Gelos vs Court of Appeals

Topic: Definition of Agricultural Tenancy

Facts: The Private Respondent owned the subject land of 25,000 square meters in Laguna. The Landowner then
entered in to a contract with the petitioner and employed him to be laborer on the land with the wage of 5.00 peso
a day. The Petitioner first went the Court of Agrarian Relation and then went to Ministry of Agrarian reform and
asked the court to fix the agricultural lease rental of the land and his request was granted. The private respondent
then filed a complaint of illegal detainer against the petitioner that was that was dismissed by the Ministry of
Agrarian reform for the existence of Tenancy relations between the parties. The Private respondents appealed to
the office of the President alleging that there was no tenancy relation between the parties. The RTC rendered
dismissed the complaint and assailed that there was a tenancy relation between the parties. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Is there a Tenancy relation between the parties?

Held: No, it was clear that the petitioner were not intended to be tenant but a mere employee of the private
respondent as showed in the contract. The petitioner was paid for specific kind of work. The court stressed many
cases that:

"tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a
legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case,
their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important."

It should also be considered that a tenant is defined under Section 5(a) R.A 1199 as a person who himself and with
the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the
share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both,
under the leasehold tenancy system.

The requisites for the tenancy relationship to exist The parties are the landowner and the tenant; The subject is
agricultural land; There is consent; The purpose is agricultural production; There is personal cultivation; and There
is sharing of harvest or payment of rental. Absence of this clearly does not qualify someone to be a tenant. It is
clear that it is not a tenancy relationship that exists between the parties, what they have is employee-employer
relationship.
Gabriel v. Pangilinan

Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the owner of a 169,507 sqm fishpond in barrio Sta.
Ursula, Pampanga. An oral contract of lease with a yearly rental was entered between them. Defendant was
notified that the contract would be terminated, but upon request was extended for another year.

Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that the trial court had no jurisdiction. It should
properly pertain to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship
between the parties. Upon opposition by plaintiff, the motion was denied. The defendant filed his answer that the
land was originally verbally leased to him by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as the defendant wanted,
subject to the condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and that which was already a
fishpond be improved at his expense, which would be reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the
termination of the lease. Plaintiff also assured him that he could continue leasing as long as he wanted since she
was not in a position to attend to it personally.

Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which Court shall take cognizance of the
case.

It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings, repairing dikes and such, personally with the
aid of helpers since he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over who said that she
helps her father in administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar who
is residing near the fishpond, defendant’s other children are all professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all
residing in Manila. None of these has been seen working on the fishpond.

Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act No.
1199, as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members of his immediate farm
household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties has been extinguished
(Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.

Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code. No tenancy relationship exists
between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199. Court is vested with jurisdiction to try
and decide this case.

Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.

ISSUES:

1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as that of a civil lease and not a
leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.

2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction, the cue being that of
an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.
HELD:

Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The leasehold tenancy is limited to
agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the
law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law
lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy
is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law
that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special
laws.

The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to exist:

1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;

2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm
household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of
his immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both

There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to
"agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. The mere
fact that a person works an agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview
of Sec 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated
are complied with.

The court doesn’t want to decide on the second requisite since it wasn’t raised. For the third requisite, the tenancy
agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond personally because he became ill and
incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's immediate farm household work the land. Only the
members of the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are
dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term
"immediate farm household".

Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land. A person, in
order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm household
cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he
who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having
abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to
enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.

We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between the appellee Trinidad
Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this
case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Reynaldo Bejasa and Erlinda Bejasa vs CA, Isabel Candelaria and Jamie Dinglasan – GR 108941

Facts: This case involves two parcels of land located in Oriental Mindoro owned by Isabel Candelaria. October 1974,
Candelaria entered into a 3-year lease agreement with Pio Malabanan wherein Malabanan agreed to clear, clean
and cultivate the land, to purchase calamansi, and other seedlings, to attend and care for whatever plants thereon
exist, to make the necessary harvest of fruits. Malabanan, later hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear
it. On May 1977, Candelaria gave Malabanan a 6-year usufruct over the land. 1983, Malabanan died. Candelaria
constituted Jaime Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the land. October 1984,
Candelaria entered into a new lease contract with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife with a 1-year term. On
December 1984, Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent in consideration of an "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a
term of 1 year.

After the 1 year period, Victoria demanded for Bejasas to vacate, but Bejasas continued to stay and did not give any
consideration for its use, be in rent or share. Candelarian again entered with a 3-year lease agreement with
Dinglasans, and made Jaime her attorney-in-fact again. Jaime then filed a complaint before Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking for ejectment of Bejasas. COSLAP dismissed the complaint. Jaime
then filed it with RTC for recovery of possession; the case was referred to DAR. DAR certified that ht e case was not
proper for trial before the civil courts. Trial court dismissed the complaint of Jaime including the leasehold claim of
Bejasas. Bejasas then filed a complaint for confirmation of leasehold and recovery of damages against Candelaria
and Jaime. RTC favored the Bejasas. On appeal, CA reversed the decision saying that (1) there was no tenant
relationship, (2) Bejasas are mere overseers and not as permanent tenants, (3) the pakyaw contract have expired,
(4) sharing of profits was not proven, (5) the element of personal cultivation was not proven.

Issue: Whether there is tenancy in favor of Bejasas.

