Auditor as to proper accounting procedures; they followed the advice had not issued a notice of disallowance to ORG-ARMM although notices of suspension
of Auditor Gagwis who said that there should be authority to cash advance coming from have been issued for minor deficiencies noted during post-audit; these notices of
the Regional Governor which should be given to the Disbursing Officer. He identified suspension were usually complied with by the agency.13
the vouchers presented by the defense as the ones processed by their division with the
corresponding amounts reflected therein. Insofar as the expanded audit is concerned, On cross-examination, witness Gagwis said that upon seeing the bundles of vouchers
they were not given the opportunity to defend the case as they were not given the so- being submitted to her office, she immediately refused to accept, and sort of "washed
called exit conference.11 her hands" by telling her staff that they were no longer incharge of ORG-ARMM. She
did not actually scan those documents and examine their contents. She also did not
On cross-examination, witness Aduana hinted on political reasons why an expanded receive the Monthly Report of Disbursements from said office. As to the execution of
audit was conducted when Regional Governor Pagdanganan assumed office despite the July 22, 1998 Affidavit, she insisted that she did it voluntarily five years later in order
the fact that an earlier audit was already made during the administration of Governor to clarify herself after hearing about the case filed in the Sandiganbayan and her name
Candao. He claimed that he did not receive any copy of the demand letter dated August was being dragged because of the Certification she made in August 1993. As to the
24, 1993; he was no longer connected with ARMM at the time. He also maintained that earlier Certification, she maintained that she did not receive the subject vouchers and
the disbursement vouchers were processed by their office and entered into their books she does not know where these documents are at present. 14
of account. However, when asked what happened to these books of account, Aduana
said these are with the Office of the Regional Governor. He admitted that the only Another witness, Brigida C. Fontanilla, Chief Accountant, ORG-ARMM, testified that
supporting document for the checks and vouchers were the authority to cash advance; her duties and responsibilities include the processing, updating and recording of
the "peace and order campaign" disbursement is peculiar to ARMM and hence they did transactions of ORG-ARMM in the books of accounts while vouchers are recorded in
not know what supporting documents to attach. When queried about the particular the Journal of Analysis and Obligations (JAO). They also prepared financial reports. As
activities covered by this "peace and order campaign" disbursement, Aduana admitted to cash advances, she explained that the procedure starts with the preparation of the
that he really does not know the breakdown of expenses or for what items in particular voucher at ORG which also issues the authority to withdraw cash advance which is
were the disbursed amounts spent. Their division merely processed the disbursement attached to the disbursement voucher and supporting documents, afterwhich it is
vouchers that were prepared by the ORG, and while his signature appears in said forwarded to the Finance and Budget Management Services for processing: there, it is
vouchers his role was limited to certifying the availability of funds. 12 first submitted to the Budget Division for the request for allotment of obligation, and
next forwarded to the Accounting Division for the journal entry of obligation and
The next witness, Rosalinda G. Gagwis, former COA Resident Auditor of ORG-ARMM, recording in the books of account, and then the documents are forwarded to the Office
testified that in 1991 she was the Chief of the Operation and Review Division (ORD), of the Finance Director for his approval, and thereafter returned back to the ORG for
COA Region XII which at the time has jurisdiction over ORG-ARMM; she was Auditor- final approval for the issuance of the check. Presently, their office is more systematic
in-Charge of ORG-ARMM only up to March 8, 1993 when the separation of COA and organized than it was during the administration of Governor Candao. Sometime in
Region XII personnel and COA-ARMM was implemented. Among her duties as such 1994 during the investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman relative to the subject
Auditor-in-Charge was to conduct a post-audit of the financial transactions of ORG- illegal withdrawals, she was summoned to produce the Cash Receipts Book and Cash
ARMM. In the course of the expanded audit of ORG-ARMM, she was requested to Disbursement Book of the 1991 ARMM seed money for regional, provincial and district
issue the Certification dated August 27, 1993 stating that she has not received the Impact Infrastructure Projects. However, she was not able to comply with the said
January to March 1993 vouchers as stated in the letter of Haron. Subsequently, on July directive because such books are not among those required by the COA for their office;
22, 1998 she executed a two-page Affidavit because she has been hearing that her what the COA directed them to maintain was the JAO, a book of original entry for
previous Certification was misinterpreted to mean that the subject vouchers were "not allotments received and disbursements for the transactions of ORG-ARMM. She wrote
existing." She then clarified that actually, ORG-ARMM tried to submit bundles of a letter-reply to the Ombudsman Investigator and transmitted the original 1992 JAO
vouchers to her office but she refused to accept them because she was no longer which was never returned to their office.15
Auditor-in-Charge of that office as there was already an order separating COA-
Regional Office XII from the COA-ARMM. She confirmed that when ARMM was a newly Explaining the contents of the JAO, witness Fontanilla said that the entries in the
created agency, its officers (Aduana, Brigida Fontanilla and Bartolome Corpus) sought voucher are recorded therein: an obligation number is placed in the request of allotment
her advice regarding accounting procedures. Prior to submission to her office for post- (ROA) which also appears in the voucher. Before such recording in the JAO, the
audit, the accountable officers like the Cashier and Disbursement Officer prepares and disbursement vouchers are presented to their office. Actually, she does not know
submits a Monthly Report of Disbursements to the Accounting Division which, within whether the 1992 JAO still exists or with the Ombudsman Investigator because at the
ten days from receipt and recording in the Books of Accounts, shall submit the same to time, they were holding office temporarily at the office of ORG Auditor which
the auditor for post-audit custody. Based on her experience, however, this deadline unfortunately got burned sometime in 1996.16
was not strictly observed as 25% to 50% of the national agencies are delayed in the
submission of such reports. The usual reasons given were the geographical locations
of the offices in Region XII and ARMM, lack of manpower due to budgetary constraints As for witness Bartolome M. Corpus, his deposition upon oral examination was taken
and lack of know-how of personnel regarding accounting and auditing procedures, on August 27, 2004 before Atty. Edipolo Sarabia, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court
especially if there is a change in administration. As far as she can recall, their office of Davao City. He testified that in 1991 he was appointed Chief of the Management
Division of the Finance and Budget Management Services (FBMS), ORG-ARMM. He their respective sentences, they shall be entitled to the benefit of the three-fold rule as
was placed on floating status for three years by the new Chief of Staff of ORG-ARMM provided in Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
(Nasser Pangandaman) upon the election of a new Regional Governor, Lininding
Pangandaman who defeated Governor Candao. As Finance Director, it was his Criminal Case Nos. 24585-24592 & 24594
responsibility to review all transactions of the ORG-ARMM and see to it that COA
regulations are in place and supporting documents are complete. After reviewing
documents, which include disbursement vouchers, his office submits the same to the Israel B. Haron and Zacaria A. Candao – convicted of 9 counts of Malversation of Public
COA Regional Officer or to the COA Resident Auditor. Being the internal control unit of Funds and each was sentenced to indeterminate prison term in each case of ten (10)
ORG-ARMM, all transactions and supporting documents must pass through his office. years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8)
As to the transactions covered by the subject 52 checks, he confirmed that these months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay a fine
passed through his office, including the disbursement vouchers, afterwhich these were in each case equivalent to the particular check involved, without subsidiary
forwarded to the Accounting Office and then to the Cash Division for issuance of imprisonment in case of insolvency and the penalty of perpetual special disqualification
checks. He claimed that his subordinates tried to submit the disbursement vouchers to to hold public office and other accessory penalties provided by law. In the service of
the Resident Auditor, as shown by the transmittal letters dated March 4 and March 30, their respective sentences, they shall be entitled to the benefit of the three-fold rule as
1993. However, Ms. Gagwis refused to accept the vouchers because she was no longer provided in Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.20
the Resident Auditor at the time. During the time of Governor Candao, he does not
recall having received any notice of disallowance from the COA although there were The Sandiganbayan found no merit in petitioners’ claim that the subject checks were
times they received a notice of suspension which had been settled. During the time he covered by existing disbursement vouchers which were belatedly submitted and
was on floating status, he discovered that some vouchers including those original received by the COA Central Office on October 29, 1993. It said that had those
vouchers covered by the subject 52 checks were still in his filing cabinet. He then vouchers really existed at the time of the 52 withdrawals petitioners made from
handed them over to Haron. In 1996, he was reinstated by Governor Nur Misuari. 17 December 29, 1992 to March 30, 1993, petitioner Haron could have readily produced
them when required to do so by the special audit team on August 24, 1993. Said court
On cross-examination, witness Corpus said that they tried to submit the vouchers to likewise did not give credence to the testimony of Corpus in view of the August 27,
Gagwis sometime in late March or early April 1993. He was not aware of the August 1993 Certification issued by then COA Auditor Gagwis that she has not received the
27, 1993 Certification issued by Gagwis. When asked about the stated purpose "peace vouchers mentioned in the transmittal letters. Gagwis’ explanation, on the other hand,
and order campaign" in the cash advance vouchers, he confirmed that this was the contradicted the testimony of Corpus that when he returned to his office sometime in
practice at that time and it was only during liquidation that ORG will have the list of May 1993, he found the original vouchers together with the transmittal letters still there
expenses; the supporting documents will come only after the issuance of the in his filing cabinet and have not been submitted to the COA Resident Auditor.
check.18 On re-direct examination, he maintained that there were previous similar
vouchers for "peace and order campaign" which have not been disallowed but only The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioners presented no proof that the cash advances
suspended by the COA.19 intended for "peace and order campaign" were spent for public purposes, as in fact the
alleged disbursement vouchers did not indicate any detail as to the nature of the
Sandiganbayan Ruling expense/s such as purchase of equipment, services, meals, travel, etc. and there were
no supporting documents such as the Request for Issuance of Voucher, Purchase
Request and Inspection Report of the items supposedly purchased. More importantly,
By Decision dated October 29, 2008, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner Haron guilty the vouchers were not accomplished in accordance with existing COA circulars
beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of because they are unnumbered and undated. Hence, the belatedly submitted vouchers
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed in conspiracy with petitioners Zacaria are of doubtful veracity or origin, nay, a fabricated evidence or, as pointed out by the
A. Candao and Abas A. Candao who were likewise sentenced to imprisonment and prosecution, "self-serving or an afterthought, belatedly prepared to give the illegal
ordered to pay a fine equivalent to the amount of the check in each case, as follows: disbursements amounting to the aggregate amount of more than ₱21M, a semblance
of regularity."21 As to the JAO and Certification dated August 18, 1998 issued by Chief
Criminal Case Nos. 24569-24584, Accountant Fontanilla, the Sandiganbayan found there is nothing therein to indicate the
24593, 24595-24620 particular disbursement voucher that corresponds to each of the subject 52 checks
which were neither reflected in the JAO.
Israel B. Haron and Abas A. Candao - convicted of 43 counts of Malversation of Public
Funds and each was sentenced to indeterminate prison term in each case of ten (10) With respect to petitioners’ assertion that the audit conducted by the COA special audit
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) team was incomplete and tainted as it did not follow procedures because the person
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay a fine audited were not notified thereof, the Sandiganbayan found these allegations
in each case equivalent to the particular check involved, without subsidiary unsubstantiated as in fact at the start of the audit on August 24, 1993, the audit team
imprisonment in case of insolvency and the penalty of perpetual special disqualification thru their team leader State Auditor Naranjo, informed the management of ORG-ARMM
to hold public office and other accessory penalties provided by law. In the service of thru the COA Resident Auditor of the expanded special audit to be conducted as they
even requested for the original copies of the disbursement vouchers together with their Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property –Presumption of malversation. - Any
complete supporting documents covering the 52 checks. But despite said letter, the public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds
ORG-ARMM failed to heed the audit team’s request. For the failure of petitioner Haron or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
to account for the funds involved in the illegal withdrawals when asked to do so, the or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
presumption arose that he misappropriated the same, which presumption was not public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
overcome by defense evidence. misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

On the respective liabilities of petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao, the 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
Sandiganbayan held that by their act of co-signing the subject checks, petitioner Haron the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed
was able to consummate the illegal withdrawals without the required disbursement two hundred pesos.
vouchers of the amounts covered by the 43 checks (for Abas) and 9 checks (for
Zacaria). Thus, by their collective acts, said court concluded that petitioners conspired 2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
to effect the illegal withdrawals of public funds which, when required by the COA to be amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
properly accounted for, petitioners failed to do so. thousand pesos.

In its Resolution dated February 20, 2009, the Sandiganbayan denied the prosecution’s 3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
motion to cancel bail bonds and petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos
but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
The Petition
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if
Petitioners raised the following grounds for their acquittal: the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than
twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall
1. …THE SANDIGANBAYAN...COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED PETITIONERS FOR THE CRIME OF
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS DESPITE PROOF POSITIVE THAT, In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
CONTRARY TO WHAT THE INFORMATIONS CHARGED, THERE WERE special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal
DISBURSEMENT VOUCHERS EXCEPT THAT THE COA REFUSED TO to the total value of the property embezzled.
ACCEPT MUCH LESS EXAMINE THE SAME. PETITIONERS WERE THUS
DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THEY WERE CONVICTED FOR The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public fund or property with
OFFENSES NOT COVERED BY THE INFORMATIONS AGAINST THEM. which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.
2. ….THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN (Emphasis supplied.)
NOT APPLYING THE "EQUIPOISE RULE" WHICH IF APPLIED WOULD
HAVE RESULTED IN THE ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONERS. The following elements are essential for conviction in malversation cases:

3. … THE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 1. That the offender is a public officer;
CONVICTING ACCUSED PETITIONERS ZACARIA A. CANDAO AND ABAS
A. CANDAO DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY
WHICH IS THEIR ONLY LINK TO THE OFFENSES HEREIN HAS NOT BEEN 2. That he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.22 of his office;

Our Ruling 3. That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was
accountable; and
The petition has no merit.
4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.23
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
All the foregoing elements were satisfactorily established by the prosecution in this ARMM Chief Accountant who is under the control and supervision of the ORG. Notably,
case. Petitioners have not rebutted the legal presumption that with the Disbursing the JAO is used to summarize obligations incurred and to monitor the balance of
Officer’s (Haron) failure to account for the illegally withdrawn amounts covered by the unobligated allotments, which is prepared by function, and project for each fund and
subject checks when demanded by the COA, they misappropriated and used the said allotment class.24 The JAO is thus separate and distinct from the Report of Checks
funds for their personal benefit. Issued (RCI) which is prepared by the Disbursing Officer to report checks issued for
payment of expenditures and/or prior accounts payable. What is clear is that the
Petitioners however assert that their convictions were based solely on the disbursement of funds covered by the 52 checks issued by the petitioners are subject
Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that the vouchers submitted by the defense were illegal to the rule that disbursement voucher "shall be used by all government entities for all
or irregular, whereas the informations simply alleged their absence or non-existence. money claims" and that the "voucher number shall be indicated on the voucher and on
They contend that said court could not have validly assessed the disbursement every supporting document."25 Inasmuch as the JAO for the months of January,
vouchers as to their legality because that duty pertains to the COA which refused and February and March 1993 do not at all reflect or indicate the number of each of the
failed to examine the same. Had the court allowed the COA to evaluate and make a disbursement vouchers supposedly attached to the 52 checks, it cannot serve as
ruling on the validity of the vouchers, the result would have been different and most evidence of the recording of the original vouchers, much less the existence of those
probably they would have been acquitted of the crime charged. disbursement vouchers at the time of the issuance of the 52 checks and the conduct of
the expanded audit.
We are not persuaded by petitioners’ asseveration.
Petitioners further raise issue on the regularity, completeness and objectivity of the
expanded audit conducted by the COA. However, records showed that the ORG-
The Sandiganbayan categorically ruled that the disbursement vouchers were inexistent ARMM were duly notified of the expanded audit at its commencement and was even
at the time of the issuance of the subject checks and expanded special audit based on requested thru the COA Resident Auditor to submit the needed disbursement vouchers.
its findings that: (1) petitioner Haron could not produce the vouchers upon demand by It must be noted that at an earlier date, a main audit had already been conducted for
the COA in August 1993; (2) Resident Auditor Gagwis certified at about the same time the financial transactions of ORG-ARMM during which State Auditor Mendoza
that to date she has not received the vouchers mentioned in the supposed transmittal experienced threats against her own security that she had to be immediately recalled
letters of March 4 and March 30, 1993; (3) the entries in the duly certified Report of from her assignment. Thus, by the time the expanded audit was conducted in August
Checks Issued by Deputized Disbursing Officer (RCIDDO) of the late Pandical M. 1993 upon the directive of the COA Chairman, petitioners, especially Haron, should
Santiago, Cashier of ORG-ARMM, showed that for the months of January, February have seen to it that the records of disbursements and financial transactions including
and March 1993, there were indeed entries of checks issued with Haron as payee but the period January to March 1993, were in order and available for further audit
no disbursement voucher numbers as these were either lacking, detached or missing, examination. In any case, even if there was no so-called entry conference held, there
and which were verified by the audit team as corresponding to the subject 52 checks is absolutely no showing that petitioners were denied due process in the conduct of the
issued and signed by petitioners and encashed by petitioner Haron who received the expanded audit as they simply refused or failed to heed COA’s request for the
money withdrawn from the government depositary accounts; (4) FBMS Chief Corpus production of disbursement vouchers and likewise ignored the formal demand made by
testified that he discovered the supposed vouchers still there at his office filing cabinet COA Chairman Banaria for the restitution of the illegally withdrawn public funds,
in May 1993 when these supposedly have already been submitted to the COA Resident submitting their compliance only after the special audit team had submitted their report.
Auditor as reflected in the March 4 and March 30, 1993 transmittal letters; and (5) the
supposed original disbursement vouchers belatedly submitted to the COA central office
last week of October 1993, were undated and unnumbered with no supporting In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in holding that the testimonial
documents as required by COA Circular No. 78-79 (April 5, 1978). and documentary evidence presented by the petitioners failed to overcome the prima
facie evidence of misappropriation arising from Haron’s failure to give a satisfactory
explanation for the illegal withdrawals from the ARMM funds under his custody and
Contrary to petitioners’ claim, the special audit team could not have examined the control. Petitioners likewise did not accomplish the proper liquidation of the entire
vouchers presented by the defense (Exhibits "1" to "1-A-43") because the only amount withdrawn, during the expanded audit or any time thereafter. There is therefore
indication of its actual receipt by the COA as admitted by the prosecution, was on no merit in petitioners’ argument that the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the
October 23, 1993 long after the expanded audit was completed and beyond the 72- equipoise rule.
hour deadline specified in the September 10, 1993 demand letter addressed to Haron
for the restitution of the total amount of illegal withdrawals. In addition, such
disbursement vouchers have no supporting documents as required by COA Circular Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there
No. 92-389 dated November 3, 1992. On the other hand, the Certification dated August is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof
18, 1998 issued by ARMM Chief Accountant Fontanilla stating that the vouchers were loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances
regular because these were properly recorded in the JAO, was not given credence by are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
the Sandiganbayan. Upon scrutiny of the JAO covering the period January to March of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not
1993, said court found that it failed to indicate the particular disbursement voucher that fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. 26 Such is
corresponds to each of the 52 checks, aside from the fact that it was prepared by the not the situation in this case because the prosecution was able to prove by adequate
evidence that Disbursing Officer Haron failed to account for funds under his custody
and control upon demand, specifically for the ₱21,045,570.64 illegally withdrawn from Petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and his Executive Secretary Abas A. Candao are both
the said funds. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is accountable public officers within the meaning of Article 217 of the Revised Penal
sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not Code, as amended. No checks can be prepared and no payment can be effected
have them in his possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not without their signatures on a disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. In
satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation other words, any disbursement and release of public funds require their approval,29 as
by the accused is hardly necessary in malversation cases.27 in fact checks issued and signed by petitioner Haron had to be countersigned by them.
Their indispensable participation in the issuance of the subject checks to effect illegal
As to the liability of petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao, the withdrawals of ARMM funds was therefore duly established by the prosecution and the
Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that they acted in conspiracy with petitioner Haron to Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that they acted in conspiracy with petitioner Haron
effect the illegal withdrawals and misappropriation of ORG-ARMM funds. in embezzling and misappropriating such funds.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the Moreover, as such accountable officers, petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A.
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proved by Candao were charged with the duty of diligently supervising their subordinates to
direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during prevent loss of government funds or property, and are thus liable for any unlawful
and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted application of government funds resulting from negligence, as provided in Sections 104
action and concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. and 105 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, which read:
Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated
by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed. It may be deduced Sec. 104. Records and reports required by primarily responsible officers. – The head
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.28 of any agency or instrumentality of the national government or any government-owned
or controlled corporation and any other self-governing board or commission of the
In this case, petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao were co-signatories in government shall exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising
the subject checks issued without the required disbursement vouchers. Their accountable officers under his control to prevent the incurrence of loss of government
signatures in the checks, as authorized officials for the purpose, made possible the funds or property, otherwise he shall be jointly and solidarily liable with the person
illegal withdrawals and embezzlement of public funds in the staggering aggregate primarily accountable therefor. x x x x
amount of ₱21,045,570.64.1avvphil
Sec. 105. Measure of liability of accountable officers. x x x
Petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao assail their conviction as co-
conspirators in the crime of malversation contending that their only participation was in (2) Every officer accountable for government funds shall be liable for all losses resulting
the ministerial act of signing the checks. The checks having passed through processing from the unlawful deposit, use, or application thereof and for all losses attributable to
by finance and accounting personnel of ORG-ARMM, petitioners said they had to rely negligence in the keeping of the funds.
on the presumption of regularity in the performance of their subordinates’ acts.
Furthermore, they assert that since conspiracy requires knowledge of the purpose for The fact that ARMM was still a recently established autonomous government unit at
which the crime was committed, they could not have been conspirators in the design to the time does not mitigate or exempt petitioners from criminal liability for any misuse or
defraud the government. embezzlement of public funds allocated for their operations and projects. The Organic
Act for ARMM (R.A. No. 6734) mandates that the financial accounts of the expenditures
We disagree with such postulation. and revenues of the ARMM are subject to audit by the COA. 30 Presently, under the
Amended Organic Act (R.A. No. 9054), the ARMM remained subject to national laws
As the Regional Governor of ARMM, petitioner Zacaria A. Candao cannot exonerate and policies relating to, among others, fiscal matters and general auditing. 31 Here, the
himself from liability for the illegally withdrawn funds of ORG-ARMM. Under Section prosecution successfully demonstrated that the illegal withdrawals were deliberately
102 (1) of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, he is responsible for all effected through the issuance of checks without the required disbursement vouchers
government funds pertaining to the agency he heads: and supporting documents. And even if petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A.
Candao invoke lack of knowledge in the criminal design of their subordinate, Disbursing
Officer Haron, they are still liable as co-principals in the crime of malversation assuming
Section 102. Primary and secondary responsibility. – (1) The head of any agency of the such misappropriation of public funds was not intentional, as alleged in the
government is immediately and primarily responsible for all government funds informations, but due to their negligence in the performance of their duties. As this Court
and property pertaining to his agency. ratiocinated in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan32 :

x x x x (Emphasis supplied.) Besides, even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded
a case of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional
malversation, under the circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode
of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is committed either intentionally
or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the
perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the
same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. A possible
exception would be when the mode of commission alleged in the particulars of the
indictment is so far removed from the ultimate categorization of the crime that it may be
said due process was denied by deluding the accused into an erroneous
comprehension of the charge against him. That no such prejudice was occasioned on
petitioner nor was he beleaguered in his defense is apparent from the records of this
case.33 (Emphasis supplied.)

Under Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if
the amount involved exceeds ₱22,000.00, in addition to fine equal to the funds
malversed. Considering that neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended
the crime charged, the maximum imposable penalty shall be within the range of the
medium period of reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua, or eighteen (18)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty, which is one degree lower from the
maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range of prision mayor maximum
to reclusion temporal medium, or ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months.34 The penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan on petitioners
needs therefore to be modified insofar as the maximum penalty is concerned and is
hereby reduced to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal medium, for each count.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated October 29, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 24569 to 24574, 24575, 24576
to 24584, 24585 to 24592, 24593, 24594, 24595 to 24620 finding petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds under Article
217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and the Resolution dated
February 20, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division), denying petitioners’ motion
for reconsideration are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that petitioners are
instead accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, in each of the above-
numbered criminal cases.

In addition to the payment of the fine ordered by the Sandiganbayan, and by way of
restitution, the petitioners are likewise ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the Republic
of the Philippines through the ARMM-Regional Treasurer, the total amount of
P21,045,570.64 malversed funds as finally determined by the COA.

In the service of their respective sentences, the petitioners shall be entitled to the
benefit of the three-fold rule as provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.