Ruling: There is no tenancy relationship. There was no proof of shared harvests. Between Candelaria (as owner)
and the Bejasas, there is no relationship. Candelaria never gave her consent. As to the authority of Dinglasans, they
had authority to bind the owner in a tenancy agreement, but there is no proof of such presented.
Anastacio Victorio vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Dominador Fernandez G.R. No. 110012 (March 28,
2001)

Facts: Sometime in 1967, Alfredo Victorio (as lessee) and Tomas Fernandez (as lessor), the fathers of herein
petitioner Anastacio Victorio and private respondent Dominador Fernandez, respectively entered into a lease
contract over a fishpond located in Brgy. Balangobon, Lingayen, Pangasinan for a 10-year period. After the said
contract expired in 1977, the same was renewed, albeit verbally, for another 10 years until 1987 but adopting the
terms and conditions of the original contract. When the second contract expired, private respondent repeatedly
asked petitioner to vacate the premises but the latter adamantly refused. Consequently, a case for ejectment was
filed by respondent against petitioner but was consequently dismissed by the trial court on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. On appeal, the regional trial court revised the decision holding that the lease contract is a civil law
lease agreement and ordering petitioner to vacate the fishpond in question and surrender peaceful possession
thereof.

Petitioner having been rebuked on reconsideration, elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on a petition for
certiorari. However, the Court of Appeals turned down the appeal, in effect, ratiocinating that the court is strongly
convinced and hereby finds and holds that the agreement entered into by the parties is a civil law contract of lease
and not one under the agricultural leasehold system as expressly termed under R.A. No. 3844, as amended. The
petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under Republic Act No. 3844 and thus entitled to security
of tenure over the fishpond in question, or a mere civil lessee whose right over the subject premises ceased upon
the expiration of the contract of lease?

Held: The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2)
the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent among the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. All these requisites must concur in order to
create a tenancy relationship between the parties (Chico vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 33 [1198]; Oarde vs. Court
of Appeals, 280 SCRA 235 [1997]; Odsique vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626 [1994]; see also Sintos vs. Court of
Appeals, 246 SCRA 223 [1995).

Petitioner's right to the fishpond emanated from the lease contract between his father and private respondent's
father wherein petitioner's father was designated as a "lessee" and not as a "tenant". Petitioner cannot, therefore,
be more than a lessee like his father because "the spring cannot rise higher than its source". Secondly, there was no
stipulation regarding the sharing of the harvest, whether explicitly or implicitly. One of the essential requisites for
existence of tenancy relationship is sharing by the landowner and tenant of the produce, and no proof of this fact
has been shown in this case. What the parties agreed upon, as established by the evidence, was for the petitioner
to pay private respondent a yearly lease rental, with an advance payment of 3 years' rental. This is not the case
obtaining in a tenancy relationship where the parties share in the produce of the land as this falls due, or as it
becomes available, during harvest time.
Teodoro vs. Macaraeg 27 SCRA 7 (1969)

Facts: Macaraeg had been the lessee of the property of Teodoro for the past seven (7) years when he was
advised by the latter to vacate the property because it would be given to another tenant. Thereafter, a new
tenant was installed who forbade Macaraeg from working on the riceland. On the other hand, Teodoro denied
that Macaraeg was his tenant and claimed that he had always leased all of his 39-hectare riceland under civil
lease. He further claimed that after the expiration of his "Contract of Lease" with Macaraeg in 1961, the latter
did not anymore renew his contract.

Held: The Contract of Lease between the parties contains the essential elements of a leasehold tenancy
agreement. The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an agricultural land devoted to agricultural production.
More specifically, the parties stipulated that "the property leased shall be used or utilized for agricultural
enterprise only." Furthermore, the parties also agreed that the farmland must be used for rice production as
could be inferred from the stipulation that "the rental of nine (9) cavans of palay per hectare for one agricultural
year . . . must be of the same variety (of palay) as that produced by the LESSEE."

The land is definitely susceptible of cultivation by a single person as it is of an area of only four and a half (4-1/2)
ha. This court has held that even a bigger area may be cultivated personally by the tenant, singly or with the help
of the members of his immediate farm household.

From the stipulation that "the rental must be of the same variety as that produced by the LESSEE," it can
reasonably be inferred that the intention of the parties was that Macaraeg personally work the land, which he
did as found by the Agrarian Court, thus: "In the instant case, petitioner (Macaraeg) cultivated the landholding
belonging to said respondent (Teodoro) for the agricultural year 1960-61 in consideration of a fixed annual
rental." (italics supplied) Moreover, there is no evidence that Macaraeg did not personally cultivate the land in
dispute. Neither did Teodoro allege, much less prove, that Macaraeg availed of outside assistance in the
cultivation of the said riceland.

Teodoro is the registered owner of the disputed landholding and he delivered the possession thereof to
Macaraeg in consideration of a rental certain to be paid in produce. Evidently, there was a valid leasehold
tenancy agreement. Moreover, the provision that the rental be accounted in terms of produce — 9 cavans per
hectare — is an unmistakable earmark, considering the other stipulations, that the parties did actually enter into
a leasehold tenancy relation (at 16-17; underscoring supplied).

Agricultural tenancy relation is different from farm employer-farm employee relation. The Court clarified the
difference in the case ofGelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608 (1992), as follows:

On the other hand, the indications of an employer-employee relationship are: 1) the selection and engagement
of the employee; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4) the power to control the
employee's conduct — although the latter is the most important element.

According to a well-known authority on the subject, tenancy relationship is distinguished from farm employer-
farm worker relationship in that: "In farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the
agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the lessee thereof. In tenancy
relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural
worker works for the farm employer and for his labor he receives a salary or wage regardless of whether the
employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or
harvest." (at 614)

Valencia vs CA

Facts: When Victor Valencia acquired two parcels of land, he entered into civil law leases with Glicerio Henson and
Fr. Andres Flores. Henson instituted Crescenciano and Marciano Frias to work on the property; while Fr. Flores
appointed the Friases, plus some others, as farmhands. However, in Fr. Flores’ lease contract, there was a
stipulation that he was prohibited from installing a leasehold tenant thereon. No such prohibition existed in
Henson’s contract. When Fr. Flores’ lease period expired, Valencia ordered his farmhands to vacate the lot. The
farmhands refused to do so, and actually even secured CLTs over the land in their names. Catalino Mantac, one of
the farmhands, subsequently entered into a leasehold contract undertaking to have a profit-sharing agreement
with Valencia.