With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-3565 April 20, 1951 This precise issue was determine in United States vs. Labial, 27 Phil. 87, 88,
in the sense that unless the contrary appears in the records, it will be
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NANG KAY alias SY presumed, that the defendant was informed by the court of his right to counsel;
KEE, defendant-appellant. "if we should insist on finding every fact fully recorded before a citizen can be
punished for an offense against the laws, we should destroy public justice,
and give unbriddled license to crime. Much must be left to intendment and
Andres F. Santos for appellant. presumption for it is often less difficult to do things correctly than to describe
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for them correctly," [People vs. Labial]. The same doctrine was reiterated in
appellee. People vs. Abuyen, 52 Phil., 722 and in United States vs. Custan, 28 Phil., 19.
We see no reason to modify it now. . . .
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
See also the case of People vs. Javier, 64 Phil., 413, wherein it was stated that this
In the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Nang Kay alias Sy Kee was charged with illegal Tribunal has repeatedly held that failure to state in the record that an accused has been
possession of firearms in that in his possession were found three grease guns and two informed of his right to have counsel, does not warrant reversal of the judgment if it
Thompson Submachine guns, and empty magazines, without the necessary license. In does not affirmatively appear that he has not been informed thereof.
court he appeared without counsel and upon being arraigned, he pleaded guilty. He
was sentenced to imprisonment for five (5) years and one (1) day, with the accessories Moreover, it has been held in the case of U. S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 746, that when
of the law, and to pay costs. The firearms and ammunition in question were ordered the appellant fails to raise the question of his right to have an attorney in the trial court,
confiscated in favor of the Government. He now appeals to this Court on the ground that question will not be considered when raised for the first time in the Supreme Court.
that the trial court failed to inform him at the arraignment of his right to be assisted by In the present case, it does not appear that this point was ever raised in the court below.
counsel. The Solicitor General also questions the correctness of the penalty imposed,
expressing the opinion and making the recommendation that the law on indeterminate
sentence should have been applied. As to the application of the law on indeterminate sentence, the Solicitor General merely
says that the trial court failed to apply said law, and he recommends that it be applied,
without giving his reasons for said recommendation. We agree with the Solicitor
Counsel for the appellant makes citations of authorities to the effect that it is the duty General that the letter of the law on indetermine sentence (Act No. 4103) as amended
of the court to inform the defendant in a criminal case of his right to have counsel, and by Act No. 4225, particularly the latter part of section 1 thereof, supports his contention,
that should the court fail to do so, its action constitutes a reversible error. In this, we the offense in the present case being penalized by special law. Said legal provision
agree with the said counsel. However, contrary to the claim of said counsel that the states that:
record in this case shows that the court failed to inform the appellant of his right to have
counsel, we believe that the record merely fails to show that the court complied with
this duty. In other words, the record of the case is silent on this point. Both the minutes . . . and if the offense is punished by any other law (not the Revised Penal
of the court session during which appellant was arraigned as well as the certificate of Code or its amendments), the court shall sentence the accused to an
arraignment signed by the Clerk of Court merely show that the case was called for indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
arraignment, the accused appeared without counsel, and that upon being arraigned, he maximum fixed by fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than
pleaded guilty to the charge. The transcript of the stenographic notes taken down by the minimum term prescribed by the same.
the stenographer further states that the court instructed the Clerk of Court to read the
information which was translated to the accused after which, the court asked the Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act
defendant for his plea. The accused then pleaded guilty. 56 and Republic Act No. 4 penalizes the criminal act of the appellant with imprisonment
of not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10)years. So, if we applied the law on
As we have already stated, the record of the case does not show whether or not the indeterminate sentence, the penalty as recommended by the Solicitor General would
court informed the appellant of his right to have counsel, but of course this cannot be be not less than five (5) years and not more than a period exceeding ten (10) years.
interpreted in the sense that the court failed to so inform him of such right. On the That penalty could hardly be regarded as favorable to the accused, considering his plea
contrary, because of the presumption that the law has been complied with, it is to be of guilty. We should not lose sight of the fact that the law on indeterminate sentence as
presumed in this case that the court has complied with its duty and that it has informed a rule is intended to favor the defendant ina criminal case particularly to shorten his
the appellant that he may have counsel, even a counsel de oficio if he wanted to. In the term of imprisonment, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral
case of People vs. Miranda, 78 Phil., 418; 44 Off. Gaz., No. 9, p. 3307, involving a record as a prisoner, to be determined by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence. Upon
similar case of illegal possession of firearm, namely, a carbine with ammunition, this favorable recommendation by that Board, the prisoner may be released on parole upon
Court passing upon the same point now raised, said: the expiration of his minimum sentence. In fact the Governor General in his message
published in 31 Off. Gaz., No. 92, August 3, 1933, issued in connection with the
promulgation of the present law on indeterminate sentence, said that one of the
purposes of the law was to prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness.

Under the special law on illegal possession of firearms applicable to this case, already
referred to, if we had no law on indeterminate sentence in this jurisdiction, considering
the plea of guilty entered by the appellant, the trial court could well and lawfully have
given him a prison sentence of five (5) years. If we are now to apply the law on
indeterminate sentence in the instant case, the prison term would to be more than five
(5) years for the reason that the minimum could not be less than five (5) years and the
maximum necessarily would have to be more than five (5) years but not more than ten
(10) years. That would certainly be not in accordance with the purpose of the law on
indeterminate sentence; in fact it would run counter to its spirit.

Moreover, there are authorities to the effect that where the statute under which an
accused was convicted fixes the maximum and minimum punishment, or either of them,
it has been held that it is not necessary, under the indeterminate sentence law, for the
court to specify in the sentence such maximum and minimum punishment. . . . (24 C.
J. S. p. 109, Sec. 1582). Besides, it has also been held that the law on indeterminate
sentence being penal in character must receive a strict construction in favor of the one
to whom the penalty is exacted. (24 C. J. S. p. 1219, Sec. 1993).

We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that in cases where the application of the law
on indeterminate sentence would be unfavorable to the accused, resulting in the
lengthening of his prison sentence, said law on indeterminate sentence should not be
applied. Under this opinion, it is obvious that the trial court did not err in sentencing the
appellant to imprisonment for five (5) years and one (1) day.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason and Jugo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 181571 December 16, 2009 The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila formally charged Batistis in the RTC in
Manila with two separate offenses, namely, infringement of trademark and unfair
JUNO BATISTIS, Petitioner, vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. competition, through the following information, to wit:

DECISION That on or about December 20, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then in possession of two hundred forty one (241) empty Fundador
bottles, one hundred sixty three Fundador boxes, one half (1/2) sack of Fundador
BERSAMIN, J.: plastic caps, and two (2) Fundador bottles with intention of deceiving and defrauding
the public in general and Allied Domecq Spirits and Wines and Allied Domecq
On January 23, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, in Manila convicted Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Leonardo P. Salvador, a corporation duly
Juno Batistis for violations of Section 155 (infringement of trademark) and Section 168 organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and engaged
(unfair competition) of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293). 1 in manufacturing of Fundador Brandy under license of Pedro Domecq, S.A. Cadiz,
Spain, and/or copyright owner of the said product, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
On September 13, 2007, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction for and feloniously reproduce, sell and offer for sale, without prior authority and consent of
infringement of trademark, but reversed the conviction for unfair competition for failure said manufacturing company, the accused giving their own low quality product the
of the State to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.2 general appearance and other features of the original Fundador Brandy of the said
manufacturing company which would be likely induce the public to believe that the said
fake Fundador Brandy reproduced and/or sold are the real Fundador Brandy produced
Batistis now appeals via petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA’s or distributed by the Allied Domecq Spirits and Wines Limited, U.K. and Allied Domecq
affirmance of his conviction for infringement of trademark. Philippines, Inc. to the damage and prejudice of the latter and the public.

We affirm the conviction, but we modify the penalty by imposing an indeterminate Contrary to law.12
sentence, conformably with the Indeterminate Sentence Law and pertinent
jurisprudence.
With Batistis pleading not guilty on June 3, 2003, 13 the RTC proceeded to trial. On
January 23, 2006, the RTC found Batistis guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Antecedents infringement of trademark and unfair competition, viz:

The Fundador trademark characterized the brandy products manufactured by Pedro ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds the accused JUNO BATISTIS Guilty Beyond
Domecq, S.A. of Cadiz, Spain.3It was duly registered in the Principal Register of the Reasonable Doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 155 of the Intellectual Property
Philippines Patent Office on July 12, 1968 under Certificate of Registration No. Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWO (2)
15987,4 for a term of 20 years from November 5, 1970. The registration was renewed YEARS and to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.
for another 20 years effective November 5, 1990.5
This Court likewise finds accused JUNO BATISTIS Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Allied Domecq Philippines, Inc., a Philippine corporation exclusively authorized 6 to of the crime of Violation of Section 168 (sic) penalty of imprisonment of TWO (2) YEARS
distribute Fundador brandy products imported from Spain wholly in finished and to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND (Php50,000.00) PESOS.
form,7 initiated this case against Batistis. Upon its request, agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a test-buy in the premises of Batistis, and
thereby confirmed that he was actively engaged in the manufacture, sale and Accused is further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the sum of TWENTY-
distribution of counterfeit Fundador brandy products.8Upon application of the NBI FIVE (Php25,000.00) PESOS as actual damages.
agents based on the positive results of the test-buy,9 Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. of
the Manila RTC issued on December 20, 2001 Search Warrant No. 01- The following items recovered from the premises of the accused and subject of the
2576,10 authorizing the search of the premises of Batistis located at No.1664 Onyx St., case are hereby ordered destroyed, pursuant to existing rules and regulations:
San Andres Bukid, Sta. Ana, Manila. The search yielded 20 empty Carlos I bottles, 10
empty bottles of Black Label whiskey, two empty bottles of Johnny Walker Swing, an Twenty (20) empty Carlos 1 bottles
empty bottle of Remy Martin XO, an empty bottle of Chabot, 241 empty Fundador
bottles, 163 boxes of Fundador, a half sack of Fundador plastic caps, two filled bottles
of Fundador brandy, and eight cartons of empty Jose Cuervo bottles.11 Ten (10) Black Label empty bottles

Two (2) empty bottles of Jhonny (sic) Walker Swing

 One(1) empty bottle of Remy Martin XO bottles of Fundador brandy, the rest of the confiscated items were not found in his
house.
One (1) empty bottle of Chabot
Ruling
Two hundred forty-one (241) empty Fundador bottles
The petition for review has no merit.
One hundred sixty-three (163) Fundador boxes
1.
One half (1/2 sack of Fundador plastic caps, and
Appeal confined only to Questions of Law
Two (2) filled Fundador bottles
Pursuant to Section 3,17 Rule 122, and Section 9,18 Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the
Eight (8) boxes of empty Jose Cuervo bottles review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty
other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by petition for review
on certiorari.
WITH COSTS AGAINST ACCUSED
A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules
SO ORDERED.14 of Court, explicitly so provides, viz:

Batistis appealed to the CA, which, on September 13, 2007, affirmed his conviction for Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party desiring to appeal by
infringement of trademark, but acquitted him of unfair competition, 15 disposing: certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal of Appellant JUNO BATISTIS is whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in so far as review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary
the charge against him for Violation of Section 155 of the Intellectual Property Code is injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which
concerned. must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by
verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
However, for failure of the prosecution to prove to a moral certainty the guilt of the said
Appellant, for violation of Section 168 of the same code a judgment of ACQUITTAL is Accordingly, we reject the appeal for the following reasons:
hereby rendered in his favor.
Firstly: The petition for review replicates Batistis’ appellant's brief filed in the CA, 19 a
SO ORDERED.16 true indication that the errors he submits for our review and reversal are those he had
attributed to the RTC. He thereby rests his appeal on his rehashed arguments that the
After the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, Batistis brought this appeal. CA already discarded. His appeal is, therefore, improper, considering that his petition
for review on certiorari should raise only the errors committed by the CA as the
appellate court, not the errors of the RTC.
Issue
Secondly: Batistis’ assigned errors stated in the petition for review on certiorari require
Batistis contends that: a re-appreciation and re-examination of the trial evidence. As such, they raise issues
evidentiary and factual in nature. The appeal is dismissible on that basis, because, one,
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE the petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only legal
BASIS OF THE SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVITS AND TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual
OFFICERS WHO CONDUCTED THE RAID ON THE HOUSE OF THE ACCUSED. findings of the CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of
origin.20
He submits that the only direct proofs of his guilt were the self-serving testimonies of
the NBI raiding team; that he was not present during the search; that one of the NBI
raiding agents failed to immediately identify him in court; and that aside from the two Whether a question of law or a question of fact is involved is explained in Belgica v.
Belgica:21
xxx [t]here exists a question of law when there is doubt on what the law applicable to a 155.1 or this subsection are committed regardless of whether there is actual sale of
certain set of facts is. Questions of fact, on the other hand, arise when there is an issue goods or services using the infringing material.
regarding the truth or falsity of the statement of facts. Questions on whether certain
pieces of evidence should be accorded probative value or whether the proofs presented Harvey Tan, Operations Manager of Pedro Domecq, S.A. whose task involved the
by one party are clear, convincing and adequate to establish a proposition are issues detection of counterfeit products in the Philippines, testified that the seized Fundador
of fact. Such questions are not subject to review by this Court. As a general rule, we brandy, when compared with the genuine product, revealed several characteristics of
review cases decided by the CA only if they involve questions of law raised and counterfeiting, namely: (a) the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) seal label attached to
distinctly set forth in the petition.22 the confiscated products did not reflect the word tunay when he flashed a black light
against the BIR label; (b) the "tamper evident ring" on the confiscated item did not
Thirdly: The factual findings of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonies of the contain the word Fundador; and (c) the word Fundador on the label was printed flat with
witnesses, and its assessment of their probative weight are given high respect, if not sharper edges, unlike the raised, actually embossed, and finely printed genuine
conclusive effect, unless cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which if Fundador trademark.24
considered, would alter the outcome of the case, were ignored, misconstrued or
misinterpreted.23 There is no question, therefore, that Batistis exerted the effort to make the counterfeit
products look genuine to deceive the unwary public into regarding the products as
To accord with the established doctrine of finality and bindingness of the trial court’s genuine. The buying public would be easy to fall for the counterfeit products due to their
findings of fact, we do not disturb such findings of fact of the RTC, particularly after their having been given the appearance of the genuine products, particularly with the
affirmance by the CA, for Batistis, as appellant, did not sufficiently prove any difficulty of detecting whether the products were fake or real if the buyers had no
extraordinary circumstance justifying a departure from such doctrine. experience and the tools for detection, like black light. He thereby infringed the
registered Fundador trademark by the colorable imitation of it through applying the
2. dominant features of the trademark on the fake products, particularly the two bottles
filled with Fundador brandy.25 His acts constituted infringement of trademark as set
forth in Section 155, supra.
Findings of fact were even correct
3.
A review of the decision of the CA, assuming that the appeal is permissible, even
indicates that both the RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the evidence against the
accused, and correctly applied the pertinent law to their findings of fact. Penalty Imposed should be an
Indeterminate Penalty and Fine
Article 155 of the Intellectual Property Code identifies the acts constituting infringement
of trademark, viz: Section 170 of the Intellectual Property Code provides the penalty for infringement of
trademark, to wit:
Section 155. Remedies; Infringement. — Any person who shall, without the consent of
the owner of the registered mark: Section 170. Penalties. - Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed
by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a
fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred thousand
155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a pesos(P200,000), shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing
registered mark or the same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with any of the acts mentioned in Section 155, Section 168 and Subsection 169.1. (Arts.
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or services including 188 and 189, Revised Penal Code).
other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or
in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive; or The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC imposing the "the penalty of imprisonment of
TWO (2) YEARS and to pay a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND (₱50,000.00) PESOS."
155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a
dominant feature thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable We rule that the penalty thus fixed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence
imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements Law,26 as amended by Act No. 4225. We modify the penalty.
intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, provides:
is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil
action for infringement by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter set forth: Provided,
That the infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts stated in Subsection
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the full of Fundador plastic caps, and two filled bottles of Fundador Brandy) clearly
Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an demonstrated that Batistis had been committing a grave economic offense over a
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the period of time, thereby deserving for him the indeterminate, rather than the straight and
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, lower, penalty.
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, ACCORDINGLY, we affirm the decision dated September 13, 2007 rendered in C.A.-
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term G.R. CR No. 30392 entitled People of the Philippines v. Juno Batistis, but modify the
of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be penalty to imprisonment ranging from two years, as minimum, to three years, as
less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. maximum, and a fine of ₱50,000.00.

The straight penalty the CA imposed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
whose Section 1 requires that the penalty of imprisonment should be an indeterminate
sentence. According to Spouses Bacar v. Judge de Guzman,Jr., 27 the imposition of an
indeterminate sentence with maximum and minimum periods in criminal cases not SO ORDERED.
excepted from the coverage of the Indeterminate Sentence Law pursuant to its Section
228 is mandatory, viz:

The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate
sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to
enhance the economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from
serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and
moral record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal
offenses whether punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with
definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal
range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.

Indeed, the imposition of an indeterminate sentence is mandatory. For instance, in

Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals,29three persons were prosecuted for and found guilty of
illegal fishing (with the use of explosives) as defined in Section 33, Presidential Decree
No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1058, for which the prescribed penalty
was imprisonment from 20 years to life imprisonment. The trial court imposed on each
of the accused a straight penalty of 20 years imprisonment, and the CA affirmed the
trial court. On appeal, however, this Court declared the straight penalty to be erroneous,
and modified it by imposing imprisonment ranging from 20 years, as minimum, to 25
years, as maximum.

We are aware that an exception was enunciated in People v. Nang Kay,30 a prosecution
for illegal possession of firearms punished by a special law (that is, Section 2692,
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act 56 and Republic Act
No. 4) with imprisonment of not less than five years nor more than ten years. There,
the Court sustained the straight penalty of five years and one day imposed by the trial
court (Court of First Instance of Rizal) because the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law would be unfavorable to the accused by lengthening his prison sentence.
Yet, we cannot apply the Nang Kay exception herein, even if this case was a
prosecution under a special law like that in Nang Kay. Firstly, the trial court in Nang
Kay could well and lawfully have given the accused the lowest prison sentence of five
years because of the mitigating circumstance of his voluntary plea of guilty, but, herein,
both the trial court and the CA did not have a similar circumstance to justify the lenity
towards the accused. Secondly, the large number of Fundador articles confiscated from
his house (namely, 241 empty bottles of Fundador, 163 Fundador boxes, a half sack
G.R. No. 176317 July 23, 2014 On 06 July 1995, an audit team composed of Revenue Officers Helen D. Rosario, Maria
Lourdes G.Morada, Marina B. Magluyan and Norma Duran, all from the central office
MANOLITO GIL Z. ZAFRA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE of the BIR, was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash accountabilities of the appellant.
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Among the documents reviewed by the audit team were the CARs furnished by the
DECISION Assessment Division ofthe BIR; triplicate copies of the RORs attached to the MRCs
submitted by appellant to COA; and appellant’s MRCs provided by the Finance Division
of the BIR. The audit team likewise requested and was given copies of the RORs issued
BERSAMIN, J.: to the San Fernando, La Union branch of the Philippine National Bank (PNB). A
comparison of the entries in said documents revealed that the data pertaining to 18
In convicting an accused of the complex crime of malversation of public fund!: through RORs with the same serial number, i.e., (a) 1513716, (b) 1513717, (c) 1513718, (d)
falsification of a public document, the courts shall impose the penalty for the graver 1513719, (e) 1529758, (f) 2016733, (g) 2018017, (h) 2018310, (i) 2023438, (j)
felony in the maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, plus 2023837, (k) 2617653, (l) 2617821, (m) 2627973, (n) 3095194, (o) 3096955, (p)
fine in the amount of the funds malversed or the total value of the property embezzled. 3097386, (q) 3503336, (r) 4534412, vary with respect to the name of the taxpayer, the
In addition, the courts shall order the accused to return to the Government the funds kind of tax paid, the amount of tax and the date of payment. Of particular concern to
malversed, or the value of the property embezzled. the audit team were the lesser amounts of taxes reported in appellant’s MRCs and the
attached RORs compared to the amount reflected in the CARs and PNB’s RORs.
The Case
The CARs showed that documentary stamp tax and capital gains tax for ROR Nos.
This appeal by petition for review on certiorari is taken from the judgment promulgated 1513716, 1513717, 1513718, 1513719, 2018017, and 2023438 totalled
on August 16, 2006,1whereby the Court of Appeals affirmed the consolidated decision Php114,887.78, while the MRCs and COA’s copies of the RORs submitted by
rendered on February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San Fernando, La appellant, the sum of the taxes collected was only Php227.00, or a difference of
Union in Criminal Cases Nos. 4634 to Nos. 4651, inclusive, 2 finding Manolito Gil Z. Php114,660.78. ROR Nos. 2018017 and 2023438, mentioned in CAR as duly issued
Zafra, a Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assigned to taxpayers and for which taxes were paid, were reported in the MRC as cancelled
in Revenue District 3 in San Fernando, La Union guilty of 18 counts of malversation of receipts.
public funds through falsification of public documents. 3
Likewise, PNB’s RORs bearing Serial Nos. 1529758, 2016733, 2018310, 2023837,
Antecedents 2617653. 2617821, 2627973, 3095194, 3096955, 3097386, 3503336, and 4534412,
show that it paid the total sum of Php500,606.15, as documentary stamp tax. Yet,
appellant’s MRCs yielded only the total sum of Php1,115.00, for the same RORs, or a
The CA summarized the factual antecedents as follows: difference of Php499,491.15.

Appellant was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue The subject 18 RORs were the accountability of appellant as shown in his Monthly
(BIR), Revenue District 3, in San Fernando, La Union from 1993-1995. Among his Reports of Accountability (MRA) or BIR Form 16 (A). The MRA contains, among others,
duties was toreceive tax payments for which BIR Form 25.24 or the revenue official the serial numbers of blank RORs received by the collection agent from the BOR as
receipts (ROR) were issued. The original of the ROR was then given to the taxpayer well as those issued by him for a certain month.
while a copy thereof was retained by the collection officer.
In sum, although the RORs bear the same serial numbers, the total amount reflected
Every month, appellant submitted BIR Form 12.31 of the Monthly Report of Collections in the CARs and PNB’s 12 copies of RORs is Ph₱615,493.93, while only Php1,342.00
(MRC) indicating the numbers of the issued RORs, date of collection, name of was reported as tax collections in the RORs’ triplicate copies submittedby appellant to
taxpayer,the amount collectedand the kind of tax paid. The original copy of the MRC COA and in his MRCs, or a discrepancy of Php614,151.93, Thus, the audit team sent
with the attached triplicate copy of the issued RORs was submitted to the Regional to appellant a demand letter requiring him to restitute the total amount of
Office of the Commission on Audit (COA). Php614,151.93. Appellant ignored the letter, thus, prompting the institution of the 18
cases for malversation of public funds through falsification of public document against
The Assessment Division of the BIR Regional Office, likewise, kept a copy of the him."4
duplicate original of the Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR) relating to the real
property transactions, which contained, among other data, the number of the issued On his part, the petitioner tendered the following version, to wit:
ROR, its date, name of payor, and the amount the capital gains tax and documentary
stamp tax paid.
Appellant denied that he committed the crimes charged. He averred that as Revenue 7) Criminal Case No. 4640 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
Collection Officer of San Fernando, La Union, he never accepted payments from penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4
taxpayers nor issued the corresponding RORs. It was his subordinates, Andrew Aberin months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual
and Rebecca Supsupin, who collected the taxes and issued the corresponding RORs. special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱39,050.00;
To substantiate his claim, he presented Manuel Meris, who testified that when he paid
capital gains tax, at the district office of BIR in Sam Fernando, La Union, it was a female 8) Criminal Case No. 4641 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
BIR employee who received the payment and issued Receipt No. 2023438. Likewise, penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years,
Arturo Suyat, messenger of PNB from 1979 to 1994, testified that when he made the 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual
payments to the same BIR office, it was not appellant who received the payments nor special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱38,878.55;
issued the corresponding receipts but another unidentified BIR employee." 5
9) Criminal Case No. 4642and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
Decision of the RTC penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years,
4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to suffer perpetual
On February 17, 2004, the RTC rendered its consolidated decision convicting the special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱20,286.88;
petitioner of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents,6 decreeing as follows: 10) Criminal Case No. 4643 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years,
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime with which he is 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual
charged in: special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱42,573.97;

1) Criminal Case No. 4634 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate 11) Criminal Case No. 4644 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14 years, 8 penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years,
months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual
special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱19,775.00; special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱40,598.40;

2) Criminal Case No. 4635 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate 12) Criminal Case No. 4645 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccionalas minimum up penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years,
to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual
disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱4,869.00; special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱42,140.45;

3) Criminal Case No. 4636 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate 13) Criminal Case No. 4646 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14 years, 8 penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years,
months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual
special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱13,260.90; special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱47,902.60;

4) Criminal Case No. 4637 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate 14) Criminal Case No. 4647 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 14 years, 8 penalty of 10 years and 1 one day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years,
months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual
special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱17,419.00; special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱52,740.66;

5) Criminal Case No. 4638 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate 15) Criminal Case No. 4648 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 10 years and penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years,
1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual
and to pay a fine of ₱11,309.20; special disqualification; and to pay a fine ₱75,489.76;

6) Criminal Case No. 4639 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate 16) Criminal Case No. 4649 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 10 years and penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years,
1 day of prision mayoras maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual
and to pay a fine of ₱9,736.86; special disqualification; and to pay a fine of ₱54,948.47;
 17) Criminal Case No. 4650 and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate proof of misappropriation, made him liable for malversation. The audit team’s demand
penalty of 10 years and one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, letter to appellant, which he failed to rebut, raised a prima facie presumption that he put
4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual to his personal use the missing funds.12
special disqualification; and to pay fine of ₱45,330.18; 18) Criminal Case No.
4651and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 years and The CA explained that even if it were to subscribe to the petitioner’s insistence that it
one 1 day of prision mayoras minimum up to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of had been his assistants, not him, who had collected the taxes and issued the RORs,
reclusion temporalas maximum; to suffer perpetual special disqualification; he was nonetheless liable,13 because his duty as an accountable officer had been to
and to pay a fine of ₱37,842.05; strictly supervise his assistants;14 and that by failing to strictly supervise them he was
responsible for the shortage resulting from the non-remittance of the actual amounts
And to pay costs. collected.15

SO ORDERED. After the CA denied his motion for reconsideration by its resolution16 promulgated on
January 11, 2007, the petitioner appeals via petition for review on certiorari.
Judgment of the CA
Issues
On appeal, the petitioner asserted that the RTC had erred as follows:
The petitioner claims that the CA erred:
I. x x x IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF MALVERSATION OF
PUBLIC FUNDS THRU FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BASED I. x x x IN FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NEGLIGENT YET HE
ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT HE WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE WAS CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES. FUNDS THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC [DOCUMENTS].

II. x x x IN TAKING IT AGAINST THE ACCUSED THE FAILURE TO FILE II. x x x IN APPLYING THE RULE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN A
AND PROSECUTE PERSONS WHO COULD HAVE POSSIBLY COMPLEX CRIME OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THROUGH
COMMITTED THE CRIMES CHARGED. FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS.

III. x x x IN FINDING THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE III. x x x IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.17
CRIMES CHARGED ARE PRESENTED IN THIS CASE.
The petitioner contends that the RTC and the CA erroneously convicted him of several
IV. x x x WHEN IT DID NOT DECIDE TO ACQUIT THE ACCUSED BASED counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents on the
ON REASONABLE DOUBT.7 basis of the finding that he had been negligent in the performance of his duties as
Revenue District Officer;18 that the acts imputed to him did not constitute negligence;
On August 16, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment affirming the conviction and that he could not be convicted of intentional malversation and malversation through
of the petitioner and the penalties imposed by the RTC,8 observing that he had negligence at the same time.19
committed falsification through his submission of copies of falsified MRCs and had
tampered revenue receipts to the BIR and COA;9 that he was presumed to be the forger Ruling
by virtue of his being in the possession of such public documents; 10 and that he had
certified to the MRAs and had actually issued the tampered receipts. 11 We DENY the petition for review for its lack of merit.

Anent the malversation, the CA opined: The RTC stated in its decision convicting the petitioner, viz:

All the elements of malversation obtain in the present case. Appellant was the Revenue The particular pages of the Monthly Reports from which witness Magluyan based her
Collection Agent of the BIR. As such, through designated collection clerks, hecollected examination to determine the discrepancies in the Official Receipts listed by the
taxes and issued the corresponding receipts for tax payments made by taxpayers. He accused therein, bore only the typewritten name of the accused without any signature.
was accountable for the proper and authorized use and application of the blank RORs However, prosecution witness Rebecca Rillorta showed that those individual pages
issued by the BIR District Office, not the least for the tax payments received in the were part of a number of pages of a report submitted for a particular month, and she
performance of his duties. The unexplained shortage in his remittances of the taxes showed that the last pages of the related reports were duly signed by the accused.
collected as reflected in the CARs and PNB’s receipts, even in the absence of direct
Witness Rillorta brought to the Court the original pages of the questioned monthly legal consequence if his defense were favorably considered, and was notthe basis for
reports and demonstrated to the Court the sequence of the pagination and the last finding him guilty. To attach any undue significance to such discourse is to divert
pages ofthe monthly reports bearing the signature of accused Zafra x x x. By these the attention away from the firmness of the finding of guilt. It cannot be denied, indeed, that
prosecution demonstrated that the individual pages of the Monthly Collection Report the RTC did not give any weight to his position.
which listed receipts for lesser amounts were part of official reports regularly submitted
by the accused in his capacity as Collection Agent of the BIR in San Fernando City, La Initially, the CA’s disquisition regarding malversation through negligence had the same
Union. While counsel for accused called attention to the absence of accused (sic) tenor as that of the RTC’s,22and later on even went to the extent of opining that the
signatures on Exhibit "A", accused did not deny the monthly report[s] and the exhibits petitioner ought to be held guilty of malversation through negligence. 23 But such opinion
as he chose to remain silent. on the part of the CA would not overturn his several convictions for the intentional
felonies of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents. As
In addition, Maria Domagas, State Auditor of the BIR showed Monthly Report of can be seen, both lower courts unanimously concluded that the State’s evidence
Accountabilities (Exhibit "D") which the accused, as Collection Officer submits on the established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for malversation of public funds through
first week of the following month for a particular month. The testimony of Maria falsification of public documents. Their unanimity rested on findings of fact that are
Domagas establishes that the questionable receipts were within the series of receipts nowbinding on the Court after he did not bring to our attention any fact or circumstance
accountability of accused for a particular month. x x x. The testimony of State Auditor that either lower court had not properly appreciated and considered and which, if so
Domagas established the link of accused accountable receipts, with the receipts considered, could alter the outcome in his favor. At any rate, even if it were assumed
numbers reported in his Monthly Collection Report as well as to the receipts issued to that the findings by the CA warranted his being guilty only of malversation through
the taxpayers. Thereby prosecution showed that while the receipts issued to the negligence, the Court would not be barred from holding him liable for the intentional
taxpayer were not signed by the accused, these receipts were his accountable forms. crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents because
Such that the use thereof is presumed to be sourced from him. Even the defense his appealing the convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is
witness admitted that the receipts emanated from the office of the accused. axiomatic that by appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy, leaving him open to being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would
Notably, there is a big disparity between the amount covered by BIR Form No. 25.24 ultimately conclude from the records to have been actually committed by him within the
issued to the taxpayer, and the amount for the same receipt number appearing in the terms of the allegations in the informations under which he had been arraigned.
Monthly Collection Reports indicating the falsification resorted to by the accused in the
official reports he filed, thereby remitting less than what was collected from taxpayers Yet, we see an obvious need to correct the penalties imposed on the petitioner. He was
concerned, resulting tothe loss of revenue for the government as unearthed by the duly convicted of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
auditors."20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) documents, all complex crimes. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,24 the
penalty for each count is that prescribed on the more serious offense, to be imposed in
The findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. Hence, the petitioner was its maximum period. Falsification of a public document by a public officer is penalized
correctly convicted of the crimes charged because such findings of fact by the trial with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed ₱5,000.00. 25 Prision mayor has a duration
court, being affirmed by the CA as the intermediate reviewing tribunal, are now binding of six years and one day to 12 years of imprisonment. 26 In contrast, the penalty for
and conclusive on the Court. Accordingly, we conclude that the Prosecution sufficiently malversation ranges from prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods to
established that the petitioner had beenthe forger of the falsified and tampered public reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua depending on the
documents, and that the falsifications of the public documents had been necessary to amount misappropriated, and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or to
committhe malversations of the collected taxes. the total value of the property embezzled, to wit:

Anent the petitioner’s defense that it was his subordinates who had dealt with the Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. —
taxpayers and who had issued the falsified and tampered receipts, the RTC fittingly Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
ruminated: funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
x x x If this Court were to believethat the criminal act imputed to the accused were done misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
by the employees blamed by the accused, the presumption of negligence by the
accused with respect to his duties as such would attach; and under this presumption,
accused would still not avoid liability for the government loss.21 (Italics supplied) 1. The penalty of prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods, if
the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed
two hundred pesos.
The petitioner relies on this passage of the RTC’s ruling to buttress his contention that
he should be found guilty of malversation through negligence. His reliance is grossly
misplaced, however, because the RTC did not thereby pronounce that he had
beenmerely negligent. The passage was nothing but a brief forensic discourse on the
 2. The penalty of prision mayorin its minimum and medium periods, if the
More than ₱200 Prision 6 years 6 years 7 years, 8 years,
amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six mayorin its
pesos but not and and 4 months 8 months
thousand pesos.
exceeding minimum 1 day to 1 day to and 1 day and 1 day
₱6,000.00 and medium 10 7 years to 8 years to 10 years
3. The penalty of prision mayorin its maximum period to reclusion temporalin periods years and and 8
its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos 4 months Months
but is less than twelve thousand pesos. 4. The penalty of reclusion temporal,
in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is morethan More than Prision 10 years 10 years 11 years, 13 years,
twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the ₱6,000.00 but mayor in its and 1 day and 1 day 6 months 1 month
amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporalin its less than maximum to 14 to 11 and 21 and 11
maximum period to reclusion perpetua. ₱12,000.00 period to years years, days to days
reclusion and 6 months 13 years, to 14 years
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual temporal in 8 months and 20 1 month and
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal its minimum days and 8 months
tothe total value of the property embezzled. x x x x period 10 days

More than Reclusion 14 years, 14 years, 16 years,

To determine the maximum periods of the penalties tobe imposed on the petitioner, ₱12,000.00 temporal in 8 months 8 months 5 months
therefore, we must be guided by the following rules, namely: (1) the penalties provided but less than its medium and 1 day and 1 day and 11
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees; and (2) considering and to 20 to 16 days to
that the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Codeare not maximum years years, 18 years,
composed of three periods, the time included in the penalty prescribed should be periods. 5 months 2 months
divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming one period, pursuant to and 10 and
Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code.27 days 20 days

Accordingly, the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code 18 years,
should be divided into three periods, with the maximum period being the penalty 2 months<
properly imposable on each count, except in any instance where the penalty for and 21 days
falsification would be greater than such penalties for malversation. The tabulation of to 20 years/td>
the periods of the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
More than Reclusion 17 years, 17 years, 18 years, Reclusion
follows, to wit:
₱22,000.00 temporal in 4 months 4 months 8 months perpetua
its and 1 day and 1 day and 1 day
[[reference maximum to to 18 to 20 years
- http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/july2014/176 period to reclusion years
317.pdf]] reclusion perpetua and
perpetua 8 months
TABLE 1
Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is
Amount Penalty Duration Minimum Periods Maximum imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term. 28 The
Misappropriated prescribed Medium maximum term is the penalty under the Revised Penal Code properly imposed after
considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the range of
Not exceeding Prision 2 years, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Codefor the offense
₱200.00 correccional 4 months 4 months 6 months 9 months committed.
in its and 1 day and 1 day and and 11
medium and to 6 years to 3 years, 21 days to days The Indeterminate Sentence Lawwas applicable here, save for the counts for which the
maximum 6 months 4 years, to 6 years. imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua. Considering that each count was a complex
periods and 20 9 months crime without any modifying circumstances, the maximum term of the penalty for each
days and 10 count is the maximum period as shown in Table 1, supra, except for the count dealt
days with in Criminal Case No. 4635 involving the misappropriated amount of ₱4,869.00, for
which the corresponding penalty for malversation as stated in Table 1 was prision
mayorin its minimum and medium periods. However, because such penalty for reclusion
malversation was lower than the penalty of prision mayor imposable on falsification of perpetua
a public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is the penalty of
prision mayor in its maximum period that was applicable. Penalty Penalty next Range of minimum term
prescribed lower in degree
On other hand, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence for each count should come under Art. 171
from the penalty next lower than that prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, except in Criminal Case No. 4635 where the penalty next lower is prision Prision mayor Prision 6 months and 1 day to 6 years
correccional in its full range, to wit: correccional

TABLE 2 To illustrate, the count involving the largest amount misappropriated by the accused
totaling ₱75,489.76 merited the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua, and a fine of ₱75,489.76. Obviously, the penalty is that prescribed
Penalty Penalty next Range of minimum term
for malversation of public funds, the more serious offense.
prescribed lower in degree
under Art. 217
In its consolidated decision of February 17, 2004, the RTC erred in pegging the
Prision Arresto mayor in 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and maximum terms within the minimum periods of the penalties prescribed under Article
correccionalin its maximum 4 months 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
its medium and period to prision
maximum correccional in It committed another error by fixing indeterminate sentences on some counts despite
periods its minimum the maximum of the imposable penalties being reclusion perpetua. There is even one
period completely incorrect indeterminate sentence. And, as earlier noted, the penalty for
falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code was applicable in Criminal
Prision mayor in Prision 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years Case No. 4635 involving ₱4,869.00 due to its being the higher penalty.
its correccional in
minimum and its medium and
medium maximum The Court now tabulates the corrected indeterminate sentences, to wit:
period periods
TABLE 3

Prision mayor in Prision mayor in 6 years and 1 day to 10 years

its its minimum and Amount Indeterminate sentence
maximum period medium periods misappropriated
to Minimum term Maximum term
reclusion
temporal in ₱19,775.00 10 years and 1 day of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
its minimum prision mayor of reclusion temporal
period
₱4,869.00 2 years of prision 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of
Reclusion Prision mayor in 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and correccional prision mayor29
temporal in its maximum 8 months
its medium and period to ₱13,260.90 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
maximum reclusion mayor of reclusion temporal
periods. temporal in its
₱17,419.00 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days
minimum period
mayor of reclusion temporal
Reclusion Not applicable in the present case since the proper imposable
₱11,390.00 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of
temporal in penalty to be imposed upon the accused in already reclusion
mayor prision mayor
its maximum perpetua
period to
 Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to
₱9,736.86 6 years and 1 day of prision 13 years, 1 month and 11 days of
correct at any time a matter of law and justice.
mayor prision mayor

₱39,050.00 - Reclusion perpetua We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the
parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their
₱38,878.55 - Reclusion perpetua judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights
and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination
₱20,286.88 10 years and 1 day prision 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of such rights and obligations would they betrue to the judicial office of administering
mayor of reclusion temporal justice and equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of
judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties,
₱42,573.97 - Reclusion perpetua
which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their
₱40,598.40 - Reclusion perpetua prescription of the wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without
jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
₱42,140.45 - Reclusion perpetua They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delictoof the accused, in order
to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of
₱47,902.60 - Reclusion perpetua Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate
actions has been reserved or waived.31
₱52,740.66 - Reclusion perpetua
In addition, the amounts to be returned to the Government as civil liability of the
₱75,489.76 - Reclusion perpetua
accused in each count shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality
of this decision until full payment by the accused.1âwphi1
₱54,984.47 - Reclusion perpetua

₱45,330.18 - Reclusion perpetua WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2006 by
the Court of Appeals subject to the modification of the penalties imposed as stated in
₱37,842.05 - Reclusion perpetua this decision.

One more omission by the CA and the RTC concerned a matter of law. This refers to ACCORDINGLY, the dispositive portion of the consolidated decision rendered on
their failure to decree in favor of the Government the return of the amounts criminally February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court is hereby AMENDED to read as follows:
misappropriated by the accused. That he was already sentenced to pay the fine in each
count was an element of the penalties imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime with which he is
was not the same thing as finding him civilly liable for restitution, which the RTC and charged in:
the CA should have included in the judgment. Indeed, as the Court emphasized in
Bacolod v. People,30 it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties 1) Criminal Case No. 4634 and sentences him to suffer the
when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion
waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner: temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱19,775.00;

It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express 2) Criminal Case No. 4635 and sentences him to suffer the
mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was indeterminate penalty from two years of prision correccional, as
of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum;
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which and to pay a fine of ₱5,000.00;
attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the
accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission 3) Criminal Case No. 4636 and sentences him to suffer the
to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion
Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱13,260.90;
as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the
correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the 4) Criminal Case No. 4637 and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion 18) Criminal Case No. 4651 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱17,419.00; perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱37,842.05;

5) Criminal Case No. 4638and sentences him to suffer the In addition, the accused shall pay to the Government the total amount of ₱614,268.73,
indeterminate penaltyfrom 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as plus interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full
minimum, to 13 years, one month and 11 days of reclusion temporal, payment, by way of his civil liability.
as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱11,309.20;
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
6) Criminal Case No. 4639 and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor, SO ORDERED.
as minimum, to 13 years, one month and 11 days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱9,736.86;
SO ORDERED.
7) Criminal Case No. 4640 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱39,050.00;

8) Criminal Case No. 4641 and sentences him to suffer reclusion

perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱38,878.55;

9) Criminal Case No. 4642 and sentences him to suffer the

indeterminate penalty from 10 years and one day of prision mayor,
as m inimum, to 18 years, two months and 21 days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; and to pay a fine of ₱20,286.88;

10) Criminal Case No. 4643 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱42,573.97;

11) Criminal Case No. 4644 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱40,598.40;

12) Criminal Case No. 4645 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱42,140.45;

13) Criminal Case No. 4646 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱47 ,902.60;

14) Criminal Case No. 4647 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱52, 7 40.66;

15) Criminal Case No. 4648 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱75,489. 76;

16) Criminal Case No. 4649 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱54,948.47;

17) Criminal Case No. 4650 and sentences him to suffer reclusion
perpetua; and to pay a fine of ₱45,330.18;
G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011 Virginia Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Regional Crime Laboratory
Office XII Butuan City, who immediately conducted the examination. The laboratory
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALLEN UDTOJAN examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright
MANTALABA, Accused-Appellant. orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance contained in two
sachets, separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively
identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
DECISION
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against
PERALTA, J.: appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following:

For this Court's consideration is the Decision1 dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Criminal Case No. 10250
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus
Judgment2 dated September 14, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan
City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan
Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
Article II of Republic Act (RA) 9165. accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
sell zero point zero four one two (0.0412) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
otherwise known as shabu which is a dangerous drug.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).3
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City
received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen
(17) years old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Criminal Case No. 10251
Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo,
PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2) pieces of That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan
₱100 marked bills to be used in the purchase. City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked possess zero point six one three one (0.6131) grams of methamphetamine
money, proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug.
operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and
said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).4
talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the
poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur- Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been
completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the
appellant as he was leaving the place. Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials
Richard S. Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big In its Omnibus Judgment5 dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant
sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which,
two pieces of ₱100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground. reads:

After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY
officers made an inventory of the items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a dangerous
big sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of drug, as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. As
shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3) two (2) pieces of one hundred provided for in Sec. 98 of R.A. 9165, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts
pesos marked money and a fifty peso (₱50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-request was punishable by life imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As such,
prepared by Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory examination of the two Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
(2) sachets containing a crystalline substance, ultra-violet examination on the person pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).
of the appellant as well as the two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money.
The request was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally received by Police Inspector
In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you
Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for illegally possessing shabu, a dangerous take?
drug, weighing 0.6131 gram as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 and accused being a minor at the time of the commission of the A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We
offense, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is accordingly sentenced prepared a request for powder dusting for our marked moneys to be used for
to six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum of prision the operation.
mayor and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?
SO ORDERED.6
xxxx
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:
Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City dated
September 14, 2005 appealed from finding the accused-appellant Allen Udtojan
Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Violation of Section 5 and A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act, is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant. Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?

SO ORDERED.7 A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of
shabu there should be a pre-arranged signal of the poseur-buyer to the police
Thus, the present appeal. officer.

Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this
of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond marked moneys, approached the guy who was selling shabu at that
reasonable doubt. time?

According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the
poseur-buyer. He also argues that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not suspect.
established. Finally, he asserts that an accused should be presumed innocent and that
the burden of proof is on the prosecution. Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?

The petition is unmeritorious. A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-
buyer and the suspect.
Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale
took place. However, based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?
that the buy-bust operation was successfully conducted, thus:
A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement
PROS. RUIZ: signal because in the pre-arranged signal we used a cap and a towel.
(sic) In the case, of this suspect, there was no towel there was no cap at
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did the time of giving the shabu and the marked moneys to the suspect and
you conduct your buy-bust operation at the time? considering also that that was about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. The
poseur-buyer immediately proceeded to us and informed us that the
shabu was already given by the suspect.
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian
assets that Allen Mantalaba was engaged in drug trade and selling shabu.
And after we evaluated this Information we informed Inspector Dacillo that we Q: What did you do next after that?
will operate this accused for possible apprehension.
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing PROS. RUIZ:
white [crystalline] substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the
Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust sachets of suspected shabu?
operation[?] Was he alone or did he had (sic) any companion at that time?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated
A: He was alone. specimen, the result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?
xxxx
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this
constitutional rights and we immediately handcuffed him. Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the
accused, as well as the marked money mentioned in this report?
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the Mantalaba is positive to the test for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet
suspect, we did not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the flourescent powder. x x x10
barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect.
The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this
Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the Court stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure,
buy-bust operation? sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors.11 It is often utilized
by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution
of their nefarious activities.12 In People v. Roa,13 this Court had the opportunity to
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu. expound on the nature and importance of a buy-bust operation, ruling that:

xxxx In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement
before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section
Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him? 8614 of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and
the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug-
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 related matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA's participation a
pieces of 100 peso bills as marked moneys.8 condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form
of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 15 of the Rules of the Court,
which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA.16 A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere
operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: non-coordination with the PDEA.
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 9 From the
above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v. Lacbanes17 is quite
elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were instructive:
properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the marked money
used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to In People v. Ganguso,18 it has been held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for
the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted. the validity of an entrapment operation, especially when the buy-bust team members
were accompanied to the scene by their informant. In the instant case, the arresting
To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the officers were led to the scene by the poseur-buyer. Granting that there was no
testimony of Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic chemical officer, surveillance conducted before the buy-bust operation, this Court held in People v.
who confirmed that the plastic containing white crystalline substance was Tranca,19 that there is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations.
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and that the petitioner was in Flexibility is a trait of good police work. The police officers may decide that time is of
possession of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, thus: the essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance. 20
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled Q: It was taken from your possession?
to great respect because trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of
the witnesses as they testify. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the A: Yes, sir.
appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. 21
Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your
hands tested for ultra-violet fluorescent powder, your hands tested positively
In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding for the presence of the said powder?
that the appellant is equally guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal
possession of dangerous drug. As an incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after
the consummation of the buy-bust operation, the arresting officers had the authority to A: Yes, sir.23
search the person of the appellant. In the said search, the appellant was caught in
possession of 0.6131 grams of shabu. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this
elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard
to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 22 prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and
convincing evidence.24
As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money
confiscated from him. However, based on his cross-examination, such denial was not Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the
convincing enough to merit reasonable doubt, thus: chain of custody of the recovered dangerous drug. According to him, while it was
Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the request for laboratory examination, only
PROS. RUIZ: police officers Pajo and Simon were present in the buy-bust operation.

Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:
recovered from your possession one sachet of shabu?
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
A: Yes, sir. Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
searched they also found another sachet of shabu also in your pocket? instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
A: Yes, sir.
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
prosecution that no money was taken from you because you have none at that same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
time, is it not? confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
A: None sir, only the ₱250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me. shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Q: This ₱250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long
possession? as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team.25 Its non-compliance will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items
A: Yes, sir. seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.26 What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
Q: Were not ₱200 of the ₱250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 27 In this
you were arrested by the police? particular case, it is undisputed that police officers Pajo and Simon were members of
the buy-bust operation team. The fact that it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who
A: No, sir. signed the letter-request for laboratory examination does not in any way affect the
integrity of the items confiscated. All the requirements for the proper chain of custody
had been observed. As testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2
after the consummation of the buy-bust operation: pieces of sachets of shabu; one during the buy-bust and the other one during
the search, what did you do [with] these 2 pieces of sachets of shabu and the
Prosecutor marked moneys?

Q: What did you do next after that? A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of
Inventory.28
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing
white [crystalline] in substance, we immediately approached the suspect. As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the
confiscated item which, in the present case, was complied with, thus:
xxxx
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking29 of the seized drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do? starting point in the custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized contraband are
immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked
[constitutional] rights and immediately handcuffed him. evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are
seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings,
Q: Where were the marked moneys? obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.30

A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to
suspect, we did not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the discuss the effect of his minority in his suspension of sentence. The appellant was
barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect. seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said
offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of
the RTC's Decision.
xxxx
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated
Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of the its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a
barangay officials. Now, when these barangay officials were present, what did minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D.
you do on the suspect? 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code31 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,
the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law,32 the laws that were applicable at the
A: We immediately searched the suspect. time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of
Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his
sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2
application, thus:
pieces of ₱100.00 peso bills as marked moneys.

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen
Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him,
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
where were the marked moneys?
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may
have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
A: On the ground. judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
Q: Who picked these marked moneys? of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of
age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5
xxxx of RA 9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section
9836 of the same law. A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who imprisonment to death; however, in Section 98, it is provided that, where the offender
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the
and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the penalty
the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise can now be graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties
benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x provided for in the Revised Penal Code. The said principle was enunciated by this Court
in People v. Simon,37 thus:
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia33 that while Section 38 of RA
9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the
conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A
of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states: review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason
therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties
for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the
the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods,
have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying
with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in
with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment. accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The
age of twenty-one (21) years. suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10
of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.
longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of
sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and
not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the
sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration,
at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When,
20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense
suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.
provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence
of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192
of P.D. 603.34 xxxx

Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine
51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as
follows:35 applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime
and the nature of the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of
Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the
Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and
court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions
of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed
penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, on appellant's conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one
to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature. (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some
manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts SO ORDERED.
shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime
consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower
in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the
scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision correccional,
prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto menor,
destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one
or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the
penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.1avvphi1

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to
determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by
degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty
beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be
prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be
adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial
solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the
concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress. 38

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority 39 can now be

appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the
appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum
penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no
other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.40The ISLAW is applicable
in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty
(reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty
(reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment dated September 14,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250
and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is
G.R. No. 170192 February 10, 2016 departure, accused failed to send the complainants abroad and despite demands to
reimburse or return the amount of P52,000.00, P10,000.00 and P5,000.00 which
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiffs-Appellees, vs. MARISSA complainants paid as processing fees, accused did then and there refuse and fail to
BAYKER, Accused-Appellant. reimburse or return to complainants the aforesaid amounts
of P52,000.00, P10,000.00 and P5,000.00.
DECISION
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
BERSAMIN, J.:
Criminal Case No. 01-1781
Estafa
An illegal recruiter can be liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment committed in large
scale and estafa without risk of being put in double jeopardy, provided that the accused
has been so charged under separate informations. That on or about the 9th day of April, 2001 up to July 23, 2001, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
The Case another, by means of false pretense and fraudulent misrepresentations, defrauded
Basilio T. Miparanum by previous of [sic] simultaneous act, that is; By pretending to
The accused-appellant assails the decision promulgated on July 28, 2005, 1 whereby possess power, influence, qualification authority, transactions or capacity to recruit and
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed her conviction for illegal recruitment and estafa, as deploy said Basilio T. Miparanum for overseas job, which representations or
follows: manifestations the accused knew to be false and fraudulent as they have no authorities
to recruit from the POEA and they have no principal employer and was merely intended
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED and the Joint Decision to convince Basilio T. Miparanum to part his money in the amount of P52,000.00, in
dated August 27, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 138 of Makati City consideration thereof, as in fact complainant Basilio T. Miparanum paid the said amount
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Case No. 01-1780 for Illegal to the accused relying on such false manifestation and/or representations to the
Recruitment, the fine imposed is hereby REDUCED to Pl00,000.00 and in Criminal damage and prejudice of complainant Basilio T. Miparanum in the aforesaid amount
Case No. 01-1781 for Estafa, appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of P52,000.00.
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to nine (9)
years of prision mayor as maximum. CONTRARY TO LAW.4

SO ORDERED.2 Only the accused-appellant and Langreo were arrested because Bermudez, who
eluded arrest, continues to remain at large. However, the trial proceeded only against
Antecedents the accused-appellant because of the lack of notification of subsequent proceedings to
Langreo.5

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Makati the following amended informations against the accused-appellant and her two The State presented four witnesses, namely: Virgilio Caniazares, Reynaldo Dahab,
co-accused, namely: Nida Bermudez and Lorenz Langreo, alleging thusly: Basilio Miparanum and PO3 Raul Bolido.