After 12 years, DAR investigated the matter and found that the right of the farmhands to the land ceased upon the
termination of the lease contracts, except as regards to Mantac, with whom Valencia entered into a tenancy
agreement. As such, it was recommended that the CLTs given to the other farmhands be cancelled. However, the
Regional Office disregarded the investigation report and ruled that the farmhands had a right to continue on the
land until otherwise ordered by the court. On appeal to the Office of the President, then Exec. Sec. Teofisto
Guingona upheld the ruling of the DAR, with the modification that the area acquired by Valencia as homestead be
excluded from the coverage of PD 27. Valencia then appealed to the CA contending that the Exec. Sec. erred in
recognizing the farmhands as tenants, and disallowing him and his 7 compulsory heirs from exercising their right of
retention under RA 6657. However, the CA dismissed the case.

Issue: Can a contract of civil law lease prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter
of the lease agreement?

Held: YES. Sec. 6 of RA 3844 does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant without the
consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized. A different interpretation would be most
unfair to the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who entered into a civil law lease agreement in good faith only
to realize later on that he can no longer regain possession of his property due to the installation of a tenant by the
civil law lessee. On the other hand, under the express provision of Art. 1649 of the Civil Code, the lessee cannot
assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. In the case before
us, not only is there no stipulation to the contrary; the lessee is expressly prohibited from subleasing or
encumbering the land, which includes installing a leasehold tenant thereon since the right to do so is an attribute
of ownership.

The right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may be provided by law. Inherent in
the right of landholders to install a tenant is their authority to do so; otherwise, without such authority, civil law
lessees as landholders cannot install a tenant on the landholding. Tenancy relationship has been held to be of a
personal character. Deforciants cannot install lawful tenants who are entitled to security of tenure. A contract of
civil law lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease
agreement. An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does not make the case an agrarian
dispute. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The elements of tenancy
must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. The principal factor in determining
whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the
alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy
laws may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants. The act of
subletting to third persons extinguishes the agricultural leasehold relations, as this constitutes an abandonment of
the landholding due to absence of personal cultivation.

Leopoldo Jeremias v. Estate of Mariano G.R. No. 174649. September 26, 2008 Chico-Nazario, J.

Facts: Irene P. Mariano (Irene), a widow, owned two parcels of land located at Barangay Balatas, Naga City,
Camarines Sur, with an aggregate area of a little more than 27 hectares. In 1972, the 2 parcels of land were
placed under the Operation Land Transfer program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. The tenanted portion
of the landholdings were subdivided among identified tenant-beneficiaries, and a subdivision plan was made.
Santiago Jeremias (father of petitioner Leopoldo) was one the 40 tenant-beneficiaries. On June 26, 1988, Irene
died intestate who was succeeded by his two children, Jose P. Mariano and Erlinda M. Villanueva. On 14 May
1989, Helen Mariano, Jose's wife, allegedly instituted Ruben Viñas (Ruben) as a tenant, through an unsigned
handwritten letter, despite the estate of the late Irene still unpartitioned and under intestate proceedings.

In 1991, Danilo Mariano was appointed as administrator of the estate of Irene Mariano. He lodged before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) separate complaints of ejectment and damages against both
Ruben Viñas and Leopoldo Jeremias for their refusal to vacate despite oral and formal demands. Ruben's basis
for saying he was a tenant is the unsigned letter by Helen Mariano, while on the other hand, Leopoldo claims
that by virtue of succession, he lawfully acquired right to cultivate granted by Irene to his father Santiago
Jeremias.

Issue: Whether or not Leopoldo Jeremias and Ruben Viñas are tenants of the lands belonging to the late Irene
Mariano which entitles them to security of tenure.

Ruling: No. The Court ruled that they are not considered tenants entitle to security of tenure under the law.
Tenancy relationship arises if all the following essential requisites are present:

1)that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2)that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3)that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4)that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5)that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6)that the harvest is
shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

Claims by one of the existence tenancy do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. In this case, there is
no substantial evidence that the petitioners were installed by the owner of the lots in question as agricultural
tenants on the property. There is, likewise, no evidence that the petitioners shared with the landowner the
harvest and/or produce from the landholding. Hence, the Court reinstated the decision of the PARAD.
CENEZE VS. RAMOS - GR No. 172287; January 15, 2010

Facts: Ceneze filed an action for declaration as bona fide tenant-lessee of two parcels of agricultural land owned by
respondent Feliciana Ramos, alleging that in 1981, Julian Ceneze, Sr. (Julian, Sr.), petitioners father, transferred his
tenurial rights over the landholding to him with the consent and approval of respondent and that, since then,
petitioner had been in actual and peaceful possession of the landholding until April 12, 1991, when respondent
forcibly entered and cultivated the land for the purpose of dispossessing petitioner of his right as tenant.

Respondent denied that a tenancy relationship existed, arguing that she had never instituted petitioner as a tenant
in any of her landholdings. She averred that petitioner had never been in possession of the landholding, but
admitted that it was Julian, Sr. who was the tenant of the landholding. When Julian, Sr. migrated to USA in 1985,
respondent allowed Julian, Sr.’s wife to cultivate the land, but she herself migrated to the USA in June 1988.
Respondent later allowed Julian, Sr.’s son, Julian Ceneze, Jr. (Julian, Jr.), to cultivate the landholding, but he likewise
migrated to the USA in 1991 without informing respondent. From then on, she took possession of the landholding,
cultivated it and appropriated for herself the harvest therefrom.