Criminal Case No. 01-1780 Caniazares testified that he and Dahab had met the accused-appellant at the house of
Illegal Recruitment a friend in Makati City in January 2001, and she had then represented herself to be
recruiting workers for overseas employment, probably as hotel porters in Canada; 6 that
on January 27, 2001, he had gone to her residence in Pembo, Makati City to pay
That in or about during the month of January, 2001 up to the 23 rd day of July, 2001, in P4,000.00 for his medical examination, and she had then accompanied him to the
the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Medical Center in Ermita, Manila for that purpose;7 that on March 30, 2001, she had
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping gone to his house to inform him that he would be deployed as a seaman instead but
and aiding one another, and who have no authority to recruit workers for overseas that he had to pay P6,000.00 more; that he had paid the P6,000.00 to her, for which
employment, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously promise and recruit she had issued a receipt; that two weeks thereafter, she had called him about his
complainants, Basilio T. Miparanum, Virgilio T. Caniazares and Reynaldo E. Dahab, deployment on April 21, 2001; that on the promised date, he had gone to her office at
overseas job abroad and in consideration of said promise, said complainants paid and GNB Marketing in Makati but no one was around; that he had then proceeded to her
delivered to accused the amount of P52,000.00, P10,000.00 and P5,000.00, house, and she had then told him that his seaman's application would not push through;
respectively as processing fees of their papers, but on the promise[d] dates of that the two of them had then proceeded to her office bringing all his certificates of
employment, and that it was there that she had introduced him to her manager, the The accused-appellant presented two witnesses, namely: Adelaida Castel and Edith
accused Bermudez, who promised his deployment in Hongkong within two weeks; that dela Cruz. Castel testified that she had known the accused-appellant for almost five
because he had not been deployed as promised, he had gone to the Philippine years; that being then present during the meeting between the accused-appellant and
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), where he had learned that the accused, Caniazares she did not hear the accused-appellant representing herself as a legitimate
Bermudez and Langreo, had not been issued the license to recruit and place people recruiter to the latter; that she had been present when Miparanum delivered the
overseas; and that he had then decided to charge them all with illegal recruitment P40,000.00 to Bermudez; and that prior to the entrapment of the accused-appellant,
and estafa in the Philippine National Police Crime Investigation and Detection Group Caniazares had called their house three times to ask the accused-appellant to
(PNP-CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City.8 accompany him to the house of Bermudez. 13 On her part, dela Cruz attested that she
had known the accused-appellant since March, 2001 because they had worked
Dahab declared that on January 27, 2001, he had met the accused-appellant at the together in a handicraft factory; that she did not know if the accused-appellant had been
Guadalupe Branch of Jollibee to pay P2,500.00 for his medical examination; that a a recruiter; that it was Langreo who had been the recruiter because he had recruited
week later, he had undergone the three-day training in Mandaluyong City, for which he her own daughter; and that she did not know anything about the transactions between
paid P2,500.00; that she had then demanded from him the placement fee of the accused-appellant and the complaining witnesses. 14
P25,000.00; and that after he had not been able to raise the amount, he never saw her
again; and that Caniazares soon called him to urge that he should complain against the Subsequently, Dahab recanted his testimony, and stated that he had only requested
accused in the PNP-CIDG.9 assistance from the accused-appellant regarding his medical examination. He insisted
that he had voluntarily paid P5,000.00 to her, and she had then paid the amount to the
According to Miparanum, he met the accused-appellant through Caniazares, who was Medical Center for his medical examination. 15
his cousin. Caniazares arrived at his house with her in tow in order to borrow money
for his placement fee. On that occasion, she told Miparanum that she could help him Ruling of the RTC
find work abroad and even leave ahead of Caniazares if he had the money. Convinced,
Miparanum went to her residence on April 11, 2001 to apply as a seaman. On April 17, On August 27, 2002, the RTC rendered its ruling, disposing:
2001, he delivered to her P6,000.00 for his seaman's book. She again asked an
additional P6,000.00 for the seaman's book, and P40,000.00 as the placement fee. On
April 20, 2001, Miparanum went to her office where he met Bermudez. There, he WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows –
handed the P46,000.00 to the accused-appellant but it was Bermudez who issued the
corresponding receipt. The accused-appellant and Bermudez told him to wait for his a) In Criminal Case No. 01-1780 the Court finds the evidence of the
deployment to Hongkong as an ordinary seaman within two weeks. Miparanum Prosecution sufficient to establish the guilt of Marissa Bayker beyond
followed up on his application after two weeks, but was instead made to undergo reasonable doubt for having violated Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042
training, and he paid P2,700.00 for his ce1iificate. Sensing that he was being (The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) and applying
defrauded, Miparanum later proceeded to file his complaint at the PNP-CIDG.10 Section 7 of the same Act, which directs imposition of the maximum penalty if
the offender is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority, she is sentenced to
PO3 Raul Bo lido of the PNP-CIDG recalled that in July, 2001, the complainants went suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Million Pesos.
to Camp Crame to file their complaints against the accused-appellant, Bermudez and She is further ordered to indemnify Virgilio Caniazares of P6,000.00, Reynaldo
Langreo. PO3 Bolido, along with SPO4 Pedro Velasco and Team Leader Police Dahab P2,500.00 and Basilio Miparanum of P12,000.00.
Inspector Romualdo Iringan, conducted an entrapment operation against the accused.
They prepared 10 marked Pl00 bills dusted with ultraviolet powder and gave the same b) In Criminal Case No. 01-1781, the Court finds the evidence of the
to Miparanum. On July 23, 2001, the entrapment team proceeded with Miparanum to Prosecution sufficient to establish the guilt of Marissa Bayker beyond
Jollibee-Guadalupe where Miparanum was to meet the accused-appellant. The team reasonable doubt for the crime of estafa defined and penalized under Article
immediately arrested her upon her receiving the marked bills. The PNP Crime 315 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and she is sentenced to suffer the penalty
Laboratory conducted its examination for traces of ultraviolet powder on her person, of imprisonment for FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11)
and the results of the examination were positive for the presence of ultraviolet DAYS of prision correccional to NINE (9)YEARS of prision mayor. She is
powder. 11 further ordered to pay Basilio Miparanum P40,000.00.

In contrast, the accused-appellant pointed to Langreo and Bermudez who had operated No pronouncement as to costs.
GNB Marketing Agency. She claimed to have met Miparanum at Jollibee-Guadalupe
only for the purpose of bringing him to Bermudez. She refused to receive the money xxxx
being handed to her by Miparanum because she did not demand for it, but the four
policemen suddenly arrested her, and one of them rubbed his arm against her
forearm. 12 SO ORDERED. 16
Judgment of the CA participation had been limited to signing the receipts as a witness, and to receiving
payments for the medical examinations;21 that the CA and the RTC had disregarded
On July 28, 2005, the CA affirmed the convictions of the accused-appellant by the the recantation by Dahab; and that had the evidence been limited to the testimonies of
RTC, 17 viz.: Caniazares and Miparanum, she would have only been liable for simple illegal
recruitment.22
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED and the Joint decision
dated august 27, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 138 of Makati City Did the CA correctly affirm the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crimes of
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Case No. 01-1780 for Illegal illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa?
Recruitment, the fine imposed is hereby REDUCED to Pl00,000.00 and in Criminal
Case No. 01-1781 for Estafa, appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty Ruling of the Court
of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to nine (9)
years of prision mayor as maximum. We affirm the assailed judgment of the CA.

SO ORDERED. I
Illegal Recruitment Committed in Large Scale
The CA opined that the Prosecution had established the elements of illegal recruitment
in large scale by proving that the accused-appellant lacked the authority or license to Illegal recruitment is committed by a person who: (a) undertakes any recruitment
engage in recruitment and placement, 18 and had promised the complainants activity defined under Article l 3(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article
employment abroad and had then received money from them; 19 and that the 34 and Article 38 of the Labor Code; and (b) does not have a license or authority to
Prosecution had also established the estafa by showing that she had misrepresented lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.23 It is committed in large
to Miparanum about her power and authority to deploy him for overseas employment, scale when it is committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. 24
thereby inducing him to part with his money.
The CA properly affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant by the RTC for illegal
Hence, this appeal. recruitment committed in large scale because she had committed acts of recruitment
against at least three persons (namely: Canizares, Dahab, and Miparanum) despite her
Issues not having been duly licensed or authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) for that purpose.
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors to the CA, to wit:
The accused-appellant's insistence on her very limited participation in the recruitment
I of the complainants did not advance or help her cause any because the State
established her having personally promised foreign employment either as hotel porters
or seafarers to the complainants despite her having no license or authority to recruit
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY from the POEA. The records made it clear enough that her participation was anything
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE but limited, for she herself had accompanied them to their respective medical
PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION'S DEFENSE examinations at their own expense. In addition, she herself brought them to GNB
Marketing and introduced them to her co-accused. In this regard, the CA pointedly
II observed:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO THE The evidence established that without any license or authority to do so, appellant
DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT promised private complainants overseas employment in regard to which she required
them to undergo medical examination and training and collected fees or payments from
III them, while repeatedly assuring that they would be deployed abroad. On appellant's
contention that it was Nida Bermudez and Lorenz Langreo who received money from
the complainants, even assuming arguendo that appellant never received any payment
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE from the complainants, actual receipt of a fee is not an essential element of the crime
RETRACTIONS MADE BY COMPLAINANT REYNALDO DAHAB20 of Illegal Recruitment, but is only one of the modes for the commission thereof. Besides,
all the private complainants positively identified appellant as the person who recruited
The accused-appellant insists on her innocence, and points to Langreo and Bermudez them and exacted money from them. Appellant's bare denials and self-serving
as the persons who had directly engaged in illegal recruitment. She argues that her
assertions cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the complainants who had no II
ill motive to testify falsely against her.25 Estafa

The accused-appellant's denial of her participation in the illegal recruitment activities of The conviction of the accused-appellant for illegal recruitment committed in large scale
Bermudez and Langreo did not gain traction from her charging her co-accused with the did not preclude her personal liability for estafa under Article 3l5(2)(a) of the Revised
sole responsibility for the illegal recruitment of the complainants.1âwphi1 Based on the Penal Code on the ground of subjecting her to double jeopardy. The elements
testimonial narration of the complainants regarding their recruitment, she was of estafa as charged are, namely: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
unqualifiedly depicted as having the primary and instrumental role in recruiting them for confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party, or a third party suffered
overseas placement from the inception. Also, her claim of having been only casually damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.29 In contrast, the crime of illegal
associated with GNB Marketing did not preclude her criminal liability for the crimes recruitment committed in large scale, as indicated earlier, requires different elements.
charged and proved. Even the mere employee of a company or corporation engaged Double jeopardy could not result from prosecuting and convicting the accused-
in illegal recruitment could be held liable, along with the employer, as a principal in appellant for both crimes considering that they were entirely distinct from each other
illegal recruitment once it was shown that he had actively and consciously participated not only from their being punished under different statutes but also from their elements
in illegal recruitment.26 This is because recruitment and placement include any act of being different.
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, as
well as referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or The active representation by the accused-appellant of having the capacity to deploy
abroad, whether for profit or not. Miparanum abroad despite not having the authority or license to do so from the POEA
constituted deceit as the first element of estafa. Her representation induced the victim
The accused-appellant protests that the RTC and the CA unreasonably disregarded to part with his money, resulting in damage that is the second element of
Dahab' s recantation; and that the recantation would render her liable only for simple the estafa. Considering that the damage resulted from the deceit, the CA's affirmance
illegal recruitment instead of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. of her guilt for estafa as charged was in order.

The protest of the accused-appellant is untenable. III

Penalties
Dahab's supposed recantation to the effect that he had only sought the assistance of
the accused-appellant for his medical examination by no means weakened or The penalty for illegal recruitment committed in large scale, pursuant to Section
diminished the Prosecution's case against her. Its being made after he had lodged his 7(b)30 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers' Act), is life imprisonment and a fine
complaint against her with the PNP-CIDG (in which he supplied the details of his of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than Pl,000,000.00. In light of the provision of
transactions with her) and after he had testified against her in court directly incriminating the law, the CA patently erred in reducing the fine to P100,000.00. Hence, we hereby
her rendered it immediately suspect. It should not be more weighty than his first increase the fine to P500,000.00.
testimony against her which that was replete with details. Its being the later testimony
of the Dahab did not necessarily cancel his first testimony on account of the possibility Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
of its being obtained by coercion, intimidation, fraud, or other means to distmi or bend
the truth.
Article 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
Recantation by a witness is nothing new, for it is a frequent occurrence in criminal
proceedings. As a general rule, it is not well regarded by the courts due to its nature as
the mere afte1ihought of the witness. To be given any value or weight, it should still be 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
subjected to the same tests for credibility in addition to its being subject of the rule that minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000
it be received with caution. 27 The criminal proceedings in which sworn testimony has pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
been given by the recanting witness would be rendered a mockery, and put at the mercy paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
of the unscrupulous witness if such testimony could be easily negated by the witness's l0,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
subsequent inconsistent declaration. The result is to leave without value not only the years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
sanctity of the oath taken but also the solemn rituals and safeguards of the judicial trial. imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
If only for emphasis, we reiterate that it is "a dangerous rule to reject the testimony termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who has given it later on
changed his mind for one reason or another, for such a rule will make a solemn trial a xxxx
mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. "28
Inasmuch as the prescribed penalty is prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, plus one year for each additional Pl0,000.00
over P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years, the penalty 1. In Criminal Case No. 01-1780, for illegal recruitment committed in large
to be imposed on the accused-appellant should depend on the amount defrauded. We scale, the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of P500,000.00 is imposed on
note that the RTC took into consideration only the sum of P40,000.00, and the CA the accused-appellant;
concurred with the RTC thereon. Yet, the records reveal that Miparanum paid to the
accused-appellant and her co-accused not only P40,000.00 but the aggregate sum of 2. In Criminal Case No. 01-1781, for estafa, the accused-appellant is
P54,700.00 (i.e., the P6,000.00 for the seaman's book, the additional P6,000.00 for the sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years and two months
seaman's book, the P40,000.00 for placement fee, and P2,700 for his training of prision correccional, as the minimum, to nine years, eight months and 21
certificate). The amount of P54, 700.00 is the determinant of the penalty to be imposed. days of prision mayor, as the maximum;

Pursuant to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed for estafa in 3. The accused-appellant shall indemnify complainants Virigilio Caniazares,
which the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00 Reynaldo Dahab and Basilio Miparanum in the respective amounts of
is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum P6,000.00, P2,500.00, and P54,700.00 plus interest of 6% per annum from
period (i.e., four years, two months and one day to eight years); if the amount of the the finality of this decision until full payment; and
fraud exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty thus prescribed shall be imposed in its
maximum period, and one year shall be added for each additional Pl0,000.00 provided
the total penalty imposed shall not exceed 20 years. Considering that the penalty does 4. The accused-appellant shall pay the costs of suit.
not consist of three periods, the prescribed penalty is divided into three equal portions,
and each portion shall form a period,31 with the maximum period being then SO ORDERED.
imposed.32 However, the floor of the maximum period – six years, eight months and
21 days - is fixed in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, or of any showing
of the greater extent of the evil produced by the crime, 33 to which is then added the
incremental penalty of one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, or three
years in all. 34 The resulting total penalty is nine years, eight months and 21 days
of prision mayor, which shall be the maximum of the indeterminate sentence.

The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken from prision correccional in its
minimum period to prision correccional in its medium period (i.e., six months and one
day to four years and two months), the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code. We note that the CA correctly fixed the minimum of
the indeterminate sentence at four years and two months of prision correccional.

In view of the foregoing, the indeterminate sentence for the accused-appellant is from
four years and two months of prision correccional, as the minimum, to nine years, eight
months and 21 days of prision mayor.

IV
Civil Liabilities

The civil liabilities as decreed by the RTC and upheld by the CA are also corrected to
reflect the actual aggregate amount to be restituted to Miparanum at P54,700.00. In
addition, the accused-appellant shall be obliged to pay interest of 6% per annum on the
respective sums due to each of the complainants, to be reckoned from the finality of
this decision until full payment considering that the amount to be restituted became
determinate only through this adjudication.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July 28, 2005 subject
to the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
G.R. No. 139930 June 26, 2012 D. Regala, Douglas Lu Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and Jaime Gandiaga, approved another
amendment to UNICOM’s capitalization. This increased its authorized capital stock to
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., one billion shares divided into 500 million Class "A" voting common shares, 400 million
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MARIA CLARA LOBREGAT, JOSE ELEAZAR, JR., JOSE Class "B" voting common shares, and 100 million Class "C" non-voting common
CONCEPCION, ROLANDO P. DELA CUESTA, EMMANUEL M. ALMEDA, shares, all with a par value of ₱1 per share. The paid-up subscriptions of 5 million
HERMENEGILDO C. ZAYCO, NARCISO M. PINEDA, IÑAKI R. MENDEZONA, shares without par value (consisting of one million shares for the incorporators and 4
DANILO S. URSUA, TEODORO D. REGALA, VICTOR P. LAZATIN, ELEAZAR B. million shares for UCPB) were then converted to 500 million Class "A" voting common
REYES, EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, LEO J. PALMA, DOUGLAS LU YM, SIGFREDO shares at the ratio of 100 Class "A" voting common shares for every one without par
VELOSO and JAIME GANDIAGA, Respondents. value share.5

DECISION About 10 years later or on March 1, 1990 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed
a complaint for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 30196 against
respondents, the 1979 members of the UCPB board of directors, before the Presidential
ABAD, J.: Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The OSG alleged that UCPB’s investment
in UNICOM was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government since
This case, which involves another attempt of the government to recover ill-gotten wealth UNICOM had a capitalization of only ₱5 million and it had no track record of operation.
acquired during the Marcos era, resolves the issue of prescription. In the process of conversion to voting common shares, the government’s ₱495 million
investment was reduced by ₱95 million which was credited to UNICOM’s incorporators.
The Facts and the Case The PCGG subsequently referred the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman in
OMB-0-90-2810 in line with the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government,7 which disqualified the PCGG from conducting the preliminary
On April 25, 1977 respondents Teodoro D. Regala, Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes, investigation in the case.
Eduardo U. Escueta and Leo J. Palma incorporated the United Coconut Oil Mills, Inc.
(UNICOM)1 with an authorized capital stock of ₱100 million divided into one million
shares with a par value of ₱100 per share. The incorporators subscribed to 200,000 About nine years later or on March 15, 1999 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
shares worth ₱20 million and paid ₱5 million. issued a Memorandum,8stating that although it found sufficient basis to indict
respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the action has already
prescribed. Respondents amended UNICOM’s capitalization a third time on September
On September 26, 1978 UNICOM amended its capitalization by (1) increasing its 18, 1979, giving the incorporators unwarranted benefits by increasing their 1 million
authorized capital stock to three million shares without par value; (2) converting the shares to 100 million shares without cost to them. But, since UNICOM filed its
original subscription of 200,000 to one million shares without par value and deemed Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation with the Securities and
fully paid for and non-assessable by applying the ₱5 million already paid; and (3) Exchange Commission (SEC) on February 8, 1980, making public respondents’ acts
waiving and abandoning the subscription receivables of ₱15 million. 2 as board of directors, the period of prescription began to run at that time and ended on
February 8, 1990. Thus, the crime already prescribed when the OSG filed the complaint
On August 29, 1979 the Board of Directors of the United Coconut Planters Bank with the PCGG for preliminary investigation on March 1, 1990.
(UCPB) composed of respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile,
Maria Clara L. Lobregat, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela In a Memorandum9 dated May 14, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman approved the
Cuesta, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Hermenegildo C. Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iñaki R. OSP’s recommendation for dismissal of the complaint. It additionally ruled that UCPB’s
Mendezona, and Danilo S. Ursua approved Resolution 247-79 authorizing UCPB, the subscription to the shares of stock of UNICOM on September 18, 1979 was the proper
Administrator of the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CII Fund), to invest not more point at which the prescription of the action began to run since respondents’ act of
than ₱500 million from the fund in the equity of UNICOM for the benefit of the coconut investing into UNICOM was consummated on that date. It could not be said that the
farmers.3 investment was a continuing act. The giving of undue benefit to the incorporators
prescribed 10 years later on September 18, 1989. Notably, when the crime was
On September 4, 1979 UNICOM increased its authorized capital stock to 10 million committed in 1979 the prescriptive period for it had not yet been amended. The original
shares without par value. The Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock stated that the provision of Section 11 of R.A. 3019 provided for prescription of 10 years. Thus, the
incorporators held one million shares without par value and that UCPB subscribed to 4 OSG filed its complaint out of time.
million shares worth ₱495 million.4
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration on the Office of the Ombudsman’s action
On September 18, 1979 a new set of UNICOM directors, composed of respondents but the latter denied the same;10 hence, this petition.
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Maria Clara L. Lobregat, Jose R.
Eleazar, Jr., Jose Concepcion, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Iñaki R. Mendezona, Teodoro
Meanwhile, the Court ordered the dismissal of the case against respondent Maria Clara The above-mentioned section provides two rules for determining when the prescriptive
L. Lobregat in view of her death on January 2, 2004.11 period shall begin to run: first, from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, if such commission is known; and second, from its discovery, if not then known,
The Issue Presented and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. 19

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not respondents’ alleged violation of Section Petitioner points out that, assuming the offense charged is subject to prescription, the
3(e) of R.A. 3019 already prescribed. same began to run only from the date it was discovered, namely, after the 1986 EDSA
Revolution. Thus, the charge could be filed as late as 1996.
The Court’s Ruling
In the prosecution of cases of behest loans, the Court reckoned the prescriptive period
from the discovery of such loans.1âwphi1 The reason for this is that the government,
Preliminarily, the Court notes that what Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) filed in as aggrieved party, could not have known that those loans existed when they were
this case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. But the remedy from an made. Both parties to such loans supposedly conspired to perpetrate fraud against the
adverse resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman in a preliminary investigation is a government. They could only have been discovered after the 1986 EDSA Revolution
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.12 Still, the Court will treat this petition as when the people ousted President Marcos from office. And, prior to that date, no person
one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents reveals that petitioner imputes would have dared question the legality or propriety of the loans. 20
grave abuse of discretion and reversible jurisdictional error to the Ombudsman for
dismissing the complaint. The Court has previously treated differently labeled actions
as special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 for acceptable reasons such as Those circumstances do not obtain in this case. For one thing, what is questioned here
justice, equity, and fair play.13 is not the grant of behest loans that, by their nature, could be concealed from the public
eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their documentations. What is rather
involved here is UCPB’s investment in UNICOM, which corporation is allegedly owned
As to the main issue, petitioner maintains that, although the charge against respondents by respondent Cojuangco, supposedly a Marcos crony. That investment does not,
was for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, its prosecution relates to however, appear to have been withheld from the curious or from those who were
its efforts to recover the ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos and of minded to know like banks or competing businesses. Indeed, the OSG made no
his family and cronies. Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the allegation that respondent members of the board of directors of UCPB connived with
right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or UNICOM to suppress public knowledge of the investment.
employees is not barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
Besides, the transaction left the confines of the UCPB and UNICOM board rooms when
But the Court has already settled in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on UNICOM applied with the SEC, the publicly-accessible government clearing house for
Behest Loans v. Desierto14 that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution applies increases in corporate capitalization, to accommodate UCPB’s investment. Changes in
only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, not to criminal cases such as the shareholdings are reflected in the General Information Sheets that corporations have
complaint against respondents in OMB-0-90-2810. Thus, the prosecution of offenses been mandated to submit annually to the SEC. These are available to anyone upon
arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill-gotten wealth contemplated in Section request.
15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution may be barred by prescription.15
The OSG makes no allegation that the SEC denied public access to UCPB’s investment
Notably, Section 11 of R.A. 3019 now provides that the offenses committed under that in UNICOM during martial law at the President’s or anyone else’s instance. Indeed, no
law prescribes in 15 years. Prior to its amendment by Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 195 accusation of this kind has ever been hurled at the SEC with reference to corporate
on March 16, 1982, however, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under R.A. transactions of whatever kind during martial law since even that regime had a stake in
3019 was only 10 years.16 Since the acts complained of were committed before the keeping intact the integrity of the SEC as an instrumentality of investments in the
enactment of B.P. 195, the prescriptive period for such acts is 10 years as provided in Philippines.
Section 11 of R.A. 3019, as originally enacted.17
And, granted that the feint-hearted might not have the courage to question the UCPB
Now R.A. 3019 being a special law, the 10-year prescriptive period should be computed investment into UNICOM during martial law, the second element—that the action could
in accordance with Section 2 of Act 3326,18 which provides: not have been instituted during the 10-year period because of martial law—does not
apply to this case. The last day for filing the action was, at the latest, on February 8,
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the 1990, about four years after martial law ended. Petitioner had known of the investment
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery it now questions for a sufficiently long time yet it let those four years of the remaining
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and period of prescription run its course before bringing the proper action.
punishment.
Prescription of actions is a valued rule in all civilized states from the beginning of
organized society. It is a rule of fairness since, without it, the plaintiff can postpone the
filing of his action to the point of depriving the defendant, through the passage of time,
of access to defense witnesses who would have died or left to live elsewhere, or to
documents that would have been discarded or could no longer be located. Moreover,
the memories of witnesses are eroded by time. There is an absolute need in the interest
of fairness to bar actions that have taken the plaintiffs too long to file in court.