Provincial Adjudicator Ruling: Decision in favor of petitioner, declaring Ceneze a bona fide tenant of the subject
landholding. DARAB Ruling: Affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator’s ruling

CA Ruling: Resolved the petition in favor of respondent landowner and dismissed petitioners complaint. MR
denied.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner failed to establish that he had a tenancy relationship with respondent

SC Ruling: Yes. Tenancy is not purely a factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the
land; it is also a legal relationship. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove
the presence of all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the
subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvest. The absence of one element does not make an
occupant of a parcel of land, its cultivator or planter, a de jure tenant. Petitioner submitted a Certification issued by
the BARC Chairman attesting that the former is a tenant of the landholding, but such certification is not binding on
this Court. The certification or findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (or of an authorized representative)
concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties are merely
preliminary or provisional in character.

To prove a tenancy relationship, the requisite quantum of evidence is substantial evidence, or such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Certification of the BARC
Chairman and the affidavits of Julian, Sr. and of the tenants of the adjacent landholdings certainly do not suffice. By
themselves, they do not show that the elements of consent of the landowner and of sharing of harvests are
present. To establish consent, petitioner presented the Affidavit executed by Julian, Sr.However, the affidavit which
was not notarized cannot be given credence considering that it was not authenticated. The other tenants’ Joint
Affidavit, likewise, fails to prove that petitioner is a tenant, more particularly, that there was personal cultivation
and sharing of the harvest. In this affidavit, the affiants stated that they helped hand in hand with [petitioner] in
harvesting and threshing our palay products and helped him in delivering the share of [respondent] every year. The
affidavit is ambiguously worded, considering that the affiants are also tenant-lessees of respondent and they could
be referring to their own harvest. The fact alone of working on a landholding does not give rise to a presumption of
the existence of agricultural tenancy. To prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be
presented, because self- serving statements are inadequate. In this case, petitioner failed to present a receipt for
respondents share in the harvest, or any other solid evidence proving that there was a sharing of harvest.

Zamoras vs. Su, Jr. 184 SCRA 248 (1990)

Facts: Zamoras was hired by Su as overseer of his coconut land in Dapitan City. Zamoras was tasked to have the
land titled in Su's name. He was also "assigning portions of the land to be worked by tenants, supervising the
cleaning, planting, care and cultivation of the land, the harvesting of coconuts and selling of the copra." As
compensation, he was paid salary of P2,400 per month plus 1/3 of the proceeds of the sales of the copra. Su got
another 1/3 of the proceeds while the other third went to the tenants. In 1981, Su obtained a loan from Anita
Hortellano and the latter was authorized by Su to harvest the coconuts. Meanwhile, he informed Zamoras that
he was being temporarily laid-off until the loan is settled. Zamoras filed a case for illegal termination and breach
of contract before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the Ministry of Labor. The Labor Arbiter held that Zamoras'
dismissal was without just cause and ordered Zamoras reinstatement. On appeal, the National Labor Relation
Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter by holding that there is no employee-employer relation existing between
the parties but a landlord-tenant relation hence jurisdiction rests with the agrarian court. Zamoras assailed the
decision of NLRC.

Held: The NLRC's conclusion that a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Su and Zamoras is not
supported by the evidence which shows that Zamoras was hired by Su not as a tenant but as overseer of his
coconut plantation. As overseer, Zamoras hired the tenants and assigned their respective portions which they
cultivated under Zamoras' supervision. The tenants dealt directly with Zamoras and received their one-third
share of the copra produce from him. The evidence also shows that Zamoras, aside from doing administrative
work for Su, regularly managed the sale of copra processed by the tenants. There is no evidence that Zamoras
cultivated any portion of Su's land personally or with the aid of his immediate farm household.

The following circumstances indicate an employer-employee relationship between them: 1. Zamoras was
selected and hired by Su as overseer of the coconut plantation. 2. His duties were specified by Su. 3. Su
controlled and supervised the performance of his duties. He determined to whom Zamoras should sell the copra
produced from the plantation. 4. Su paid Zamoras a salary of P2,400 per month plus one-third of the copra sales
every two months as compensation for managing the plantation."

There is no tenancy relation because the element of personal cultivation does not exist.

Bernas vs. Court of Appeals 225 SCRA 119 (1993)

Facts:Natividad Deita is the owner of a 5,831-sq m property which she entrusted to her brother, Benigno, so that
he could use the fruits thereof to defray the cost of his children's education in Manila. The property was leased
by Bernas pursuant to a production sharing arrangement executed between Bernas and Benigno. Natividad
played no part in this arrangement. In 1985, the lots were returned by Benigno to his sister but when the owners
sought to take possession, Bernas refused to relinquish the property. Bernas was claiming that he was an
agricultural lessee entitled to security of tenure. Natividad filed an action for recovery of possession. The trial
court ruled in favor of Bernas but this was subsequently reversed by the CA.

Issue: Is consent by a legal possessor, even if without the consent of landowner, sufficient to create tenancy
relationship?

Held: Yes. As legal possessor of the property, Benigno had the authority and capacity to enter into an agricultural
leasehold relation with Bernas. "The law expressly grants him, as legal possessor, authority and capacity to
institute an agricultural leasehold lessee on the property he legally possessed." (at 125-126)

For agricultural tenancy to exist, the subject of the agreement must be an agricultural land.

RA 6657 defines the term "agricultural land" as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and
not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." (see discussion on scope of CARP,
Chapter I). Under RA 3844, "agricultural land" refers to land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to
crop lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned land.

The area of agricultural land that a lessee may cultivate has no limit, but he should cultivate the entire area
leased. The three (3) hectare limit under RA 6657 applies only to the award that may be given to the agrarian
reform beneficiary.

Consent by landholder: As discussed earlier, consent must be given by the true and lawful landholder of the
property. In Hilario vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 573 (1987), the Supreme Court held that tenancy relation does not exist
where a usurper cultivates the land.