Respondents claim that, in any event, the complaint against them failed to show
probable cause. They point out that, prior to the third amendment of UNICOM’s
capitalization, the stated value of the one million shares without par value, which
belonged to its incorporators, was ₱5 million. When these shares were converted to 5
million shares with par value, the total par value of such shares remained at ₱5 million.
But, the action having prescribed, there is no point in discussing the existence of
probable cause against the respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Memorandum dated
May 14, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman that dismissed on the ground of
prescription the subject charge of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 against
respondents Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, Jose R. Eleazar, Jr., Jose
C. Concepcion, Rolando P. Dela Cuesta, Emmanuel M. Almeda, Hermenegildo C.
Zayco, Narciso M. Pineda, Iñaki R. Mendezona, Danilo S. Ursua, Teodoro D. Regala,
Victor P. Lazatin, Eleazar B. Reyes, Eduardo U. Escueta, Leo J. Palma, Douglas Lu
Ym, Sigfredo Veloso, and Jaime Gandiaga.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135715 April 13, 2011 The above mentioned transactions, were, however, discovered only in 1992 after then
President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos), in an effort to recover the ill-gotten wealth
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT- FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS, of the late President Marcos, his family, and cronies, issued Administrative Order No.
represented by MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, PCGG CHAIRMAN AND ORLANDO C. 136 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (the
SALVADOR AS CONSULTANT OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP OF THE Committee), with the Chairman of the Philippine Commission on Good Government
AD-HOC COMMITTEE, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO AS (PCGG) as the Committee’s head. The Committee was directed, inter alia, to inventory
OMBUDSMAN, PANFILO O. DOMINGO, CONRADO S. REYES, ENRIQUE M. all behest loans, and identify the lenders and borrowers, including the principal officers
HERBOZA, MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, ABDULLAH DIMAPORO AND AMER and stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as the persons responsible for the
DIANALAN,Respondents. granting of loans or who influenced the grant thereof. 7 Subsequently, then President
Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 618 outlining the criteria which may be utilized
as a frame of reference in determining a behest loan, viz:
DECISION
a. It is under-collateralized;
PEREZ, J.:
b. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
This petition for review on certiorari1 is one among the 17 cases filed before us by the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, charging public
respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto (Ombudsman) for grave abuse of c. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of
discretion, when, on the ground of prescription and insufficiency of evidence, he marginal note;
dismissed all of these cases then pending before him, including this case in OMB-0-
97-1718. d. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified
as cronies;
The Facts
e. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;
Respondents Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, Abdullah Dimaporo, and Amer Dianalan, were
stockholders and officers of the Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills (MINCOCO), a domestic f. Use of corporate layering;
corporation established in 1974,2 while respondents Panfilo O. Domingo, Conrado S.
Reyes, Enrique M. Herboza, and Ricardo Sunga, were then officers of the National g. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought;
Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC).
h. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.
On 10 May 1976, MINCOCO applied for a Guarantee Loan Accommodation with the
NIDC for the amount of approximately P30,400,000.00, which the NIDC’s Board of
Directors approved on 23 June 1976. The Committee found that twenty-one (21) corporations, including MINCOCO, obtained
behest loans. It claimed that the fact that MINCOCO was under-collateralized and
undercapitalized; that its officers were identified as cronies; that the late President
The guarantee loan was, however, both undercapitalized and under-collateralized Marcos had marginal note, effectively waiving the government’s right to foreclose
because MINCOCO’s paid capital then was only P7,000,000.00 and its assets worth is MINCOCO’s mortgage liens; and, that the Guarantee Loan Accommodation were
P7,000,000.00. approved in an extraordinary speed of one month, bore badges of behest loans.

This notwithstanding, MINCOCO further obtained additional Guarantee Loan Subsequently, the Committee filed with the Ombudsman a sworn complaint against
Accommodations from NIDC in the amount of P13,647,600.00 and MINCOCO’s Officers and NIDC’s Board of Directors for violation of Section 3(e) and
P7,000,000.00,3 respectively. (g) of Republic Act No. 3019,9 as amended.

When MINCOCO’s mortgage liens were about to be foreclosed by the government By Resolution dated 9 July 1998, the Ombudsman motu prorio dismissed the complaint
banks due its outstanding obligations, Eduardo Cojuangco issued a memorandum on the grounds that, first, there was insufficient evidence to warrant the indictment of
dated 18 July 1983, bearing the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos’ (President the persons charged; and, second, the alleged offenses had prescribed. 10 The
Marcos) marginal note, disallowing the foreclosure of MINCOCO’s properties. 4 The Ombudsman explained:
government banks were not able to recover any amount from MINCOCO and President
Marcos’ marginal note was construed by the NIDC to have effectively released
MINCOCO, including its owners, from all of its financial liabilities. 5
Being undercapitalized, standing alone is meaningless. The approval of the indictment;15 that it is beyond the ambit of the Court to review this exercise of
loans/guarantees was still based on sound lending practice, otherwise, MINCOCO discretion;16 that Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution applies only to civil suits
would have been disqualified from obtaining the same. If MINCOCO’s equity was more and not to criminal proceedings;17 and, that the crime under which the respondents
than the amount of the loans, there was no need for it to obtain the latter. herein were charged had already prescribed.18

Anent the claim that Mohammad Ali Dimaporo was a crony of the late President Private respondents Panfilo O. Domingo and Enrique M. Herboza, filed their respective
Marcos, no evidence was adduced to prove the same, hence, remains a bare Comments mainly reiterating the Ombudsman’s contentions. The other respondents
allegation. x x x. did not file their Comments, and, thus, considered to have waived their chance thereto.

On the issue that the notation by President Marcos in the Memorandum of July 18, The Court’s Ruling
1983 is a behest order, suffice it to state that these marginal notes, if they meant
endorsement as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61, endorsed the The remedy from an adverse resolution of the Ombudsman is a petition for certiorari
recommendation regarding the mortgage liens of the government banks of the under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; what was filed with the Court, however, was a
Mothballed Coconut Oil Mills and not the approval/grant of the loans/guarantees in petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Nevertheless, the Court will treat this
1976. It is in effect approved the release of the liabilities of the former owners of coconut petition as one filed under Rule 65 since a reading of its contents shows that the
oil mills, one of which was MINCOCO, but not the acquisition of the said Committee imputes grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman for dismissing the
loans/guarantees. complaint.19 This was how we also treated the previous cases marred by the same
procedural lapse, the latest of which is the 2009 Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding
The take over of MINCOCO by UNICOM without the consent of NIDC is not a Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 135703).20
characteristic of a behest loan. It is a mere violation of procedures that does not warrant
a criminal action. At the core of the controversy is the Ombudsman’s Resolution holding that prescription
had already set-in effectively barring the institution of charges against the private
xxxx respondents. The Ombudsman claimed that the alleged behest loans, transpired in
1976,21 and, thus, the complaint filed after more than two decades from the commission
For the perpetration of the acts being complained of, the respondents are charged of thereof or on 8 October 1997, was well beyond the 10-year prescriptive period provided
violations of Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019. The instant case however for under the old Republic Act No. 3019.22
will no longer prosper for the offenses have already prescribed.
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following shall be considered: (1) the period
Be it remembered that MINCOCO applied for and was granted loans/guarantees way of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription started to
back in 1976. Thus, these acts are governed by the law in force at the time of their run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.23
commission, which is the old R.A. No. 3019 before its amendment by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195 in March 1982. Offenses perpetrated prior to the enactment of this latter law At the outset, the provision found in Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution that
prescribed ten (10) years later. And since the case was filed against the herein "the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
respondents only in September 1997, the offenses have long prescribed in 1986. employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches or estoppels," has already been settled in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Prescription commenced to run in 1976 when the assailed transaction happened. x x Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130140),24 where the Court
x.11 held that the above cited constitutional provision "applies only to civil actions for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases."25
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.12
The period of prescription for the crime charged in this petition, committed in 1976 and
prior to the amendment of Republic Act No. 3019, is ten (10) years.
The petitioner argued that the right of the State to recover behest loans as ill-gotten
wealth is imprescriptible under Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution; 13 and,
assuming that the period to file criminal charges herefore is subject to prescription, the Section 1126 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,
prescriptive period should be counted from the time of discovery of behest loans or provides that the offenses committed under Republic Act No. 3019 shall prescribe in
sometime in 1992 when the Committee was constituted.14 fifteen (15) years; prior to this amendment, however, under the old Republic Act No.
3019, this prescriptive period was only ten (10) years. In People v. Pacificador, 27 the
Court held that the longer prescriptive period of 15-years does not apply in crimes
The Ombudsman, in his Comment, countered that his office has the discretionary committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on
power during preliminary investigation to determine the sufficiency of evidence for 16 March 1982, because, not being favorable to the accused, it cannot be given
retroactive effect. Considering that the alleged crime was committed in 1976, and in beneficiaries of the loans."37 In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad
line with the Court’s ruling in Pacificador, the prescription period should be ten (10) Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817),38 the
years. Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the
legality of these transactions.
Prescription of crime shall begin to run from the day of its commission, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether a criminal case is
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. to be filed, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when
there is a grave abuse of discretion.
While we sustain the Ombudsman’s contention that the prescriptive period for the crime
charged herein is 10 years and not 15 years, we are not persuaded that in this specific True, the Ombudsman is a constitutionally created body with constitutionally mandated
case, the prescriptive period began to run in 1976, when the loans were transacted. independence. Despite this, however, the Ombudsman comes within the purview of the
Court’s power of judicial review39 – a peculiar concept of Philippine Ombudsman,
The time as to when the prescriptive period starts to run for crimes committed under embodied in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution40 – which serves as a safety
Republic Act No. 3019, a special law, is covered by Act No. 3326, 28 Section 2 of which net against its capricious and arbitrary acts.41 Thus, in Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio,42 the
provides that: Court held that "while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case is to be filed, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the
Ombudsman’s action when there is grave abuse of discretion." 43 This is because,
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation "while the Ombudsman enjoys, as it must, complete independence, it cannot and must
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the not lose track of the law, which it is bound to uphold and obey." 44
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
After reviewing the case’s records, the Court finds that the present petition calls for the
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty exercise of its power of judicial review.
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy.
Private respondents are charged with violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act
No. 3019 which states:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is
committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of his
right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent the running of Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public
the prescriptive period.29 An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause
of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations xxxx
where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence
of a cause of action."30 It was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
the running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque 31 which became the private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149),32 and the subsequent cases33 which or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees
Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
we held in a catena of cases,34 that if the violation of the special law was not known at other concessions.
the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery
thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
xxxx
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the
subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee (g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly
made an exhaustive investigation.35 When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or
years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this will profit thereby.
was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans,36 that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to From the 1999 landmark case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, because of Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130140),45 to the 2008 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved public officials and the Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Tabasondra (G.R. No. 133756), 46 and to the
2009 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. Violation of Section 3(e)61 of Republic Act No. 3019 requires that there be injury caused
No. 135703),47 the same issues confronted the Court as the one presented in the by giving unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences to private parties who
present petition, in that the Ombudsman similarly dismissed these cases not only on conspire with public officers. In contrast, Section 3(g) 62does not require the giving of
the ground of prescription but also for insufficiency of evidence. 48 unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences to private parties, its core element
being the engagement in a transaction or contract that is grossly and manifestly
Interestingly, the facts in Tabasondra49 are squarely on all fours as the present case. disadvantageous to the government.
Tabasondra,50 involved Coco-Complex Philippines, Inc., (CCPI), a domestic
corporation primarily incorporated for the manufacture of coconut oil. 51 CCPI applied The waiver of MINCOCO’s multi-peso loan should have been enough basis in finding
for Guarantee Loan Accommodation thru the National Investment Development that probably Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was violated and the fact that NIDC
Corporation amounting to P9,277,080.00, allegedly for the purchase of an oil mill to be extended a loan guarantee to MINCOCO, despite its being undercapitalized and under-
supplied by Krupp Germany. The NIDC Board approved the loan in collateralized, should have also been enough ground in finding probable cause for
1969,52 notwithstanding the fact that CCPI was undercapitalized with only violation of Section 3(g) of the above-cited law.
P2,111,000.00 paid-up capital,53 and under-collateralized with only P495,300.00
assets.54 Thus, with the NIDC’s Guarantee Loan Accommodation, the Philippine More importantly, the finding of the Committee that MINCOCO obtained behest loans
National Bank (PNB) granted the loan. Still, with NIDC’s guarantee, CCPI obtained because of the following circumstances: MINCOCO was under-collateralized and
additional loans from PNB in 1972, which, as of 1992, ballooned to P205,889,545.76. undercapitalized; its officers were identified as cronies; President Marcos had marginal
note, effectively waiving the government’s right to foreclose MINCOCO’s mortgage
When the Committee filed criminal complaints against the CCPI’s Officers and PNB’s liens; and, NIDC approved MINCOCO’s Guarantee Loan Accommodation in an
Board of Directors for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, the extraordinary speed of one month, should have been accorded a proper modicum of
Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. For this, the respect by the Ombudsman.
Committee charged the Ombudsman for grave abuse of discretion, but pending its
resolution before us, the Ombudsman, taking cue from the Court’s 1999 ruling in G.R. Considering the membership of the Committee – representatives from the Department
No. 130140,55 motu proprio reinvestigated the complaint it earlier dismissed (and was of Finance, The Philippine National Bank, the Asset Privatization Trust, the Philippine
still pending before us), only to dismiss it anew, in a Resolution dated 16 October 2000, Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation and even the Development Bank of
opining that NIDC’s Board of Directors, who approved the loans in favor of CCPI, should the Philippines – its recommendation should be given great weight. No doubt, the
have been the ones indicted.56 Subsequently, the Court dismissed Tabasondra for members of the Committee are experts in the field of banking. On account of their
being moot and academic. special knowledge and expertise, they are in a better position to determine whether
standard banking practices are followed in the approval of the loan/guarantee or what
Similarly, in the present petition, MINCOCO was also granted by NIDC a Guarantee would generally constitute as adequate security for a given loan. 631avvphi1
Loan Accommodation amounting initially to P30.4 million pesos, despite its being
undercapitalized and under-collateralized.57 The duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a preliminary investigation is to establish
whether there exists probable cause to file information in court against the accused.64 A
As the Ombudsman admitted, when MINCOCO’s mortgage liens were about to be finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than
foreclosed by the government banks, the late President Marcos intervened and through not, the accused committed the crime.65 Considering the quantum of evidence needed
a marginal note, in connivance with the NIDC’s officers, waived the liabilities of its to support a finding of probable cause, the Court holds that the Ombudsman gravely
owners to the detriment of the government.58 It behooves the Court that while the abused its discretion when it dismissed the complaint against herein respondents.
Ombudsman admitted this fact, it saw nothing wrong in President Marcos’ intervention,
and the involvement therein of the NIDC’s officers. This intervention alone, by no less Preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
than the highest official of the land, waiving a multi-million peso liability of a private parties’ evidence.66 It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a
corporation, should have alarmed the Ombudsman. well founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.67 The validity and merits of a party’s accusation or defense, as
It surprises us that while the Ombudsman dismissed Tabasondra for not impleading well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during the trial
therein the NIDC’s Board of Directors, now that they (NIDC’s Board of Directors) have proper.68
been impleaded, the Ombudsman still dismissed the complaint, allegedly for
insufficiency of evidence.59 In conclusion, the offenses ascribed to respondents "involve behest loans which bled
white the economy of the country, one of the excesses of the authoritarian regime that
Applying mutatis mutandis G.R. No. 13375660 in this petition, it is apparent that there led to the EDSA revolution, a serious evil that the 1987 Constitution aimed to
can be liability for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019. extirpate."69 It involves nothing less than the interest of the people whose transgressed
rights are supposed to be vindicated by their protector – the Ombudsman.70 As
protector of the people, the Ombudsman should be pro-active in making use of its vast
arsenal of powers to "bring the lamp of scrutiny to otherwise dark places even over the
resistance of those who would draw the blinds." 71

The criminal liability of Conrado S. Reyes is hereby extinguished in accordance with

Article 89(1)72 of the Revised Penal Code as confirmed by his death certificate. 73 With
respect to respondents Panfilo O. Domingo and Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, the facts of
their deaths have to be confirmed to determine the application to them of the same
provision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby ORDERED to:

1. DISMISS the complaint against deceased respondent Conrado S. Reyes;

2. REQUIRE the counsels of respondents Panfilo O. Domingo and

Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to submit proof of their deaths; and

3. FILE with the Sandiganbayan the necessary Information against

respondents Abdullah Dimaporo, Amer Dianalan, Enrique M. Herboza, and
Ricardo Sunga.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013 The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against each
other. Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery under I.S. Nos.
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its manager 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondents
and authorized representative Norma Tan, Petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE NELSON F. Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and three (3) John Does, one of whom was
LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City, eventually identified as respondent Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with
BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. 3 A preliminary
DOES" Respondents. investigation took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise
filed a case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's
employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 2003-1935.
DECISION
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of his co-
LEONEN, J.: respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally.
He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged
Rules of Court, praying that the assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp
Court of Baguio City and Order dated August 15, 2005 be reversed and that Criminal so that he and his family could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had
Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered reinstated and prosecuted before the the clamp with him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City. Complaint he filed against Jadewell.4

Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La
authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable cause to file a
Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner. Regarding the case of Robbery
render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is against respondents, Prosecutor Banez stated that:
illegally parked.1
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony
According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San Fernando of Robbery. The elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain and force upon
City, La Union, the facts leading to the filing of the Informations are the following: things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the existence of the crime.

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General Manager xxxx
Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged
in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing the wheel
Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these cases and their failure to pay the
clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000
624 owned by Edwin Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left which prescribes fines and penalties for violations of the provisions of such ordinance.
unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Certainly, they should not have put the law into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
Jadewell which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is ₱26,250.00. The
fines of ₱500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of ₱500.00 were also not
paid by the respondents herein. WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the
respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged into this
controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered owner of the Nissan
In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C. Tan, Renato Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No. 003-2000 in both cases and we
B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 7, 2003, hereby file the corresponding informations against them in Court. 6
along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein respondents Benedicto Balajadia,
Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a
Nissan Cefiro car with Plate No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.
considered illegally parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was
earlier rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly removing On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court
the clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its owner, Jadewell, its use of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003, stating:
and value which is ₱26,250.00. According to complainants, the fine of ₱500.00 and the
declamping fee of ₱500.00 were not paid by the respondents.2 That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused with unity of action and concerted design, did then and
there, with unity of action and concerted design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously 6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the law, the
forcibly dismantled [sic] and took [sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached to the left period of prescription of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to information. While it may be true that the Informations in these cases have been filed
Edwin Ang which was earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has, however, filed its criminal
Personnel's for violation of the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the damage and complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed period. 12
prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking System Corporation (Jadewell)
which owns such clamp worth ₱26,250.00 and other consequential damages. Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a
Reply14 on April 1, 2004.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding the Order
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003. 7 granting respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:

The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with the For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution on one of
Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the ground [sic] for the motion to quash, which is that the criminal action has been
the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a January 20, 2004 extinguished on grounds of prescription.
Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation8 on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash
and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being alleged
grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the violations of City Ordinances.
Information to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on
respondents with more than one offense.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and not on any date before
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that: that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, En Banc).

1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law prevails over
Ordinance No. 003-2000. Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability is totally PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS
extinguished by prescription of the crime. AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL
BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x
Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two Petitioner then filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional Trial
months." Court of Baguio City. The case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent judge committed grave abuse
4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case
committed on May 7, 2003. 5. As can be seen from the right hand corner of Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that the
the Information, the latter was filed with this Honorable Court on October 2, respondent judge ruled erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses
2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged commission of the offense charged against the private respondents was halted by the filing of the
charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if any, was Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were filed with
already extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed. 9 the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited Section 1 of Rule 110
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr.,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities, the
accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases. complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in
their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "the institution of the criminal
action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the unless otherwise provided in special laws." 17
February 10, 2004 Order11 to argue among other points that:
Petitioner contended further that:
the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance violations may only be
not the filing of the criminal information before this Honorable Court, is the reckoning commenced by the filing of an Information, then the two-month prescription period may
point in determining whether or not the criminal action in these cases had prescribed. only be interrupted by the filing of Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-
2000) against the respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch
xxxx 7, ruled in favor of the respondents and upheld the respondent judge’s Order dated
February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered by the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on Summary Procedure. Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by
Considering that the offenses charged are for violations of a City Ordinance, the the Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
criminal cases can only be commenced by informations. Thus, it was only legally and
procedurally proper for the petitioner to file its complaint with the Office of the City Hence, this Petition.
Prosecutor of Baguio City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary
Procedure, these criminal cases "shall be commenced only by information." These The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office
criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other way. of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission
of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the assailed Does."
Resolution does not apply in this case. The offense charged in Zaldivia is a violation of
municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint should have been filed directly in Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as
court as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other amended by Act No. 3763, does not apply because respondents were charged with the
hand, Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance and violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal ordinance. In any case, assuming
as aforestated, "shall be commenced only by information."18 arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of two months. This is
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other chartered
City Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month prescriptive period. Hence, the cities, the Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise
offenses charged have not prescribed. provided in their charters.

In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did not gravely In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did not err in
abuse his discretion. They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, provides dismissing the cases based on prescription. Also, respondents raise that the other
that: grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to Quash, namely, that the facts
charged constituted no offense and that respondents were charged with more than one
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation offense, were sustained by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the petitioner had no legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing
institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment. the civil liability of the case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was contrary to
the ruling in People v. Judge Santiago 23 which held that the private complainant may
only appeal the civil aspect of the criminal offense and not the crime itself.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.20 (Emphasis supplied) In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the case on
the ground of prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004 only cited that
ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but did not specify the
Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes21 held that the proceedings mentioned in grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner also maintains that the
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings . Thus, this Court, proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must include the preliminary
in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial investigation proceedings before the National Prosecution Service in light of the Rules
Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the on Criminal Procedure25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months
after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court
on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a Petition for
Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935. Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x x may file a verified petition" 26 before the court.

In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City Branch 7, The Petition is denied.
through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. The
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and the (3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)
procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the
prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any Section 11 of the Rules provides that:
prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other
special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any
other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
apply. Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de officio.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,27 this Court defined the parameters of prescription:
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section 451 reads:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period
of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. – A city may either be component or highly urbanized:
interrupted.28 (Citation omitted) Provided, however, that the criteria established in this Code shall not affect the
classification and corporate status of existing cities. Independent component cities are
those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.
for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute. Article 91 of or component cities. An independent component city has a charter that proscribes its
the Revised Penal Code reads: voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It stands that all cities as defined by
Congress are chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No.
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the charter of Baguio City.
the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an
reason not imputable to him. ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v.
Reyes.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of
the petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also
the prescription period. featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was
committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
Procedure. This Court ruled that:

SECTION 1. Scope – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction: against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
xxxx
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction
B. Criminal Cases: of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference
is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos,
(2) Violations of the rental law; or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5,
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have 2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. According to
thousand pesos. the Department of Justice – National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an
Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as:
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need
shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or not be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the same.
preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the
prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that –
case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court
and not on any date before that.
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof;
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that
the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted
proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include against him; and
administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law
does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does. d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former
should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information is sufficient
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this if it states that the crime charged was committed or some of the ingredients thereof
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place
modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. in which the crime was committed is an essential element of the crime, e.g. in a
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.30 prosecution for violation of the provision of the Election Code which punishes the
carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling place," or if it is necessary to identify the
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the offense charged, e.g., the domicile in the offense of "violation of domicile."
Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling
the prescription period. The recent People v. Pangilinan 31categorically stated that Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan
referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of
Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances. SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an offense
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription commences to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules their agents, and shall be interrupted:
of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the
representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of
Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial
Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial Prosecutor; or with the Office of the Ombudsman; or
proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the
preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it is merely
the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information. for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, or even if the court
Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its merits.
discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within which to file the
Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of
prescription is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court.

xxxx

For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence
to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at
the time, from the discovery and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted only by the filing of
the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1âwphi1

Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justice’s Prosecution

Staff and established Regional State Prosecution Offices. These Regional State
Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for particular regions where the
Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area of responsibility of the Region
1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte,
Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province, Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan,
Laoag, and San Carlos.

The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor was
designated to file the Information within the two-month period provided for in Act No.
3326, as amended.1âwphi1

The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it

resulted in the dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the
doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also
upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia
also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling:

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if
the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he
delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However,
that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their
obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language.

The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to
prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.33

WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995 . . . (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the defamatory words
complained of . . . . he must have been angry and worried "about some
PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE missing documents . . . as well as the letter of the Department of Tourism
advising ASPAC about its delinquent tax of P1.2 million . . . . " the said
MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, respondents.
defamatory words must have been uttered in the heat of anger which is
a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation.2
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8)
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It MONTHS imprisonment . . . . "3 After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the
essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately decision.of the RTC became final. The case was then set for execution of judgment by the
admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The MeTC which, as a consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But·before he could be arrested
law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can petitioner filed an application for probation which the MeTC denied "in the light of the ruling
avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused — to of the Supreme Court in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 84850, 29 June 1989, 174
wager on the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, SCRA 566 . . . ."4
the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now
applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's
affirmance of his conviction. Consequently, probation should be availed of at the first Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which on 2 July 1992 dismissed his
opportunity by convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest petition on the following grounds —
spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to comply with the
As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of P.D. 968, as provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 of September 4, 1991.
amended by P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990? Violation of the circular is sufficient cause for dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans. Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the petition that he
Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted — had asked the respondent court to reconsider its above order; in fact, he
had failed to give the court an.opportunity to correct itself if it had, in fact,
committed any error on the matter. He is, however, required to move for
You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic), reconsideration of the questioned order before filing a petition
bullshit. Puro kayo walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . . . Magkano for certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA 436). This failure is fatal to his
ba kayo . . . God damn you all. cause. It is a ground for dismissal of his petition (Santos v. Vda. de
Cerdenola, 5 SCRA 823; Acquiao v. Estenso, 14 SCRA 18; Del Pilar
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation in five Transit, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 31-SCRA 372).
(5) separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each Information charging
him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980. Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit any capricious,
arbitrary, despotic or whimsical exercise of power in denying the
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Br. petitioner's application for probation . . . .
61, found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against
him, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos. 105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210, sentenced him to a prison Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time
term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision ....
correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleqed in the
information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian,
Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant probation after
and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.1 He was however acquitted in Crim. conviction, upon an application by the defendant within the period of appeal, upon terms and
Case No. 105208 for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and conditions and period appropriate to each case, but expressly rules out probation where an
appeal has been taken . . . . 5
testify.

Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
elevated his case to the Regional Trial Court.
In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks this Court's
On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed his conviction but compassion in dispensing with the minor technicalities which may militate against his petition
appreciated in his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or obfuscation. Thus as he now argues before us that he has not yet lost his right to avail of probation
— notwithstanding his appeal from the MeTC to the RTC since "[t]he reason for his appeal was
precisely to enable him to avail himself of the benefits of the Probation Law because the
original Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court was such that he would not then be entitled The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation"
to probation." 6 He contends that "he appealed from the judgment of the trial court precisely rather than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as
for the purpose of reducing the penalties imposed upon him by the said court to enable him amended by P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which too
to qualify for probation." 7 frequently impede a disciplined and principled search for the meaning
which the law-making authority projected when it promulgated the
The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris still qualified to avail of probation even language which we must apply. That meaning is clearly visible in the text
after appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as the nose on a man's face. The
duration of the penalties imposed. Courtis simply·reading Section 4 as it is in fact written. There is no need
for the involved process of construction that petitioner invites us to
engage in, a process made necessary only because petitioner rejects the
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation. conclusion or meaning which shines through the words of the statute.
The first duty of the judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds it, not
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot extend to those not as he would like·it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v. Court of
expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace and First Instance warned, confusion and uncertainty will surely follow,
clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the court to a making, we might add, stability and continuity in the law much more
seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty difficult to achieve:
imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. 9 It is a special prerogative
granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, . . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements
the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised which tinge words as to give them the color of a
primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but
accused.10 The Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its decidedly harmful. That which has caused so much
government of any of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for
legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the public to understand and know what the law is
the law who is not clearly within them. with respect to a given matter, is in considerable
measure the unwarranted interference by judicial
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no tribunals with the English language as found in
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the statutes and contracts, cutting the words here and
appeal from the judgment of conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals 11 which interprets inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas
the quoted provision, offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the application of the of what the legislature ought to have done or what
law should not be subjected to any to suit the case of petitioner. While the proposition that parties should have agreed upon, giving them
an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for probation if the appealis solely to meanings which they do not ordinarily have cutting,
reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit may be equitable, we are not yet prepared trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers
to accept this interpretation under existing law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, we quote Mr. themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the
Justice Feliciano speaking for the Court en banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals— meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been
submitted to some court for its interpretation and
construction.
. . . we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal statute. We,
however, understand petitioner's argument to be really that any statutory
language that appears to favor the accused in acriminal case should be The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our
given.a "liberal interpretation." Courts . . . have no authority to invoke people's grasp of English is steadily attenuated. 12
"liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" where the words of the
statute themselves, and·as illuminated by the history of that statute, Therefore, that an appeal should not·bar the accused from applying for probation if the
leave no room for doubt or interpretation. We do not believe that "the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and express
spirit of·the law" may legitimately be invoked to set at naught words which mandate of Sec, 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which opens with a negativeclause,
have a clear and definite meaning imparted to them by our procedural "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
law. The "true legislative intent" must obviously be given effect by judges the appeal from the judgment of conviction." In Bersabal v. Salvador, 13 we said —
and all others who are charged with the application and implementation
of a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in mind, however, that the
spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given effect are derived from By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory
the words actually used by the law-maker, and not from some external, construction. negative words and phrases are to be regarded as
mystical or metajuridical source independent of and transcending the mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. . . . the use
words of the legislature. of the term "shall" further emphasizes its mandatory character and
means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced.
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish; where the law does the limit of not more than six (6) years provided for in the Probation Law, as amended. To
not make exception the court should not except. illustrate: 8 months multiplied by 16 cases = 128 months; 128 months divided by 12 months
(in a year) = 10 years and 8 months, hence, following his argument, petitioner cannot still be
eligible for probation as the total of his penalties exceeds six (6) years.
Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable.
Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the probationable
period. Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times since
one decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms there are only four (4) Informations thereby allowing petitioner to qualify for probation,
imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his instead of sixteen (16) times, is quite difficult to understand. The penalties imposed by the
disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and MeTC cannot be any clearer — "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8)
if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6) months of prision correccional, in each crime committed on each date of each case, as
years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified. The alleged in the information(s). "Hence, petitioner should suffer the imposed penalties sixteen
number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are (16) times. On the other hand, the RTC affirmed, the judgment of conviction and merely
within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the reduced the duration of each penalty imposed by the MeTC "in each case to a STRAIGHT
word maximum not total when it says that "[t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be extended penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" on account of a mitigating circumstance for
to those . . . . sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years." each case, count or incident of grave oral defamation·There is no valid reason therefore why
Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take each penalty the penalties imposed by the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times, and not sixteen
separately and distinctly with the others. Consequently, even if petitioner was supposed to (16) times, considering that the RTC merely affirmed the MeTC as regards the culpability of
have served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) petitioner in each of the sixteen (16) cases and reducing only the duration of the
months of prision correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced to serve the prison penalties imposed therein. Thus —
term for "each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s),"
and in each of the four (4) informations, he was charged with.having defamed the four (4) Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial
private complainants on four (4) different, separate days, he was still·eligible for probation, court is AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
as each prison term imposed on petitioner was probationable.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco

Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases
based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance which is
society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but analogous to passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the
because of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might further said accused in each case to a straight penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
commit. 14 The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law; and to pay
convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The Revised Penal the costs. 16
Code, 15 and not necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single
proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the disqualification is
principally the gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant degree of penalty Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the accused was acquitted
imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not generally or absolved in any of the four (4) counts under each of the four (4) Informatfons, or that any
considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation. part of thejudgment of conviction was reversed, or that any of the cases, counts or incidents
was dismissed. Otherwise, we will have to account for the twelve (12) other penalties
imposed by the MeTC. Can we? What is clear is that the judgment of conviction rendered
To demonstrate the point, let ustake for instance one who is convicted in a single decision by the was affirmed with the sole modification on the duration of the penalties.
of, say, thirteen (13) counts of grave oral defamation (for having defamed thirteen [13]
individuals in one outburst) and sentenced to a total prison term of thirteen (13) years, and
another who has been found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to six (6) years and one (l) In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken
day of prision mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (l2) years and one (1) day of reclusion separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have immediately
temporal minimum as maximuin. Obviously, the latter offender is more perverse and is filed an application for probation as he was already qualified after being convicted by the
disqualified from availing of probation. MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict
of the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC to
the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation. For, plainly, the law considers appeal and
Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Decision he probation mutually exclusive remedies. 17
could not have availed of the benefits of probation. Since he could have, although he did
not, his appeal now precludes him from applying for probation.
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties imposed
by the MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that petitioner
And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however erroneous it may be, that appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose of reducing his penalties to make
the penalties imposed against him should be summed up, still he would not have qualified him eligible for probation — since he was already qualified under the MeTC Decision — but
under the Decision rendered by the RTC since if the "STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) rather to insist on his innocence. The appeal record is wanting of any other purpose. Thus,
MONTHS imprisonment" imposed by the RTC is multiplied sixteen (16) times, the total in his Memorandum before the RTC, he raised only three (3) statements of error purportedly
imposable penalty would be ten (10) years and eight (8) months, which is still way beyond
committed by the MeTC all aimed at his acquittal: (a) in finding that the guilt of the accused for perfecting an appeal. . . . place the defendant on
has been established because of his positive identification by the witness for the prosecution; probation . . . .
(b) in giving full faith and credence to the bare statements of the private complainants despite
the absence of corroborating testimonies; and, (c)in not acquitting him in all the
Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for probation
cases," 18 Consequently, petitioner insisted that the trial court committed an error in relying from one who had appealed the trial court's judgment is allowed by law,
on his positive identification considering that private complainants could not have missed the petitioner's plea for probation was filed out of time. In the petition is a
identifying him who was their President and General Manager with whom they worked for a clear statement that the petitioner was up for execution of
good number of years. Petitioner further argued that although the alleged defamatory words judgment before he filed his application for probation. P.D. No. 968 says
were uttered in the presence of other persons, mostly private complainants, co-employees that the application for probation must be filed "within the period for
and clients, not one of them was presented as a witness. Hence, according to petitioner, the perfecting an appeal;" but in this case, such period for appeal had
trial court could not have convicted him on the basis of the uncorroborative testimony of passed, meaning to say that the Regional Trial Court's decision had
private complainants. 19 attained finality, and no appeal therefrom was possible under the law.
Even granting that an appeal from the appellate court's judgment is
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness, if not complete contemplated by P.D. 968, in addition to the judgment rendered by the
innocence, and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the penalties imposed. For sure, trial court, that appellate judgment had become final and was, in fact, up
the accused never manifested that he was appealing only for the purpose of correcting a for actual execution before the application for probation was attempted
wrong penalty — to reduce it to within the probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an by the petitioner. The petitioner did not file his application for probation
appeal, more so after asserting his innocence therein, petitioner should be precluded from before the finality of the said judgment; therefore, the petitioner's attempt
seeking probation. By perfecting his appeal, petitioner ipso facto relinquished his alternative at probation was filed too late.
remedy of availing of the Probation Law the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation
or opportunism on the part of an accused who although already eligible does not at once Our minds cannot simply rest easy on. the proposition that an application for probation may
apply for probation, but doing so only after failing in his appeal. yet be granted even if it was filed only after judgment has become final, the conviction
already set for execution and a warrant of arrest issued for service of sentence.
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction by the RTC to the
Court of Appeals does not necessarily mean that his appeal to the RTC was solely to reduce The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which
his penalties. Conversely, he was afraid that the Court of Appeals would increase his necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the
penalties, which could be worse for him. Besides, the RTC Decision had already become application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond comprehension. The
final and executory because of the negligence, according to him, of his former counsel who law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been perfected.
failed to seek possible remedies within the period allowed by law.

Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as

Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in accordance with Sec 3, par. mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC
(e), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, 20 should have moved to quash as each of the four (4) although the imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted
Informations filed against him charged four (4) separate crimes of grave oral defamation, only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed
committed on four (4) separate days. His failure to do so however may now be deemed a on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for perfecting an
waiver under Sec. 8 of the same Rule 21 and he can be validly convicted, as in the instant appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant petition for review should
case, of as many crimes charged in the Information.
be as it is hereby DENIED.

Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law. This SO ORDERED.
is vital way beyond the period allowed by law and crucial. From the records it is clear that
the application for probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had
been issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" 22of the RTC.
This is a significant fact which militates against the instant petition. We quote with affirmance
the well-written, albeit assailed, ponencia of now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the specific issue —

. . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time. The
law in point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides thus:

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the

provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and
upon application by said defendant within the period
G.R. No. 168546 July 23, 2008 In view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of
[v]iolation of Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A. No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a)
MICHAEL PADUA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. and (i) thereof, and therefore, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six
(6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a fine of Five Hundred
DECISION Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).

QUISUMBING, J.: No subsidiary imprisonment, however, shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to
pay the fine pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
This petition for review assails the Decision 1 dated April 19, 2005 and
Resolution2 dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 SO ORDERED.14
which had respectively dismissed Michael Padua’s petition for certiorari and denied his
motion for reconsideration. Padua’s petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
assailed the Orders dated May 11, 20043 and July 28, 20044 of the Regional Trial Court Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation 15 dated February 10, 2004 alleging
(RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition for probation. that he is a minor and a first-time offender who desires to avail of the benefits of
probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 16 (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as
"The Probation Law of 1976" and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He further alleged
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows: that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under the said
laws.
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan Ubalde were charged
before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City of violating Section 5,5 Article II of Republic Act The RTC in an Order17 dated February 10, 2004 directed the Probation Officer of Pasig
No. 9165,6 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," City to conduct a Post-Sentence Investigation and submit a report and recommendation
for selling dangerous drugs.7 The Information reads: within 60 days from receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor was also directed to submit
his comment on the said petition within five days from receipt of the order.
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan
Ubalde y Velchez a.k.a. "Allan" and Michael Padua y Tordel a.k.a. "Mike", with the On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a
crime of violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in relation to R.A. [No.] 8369, Post-Sentence Investigation Report to the RTC recommending that Padua be placed
Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as follows: on probation.18

On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio
Court, the accused, Edgar Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael Padua y Tordel, a issued an Order denying the Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section
minor, seventeen (17) years old, conspiring and confederating together and both of 2419 of Rep. Act No. 9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the
them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to sell any privilege granted by the Probation Law. The court ruled thus:
dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and
give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded newsprint
containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops, which was found positive to the Before this Court now is the Post-Sentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor
tests for marijuana, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law. Michael Padua y Tordel prepared by Senior Parole and Probation Officer Teodoro
Villaverde and submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City Parole and Probation Office,
Josefina J. Pasana.
Contrary to law.8
In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered Michael Padua y Tordel be placed on probation, anchoring his recommendation on
a plea of not guilty.9 Articles 189 and 192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Welfare Code, as
amended, which deal with the suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful
During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however, Padua’s counsel offender. Such articles, therefore, do not find application in this case, the matter before
manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea the Court being an application for probation by minor Michael Padua y Tordel and not
of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders under Section 7010 of the suspension of his sentence.
Rep. Act No. 9165. The prosecutor interposed no objection. 11 Thus, the RTC on the
same date issued an Order12 stating that the former plea of Padua of not guilty was On the other hand, Section 70 is under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the
considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. Hence, in a Program for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all
Decision13 dated February 6, 2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of the crime charged:
under Article VIII of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to violations of either Section 15 or CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER
Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII was [v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND
OTHER PURPOSES.22
More importantly, while the provisions of R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof
deals with Probation or Community Service for First- Time Minor Offender in Lieu of The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public respondent, opted to
Imprisonment, the Court is of the view and so holds that minor Michael Padua y Tordel adopt its Comment23 as its Memorandum. In its Comment, the OSG countered that
who was charged and convicted of violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot avail
of probation under said section in view of the provision of Section 24 which is hereunder I.
quoted:
The trial court and the Court of Appeals have legal basis in applying Section
"Sec. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. 24, Article II of R.A. 9165 instead of Section 70, Article VIII of the same law.
– Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless of the
penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation
Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended." (underlining supplied) II.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on Juveniles
y Tord[e]l should be, as it is hereby DENIED. in Conflict with the Law" has no application to the instant case.24

SO ORDERED.20 Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in dismissing Padua’s petition
for certiorari assailing the trial court’s order denying his petition for probation? (2) Was
Padua’s right under Rep. Act No. 9344,25 the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on July 2006," violated? and (3) Does Section 3226 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known
28, 2004. He filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals as the "Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" have application in this case?
assailing the order, but the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005,
dismissed his petition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Padua’s
petition for certiorari.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit
and ordered DISMISSED.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
SO ORDERED.21 (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.27
denied. Hence, this petition where he raises the following issues:
"Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There
I. is "excess of jurisdiction" when the court transcends its power or acts without any
statutory authority. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words,
THE DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATION WHICH DEPRIVED power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice,
PETITIONER’S RIGHT AS A MINOR UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an
NO. [02-1-18-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE ON JUVENILES IN evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to
CONFLICT WITH THE LAW. act at all in contemplation of law.28

II. A review of the orders of the RTC denying Padua’s petition for probation shows that
the RTC neither acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion because it
merely applied the law and adhered to principles of statutory construction in denying
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[’S] RIGHT [TO BE RELEASED Padua’s petition for probation.
UNDER RECOGNIZANCE] HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE
LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT ESTABLISHING A
COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM,
Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No. Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38 37 of Rep. Act No. 9344 could
9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that no longer be retroactively applied for petitioner’s benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No.
any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit: 9344 provides that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense
charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section 40 38 of Rep. Act No.
– Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under this Act, regardless 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court shall
of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence, or extend the
Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. (Emphasis supplied.) suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of 21 years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over
and thus, could no longer be considered a child 39 for purposes of applying Rep. Act
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and academic as far
trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege as his case is concerned.
granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory
construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 19, 2005 and
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.29 If a statute is clear, plain and free the Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is SO ORDERED.
expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of
intention.30 Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from
the words of a statute there should be no departure.31

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators
in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those
persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and
magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation
of Sections 1132 and 1533 of the Act. The law considers the users and possessors of
illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence,
while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from
availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike,
are given the chance to mend their ways.34 The Court of Appeals also correctly stated
that had it been the intention of the legislators to exempt from the application of Section
24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law
could have easily declared so.35

The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while
protective of drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous
drugs is meted only a penalty of six months rehabilitation in a government center, as
minimum, for the first offense under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person
charged and convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten
Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) under Section 5, Rep. Act No. 9165.

As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his right under Rep. Act
No. 9344, the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006" was violated. Nor can he
argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known as the "Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" has application in this case. Section 6836 of Rep. Act
No. 9344 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of
sentence and not probation.
G.R. No. L-67301 January 29, 1990 On September 23, 1982, the probationer (petitioner) asked his supervising probation officer
for permission to transfer his residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life Subdivision in Las
MANUEL V. BALA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, THE Piñas specifically 33 Jingco Street. The probation officer verbally granted the probationer's
request as he found nothing objectionable to it.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and PAUL AYANG-ANG Probation Officer, Manila
Probation Office No. 4, respondents.
By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should have expired on August 10, 1983, 3 one
Coronet Law Office for petitioner. year after the order granting the same was issued. But, the order of final discharge could not
be issued because the respondent probation officer had not yet submitted his final report on
the conduct of his charge.

SARMIENTO, J.:
On December 8, 1983, the respondent People of the Philippines, through Assistant City
Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion to revoke the probation of the petitioner
The petitioner by this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, presided over by the
Temporary Restraining Order seeks the reversal of the order dated April 2, 1984 of the then respondent judge. 4
Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), of Manila, Branch XX. 1 The
decretal portion of the assailed order reads:
The motion alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of his probation.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons above-stated, the motion to dismiss and/or strike
out motion to revoke probation, filed by Manuel Bala, thru counsel, should be, as On January 4, 1984, the petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on the ground that he
it is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit. was no longer under probation, 5 his probation period having terminated on August 10, 1983,
as previously adverted to. As such, no valid reason existed to revoke the same, he
contended.
Let the motion be set for continuation of hearing on April 25 & 27, at 8:30 o'clock
in the morning.
As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City Fiscal's motion to revoke the petitioner's probation,
the respondent probation officer filed on January 6, 1984, a motion to terminate Manuel
SO ORDERED. Bala's probation, at the same time attaching his progress report on supervision dated
January 5, 1984. 6 The same motion, however, became the subject of a "Manifestation,"
The petitioner had been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Maria Eloisa dated January 10, 1984, which stated that the probation officer was not pursuing the motion
Criss Diazen which had been attached to her United States of America passport, with that to terminate dated January 6, 1984; instead, he was submitting a supplemental
of Florencia Notarte, in effect falsifying a genuine public or official document. On January 3, report 7 which recommended the revocation of probation "in the light of new facts,
1978, the trial court adjudged petitioner Manuel Bala in Criminal Case No. 24443, guilty of information, and evidences."
the crime of falsification of a public document. The dispositive portion of the judgment states:
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Manuel Bala probation, questioning the jurisdiction of the court over his case inasmuch as his probation
y Valdellon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of a public period had already expired. Moreover, his change of residence automatically transferred the
or official document defined and penalized under article 172 of the Revised Penal venue of the case from the RTC of Manila to the Executive. Judge, of the RTC of Makati
Code, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Applying the which latter court include under its jurisdiction the Municipality of Las Piñas the probationer's
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty place of residence, invoking Section 13, P.D. No. 968, which provides
of not less than ONE (1) YEAR AND ONE (1) DAY and not exceeding THREE (3)
YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS & TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of prision correccional, to Sec. 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. ...
pay a fine of Pl,800.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the
rate of P8.00 for each day, and to pay the cost. He shall be credited with the period
of preventive imprisonment that he may have undergone in accordance with law. Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of
another court, control over him shall be transferred to the Executive Judge of the,
Court of First Instance of that place, and in such a case a copy of the probation
The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of Appeals, on April 9, 1980, affirmed in order the investigation report and other pertinent records shall be furnished to said
toto the lower court's decision. Executive Judge. Thereafter. the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the
probationer is transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was
After the case had been remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, 2 the previously possessed by the court which granted the probation.
petitioner applied for and was granted probation by the respondent judge in his order dated
August 11, 1982. The petitioner was then placed under probation for a period of one (1) year, As stated at the outset, the respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein.
Hence, this petition. program for a specific period of time. On the basis of his final report, the court can determine
whether or not the probationer may be released from probation.
The present law on probation, Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1990, which amends section 4 of
P.D. 968, clearly states that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if We find it reprehensible that the respondent probation officer had neglected to submit his
the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." report and recommendation. For, as earlier discussed, without this report, the trial court
could not issue the order of final discharge of the probationer. And it is this order of final
However, in the case at bar, P.D. 1990 is inapplicable. P.D. 1990, which went in force on discharge which would restore the probationer's suspended civil rights. In the absence of
the order of final discharge, the probation would still subsist, unless otherwise revoked for
January 15, 1985 can not be given retroactive effect because it would be prejudicial to the
accused. cause and that is precisely what we are going to do. We are revoking his probation for cause.

It is worthy to note, that what was actually resolved and denied was the motion to dismiss The petitioner, by applying for probation and getting it, consented to be emancipated from
the yoke if not stigma of a prison sentence, pledging to faithfully comply with the conditions
and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation which disposed of only the issue of the
petitioner's transfer of residence. The motion did not touch on the issue of the timeliness to of his probation, among which are:
revoke probation. The respondent judge has not yet heard and received evidence, much
less acted on the matter. Accordingly, the Solicitor General submits that the present petition xxx
is premature.
4. To be gainfully employed and be a productive member of society;
The Court finds no merit in the petition. Probation is revocable before the final discharge of
the probationer by the court, contrary to the petitioner's submission. xxx

Section 16 of PD 968 8 is clear on this score: 6. To cooperate fully with his program of supervision and rehabilitation that will be
prescribed by the Probation Officer. 9
See. 16. Termination of Probation. — After the period of probation and upon
consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court These conditions, as the records show, were not complied with. This non-compliance has
may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled defeated the very purposes of the probation law, to wit:
the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed
terminated.
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with
individualized treatment;
Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate
probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in the provisions of the
probation law. Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must first be issued by the (b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be
court of an order of final discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and
officer. Only from such issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed terminated.
(c) prevent the commission of offenses. 10
The period of probation may either be shortened or made longer, but not to exceed the
period set in the law. This is so because the period of probation, like the period of By his actuations, probationer-petitioner Manuel V. Bala has ridiculed the probation program.
incarceration, is deemed the appropriate period for the rehabilitation of the probationer. In Instead of utilizing his temporary liberty to rehabilitate and reintegrate himself as a
the instant case, a review of the records compels a revocation of the probation without the productive, law abiding, and socially responsible member of society, he continued in his
need of further proceedings in the trial court which, after all, would only be an exercise in wayward ways — falsifying public or official documents.
futility. If we render justice now, why should we allow the petitioner to further delay it.
Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite with responsible society. Precisely he was granted
probation in order to give him a chance to return to the main stream, to give him hope — Specifically, on April 30, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial
hope for self-respect and a better life. Unfortunately, he has continued to shun the straight Region, Branch XXX, convicted the petitioner, along with two other persons, Lorenzo Rolo
and narrow path. He thus wrecked his chance. He has not reformed. y Punzalan and Efren Faderanga y Fesalbon, for falsification of public and/or official
documents (U.S. Passports), under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised
Penal Code, in five separate informations, in Criminal Cases Nos. 29100, 29101, 29102,
A major role is played by the probation officer in the release of the probationer because he 29103, and 29107. The trial court imposed upon each of them in all five (5) cases a prison
(probation officer) is in the best position to report all information relative to the conduct and term of "two (2) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years also of prison
mental and physical condition of the probationer in his environment, and the existing correccional, as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000, the accessory penalties thereof, and to
institutional and community resources that he may avail himself of when necessary. Indeed, pay the costs." On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the RTC with
it is the probation officer who primarily undertakes the supervision and reform of the modification by granting restitution of the amounts they collected from the offended private
probationer through a personalized, individualized, and community-based rehabilitation parties. The judgment has since become final. As a matter of fact, for failure of the petitioner
to appear for execution of judgment despite notice, the trial court ordered the arrest of was null and void in the place, because then the Manila CFI was without jurisdiction to grant
Manuel Bala on July 10, 1989. A warrant of arrest against Bala was issued on July 12, 1989 him probation as he was a resident of Las Piñas.
and this warrant has not yet been implemented because Bala absconded. These facts are
evident and constitute violations of the conditions of his probation. Thus, the revocation of
It is therefore incorrect to assume that the petitioner's change of abode compels change of
his probation is compelling. venue, and necessarily, control over the petitioner, to the Executive Judge of the RTC of his
new residence. Thus, in the apportionment of the regional trial courts under Batas Pambansa
At any time during the probation, the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Las Piñas is one
probationer for violation of any of the conditions of probation. The probationer, among the municipalities included in the National Capital Judicial Region (Metro Manila) with
once arrested and detained, shall immediately be brought before the court for a a seat at Makati. 18 Needless to say, the Regional Trial Court in Makati, like the Manila
hearing which may be informal and summary, of the violation charged. ... If the Regional Trial Court, forms part of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
violation is established, the court may revoke or continue his probation and modify Region. 19 Accordingly, the various branches of the regional trial courts of Makati or Manila
the conditions thereof. If revoked, the court shall order the probationer to serve the under the National Capital Region, are coordinate and co-equal courts, the totality of which
sentence originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of probation or modifying is only one Regional Trial Court. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. In other
the terms and conditions thereof shall not be appealable. 11 words, the case does not attach to the branch or judge. 20 Therefore, in this case, RTC
Branch XX of Manila, which granted the probation, has not lost control and supervision over
(Emphasis supplied.) the probation of the petitioner.