Hilario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 148 SCRA 573 (1987)

Facts: Salvador Baltazar was working on the land pursuant to a contract executed between him and Socorro
Balagtas involving a two (2)-ha property. According to Baltazar, in 1965, he relinquished 1.5 ha to certain
individuals and what remained under his cultivation was ½-ha owned by Corazon Pengzon. After Socorro's death,
no new contract was executed. Sometime in 1980, the Hilarios started cultivating a 4,000-sq m portion of the
property and enjoined Baltazar from entering the same. The Hilarios claimed that they acquired the landholding
from the Philippine National Bank after a foreclosure proceeding. On the other hand, Corazon Pengzon explained
that she did not get any share from the produce of the land since 1964 and she would not have accepted it
knowing that she did not own the property anymore.

Held: Baltazar is not a tenant because no consent was given by Pengzon. As held in Tiongson v. Court of Appeals,
130 SCRA 482, tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder
through lawful means and not by imposition or usurpation. "So the mere cultivation of the land by usurper
cannot confer upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection of security of tenure
of the law(Spouses Tiongson vs. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 482)."

Successors-in-interest of the true and lawful landholder/owner who gave the consent are bound to recognize
the tenancy established before they acquired the agricultural land.
Tiongson vs CA

Facts: 1946, Severino Manotok donated and transferred to his 8 children and 2 grandchildren a 34 hectare land in
Quezon City. Severino Manotok was appointed judicial guardian of his minor children. There was no tenant
occupying the property at the time of the donation. Later, Teodoro Macaya accompanied Vicente Herrera, the
overseer of the property, went to the Manotok and pleaded that he be allowed to live in the property to prevent
theft and to guard the property. Manotok allowed Macaya but imposed the condition that any time the owners
needed to take the property, Macaya and his family must vacate, and that he could raise animals and plant
according to his needs, and that the owners have no responsibility to Macaya and he will use only 3 hectares.
These conditions were not put in writing.

In 1950, the property owners organized themselves as a corporation and transferred the 34 hectare land a
capital contribution to the capital stock of the corporation. Later, when the owners demanded for payment of
taxes, Macaya agreed to help pay the taxes by remitting 10 cavans of palay every year as his contribution. Later,
owners requested Macaya to increase his contribution to 20 cavans, Macaya agreed. Later, Macaya pleaded that
he will contribute 10 cavans only, the owners said the "he might as well not deliver anymore". Macaya did not
deliver palays from then on. 1974, the owners executed a Unilateral Deed of Conveyance of the property to
Patricia Tiongson, etc. Macaya was informed that the land is needed for house construction of the owners and
was asked to vacate, Macaya pleaded that he may be allowed to harvest first before vacating. However, after
harvest, Macaya did not vacate and even expand his cultivation to 6 hectares without the consent of the owners.

Issue: Whether there is tenancy relationship between the parties.

Ruling: Real estate taxes of the property declare the land as residential. The physical view of the property also
shows that the land was a rolling forestal land without any flat portion except the one tilled by Macaya. As to the
sharing, the decision of the petitioners not to ask for anymore contributions from Macaya reveals that there was
no tenancy relationship ever agreed upon by the parties. Neither can such relationship be implied from the facts
as there was no agreed system of sharing the produce of the property. Moreover, from 1946 to 1956 at which
time, Macaya was also planting rice, there was no payment whatsoever. At the most and during the limited
period when it was in force, the arrangement was a civil lease where the lessee for a fixed price leases the
property while the lessor has no responsibility whatsoever for the problems of production and enters into no
agreement as to the sharing of the costs of fertilizers, irrigation, seedlings, and other items. As to consent, the lot
was taxed as residential land in a metropolitan area. There was clearly no intention on the part of the owners to
devote the property for agricultural production but only for residential purposes. Thus, together with the third
requisite, the fourth requisite which is the purpose was also not present. There was no agreement as to any
system of sharing the produce of the land. The petitioners did not get anything from the harvest and private
respondent Macaya was using and cultivating the land free from any charge or expense.

Endaya vs. Court of Appeals 215 SCRA 109 (1992)

Facts: Spouses San Diego owned a 2.0200-ha rice and corn land. The property has been cultivated by Pedro Fideli
as a tenant of the couple under a 50-50 sharing agreement. In 1974, a lease contract was executed between
spouses San Diego and a certain Regino Cassanova for a period of four (4) years at P400.00 per ha per annum
rental and gave him the authority to oversee the planting of crops. The contract was subsequently renewed to
last until 1980. In both cases, Fideli signed as witness. While the contract was subsisting, Fideli continuously
worked on the property, sharing equally with Cassanova the net produce of the harvests. In 1980, the land was
sold to spouses Endaya. Fideli continued tilling the land despite the Endaya's demand to vacate the property.
Fideli refused to leave and deposited with Luzon Development Bank the landowner's share in the harvests. Fideli
filed a complaint praying that he be declared the agricultural tenant of the Endayas. The trial court ruled in favor
of the Endayas but the same was subsequently reversed by the CA holding that Fideli is an agricultural lessee
entitled to security of tenure.

Held: It is true that the Court has ruled that agricultural tenancy is not created where the consent of the true and
lawful owners is absent. But this doctrine contemplates a situation where an untenanted farm land is cultivated
without the landowner's knowledge or against her will or although permission to work on the farm was given,
there was no intention to constitute the worker as the agricultural lessee of the farm land. The rule finds no
application in the case at bar where the petitioners are successors-in-interest to a tenanted land over which an
agricultural leasehold has long been established. The consent given by the original owners to constitute private
respondent as the agricultural lessee of the subject landholding binds private respondents who, as successors-in-
interest of the Spouses San Diego, step into the latter's shoes, acquiring not only their rights but also their
obligations. (at 118;underscoring supplied). Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has
been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.