The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the probationer be arrested so that The petitioner also claims that he had verbally obtained permission to transfer residence
he can serve the sentence originally imposed. The expiration of the probation period of one from his probation officer.1âwphi1This would not suffice the law is very explicit in its
year is of no moment, there being no order of final discharge as yet, as we stressed earlier. requirement of a prior court approval in writing. Section 10 of PD 968 categorically decrees
that the probationer must
Neither can there be a deduction of the one year probation period from the penalty of one
year and one day to three years, six months, and twenty-one days of imprisonment because
an order placing the defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence," but is in effect xxx
a suspension of the imposition of the sentence. 12 It is not a final judgment but an
"interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant
(j) reside at premises approved by it (court) and not to change his residence without
under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of its prior written approval;
discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment if the
conditions are violated." 13
xxx
Lastly, probation is a mere privilege. Privilege is a peculiar benefit or immunity conferred by
21
law on a person or group of persons, not enjoyed by others or by all; special enjoyment of a Further, such written approval is required by the probation order of August 11, 1982 as
good or exemption from an evil; it is a special prerogative granted by law to some one of the conditions of probation, to wit:
persons. 14 Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court.
This discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only (3) To reside in BF Homes, Las Piñas and not to change said address nor leave
incidentally for the benefit of the accused. 15 If the probationer has proven to be unrepentant, the territorial jurisdiction of Metro Manila for more than twenty-four (24) hours
as in the case of the petitioner, the State is not barred from revoking such a privilege. without first securing prior written approval of his Probation Officer.
Otherwise, the seriousness of the offense is lessened if probation is not revoked.
In the light of all the foregoing and in the interest of the expeditious administration of justice,
On the second assigned error, the petitioner argues that his transfer of residence we revoke the probation of the petitioner for violations of the conditions of his probation,
automatically transferred jurisdiction over his probation from the Manila Regional Trial Court instead of remanding the case to the trial court and having the parties start all over again in
to the same court in his new address. needless protracted proceedings. 22

We disagree. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the probation of the petitioner is hereby
REVOKED. Further, the trial court is ORDERED to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
In criminal cases, venue is an element of jurisdiction. 16 Such being the case, the Manila petitioner and for him to serve the sentence originally imposed without any deduction. Costs
RTC would not be deprived of its ,jurisdiction over the probation case. To uphold the against the petitioner.
petitioner's contention would mean a depreciation of the Manila court's power to grant
probation in the first place. It is to be remembered that when the petitioner-accused applied SO ORDERED.
for probation in the then CFI of Manila, he was a resident of Las Piñas as he is up to now,
although in a different subdivision. As pointed out earlier, he merely moved from BF Homes
to Philam Life Subdivision 33 Jingco Street, also in Las Piñas. 17 On the other hand, pursuing
the petitioner's argument on this score to the limits of it logic would mean that his probation
G.R. No. 188191 March 12, 2014 The Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City or any person acting in his
behalf to release immediately petitioner ENRIQUE ALMERO Y ALCANTARA from
ENRIQUE ALMERO y ALCANTARA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, detention by virtue of the property bond posted by him for his provisional liberty in
MIRASOL BARTOLOME, CLARITA P. MATIAS, ROSENDO P. MATIAS, and Criminal Case No. 96-6531, unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause or
ANTONIO P. MATIAS, Respondents. causes.

RESOLUTION No costs.

SERENO, CJ: SO ORDERED.5

We resolve the petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by THE CA RULING
Enrique Almero y Alcantara from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 26
September 2008 and Resolution dated 29 May 2009 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 103030.1 The CA ruled that the RTC should have confined itself to determining whether or not
the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for
THE MTC RULING IN CRIMINAL CASE No. 96-6531 probation. Since no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law is available against the denial of probation, a Rule 65 petition is clearly
the appropriate remedy. However, the trial court erred in taking cognizance of
Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-6531 for reckless imprudence supplemental grounds assailing the judgment of conviction, because an application for
resulting in homicide and multiple physical injuries. After private respondents reserved probation is a waiver of the right to appeal from the judgment of conviction and
the right to institute a separate action for damages, trial ensued. On 8 January 2007, effectively renders the same final. The CA ruled that even assuming petitioner failed to
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Labo, Camarines Norte found petitioner guilty and be present at the promulgation of judgment, he had no one but himself to blame for
sentenced him to suffer prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. failing to inform the MTC of his change of address.6

Petitioner filed an Application for Probation on 7 September 2007, reasoning that he On the argument that private respondents possessed no legal personality to represent
was informed of his conviction only upon being served the warrant for his the State in a criminal case, the CA held that petitioner himself impleaded them in the
arrest.2 Prosecutor Analie Velarde opposed his application on the ground that he was certiorari petition before the RTC. The CA also found that petitioner filed his application
known to be uncooperative, habitually absent, and had even neglected to inform the for probation only on 7 September 2007, or more than one month after he received
court of his change of address. On 22 February 2007, the MTC denied his application, notice of the judgment of conviction. Inasmuch as the grant of probation rests solely on
prompting petitioner to file a special civil action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). the discretion of the court, the denial thereof cannot be considered grave abuse, viz.:
While his first Petition raised the sole issue of the denial of his application for probation,
he filed a Supplemental Petition,3 which a) assailed the validity of the promulgation of
the 8 January 2007 judgment; and b) impleaded private complainants Mirasol WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial court’s appealed January 28, 2008
Bartolome, Clarita P. Matias, Rosendo P. Matias and Antonio P. Matias. Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered ordering
the DISMISSAL of appellee’s petition for certiorari.7
THE RTC RULING IN SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-0012
Petitioner comes before this Court, assigning the following errors:
In his supplemental Petition, petitioner stated that upon close scrutiny, he discovered
that the judgment itself was premature and flawed, because the MTC never ruled upon I. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that private
his Formal Offer of Exhibits.4 The RTC found that the MTC committed grave abuse of complainants have personality to appeal the 28 January 2008 Decision of the
discretion in rendering judgment without first ruling on his Formal Offer of Exhibits since, RTC.
technically, petitioner had not yet rested his case. It also ruled that the promulgation of
judgment was similarly tainted with grave abuse of discretion, because petitioner was II. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that the RTC
not present at the time, in violation of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Without reversibly erred in nullifying petitioner’s judgment of conviction.
addressing the issue of probation, the dispositive portion states:
III. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that petitioner is
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for Certiorari is hereby not entitled to probation.8
GRANTED. The judgment promulgated on 22 February, 2007 is hereby SET ASIDE
AND NULLIFIED and the case is remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Labo, OUR RULING
Camarines Norte for further proceedings.
The Petition lacks merit. ‘person(s) aggrieved’ by petitioner judge’s ruling on his non-disqualification to file the
special civil action under sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. Recently in line with the
Anent the first issue, petitioner argues that in criminal cases, the offended party is the underlying spirit of a liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote their
State, and that private complainants’ interest is limited to the civil liability arising object, as against the literal application of Rule 110, section 2, we held, overruling the
therefrom. Petitioner's application for probation purportedly did not involve the civil implication of an earlier case, that a widow possesses the right as an offended party to
aspect of the case. Heirs of the Late Francisco Abueg v. Court of Appeals cited by the file a criminal complaint for the murder of her deceased husband. 15
CA allegedly cannot apply, since it does not even discuss the right of private
complainants to interpose an appeal. Petitioner’s second and third arguments are brought by an erroneous understanding of
the nature of probation and shall be discussed jointly.
In the Comment9 it filed, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) reiterated that what
petitioner filed with the RTC was a petition for certiorari, which is a special civil action. Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred
It cannot be considered an appeal in a criminal case over which only the State has an by the State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly,
interest, but an appeal in a civil action from which private persons can appeal in the the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised
event of an adverse outcome. Private respondents, in their Comment, 10 argued that the primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the
CA correctly applied Abueg, which is on all fours with the present case. In Abueg, the accused.16
accused was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property for crashing against and killing Francisco Abueg. Instead of filing an appeal, In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:
the accused applied for probation. After the CA affirmed the grant of probation, the
Supreme Court entertained and acted upon the petition for certiorari filed by the victims’
heirs.11 Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It
essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately
admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal.
We agree with the submission of the respondents. While the present petition originated The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction
from a criminal proceeding, what petitioner filed with the RTC was a special civil action, before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of
in which he himself impleaded private respondents. He cannot now belatedly change the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally
his stance to the prejudice of private respondents, who would otherwise be deprived of affirmed on appeal… he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering
recourse in a civil action they did not initiate. In any case, this Court has consistently nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction.17
ruled that private parties may be clothed with sufficient personality if the facts show that
the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and if the issues in the action
could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner. Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale
for the treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they
rest on diametrically opposed legal positions. An accused applying for probation is
In Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz,12 citing People v. Calo, Jr.,13 the Supreme Court deemed to have accepted the judgment. The application for probation is an admission
ruled: of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of
conviction.18 This was the reason why the Probation Law was amended: precisely to
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction – even if the
or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People sentence is probationable – for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for
or the State in criminal proceeding pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals, the the probation only if the accused fails in his bid. 19
ends of substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in this action could
be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by entertaining the Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question
petition at bar. As an offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient the judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right
personality and a valid grievance against Judge Adao’s order granting bail to the to appeal.20 While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed
alleged murderers of his (private petitioner’s) father.14 (Citations omitted.) the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of
probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D.
Furthermore, in Paredes v. Gopengco, it was held that parties in criminal cases have 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.
sufficient personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action of
prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying The assignment of errors in the Petition before us reflects the diametrically opposed
spirit of the liberal construction of the rules, to wit: positions taken by accused petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the defects
committed by the trial court during the promulgation of the judgment, thus casting doubt
Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case before petitioner judge, on the judgment itself. Yet in the same breath, he persists in his application for
it cannot be gainsaid that respondents have sufficient interest and personality as
probation, despite the waiver and admission of guilt implicit in any procedure for
probation – precisely the unhealthy wager the law seeks to prevent.

Petitioner applied for probation beyond the reglementary period, yet the trial court still
allowed the filing before ultimately denying it for lack of merit. Regarding this delay and
the other defects imputed by petitioner to the RTC, we concur with the findings of the
CA:

(W)e find that public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
appellee’s application for probation. Granted that appellee had not received the notice
of the January 8, 2007 decision rendered in Criminal Case No. 06-6531, it appears from
the record that appellee had no one but himself to blame for the procedural quagmire
he subsequently found himself in. In denying appellee’s motion for reconsideration of
the September 18, 2007 denial of the application for probation, public respondent
distinctly ruled as follows:

x x x. (T)he application has been filed out of time as accused himself admitted in the
motion.1âwphi1 He blames Atty. Evan D. Dizon, his former counsel, for not notifying
the court of his change of address but Atty. Dizon himself had been trying to contact
accused since 2001 even before he filed his formal offer of evidence since all notices
sent to the accused’s given address have been returned to this court since 2001. If it is
true that he moved to Cavite only in 2003, why were said notices returned with notations
‘unknown,’ ‘unclaimed,’ or ‘moved’?21

This Court will not countenance pleas for liberality in adverse outcomes caused by the
negligence and evasiveness of the parties themselves.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 103030 dated 26
September 2008 and 29 May 2009 are hereby AFFIRMED, respectively.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014 Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by
petitioners People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson
(collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1 February
2012.1 The Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
x-----------------------x G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama,
Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless
G.R. No. 154954 imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the
criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had modified
APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of
ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO the accused therein guilty of the crime of homicide.3
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES
II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-
GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of
PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona),
RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano
GUZMAN, Respondents. (Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial was violated. Reproduced below
is the dispositive portion of our Decision:5
x-----------------------x
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed
Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama,
Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries –
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found
x-----------------------x GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined
and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner, vs. MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of
JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all
ADRIANO, Respondents. damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until
satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
RESOLUTION
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby
SERENO, CJ: AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the
criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise
AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition
We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny"
in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal
Villa due to fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments raised by the
deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
parties in their respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, we find a few
remaining matters needing to be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ' these matters include
the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of Appeals judgments insofar as Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the
respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony D. Arna (Arna), Renato House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-
Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question of who Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or
are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the validity of the probation proceedings alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would
and the concomitant orders of a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case. increase the applicable penalties.

SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the
case:6 carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started
eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and
Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido incoherent mumblings.1avvphi1Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings,
"Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was
Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes). really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes
and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on
Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded arrival.
to Rufo’s Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael
Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that
they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for
the commencement of their initiation.
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults 3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards 4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical 5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan 6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
"initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to 7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the 8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their 9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, 10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of 11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance 12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their 13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
arms or withknee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege 14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on 15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the 16. Antonio General (General)
fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation. 17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to 19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize 20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, 21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the 22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. 23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the 24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended. 25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) In Criminal Case No. C-38340
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of 1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of 2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, 3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to 4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which 5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him 6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical 7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
 8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez) Motion for Partial Reconsideration
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon) filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 in connection with
On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave
C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first. abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C- Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that the right to speedy trial of the
38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert that right within a reasonable
homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion,
Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, respondents Escalona et al.did not timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the
Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced anew. time that the original records and pieces of evidence were unavailable. She again
emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years
from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a number of incidents
On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy attributable to the accused themselves that caused the delay of the proceedings. She
by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of then insists that we apply the balancing test in determining whether the right to speedy
each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then trial of the accused was violated.
passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero,
Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo,
Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
(Victorino et al.) – were acquitted,as their individual guilt was not established and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus
interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it
concedes that the mode in which the accused committed the crime was through fault
2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should have been equivalent to
Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the
menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of accused was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpaby
₱30,000 as indemnity. considering the act as one committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the
accused conducted the initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that
3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus equivalent to malice
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article aforethought.
249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their
years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also acquittal may also be reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also
ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No.
of ₱50,000 and to pay the additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have been similarly convicted like
damages. their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the former also
participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed to his death.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge
against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied
the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No.
court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the
Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial. effect of our Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of sentence are
concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation after the
CA rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability from the
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical
individually brought before this Court. (Citations omitted) injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a result,
they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
them closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their misappreciated the facts and the evidence.19
Applications for Probation on various dates in January 2002 11 pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law. They argue that We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s
Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their arguments and found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in
respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon their completion concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were
of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and declared the sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny
criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April 2003.13 the motion of petitioner Villa with finality.

To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their respective Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
Applications for Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging
them from probation, and declaring the criminal case against them terminated. Thus,
they maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality, We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with
insofar as they were concerned, whenthey waived their right to appeal and applied for respect to G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of
probation. Appeals). Many of the arguments raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of the
earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUES
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act complained
of was born of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or account of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We emphasize that the finding of
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, a felony committed by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with that committed by
Saruca, and Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as a result of an act
performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code expresses
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded thusly:
to that for intentional felonies
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a
their probation discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión
terminated the cases against them DISCUSSION correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
assertions raised by petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly considered and passed
uponin our deliberations, which led to our Decision dated 1 February 2012. We xxxx
emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy
trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an
acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
their right against double jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the part of the person performing or failing to perform suchact, taking into consideration
the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse of his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the CA’s Decision circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment
constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or toact in the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by (Emphases supplied)
reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and
so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice." 18 Thus, grave
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The
malicious intent to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.
the matter:20 Our Revised Penal Code belongs tothe classical school of thought. x x x
The identity of mens rea– defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
criminal intent – is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what the absentmalicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional
law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be felony.x x x.
committed by means of doloor "malice."
xxxx
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom,
intelligence, and intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus
– is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the
refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.It does accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised
not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intentconcerns the result of Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa).
the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a definite result, According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from
intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result. On the other imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
hand, the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding
from an evil heart or purpose.With these elements taken together, the requirement of Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice,
intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason
malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing
felony requires the existence of dolus malus– that the act or omission be done "willfully," it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In
"maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought." The maxim is contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault,
actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea– a crime is not committed if the mind of the from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight
person performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of the other or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly
elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond visible.
reasonable doubt.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as
xxxx follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take
in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, precaution against the mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to do so constitutes
the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or negligence.
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus interficendi– cannot
and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness,
intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the product of accident, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger
natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without malice or involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to
criminal intent – but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of
be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide. conduct is bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In
contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus possible that there
xxxx are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual,
"from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to
employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus
malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental,
since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence
consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an of malicious intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for
intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, committing an intentional felony.
there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against
the physical integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we
victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the cannot agree with the argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for
required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per semerely intentional felony can also be applied to the present case on the ground that the nature
of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony already or totally satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas waived in writing his right to
amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the imposable appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpaon the one hand and felonies
committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled from
between them. The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are the foregoing provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a
mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a result of the imprudence or criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is the correction or review of the
negligence of another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261 judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional
(Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death was a result of the edict27against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It
commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the state
penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the discretion of the court. We appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase
have already resolved – and the OSG agrees – that the accused Dizon and Tecson et criminal liability. Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying
al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on for probation – makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory. Our
Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating:28
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred
because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration the criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final
judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on
filed by Tecson et al. multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s
already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial
Tecson et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). initiated by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the
State.
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar the state from seeking the Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be
annulment of the judgment via a allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while
Rule 65 petition. strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where
the government’s power and resources are once again employed against the
defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal does
In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and
finding them guilty of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
of their respective availments of the probation program and their ultimate discharge
therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no longer be convicted of the heavier
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. 22 Respondents allude to our It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule
Decision in Tan v. People23 to support their contention that the CA judgment can no 120 does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already
longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court. explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this
rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court
that issued the criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the exception is articulated
The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former in Nazareno, from which we quote:30
had timely filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition
is analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that a petition
for certiorarialso prevents the case from becoming final and executory until after the In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done
matter is ultimately resolved. in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment
is per sevoid on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court
that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other
once the accused applies for probation, viz: words, the review is on the question of whether there has been a validly rendered
decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or correctness. Under the
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is on the
of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and
the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or whenthe sentence has been partially gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
(Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While this Court’s Decision in Tan may have of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
created an impression of the unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon as the
accused applies for probation, we point out that what the state filed therein was a mere It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for
motion for the modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for probation be filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant,
certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct and separate from the main case. While meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and sentenced
in the main case, the core issue is whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the
charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is whether the court acted (a) without or in excess Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al.in
of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special authority that
jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there is nomodification of judgment in a petition would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed with or taken
for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-evaluation of the merits of the case cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous
in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused. In a Rule 65 case, the CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion
petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of the G. Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling was
finding of lack of jurisdiction. made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e. accused Concepcion,
Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be
that it is inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications
through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal with Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that
judgment only if the appeal brought before the court is in the nature of a regular appeal applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as
under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal would put the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is substantive and not merely
the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in the partial annulment procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation proceedings were premised on
of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the judgment therein an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. acquired jurisdiction over the case.

The orders of Caloocan City RTC Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as 130 granted the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court
they were issued without jurisdiction. in which the criminal action has been properly instituted. 37 If a party appeals the trial
court’s judgment or final order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is
parcel of our criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to concerned.39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case the moment
adjudicate and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity the other party’s time to appeal has expired. 40 Any residual jurisdiction of the court of
of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before it. 31 That power origin shall cease – including the authority to order execution pending appeal – the
and capacity includes the competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate
punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein accordance with court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the
law. power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and
resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain with the
The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any
Tecson et al. before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would have prevented jurisdiction
have competence to take cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not from attaching in the first place.
the court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that
originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed
the Caloocan City RTC. except by virtue of a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the
accused of the offense charged becomes final under any of the following conditions
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference: among others:42 after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal; when the
accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan appeal; when
the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served; or when the
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by order is entered in the book of entries of judgments. 43 If the case was previously
said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be attached
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court from which expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly
the appeal was taken.44 The court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case within them. (Emphases supplied)
for appropriate action. It is during this time that the court of origin may settle the matter
of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution thereof, 45 including the The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et
convicts’ applications for probation.46 al.60 It points out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the
RTC, they thereby made themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law).
over the case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications
for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their respective We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:
applications47 while a motion for reconsideration was still pending before the CA 48 and
the records were still with that court.49 The CA settled the motion only upon issuing the
Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven months after Tecson et al. SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court
had filed their applications with the trial court.50 In September 2002, or almost a month may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by
before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting the said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
probation applications,51 the OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
Certiorari with the CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall
judgments by filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
2002.54 We noted the petition and then required respondents to file a comment of conviction.
thereon.55 After their submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually
required all parties to file their consolidated memoranda. 56 The records of the case Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a
remained with the CA until they were elevated to this Court in 2008. 57 fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on
the probation applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)
suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their final discharge, and
eventually declare the case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have
pasis a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law oran underhanded one- appealed the conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court
upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both – to which this Court was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for probation even after
cannot give a judicial imprimatur. the trial court has imposed a non probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on
lowers the original penalty to a sentence within the probationable limit. In that case, the
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight years of prisión mayor,
it. Probation58 is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became eligible for
who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8
their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a months and 21 days of prisión correccional.
chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration recordby making them undergo
rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to help In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the
offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self respecting accused was ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In
individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the community. Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity and
does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for
an act of grace orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court
Appeals,59 this Court explained thus: enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing themselves of the
benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation only on
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to
by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion probationable.
of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and
only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law should not therefore While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, issued its various Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in
rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the 1989
case Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and Francisco. The Applications for Probation of
Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch 130, as they 6. By prescription of the penalty.
had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents were originally
found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of 7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this
reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their Code. (Emphasis supplied)
conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor,
which made the sentence fall within probationable limits for the first time, the RTC
should have nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the time. As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally
speaking, it is as if no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment
of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist.
authority, so gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a
consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al.
and thereafter discharging them from their criminal liability must be deemed to have In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. find it inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely
to "suspend the execution of the sentence," 66 and not to replace the original sentence
with another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia: 67
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a
void for having been issued without jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an
v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz: "interlocutory judgment"in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a
final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)
Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it
are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and
all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied) Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et may now reapply for probation.
al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand modified
our pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal their
Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been conviction is concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En Bancin effect
extinguished as a result of their discharge from probation and the eventual termination abandoned Lagrosaand settled the following once and for all: 69
of the criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support his
argument, he cites the following provision of the Revised Penal Code:
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the
judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation.
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a
extinguished: conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court,now set aside; and, two, a
conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the
occurs before final judgment. probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will
not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed
2. By service of the sentence. on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a
lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment — even if this
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects. has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial
court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang
kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao gets the
4. By absolute pardon. whip). Where is justice there?

5. By prescription of the crime.

The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et
probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the al.ultimately liable for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant
probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor
he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Franciscoand in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisión correccional in
this case. its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et al., we rule
xxxx that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was
convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for probation.
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to
apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted
not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The the Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have
stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous probation program and have
that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the trial
penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent probation service in resolving
from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their whether to place them under probation at this time and in determining the terms,
right to apply for that privilege. conditions, and period thereof.

xxxx Final clarificatory matters

In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the
only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on minimum term of the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While
him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have this issue was not raised by any of the parties before us, this Court deems it proper to
found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the
years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence reads
probation. as follows:

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months
no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of
accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the prisión correccional, as maximum.
statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco,
the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next
only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard lower" than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless
the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law
accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose. (ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day," which had been inadvertently added, must be
removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the dispositive portion, the fourth
xxxx sentence should now read as follows:

At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of
Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would havehad arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional,
the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have as maximum. In this instance, we further find it important to clarify the accessory
availed himself of the right had the RTC doneright by him. The idea may not even have penalties inherent to the principal penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.
crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair to deny Arnel accessory penalty automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal
the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof.71 The applicable accessory penalty is
unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases determined by using as reference the principal penaltyimposed by the court before the
supplied) prison sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL.72 This determination is made
in spite of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It must
be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory penalties specifically
allude to the actual "penalty" 73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence" 74 set by a court. order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from
We believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on the convict two continuing with her teaching profession.
distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same offense. 75 The two penalties are only
relevant insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after which Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from
the convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the shortening of the prison term.76 public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
prisión correccionalin its medium period. As this provision grants courts the discretion
tolay down a penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating and aggravating It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even
circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within the aforementioned disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of
range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon and Tecson suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x.
et al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years and two months of prisión During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed
correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed
correccional automatically carries with it80 the following accessory penalties: ARTICLE in the probation order.
43. Prisión Correccional— Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión
correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right
tofollow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby
The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also DENIED.
pardon.
The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda,
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED.
sans the ISL; that is, for four years and two months 81 or until they have served their In light of the finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without
sentence in accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect immediately, once the or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned Applications
judgment of conviction becomes final.82 for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all
orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY
that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent
We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for probation in view of our
shall furthermore suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. recent ruling in Colinares v. People of the Philippines,88 without prejudice to their
Under Article 32 of the RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall remaining civil liability, if any.
forever deprive them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular election for
any public office; (b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public office. 83 Any
public office that they may be holding becomes vacant upon finality of the Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated
judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if expressly 1 February 2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth
remitted in a pardon.85 sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as follows: "They
are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n correccional,
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of as maximum."
probation, shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in
Baclayon,86 the grant of probation suspends the execution of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. We have reiterated this point SO ORDERED.
in Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation
is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence.
We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the
principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension
from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the
G.R. No. 202124 April 5, 2016 In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San
Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-
Appellant. That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay
Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the
DECISION jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of
undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident
PERALTA, J.: premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the
This resolves the appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder,
January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, finding accused-appellant produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous
Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder in Criminal desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel
Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and
who are minors, were not hit.
In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows: CONTRARY TO LAW.3

That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At
Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, said proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime
with a caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm while the other two had no
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and participation in the shooting incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was
shoot with said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who suffered the not present at the crime scene. Based on the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial
following: Prosecutor found no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San
Miguel.4 Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against
"Gunshot wound - Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to
appellant.5

Point of Entry – lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level
of the umbilicus, directed upward toward the left upper abdomen." At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim,
and Dr. Lourdes Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed
that the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age, who suffered the following: wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet wounds showed that the
victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but she could not tell what kind of
"Gunshot wound - ammunitions were used.6

Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the
evening of June 6, 2002, as his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room
nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was suddenly stripped off, and only the
Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"
supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the wall gone, the three (3)
men responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which
which directly caused their instant death. were illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified
the 3 men as appellant, Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.
That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given
provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so.
commission of the offense. The men then uttered, "Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded
with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda na ako at marami akong anak.
Contrary to law.2 Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot was fired, and
Norberto immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to protect
them from being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the maximum for each of the offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth
direction where his family huddled together in their hut. 7 Divina and Judy Ann Divina. Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the suit.

When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two SO ORDERED.12
(2) young daughters were wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help
from neighbors, while he and his older daughter carried the two (2) wounded children Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30,
out to the street. His daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital, while 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes
Claudine expired at the hospital despite the doctors' attempts to revive her. 8 charged.13

In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July
Norberto replied that he had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by 30, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution14 notifying the parties that they may submit
the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against appellant's two other brothers for their respective Supplemental Briefs. Both parties manifested that they will no longer
molesting his daughter.9 submit supplemental briefs since they had exhaustively discussed their positions before
the CA.15
On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense.
Appellant's testimony, along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in
San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he (appellant) was just watching TV at the Norberto's testimony, such as his failure to state from the beginning that all three
house of Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living for several years, at the time the assailants had guns, and to categorically identify appellant as the one holding the gun
shooting incident occurred. However, he and the other witnesses admitted that said used to kill Norberto’s children.
house was a mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene.10
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony
of Norberto, the trial court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant,
together with two other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment
Appellant was then convicted of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the
Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. Thus,
generally, the Court will not recalibrate and re-examine evidence that had been
analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. 16
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:
The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta CA, that appellant acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under Article firearms and simultaneously firing at Norberto and his family, killing his two young
248 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion daughters. Norberto clearly saw all of the three assailants with their firearms as there
Perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs in the amount is illumination coming from a lamp inside their house that had been laid bare after its
of Php50,000.00 and another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Claudine walling was stripped off, to wit:
Divina and accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same
sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims time, do you have light in your house?
actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs. A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of light was there?
SO ORDERED.11 A: A gas lamp.
Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?
On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment in Criminal Case A: In the middle of our house.
No. 7702-G, reads: xxxx
Q: when did they fire a shot?
A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta Q: How many gunshots did you hear?
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and penalized A: Only one.
under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm?
sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)
Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as xxxx
Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot? suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger
A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters San Miguel and Gilberto Alegre (sic) [Gilbert Estores]. They ordered him to go out of
were hit. their house and when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them having
xxxx hit and killed his two (2) daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and
Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time? his children were at very tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were shot
A: All of them. and killed were 13 years old and 3 ½ years old respectively. In this case, the victims
Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were were defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed assailants when they were
having one firearm each? gunned down. There was clear showing that the attack was made suddenly and
A: Yes, sir. unexpectedly as to render the victims helpless and unable to defend themselves.
Q: And they fired shots at the same time? Norberto and his wife and his children could have already been asleep at that time of
A: Yes, sir. the night. x x x 21
Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?
A: To the place where we were. Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder.
Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your As held in People v. Fallorina,22 the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
position then? attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Minor
A: I ordered my children to lie down. children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense.
Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.
down?
A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and
ordering them to line (sic) down face down) As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the
Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house? Revised Penal Code states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences
A: Less than five minutes, sir. the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house? execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
A: Yes, sir. than his own spontaneous desistance. In Esqueda v. People,23 the Court held:
Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what
happened to them? If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is
A: Yes, sir, they were hit. either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim,
or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the
x x x17 offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive;
(b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature
and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed;
Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of and (e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on
Norberto's daughters because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill the victim.
Norberto's family. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting
between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of
long as their concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such appellant as shown by the use of firearms, the words uttered 24during, as well as the
case, the act of one is the act of all.18 Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court thus quotes with approval the trial
as they went to the house of Norberto together, each with his own firearm. It is, court’s finding that appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.:
therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired
from appellant's firearm that killed the children. In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of
murder first by suddenly stripping off the wall of their house, followed by successive
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing firing at the intended victims when Norberto Divina refused to go out of the house as
of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace
treachery or evident premeditation.19 The presence of any one of the circumstances and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of the family would surely have died.
enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as murder. 20 The Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina
trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery attended but for Multiple Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina
the killing of Norberto’s two children, thus: and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in
this case, he alone is liable for the crime committed.25
x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down
side by side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to
state from the very beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that
it was the shots from appellant’s firearm that killed the children, are too trivial and to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two
inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's credibility. An examination of Norberto's or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule
testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the
in People v. Cabtalan,26 "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash
matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.
of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime."27 Both the trial court and the CA found
Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to
sees no reason why it should not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. move for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to
People28 that: question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would justify altering or
revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint
determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him
demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper
examination, thereby placing the trial court in unique position to assess the penalty for each offense.31
witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor
x x x.29
Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of
The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial.
outstanding or exceptional circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing
principle. There is no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's ruling that the
prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina identifying appellant Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida,32 the Court explained the concept of a complex crime
as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution evidence established as defined in Article 4833 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
beyond any reasonable doubt that appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes
However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus,
court to identify the crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known
caused by the trial court's use of the terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted as a compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
Murder" in convicting appellant, and yet imposing penalties which nevertheless show felonies while the other is known as a complex crime proper, or when an offense is a
that the trial court meant to penalize appellant for two (2) separate counts of Murder necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when
and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder. a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs
where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine
that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven distinct crimes.34
during trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not
Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was not the result of a single act but of
several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the
counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal two others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from
Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to comply their respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When
with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of
information must charge only one offense. people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing
not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as
a complex crime because as held in People v. Nelmida,35 "each act by each gunman
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at
the same is defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a
AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al.,30 thus: complex crime."36

The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to

give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him
Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail
account dwelling as an ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the as regards criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G contain sufficient allegations Generally, in these types of criminal cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded
to that effect, to wit: by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual
damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.
Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the
That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from
provocation for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory
commission of the offense.37 damages in civil law.42 This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states,
"Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:
It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can
be increased by the Court when appropriate.43 Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to
kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing circumstances. In addition:
the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the
acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause or accident (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity
other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused x x x38 of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded
In People v. Agcanas,39 the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at
human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more the time of his death;
guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling aggravates a felony where the
crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not (2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
given provocation therefor.40The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the
group of appellant violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession,
entire family therein, without provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance. not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the (3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
thus, with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
death for each of two (2) counts of murder.41 However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to
eligibility for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is
prescribed for each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only
one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law
from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot
anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified
impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and and increased when the present circumstance warrants it.44
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used
compensatory in nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals45 expounded on the nature and interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary damages
purpose of moral damages, viz.: when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and
humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold wantonly inflicted,53 the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt
injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant – associated with such
reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness,
understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud54 – that intensifies the injury. The terms
to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that
and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either
awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others
imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and like him from similar conduct in the future.55
(2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 46 and
Article 222047 of the Civil Code. x x x. The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having
specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission
Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order
damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is
wrong."48 They may also be considered and allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and
and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift
assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness of the to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the victim, [and] mental aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike
distress."49 the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however,
is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would
make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended
The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
Rey Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil,
suffering inflicted."50 liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 51 of the Civil Code also does not fix the award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil
amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending Code. 56
on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of
moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal
exceed the award of civil indemnity.52 Procedure57 requires aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be
stated in the complaint or information. It is in order not to trample on the constitutional
Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, right of an accused to be informed of the nature of the alleged offense that he or she
thus: has committed. A criminal complaint or information should basically contain the
elements of the crime, as well as its qualifying and ordinary aggravating circumstances,
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or for the court to effectively determine the proper penalty it should impose. This, however,
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or is not similar in the recovery of civil liability. In the civil aspect, the presence of an
compensatory damages. aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the information but proven during trial
would entitle the victim to an award of exemplary damages.

ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may
be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only
circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid due to the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances
to the offended party. of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In
much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages
may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio,58 the Court imposed exemplary damages to
intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal,59 the Court awarded
exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of attendant circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of
the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. In People v. age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
Cañada,60 People v. Neverio61 and People v. Layco, Sr.,62 the Court awarded by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-
exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is under the custody of
and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse. the police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full view of
the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third
Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at ₱30,000.00,63 despite degree of consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child below
the lack of any aggravating circumstance. The Court finds it proper to increase the seven years old; (5) when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired
amount to ₱50,000.00 in order to deter similar conduct. Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease; (6) when committed by any
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National
Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the
If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence 64 sets the amount
of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible
penalties or single indivisible penalty, all of them must be taken in relation to Article 63
Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first of the RPC, which provides:
consider the penalty imposed by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death
Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal
Laws, and for Other Purposes, certain crimes under the RPC and special penal laws Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the
were amended to impose the death penalty under certain circumstances. 65 Under the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless
same law, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua: piracy in of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission
general,66 mutiny on the high seas,67 and simple rape.68 For the following crimes, RA of the deed.
7659 has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: qualified
piracy;69 qualified bribery under certain In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
circumstances;70 parricide;71 murder;72 infanticide, except when committed by the the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal
grandparents for the same purpose;73kidnapping and serious illegal detention under 1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
certain circumstances;74 robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
certain circumstances;75 destructive arson, except when death results as a
consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under the
article;76 attempted or frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by reason or on 2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
occasion thereof; plunder;77 and carnapping, when the driver or occupant of the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof.78 Finally, RA 7659 imposes the death penalty 3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
on the following crimes: circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty
shall be applied.
(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the
gift or present. 4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one
(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of
detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the
or any other person; (ii) when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of result of such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)
the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped, subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts. Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties,
the court has the duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of circumstances. Accordingly, in crimes where the imposable penalty is reclusion
the acts penalized under Article 320, death results. perpetua to death, the court can impose either reclusion perpetua or death, depending
on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances present.
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes
insane or homicide is committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides
that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the
when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.79 offender caused several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design,
the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the
As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to number of victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated.
impose reclusion perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a
damages, following the ruling in People v. Salome80 and People v. Quiachon,81 is "the qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art.
penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not 48 of the RPC wherein the maximum penalty shall be imposed,92 then, for every victim
the public penalty actually imposed on the offender."82 who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death
penalty were it not for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article
v. Victor,83 that the award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by 48 of the RPC, the following doctrines are noteworthy:
death should be ₱75,000.00 We reasoned that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog,93 this Court ruled that special complex
but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crime, or more properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty
crimes against chastity."84 Such reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes found in in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in
RA 7659. The amount was later increased to ₱100,000.00. 85 the case of People v. Barros,94 explained that composite crimes are "neither of the
same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the
In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more
Arizapa,86 ₱50,000.00 was awarded as moral damages without need of pleading or grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a
proving them, for in rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's injury is concomitant necessary means to commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the
with and necessarily results from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of
of moral damages.87 Subsequently, the amount was increased to ₱75,000.00 in People firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although
v. Soriano88 and P100,000.00 in People v. Gambao.89 composed of two or more offenses."95

Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA In People v. De Leon,96 we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with
9346, the imposable penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found homicide, as follows:
in RA 7569, must be used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty
imposed.1avvphi1 In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit
robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The
Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take
ordinary aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference
penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the
jurisprudence90 pegs the amount of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱100,0000.00 commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony
as moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The
aggravating circumstances present, the amount of ₱100,000.00 is awarded as constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be
exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the consummated.
attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be
fixed at ₱100,000.00. "[T]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes x x x." 91 that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is
committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact
When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with
perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the
the proper amounts should be ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or
damages and ₱75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery
aggravating circumstances present. with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus,
includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.97
In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as
understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
committed by reason or on occasion of the rape.98 Hence, even if any or all of the
circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation) A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when an offender performs all the acts
would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
of treachery is to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we perpetrator.
ruled in People v. Macabales:99
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly
Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
circumstance of treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
persons and not to crimes against property. However, we find that the trial court in this desistance.
case correctly characterized treachery as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying,
circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending himself when
his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed
appellant Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity
Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex and moral damages that should be awarded will each be ₱100,000.00 and another
crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic ₱100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the circumstances of the crime call for
aggravating circumstance. the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should
be ₱75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00. If,
however, the crime proven is in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty damages that should be awarded will each be ₱50,000.00, and an award of ₱25,000.00
in the Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder civil indemnity and ₱25,000.00 moral damages when the crime proven is in its
under the Revised Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven attempted stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due
concerning the actual commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify to the disparity in the outcome of the crime committed, in the same way that the
the homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine imposable penalty varies for each stage of the crime. The said amounts of civil
the penalty to be imposed.100 indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in their frustrated or
attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed constitute complex
Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it crime under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with attempted
cannot be imposed due to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty murder, the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is
of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral damages will be ₱100,000.00 each, ₱100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages
and another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the heinousness of the and exemplary damages is ₱25,000.00 each.
crime and to set an example. If there is another composite crime included in a special
complex crime and the penalty imposed is death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as civil In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several
indemnity, ₱100,000.00 moral damages and ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages shall victims (except the robbers) sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It
be awarded for each composite crime committed. must be remembered that in a special complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the
component crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages because the intention of the
For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide101 wherein three (3) people died as a offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of
consequence of the crime, the heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of committing the said crime, another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion
damages as discussed earlier. This is true, however, only if those who were killed were of a robbery with homicide, other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity,
the victims of the robbery or mere bystanders and not when those who died were the the crime committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries become part of the
perpetrators or robbers themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide may crime, "Homicide", in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, is understood
still be committed even if one of the robbers dies.102 This is also applicable in robbery in its generic sense and now forms part of the essential element of robbery, 103 which is
with rape where there is more than one victim of rape. the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity
of the injuries sustained by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim suffered mortal wounds and could
stage in which the crime was committed and proven during the trial. Article 6 of the have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the victim should be awarded civil
RPC provides: indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the damages
awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that are not fatal, an
award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should likewise be a. Frustrated:
awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an attempted stage. i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
penalties, like homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting b. Attempted:
to homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be ₱50,000.00 i. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
and ₱50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary damages being awarded. However, ii. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
an award of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall be added if iii. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
there is an aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:
the information. 1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
certain cases. The award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder c. Exemplary damages111 – ₱100,000.00
cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the 1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely
trial court.104 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be attempted:112
recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
although the exact amount was not proved.105 In this case, the Court now increases the b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
amount to be awarded as temperate damages to ₱50,000.00. c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the
In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed above-mentioned:
were further made atrocious by the fact that the victims are innocent, defenseless a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
minors – one is a mere 3½-year-old toddler, and the other a 13-year-old girl. The b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
increase in the amount of awards for damages is befitting to show not only the Court's, c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
but all of society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of lives. 2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely
attempted:
In summary: a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00
b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00
I. For those crimes106 like, Murder,107 Parricide,108 Serious Intentional
Mutilation,109 Infanticide,110 and other crimes involving death of a victim where
the penalty consists of indivisible penalties: III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion death, injuries, or sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages
perpetua because of RA 9346: and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of violence and
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00 sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty consists of
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00 indivisible penalties:
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated: 1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion
a. Frustrated: perpetua because of RA 9346:
i. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00 a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00
ii. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00 b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00 c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00
b. Attempted: 1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the
i. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00 above-mentioned:
ii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00 a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00 b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
than the above-mentioned:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00 The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00 crime committed. In other complex crimes where death does not
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00 result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape, the civil indemnity, moral
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
 and exemplary damages depend on the prescribed penalty and the In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the
penalty imposed, as the case may be. same as the above if the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.

IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide,113 Robbery with 2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have
Rape,114 Robbery with Intentional Mutilation,115 Robbery with died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be
awarded:
Arson,116 Rape with Homicide,117 Kidnapping with Murder,118 Carnapping with
Homicide119 or Carnapping with Rape,120 Highway Robbery with a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
Homicide,121 Qualified Piracy,122 Arson with Homicide,123 Hazing with Death,
Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation124 and other crimes with death, injuries, and b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of
indivisible penalties:
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua because of RA 9346: 2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:

a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00 a. Civil indemnity – ₱25,000.00

b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00 b. Moral damages – ₱25,000.00

c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00 c. Exemplary damages – ₱25,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the In Robbery with Physical Injuries,126 the amount of damages shall
same as the above if the penalty imposed is Death but reduced likewise be dependent on the nature/severity of the wounds
to reclusion perpetua although death did not occur. sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.

1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds125 and could The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with
have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall Homicide, the robber/s or perpetrator/s are themselves killed or
be awarded: injured in the incident.1âwphi1

a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00 Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00 apply, and that for every additional rape committed, whether against
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00 the same victim or other victims, the victims shall be entitled to the
1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries: same damages unless the other crimes of rape are treated as
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00 separate crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple
b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00 rape/qualified rape shall apply.
c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the of divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray,
above-mentioned: Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender, 127 Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and Unintentional Abortion,
etc.:
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
1.1 Where the crime was consummated:
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00
a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00
 b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00 a. Civil indemnity – ₱50,000.00

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those b. Moral damages – ₱50,000.00
crimes where there are no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and
Death under tumultuous affray: c. Exemplary damages – ₱50,000.00

a. Frustrated: VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or
funeral expenses is presented in court, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
i. Civil indemnity – ₱30,000.00 temperate damages shall be awarded.

ii. Moral damages – ₱30,000.00 To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for
awards of civil indemnity is P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although
b. Attempted: the minimum amount cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil
indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance
warrants it.131
i. Civil indemnity – ₱20,000.00
Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the
ii. Moral damages – ₱20,000.00 ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the
heirs of the victims the following damages: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, of the two children who died; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages for each of the two
even if not alleged in the Information,128 in addition to the victims; (3) another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two victims;
above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral and (4) temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two deceased.
damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 exemplary damages For the four (4) counts of Attempted Murder, appellant should pay ₱50,000.00 as civil
for consummated; ₱30,000.00 for frustrated; and indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages for
₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded. each of the four victims. In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary
damages and temperate damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at
VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.132
perpetua and death occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those
who died are entitled to the following:129 Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the
charges against Gilberto Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been identified by
a. Civil indemnity – ₱100,000.00 Norberto Divina as the companions of appellant on the night the shooting occurred.
Norberto had been very straightforward and unwavering in his identification of Estores
and San Miguel as the two other people who fired the gunshots at his family. More
b. Moral damages – ₱100,000.00 significantly, as noted by the prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and San Miguel,
who insisted they were not at the crime scene, tended to conflict with the sworn
c. Exemplary damages – ₱100,000.00130 statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the basis for the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling
that he finds no probable cause against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said
that on June 6, 2002, he saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of
the crime scene, but it was only appellant who was carrying a firearm and the two other
the rebellion and could have died if not for a timely medical
people with him had no participation in the shooting incident. Said circumstances
intervention, the following shall be awarded:
bolster the credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony that Estores and San Miguel may
have been involved in the killing of his two young daughters.
a. Civil indemnity – ₱75,000.00
After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double
b. Moral damages – ₱75,000.00 jeopardy because the same only attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a
first jeopardy has attached before the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly
c. Exemplary damages – ₱75,000.00 terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. In turn, a
first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court;
(c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.133 In this case, the case against Estores and San Miguel was
dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no double jeopardy to speak
of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the real participation, if any, of Estores
and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of
murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer two
(2) terms of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under R.A. 9346.
He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina
the following amounts for each of the two victims: (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (b) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (d) ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of
attempted murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article
51 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each of the
four (4) counts of attempted murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages
in the amount of P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages of PS0,000.00 to each of the four victims, namely, Norberto Divina,
Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina.

(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at

the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision
until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages,
exemplary damages and temperate damages.

(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of
Justice, be FURNISHED a copy of this Decision. The Prosecutor General
is DIRECTED to immediately conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the possible
criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel regarding this case.
Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for
his information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-4160 July 29, 1952 107, section 1-(a). As Anita Tan failed to make reservation, and the accused were
acquitted, the lower court ruled that she is now barred from filing this action against the
ANITA TAN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. STANDARD VACUUM OIL CO., JULITO STO defendants.
DOMINGO, IGMIDIO RICO, and RURAL TRANSIT CO.,defendants-appellees.
This ruling is so far as defendants Julio Sto. Domingo and Imigidio Rico are concerned
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: is correct. The rule is that "extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from the declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist" (Rule 107, section 1-d, Rules of
Anita Tan is the owner of the house of strong materials based in the City of Manila, Court). This provision means that the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge
Philippines. On May 3, 1949, the Standard Vacuum Oil Company ordered the delivery will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment
to the Rural Transit Company at its garage at Rizal Avenue Extension, City of Manila, that the fact from which the civil liability might arise and did not exist. Here it is true that
of 1,925 gallons of gasoline using a gasoline tank-truck trailer. The truck was driven by Julito Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico were acquitted, the court holding that they were
Julito Sto. Domingo, who was helped Igmidio Rico. While the gasoline was being not responsible for the fire that destroyed the house of the plaintiff,—which as a rule
discharged to the underground tank, it caught fire, whereupon Julito Sto. Domingo will not necessarily extinguish their civil liability,—but the court went further by stating
drove the truck across the Rizal Avenue Extension and upon reaching the middle of the that the evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate
street he abondoned the truck with continued moving to the opposite side of the first accident for which the accused cannot be held responsible. In our opinion, this
street causing the buildings on that side to be burned and detroyed. The house of Anita declaration fits well into the exception of the rule which exempts the two accused from
Tan was among those destroyed and for its repair she spent P12,000. civil liability. When the court acquitted the accused because the fire was due to an
unfortunate accident it actually said that the fire was due to a fortuitous event for which
As an aftermath of the fire, Julito Sto. Domingo and Imigidio Rico were charged with the accused are not to blame. It actually exonerated them from civil liability.
arson through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Manila where, after
trial, both were acquitted, the court holding that their negligence was not proven and But the case takes a different aspect with respect to the other defendants. For one
the fire was due to an unfortunate accident. thing, the principle of res judicata cannot apply to them for the simple reason that they
were not included as co-accused in the criminal case. Not having been included in the
Anita Tan then brought the action against the Standard Vacuum Oil Company and the criminal case they cannot enjoy the benefit resulting from the acquittal of the accused.
Rural Transit Company;, including the two employees, seeking to recover the damages This benefit can only be claimed by the accused if a subsequent action is later taken
she has suffered for the destruction of her house. against them under the Revised Penal Code. And this action can only be maintained if
proper reservation is made and there is no express declaration that the basis of the civil
Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss alleging in substance that (a) plaintiff's action has not existed. It is, therefore, an error for the lower court to dismiss the case
action is barred by prior judgment and (b) plaintiff's complaint states no cause of action; against these two defendants more so when their civil liability is predicated or facts
and this motion having been sustained, plaintiff elevated the case to this Court imputing other than those attributed to the two employees in the criminal case.
eight errors to the court a quo.
Take, for instance, of the Standard Vacuum Oil Company. this company is sued not
The record discloses that the lower court dismissed this case in view of the acquittal of precisely because of supposed negligent acts of its two employees Julito Sto. Domingo
the two employees of defendant Standard Vacuum Oil Company who were charged and Igmidio Rico but because of acts of its own which might have contributed to the fire
with arson through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In that destroyed the house of the plaintiff. The complaint contains definite allegations of
concluding that accused were not guilty of the acts charged because of the fire was negligent acts properly attributable to the company which proven and not refuted may
accidental, the court made the following findings: "the accused Imigidio Rico cannot in serve as basis of its civil liability. Thus, in paragraph 5 of the first cause of action, it is
any manner be held responsible for the fire to the three houses and goods therein expressly alleged that this company, through its employees, failed to take the
above mentioned. He was not the cause of it, and he took all the necessary precautions necessary precautions or measures to insure safety and avoid harm to person and
against such contingency as he was confronted with. The evidence throws no light on damage to property as well as to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
the cause of fire. The witnesses for the prosecution and for the defense testified that which the circumstances justly demanded, thereby causing the gasoline they were
they did not know what caused the fire. It was unfortunate accident for which the unloading to catch fire. the precautions or measures which this company has allegedly
accused Iigmidio Rico cannot be held responsible." And a similar finding was made failed to take to prevent fire are not clearly stated, but they are matters of evidence
with respect to the other accused that the information filed against the accused by the which need not now be determined. Suffice it to say that such allegation furnishes
Fiscal contains an itemized statement of the damages suffered by the victims, including enough basis for a cause of action against this company. There is no need for the
the one suffered by Anita Tan, thereby indicating the intention of the prosecution to plaintiff to make a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action, for as this court
demand indemnity from the accused in the same action, but that notwithstanding this already held in a number of cases, such reservation is not necessary when the civil
statement with respect to damages, Anita Tan did not make any reservation of her right action contemplated is not derived from the criminal liability but one based on culpa
to file a separate civil action against the accused as required by the Rules of Court Rule aquiliana under the Old Civil Code (articles 1902 to 1910). These two acts are separate
and distinct and should not be confused one with the other. Plaintiff can choose either civil action against this company because its civil liability is completely divorced from
(Asuncion Parker vs. Hon. A.J Panlilio supra, p. 1.) the criminal liability of the accused. The rule regarding reservation of the right to file a
separate civil action does not apply to it.
The case of the Rural Transit Co. is even more different as it is predicated on a special
provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, article 101, Rule 2, of said Code provides: Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby modified as follows: it is affirmed with
regard to defendants Julito Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico; but it is reserved with
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from regard to defendants Standard Vacuum Oil Company and Rural Transit Company, with
criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of article 12 and in costs.
subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules: Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.
xxx xxx xxx

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for
whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion
to the benefit which they have received.

And on this point, the complaint contains the following averments:

3. That after the corresponding trial the said defendants were acquitted and
defendant Julio Sto. Domingo was acquitted, on the ground that he so acted
causing damage to another in order to avoid a greater evil or injury, under
article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as shown by the pertinent
portion of the decision of this Honorable Court in said case, dated October 28,
1949, which reads as follows:

Under the foregoing facts, there can be no doubt that had the accused Julito
Sto. Domingo not taken the gasoline tank-truck trailer out in the street, a bigger
conflagration would have occurred in Rizal Avenue Extension, and, perhaps,
there might have been several deaths and bearing in mind the provisions of
Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code the accused Julito Sto.
Domingo incurred no criminal liability.

4. That it was consequently the defendant Rural Transit Co., from whose
premises the burning gasoline tank-truck trailer was driven out by defendant
Julito Sto. Domingo in order to avoid a greater evil or injury, for whose benefit
the harm has been prevented under article 101, second subsection of the
Revised Penal Code.

Considering the above quoted law and facts, the cause of action against the Rural
Transit Company can hardly be disputed, it appearing that the damage caused to the
plaintiff was brought about mainly because of the desire of driver Julito Sto. Domingo
to avoid greater evil or harm, which would have been the case had he not brought the
tank-truck trailer to the middle of the street, for then the fire would have caused the
explosion of the gasoline deposit of the company which would have resulted in a
conflagration of much greater proportion and consequences to the houses nearby or
surrounding it. It cannot be denied that this company is one of those for whose benefit
a greater harm has been prevented, and as such it comes within the purview of said
penal provision. The acquittal of the accused cannot, therefore, be deemed a bar to a