Reyes vs Joson

Adriano vs Tanco

Caballes vs. Department of Agrarian Reform 168 SCRA 248 (1988)

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by public respondent Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its then Secretary, the Hon. Heherson Alvarez, finding the existence of a
tenancy relationship between the herein petitioner and the private respondent. The landholding subject of the
controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) square meters was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda
Caballes (petitioner), by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea Alicaba
Millenes. This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of about 500 square meters, situated
at Lawa-an, Talisay, Cebu. In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent
Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of ₱2.00
to the owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land,
agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a fifty-fifty basis. Abajon planted corn and
bananas on the landholding. For four years, he paid the ₱2.00 rental for the lot occupied by his house, and
delivered 50% of the produce to the owner.

As the property was sold, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying they needed the
property, but Abajon refused. On April 1, 1982, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that immediately
after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge,
the latter, with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on the property worth about ₱50.00. A
criminal case for malicious mischief was filed against Abajon. (Obviously, all the planting on the property,
including that of the banana plants, had been done by Abajon). Upon motion of the respondent in open court,
the trial court ordered the referral of the case to the Regional Office of the Public Respondent for a preliminary
determination of the relationship between the parties. The Regional Director of DAR held that there is the
existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. On appeal by the petitioner, the Secretary of DAR,
reversed the decision of the Regional Director. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondent,
the New DAR Secretary sets aside the previous decision and finds the existence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.

HELD: There is none. The Higher Court laid down the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship. All requisites
must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not make an
occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. The fact of sharing
alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. This does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a
tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only 60 square meters and located in an urban area and in the
heart of an industrial or commercial zone. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been
given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate
that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or
compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort rather than a tenant. Agricultural
production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement is a clear proof that the private respondent
was never a tenant.

Facts: Spouses Caballes acquired subject land from the Millenes family. Prior to the sale, Abajon constructed his
house on a portion of the property, paying a monthly rental to the owner. Abajon was also allowed to plant on a
portion of the land and that the produce thereof would be shared by them on a 50-50 basis. When the new
owners took over, they told Abajon to transfer his dwelling to the southern portion of the property because they
would be building a poultry near Abajon's house. Later, the Caballes asked Abajon to leave because they needed
the property. Abajon refused. During the trial the former landowner testified that Abajon dutifully gave her 50%
share of the produce of the land under his cultivation.

Held: The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. The circumstances of this case
indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of
benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side
rather than a tenant of the said portion. Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the
arrangement, it is clear that the private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes.
Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not a
tenant of the herein petitioner.

Evangelista vs CA

De Jesus vs IAC

ROSALINA BONIFACIO, surviving wife; and children vs. HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos and PASTORA SAN MIGUEL

1. CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTION; EJECTMENT CASE SURVIVES DEATH OF A PARTY. — The general rule is that an
ejectment case survives the death of a party. The supervening death of a party did not extinguish his civil
personality.
2. AGRARIAN RELATION; AGRICULTURAL LEASE; EJECTMENT GROUNDED ON PERSONAL CULTIVATION; PERSONAL
CULTIVATION, CONSTRUED. — Much of the problem lies in the term "personal cultivation" by which the ground
for ejectment under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 was loosely referred. As it is, the term gave the impression that
the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was allowed only if and when the landowner-lessor and no other opted
to cultivate the landholding; thereby giving rise to a bigger misconception that the right of cultivation pertained
exclusively to the landowner-lessor, and therefore his personal right alone. Thus, whether used in reference to
the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term "personal cultivation" cannot be given a restricted connotation to
mean a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right extends to the members of
the lessor's or lessee's immediate family members.

3. RIGHT TO CULTIVATE TRANSMITTED TO IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE DECEASED LANDOWNER-

LESSOR. — Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the immediate family members of
the deceased landowner-lessor as well. The right to cultivate the landholding asserted in CAR Case No. 2160-B
'68 not being a purely personal right of the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was transmitted to petitioners
as heirs and successors-in-interest. Petitioners are entitled to the enforcement of the judgment in CAR Case No.
2160-B 68.

FACTS: The favorable judgment adverted to by petitioners traces its origin to the complaint filed on July 1, 1968
by Olimpio Bonifacio before the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Baliwag, Bulacan, seeking the ejectment of
private respondent Pastora San Miguel from Bonifacio's two-hectare agricultural land situated at Patubig,
Marilao, Bulacan and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27298. The ground relied upon therefor was
personal cultivation under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(CAR Case No. 2160-B '68).

On September 18, 1970, judgement was rendered on the merits by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio granting authority
to plaintiff OLIMPIO BONIFACIO to eject defendant PASTORA SAN MIGUEL from the landholding in question
situated at Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares, more or less, and consequently, ordering
said defendant to vacate the same landholding and deliver possession thereof to said plaintiff for the latter's
personal cultivation, subject to the provisions of Section 25 of R.A 3844 and dismissing all other claims and
counterclaims of the parties.

Respondent Pastora San Miguel appealed and the Court of Appeals modified said judgment with respect to her
counterclaim by ordering Olimpio Bonifacio to pay her the amount of P1,376.00. The judgment was affirmed in
all other respects.

Private respondent Pastora San Miguel was still dissatisfied, sought relief from this Court claiming that during
the pendency of her petition, on August 7, 1983, Olimpio Bonifacio died and no notice of such death was given
to the Court, no order for the substitution of his heirs was made. On July 31, 1985, the Court En Banc resolved to
deny private respondent's petition for lack of merit and to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Subsequently, petitioners Rosalina Bonifacio, as surviving wife, and all the children and heirs of Olimpio
Bonifacio, moved for the execution of the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68 before the respondent Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan. A writ of execution was issued on February 20, 1986 and on March 6, 1986, the Deputy
Sheriff submitted his Report (Partial Delivery of Possession), stating in part that except for a portion thereof
occupied by the house of Pastora San Miguel which the latter refused to vacate, he had delivered the land
subject matter of the action to Rosalina Bonifacio as surviving wife of Olimpio Bonifacio.
Private respondent Pastora San Miguel moved to quash the writ of execution. This was opposed by petitioners
who in turn sought the issuance of a writ of demolition and an order declaring Pastora San Miguel in contempt
of court for allegedly re-entering the subject land.

After hearing, respondent Judge Natividad G. Dizon issued a resolution on July 15, 1986, stating that the writ of
execution of the Decision dated September 18, 1970 made by the Sheriff of this Court is declared null and void
and the "Motion for Demolition" filed by plaintiff is denied and the "Petition for Contempt" is likewise denied.

Petitioners assail this resolution in the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals, which as stated
earlier, was certified to us pursuant to Section 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in relation to Section 5 (2) [e],
Art. X of the 1973 Constitution and Rule 50, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioners contend that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction in ruling that the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68 can no longer be executed as said action is
purely personal in character and therefore cannot, upon Olimpio Bonifacio's death, be inherited by his heirs.
They assert that CAR Case No. 2160-B '68, being an ejectment case and not one of those specifically provided by
law to be purely personal, survives the death of a party. Furthermore, as under Rule 39, Section 49 (b) of the
Rules of Court, a judgment is binding not only upon the parties but also on their successors-in-interest,
petitioners are entitled to enforce the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B '68.

Private respondent places stress on the fact that the action under consideration is not an ordinary ejectment
case but an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee. She theorizes that the right being asserted
in the action is personal to Olimpio Bonifacio, which necessarily died with him. She further contends that the
non-substitution of Olimpio Bonifacio by his heirs rendered the proceedings taken after his death null and void.
She also points to certain supervening events which allegedly prohibit execution of the judgment in CAR Case
No. 2160-B '68, the amendment of Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844 by R.A. No. 6389 and 2) the promulgation of P.D. No.
27.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT, THE FAVORABLE JUDGMENT OBTAINED BY THE DECEDENT IS INHERITED BY THE
COMPULSORY HEIRS, THEREBY VESTING TO THE LATTER, ALL THE RIGHTS CONFERRED BY THE JUDGMENT TO THE
DECEDENT.

HELD: YES, the favorable judgement obtained by the decedent is inherited by the compulsory heirs. Private
respondent is correct in characterizing CAR Case No. 2160-B '68 as more than an ordinary ejectment case. It is,
indeed, an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee, which in the light of the public policy
involved, is more closely and strictly regulated by the State. But this does not operate to bar the application to
the instant case of the general rule that an ejectment case survives the death of a party.

Much of the problem lies in the term "personal cultivation" by which the ground for ejectment under Section 36
(1) of R.A. 3844 was loosely referred. As it is, the term gave the impression that the ejectment of an agricultural
lessee was allowed only if and when the landowner-lessor and no other opted to cultivate the landholding;
thereby giving rise to a bigger misconception that the right of cultivation pertained exclusively to the landowner-
lessor, and therefore his personal right alone. Section 36 (1), R.A. 3844 however readily demonstrates the fallacy
of this interpretation which provides:
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. — Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding
except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of the immediate family will

personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if
suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other
useful non-agricultural purposes.

Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only when the landowner-lessor
desired to cultivate the landholding, but also when a member of his immediate family so desired. This provides
that the law clearly did not intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner but to
extend the exercise of such right to the members of his immediate family. Clearly, the right of cultivation as a
ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and personal to the landowner-lessor. To say otherwise would be
to put to naught the right of cultivation likewise conferred upon the landowner's immediate family members.

The right of cultivation was extended to the landowner's immediate family members evidently to place the
landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was (and still is) allowed to cultivate the land with
the aid of his farm household. In this regard, it must be observed that an agricultural lessee who cultivates the
landholding with the aid of his immediate farm household is within the contemplation of the law engaged in
"personal cultivation”.

Thus, whether used in reference to the agricultural lessor or lessee, the term "personal cultivation" cannot be
given a restricted connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either case,
the right extends to the members of the lessor's or lessee's immediate family members.

In this case, petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the immediate family members of
the deceased landowner-lessor as well. The right to cultivate the landholding asserted in CAR Case No. 2160-B
'68 not being a purely personal right of the deceased landowner-lessor, the same was transmitted to petitioners
as heirs and successors-in-interest. Petitioners are entitled to the enforcement of the judgment in CAR Case No.
2160-B '68.

Oarde vs CA

Matienzo vs Servidad

FACTS: Jose Matienzo and his wife Elenita Robles, were instituted head-overseer in the land of Martin and Feliza
de Servidad who will take care of their plants. The plaintiff with respect to defendant will not share percentage
for the land but the defendant has to plant coconut and the plaintiffs will not pay as their condition. Parties
entered into another agreement concerning the conditions of copra. The condition given in copra making is one
third. On January 30, 1964, defendant wrote plaintiff telling him not to “interfere with the plants” as they had no
agreement yet for that year, and that being the land-owner, he should be the one to decide in accordance with
the “tenancy law”. On March 4, 1964, defendant sent another letter to plaintiff prohibiting him from planting
and clearing the land for the same reason. Plaintiff sought the assistance of the Office of the Agrarian Counsel in
Naga City. Plaintiff brought an action against defendant in the Court of Agrarian Relations of Naga City praying
that defendant be held guilty of illegal ejectment; that in view of the strained relationship with defendant, he
was waiving his right to reinstatement provided that he will be paid reasonable compensation for his
improvements; and that defendant be ordered to pay him actual and moral damages. A judgment was rendered
on May 17, 1966 dismissing the suit for lack of merit. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which Court,
however, certified the case to us.

ISSUES: Was the plaintiff instituted as an overseer or as a tenant by defendant.

HELD: It is clear from Exhibit C that plaintiff was made an overseer of defendant, not a tenant. No tenancy
relationship had ever existed between the parties. What transpired was that plaintiff was made overseer over a
7-hectare land area; he was to supervise applications for loans from those residing therein; he was allowed to
build his house thereon and to plant specified plants without being compensated he was free to clear and plant
the land as long as he wished; he had no sharing arrangement between him and defendant; and he was not
obligated to pay any price certain to, nor share the produce with, the latter.

Isidro v CA

Facts: Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of the subject parcel of land. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia,
sister of private respondent and also the overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the
swampy portion of the land. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject to the condition that petitioner
would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted the
same into a fishpond. In 1990, private respondent through the overseer demanded from petitioner the return of
the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort
and invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond. A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by
private respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. The trial
court dismissed the case because it ruled that it is an agrarian dispute, hence not cognizable by civil courts.
Private respondent appealed to the RTC which affirmed in toto the decision of MTC. On appeal to the CA, the
decision of the trial court was reversed.

Issue: Whether or not the case is an agrarian dispute and hence not cognizable by civil courts

Held: No. A case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute upon
which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the
possessor an agricultural lessee of tenant. The law provides for conditions or requisites before he can qualify as
one and the land being agricultural is only one of them. The law states that an agrarian dispute must be a
controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously mentioned,
such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the
parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are
complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.

CORNES VS. LEAL REALTY - GR No. 172146; July 30, 2008

Facts: DARAB Case No. 234-T91: Filed by petitioners and their predecessors-in interest against respondents for
maintenance of peaceful possession and for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners contended
that they had been farmers and full-fledged tenants for more than 30 years of an agricultural landholding which
was previously owned and registered in the name of Josefina Roxas Omaa (JOSEFINA). Petitioners alleged that
subject landholding is covered by RA 6657, but was sold by JOSEFINA to respondents in contravention of the law.
Meanwhile, LEAL HAVEN converted a portion of the subject landholding into a memorial park. It is petitioners
stance that when respondents entered into a contract of sale with JOSEFINA, they were aware of the tenancy
relationship which existed between petitioners and JOSEFINA.

DARAB Case No. 396-T93: Filed by petitioners against respondent LEAL REALTY and SPS. TUGADI for violation of
RA 6657, annulment of documents, title and damages. In addition, petitioners posited that LEAL REALTY
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the SPS. TUGADI without proper conversion of the lot from
agricultural to non- agricultural in breach of the CARL.

DARAB Case No. 397-T93: Filed by petitioners against respondent LEAL REALTY and SPS. ALCAZAREN for violation
of Republic Act No. 6657, annulment of documents, title and damages. Petitioners questioned the subdivision of
the subject landholding into smaller lots as contrary to law.

DARAB Case No. 329-T95: Filed by LEAL REALTY, with the PARAB (Tarlac) against petitioner Nita Cornes-
Valenzuela (VALENZUELA), for injunction with prayer for TRO and PI. LEAL REALTY alleged that despite its
objection, VALENZUELA constructed a residential house within the premises of the subject landholding; hence, it
prayed for the removal of the construction at VALENZUELAs expense.

Provincial Adjudicator Ruling :Dismissed Cases No. 234-T91, No. 396-T93, and No. 397-T93; Granted DARAB Case
No. 329- T95. There was no tenancy relationship which existed between the parties.

DARAB Ruling : Vacated the appealed Decision, declaring petitioners as bona fide tenants of the subject
landholding. Right to security of tenure does not only apply to bona fide tenants; but also to actual tillers of the
land. It also declared that there was an implied tenancy between the parties. The DARAB ruled that for more
than 30 years, the petitioners were deemed tenants of the subject landholding.

CA Ruling: Granted respondents Petition for Review. The fact that petitioners had worked on the subject
landholding did not give rise to the existence of a tenancy relationship. MR denied.

Issue Whether or not petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest are tenants de jure of the subject
landholding

SC Ruling: No. In order for a tenancy agreement to arise, it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements,
viz: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.

Petitioners failed to adduce substantial evidence to show the existence of all the indispensable requisites for the
constitution of a tenancy relationship.

While it might have been shown and not contested that petitioners predecessors-in-interest, namely JACINTO,
PABLO, JUANITO and FRANCISCO occupied the subject landholding as tillers thereof, the records support the fact
that their occupancy was in the nature of hired laborers of JOSEFINA. As can be gleaned from the Entry No. E-17-
7182 covering the subject landholding in the name of JOSEFINA, the same was not tenanted. Moreover, Entry
No. E-22- 4361, also annotated on the aforesaid certificate of title, is explicit that the subject landholding is not
tenanted. Further, the records reveal that petitioners predecesssors-in-interest executed an affidavit attesting
that they were working on the subject landholding as hired laborers only. The fact alone of working on anothers
landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy.

Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed a sharing of harvests in the context of a
tenancy relationship between petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest and JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is
illuminating to the effect that to prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be
presented. None was shown, except the testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Cornes, which is self-serving and is
without evidentiary value.

The testimony of Araceli Pascua, an employee of the DAR in Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject landholding was
tenanted cannot overcome substantial evidence to the contrary. What cannot be ignored is the precedent ruling
of this Court that the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the courts. The element of
consent in the creation of the tenancy relationship was sorely missing. As was seen earlier, even petitioners
predecessors-in-interest were unequivocal in their admission that they worked as hired laborers on the subject
landholding. The intent, if any, to institute them as tenants of the landholdings was debunked by their very
admission. One glaring factor that strikes the mind of this Court is the fact that petitioners did not implead
JOSEFINA, who is an indispensable party.